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The risk from heaven - the drones fly over andthreaten French nuclear power plantsA risk analysis to the example of the central nuclear Fessenheim,Gravelines and Cattenom

A report by Oda Becker, Phys. dipi., HanoverCommissioned by Greenpeace e. V. (Germany)Foreword by Heinz Srnital, an expert on nuclear issues at GreenpeacePublished in November 2014

Table of Contents1. Introduction................................................................................. 32. Drones - a real risk to nucleair plants are?9 ................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43. Vulnerability of French nuclear power vis-a-vis the attacks ............................ 94. Scenarios of a terrorist attack at a nuclear power plant using drones ............... 125. 4.1 Attacks with explosives with the participation of insiders and using

drones ........................................................................................ 126. 4.2 "Bombing" with an AT-14 using drones .............................................. 137. 4.3 aerial terrorist attacks using drones................................................... 168. Limits of measures against................................................................ 199. The effects of severe accidents........................................................... 2110. Conclusion................................................................................... 2511. Footnotes.................................................................................... 2712. References .................................................................................. 2913. Annex.............................................................................. 32

Foreword

According to information of the company Electricite de France (EdF), different Frenchnuclear facilities have been, since October 5, 2014, an overflight by drones. On 20November 2014, it accounted for 31 flights over fifteen nuclear power plants, threecenters dealing fuel and a nuclear research center. Until then, the security servicesfailed to prevent such overflights or determine their origin and pilot motivation. Althoughthe special unit of the National Gendarmerie established in 2007 to monitor nuclearplants was ordered to neutralize flying objects overflights continued over nuclearfacilities. Even if we still do not know who is in wr'origine these overflights show vividlythe flaws in the safety of nuclear installations and the inability of the departmentsconcerned to find their origin and prevent them.

In this expertise, physicist Oda Becker describes the risks posed by these overflights. Ifradioactive releases occurred in nuclear power plants Fessenheim, Gravelines andCattenom, which are part of the central flown by drones, that would not only France

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would be concerned, but also Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, Luxembourg and variousother countries.

The possibility of a terrorist attack on a nuclear facility highlights a fundamental securityproblem. The German government has also justified the nuclear exit decided in 2002 bythe terrorist risks to which plants are exposed.

Moreover, terrorist activities in recent months in the world requires us to reconsider theuse of nuclear energy by integrating safety (security), in addition to issues of safety(safety). A terrorist attack cannot be excluded. A nuclear exit, as it was decided inGermany, Switzerland or Belgium thus helps protect against a terrorist attack: A quickexit from nuclear power must also be discussed with this approach.

An output of nuclear should not initiated at European level? What guarantees can theoperators of nuclear sites and supervisors give us ,in protecting against terrorist attacks?Managers must act before an attack lead to a major release of radioactivity in Europe.

1. INTRODUCTION

In recent weeks, a series of hitherto unidentified flying drones of French nuclear plantshas attracted the attention of the public and the authorities. The public group Electricitede France (EdF), which operates nuclear plants notified in late October that droneswere seen flying over since October 5 different nuclear power plants. [Tagesschau2014].

Overflights were observed either late at night or during the night or early morning.Overflight October 19 were observed over four very distant nuclear plants each other;the next day, three more plants were flown, which implies a coordinated action. [NZZ2014]

These overflights were not limited to the facilities of public group Electricite de France(EdF) only the facilities of the Centre for Atomic Studies (CEA) in Saclay and the factoryof the Areva Group in The Hague were also flown. More than 30 flights of this naturehave been reported to date [GREENPEACE 2014].

Nobody took part in various speculations about the background of current events. Thissynthetic expertise report focuses on the issue of the danger associated with suchoverflights drones, assuming they would be carried out by terrorist profit organizations.

In France, 58 nuclear reactors are operated at 19 sites, some of which reach the nextyears a 40-year operating life. In addition to the large number of expected retirees in thenear future which will result in a lack of specialized and experienced staff and agingequipment related to high stress over an extended period, it is mainly the weak points ofdesign that are insufficient protection against external aggression and a potential riskthat is becoming increasingly important. Based on the current situation, we studied, forexample, the potential risk of terrorist attacks to nuclear sites Fessenheim, Gravelines

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and Cattenom, located near the Belgian border, Luxembourg, Germany andSwitzerland.

Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States, the publicdebate is increasingly on the threat of terrorist attacks on hotspots. Over an extendedperiod, the public debate was about the threat of terrorist attacks on nuclear powerplants, especially with airliners. One can indeed imagine many scenarios of attack. Thisis especially the oldest French nuclear power plants (900 MW reactors) that arethreatened by a wide variety of potential terrorist attack scenarios; Indeed, theirprotection against risks from outside is insufficient. Furthermore, in terms of protectionagainst accidents, their design is inadequate for the latest technical and scientificprogress.

To weigh the risks of terrorist attacks, it is necessary to describe more precisely thepossible scenarios and evaluate the impact of resources used for a given plant. Inprinciple, the public is entitled to be kept informed.The likelihood of a terrorist attack can not be assessed by the conventional method ofprobability. However, experience shows that if a terrorist group decided to attack aspecific target, the probability that it reaches its target is very high. The hijackers of 11September 2001 had been able to acquire enough aviation skills to achieve their goal.In addition, they managed to grab all the aircraft they had planned to divert.

NOTE:

The debate on the risks of terrorist attacks should have no guidance or instructionconsideration or could be "useful" in the planning and execution of an attack. This iswhy the discussions held and the scenarios studied in the present study were generallyformulated with great restraint and sensitive details have been omitted. The terroristswho, through their skills, knowledge and resources, would in principle be able to carryout effective attacks, do the following find any information which they have or they canobtain elsewhere. In the presentation of scenarios and evaluation results, however, wetook care that said retention in the formulations do not interfere too much understandingor the value of expertise.

2. Drones - a real risk to nuclear power plants?

In armed conflicts, the deployment of unmanned military systems is increasing. Inparticular, use of increasingly armed aerial systems (UCAVs), for example inAfghanistan, Pakistan or Yemen [2013 Alwardt]. The following will assess the threatpotential, current or future, such systems for nuclear power plants (especially French).The UAV is a flying device without embedded driver or remotely from a distant station isprogrammed in advance for one or more paths. In principle, the drone is a reusabletransport system unmanned, which can be equipped with sensors, but also a cocking.Drones are also designated under other common names such as "flying objects without

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occupants" (in English: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, UAV) or "flying systems withoutoccupants" (in English: Unmanned Aerial System, UAS). [Alwardt 2013]

Drones Come in different sizes, their size from a few centimeters to the size of acommercial aircraft. The standard classification of drones and the following categoriesdepending on the flight duration, autonomy and flight altitude:' mini (1 hour /few km / low)* Tactical (hours / <300 km / low to medium) and* Strategic (> 20 hrs/I> 1000 km / medium high)'. [Alwardt 2013]

Globally, an estimated 900 different types of UAVs are currently under development,most of them unarmed aircraft. Most drones used today by armies are like recognitionsystems. Compounds sensor input modules, infrared cameras, radar sensors locatingor interception and recording of the electromagnetic spectrum signals provide high-resolution aerial photographs and transmit images in real time using satellite orterrestrial radio connections and to monitor the activities on the ground in real time.[Alwardt 2013]

However, it is also clear that the drones, as a means of recognition, will gain increasingimportance in the future. As part of this function, UAV technology has developed rapidlyin recent decades. [CSS 2010] The technique of collecting military reconnaissance,search and evaluate information on actual or potential adversaries. The operator andtactical reconnaissance and strategic intelligence are the basis for specific militaryoperations.

For reconnaissance missions are used eg. the two types of drones: ALADIN, aminiature drone, currently being in operational use in several member countries OTAN.1The ALADIN system provides real-time detailed surveillance and reconnaissanceinformation. It is a portable system that does not need of runway. This drone has alength of 1.57 meters and a wingspan 1.46 meters. The maximum takeoff weight of 4kg. [EMT 2014A]

With a range of more than 6 hours, LUNA is an unmanned reconnaissance system tomonitor, recognize and locate the target in real time over a distance of 100 kilometers.Thanks to the modular design of payload, LUNA can be equipped in the future with themost modern payloads.

Its specific characteristics: achieving glides without engine and restarting the engine.The takeoff is from a launch pad equipped with a silent elastic catapult that can befolded for transport. [EMT 2014b]

Especially the United States had started, there was nearly a decade, to equip weaponsreconnaissance drones (such as the Predator, Reaper) or design special unmannedcombat drones (Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle, UCAV) to use them in a targetedmanner in the air-ground attacks. Was used for this air-ground missiles such as theHellfire, originally developed for helicopters and airplanes chasse.2 These aircraft were

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used for the first time during the war in Kosovo. Equipped with laser marking devices,they identified potential targets to then destroy with aircraft crew. The development ofUCAV (UCAVs) is moving towards an increased payload, speed and improved stealth(that is to say make them almost invisible to radar). [Alwardt 2013; CSS 2010]

However, this kind of drone requires, depending on the scope and operationalframework of complementary infrastructure. To operate drones which have significantautonomy, we must also have, among others, take-off and landing runways speciallyequipped as well as maintenance facilities and weapons. Even small drones requiretakeoff and landing devices. In addition, reliable navigation systems are essential, andstable data links and communication between the aircraft and the ground, to control theUAV. [Alwardt 2013]

Why we can assume that at present terrorist groups do not have that kind of armedUAVs. In the future, this could change: the possibility of terrorists or rebels can seizedrones to carry out attacks against targets that were previously out of reach, isconsidered by experts as a threat .dropoff window [Alwardt 2013] Until now, in militaryapplications, there are no small and easy to carry drones to "standard" weapons or suchon which are embarked explosifs.3

However, according to experts, significant expenditures for development and testing isneeded to build, from commercially available components, a drone autonomy, payload,a more stable flight important and with an improved control device. [Alwardt 2013]

For civil applications, miniature drones are already available in different versions on themarket. The civilian application drones are often called "multicopter" (as the"Oktocopter") They are mainly used in the field of aerial photography. But thepossibilities are numerous. The German group Deutsche Post (mail and logistics)operates drones named "Paketkopter" to supply drugs the island of Juist, North Sea(payload 1.2 kg).[Stern 2014]

According to analyzes Conducted by the Consumer Electronics Association (CEA) worldtrade in civil enforcement drones in 2015 will reach a volume of 130 million Dollars. Thisrepresents an increase of 55% from the market in 2014 and probably represents400,000 pieces.

It is assumed that within five years the turnover with the sale of drones cross the onebillion Dollars bar. According to ECA drones are used, among other things to protectsporting events or to help in search and rescue operations. Many applications arepossible. [BUSINESS 2014]

Implementation of civil UAV can carry several kilograms of explosives are certainly rare,but already available in the commerce.4 The drone HT-C180 8 eg. can carry a payloadof 2.6 kg reaches a speed of 55 km / h and has a range of 20 minutes [HEIGHTTECH2014]. The Hexacopter, aircraft with 6 arms and 12 total in engines, can carry payloads

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•weighing up to 8 kg. The manufacturer advertises for .its drones with the slogan smalldrone - great drone, to each his own drone "[GENERALVIEW 2014]

In China, the danger associated with these miniature drones already today we takeseriously: according to the official Chinese news agency Xinhua,'China has developed alaser defense system for the destruction of drones flying at low altitude. Thus the laserdevice can remove small unmanned flying objects within a radius of two kilometers.The "firing" is made within five seconds after detection of the target. The goal of thesesystems is to protect against terrorist attacks. According to the development company itis normally the snipers and helicopters to shoot down these drones, but their successrate and accuracy is low and may cause unexpected damage. Unmanned drones aresold at a relatively cheap price and easy to use, which makes them attractive toterrorists. [PICHLER 2014]

As part of a terrorist attack scenario, directed by ex. with the participationinternal agents, drones loaded with explosives can pose a serious risk (seesection 4.1 ).

It is unlikely that this kind of drone, provided it is loaded with a small amount ofexplosives and crashed anywhere on a nuclear power plant is an immediate risk to thesafety of a nuclear power plant. By cons, a crash of several drones loaded with severalkilograms of explosives could put a nuclear power plant in a dangerous situation. If wecan expect a master of such a situation by the central security systems, see emergencymeasures implemented, it is not provided certain that there will no release of radioactiveparticles after such an attack. This is especially the oldest French nuclear plants arevulnerable because of their protection against risks coming from outside limited andshortcomings in the management of major incidents design (see Chapter 3).

It also seems not impossible to destroy an external power source and essentialcomponents of emergency power supply or for the specific needs and / or even damageother components or parts of the system.

When the external power source is destroyed by explosive charges, we can not fix itfast enough. If the passage is self-powered a~nd lacked emergency power also failsbecause of the attack or not attributable to the fault attack, the team's factory will supplypower for the combustible cooling system within the reactor and stored in the spent fuelpool by mobile devices.

Under certain operating conditions (replacement of fuel elements) the relatively shortspace of time available for a response is only a few hours.

If several fires on the site the team could be hopelessly overwhelmed and can not fullyprevent potential radioactive releases. Nuclear Force Action Rapide (RNA) that can helpthe site team is operating in a period of 24 hours from the occurrence of the accident.5A short circuit or fire in a transformer can produce unexpected effects: Following a fireat the transformer, which took place in 2007 in the German nuclear power plant

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Kriimmel, a series of unexpected technical and organizational failures s' had occurredand had caused a decline in the level of coolant in the reactor pressure vessel. Fromprevious experience with nuclear power plants Fessenheim, Gravelines and Cattenom itis feared that failures of systems or components can worsen the situation.

With small amounts of explosives on board UAVs could well attack site staff or securitystaff to support the terrorist attack from the air, water and soil.

Nevertheless, such miniature drones pose a danger if they were to be used as aspecific part of a terrorist plot, or a mission of "recognition" in the military sense. UAVscan provide detailed shots of the ground, and learn about the resources and thestrategy of security forces. This would greatly increase the likelihood of a successfulattack and is a factor that makes it "promising" in terms of a terrorist group.

He is not here to speculate on the perpetrators of the recent drone overflights or theirmotives. We rather focus on the issue of whether these overflights are a danger,assuming the hypothesis that a group of people driven by a terrorist or criminal mobile isresponsible.

This synthetic expert report focuses on the issue around the terrorist attack scenariosthat may cause virtually irrevocable core meltdown accident is conceivable, whether anattack could cause damage so that taking measures intervention to prevent the spreadoutward is void.

On the facts as to the availability and use of drones opportunities as well as taking intoaccount the vulnerability of French nuclear power plants, three scenarios are plausible:

* Assistance to an attack with explosives prepared by authors from the inside.We test for that successful approaches with aerial drones.

* The preparation of a potential air attack. One seeks in particular to examine the terrainand its supervision, the other to simultaneously evaluate the effectiveness of responsemeasures.

• Preparation of a ground attack. Is over for this information about the field and on theother hand it saves the security measures that are currently being implemented (staffnumbers, patterns and response times etc.).

These three scenarios are presented and discussed below.

The large number of overflights is a show of force on the part of officials. One can onlyspeculate about their purpose. Thus, many flown plants could for example be to drawattention to a large area to divert the already chosen target. On the other hand it couldalso be that officials are looking through this method the easiest target.

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One can also imagine that such a show of strength is followed by a very serious threatfrom a terrorist or criminal group. France, which depends on nuclear power plants couldend up in an awkward situation. Today, nuclear power accounts for about three-quartersof French electricity production, this share should be reduced to 50% by 2025.

The idea of attacking a nuclear power plant may be attractive to a terrorist group, notonly because of an immediate effect on the production of electricity, but also because ofits symbolic nature and of global attention attracted by a such an act: nuclear energy isconsidered a synonym of technological progress. In addition, there is a technologyrelating benefits to the civilian sector and the military. However, a successful attack on anuclear power plant in one country would be considered a successful attack on allnuclear facilities in the world.

3. Vulnerability of nuclear power plants French vis-a-visattacks

France currently has 58 pressurized water~reactors spread over 19 sites. They aredivided into three categories (see Appendix Al):

With its reactors with a unit capacity of 900 MWe each, the Fessenheim nuclear powerplant is part of the CP0 and is the. oldest still operating in Central France (commissionedin 1978). This nuclear power plant is located near the French-German border, about 30km from the German city of Freiburg.

With 6 900 MWe reactors (CP1 stage), Gravelines is the largest nuclear power plant inFrance. Units 1 to 4 were commissioned in 1980-81, while the reactors 5 and 6 werebrought into service in 1985. This nuclear power plant is located on the French coast,halfway between Calais and Dunkirk.

Cattenom plant consisting of 4 1300 MWe reactors is part of P'4. The units were in 1992to 1987 industrial service This nuclear power plant is located along the Mosel River, 9km from the Luxembourg border and near the German city of Trier.

Reactor vessel

The reactors of nuclear power plants Fessenheim and Gravelines are particularlyvulnerable to external aggressions in that they are protected only by a singlecontainment thin (90 cm). This type of construction no longer reflects the current state ofscience and technology. For new construction projects, consideration is required for athickness of about 2 meters.

The containment contains the primary circuit and reactor pressure vessel in which is thefuel. The enclosure should prevent firstly the passage of radioactive particles outwardly(eg. In case of a refrigerant leak) and secondly protect the reactor against external

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mechanical impacts.

The reactors of the Cattenom plant is already better designed, yet they are still notsufficiently protected cons of external aggression. The reactors are equipped with adouble wall containment, except that the thickness of the walls is very low with 90 cm.

Building Off

The nuclear fuel rods exhausted and extracted from the reactor core is stored in adeactivation pool for at least 2 to 3 years. Disabling this basin is located in anotherseparate building and is insufficiently protected against external aggressions. Accordingto the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN), these buildings have, at all sites, a thin tin roofand concrete walls thin (30 cm). Details learning about the construction of spent rods offbuildings are not available. [WIDE 2012]

Deficits Design

The deficits currently known in French nuclear power plants, not only vis-A-vis terroristattacks but also vis-A-vis earthquakes and floods, are numerous. In addition, it is well.known that the action against a serious accident, especially when it involves severalblocks of the site at a time or the spent fuel pool, are non-existent.

The oldest power plants with 900 MWe reactors particular, but also those equipped with1300 MWe reactors, present a series of design deficits, which increase as thepossibilities of attack "success" of a potential attack terrorist.

To illustrate this, we outline a failure of the power supply (blackout Station, SBO) on theFessenheim site:

The power supply of the Fessenheim nuclear power plant comprises a main networkand a reserve power connection when the external power supply fails, the power supplywill be ensured by a block generator (rescued auxiliary circuit). When the blockgenerator also fails, the reactor is quickly stopped by automatic means. BothEmergency power diesel engines that can provide power for all systems important tosafety then start. Both engines would be sufficient to power and master the necessarysafety systems.

If emergency power supply, gas generator regular power goes out, why the backuppower system should start automatically. Live steam to be emitted into the atmospherethrough the discharge valves (VCD-a (steam bypass valves to atmosplhere)).Maintaining the pressure in the primary circuit and the supply of the quantity of waterrequired for cooling of the core by the coolant pumps and boration required for settingstop, must be performed by the control circuit Chemical and Volumetric (RCV). [OKO-INSTITUT 2012]

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The emergency power to a lower level of redundancy that of German nuclear powerplants. Why it is likely to encounter glitches. In addition, all the backup power circuitsand / or maintenance and emergency cooling system make use of a single tank byblock, which is a particularly sensitive weakness from the standpoint of safety.[OKO-INSTITUT 2012]

Because of the inadequate design and to system failures and malfunctions ofcomponents that may occur (related eg. To aging and / or poor safety culture in general)or a power supply fault-free backup or operation of the systems involved meeting therequirements of an emergency situation can not be taken for granted.In the case of a reactor vessel opened when replacing the fuel elements with asimultaneous failure of electrical power at the two blocks, the risk of exposure of theheart under such conditions occur in a few hours already.

Because of the existing deficiencies and delays for responsiveness and enhancedresponse, the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) requires the establishment of a"hard core" ("Safety Hardened Core") according to concept to set up equipmentproviding functions vital to safety in case of an event majeur.8 This "retro fitting" not tobe transposed only until 2018, it does not provide for the transitional period onlyprovision small power generators to emergency diesel for battery power. [OKO-INSTITUT 2012]

Namely, at least until 2018, however, the risk of a major failure in the power supply ofthe two blocks.

Among the additional failures of the Fessenheim plant shown [OKO-INSTITUT 2012]:

* Some preventive measures, eg. in case of external aggression, ensure the integrity ofthe pool and the maintenance of the water level in the tank (prevention of water lossdue to leakage in the adjacent piping) however, have not yet been implemented.

* Because of the location of the technical security devices well below the level of theside channel of the Rhine, there is a potential risk of flooding of the entire site.

Safety Culture

In addition, there are indications which suggest that the safety culture is inadequate inFrench nuclear power plants: When unexpected inspections in August 2011 in thecentral Cattenom, ASN noted differences in 35 items important safety. "The manydeficiencies and safety-related importance suggests that the operator of the plant is notmuch awareness of the safety of the facilities." [MAJER 2012] It can therefore beconcluded that in each nuclear power plant is a significant number of undetectedfailures that may contribute, in the event of a serious accident, the malfunction ofcomponents or systems.

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A culture of inadequate security continues to increase the risk of a terrorist attackinvolving internal agents.

4. Scenarios of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plantusing drones

4.1 Attacks with explosives with the participation of domestic agentsand using drones

Perpetrators of attacks from the inside is a threat at least as strong for nuclear powerplants as external terrorist attacks. This is why the threat of internal actors is the objectof much attention in the specialized international circles. And an expert he stressed atthe International Conference on Nuclear Safety (NUSEC) 9 that the most seriousdanger for agents operating from within is their knowledge of the subject they constantlyhave, no control. [HONELLIO 2005]

So-called reliability checks are supposed to prevent hiring in nuclear power plantsagents potentially operating from within. Certainly, these checks make internalpenetration agents in nuclear power plants more difficult, but they do not entirelyeliminate the risk. Thus do we recently learned that a Belgian jihadist named IlyassBoughalab worked for three years as a technician for the company Vin~otte Wilrijk, untilhis departure in November 2012, to Syria. By its function, he had access to the securityzone of the Doel nuclear power plant. [BRUSSELS 2014]

The current lack of skilled labor and the increased use of external companies increase -

for terrorists, opportunities to be engaged, at least in the short term in a nuclear plant.When a potential attacker managed to get a job at a nuclear power plant, it can recruitother agents that operate within, whether ideological conviction, through corruption orblackmail.

One of the most important safeguards against the abuse of domestic workers in theprinciple of mutual surveillance ("four eyes"). But this principle has no effect if there aremultiple internal aggressors. It can also be undermined by inattention, negligence orsimply a bad culture in general security.

For agents operating from within the possibilities of intervention are primarily acts ofsabotage, such large valves for safety during restoration or maintenance operations.Clearly, an incident of this nature occurred in early August in the Doel nuclear powerplant (Belgium), where the block No. 4 had to be stopped unexpectedly due to leakageof 90,000 liters of oil detected in the turbine steam. The Belgian authority responsible forthe fight against terrorism (OCAM) is investigating this case [FLANDERS 2014].

Potentially effective scenarios with agents operating from within are many, but the onethat seems the easiest to achieve is attack explosives. The most dangerous are the

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events in which the explosive is placed in a targeted manner on the pressure points ofthe plant. Even small amounts of explosives (of the order of a few kilograms) couldcause a core meltdown accident causing significant emissions of radioactivesubstances.But in the case of a terrorist attack carried out with the participation of insiders, we canexpect everything to be done and "successful" in minutes. One can only suspect thatthe staff in vehicle safety of a nuclear power plant to be able to prevent a well-plannedattack. Staff of charge in vehicle safety could even be involved as agents operating fromwithin. One can imagine, for example they introduce themselves in fraud of weapons orexplosives in buildings, or that they will lend their support.

The drones could be used so as to support a bomb.

It is conceivable that several drones "deliver" the explosive. It is estimated that aninformed agent operating from inside can cause a core meltdown accident with alreadywell under 10 kilograms of explosives. In other words, a quantity of explosives"available'' without problem using drones for their payload and the apparent ease offlying an unobstructed nuclear power plant. We cannot exclude the possibility that theauthors of overflights just wanted to test this kind of aerial approach.

In addition, the drones could favor attack by aerial surveillance and / or assaulting thesecurity personnel with small explosive charges or similar.

4.2 "Bombing" with an AT-14 using drones

A study conducted in 2010 at the request of Greenpeace Deutschland eV studied theeffect that could have on one of the oldest German nuclear attack with a guided mobileantitank weapon. Due to its characteristics and acquisition opportunities, the weaponchosen was the guided missile AT-14 (Kornet E). This weapon allows, besides itshollow charge warhead to also extend thermobaric warheads to great effect destructivewhen combustible materials are used. [BECKER 20101

Anti-tank rocket launchers

The improved shielding technology and additional shielding made to combat vehiclesled to the development of portable anti-tank guided missiles ((ATGW = Anti-tank guidedweapon) ever more efficient. It is above all the effectiveness of warheads rose veryrapidly in recent dec~ades, a priori, the warheads are used hollow, while for someweapon systems also were developed thermobaric warheads.

The modern anti-tank weapons could also be directed against nuclear power plants: themore weapons are effective, the effects of such an attack could be severe. The increasein weapons systems performance parameters leads parallel potentially increasedendangerment for nuclear power plants.

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The technical possibility of a rapid sequence of shots and combined with a simplereload facilitates a stroke and could fire several times on the same goal. In addition, thereduced weight and easy handling modern weapons systems facilitates handling and afortiori'an attack. [BECKER 2005]

Portable anti-tank weapons are available in large numbers on the black market sincethey are easy to carry and hide, and above all they can be used very effectively againstdifferent targets.The AT-14

The AT-14 is an anti-tank guided missile laptop ((ATGW = Anti-tank guided weapon) 3rdgeneration, developed by the Russian company KBP to fight heavy tanks (range:. 100-5500 meters) The standard warhead is of the type tandem shaped charge and pierce ahomogeneous armor steel of 1.2 m or a concrete wall with a thickness of 3 m. next tothe shaped charge warhead in tandem, there is a thermobaric warhead designed toovercome non-armored targets and reinforcements, the explosive power of thiswarhead is (according to manufacturer) that 10 kilograms of explosives (TNT).

The guided missile is launched directly from the transport container and pitch, allowingto have a weapon ready to fire very rapidly, with a sequence of relatively rapid shots(loading speed is 30 s). Furthermore the optical sighting device to the daylight, themissile launcher on tripod is equipped with a thermal imaging sight for detecting a targetnight. It is thus possible to simultaneously control two launchers for a single sighting unitand attack a single target simultaneously with two missiles [ARMY 2014].

Overall, it must be assumed that it would be possible for would-be assassins to illegallyacquire AT-14 with their specific accessories. It is possible that thermobaric warheadshave been used occasionally by terrorists, but it could not be set at 100%.

The AT-14 is sold worldwide. The first operating systems were provided to the Russianarmed forces in 1994. During the IDEF (International Exhibition of the defense industry)in Istanbul in 2009, the same weapon system was one of the best sellers. [NOVOSTI2007a, b; 2009]. Since this weapon system was exported to many countries 11 [ARMY2014]. As these weapons systems circulate globally, the more it will become easy forterrorist organizations to procure. In this context, it is important to remember that theIraqi army has recently used this weapon in Diyala province against the extremist groupcalled the Islamic State (El). [NOVOSTI 2014]

Effect of a hollow charge warhead: a hollow charge warhead is a metal projectilecomprising a hollow cone coated with explosive. Upon impact with the target, thedetonator is triggered resulting in the firing of the explosive. All the explosive forcecondenses into a home that generates a huge wave of heat, the dart, which reached thetarget at a very high speed of several thousand meters per second. Warheads thirdgeneration weapon systems are already able to drill a about a meter thick steel armor orpuncture a reinforced concrete wall with a thickness of about three meters.

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Effect of a thermobaric warhead: the effect of pressure thermobaric weapons also called"spray cans" (MEF = Fuel-Air Explosiv) based on the principle of the dispersion of anexplosive gas in the air before triggering the explosion ignition.12 a thermobaricwarhead is composed of a container containing a pyrophoric substance. To trigger theexplosion using two explosive charges: initial detonation first explosive disperses a finecloud of mist, aerosol (air-fuel) which by its consistency, spreads over a wide area. Fewtenths of a second later, the second charge ignites the explosive cloud of mist. Theblast took place almost simultaneously in a huge fireball with a diameter of 10 to 40meters.

The main effect of thermobaric warhead is obtained by the huge shock after the blastthat can destroy buildings and equipment. The effect of the shock wave lasts muchlonger than with a conventional explosive. The pressure in the detonation may reach 3MPa (30 bar). Outside the cloud wave of breath travels over three kilometers persecond. In addition, aerosol cans have a thermal effect significantly stronger thanconventional explosives. The temperature can reach 2500 to 3000 0 C. Other damageoccurs by the equally brutal Depression: The explosion subtracted from the oxygen inthe ambient air and thus causes a pressure drop below atmospheric pressure creating astrong enough airflow to attract mobile objects, causing further destruction. If oneshoots like a local fortified bunker, the fuel can enter and there cause Considerable

destruction. [EC 2014; FAS 2014]

Attack scenario

There are a few years, Russia has conducted firing tests to study on a model) thestrength of the new type of reactor (fourth generation) face of modern weaponssystems. Was used among other AT-I14 missile. Result: the attack scenario chosen forthese test firing could lead to a core meltdown accident. [BECKER 2010]

The following describes the scenario of a potential attack with the system of AT-I14weapons. It is not the intention of the writer to describe the approach most "efficient",but to raise awareness of the potential risk and the possibility of such an attack.

By analogy with the Russian test firing is assumed that the two groups of attackers withat least two people each perform the attack. At the beginning of the attack, the terroristslurk hidden place 100 to 1000 meters away from the reactor, a small part of the building.Both groups are launching sequential pace of hollow charge projectiles more doublesalvo. Next, are launched several thermobaric warheads load. Using a viewfinder sametarget area may be referred.

The hollow charge projectiles could penetrate the outer wall without problems reinforcedconcrete containment which comprises only 90 centimeters thick. The tongue of thehollow charge would lose about a third of its energy and destroy it after a limited numberof key safety components, at least in some areas. However, these relatively limiteddamage would still be manageable for safety systems centrale.13 However, given the

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sensitivity to "disturbances" of older nuclear power plants and failures in themanagement of incidents, the risk of a serious accident occurs, can not be entirelyexcluded.

Each shaped charge projectiles pierce a very small hole in the outer wall of thecontainment. Except that the concrete would break around the drilled hole. Because ofthe unmatched precision with which the goal is reached, it is conceivable that multiplebombing in the same target causes a hole and crack propagation in the affected area ofthe wall of the enclosure. A thermobaric warhead propelled into this hole disperseaerosol inside the reactor building. The effect of the first thermobaric warheads wouldenlarge the hole in the wall already damaged. Tlhe destructive power of successivethermobaric warheads would then propagate very far within the containment. The shockwave would destroy a large number of safety components. Because of the intense heatsensors and control circuits would fail. In any event, thermobaric explosions affect avery wide scope impeding several redundant elements at a time. Most likely, the coolingof the reactor core would crash without full way to restart the short term. A core meltaccident would be almost inevitable. Now since the containment pressed damaged(hole pierced by bullets) would result in the most serious accident: A fusion of heartchamber open containment.

In Conclusion-

The results from the Russian firing tests allow to draw conclusions about the potentialeffects of such an attack on a French nuclear power plant. The outer cover of thereactors at Fessenheim and Gravelines (like that of all nuclear power plants withreactors of 900 MWe) is relatively low. At the same time, multiple shots with an AT-I14missile launchers would be possible from adistance of several hundred meters. Suchan attack could, assuming that are also used thermobaric warheads, cause a coremeltdown accident accompanied by a Significant release of radioactive particles.

In such a scenario of attack, the storage building of spent fuel elements would also beseverely damaged. There would probably be a refrigerant leak in the spent fuel pool•cooling and will not be repaired quickly enough. Conclusion: a serious accident resultingin significant emissions of radioactive substances, see Chapter 6.

UAVs can be used in the preparation or during the execution of such an attack. Thus,one might choose appropriate targets for bombing "successful" from the photographicmaterial obtained using drones and analyze the performance and security personnelequipment (routines, hardware, media etc.) .dropoff window During the attack thedrones could be used as way to keep in check security personnel with small explosivecharges in order to lead to "good terms" the bombing scenario.

4.3 Aerial terrorist attacks using drones

In the case of an airline terrorist attack, many scenarios are conceivable beyond the attackcarried out using a commercial airliner. The threat of a terrorist attack air is particularly high for

16

reactors of nuclear power plants Fessenheim and Gravelines, as indeed for all 34autres Frenchreactors in category 900 MWe, since they are protected from external attack by a single-wallcontainment of a relatively thin (90 cm).

Conceivably an aerial terrorist attack, for example by using a helicopter. Such an attack isrelatively easy to achieve since helicopter is a highly maneuverable aircraft. The availability ofhelicopters being sufficient, terrorists might consider this process as a means of action. 14 Alltechnical prerequisites for the "success" of such a scenario are met with helicopter.

Execution of the attack scenario

To achieve such an attack, a terrorist group should first take a helicopter, ship a largeamount of explosive, fly the helicopter loaded to the nuclear power plant and there bursta large amount of explosives - a dropoff window.

Grab a helicopter can relatively easily for terrorists: Helicopter Flights even in privatematch a growing trend. In many German cities, you can book a helicopter, for examplefor air tours. It would also be conceivable to hijack a helicopter with his driver, asdemonstrated by the following example: in Bruges (Belgium), three inmates escapedfrom prison using a helicopter. The helicopter pilot had been taken hostage by twopeople who had booked a flight as ordinary tourists. [WELT 2009]

Boarding a significant amount explosive is possible without difficulty many places allowto land and take off again a helicopter without a problem, the area required is relativelysmall. Thus, the helicopter could land in a secret place to embark explosives. Possiblepayload for a helicopter is about a ton. Even smaller helicopters can pick severalhundred pounds. The safe working load of a helicopter can load a significant amount ofexplosives.

It is clearly possible to reach the target with a helicopter: With more than 200 km / hcruising speed, a helicopter reached a relatively high speed. The approach of a nuclearplant can therefore be done very quickly, so that the intention of the terrorists is unveiledjust before the attack. With a tank capacity of several hundred liters, a helicopter has awide operating range (hundreds of kilometers).

With a simple and precise control, and the ability to land even on small surfaces (eg. Onthe roofs of hospitals), the helicopter is predestined for rescue operations. But thesesame properties allow terrorists to use a helicopter as a weapon against a nuclear plant.Terrorists can smoothly fly a helicopter containing a large quantity of explosives to throwon or against the containment reactor building or disabling of spent fuel elements.Observed drone overflights in recent weeks highlight the weaknesses in the air defenseof the French nuclear power plants. Especially the defense against such potential aerialattacks. Thus, the observed drones could have recorded material for preparing anattack in detail.

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Triggering an explosion on buildings is possible: It would be possible with the help of ahelicopter, to implement more than one hundred kilograms of explosives. The explosivecould be set for this purpose on the building. The destructive effect of an explosive ismaximum when installed directly on the structure to be destroyed, and with the bestpossible contact. To install the explosive charge and make firing, a period of a fewminutes should be enough. But this time is not sufficient for the security or police forces,once warned, could prevent the attack. In these conditions, we must assume a"successful" action. Especially, if the attack is supported by the transmission ofinformation on the Current situation (position and security personnel activities etc.) or bytargeted fight against security personnel • using drones.

Another possibility would be a suicide attack, in which the pilot of a helicopter loadedwith explosives crashed leave the unit on the building. In such a case, a large amount offuel in the helicopter tank further increase the extent of potential damage. In any event,it is likely that terrorists could carry with a helicopter a significant amount of explosivesin a place considered appropriate.

Effect of an explosive attack

Nuclear facilities are not designed to withstand the detonation of explosive charges. It isconsidered that the protection against explosives is achieved by the fact that suchexplosive substances should not be stored near a nuclear power plant.

Widespread is the Trinitrotoluol explosive (TNT) used among others for militarypurposes, in weaponry and blasting work in civil engineering. Rough calculations wereused to assess the amount of TNT needed to pierce a single wall containmentreinforced concrete with an explosive charge placed on it. A helicopter can carry withoutany problems several times this amount. It is the same for the buildings in which arestored the spent fuel elements. View the amount of explosives that a helicopter cantransport, destruction of structures with double walls of the Cattenom plant cannot beexcluded.

During the explosion of such a quantity of explosive or expense as powerful, concreteblocks of the impact of several tons, the shock wave and shaking can cause majordestruction within the containment and stop the cooling of the reactor. The scale ofdestruction would not allow the restoration of proper cooling. The result, with a highprobability, a core meltdown followed by a significant spread of radioactive particles.

In the case of an explosion at the storage building of spent fuel elements, a significant releaseof radioactive particles is feared. All French nuclear power plants off buildings have a single wallstructure. Why it is quite possible that explosives cause considerable damage causing leakageof cooling water from the spent fuel pool. Appropriate measures against non-existent orimpossible to implement and spread of radioactive particles is inevitable. (See Chapter 6)

UAVs can be used in the preparation or during the execution of such an attack. Thus, dronesprovide their photographic equipment detailed information to identify ideal places to land the

18

helicopter, the appropriate points for installing explosive charges and analyzing equipment andsecurity personnel activities (routine, equipment, media etc.) During the attack, it would be alsopossible that the drones are used to attack security personnel with small explosive charges to

allow the installation of explosive charges and pop them without being disturbed.

In Conclusion

In reviewing all the required steps, a terrorist attack carried out using a helicopter is arelatively simple attack scenario to run, and which, with high probability, will havecatastrophic consequences. Overflights drones have shown that protective measures inplaces in the French nuclear power plants could not prevent such an attack. Dronescould indeed support an attack.

Note: The national safety authorities in Germany seem to consider such an attack as athreat. So do we recently posed grids on one of the buildings of the nuclear plantBrokdorf, whose purpose was not officially disclosed for confidentiality reasons.According to speculation, these grids should prevent the landing of helicopters.[SEIFERT 2014]

5. Limits of counter measures

Stopping short-term reactor: It is possible in principle to reduce the vulnerability of anNPP vis-A-vis the aggressions of any kind by putting off. However a decision to take intoaccount the short term an aggravated threat has not much interest.

Or reactor safety is a crucial problem: while it is possible to stop the reaction in nuclearchain by an emergency stop, but it is not possible to stop the release of heat from thedecay of the fuel (the "residual power"). Under these conditions, a possible failure of thecooling system may result in a short time the core melt.

After stopping, the heat decreases, at the beginning rather quickly. One could try toreduce the decay heat and slow the processes leading to core meltdown by stoppingthe reactor at the right time.

Estimates show that the judgments should be several weeks or months before theattack to clear enough time for appropriate response measures. But in any case, thechances of success of countermeasures with a shutdown reactor are alwaysbienmeilleures. Spread of radioactive particles is also smaller, since a portion of short-lived radionuclides (eg. 131) will already be disintegrated to a large extent. [HIRSCH2004]

Strengthening the protection of facilities: One option to defend themselves from terroristattacks is to strengthen the protection of installations, for example through increasednumbers of security personnel and improving their equipment, upgrading fences, addingbarriers on access roads, etc. Details on the measures of this nature are not published;

19

was undoubtedly advanced the practices positively since 11 September 2001.

It is certain that with such measures, improves protection against ground attack. Butthey are not very effective against air attacks, such as drone overflights have shown.

Each of the French nuclear power plants is monitored by a special unit of the police.According to media reports, the police received the authorization 30.10.2014 shoot thedrones flying over the site of a nuclear installation, but with the prohibition of fire atnuclear installations [Mo.-WORT 2014] .dropoff window The real question is also toknow what weapon is appropriate. In all cases, overflights continued over nuclear powerplants even after the shooting authorization.

Air exclusion zones and aerial control: In France, it is forbidden to fly over nuclear saton a radius of five kilometers and at an altitude below 1000 meters. This is the army ofthe French air which is responsible for monitoring the airspace. Certainly the-fly zonesover nuclear power plants reduce the risk of accidental crash, but this measure has noeffect if targeted attack, like a helicopter. The low efficiency of these no-fly zones washighlighted by overflights drones.

Similarly, the Air Force interceptors can contribute only in a limited way to the protectionof French nuclear power plants. In theory it would be possible to shoot down ahelicopter with terrorist intent is detected in time, through the intervention of the militaryduly warned hunters. Yet one can hardly hope that the interceptors are timely, sincethey have once given the alarm, at least 15 minutes to take off and a few extra minutesto reach the nuclear plant. Meanwhile, a helicopter can travel some 70 km away. It israther unlikely that a terrorist intent of the helicopter crew was already detected at thisdistance.

In Conclusion

Including the oldest power plants with 900 MWe reactors but also those equipped with1300 MWe reactors, present a series of design deficits that increase the "success" of apotential terrorist attack. It is a fact that the implementation of more stringent passivemeasures on the sites of nuclear power plants does not compensate.

Overall, one can only question the effectiveness of the overall protective measures. Allprotective measures can be circumvented by the imagination of the perpetrator and / oran appropriate strike force and appropriate weaponry, serving a commando molesters.This is true for ground attacks, but even more for air attacks or those from the water, oreven more so for mixed attacks.

Most of the time, the risk of terrorist attacks on nuclear plants deliberately minimized. Itis claimed that nuclear power plants are sufficiently secured, or for reasons ofconfidentiality could not disclose details. This claim has been refuted impressively byoverflights drones. Apparently, the operators and the authorities are powerless to stop

20

the overflights. On the other hand, the security measures in place on sites should beknown after extensive reconnaissance flights.

A high level of protection we could not reach, which presents a unique opportunity tothwart an attack, only through a large-scale military security, that is to say, through aparking ground troops with positions of artillery, anti-aircraft batteries, speedboats andfrogmen, etc. But such a militarization of the energy industry appears incompatible withthe idea of an open democratic society. [HIRSCH 2004]

Furthermore, such measures would generate other specific risks: weapons can betriggered by error or a technical fault. Civilians may be victims of defensive measurestriggered due to a perceived or real threat.

The weapons used can also cause damage to the nuclear power plant, or even be useddeliberately against the center so close military personnel have been corrupted orrecruited by other means by terrorist 9rganizations. Even the storming and takingcontrol of artillery positions by terrorists cannot be totally excluded. [HIRSCH 2004]

6. The Effects of Severe Accidents

Accident scenario in the reactor core

The attack scenarios described in this expertise would cause in all likelihood notmanageable loss of coolant in the reactor attacked, and leading to a core meltdownaccident. It is even in the case of the most dangerous variant and the most seriousconsequences for a core melt accident: a meltdown with containment enclosure open.Releases of radioactive particles begin in this case especially early (within a few hours)because the security envelope riot even offer any temporary retention. In addition, thesereleases are particularly high. Indeed, when the dispersion is delayed, part ofradionuclides derived by the fusion of the fuel is precipitated on cooler surfaces of thebuilding. In the case of a damaged containment, see open, spread reduction factoroutwardly does not exist. The early warning period for the dissemination of radioactiveparticles is then only a few hours. The amounts of volatile radionuclides (eg. Cesium137) are scattered in a range of 50% to 90% of the inventory of the core.

Accident scenario at the deactivation pools

In the French nuclear power plants, spent fuel pools deactivation are not located insidethe containment, but in a separate building next door. Because of the thinness of thewalls and roof of the building, the storage pool is particularly vulnerable. A terroristattack causing severe damage to the building can cause a flow of waterrefroidissement.1 7 Because of the residual power, it has the effect of warming the fuelthat is stored there. The fuel discharged from the reactor generates a little production ofrelatively high heat, and can reach the space of a few hours a temperature of 900 °C.At this temperature, the cladding of the fuel rods, made of zircaloy, begins to burn in thefree air. Such fire has a very high temperature; it is impossible to extinguish with water.

21

It can be spread in the pool at other older fuels, which themselves do not get heated tooquickly. In the end, such a fire can lead to the merger of all inventory storage basin[ALVAREZ 2003].

Inflammation of zircaloy outdoors is favored if, during a terrorist attack, the fuelelements of the basin are also damaged, eg. by fallout from rubble or splinters. Zircaloychips can ignite from 200 0 C.

If leakage of the coolant in the spent fuel pool, any intervention is practically almostimpossible. Once the water has drained basin, not only loses its cooling effect, but alsothe screen effect of water against radiation. The radiation level would greatly increasenot only around the basin, but also in other areas of the building. At the edge of thebasin, the dose rates can reach about 100 Sv / h. [ALVAREZ 2003] Near the basin, theexposure of a few minutes duration can be fatal. At a distance of 20 m, the dose ratescan still be close to 1 Sv / h [2011 AS N].

Serious damage to the storage basin lead to significant emissions of radioactivesubstances. The emission level for this scenario could not be determined to date neitherexperimentally nor accurate analyzes. However, a US study provides guidance valuesindicating that 10 to 100% of the inventory cesium content in the pool, are scattered outof the building [ALVAREZ 2003].

A Cattenom, the spent fuel pool is designed for a total stock of 630 spent fuel elements.[ASN 2011] However, part of host units (193) must be kept free for unexpectedburnouts. Under these conditions, in normal operation, there is a maximum stock of 437fuel elements 18 which still represents more than double the elements present in theheart. Therefore, emissions of significant radionuclide cesium 137, which is to beexpected as a result of a terrorist attack as envisaged above, are of the same order ofmagnitude as those from the reactor core. They can far'exceed them.

Radiological Consequences

If core meltdown accident containment enclosure open, there remains very little time toevacuate the population. In case of failure of the evacuation and depending on theweather, hundreds of thousands of people will be exposed to harmful doses of radiationor death. In the vicinity of the plant, it is likely that people are suffering from acuteradiation syndrome and most remote people suffer long-term effects (mainly cancer andheritable genetic damage).

Germany is insufficiently prepared for a nuclear accident. This was detected during anexercise of communication between the federal state and the Lander placed in thecontext of a nuclear catastrophe in the Emsland nuclear power plant on September 17,2013. During this simulation, the population has been warned that when the radioactivecloud had already reached millions of people.

22

Using the results of the FlexRisk evaluation, it is possible to describe the potentialconsequences from an accident than design conditions of a central [FLEXRISK 2014]•.19 As part of FlexRisk project has been calculate CS 137 deposits on the basis of 88actual weather scenarios on a representative year (1995). For each of the reactors atFessenheim, Gravelines and Cattenom it was assumed an issue of 30% of theinventory of the heart cesium 137. The consecutive series of terrorist attacks mentionedabove could be even higher. Below is a selection of some results presented anddiscussed. 137 identified cesium deposits are shown as they are considered anindicator for contamination in the long run. According to the International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA), the territories contaminated soil value by cesium 137 is greater than 40kBq / m2 are considered contaminated because, during the first year, the populationthere would be exposed to an effective dose of more than 1 mSv [Lelieveld 2012].

Nuclear power plant in Gravelines

A similar weather conditions as of 1 January 1995, a narrow strip of French territory andsouthern Germany would be highly contaminated after the dispersal of radioactivesubstances into the environment and soil contamination by cesium 137 value samounted in 1000 kBq / m. Moreover, most of Switzerland and a large area of Austriawould also be contaminated.

In the case of a diffusion of radioactive particles in similar weather conditions as of 2September 1995 the Belgian territory would be severely affected.

Fessenheim nuclear plant

In a release of radioactive substances in weather conditions of 29 June 1995, theFrench territory would be most affected. Belgium would be almost completelycontaminated. Furthermore, a region in western Germany would be contaminated.In another example, based on weather conditions similar to those of 25 January 1995,the German territory would be primarily affected by the release of radioactivesubstances. With 1000 kBq I m2, cesium 137 deposits contaminate a wide area, evenSweden could cope with contamination over large areas.

Cattenom Nuclear Power Plant

A similar weather condition to those of 11 May 1995, a narrow strip of French territorywould be highly contaminated by the release of radioactive substances andcontaminated soil value by cesium 137 would be over 1,000 kBq / m. In addition, a partof Italy would also be affected.

In a release of radioactive particles into the environment in similar weather conditions asof 9 October 1995, Luxembourg would not only be fully allocated, but also highlycontaminated. Heavy radioactive loads also would present in Belgium, the Netherlandsand Germany.

23

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24

7. Conclusion

In summary, we see in this synthetic expertise that, contrary to what is claimed by theauthorities and operators, drone overflights observed since the beginning of October2014 are indeed a danger. Not only overflights drones, but also the inability of thesecurity authorities demonstrated in the investigation of this case and the prevention ofsuch actions, however, give rise to serious concerns.

Most of the time, the risk of terrorist attacks on nuclear plants deliberately minimized. Itis claimed that nuclear power plants are sufficiently secured, or for reasons ofconfidentiality could not release details. This claim has been refuted impressively byoverflights drones. Apparently, the operators and the authorities are powerless to stopthe overflights. On the other hand, the security measures in place on sites should beknown after the potential of comprehensive reconnaissance flights.

If on the assumption that a group of people driven by a terrorist or criminal isresponsible mobile drone overflights were analyzed in this synthetic expertise dangerthat results.

In military applications, UAVs, even the smallest of the portable kind, are becomingincreasingly important in the recognition and monitoring of potential adversaries. As partof this function, UAV technology has developed rapidly in recent decades.In the military, there is no time for small drones, carrying light loads, which would have"standard" of weapons or explosives.

However, the civilian application UAV designed for payloads of a few kilograms and cantherefore embarked eg. explosives, are already commercially available.

In the light of deficits design and increased sensitivity to disturbance, especially the 34oldest nuclear plants in France, one cannot exclude the possibility of an attack carriedout using drones on which explosives are shipped and sent to hotspots of a nuclearplant to cause an incident that can be mastered by the security system set up on thesite and able to defeat any protective measures implemented by staff site in case ofemergency at a nuclear plant accident resulting in a release of radioactive material.This synthetic expert report focuses on the issue around the terrorist attack scenariosthat may cause virtually irrevocable core meltdown accident is conceivable, whether anattack could cause damage so that taking measures intervention to prevent the spreadoutward is void.

On the facts as to the availability and use of drones opportunities as well as taking intoaccount the vulnerability of French nuclear power plants Fessenheim, Gravelines andCattenom, three scenarios are conceivable:

* Option 1: Drones support an explosives attack carried out by agents operatingfrom within. It is estimated that an informed agent operating from inside could

25

cause a core meltdown accident with already well under 10 kilograms ofexplosives. In other words, a quantity of explosives "available" without problemsusing a limited number of drones, for their payload and the apparent ease offlying over a barrier-free nuclear power. We can not exclude the possibility thatthe authors of overflights just wanted to test this kind of aerial approach.

*Option 2: A bombing containment with anti-tank guided missiles like the AT-14from a distance of several hundred meters may cause a core meltdown accidentthat results in a significant release of radioactive materials into the environment,provided also that thermobaric warheads are used. Drone overflights could havehad as to explore the details of the site and the security system What is in place.In addition, the drones could favor attack by aerial surveillance and / orassaulting the security personnel with small explosive charges or similar.

*Option 3: The preparation of a potential air attack carried out using a helicopter.In this case, the drones are used as a means providing detailed shots of theground, and information on resources, strategy and the effectiveness of securityforces of the operator and the authorities. Drones are then considered as a "trialballoon." We can analyze the details of the land and its security. Overflightsdrones prove that the security measures in place are ineffective. Apparently, thisapplies not only to the case of unexpected actions but also for actions to predict.

The three scenarios of terrorist attack show everyone the high probability of an accidentwith core melt containment initiated following an attack on the reactor building.Foreseeable radioactive releases would be particularly high in these circumstances andwould present already after a few hours after the attack. Thus there would be very little,probably too little time to manage a mass evacuation of population.

In such a scenario of attack, the storage building of spent fuel elements would also beseverely damaged. In sum, this would result in a serious accident accompanied bysignificant radioactive releases.

There is no currently, measures that reduce to a minimum the vulnerability of a nuclearpower plant in case of a terrorist attack. A reactor promises increased security only if itis done a few weeks before the attack. Only in this case, the decay heat would beenough to win diminished significantly more time to take effective measures against. Itis uncertain that time is sufficient to prevent discharges, however, it would gain moretime for protective measures of the population. However, the French Nuclear SafetyAuthority (ASN) should seriously consider stopping the reactors, at least until theclarification of incidents.

The evaluation of radiological effects involved in a serious accident triggered by theterrorist attacks described above on a reactor nuclear power plants Cattenom,Fessenheim and Gravelines proves that the weather conditions, many countries wouldbe affected by soil contamination over a wide area, especially Belgium, Germany,Luxembourg, Switzerland and France.

26

To assess and weigh integrally nuclear risks, it is imperative to take into account theentire risk spectrum trained by terror. In principle, the public is entitled to be keptinformed. On the other hand, avoid proven that critical details in vulnerability of nuclearpower plants identified as part of the review, not be published as they could be exploitedabused as a useful means of information and 'instructions the handling "to makeattacks. In addition, we must take care to ensure that "unpublished" ideas for newscenarios previously not conceivable, and can invite imitation, are sketched veryroughly. This synthetic expertise was drawn from the point of view of this systematicrespect.

8. Footnotes Page

1 German troops ISAF use ALADIN drone for reconnaissance flights Kabul and themountains of Afghanistan.2 In terms of tactical UAVs, Israel is the world's largest exporter. Thus the Indian armedforces, Russian and German they are equipped with Israeli-made drones.3 The annex A2 a table with some military drones.4 is provided in Appendix A2 a table with some military drones.

5 Action Force of Nuclear Fast (RNA) must be able to travel to any French site downwithin 24 hours from the occurrence of the accident to power the installation using

mobile systems and qualified and well trained staff.6 Additional data on containment are contained in Annex A2.7 In addition, the Fessenheim has a gas turbine. Thus the generator is diverse. Thedisadvantage is that the two blocks have a single-chip design which means that one cannot exclude their failure, ultimately it would be easy to provoke.8 Among the facilities put in place to protect against a hard core design and otherfailures include a generator (mobile) diesel, an autonomous pump for the water supplyof the spent fuel pool, system reservoirs of steam generator backup power supply(ASG) and food PTR system (cooling pool water treatment and swimming pool water)from a pumping well groundwater or lake.9 Nuclear Energy and Security, University of Salzburg, 20 to 23 July 200510 Kornet-E is the Russian name as the name used by NATO AT 14.

"11 Syria, Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, India, Morocco,Algeria and Greece.12 explosions of gas and air mixture already have repeatedly caused catastrophicaccidents in refineries.13 In general, the security systems are designed to quadruple security to ensure thecooling of the reactor core in the event of failure of a component of the system. Theelements of the "redundant" structure system such as pumps, valves, power supply etc.are physically separated.14 In 2009, 944 helicopters were registered in Germany and 2528 persons held ahelicopter pilot's license. 12009 BVBS].15 BK B2' 117 and EC 135, two helicopters widely used in Germany among other air

27

rescue or police, have the following specifications: Cruising speed: 241 km / h;Autonomy: 785 or 575 kin, maximum load embraqu~e 920 or 1210 kg; Fuel tankcapacity: 720 liters, or 772 [ADAC 2010].16 There are more high explosives as TNT, able to develop a shock wave in asignificantly shorter time. Can be expected to particularly serious damage when militaryexplosives are used.17 The radiological consequences of a terrorist attack depends on the severity of theattack and especially the question if there is a leak in the pools. If the pool remainsintact and only the cooling system fails, critical conditions arise only after several days,unless the heart is fully discharged at the time of the attack. In this case, there are still

'only a few hours for the development of interventions. [WIDE 2012] During thereplacement of fuel elements, the reactor core is fully transferred to the spent fuel pool.18 The pools deactivation Of the reactors at Fessenheim nuclear power plant canaccommodate a maximum of 313 fuel elements each and those of the Gravelinesnuclear power plant 382 each. Taking into account the reserve to keep for unexpectedburnouts, this implies 156 home units in the Fessenheim plant and 255 at Gravelines.Each reactor cores 157 receives fuel elements. The following capabilities exist: GPO313 fuel elements, bearings CPI and CP2 382 fuel elements, P4 series 459 fuelelements, P'4 630 fuel elements, N4 612 fuel elements [ASN 2011])19 As part of this project, we studied the geographical distribution of risk in the event ofserious accidents at nuclear power plants in Europe. Based on source terms andaccident frequency was calculated using the current model of dispersion and accordingto 2800 different weather situations contamination in nearby soil layer entrained by aserious nuclear accident.20 http://www.emt-penzberg.de/uploads/media/ALADI N del 0. pdf und

http://www.army-technology.com/projects/emt-aladin-uav/21 http://www.army-technology.com/projects/honeywell-thawk-mav-us-army/22 http://www.army-technology.com/projects/puma-unmanned-aircraft-system-us/ und

http :llwww.avinc.comluaslsmall~uaslpumal23 http://www.army-technology.com/projects/rq 11-raven!24 http://www.army-technology.com/projects/luna/25 http://www.army-technology.com/projects/shadow200uav/26

http ://www.deutschesheer.de/portal/a/heer/! ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP31 5EyrpHK9jNTU Ir2S1IOSMvMxsvZzStBK97Kp8_YJsROUAzD2Fiw! !I

27 http://www.army-technology.com/projects/hunter und http://www.iai.co.il/2013/18898-16401 -en/IAI .aspx

28 http://www.general-view.com29 http://heighttech.com

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9. Bibliographies

ADAC 2010 Die ADAC-Hubschrauber-Flotte auf einen Blick, www.adac.de, eingesehenim M~rz 2010

ALVAREZ 2003 Reducing the Hazards from Stored Power-Reactor Fuel in the UnitedStates, R. Alvarez et al.; Science & Global Security, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2003), 5. 1-60

ALWARDT 2013 Braucht Deutschland Kampfdrohnen? Christian Alwardt, MichaelBrzoska, Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Martin Kahl, Gbtz Neuneck, Johann Schmid, PatriciaSchneider. Hamburger Informationen zur Friedensforschung und SicherheitspolitikAusgabe 50/201 3; Hamburg, Juli 2013

ARMY 2014 Army-technology: Kornet E Anti-Armour Missile, Russia, www.army-technology.com/projects/kornetl, eingesehen im November 2014

ASN 2011 Complementary Safety Assessments of the French Nuclear Power Plants(European "Stress tests"), Report by the French Nuclear Safety Authority, December2011

BECKER 2005 Studie zu den Auswirkungen eines Beschusses der im Standort-Zwischenlager KrLimmel aufbewahrten Beh~lter des Typs CASTOR& V/52 mitpanzerbrechenden Waffen, Oda Becker, Dezember 2005

BECKER 2010 Terrorangriff mit einer panzerbrechenden Waffe (AT 14) auf &lteredeutsche Atomkraftwerke; Oda Becker; erstellt im Auftrag von GreenpeaceDeutschland e. V.; September 2010;www.greenpeace.de/siteslwww.greenpeace.de/fileslKU RZ_Panzerbrechende_Waffen_14092010_0.pdf, eingesehen im November 2014

BRUSSELS 2014 Belgian jihadist, former worker at Doel nuclear plant, dies in Syria,Thursday, 16 October 2014 15:45;http://www.thebrusselstimes.com/belgium/item/l1154-belgian-jihad ist-fo rmer-worker-at-doel-nuclear-plant-dies-in-syria; eingesehen im November 2014

BUSINESS 2014 Bussinessporta124: Unbemannte Systeme im Anflug auf dieInternational CES 2015, 7. November 2014;http :llwww.businessportal2 4.com/de/unbemannte-systeme-im-anflug-auf-d ie-international-ces-201 5.html; eingesehen im November 2014

BVBS 2009 Bundesministerium foir Verkehr, Bau und Stadtentwicklung: BeantwortungFrage Nr. 200 von Herrn Peter Hettlich MdB, Berlin, 01.07.2009

BZ 2014 Drohnen in Frankreich. Wer schickt Drohnen (Qber die Atommeiler?30.10.2014; http :Ilwww. berliner-zeitung .de/politik/d rohnen-in-frankreich-wer-schickt-d ro hnen-ueber-d ie-atommeiler-, 1080801 8,28900304. html

CSS 2010 Drohnen: Milit~rischer Nutzen und politische Debatten; CSS Analysen zurSicherheitspolitik; Nr. 78; ETH Z(~rich; Juli 2010;http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/CSS-Analysen-78 .pdf; eingesehen imNovember 2014

EC 2014 EconomicsExperts: Thermobaric Weapons,www.economicexpert.com/a/Fuel:air:explosive.htm, eingesehen im November 2014

29

EMT 2014a ALADIN Mini-Luftaufkl~rungssystem; EMT; http://www.emt-penzberg.de/uploads/media/ALADlN del 0.pdf; eingesehen im November 2014

EMT 201 4b LU NA Luftaufkl~rungs-und Uberwachungssystem; EMT; http://www.emt-penzberg.de/uploads/media/LUNA del 0.pdf; eingesehen im November 2014

FAS 2014 Federation of American Scientists (FAS): Fuel/Air Explosive (FAE),www.fas.org/man/dod-1 01 /sys/dumb/fae.htm, eingesehen im November 2014

FLANDERS 2014 Flanderstoday: Anti-terror office joins investigation of sabotage atDoel. Alan Hope; 11.08.2014; http://www.flanderstoday.eu/business/anti-terror-office-joins-investigation-sabotage-doel; eingesehen im November 2014

FLEXRISK 2014 The Project ,,flexRISK": Flexible Tools for Assessment of Nuclear Riskin Europe; http://flexrisk.boku.ac.at/en/projekt.html; eingesehen im November 2014

GENERALVIEW 2014 Unbemannte Flugsysteme; http:I/www.general-view.com;eingesehen im November 2014

GREENPEACE 2014 Drohnen 0~ber Atomkraftwerken, Philipp Brandst~dter,08.11.2014; http://www.greenpeace.de/themen/energiewende/atomkraft/drohnen-ueber-atom kraftwerken

HEIGHTTECH 2014 Height-Tech Drohnen - der Inbegriff von Windstabilit~t undFlugpr~zision; http://heighttech.com/produktel

HIRSCH 2004 Terrorangriffe auf deutsche Atomkraftwerke, Darstellung der Gefahrenund Bewertung der Gegenmal'~nahmen unter besonderer Ber~cksichtigung derGegebenheiten an den Standorten Biblis und Brunsb~ttel; Helmut Hirsch, OdaBecker, Wolfgang Neumann; Bericht f(or Greenpeace Deutschland e.V.;Uberarbeitete Fassung; Hannover, April 2004

HONELLIO 2005 Sabotage vulnerability of nuclear power plants; A. L. Honnellio u. S.Rydell; Konferenzbeitrag ,,Nuclear Energy and Security (NUSEC)", Universit~tSalzburg, 20.-23.07.2005

LARGE 2012 Vulnerability of French Nuclear Power Plants to Aircraft Crash, JohnLarge; im Auftrag von Greenpeace Frankreich; April 2012

LELIEVELD 2012 Global risk of radioactive fallout after major nuclear reactor accidents,J. Lelieveld, 0. Kunkel, and M. G. Lawrence Atmos. Chem. Phys., 12, p.4245-4258,2012.

LU.-WORT 2014 Luxemburger Wort: R~tselraten Liber Drohnen: Wer steckt dahinter?.03.11.2014; http://www.wort. lu/de/international/sicherheit-der-franzoesischen-atom kraftwerke-raetselraten-ueber-d rohnen-wer-steckt-d ah inter-545740b6b9b39887080826ed; eingesehen im November 2014

MAJER 2012 Abschlussbericht zum Kernkraftwerk Cattenom; Dieter Majer; erstelltunter der Mitwirkung des Ministeriums for Gesundheit Luxemburg, des Ministeriumsfor Umwelt, Energie und Verkehr des Saarlandes und des Ministeriums forWirtschaft, Klimaschutz, Energie und Landesplanung Rheinland-Pfalz. Februar 2012

MAKHIJANI 2012 Post-Fukushima Nuclear Safety in France: Analysis of theComplementary Safety Assessments (CSAs), Makhijani, A. (lEER); Marignac, Y.(Wise); March 2, 2012

30

NOVOSTI 2007a Russische Informations- und Nachrichten Agentur Novosti: Russlandliefert wieder Waffen in den Nahen Osten, 19.06.2007,http://de.rian.ru/safety/20070619/67446073. html, eingesehen im Marz 2007.

NOVOSTI 2007b Russische Informations- und Nachrichten Agentur Novosti:Waffenmarkt: Algerien kann Indien und China bei Waffenk~ufen in RusslandL0bertreffen, 05.04.2007, http://de.rian.ru/business/20070405/63137770. html,eingesehen im Marz 2010

NOVOSTI 2009 Russische Informations- und Nachrichten Agentur Novosti: RussischePanzerabwehr-Raketen sorgen fur Furore auf IDEF-2009, 30.04.2009,http://de.rian.ru/safety/20090430/1 21 393495.html, eingesehen im Marz 2010

NOVOSTI 2014 Russische Informations- und Nachrichten Agentur Novosti: lrakischeArmee setzt erstmals russisches System Kornet gegen IS-K~mpfer ein; 22.09.2014;http://de.ria. ru/security and military/20 140922/2696071 04.html; eingesehen imNovember 2014;

NZZ 2014 Neue ZL~richer Zeitung: Mysteribse Drohnen uber franzosischen AKW;1.11.014; http://www. nzz.ch/panorama/mysterioese-drohnen-ueber-franzoesischen-akw-1 .184161 51

0KG-I nstitut 2012 ODkoinstitut/Physikerbiiro: Analyse der Ergebnisse des EU Stresstestder Kernkraftwerke Fessenheim und Beznau; Teil 1: Fessenheim; Christoph Pistner,Mathias Brettner, Christian Kupper, Stephan Kurth, Simone Mohr. Im Auftrag desMinisteriums fur Umwelt, Klima und Energiewirtschaft Baden-Wuirttemberg;Darmstadt, 11.10.2012

PI CHLER 2014 Pressetext (Nachrichtenagentur): China testet erfolgreich Anti-Drohnen-Laser; Schnelles System soil verstarkt zur Terrorabwehr eingesetzt werden. Pichler,03.11.2014; http://www.pressetext.com/news/201 41103016; eingesehen imNovember 2014

SElIFERT 2014 umweltFairaendern .de: "VS-vertraulich" - Atommeiler und Anti-Terror-Schutz - Rechte Dritter bleiben auf der Strecke; Dirk Seifert 6. Mai 2014http://umweltfairaendern.de/201 4/05/vs-vertraulich-atommeiler-und-anti-terror-schutz-rechte-d ritter-bleiben-auf-der-strecke/, eingesehen im November 2014

STERN 2014 Stern: Juist wird von ,,Paketkopter" angeflogen: 24. September 2014,http :/Iwww. stern. de/wirtschaft/news/d hl-testet-d rohnen-j uist-wi rd-Von-paketkopter-angeflogen-2140565.html; eingesehen im November 2014

TAGESSCHAU 2014 Regierung leitet Untersuchung ein, Drohnen tiber FrankreichsAtommeilern; 30.10.2014; http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/drohnen-ueber-akw-in-frankreich-1 01 .html

WELT 2009 Die Welt: Drei H~ftlinge fliehen per Helikopter; 23.07.2009;http://www.welt.de/vermischtes/article41 80865/Drei-Haeftlinge-fliehen-mit-dem-Helikopter.html; eingesehen im November 2014.

31

Annex

Al : Locations and types of nuclear power plants in France

France currently has 58 pressurized water reactors spread over 19 sites. They aredivided into three categories (levels depending on the design) [2011 ASN]:• 34 reactors of 900 MWe class, divided into levels• GPO (Bugey, Fessenheim)• OP1 (Le Blayais, Dampierre-en-Burly, Gravelines, Tricastin) and• CP2 (Chinon, Cruas-Meysse, Saint-Laurent-des-Eaux)• 20 reactors of 1,300 MWe class, divided into levels* P4 (Flamanville, Paluel, Saint-Alban) and* P4' (Belleville-sur-Loire, Cattenom, Golfech, Nogent-sur-Seine, Penly)* 4 reactors of 1,450 MWe class or• Serie N4 (Chooz, Civaux).In "bold" are highlighted nuclear power plants which we know that there haddrone overflights far (the state of 08.11.2014).

d~u paliel i"• P<WH)!W du• |paler 13(00 MAWe

Cornstructlocn d'encsin*te de cofn~rnemet a paroi simple [m] • double paroJ [in]

Rayon intes÷[r 18.50 22.50

Hauite~ur dli h~tiinent 60,35 59

Epaisseur de la psvoi 0,90 09

Epaisseur de le paroi de I• coupo~e 0,00.95

Rv~te nent •nterietur 0,)0s63e,•tn

32

O4nomi- Pays Autc'-natijn Conatructeui nomie

[h]

ALADIN Allemaqne/EMT I

Vitesae Port•,e Poids Charge[kin h] longueur• [kg] utile

hauteur [in] [kg]

40-70 1.46/1,67/0,38 4

En application d~epuis chezlea forces mniltaiiea

2005/Allemagne. Paya baa

honeywell Etata-Unia!RO -16 T- 1-tonywellhawk Aeoapace

413 85 (i,313 2007!Etata-Unia

Puma AE -":' Etata-Unia/ 3.AetoVironmerit

P0 -1i Etata-Unlia! 1,

Raven3 Ae ,oVir onnt' lti

LUNA>" AJle~magnei EMT 6

.5 8.3 2.8/t.4 6.1

,5 "2-81 1.4 1.9

20 2 / Etata-Unma,Darrernil(, Su•tde

2003/ Etats-Unis,Royaurne-UnI, Auatrahie, Italie.Danmaii,. Pays baa.Eapagne. R~p ublique tc h&que

4 20100/Alleragie

256,3 2004/Etats-Unia. Su~tde. Itahie,Autrahi_

70 4,1712.3,6/0,87 40

PO -7Sladow200-•

1ZO20

Etata-Unia/AAlOceperation

Allemagne]Rheinmetall

6-7 148-250 4,27/3.4/0,86 90

2,5 120-210 3,42/2,28/0.96 166

21 260 10,50/6,90/t.7 8,86

30 2005/Altenagne

RQ - A USA, Isanet/Hunter-: Nor'throp Gru~m-

anl~

100 1996/Etats-Unia. France,Belgique

Deno~mination Fabricant/ Charge Vireoaso D~arnl~tre• altitde de 20,1 Auronorniesource utile [hg! [kin'h] hauteui [m] [in] [nain]

Y-Copter 4

Geneia~ ViewlAllemegnel 0

Aucune information diaponible

HT-i3 Hexeccl:terl

HT-8 ~Octocopter1

HT-8CI8flCictcccpter

14

Hiun-TechGmbH{AIIemui~ne

0.90/0.45

1 ,('0~C.26

33

34

3-

Un rapport d'Oda Becker, Phys. dipl., HannovreGommand• par Greenpeace e. V. (Allemagne)

Avant-propos de Heinz Smital, expert des questions nucldaires & Greenpeace

Publi• en novembre 2014

n~pressuim Greenpeace e.V., Hongkrongstr. 10, 20457 Hamburg. Tel. 040/3 06 18-010117 Berlin, mail@greenpeace~de, www~greenpeace.de V P Susanne Neubronner

11/2014

V t tL Marienstralle 19-20.Titel: Daniel Muller © Greenpeace

Gedruckt auf 100% Recychingpapier

1. Introduction..................................................................................... 62. Les drones - un risques reel pour les centrales nucleair es? ........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

3. Vulnerabilite des centrales nucleaires franqaises vis-a-vis des agressions.......13

4. Scenarios d'une attaque terroriste a une centrale nucleaire a I'aide de drones .... 16

5. Limites des contre-mesures ............................................................... 23

6. Les effets des accidents graves ........................................................... 25

7. Conclusion .................................................................................... 29

8. Notes de bas de page........................................................................ 32

9. Bibliographie.................................................................................. 33

On peut •galement imaginer qu'une telle demonstration de force soit suivie d'une menacetrfis sfrieuse 6manant d'un groupe terroriste ou criminel. La France, qui d~pend de ses

centrales nuclfiaires, pourrait se retrouver dans une situation contraignante. Aujourd'hui, le

nucl6aire repr6sente environ les trois quarts de la production d'61ectricit6 fran~aise, cette part

doit •tre ramen~e iA 50% d'ici it 2025.

L'id6e d'attaquer une centrale nucl6aire pourrait •tre attrayante pour un groupe terroriste,

non seulement Ai cause d'un effet imm6diat sur la produdtion d'61ectricit6, mais aussi Ai cause

de son caract~re symbolique et de l'attention mondiale attir6e par un tel acte : L'6nergie

nucl6aire est consid6r6e un synonyme de progr~s technologique. En plus, ii s'agit d'une

technologie portant des avantages au secteur civil et au secteur militaire. Or, une attaque sur

une centrale nucl~aire r6ussie dans un pays serait consid~r6e uine attaque r6ussie sur toutes

les installations nucl6aire dui monde.

En cas de plusieurs incendies sur le site l'6quipe pourrait fitre ddsesp&irment dfibordde et nepourra plus enti~rement emp~cher d'6ventuels rejets radioactifs. La Force d'Action Rapide du

Nucldaire (FARN) pouvant secourir l'6quipe du site n'est opdrationnelle que dans un ddlai de

24 heures depuis la survenance de l'accident.>

Un court-circuit oul un incendie au niveau d'un transformateur peut produire des effets

inopinds : Suite gt un incendie au niveau du transformateur, ayant eu lieu en 200o7 dans la

centrale nuicldaire allemande Kriimmel, uine sdrie de panties techniques et organisationnelles

inopindes s'6tait produite et avait provoqu6 une baisse du niveau dui rdfrigdrant dans La ciive

sous pression dui rdacteur. A partir des experiences prdcddentes avec les centrales nucldaires

de Fessenheim, Gravelines oui Cattenom on peut craindre que des pannes de systfimes on de

composants puissent aggraver La situation.

Avec des petites quantitds d'explosif embarqudes sur des drones on pourrait attaquer ainsi

l'6quipe du site oii le personnel de sdcurit6 pour favoriser l'attaque terroriste de l'air, de l'eau

et dui sol.

Ndanmoins, de tels drones miniatures constituent un danger s'ils devaient fitre utilisds en tant

qu'6ldment spdcifique d'un plan terroriste, ou d'une mission de «•reconnaissance» au sn

militaire. Les drones peuvent fournir des prises de viie ddtailldes du terrain, et renseigner

stir les ressoiirces et La stratdgie des forces de sflret6. Ceci augmenterait considdrablement Ia

probabilitd d'une rdussite de l'attaque et constituerait un dldment qui rend pius <•prometteur>•

le plan d'un groupe terroriste.

I1 ne s'agit pas de sp~culer ici sur les aiiteurs des rdcents survols de drones, ni sur leurs

motivations. On se penchera plut6t sur La question de savoir si ces survols constituent

un danger, en admettant l'hypoth~se qu'un groupe de personnes animdes par un mobile

terroriste ou criminel en soit responsable.

Le prdsent rapport d'expertise synthdtique porte surtout sur la question autour des scdnarios

d'attaque terroriste pouvant causer un accident de fusion de cceur pratiquement irrdvocable

soient concevable, ?i savoir si une attaque pourrait provoquer des ddgaits de sorte que La prise

de mesures d'intervention pour emp~cher La dissemination vers l'extdrieur soit de nul effet.

Au regard des faits, quant fi La disponibilit6 et aux possibilitds d'utilisation des drones ainsi

qu'en prenant compte La vulndrabilitd des centrales nucldaires fran~aises, trois cas de figure

sont plausibles :

* L'assistance it ine attaque ?i l'explosif prdparde par des auteurs agissant de l'interieur.

On teste pour cela des approches adriennes reussies avec des drones.

* La preparation d'une attaque adrienne potentielle. On cherche en particulier fi examiner

la configuration dui terrain et sa surveillance, d'autre part it 6valuer simultandment

l'efficacit6 des mesures de riposte.

* La prdparation d'une attaque au sol. On relfive pour cela les informations concernant le

terrain et d'autre part on enregistre les mesures de suret6 actuellement mises en oeuvre

(l'effectif dui personnel, les modes et ddlais de rdaction etc.).

Ces trois cas de figure sont exposds et commentds ci-apr~s.

Le grand nombre de survols constitue une ddmonstration de force de la part des

responsables. On ne peut que spdculer sur leur objectif. Ainsi, le grand nombre de centrales

survoldes pourrait par exemple viser • attirer l'attention stir nine grande surface afin de

La ddtouirner de La cible ddjgt choisie. D'autre part il se pourrait aussi que les responsables

recherchent par cette m~thode l'objectif le plus facile.

r~alis6 avec la vente de drones franchira la barre d'un milliard de Dollars. Selon La CEAles drones sont utilis~s entre autre pour protfiger des manifestations sportives ou pour

contribuer Ai des opfirations de recherche et de sauvetage. De nombreuses applications sont

possibles. [BUSINESS 2014]

Des drones d'application civile pouvant transporter quelques kilogrammes d'explosif sont

certes rares, mais dfijA disponibles dans le commerce.4 Le drone HT-8 Ci8o par ex. peut

embarquer une charge utile de 2,6 kg atteint une vitesse de 55 km/h et a une autonomie de

20 minutes [HEIGHTTECH 20141. L'hexacopter, un a~ronef Ai 6 bras et 12 moteurs en total,

petit embarquer des charges utiles d'une masse maximale de 8 kg. Le fabricant fait de la

publicit6 pour ses drones avec le slogan :petit drone - grand drone, A chacun son propre

drone" [GENERALVIEW 2014]

En Chine, on prend aujourd'hui d~jA au s~rieux le danger li6 Ai ces drones miniatures :selon

l'agence de presse officie~le chinoise Xinhua, la Chine a dfivelopp6i un syst~me de ddifense au

laser destinei A la destruction des drones volant Ai basse altitude. Ainsi le dispositif laser

peut-il 6iliminer de petits objets volants sans 6quipage dans un rayon de deux kilom~tres.

Le «tir,» est effectu6 dans tun ddlai de cinq secondes apr~s d6tection de La cible. L'objectif

de ces systfimes est de prot~ger contre des attaques terroristes. Selon la socifit4 de

d~veloppement ce sont normalement les francs-tireurs et les hdlicopt~res qui doivent abattre

ces drones, mais leur taux de r~ussite et d'exactitude est faible et peut entrainer des d~gfits

inopin~s. Les drones sans 6quipage sont vendus Ai un prix relativement bon march6 et facile

Ai utiliser, ce qui les rend attrayants pour les terroristes. [PICHLER 2014]

Dans le cadre d'un scenario d'attaque terroriste, r~alisdi par ex. avec la participation

d'agents internes, des drones chargfis d'explosifs peuvent presenter un risque sfirieux (voir

chapitre 4.1i).

Ii est peu probable que ce genre de drone, pour peui qu'il soit charg6i avec une petite quantit6i

d'explosif et s'6crase n'importe ofi sur une centrale nucldiaire, reprfisente un risque imm~diat

pour la sficurit6 d'u~ne centrale nuclfiaire. Par contre, un crash de plusieurs drones charges de

quelques kilogrammes d'explosifs pourrait mettre une centrale nucl~aire dans uine situation

dangereuse. Si l'on peut s'attendre A iune maitrise d'une telle situation par les syst~mes

de sficuritfi de la centrale, voir des mestures d'tirgence mises en oeuvre, il n'est pas pour

autant certain qtu'il n'y aura pas de disseimination de partictules radioactives suite A iune telle

attaqtie. Ce sont en particulier les centrales nuicl~aires fran~aises les plus anciennes qui sont

vuiln~rables A cause de Ieuir protection contre les risques venant de l'extfirieur limit~e et les

insuffisances dans la conception de gestion d'incidents majeurs (voir chapitre 3).

I1 ne parait d'ailleurs pas impossible de d~truire une source de courant externe et des 81eiments

essentiels d'alimentation dlectrique de secours ou destinds A• des beso ins pro pres et /ou

d'endommager encore d'autres composants ou parties de systeme.

Lorsque la source de courant externe est d~truite par des charges explosives, 1'on ne pourra

pas r~parer celle-ci suffisamment rapidement. Si le passage Ai alimentation propre est manquei

et l'alimentation 6lectriqtue de secours tombe 6galement en panne Ai catise de l'attaqtie ou de

dfaifats non imputables Ai l'attaqtue, l'6quipe de l'usine devra assurer l'alimentation dlectrique

pour le systbme de refroidissement des combustibles au sein dui r~acteur et stock~s dans la

piscine de d~sactivation par des appareils mobiles.

Dans certaines conditions de service (remplacement des 6ilfments combustibles) l'espace de

temps relativement court disponible pour tine intervention n'est que de quelquies heures.

spficifiques: La r~alisation de vols planfis sans moteur et le redemarrage du moteur. Led~collage se fait Ai partir d'une rampe de lancement munie d'une catapulte Ai •lastique

silencieuse qui peut •tre pli~e pour le transport. [EMT 2o14 b1

Surtout les Etats Unis avaient commenc6, ii y a pr~s de dix ans, At 6quiper d'a~rmes les drones

de reconnaissance (comme le Predator, le Reaper) oui A concevoir des drones de combat

spficiaux sans fiquipage (Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle, UCAV) pour les utiliser de fa~on

cibl~e dans les attaques air-sol. On utilisait pour cela des missiles air-sol tels que le Hell fire,

initialement dfiveloppfis pour les hdlicoptfires et les avions de chasse.2 Ces a~ronefs Ataient

employfis pour la premiere fois durant La guerre aui Kosovo. l~quipfis de dispositifs de

marquage au laser, ils identifiaient les cibles potentielles Ai d~truire ensuite A l'aide d'avionsA

•quipage . Le dfiveloppement des UCAV (drones de combat) s'oriente vers une augmentation

de la charge utile, de la vitesse et une ameilioration de la furtivit6i (c'est-A-dire les rendre

.quasiment invisibles aux radars). [ALWARDT 2013; CSS 20101

Or, ce genre de drone exige, en fonction de Ia portfie et du cadre opfirationnel, d'une

infrastructure compl~mentaire. Pour exploiter des drones dotfis d'autonomie importante, on

doit 6igalement disposer, entre autres, de pistes de dfiollage et d'atterrissage spficialement

amenagfies ainsi que d'installations d'entretien et d'armement. M~me les petits drones

exigent des dispositifs de d~collage et d'atterrissage. En outre, des systdmes de navigation

fiables sont indispensables, ainsi que des liaisons stables de donn~es et de communication

entre l'avion et le sol, permettant de piloter le drone. ]ALWARDT 2013]

Raison pour laquelle on peut supposer qu'A l'heure actuelle des groupements terroristes

ne poss~dent pas ce genre de systfimes de drones armfis. A l'avenir, cela pourrait changer :

la possibilit6i que des terroristes ou des rehelles puissent s'emparer de drones pour r6aliser

des attaques contre des cibles qui 6itaient jusqu'A present hors de leur port~e, est consid~r~e

par les spficialistes comme une vfiritable menace. [ALWARDT 2013] Jusqu'At prfisent, dans

les applications militaires, ii n'y a pas de drones petits et faciles Ai transporter Ai armement

<'standard»• ou par ex. sur lesquels sont embarqufis des explosifs.3

Toutefois, selon les experts, des dfipenses non nfigligeables de d~veloppement et d'essais sont

nficessaires pour construire, At partir des composants disponibles dans le commerce, un drone

d'une autonomie, d'une charge utile, d'une stabilit6i en vols plus importants et dotes d'un

dispositif de pilotage amdlior&. [ALWARDT 201•3]

Pour des applications civiles, des drones miniatures sont d~jA disponibles en difffientes

exficutions dans le commerce. Les drones d'application civile sont souvent nommes

«<multicopter»> (tel que l'<Oktocopter»>) uls sont surtout uitilisfis dans le domaine des prises

de vues a~riennes. Mais leurs possibilitfis d'utilisation sont multiples. Le groupe allemand

Deutsche Post (courrier et logistique) exploite des drones nomm~s <•Paketkopter» pour

approvisionner en mfidicaments l'ile de Juist, en mer du Nord (charge utile : 1,2 kg).

[STERN 2014]

Selon des analyses mendes par Ia Consumer Electronics Association (CEA) le commerce

mondial des drones d'application civile atteindra en 2015 un volume de 130 millions de

Dollars. Ce chiffre correspond At une augmentation de 55% par rapport au marchfi en 2014 et

reprfisente probablement 400 000 pi~ces. On suppose que, d'ici cinq ans, le chiffre d'affaires

2. L~s r OD ® - ( = f'cent a~Des c uicI~res'?

Dans les conflits arm~s, le d~ploiement de syst~mes militaires sans pr6sence humaine est en

augmentation. En particulier, on utilise de plus en pius souvent des syst~mes adriens armds

(drones de combat) par exemple en Afghanistan, au Pakistan ou au Yemen [ALWARDT

2013]. On 6valuera ci-apr~s le potentiel de menace, actuel ou futur, de tels syst~mes pour les

centrales nucldaires (notamment frangaises).

Le drone est un appareil volant sans pilote embarqu•, soit tdl~command6 depuis un poste

tr~s 61oign6, soit programm6 • l'avance pour une ou plusieurs trajectoires. En principe, le

drone est uin syst~me de transport rdutilisable sans 6quipage, qul peut •tre dot6 de capteurs,

mais aussi d'un armement. Les drones sont aussi ddsign~s sous d'autres appellations

courantes comme ((objets volants sans occupants>> (en anglais :Unmanned Aerial Vehicle,

UAV) ou <<syst~mes volants sans occupants»> (en anglais :Unmanned Aerial System, UAS).

[ALWARDT 2013]

Les drones existent en diff~rentes tailles, leur envergure allant de quelques centim~tres

jusqu'gt la taille d'un avion commercial. La classification standard des drones distingue les

categories suivantes en fonction de la durde de vol, l'autonomie et l'altitude de vol:

* mini (i heure/ quelques kilom~tres / basse),

* tactique (plusieurs heures / < 300 km / basse • moyenne) et

* strat~gique (> 20 heures/> 1000 kin/moyenne A haute). [ALWARDT 2013]

A l'&chelle mondiale, on estime que 900 types de drones diff~rents sont actuellement en

cours de d~veloppement, Ia plupart d'entre eux @tant des appareils non arm, s. La plupart

des drones utilis~s aujourd'hui par les arm6es le sont comme systdmes de reconnaissance.

Des modules de saisie composds de capteurs, cameras infrarouges, radars ou capteurs

d'interception localisant et enregistrant des signaux du spectre 6lectromagn~tique

fournissent des photos a~riennes A haute resolution et transmettent des images en temps reel

Al'aide de connexions satellitaires ou par radiocommunication terrestre, permettant ainsi de

suivre les activit6s au sol en temps reel. [ALWARDT 2013]

Toutefois, ii est aussi clair que les drones, en tant que moyen de reconnaissance, gagneront

importance croissante dans l'avenir. Dans le cadre de cette fonction, la technologie des

drones s'est d6veloppee rapidement les derni~res d6cennies. ]CSS 2010] La technique de

reconnaissance militaire collecte, recherche et 6value des informations sur des adversaires

r~els ou potentiels. La reconnaissance op6ratrice et tactique ainsi que le renseignement

stratdgique sont la base pour les opdrations militaires propres.

Pour les missions de reconnaissance sont utilis6s par ex. les deux types de drones suivants:

ALADIN, tun drone miniature, •tant actuellement en utilisation op~rationnelle dans plusieurs

pays membres de L'OTAN.' Le syst~me ALADIN fournit en temps r~el des informations de

surveillance et reconnaissance d~taill6es. Il s'agit d'un syst~me portable qui n'a pas besoin

de piste de d~collage. Ge drone a une longueur de 1,57 metres et une envergure atteignant

1,46 m~tres. La masse maximale de d~collage est de 4 kilogrammes. [EMT 2o14a]

Avec uine autonomie de plus de 6 heures, LUNA est un syst~me de reconnaissance sans

•quipage permettant de surveiller, reconnaitre et localiser sa cible en temps r6el sur

une distance de loo kilom~tres. Gr~ce A la conception modulaire de charge utile, LUNA

pourra •tre •quip6 dans l'avenir des charges utiles les plus modernes. Ses caractdristiques

Afin de peser les risques li6s f des attaques terroristes, ii est n6cessaire de d~crire de mani~replus precise les sc6narios possibles et d'6valuer les effets des moyens mis en oeuvre pour une

centrale donn~e. En principe, le public est en droit d'•tre tenu ai courant.

La probabilit6 d'une attaque terroriste ne peut pas •tre 6valufie au moyen de la m~thode

classique du calcul des probabilit~s. Toutefois, l'exp~rience montre que si un groupe terroriste

a dfiid6i d'attaquer une cible particuli~re, la probabilit6 qu'il parvienne Aison objectif est

tr~s &evfie. Les pirates de l'air du ii septembre 2001 avaient pu acqu6rir suffisamnment de

comp~tences en a~ronautique pour atteindre leur but. En outre, ius ont r6ussi fi s'emparer de

toiusles avions qu'ils avaient prfivu de d~tourner.

NoteLe d~bat portant sur les risques lids & des attaques terroristes ne dait comparter aucune indication ni

consideration d'instructians au susceptibles d'6tre "utiles,, dans la planification et Ia realisatian d'un

attentat. C'est pourquai les r~flexions menees et les scenarios etudies dans la pr~sente expertise ont

g~n~ralement •t4 formulas avec beaucoup de retenue et des d~tails sensibles ant 6t6 valantairement

omis. Les terroristes qui, par leurs comp~tences, leurs connaissances et leurs ressaurces, seraient en

principe en mesure de r~aliser des attaques efficaces, ne trouverant ci-apr~s aucune information dant

ils ne dispasent d~j& ou qu'ils ne puissent se procurer par ailleurs. Dants la presentation des scenarios

et des r~sultats d'evaluation, on a toutefais pris garde & ce que ladite retenue dans les formulations

n entrave pas trop Ia comprehension ni la valeur de 'expertise.

Ces derni~res semaines, une s~rie de drones jusqu'ici non-identifi~s survolant des centralesnucl6aires frangaises a attir6 l'attention dui public et des autorit~s. Le groupe public t~lectricit6

de France (EdF), qui exploite les centrales nucl~aires a communiqu6 fin octobre que des

drones ont 6t6 observes depuis le 5 octobre survolant diff~rents centrales nuc1~aires.

[TAGESSCHAU 20141.

Les survols ont 6t6 observ~s soit tard le soir, soit durant la nuit ou t6t le matin. Les survols

observ~s le 19 octobre 4taient au-dessus de quatre centrales nucl~aires tr~s 6loigndes les uines

des autres ; le lendemain, trois autres centrales ont •t6 survol~es, ce qui suppose une action

bien coordonn~e. ]NZZ 20o14]

Selon les m6dias, les drones n'avaient pour certains qu'une envergure de 20 Ai 30 centim~tres,

mais d'autres, mesurant deux m~tres, 6taient potentiellement en mesure de transporter des

petites quantit~s d'explosifs. M~me apr~s.qlue le ministre franqais de l'int~rieur eut affirm6

que les unites sp~ciaiis6es de la gendarmerie, charg~es depuis 2007 de survejiller Les centrales

nucl~aires, avaient entretemps re•;u 1'ordre de nmeutraiiser» ces objets volants, des drones

non-identifi~s survol~rent encore des centrales nucl~aires franqaises At pLusieurs reprises.

[BZ 2014]

Ces survols n'6taient pas limit~s aux installations dui groupe public 121ectricit6 de France

(EdF) seulement, les installations du Centre d'6tudes atomiques (CEA) de Saciay et l'usine

dui groupe Areva A La Hague ont aussi 6it6 survolkes. Plus de 30 vols de cette nature ont 6t•

observes jusqu'Ai prfisent [GREENPEACE 2014].

Personne n'a pris part aux diff~rentes speculations sur i'arri~re-plan des 6ivfnements actuels.

Le preisent rapport d'expertise synthfitique porte surtout suir La question dui danger liit/A de

tels survois de drones, dans l'hypoth~se oi'i ceux-ci seraient r~alisfis par des organisationsA

but terroriste.

En France, 58 r~acteurs nucl~aires sont exploitfis suir 19 sites, patrmi lesquels certains

atteindront ces prochaines annfies uine durfie de fonctionnement de 40 ans. En pius dii grand

nombre de retrait~s escompt~s dans uin futur proche qui entrainera uin manque de personnel

spfiialis6i et expfiriment6i et dui vieiLiissement du matfiriel 1ik aux contraintes d1ev~es snr

une p~riode 6itendue, ce sont surtout les points faibles de conception qui reprfisentent tine

protection insuffisante contre les agressions externes et tin risque potentiei qui prend de

pius en plus d'importance. Sur La base de La situation actueiie, on a 6itudi6i, Ai titre d'exemple,

le risque potentiel 1ik A des attaques terroristes pour les sites nuci~aires de Fessenheim,

Gravelines et Cattenom, situ~s pros de La frontikre beige, iuxembourgeoise, allemande et

su isse.

A La suite des attentats terroristes dui ii septembre 2001 auix l~tats-Unis, le ddbat public

porte de plus en pius suir la menace d'attaques terroristes stir des points n~vraigiques. Suir

une pdriode prolong~e, le d~bat public portait sur la menace d'attaques terroristes siir des

centrales nucl~aires, notamment avec des avions de ligne. On peut en effet imaginer de

nombreux sc~narios d'attaque. Ce sont en particulier les centrales nucl~aires frangaises Les

plus anciennes (r~acteurs de 900 MW) qui sont menacies par une large vari~t4 de scdnarios

d'attaques terroristes potentielles ; en effet leur protection contre ies risques venant de

l'ext~rieur est insuffisante. En outre, en termes de protection contre les accidents, leur

conception est inadequate par rapport atix derniers progr~s techniques et scientifiqties.

9vawt-p oposD'apr~s les informations de l'entreprise E~lectricit6 de France (EdF), diff~rentes installations

nucl6aires franqaises ant fait l'ob jet, depuis le 5 octobre 2014, d'un survol par des drones.

En date du 20 novembre 2014, onl comptabilisait 31 vols au dessus de quinze centrales

nucl6aires, trois centres traitant du combustible et un centre de recherche nucl~aire.

Jusqu'A cette date, les services de s~curit6 ne sont pas parvenus A emp~cher ces survols

ni A d~terminer leur origine et la motivation des pilotes. M~me si l'unit6 sp6ciale de la

Gendarmerie nationale cr66e en 2007 pour surveiller les centrales nucl~aires a re~u l'ordre de

neutraliser les objets volants, les survols ont continue au-dessus des installations nucl~aires.

M~me si l'on ne sait toujours pas qui en est Ai wl'origine, ces survols mettent en 6vidence de

mani~re 6clatante les failles dans la s~curit• des installations nucl~aires ainsi que l'incapacit6

des services concernt~s A trouver leur origine et A les emp~cher.

Dans la pr~sente expertise, la physicienne Oda Becker d~crit les risques pos~s par ces survols.

Si des rejets de radioactivit6 se produisaient dans les centrales nucl~aires de Fessenheim,

Gravelines ou Cattenom, qui font partie des centrales survol~es par des drones, ce serait non

seulement la France qui serait concern~e, mais aussi l'Allemagne, Ia Suisse, la Belgique, le

Luxembourg et diff~rents autres pays.

La possibilit& d'une attaque terroriste sur une installation nucl~aire met en •vidence un

probl~me fondamental de s~curit6. Le gouvernement allemand a d'ailleurs justifi6 la sortie du

nucl~aire d~cid~e en 200o2 par les risques terroristes auxquels sont expos6es les centrales.

De plus, les activit~s terroristes de ces derniers mois dans le monde nous obligentA

reconsid~rer l'usage de l'6nergie nucl~aire en int6grant les questions de s~curit• (security),

qui s'ajoutent aux questions de suret6 (safety). U ne attaque terroriste ne peut •tre exclue.

Une sortie du nucl6aire, comme elle a •t6 d~cid~e en Allemagne, en Suisse ou en Belgique

contribue donc A prot~ger la population contre un attentat terroriste. Une sortie rapide du

nucl~aire doit aussi 6tre discut~e avec cette approche.

Une sortie du nucl~aire ne devrait-elle pas initi~e au niveau europ6en ? Quelles garanties les

exploitants des sites nuclkaires et les autorit~s de surveillance peuvent-ils nous donner quant

Ala protection contre des attaques terroristes ? Les responsables doivent agir avant qu'un

attentat conduise A, un rejet majeur de radioactivit6 en Europe.

Heinz Smital (Green peace Allemagne)

La France conipte aujourd'hui 58 reacteiirs A ean sons pression repartis silr 19 sites. Ils serepartissent en trois categories (voir l'annexe A1)

Avec ses r~acteurs d'une puissance iinitaire de 900 MWe chacun, Ia centrale nucIeaire de

[essenheim [ait partie dii palier CPo et est Ia centrale Ia phas ancienne encore en activite

en France (raisc en service en 1978). Cette centrale nucleaire est sitlIee pros de ]a frontidre

franco-allemande, A' environ 30 km de Ia yiule allemnande de Fribourg.

Avec 6 reactenrs de 900 MWe (palier CP1}, Gravelines est Ia centrale nucieaire Ia plis

iniportante de France. Les reacteurs 1 A 4 ont etd mis en service en 1980-81, tandis quc ics

reactetirs 5 et 6 ndetaient mis en service qu'en 1985. Cette centrale nucleaire est situee stir Ia

cote [rancaise, A. ni-chenmin entre Calais ct Dunkerque.

La centrale de Cattenom composee de 4 reactetirs dc 1300 MWe fait partic dii palier P'4. Les

unites ont ere maises en service industriel de 1987 A 1992. Cette centrale nucieaire est situd'e

aubord de Ia Moselle, A 9 km de la [rontidre dii Luxembourg et prd~s de Ia yulle allentande de

Trdves.

Les reacteurs des centrales nucleaires de Fessenheim et Gravelines sont part icnlidrement

vulnerables aux agressions externes dans Ia mesure onf us ne sont proteges qiie par iine

enceinte de confinement simple de faible epaisseur (90 cm). Ce genre de construction ne

correspond plus A• letat actuel de la science et de Ia technique. Pour les projets de noiivelles

constructions, on tient pour necessaire tine epaisseur d'environ 2 indtres.

L'enceinte de confinement renferme le circuit primaire et Ia cuve de pression dii reactenr

dans leqiiel se trouve Ie combustible. L'enceinte doit emuptcher d'une part Ic passage de

particules radioactives vers l'exterieur (par ex. en cas diune muite de refrigerant) et d'atitre

part proteger le reacteiir contre des incidences mecaniqnes exterieures.

Les reacteurs de Ia centralc de Cattenom sont deja mueux congus, pourtant ius ne sont

toujours pas sufibsaminent proteges contres des agressions externes. Les reacteurs sont dotes

d'une enceinte de confinement A double paroi, sauf que l'dSpaisseur des parois est egalement

trds faible avec 90 cm/i

Les barres de combustible nueleaire epuisdes et extraites dii cceur dii reacteur sont stockees

dans tin bassin de desactivation pendant an moins 2 A 3 ans. Ce bassin de ddsactivat ion

est situe dans atitre batiment separe ct est insullisamment protege contre des agressions

externes. Sclon l'Autoritd de stfirete niicleaire (ASN), ces ba~timents, ont, stir tous les sites, tin

toit en t61e mince et des mtors en beton de faible epaissetir (30 cnl). Des details renseignant

siir Ia constrtiction des b~itiments de desactivation des barres cptiisees ne sont pas

disponibles. [LARGE 2o12j

Les deficits acttiellenient conntis chez les centrales nticldaires fran,•aises, non setilement vis-a-

vis des attaques terroristcs trals atissi vis-A-vis les sdisnics et Ics inondations, sont nombretix.

En otitre, il est bien connn qtie les mestires de htitte contre tin accident grave, surtouti

lorsque ccluiiici inipliqite plusiceirs blocs dim site A' Ia fois on Ia piscine de ddsactivation, sont

inexistantes.

Les centrales les pilus anciennes fonctionnant avec des r~acteiirs de 900 MWe nobtainment,mais aussi celles eqiiip~es de rc~acteurs de 1300 MWe, presentent une serie de deficits de

conception, qui algohentent tant les possibilite•s d'attaque que Ia ¢•reiissite,, potentielie d'une

attaque terroriste.

Pour illustrer ce cas, nous esquissons une panne de 1'alimentation electrique (Station Black-

out, SBO) sur Ie site de Fessenheim:

L'alimentation e'lectriqlue de Ia centrale nucheaire de Fessenheim comprend itn rt~seau

principal et on branchement secteur de r(•serve Lorsque I'alimentation c}lectrique externe

tombe en panne, l'alimentation devra €?tre assuree par itn gen(?ateur de blocs (circuit

auxiliaire secouril). Lorsqiie Ic gc~n(rateur de blocs tombe egalement en panne, Ie re~acteur

est arrete rapidement par voie autornatique. Les deux moteiirs diesel electrogenes de secours

pouvant assurer l'alimentation d}ectrique de ['ensemble des systemes importants pour Ia

seciirit¢? demiarrent alors. Ces detix moteurs scraient suffisants pour alirnenter et ruaitriser les

systemes de securite necessaires.7

En cas d'alimentation electrique de secours, l'alimentation regitliere dii generateiir ~igaz est coiipee, raison pour laquelle le systdme d'alimentation de secours doit deinarrer

autoifatiquement. La vapeur vive doit dtre dmfise dlans l'atmosphere fi travers les soupapes

de discharge (VCD-a (vannes de contournement de vapeur ai l'atinosphdre)). Le maintien de

Ia pression aii niveaii dii circuit prirnaire et l'alirnentation de Ia quantite d'eaii ne•cessaire

aii refroidissement dii cneir par les pompes de rd}frigd•rant ainsi que Ia boration exigee pour

Ia maisc en arrdt, doivent dtre assures par le circuit de Contr01e Chimique et Voluiuetriqiie

(RCV). [O)KO-INSTITIJT 20121

L'alimentation dlectriqite dc secours ia un niveau de redondance plus faible que celle des

centrales nucleaires allemandes. R{aison pour laqitelle elle est susceptible de rencontrer

des defaiits. En outre, ['ensemble des circuits d'alimentation electrique de secours ct/oh do

systdme de refroidissernent de maintien et de secours font recours un seul reservoir par

bloc, ce qui constitute itne faiblesse particulidrement sensible dii point de vue de la secuirite.

[O•KO-INSTITIJT 20121

A cause de Ia conception inadequatc et en vite des pannes de systeme et des

dysfonctionneinents de composants susceptibtes de se produire (lids par cx. au vieillissement

ct/iol .• ne mauvaise culture de hi securitd cn general) ni itne alimentation electriquc de

secours sans defaut ni tin fonctionnement des systdmes imnpliques repondant aux exigences

d'une situat ion d'dniergence ne peuvent dtre considerds cormme garantis.

Dans Ie cas d'une cure de reacteuir ouverte lors du remplacement des eldments combustibles

avec one panne simultanee de l'alinientation electriquec aol niveao des deux blocs, Ic risque

d'une exposition dii cam•.r dans de telles conditions se presente aut bout de quelques heores

dd~ji

A cause des defaillanccs existantes et en faveur de delais de reactivite et d'intervention

reduiits, l'Autorite franqaise de sfiretd nuicleaire (ASN) impose Ia maisc en place d'un '<noyau

dur,, (,Hardened Safety Core") visant sclon Ic concept •t mettre en place des equipeinents

assurant les fonctions vitales pour Ia seciirite en cas d'on evenement majeor.• Ce ,,retro

fitting" ne devant dtre transpose seulemnent juisqu'•i 2018, 00 ne Iprevoit pour Ia periodc

transitoire iiniquernent la maisc a disposition de petits groupes electrogdnes aut diesel de

secours pour I'alimentation par batterie. [OKO-1NSTITtIT 20121]

A savoir, aii moins jlisqu'a 2018, subsiste Ie risque d'une panne mnaieure aul niveau del'alimentation electriquc des deiix blocs.

Parmi les defillances additionnelles de Ia centrale de Fessenheini ligurent {OKO-INSTITtJT

20121

* Des mesures de prevention perrmettant, par ex. en cas d'agression externe, de

garantir l'int~grit(} de Ia piscine ainsi que le rnaintien dii niveau d'eau dans Ia cuve

(emp(•hement de pertes d'eaii suite l tine fijite dans Ia tliyauterie adjacente) n'ont

cependant pas encore &te raises en place.

* A cause de I'emplacement des disposit ifs de securite technique bien au-dessous dii

niveau dii canal lateral dii Rhin, il existe tin risque potentiel d'inondation de l'ensemble

dii site.

En outre, ii existe des indications qui laisseni supposer ijie Ia culture de Ia s}ctirite5 est

inadequate dans les centrales nucleaires fran<;aises :Lors de contr61es inopines effecttues en

aofit 201 1 dans la centrale de Cattenom, L'ASN a releve 35 e~carts au niveau d'elenents de

securitAS importants. <•Les nonibreuses lacunes constatees et leur importance en rmatiere de

shlrehe laissent siipposer que l'exploitant de Ia cent rale n'est pas grandement sensibilise i l a

securit(5 des installations>,. [MAJER 20121 On petit donc en concltire que dans chaque centrale

nuck~aire existe tin nombre important de defaillances non deceldes pouvant contribuer, en

cas d'accident grave, aii dysfnnctionnement de composants ou systdmes.

line culture de Ia seciritO inadeqtuate continue a lavoriser le risque d'un attentat terroriste

avec Ia participation d'agents internes.

Des auteurs d'attentats agissant de l'interieur constituent tine menace an moins aussi fortepour Ies centrafes nticieaires pie des attaques terroristes externes. C'est potirqtioi Ia menace

qie representent des acteurs internes est i'ob jet d'une grande attention dans fes mniliemix

internationaux speciaiises. Ainsi un expert a-t-ii souiigne lors de Ia conference internationale

sI a securite3 nucheaire (NHSEC)' pie le danger le pills grave concernant ies agents operant

de i'inteSrieur est leur connaissance en Ia mati~re :ifs en disposent constamment, sans auctin

contr61e. [HONELLI(0 20051

Des contr6ies dits de fiabifite sont censes emp{•her l'eibanche dans des centrales

nucldaires d'agents operant potentieliement de i'interieur. Certes, ces ve;riticat ions rendent

Ia penetration d'agents internes dans des centrales nicle~aire pius difficile, nmats elies

n'dliminent pas enti~rement ce risque. Ainsi a-t-on tout recemment appris qutmn djihadiste

beige nomme Iiyass Bonghaiab a travalille pendant trois ans en tant que technicien pour ia

soci6te5 Vinqotte • Wiirijk, jtisqu'a son depart en novembre 2012 pour Ia Syrie. De par sa

fonction, ii avait acc~s ai ia zone de secnrit& de ia centraie nucigeaire de Doe. IBRUSSELS 2014]

Le manque actuei de main d'oeuvre qtmaiifiee et Ie recours accru ai des entreprises exterieures

atigmentent, pour les terroristes, ies possibilites d'&tre engages, an mioins a court terme, dlans

iine centraie nncieaire. Lorsqu'nn agresseur potentiei a reussi a obtenir tin emnpioi ati sein

d'une centraie nncieaire, ii petit recrtiter d'antres agents smisceptibies d'operer de i'interietr,

qtie cc soit par conviction ideologiqtme, par corrumption on par chantage.

tine des mesures de protection les pills importantes contre les agressions d'agents en interne

est Ie principe de surveiiiance nitittelie (¢doubie regard>*). Mais cc principe est sans eftet s'ii

existe pitisietirs agressemirs internes. Ii petit egalenient etre mis a mnal par inattention, par

negligence on tout siulpiement par une rnlatvaise cltiitre de fa sectirite en generai.

Pour des agents operant de l'interieur les possibiiites d'intervention sont en premier iieu

ies actes de sabotage, par exempie stir des sotipapes importantes potir Ia sectirite iors des

operations de rernise en etat on d'entretien. Manifesternent, tin incident de cette nattire s'est

prodtiit debtit aout dans ia centraie nucleaire de Doei (Beigique), ofti ie bloc no 4 a dtl Otre

arr~te inopineinent •'m catise de Ia ftiite de 90 000 litres d'hnile ddtectee ati niveati des turbines

Svapeur. L'amitorite beige chargee de Ia ititte contre Ie terrorisnie (I'OCAM) enqti~te stir cc cas

EFLANDERS 20141.

Les scenarios potentiellenuent efficaces avec des agents operant de i'interieur sont mtiltipies,

mats ccliii qiii parait le pills simple •i realiser est l'attaqtme atix explosifs. Les pins dangeretix

sont les attentats ati cotirs desquels l'expfosii est place de rnani~re ciblee stir les points

nevraigiqties de Ia centrale. Memre de petites quantit~s d'expiosil (de l'ordre de quielqmies

kilogramnies) pourraient provoqtier tin accident de ftision de camur entrainant d'iniportantes

emissions de stibstances radioactives.

Mais dans Ie cas d'un attentat terroriste realise avec Ia participation d'agents internes, on peuti

s'attendre • cc pie totit soit termine• et ¢reussi,• en qtieqtues mintites. On ne petit pie dotiter

qtie Ie personnel charge de Ia smurete d'tmne centrale ntmcieaire soit en mestire d'ernp~her

tine attaque bien pr~paree. Des rnembres du personnel charge de Ia surete potirraient nieme

6tre impliques en tant qu'agents operant de l'interieiir. On petit par exenmple imaginer qu'ilsintroduisent eu~x-m~nies en fraude des armes oti des explosifs dans les bfitiments, ou qtiils y

apportent letir concotirs.

Les drones pourraient etre titilises alors comrnc soutien en vue d'un attentat At l'explosif.

11 est concevable que pltisieurs drones dlivrent,, l'explosif. On estirne qi'un agent inforred

operant de l'interieur puisse provoquer tin accident de fiusion de cumur dejA avec bien moins

de 10 kilogramrnes d'explosif. En d'autre termes, une cquantite d'explosif ,livrable* sans

probieme Ai l'aide de drones, vue leur charge utile et Ia facilitd5 apparente dc survoler tine

centrale nucleaire sans obstacle. On ne peut pas exciure Ia possibilite que les auteurs des

survols souhaitaient tester justement ce genre d'approche adrienne.

En outre, les drones pourraient favoriser l'attaque par one surveillance aerienne et/ou

agresser le personnel de Ia securit6 avec des petites charges d'explosif ou similaire.

line etude menee en 2010 Ai Ia deniande de Greenpeace Deutschland e.V. a ettidie l'effet

quei pourrait avoir stir tine des centrales nucleaires allemandes les plus anciennes uine

attaque A l'aide d'une arme antichar portable guidee. En raison de ses caracteristiques et des

possibilites d'acquisition, l'arme retenue fut le lance-missile AT-14 (Kornet E).0° Cette arme

permet, entre son ogive At charge cretise, de lancer egalenient des ogives thermobariques Al

grand effet destructif lorsque des substances combustibles sont ernployees. [BECKER 20101

La technologie de blindage amelioree et les blindages additionnels apportes aux vehictiles de

combat ont entraine le developpenient de missiles guides antichar portables ((ATGW Anti-

tank guided weapon) toujours pltis performants. C'est avant toute l'efficacite des ogives qui a

progressd trds rapidement au cours des dernieres decennies. A priori, on utit lise des ogivesA

charge creuse, tandis qiie pour certains systdmes d'arrme on a ddvelopp6 dgalement des ogives

t hermobariques.

Les armes ant ichiars ruodernes pourraient egalement etre dirigees contre des centrales

nticleaires :plus les armes sont efficaces, plus les effets d'une telle attaque pourraient dtre

graves. L'accroissement des paramdtres de performance des systdmes d'arines entraine

paralldlement une raise en danger potentiellement accrue pour les centrales nucleaires.

La possibilit6 technique d'une sequence rapide de tirs conjugude et d'un rechargement simple

facilite tine attaque et permettent de tirer plusieurs fois de suite stir Ie menie but. De surcroit,

le poids reduit et la manipulation simplifiee des systdmes d'armes modernes facilite leur

manientent et a fortiori tine attaque. [BECKER 20051

Les armes ant ichars portables sont disponibles en grand nombre suir le niarche noir puisqu'

elles sont simples A transporter et cacher, et, surtotit elles peuvent etre employees tries

efficacement contre diffidrentes cibles.

L'AT-i 4 est tin missile gtiidce antichar portahle ((ATGW ::Anti-tank guided weapon) de Ia 3e

gdeneration, developpe par Ia socidte russe KBP pour combattre des chars lotirds (portee 100o

ai 5.500 mdtres). L'ogive standard est dtu type a charge creuse en tandem et perce tin acier de

blindage homogdene de 1,2 m oti tine pardi en beton d'une epaissetir de 3 m. A c6te de l'ogive

A charge creuse en tandem, il existe tine ogive thermobariqtie con•tie pour stirmonter des

cibles non blindees et des renforts. La puissance explosive de cette ogive correspond (selon

les indications do fabricant) A celle de to kilogrammes d'explosif (TNT).

Le missile guide est lance directement ii partir dii conteneur de transport et de lancement,ce qui permet de disposer d'une arme prete At faire fetu tres rapidement, avec une sequence

de tirs relativement rapide (Ia vitesse de chargement est de 30 s). Outre le dispositif

optiqite de visee A Ia limi•Se dii jour, Ie lanceur de missile sur trepied est equipe d'un

viseur a image thermique permettant de detecter une cible de nuit. 11 est ainsi possible de

piloter simultarnenent detux lanceurs rnoyennant tin seul appareil de visee et d'attaquer

simultanement une seule cible avec detix missiles fARMY 20141.

Globalement, il fatit supposer qu'il serait possible pour des auteurs potentiels d'attentats

d'acquerir illegalement des AT-i4 avec leurs accessoires specifiques. II est possible que des

ogives thermobariques aient dejAi ete utilisees ponctuellenient par des terroristes, mais cela

n'a pas pu dtre etabli a ioo ¾.

L'AT-14 est vendo dans le monde entier. Les premiers systemes operationnels ont etd f0urnis

aux forces armees russes en 1994. Lors de I'JDEF (salon international de l'industrie de Ia

defense) a Istanbul en 2009, ce mdnie systdme d'armes flit l'une des mneilleures ventes.

INOVOST1 2oo7a,b; 200 9j. Depuis, ce systdme d'arrnes a dte exporte dans de notobreux pays"

[ARMY 20141. Le plus ces systdines d'armes circulent At l'echelle mondiale, plus il deviendra

facile pour des organisations terroristes de s'en procurer. Dans ce contexte, ii est important de

rappeler qiie l'armtl'e irakienne a receminent employe cette arme dans Ia province de Diyala

contre Ic groupe extretniste denommdn fEtat islamiqtie (El). [NOVOSTI 2o01 4 ]

tine ogive A charge creuse est tin projectile metallique

renfermant tin cone dvidd recouvert d'explosif. A l'impact stir Ia cible, le detonatetir se

declenche donnant lieu A Ia raise A etei de l'explosif. Toute Ia force d'explosion se condense

en oan foyer generant tine enorme onde de chaleur, le dard, qui atteint Ia cible a tine vitesse

trds dlevee, de plusietirs milliers de metres par seconde. Les ogives des systdmes d'armes de

troisieme generation sont ddjA• en mnesure de percer tin blindage d'acier d'environ tin metre

d'epaissetir oil de percer tin nouir en beton armne d'une epaissetir d'environ trois mdtres.

l'effet des armes a stirpression thermobarique appelees atissi

,¢bombes aerosols,, (FAE : Fuel-Air Explosiv) repose stir le principe de Ia dispersion d'tin gaz

explosif dans l'air avant de ddclencher l'explosion par ignition."• lne ogive thermobarique

est composee d'tin conteneur renfermant tine substance pyrophoriqtie. Pour declencher

l'explosion l'on titilise detix charges explosives I a detonation initiale disperse totit d'abord

tin fin ntiage de brume explosive, tin aerosol (melange air-combtistible) qui, de par sa

consistance, se diffiuse stir tin large pdriindtre. OQuelqties dixiemes de seconde plus tard,

Ia detixieme charge embrase ce ntiage de brtime explosive. La deflagrat ion a lieti presqtie

simultanement dans tine enorme botile de feti d'un diametre de 10 A 40 metres.

L'effet principal des ogives therniobariqtie est obtenti par l'enorme onde de chioc issue de Ia

deflagration pouvant ddtruire des batinuents et des equipements. L'effet de l'onde de chtoc

perdtire nettement pltis longtemps qi'avec tin explosif traditionnel. La stirpression dans Ia

detonation petit atteindre 3 MPa (30 bar). En dehors di nutage Ia vagtie de sotiflle se deplace

a pltis de trois kilonidtres par seconde. En outre, les bombes aerosol ont tin effet therotique

sensiblement plus fort qtie les charges explosives conventionnelles. La temperattire peuti

atteindre de 2500 A 3000 •C. Datitres degats se p)rodtiisent par Ia depression totit atissi brttale

:L'explosion sotistrait de l'oxygdne de l'air ambiant et provoqtie ainsi tine chtite de pression

en-dessotis de la pression atniospheriqtie creant tin Iltix d'air assez fort pour attirer des objets

mobiles, ce qtii entraine d'attres destrtictions. Si I'on tire stir des locatix fortifies comme tin

bunker, le combustible peiit y pdnetrer et y occasionner des destructions considerables. LEC2014; LAS 20141

11 y a quelques anrnees, la Russie a effectue des essais de tirs afin d'etudier sur on modd~e) Ia

resistance do nouveau type de reacteur (de quatricime gendration) face aux syst~ines d'armes

rnodernes. On utilisait entre autre le missile AT-u4 . R~siiltat :Ic scenario d'attaqiie choisi pour

ces essais de tir pourrait engendrer un accident de Fusion de cceur. [BECKER 2010)

On d~crit ci-apr~s Ic scenario d'une attaque potentielle avec le syst~me d'armes AT-i4 . 11 n'est

pas dans l'intention dii redacteiir de decrire l'approche Ia plus ,•eliicace>,, mais de sensibiliser

aii risque potentiel et •' l'0ventiialite d'une telle attaqoe.

Par analogie aux essais de tir fuisses on presuime qoe deux groupes d'agresseurs avec ao

moths deox personnes chaciin realisent l'attaqoe. An debuit de l'attaqite, Ies terroristes

goettent on lieu dissimile • ioo jusqu'g iooo mdtres de distance dii reacteur, one partie

restreinte do batiment. Les deux groupes lancent • rythme sequentiel des projectiles ~charge creuse en plusieurs double salve. Ensuite, snnt lancees pliisieurs ogives h charge

thermobarique. A l'aide doun viseor une memne zone cible pourrait dtre visee.

Les projectiles • charge creuse pourraient percer sans probl~me la paroi exterieure en beton

arme de l'enceinte de confinement qui ne comporte que 90 centhnetres d'epaisseiur. L'ardillon

de Ia charge creuse perdrait alors environ tin tiers de son energie et il ne detruirait • Ia suite

qu'un nombre limite de composants de s~iirite importants, tout ao moins dans certaines

zones. Or, ces degiits relativement limitds seraient encore maitrisables poor les systdoes

de siiret6 de Ia centrale.' Toutefois, viie Ia sensibilite aux ,,perturbations,• des anciennes

centrales nuckeaires et les ddfaillances en mati~re de gestion d'incidents, le risque qu'un

accident grave se prodiiise, ne poiurra pas etre entierement exclui.

Chactin des projectiles h charge creuse ne percerait qu'on trde petit troo dans Ia paroi

exterieore de l'enceinte de confineiment. Sauf que Ie beton arme se briserait aiitour dii troo

perce. A cause de Ia precision in~galee avec laqoelle le bitt est atteint, il est concevable qo'un

bombardement multiple de Ia mdue cible provoque on troui et Ia propagation de fissures

dans Ia zone affectee de la paroi de l'enceinte. line ogive thermobarique propiilsee dans ce

troil disperserait oin aerosol a l'interieor dii b~itiment reacteuur. L'elfet des premieres ogives

therrmobariques agrandirait le troul dans Ia paroi deja endommagee. La puissance destructive

des ogives thermobariqiies siiccessives se propagerait alors trds loin • l'interieuir de l'enceinte

de confinenient. L'onde de choc ddtruirait un grand nombre de composants de s~cuirit&. A

cause de Ia chaleur intense les capteors et les circuits de commande toniberaient en panne.

En tout etat de cause, Ies explosions thermobariqoes ont on effet siir on p~rimdtre trds large

entravant plusieurs eldnents redondants a Ia fois. Tres probablement, Ie refroidissement

do cixuir dii reacteiir tonuberait en panne int~gralement sans moyen de le faire redemnarrer

Scourt terme. Un accident de fu~sion dii crur scrait pratiquement in~vitable. O)r, puisque

I'cnccinte de confinenient serrait endomniagee (troll perc6 par les projectiles) il en resuhterait

l[accident le plus grave t ine fusion de cnoeir a enceinte de confinemient ouverte.

Les resultats issius des essais de tir russes permettent de tirer des conclusions quant aiix

effets potentiels d'une telle attaque sur iine centrale nuclh~aire franqaise. La protection

externe des reacteiirs de Fessenheim et Gravelines (conime celle de tootes les cent rales

nucleaires equiip~es de r~acteiirs de 900 MWe) est relativement faible. En iodine temps,

des tirs multiples avec tin lance-missiles AT-i4 seraient possibles depuis tine distancede pitisietirs centaines de rn~tres. line telle attaq, e pourrait, fi supposer qtie soient aussi

titilisees des ogives thermobariqucs, causer tin accident de fusion de coetir accompagne d'une

dissemination non negligeable de partictiles radioactives.

Dans tin tel scenario dattaque, le batimnent de stockage des elemnents combustibles epuisos

serait egalement gravement endomniage. II y aurait probablement tine Ibite de refrigerant

ati niveau de Ia piscine de desactivat ion et ie refroidissement ne sera pas suffisamment

rapidement remis en Otat. Conclusion tiun accident grave entrainant diniportantes emissions

de stubstances radioactives, voir chapitre 6.

Des drones petivent servir ~i la preparation oti pendant l'exectition d'une telle attaque.

Ainsi, pourrait-on choisir des cibles appropri~es pour tin bombardement ,,reuissi, ~i partir

dti materiel photographique obtenti • l'aide des drones et analyser Ia performance et

l'eqtiipement dti personnel de sectirite (routines, materiel, moyens de communication etc.).

Pendant l'attaqtie les drones pourraient servir de moyen potir tenir en echec le personnel

de securit6 avec des p~etites charges d'explosils afin de pouvoir condtiire a •bon terme,• Ie

scenario de bombardement.

Dans le cas d'tune attaqtie terroriste a•,rienne, de nombreux scenarios soot concevables

ati-del•' de l'attaqtie realisee a l'aide d'tin avion de ligne. La menace d'tine attaque terroriste

adrienne est partictilidreoment dlevee potir les rdacteurs des centrales nuicleaires de

Fessenheim et Gravelines, comme d'ailletirs potir totisles 34atitres reactetirs franqais de

Ia catogorie 900 MWe, ptiisqti'ils ne soot proteges des agressions exterietires que par tine

enceinte de confinement • paroi simple d'une epaisseur relativement faible (90°cm).

On petit concevoir tine attaqile terroriste adrienne par exemple im l'aide d'tin hdlicoptdre.

line telle attaqtie est relativement simple ii realiser ptiisqti'un helicoptere est tin adronef

trds maniable. La disponibilite des helicopteres etant suflisante, des terroristes pourraient

envisager ce procede comnie moyen d'action.'4 Totites les conditions techniqtues prealables

Ia ,retissite,, d'tmn tel scenario soot reunies avec l'hdlicoptdre.'S

Potir potivoir roaliser tine telle attaqtie, tin groupe terroriste devrait d'abord s'enparer d'un

helicoptere, embarqtier tine qmiantite iniportante d'explosif, voler avec I'helicoptere charge

vers la centrale nucleaire et y faire dclater tine grande qtiantite d'explosit.

S'emparer d'un helicoptere est possible relativement facilement pour des terroristes: Les

vols en hdlicoptdre nidme ai titre prive correspondent a tine tendance en pleine croissance.

Dans nombreuses villes allemandes, on petit reserver tin hdlicoptd•re, par exemple pour des

exctirsions aeriennes. I1 serait egalenient concevable de detourner tin hdlicoptdre avec son

pilote, comnme le deinontre l'exemple stiivant : f Bruges (Belgique), trois ddtentis se soot

evades dtine prison •'i [aide d'tin helicoptdre. Le pilote de l'hdlicoptdre avail d'abord dte pris

en otage par detix personnes qtii avaient reserve tin vol comme des totiristes ordinaires.

[WELT 2009j

L'embarquement d'une quantitd importante en explosif est possible sans difficulte: de

nombretix endroits permettent de laire atterrir ci reddcoller tin hdlicoptdre sans probhdme,

Ia stirface necessaire dStant relativeinent reddtite. Ainsi, l'helicoptdre potirrait atterrir dans

tin lieti secret potir y cmbarqticr des explosifCs. La charge utile possible potir tin helicoptdre

est de l'ordre d'une tonne. Meme des hdlicopt~res pills petits peuvent embarquer plusieurscentaines de kilos. La charge utile admissible d'un helicoptere permet de charqer une quiantitd

non negtiigeable d'explosils.

11 est manifestement possible d'atteindre la cible avec un helicopt~re: Avec; one vitesse

de croisiere supt~ieure it 200 km/h, on hd1icopt~re atteint one vitesse relativement clevee.

L'approche d'unc centrale nucl~aire pent donc se faire tr~s rapidement, de sorte que

l'intention des terroristes n'est ddvoik~e clie juste avant l'attentat. Avec une capacite de

reservoir de pilisielirs centaines de litres, oin helicopt~re dispose d'un large rayon d'action

(pltisieors centaines de kilomi~tres)..

Graice fi un pilotage simple et precis, ainsi qu'a Ia possibilite d'atterrir mdmne stor des surfaces

reduites (par ex. slur les toits d'hc~pitaux), I'helicopt~re est predestine aux interventions de

sauvetage. Mais ces memes proprietes permettent fi des terroristes d'utiliser un helicoptcre

conune one arnie contre one centrale nicleaire. Des terroristes peuvent sans probleme piloter

un helicoptere contenant une grande quantite d'explosifs pour le jeter sur ou contre l'enceinte

de confinement d'un reacteur ou le bdtiment de desactivation des elements combustibles

use~s. Les survols de drones observes ces dernieres semaines mettent en evidence les faiblesses

dans la defense aerienne des centrales nucleaires fran{'aises. Surtout la defense contre de

telles attaques aeriennes potentielles. Ainsi, les drones observes poorraient avoir enregtistre du

materiel permetta•nt de preparer en detail une attaque.

Le declenchement d'une explosion sur des b~timents est possible: II serait possible, at l'aide

d'lun helicopt&re, de mettre en oeuvre plus de cent kilogrammes d'explosif. L'explosif potirrait

dtre fixe fi cet e~ffet sur le biitinient. L'effet destructceur d'un explosif est maximal lorsqo'iI

est instalIe directenient stir Ia structure a detroire, et avec Ic meilleur contact possible.

Pour installer Ia charge explosive ct proceder ai la maisc i• fell, tin laps de temps de quelques

minutes devrait etre suffisant. Or cette dtir•e n'est pas soffisante pouir que les forces de

sectirite 00 Ia police, ulne fois prevenoe, pliissent eiip~cher l'attentat. Dans ces conditions,

on doit partir dli principe d'one action ,"relissie",. D'autant p)lus, si l'attaque est soutenue par

Ia transmission d'informations sur la situation actuelle (position et activites do personnel de

securite etc.) ou par une lutte ciblee contre le personnel de securite a• l'aide de drones.

tine alitre possibilit6• serait tin attentat suicide, dans Icquel Ie pilote d'un heIicopt~re charge

d'explosif laisserait l'appareil s'ecraser sur Ie biitiiuent. Dans tin tel cas, tine grande quantite

de carbtirant dans le reservoir de I'helicoptere aligmenterait encore l'ampleor des dommages

potentiels. En tout etat de cause, il est fort probable qoe les terroristes puissent transporter

at l'aide d'un helicoptere une qoantite importante d'explosijs dans un lieo considere comme

approprie.

Les installations nticleaires ne sont pas conques pour resister a~ Ia detonation de charges

explosives. On consid~re qtie Ia protection contre les explosifs est obtenue par Ie tait que

de telles stibstances explosives ne doivent pas e~tre conservees ii proximite d'une centrale

noclc•aire.

IUn explosif largeiment repandu est le Trinitrotoltiol (TNT) titilise entre autre a des fins

inilitaires, dans l'arnienent et pour des travatix de satitage dans Ie genie civil. Des calctils

approxiiiatifs ont permis de€valiier Ia qtiantite de TNT necessaire potir transpercer iine

enceinte de confinement a simple paroi en beton arme fi l'aide d'tine charge explosive posee

dessiis. tin helicoptere pelit sans aiicnn p~roblcme transporter pltisiemirs lois cette quiantite•. II

en va de mi~me pour les b,•timents dans lesquels sont stockes les elkments combustibles uses.Vue Ia quantite d'explosifs qu'un helicopti~re peut transp~orter, Ia destruction des structures il

doubles parois de Ia centrale de Cat tenom ne petit pas etre exclue.'('

Lors de l'explosion d'une telle quantite d'explosif on de charges aussi puissantes, les

retombees de blocs de boron de plusietirs tonnes, l'onde de choc et la secousse peuvent

provoquer d'importantes destructions ii l'interieur de 1'enceinte de confinement et

interrompre Ie refroidissement dii reactetir. L'envergure de Ia destruction ne perruettrait pas

Ie retablissement d'un refroidissement approprie. LI en resiihera, avec tine lorte probabilite,

un accident de fulsion de cneur suivi d'une dissemination non n~gligeable de particules

radioact ives.

Dans le cas d'une explosion ati niveall dii bfitiment de stockage des Olements combustibles

epuises, tine dissemination non negligeable de partictiles radioactives est it craindre. Totis

les bfittiments de desactivation des centrales nucleaires franqaises ont tine structure fi paroi

simple. Raison pour laqtielle il est tout ,5_ fait possible que des explosifs provoquent des

d•Sgitts importants en provoquant tine fuite de l'eau de refroidissernent de Ia piscine de

desactivation. Des contre-ruesures appropriees soot inexistantes ott itopossibles itinmettre en

miuvre et Ia dissemnination de partictiles radioactives est alors in~vitable. (Voir chapitre 6)

Des drones petivent servir at Ia preparation oti pendant l'exectition d'une telle attaque. Ainsi,

les drones fournissent avec leur rnateriel photographique les renseignenients detaillds

permettant de deceler les lieux ideatix pour faire atterrir l'h•lqicopt~re, les points appropri~s

pour installer les charges explosives et d'analyser l'equipement et les act ivites dii personnel

de sectirite (routine, nmateriel, moyens de communication etc.) Dtirant l'attaque, il serait

possible aussi que les drones soient titilises pour agresser le personnel de secirite avec des

petites charges d'explosif afin de permettre ['installation des charges explosives et faire

&,later celles-ci sans etre perturbe.

A l'examen de toutes les etapes necessaires, tine attaqtie terroriste realisee fi ['aide d'tin

helicopt~re constitue tin scenario d'attaque relativement simple at executer, et qtii, avec tine

forte probabilite, aura des consequiences catastrophiques. Les stirvols des drones ont illustre

qtie les mestires de protection maises en places dans les centrales nickeaires fran~aises ne

pourraient pas emp~cher tine telle attaqtie. Les drones pourraient bel et bien sotitenir tine

attaque.

Note: Les atitorites nationales de securite en Allemagne semblent considerer tine telle attaqtie

cotnite utne menace. Ainsi a-t-on rocenment posr, des grilles stir l'iin des bfittiiients de Ia

centrale nticle~aire de Brokdorf, dont Ia raison d'c~tre n'a pas €}t olficiellernent commttniquiee

pour des raisons de confident ialite. Selon des spdculations, ces grilles devraient emip~cher

['atterrissage d'hdicopt~res. [SEI FERT 2014]

Arr~t du r~acteur a court terme: I1 est en principe possible de redtiire Ia vtlnerabilite d'unecentrale nucleaire vis-a-vis des agressions de toute nature en Ia mnettant iil l'arret. Cependant

uin arrdt visant a prendre en compte a court ternie une menace aggravee n'a pas tin grand

inter~t.

Or la siurete dii reacteur pose tin probl~me crucial :certes, ii est possible d'interrompro Ia

reaction en chaine nicleaire par uin arr~t d'iurgence, inais il n'est pas possible d'arreter Ie

dt~gagemnent de chaletir issu de Ia desintegration dui combustible (dite •,puissance residuelle,,.

Dans ces conditions, tine eventuelle panne dui syst~nie de refroidissement petit entrainer en

peii de temps Ia fiusion dui ca~iur.

Aprds l'arrdet, cette chaleur diminue, aui debtut plititt rapidement. On pouirrait donc tenter de

reddtire cette chaletir de desintdgration et de ralentir les processus conduiisant/ l~ a fusion dii

coctur en arretant Ie reacteur ati moment addqiiat.

Les estimations niontrent quie les arrdts devraient avoir lieu pltisieuirs semaines, voire

pluisieurs mtois avant l'attaque pour degager suiffisarorent de tenips pour des mesures

d'intervention adaptdSes. Mais dans touts les cas, les chances de sticces des contremnesuires avec

tin re~actetir fi l'arrdt sont toiljours bienmeilltiures. La dissd~mination de partictules radioactives

est dgalenient plus faible, piuisqu'tine partie des radionticleides a vie cotirte (par ex. l'iode

131) sera deja desintegree dans uine large mestire. [HIRSCtt 20o41

Renforcement de la protection des installations: tine des options possibles pour se

defendre d'attaquies terroristes est de renforcer la protection des installations, par exerople

Stravers l'atigmentation des effectifs dui personnel do sectirite et l'amdlioration de letir

armeiient, Ia nuodernisation des grillages, l'ajotit de barrid'res stir les voies d'accds, etc. Les

ddtails concernant les inesures de cette nature no soot pas puiblies; on a sans aucun douite

fait avancer los pratiques de fa~on positive deputis Ic i1 septembre 2001.

I1 est certain qti'avec de telles mestires, on ameliore la protection contre des attaqties ati sol.

Mais elles sont peu etficaces contre des attaques aeriennes, comme les stirvols do drones l'ont

ddmontre.

Chactine des centrales nucleaires fran~aises est stirveillee par tine tinite speciale de Ia

gendarmerie. Selon les inedias, les gendarmes ont rec~u Ic 30/10/2014 latitorisation de tirer

stir les drones suirvolant Ie site d'une installation nuicleaire, avec toutefois l'interdiction

de tirer en direction des installations nucleaires [Li.-WORT 20141. La vraie qtiestion est

d'ailleuirs de savoir qitelle arnie est appropriee. Dans toins los cas, les stirvols ont continue au

desstus des centrales nticleaires medme aprds l'auitorisation do tir.

Zones d'exclusion adrienne et lutte aerienne: En France, il est interdit de suirvoler des

installions nuicleaires dans tin perimctre do cinq kilonidres et • tine altittude infcrieuire f i ooo

mdtres. C'est l'arrnee do l'air 1ran•,aise qtii est chargd~e de Ia surveillance do cot espace aerien.

Certes, les zones doexcltision aerienne ati-dessus des centrales nuicleaires reditisent Ie risque

d'uin crash accidentel, mais cette mestire est sans effet en cas d'attaquie ciblee, corome avec tin

helicoptere. La faible efficaciteL de ces zones d'excltision adrienne a ete raise en evidence par

los stirvols des drones.

Do mdme, los interceptetirs des forces adrionnes no peulvent contribtier que doefa:on himuitde

ala protection des cent rales nuicicaires fran•:aises. En theorie, il serait possible d'abattre tin

hdlicoptdre dont l'intention terroriste ost detectce ;;i temps, par Ilintorvent ion des chassetirs

rnilitaires durnent avertis. Pouirtant, on ne pent gudre esperer qne ies intercepteurs arriventan bon moment, pnisqn'iI Ienr faiit, nne fois i'alarme donnee, an moins 15 minntes ponr

decoiier et qneiqnes minntes snppiementaires poor atteindre Ia centrale nncloaire. Pendant

ce temps, nn hdmcoptere pent parcohirir qneiqne 70 km. ii est pint6t invraisembiabie qne

l'intention terroriste de i'eqnipage de l'hdiicopt~re soit dejg• detectee a cette distance.

Notamment ies centraies ies pins anciennes tonctionnant avec des reactenrs de 900 MWe,

mais atissi ceiles eqoipees de reactenrs de 1300 MWe, presentent one serie de deficits de

conception qni angmentent Ia ',r~lssite,, potentielle d'imne attaqne terroriste. C'est nn fait qoe

Ia maise en oeuvre de mesnres passives pills rigonrenses snr ies sites des centraies nnckeaires

ne permet pa de compenser.

Giobalement, on ne pent qiie meltre en dotite i'efficacit•5 de l'ensemble des mesores de

protection. Totites ies mnesnres de protection penvent dtre contonrnees par I imaginat ion

d'nn agresseor et/on par une force de frappe adaptie et nn armernent approprie, an service

d'nn commando d'agresseors. Ceia vant poor ies attaqnes an sol, mais pins encore ponr les

attaqoes aeriennes on ceiles depnis l'ean, on • pills forte raison ponr des attaqnes mixtes.

La pinpart do, temps, le risque d'attaqnes terroristes suir des centrales nncieaires est

d6iib~rmnent minimise. On affirme qne ies centraies nncleaires sont snffisamment

secnrisees, or, poor des motifs de confidentialite on ne ponvait pa commnniqner des details.

Cette affirmation a dte refntde de mnaniere impressionnante par ies snrvois des drones.

Apparemment, ies expioitants et ies antorit~s sont impoissants am mettre fin anx sorvols.

D'anre part, ies miesnres de secnrisation raises en place stir ies sites devraient etre con nnes

apres des vois de reconnaissance exhanstifs.

On ne ponrrait atteindre nn nivean eleve de protection, qni offrirait nne veritabie chance de

contrecarrer one attaqne, qtm'• travers one sc~nrisation miiitaire de grande ampienr, c'est-

a-dire "a travers nn stat ionnement de tronpes terrestres avec des positions d'artiiierie, des

batteries de defense antiaerienne, des vedettes rapides et des nagenrs de combat, etc. Mais

nne teile niiiitarisation de i'indnstrie de i'energie apparait incompatibie avec i'idee done

societe denmocratiqtme onverte. [HIRSCH 20041

Ln ontre, de teiies mesnres engendreraient d'antres risqnes specifiqnes :Les armes penvent

•tre d&clenche~es par erreor on par on defaumt technique. Des civiis peuvent Otre victimes de

mesores d~fensives declench~es en raison doune menace sopposee on reelie.

Les armes tmtiiisees penvent Ügaienment provoqoer des donmnages ii Ia cent rale nmicieaire, on

meme etre empioySes deliberement contre ia cent raie si des proches do personnel miiitaire

ont tde corrompos on recrutets par d'autres moyens par des organisations terroristes. Memne

ia prise d'assant on Ia prise de contrd1e des postes d'artiiierie par des terroristes ne peutit 're

totalement exchie. {ItIRSCI 20041

Les scenarios d'attentats decrits dans Ia presente expertise provoqueraient scion totitevraisemblance tine perle non maitrisable de refrigerant dans les r.Sacteurs attaques,

entrainant ainsi un accident de fusion de caeur. II s'agit meme en l'occurrence de la variante

Ia plus dangeretise et Ia plus lourde de consequences pour un accident de fusion de co.eur:

une fusion dii crtir avec enceinte de confinement ouverte. Les diss~minations de part icules

radioactives cominencent dans cc cas partictili~rement tot (dans tin d61ai de quelques heures)

car l'cnveloppe de securite n'offre plus aucune retenue maine temporaire. En outre, ces

rejets sont partictiliareinent eleves. En effet, lorsqtie Ia dispersion est retardee, tine partie

des radionucleides dagages par Ia fusion dii combustible est prdcipitee stir des surfaces pitis

froides dii batiment. Dans le cas d'une enceinte de confinement endomnmagee, voir ouverte,

ce facteur de reduction de Ia dissenmination vers I'exterieur n'existe pas. Le delai de prealerte

pour Ia dissaniination de particules radioactivcs n'est alors que de quelqmmes heures. Les

quantites de radionticieides volatils (par ex. ie cesium 137) dissemines se situent dans tine

plage de 50% ii 90% de l'inventaire do Qrtir.

Dans les centrales nmicleaircs francaises, les bassins de ddsactivat ion des combustibles tusds

ne se sittient pas • l'interietir de l'enceinte de confinement, mais dans tin b~timent voisin

distinct. En raison de Ia faible epaissetir des parois ct de la toittire de cc b~tirnent, Ia piscine

de stockage est partictilidrement vtilndrable. U~ne attaqtmc terroriste causant de graves

doinmages • cc batiinent petit entrainer tin econlemcnt de l'eati de refroidissemnent.'7 A

catise de Ia puissance residnelle, cela a pour effet tin r~chauffcnient dii conbtistible qtii y

est cntrepose. Le combustible decharge deptiis peti dti reactetir gendre tine product ion de

chalcur relativernent elevdSe, et petit atteindre en l'espace de qtaclquies hetires one temperattire

de 900 C. A• cette teinperattire, Ie gainage des crayons de combustible, constittie de zircaloy,

comunence ai brtiler ii l'air libre. un tel incendic a tine temperatuire trds elevee ;ii est

impossible de l'etcindre a I'cao. II petit se propager dans Ia piscine a d'aitres conbtistibles

plus anciens, qimi d'etix-indmes ne s'echatifferaient pas atissi vite. Au final, tin tel incendie

petit condtiirc ii• Ia fusion de tout l'inventaire dii bassin de stockage )ALVAREZ 20031.

L'inllainmnation dti zircaloy a l'air libre est favorisee si, lors d'tinc attaqtie terroriste, les

dldenents combustibles dii bassin sont egaleinent endominages, par ex. par des retoinbees de

gravats ou des eclats. Les copeatix de zircaloy petivent s'enilaminer dds 200 'C environ.

En cas de ftite do rdfrigdrant dans Ia piscine de ddsactivation, totite intervention est

pratiqtieinent qumasiment impossible. Dds qtie l'eati s'est ecotilce dti bassin, on perd non

setilement son effet refrigerant inais atissi l'elfet dcran de I'eau contre Ic rayonnenuent. Le

niveaui de rayonnement atigmnenterait considerablement non settlement atix alentotirs do

bassin, inais atissi dans d'attres zones dtu biitiment. Ati bord dii bassin, les debits de dose

petivent atteindre 100 Sv/h environ. ]ALVAREZ 20031 A proxirn'itd dti bassin, l'exposition

d'une dtiree de quiclqtis mininttes petit dtre inortelle. A tine distance de 20 in, Ics debits de

dose petivent encore avoisiner 1 Sv/h IASN 201 i].

Les graves doommages ati bassin de stockage cot rainent d'iimportantes eimissions de

substances radioactives. Le niveati des einissions potir cc scenario n'a pti etre determine

jtisqtia' cc jour ni cxperimentalenient, ni par des analyses exactes. Totitelois, tine etuide

americaine fournit des valeurs d'orientation indiquant que 10 • 10oo% de l'inventaire enceSsium contenti dans Ia piscine, serajent dissemines hors dii b~timent [ALVAREZ 2003].

A Cattenoni, Ia piscine de desactivation est conqiie pour un stock total de 630 ekcments

combustibles epuises. [ASN 201liTnutefois, une partie des unites d'accueil (193) doit etre

gardee libre pour des epuisenuents inuprevus. Dans ces conditions, en exploitation normale,

ii est prewu un stock maximal de 437 3k~ements combustibles,'s ce qui repr•'sente quand

m~me plus dui double des {qkments presents dans Ie cceur. Par consequ~ent, les Omiissions dii

radionucleide significatif, le cesiunm 137, auxquelles il fatit s'attendre • Ia suite d'iine attaque

terroriste telle qui'envisagee ci-dessus, sont dii mu'me ordre de grandeur qiie celles issues dii

coeur dii rC~acteuir. Ell~es peuvent depasser de loin celles-ci.

En cas d'accident de fusion de comur avec enceinte de confinement oiiverte, il ne reste que

trges peu de temps pour evaciier Ia population. En cas d'echec de l'evaciiat ion et en fonct ion

des conditions rn~teorologiques, des centaines de milliers de personnes seront exposees

des doses de rayonnement nocives ou nu~ie nmortelles. En proximite• de Ia centrale, il est fort

probable que les personnes soient atteintes dii syndrome d'irradiation aigu{5 et les personnes

ii• distance plus grande souffriront d'effets fi long terine (surtout dii cancer et des aherations

genetiques h&reditaires).

L'Alleniagne n'est qu'insuffisamment pr{•paree •' un accident nucleaire. Ceci a ere d~eel

lors d'un exercice de conmnunication entre l'etat f~deral et les L~inder place dans Ic contexte

d'iine catastrophe niicleaire dans la centrale nuclkaire Emsland le 17 septembre 2013. Lors de

cette simulation, Ia population n'a et avertie qu'au mnonent oi'i le nuage radioactif avait d~j•

atteint (des millions de personnes.

A l'aide des re~suiltats de l'evaliiation HlexRisk, il est possible de d6crire les consequences

potentielles issues d'un accident excedant les conditions de conception d'une centrale

(FLEXRISK 2o14(."• Dans Ic cadre dii projet FlexRisk, on a pui calcuiler les dep6ts de CS 137

siir Ia base de 88 scenarios inteorologiques reels siir uine annee representative (1995). Pour

chacun des reacteuirs de Fessenheinl, Gravelines et Cattenoni on avait presuine one emission

de 30% de l'inventaire dii c(eur en cesiuim 137. Les dmissions consecuitives aiix attaques

terroristes evoqu~es pluis haut pourraient m~me dtre plus 6levees. On trolivera ci-dessoiis ine

seilection de quelques resuhlats, presentes et coimnentes. Les dep6ts de cesium 137 identifies

y sont illustres car ils sont considdres un indicateiir pour les contaminations siir Ie temps

long terme. Scion l'Agence Internationale de l'Energie Atoniique (A1EA), les territoires dont Ia

valeur de contamination dui sol par le cesiuim 137 est superieure fi 40 kBq/m sont consideres

comrne contamineis puisquie, aii cours de Ia premidre annee, Ia populat ion y serait expos•eCi

iine dose efficace de plus de 1 mSv (LELIEVELD 20121.

A des conditions meteorologiquies semblables • celles dii ier janvier 1995, imne bande

&,troite dii territoire Irangais et dii siid de l'Alleniagne serait fortement contaruinee aprds Ia

dissemination de substances radioactives dans l'environnement etlIa valeiir de contamination

dii sol par Ic cesium 137 s'dldverait • looo kBq/m environ. De surcroit, presque touite Ia

Siiisse et un large pdrimdtre dim territoire autrichien seraient egalenient contaminees.

Dans le cas dimne difhision de particules radioactives dans des conditions metoorologiqiies

pareilles i'i celles dii 2 septenibre 1995, le territoire beige serait torteruent touche.

Lors d'un rejet de substances radioactives dans des conditions me~teorologiques dii 29 julin1995, le territoire franqais serait le plus touche. La Belgique serait quasirnent enti~renient

contaminee. Par ailleurs, une region dans l'omest de l'Allemagne serait contaminee.

Dans tin autre exemple, base stir des conditions me~t~orologiques simnilaires fi celles dii

25 janvier 1995, le territoire Allemand serait principalement touchd par Ia liberation de

substances radioactives. Avec 1000 kBoJmi, les dep6ts de cesium 137 contamineraient tin

large perim~tre, voire m~me Ia Suiede risqtierait de faire face a_ la contamination stir de larges

p~rimdtres.

A des conditions meteorologiques semblables it celles du 1 1 mnai 1995, tine bande etroite dii

territoire franqais serait fortement contamnee& par Ia liberation de substances radjoactives

et la valeur de contamination dii sol par le cesiumn 137 s'el~verait g plus de 1000 kBq/m. De

stircroit, tine part de l'Italie serait •?galement totich~e.

Lors d'un rejet de particules radioactives dans l'environnement dans des conditions

md6torologiques similaires fi celles dui 9 octobre 1995, le Luxembourg serait non setilement

enti~remnent affecte mais atissi forternent contamine. De fortes charges radioactives se

pr~senteraient 6galement en Belgiqtie, atix Pays bas et en Allemagne.

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Illustration : Dep6ts potentiels de cesium 137 apres un accident grave dans Ia centrale nucleaire de Gravelines

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Illustration : D~p6ts potentiels de cesium 137 apres un accident grave dans Ia centrale nucl~aire de Fessenheim

Cattorlorn-1 Cottofoom-10966404 90o4. 112.14 P05 166.6 04COI137 06640000040006 132'10 P~q 1466 4C6137

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95000 7.00.o1160.040oit1 031009310.,1100041..0 100 .. 0 100 100 E0 .. 6 400 4."0 . =0 40.0 4.02 603 1.0 004 .. 0 407 4.6

0500054

Illustration : Dp6ts potentiels de cesium 137 apres un accident grave dans Ia centrale nucl~aire de Cattenom

En r~sum•, on constate dans la pr~sente expertise synth~tiqtie que, contrairement ?i ce qui est

pr~tendu par Les autorit~s et Les exploitants, les survols de drones observes depuis le d~but

d'octobre 2014 reprdsentent bel et bien un danger. Non seulement les survols des drones,

mais aussi l'incapacite des autoritds de sdcuritd d~montrde aui niveau de l'enqu~te suir cette

affaire et l'empfihement de telles actions, donnent toutefois lieu fi de vives inquidtudes.

La plupart dui temps, le risque d'attaques terroristes sur des centrales nuclkaires est

ddlibfirfment minimis6. On affirme que Les centrales nucldaires sont suffisamment

sdcuris~es, or, pour des motifs de confidentialit6 on ne pouvait pas communiquer les dfitails.

Cette affirmation a 6te r~fultde de mani~re impressionnante par les survols des drones.

Apparemment, les exploitants et les auitoritds sont impuissants fi mettre fin aux survols.

D'autre part, les mesures de sdcurisation raises en place stir les sites devraient •tre connues

apr~s des vols potentiels de reconnaissance exhaustifs.

Se plaqant dans l'hypoth~se qu'un groupe de personnes animdes par un mobile terroriste

ou criminel soit responsable des survols des drones, on a analyse dans La pr~sente expertise

synth~tique le danger qui en r~sulte.

Dans les applications militaires, les drones, m~me les plus petits du genre portable, prennent

de plus en plus d'importance dans la reconnaissance et La surveillance d'adversaires

potentiels. Dans le cadre de cette fonction, La technologie des drones s'est d~velopp~e

rapidement les derni~res d~cennies.

Dans le domaine militaire, il n'existe pas pour le moment de drones de petite taille,

transportant des charges l~g~res, qui seraient dot~s '<en standard>• d'un armement ou

d'explos ifs.

Toutefois, les drones d'application civile con~us pour des charges utiles de quelques

kilogrammes, pouvant donc embarqu• par ex. des explosifs, sont d~jai disponibles dans le

commerce.

A la lumi~re des deficits de conception et de La sensibilit• accrue aux perturbations, surtout

des 34 centrales nucl~aires les plus anciennes en France, on ne peut pas exciure le risque

d'une attaque r~alisee •. l'aide de drones suir lesquels des explosifs sont embarqu~s et envoy~s

vers des points n~vralgiques d'une centrale nuclkaire de faqon • provoquer un incident qui ne

puisse plus fitre maitris6 par le syst~me de s~curit• mis en place suir le site et capable de faire

&chouer toute mesure de protection mise en oeuvre par le personnel dui site en cas d'urgence

Lors d'un accident de centrale nucl~aire et qui entrai'nera tin rejet de mati~res radioactives.

Le present rapport d'expertise synth~tique porte surtout sur La question autour des scenarios

d'attaque terroriste pouvant causer un accident de fulsion de comur pratiquement irrevocable

soient concevable, fi savoir si une attaque pourrait provoquer des d~ga.ts de sorte que La prise

de mesures d'intervention pour emp~cher la dissemination vers l'ext~rieur soit de nul effet.

Au regard des faits quant fi La disponibilit6 et aux possibilites d'utilisation des drones ainsi

qu'en prenant compte la vuln~rabilit6 des centrales nucl~aires fran~aises de Fessenheim,

Gravelines et Cattenom, trois cas de figure sont concevables:

•Option N° 1 Les drones soutiennent tine attaque aux explosifs 'men~e par des agents

operant de l'int~rieur. On estime qu'un agent inform6 operant de l'int~rieur pourrait

provoquer tin accident de fuision de creur d~jfi avec bien moins de to kilogrammes

d'explosif. En d'autre termes, tine quantit• d'explosif <livrable>• sans problkme ?i l'aide

d'un nombre limit• de drones, vue leur charge utile et la facilit6 apparente de survoler

un centrale nucl~aire sans obstacle. On ne peut pas exclure la possibilit6 que les auteursdes survols souhaitaient tester justement ce genre d'approche a~rienne.

•Option N' 2 : Un bombardement de l'enceinte de confinement avec des missiles

guides antichar dui type AT-14 • une distance de plusieurs centaines de m~tres

pourrait provoquer un accident de fuision de cceur qui entraine tin rejet important de

mati~res radioactives dans l'environnement, • condition 6galement que des ogives

thermobariques soient employees. Les survols de drones pourraient ainsi avoir eu

comme but d'explorer des details diu site et du syst~me de s~curit6 qu'y est mis en place.

En outre, les drones pourraient favoriser l'attaque par une surveillance a~rienne et/ou

agresser le personnel de la s~curit6 avec des petites charges d'explosif ou similaire.

•Option N° 3 : La preparation d'une attaque adrienne potentielle effectu~e •i l'aide d'un

h~licopt~re. Dans ce cas, les drones sont utilis~s comme moyen fournissant des prises de

vue d~taill~es dui terrain, et de renseignement sur les ressources, la strat~gie et l'efficacit•

des forces de sfiret• de l'exploitant et des autorit~s. Les drones sont alors il consid~rer

comme un ((ballon d'essaih>. On peut ainsi analyser des d~tails sur le terrain et sa

s~curisation. Les survols des drones prouvent que les mesiires de s~curit6 mises en place

sont inefficaces. Apparemment, ceci est valable non seulement pour le cas d'actions

inattendues, mais egalement pour des actions • prevoir.

Les trois scenarios d'attaque terroriste d~montrent chacun la forte probabilit6 d'un accident

de fusion de cceur avec enceinte de confinement ouverte • Ia suite d'une attaque sur le

baitiment du r~acteur. Les rejets radioactifs pr~visibles seraient particuli~rement 6levis dans

ces circonstances et se pr~senteraient d~jaL au bout de quelques heures apr~s l'attaque. Ainsi

il resterait tr~s peu, probablement trop peu de temps pour g~rer une 6vacuation massive de•

population.

Dans un tel scenario d'attaque, le bafitment de stockage des 6lkments combustibles 6puis~s

serait •galement gravement endommag6. En somme, ii en r~sulterait uin accident grave

accompagn6 d'importants rejets radioactifs.

II n'existe pas pour le moment, des mesures qui permettent de r~duire /i un minimum la

vuln~rabilit6 d'une centrale nucl~aire en cas d'une attaque terroriste. Un arr~t du r~acteur

ne promet une s~curit6 accrue seuilement si celuii-ci est effectu6 quelques semaines avant

l'attaquie. Seuilement dans ce cas-la•, la chaleur de d~sint~gration aurait suffisamment

diminu~e pour gagner nettement plus de temps ai la prise de contre-mesures efficaces. Il est

incertain que le temps soit suffisant pour emp~cher les rejets, toutefois on gagnerait plus

de temps pour les mesures de protection de la population. Cela 6tant, l'Autorit6 fran~aise de

sfiret6 nucl~aire (ASN) devrait s~rieusement consid~rer l'arr~t des r~acteurs, tout au momns

jusqu'a la clarification des incidents.

L'•valuation des effets radiologiques que comporte un accident grave d~clenche par une

des attaques terroriste d~crites ci-dessus stur un r~acteur d'une des centrales nuicl~aires de

Gattenom, Fessenheim oui Gravelines prouive qu'en fonction des conditions m~t~orologiques,

de nombreux pays seraient affect~s par la contamination du sol sur uin large p~rim~tre,

particuli~rement la Belgique, l'Allemagne, le Luxembourg, la Suisse et la France.

Afin de pouvoir dvaluer et peser de fa~on intdgrale les risques nuc1daires, ii est impdratif deprendre en compte l'ensemble du spectre des risques entrainds par la terreur. En principe, le

public est en droit d'etre tenu au courant. D'autre part, il~faut dviter de fa~zon si~re que des

ddtails critiques en mati~re de vulndrabilitd des centrales nucbdaires d~celds dans le cadre de

l'examen, ne soient pas publids puisqu'ils pourraient •tre exploitds abusivement comme moyens

utiles de renseignement et •xinstructions au manijement" pour rdaliser des attaques. En outre,

il faut veiller strictement & ce que des iddes ((inedites') pour de nouveaux scdnairios, jusqu'ici

non concevables, et pouvant inviter &t l'imitation, ne soient esquissds que tr~s grossi~rement.

La prdsente expertise synthitique a dt dress~e sous l'aspect du respect systdmatique de cette

optique.

,& rrce ~scl1 Leg troupes allemandee ISAF utilisent Is drone ALADIN pour des vole de reconnaissence cur Keboul et lee montagnes d'Afghanistan.

2 En matiere da drones tactiques, Israel est Ie principal exportateur mondial. Ainsi lee forces ermdes indiennes, rusces at allemandeesont-elles Aquipees de drones de fabricetion isradlienne.

3 On trouvera en ennexe A2 un tableau presentant quelques drones militaires.

4 On trouvere dens Ilannexe A2 un tableau presentant queiques drones militeires.

5 La Force d'Action Repide du Nucleaire (EARN) doit pouvoir se rendre A n'importe quel site frengais en pence dents un delci de 24

heures depuis Ia survenance de I'eccident pour elimenter l'installation A Iaide de systemes mobiles et de personnel quelifid et bienprpepre.

6 Des donndes supplementairas ser lee enceintes de confinement figurent dane Ilannexe A2.

7 En addition, Is centrele de Feesenheim sest dotee d'une turbine A gez. Ainsi Is groupe Alectrogene eat diversifie. Linconadnient est

qua les deux blocs ent ens conception mono-circuit ce qui implique qua I'on ce peut pee exciere leur pence, A Is limite celle-ci serait

simple A provoquer.

8 Permi las dquipements A msttra an place pour en noyeu dur protegeant contra des dfefiliances de conception at eutres, figurect en

groups Alectrogene (mobile) eu diesel, ens pompe autonome assurant Ilalimentation an eae daisa piecins de dsesctivation, des

resarvoirs du systflme d'alimentation da secours des gecereteurs de vaepeur (ASG) ainci qua ]lelimentation du systflme PTR

(refroidissement de laea de piscine at treitement de laea de piscins) depeis en puits de pempage deeseaux souterrainec ou en lee.

9 Nuclear Energy and Security, Universite de Saizbourg, 20 -23 Juiliet 2005

10 Kornst-E est Ia denominatioc russe tandie qua is noma utilise par l'OTAN act AT 14.

11 Syria, Jordenie, Emirats Arabes Unis, Koweait, Arabia saoedite, Terquis, Inde, Meroc, Algdrie at Grece.

12 Des explosions de melanges daessence et deair ont dEjA plusieurs feis provoque des accidents catestrophiques dens des reffineries.

13 En general, lee systemes de sdcuritE sent congeus A sflcuritd quadruple aftn d'assurer Is refroidisement du cm~ur de reacteur an cas

de panne d'un ElEment du systEms. Las ElEments censtitutifs du systflme A structure ,redondante, tels qua lee pempes, lessoupapes. Ilalimentation Electrique etc. sont sEparEs physiquemant.

14 En 2009, 944 hElicopteres Etaient immetricules en Alisemgne at 2 528 personnes teiaent titulaires d'une licence de pilotage

d'hdlicopteres. [EVES 2009].

15 La BK 1172S2 at IBC 135, deux hElicepteres largement utilisEs en Allamagne entraeautres pour Is sauvetage aErien ce pour Is police,ont lee carectdristiques techniques suivantes : Vitesse de croisiere: 241 km/h; autonomie : 785 ce 575 kin, charge embraqude

maximalea:920 cu 1210 kg; cepacitE du rEservoir de carburant : 720 ou 772 litres [ADAC 2010].

16 II exists des explocifs bien plus brisants qua Is TNT, capeblec de dEveloppar ens Ilonde de choc an en temps concidErablement plus

court. On peut seattendre A des dEg~te particuli~rement graves Iorsque des charges explosives militeires sont employEes.

17 Las consEquences radiolegiques d'une attaque terrorists dEpendent de Ia gravite de Ilattaque at surtout de Ia question scii ye e nsfelts cu niveau des piscines. Si le piscine rests infects at seulement Is systems de refroidissement tombs an pence, des conditions

critiques neasa prEsenteront qu'apres plusieure jours, A momns qua le cceur colt intEgralement dEchargE au moment de t'attaque. Dens

ce ccc, ic e restent qua queiques heures pour Is mica an place de macures d'intervention. [LARGE 2012] Derant is rempiacement des

ElEments combustibles, Isoe er du rEacteur act transfdrE intEgreaement vera Ia piscine da dEsactivatien.

18 Las piscines de ddcactivation des rEacteers dae lacentrals nuclEaira da Fessanheim peuvent eccueillir cu maximum 313 ElEments

combustibles checuns at celles dae lacentrals nuclEaira de Gravelines 382 checune. En tenant compte dae larEserve A gerder pour

dec Eepisements imprdvus, ceci implique 156 unitEs d'accueil dens Ia centrals de Faessnheim at 255 A Graselines. Chacen decconurs de rEacteur reqoit 157 ElEments combustibles. Las cepacitEs suivantes esistent : palier CP0 : 313 ElEments de combustibles,

paliers GPl at CE2 : 382 ElEments de combustibles, palier P4 : 459 ElEments de combustibles, palier P'4 : 630 ElEments de

combustibles, palier N4 : 612 ElEments de combustibles [ASN 2011])

19 Dens Is cadre de us projet, one Etetdid is rEpartition gEographique de risque an ccc d'accidents graves se produissnt dens dec

centrales neciEsires an Europa. Ser Is base da tarmes sources at deai frEquencce d'accidents, on a calculd A 'aide de medels actualda dispersion at en fonction de 2800 situations mEtEorologiques diffErentes Is contamination dane Is couche proche du eel

entraineas par un grave accident nuclEcire.

20 http://www.emt-penzberg.de/uploads/media/ALADIN..dae_01 .pdf end http://www.army-tachnology.com/projects/emt-aiadin-uav/

21 http://www.army-technology.com/projects/honeywell-thswk-mnav-us-army/

22 http:llwww.army-technology.com/projecte/puma-unmanned-aircraft-system-us/ end http://www.avinc.com/uac/small~uss/puma/

23 http:llwww.army-technology.com/projects/rql11-raven!

24 http:llwww.army-tschnology.com/projacts/luns/

25 ht tp:llwww.army-technology.com/projects/shadow200uav/

26 http://www~deutschesheer~de/portal/a/heer/lut/p/c4/D4-SB8K8xLLM9MSSz~y8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9jNTUir2S1 OSMvMxsvZzStBK-97Kp8_YJsROUAzD2Fiwll/

27 http:I/www.army-technoiogy.oom/projects/hunter end http:llwww.iai.co.il/2013/18898-1 6401 -en/IAi.aepx

28 http://www.gecerai-view.com

29 http://heig httach.com

ADAC 2010 Die ADAC-Hubschrauber-Flotte auf einen Buick, www.adac.de, eingesehen im M•.rz 2010

ALVAREZ 2003 Reducing the Hazards from Stored Power-Reactor Fuel in the United Stetes, R. Alvarez et al.; Science & Global Security,Vol. 11, No. 1 (2003), 5. 1-60

ALWAROT 2013 Braucht Deutschlend Kampfdrohnen? Christian Alwardt, Michael Brzoeka, Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Martin Kahi, GbtzNeuneck, Johenn Schmid, Patricie Schneider. Hamburger Informationen zur Friedensforschung und Sicherheitapoiltik

Ausgabe 50/2013; Hamburg, dull 2013

ARMY 2014 Army-technology: Kornet E Anti-Armour Missile, Russia,www.army-tech nology~com/projects/kornet/,

eingesehen im November 2014

ASN 2011 Complementary Safety Assessments of the French Nuclear Power Plants (European "Stress tests"), Report by the French

Nuclear Safety Authority, December 2011

BECKER 2005 Studie zu den Auswirkungen eines Beschusses der im Standort-Zwischenlager Kr~immel aufbewahrten Beh~lter des TypeCASTORE V/52 mit panzerbrechenden Waffen, Oda Becker, Dezember 2005

BECKER 2010 Terrorangriff mit einer panzerbrechenden Waffe (AT 14) auf hitere deutsche Atomkraftwerke; Ode Becker; erstellt im

Auftrag von Greenpeace Deutschland a. V.; September 2010; www~greenpeace~de/sites/www.greenpeace.de/files/

KURZPsnzerbrechende_.Waffen 14O92010_0.pdf,

eingesehen im November 2014

BRUSSELS 2014 Belgian jihadist, former worker at Doel nuclear plant, dies in Syria, Thursday, 15 October 2014 15:45;http:llwww~thebrusselstimes~com/belgium/item/1 154-belgian-jihadist-former-worker-at-doel-nuciear-plant-dies-in-s~ria;

eingesehen im November 2014

BUSINESS 2014 Bussinessporta124: Unbemannte Systeme im Anflug auf die International CES 2015, 7, November 2014;

http://www~businesspor tal24.com/de/unbemannte-systeme-im-an flug-auef-die-international-ces-201 5.html;

eingesehen im November 2014

EVES 2009 Bundesministerium fOr Verkehr, Bau end Stadtentwickiung: Beantwortung Frage Nr. 200 von Herrn Peter Hettlich MdB,

Berlin, 01.07.2009

BZ 2014 Drohnen in Frankreich. War schickt Drohnen liber die Atommeiler? 30.10.2014; http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/politikl

droh nen-in-f rankreich-wer-sch ickt-d rohnen-ueber-d ie-at ommeiler-,1 0808018,289 00304.ht ml

CSS 2010 Drohnen: Milit~rischer Nutzen und politische Debatten; CSS Analysen zur Sicherheitapolitik; Nr. 78; ETH Zerich; dull 2010;

http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/OSS-Analysen-78.pdf; eingesehen im November 2014

EC 2014 EconomicsExperts: Thermobaric Weapons,www~economicexper t~com/a/Fuel:air:expiosive.htm,

eingesehen im November 2014

EMT 2014a ALADIN Mini-Luftaufkikrungssystem; EMT;http://www.emt-penzberg.de/uploads/media/ALADIN..de_.01.pdf; eingesehen im November 2014

EMT 2014b LUNA Luftaufkli~rungs-und Uberwachungssystem; EMT;

http://www~emt-penzberg.de/upioads/media/LUNA.AdeO1.pdf; eingesehen im November 2014

FAS 2014 Federation of American Scientists (FAS): Fuel/Air Explosive (FAE), www.fas.org/man/dod-1 01/sys/dumb/fae.htm,

eingesehen im November 2014

FLANDERS 2014 Planderstoday: Anti-terror office joins investigation of sabotage at Doel, Alan Hope; 11,08,2014; http:llwww~flanderstoday.

eu/business/anti-terror-office-joins-investigation-sabotage-doel; eingesehen im November 2014

FLEXRISK 2014 The Project ,,flexRlSK": Flexible Tools for Assessment of Nuclear Risk in Europe; http:llflexrisk~boku~ac~at/en/projekt~html;

eingesehen im November 2014

GENERALVIEW 2014 Unbemannte Flugnysteme; http://www.general-view.com; eingesehien im November 2014

GREENPEACE 2014 Drohnen fiber Atomkraftwerken, Phiiipp Brandsth.dter, 08.11.2014; http:llwww.greenpeace~de/themen/energiewende/

atomkraft/drohnen-ueber-atomkraftwerken

HEIGHTTECH 2014 Height-Tech Drohnen - der Inbegriff von Windstabilit•.t end Flugpr~zision; http://heighttech.com/produktel

HIRSCH 2004 Terrorangriffe auf deutsche Atomkraftwerke, Darstellung der Gefahren end Bewertung der Gegenmaitnahmen unter

besonderer Beriicksichtigung der Gegebenheiten an den Standorten Biblis und Brunab~ttel; Helmet Hirsch, Ode Becker,Wolfgang Neumann; Bericht for Greenpeace Deutschland e.V.; Uberarbeitete Fassung; Hannover, April 2004

HONELLIC 2005 Sabotage vulnerability of nuclear power plants; A. L. Honnellio u. S. Rydeli; Konferenzbeitrag ,Nuclear Energy and

Security (NUSEC)", Universit~it Salzburg, 20.-23.07.2005

LARGE 2012 Vulnerability of French Nuclear Power Plants to Aircraft Crash, John Large; im Auftrag von Greenpeace Frankreich; April

2012

LELIEVELD 2012 Global risk of radioactive fallout after major nuclear reactor accidents, J. Lelieveld, 0. Kunkel, and M. G. Lawrence Atmos.

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LU.-WORT 2014 Luxemburger Wort: R•.tselraten fiber Drohnen: War steckt dahinter? 03,11,2014; http:llwww~wort~iu/de/international/

sich erheit-der-franzoesischen-atomkraftwerke-raetselraten-ueber-drohnen-wer-steckt-dahin-ter-545740b6b9b39887080826ed; eingesehen im November 2014

MAJER 2012 Abschlussbericht zum Kernkraftwerk Cattenom; Dieter Majer; erstellt enter der Mitwirkung des Ministeriums forGesundheit Luxemburg, des Ministeriums fOr Umwelt, Energie und Verkehr des Sasrlandes und des Ministeriums fOr

Wirtschaft, Klimaschutz, Energie end Landesplanung Rheinland-Pfalz.

Februar 2012

MAKHIJANI 2012 Post-Fukushima Nuclear Safety in France: Analysis of the Complementary Safety Assessments (CSAs), Makhijani, A,(lEER); Marignac, Y. (Wise); March 2, 2012

NOVOST1 2007a Russische Informations- end Nachrichten Agentur Novosti: Russland liefert wieder Waffen in den Nahen Osten,19.05.2007, http:llde~rian~ru/safetyf2007O0l19/57448073.html,

eingesehen im M~rz 2007

NOVOSTI 2007b Russiache Informetions- und Nachrichten Agentur Novosti: Weffenmarkt: Algerien kann Indian und China bei Wsffenk•.u-fan in Russlend iibertreffen, 05.04.2007, http://de.rien.ru/business/20070405/63137770.html, singesehen im M•.rz 2010

NOVOSTI12009 Russisohe Informetions- und Nachrichten Agentur Novosti: Russische Panzerabwehr-Raketen sorgen fUr Furorseauf

IOEF-2009, 30.04.2009,http:I/de.rien.ru/safety/20090430/121 393495.ht ml,

eingesehen im M•.rz 2010

NOVOSTI12014 Russisohe Informations- und Nachrichten Agentur Novosti: Irekisohe Armee setzt eretmals russisohes System Kornet

gegen IS-Kh.mpfer sin; 22.09.2014;

http://de.ria.ru/security..and miitary/20140922/2696071 04.html: eingesehen im November 2014;

NZZ 2014 Neue Ziiriohsr Zeitung: Mysteribss Drohnen Uber franzbsischsn AKW; 1.11.014; http://www.nzz.ch/panorema/

mysterioesss-drohnsn-ueber-franzoesischen-akw-1 .18416151

OKO-Institut 2012 Okoinstitut/Physikerb~ro: Analyse der Ergebnisse des EU Stresestest der Kernkraftwerke Fessenheim und Beznsa; Teil 1:

Fessenheim; Christoph Pistner, Methias Erettnsr, Christian K~pper, Stephen Kurth, Simons Mohr. Im Auftreg dess

Ministeriums f~r Umwelt, Klims und Energiewirtschaft Eaden-W~rttsmberg; Darmstadt, 11.10.2012

PICHLER 2014 Pressetext (Nachriohtenagentur): Chine testet srfolgreich Anti-Drohnsn-Laser; Sohnelles System soil verst•,rkt cur

Terrorabwsh r eingeasett we rden. Pichler, 03.11.2014; http://www.pressstsxt.com/news/20141 103016;

eingesshsn im November 2014

SEIFERT 2014 umweitFairasndern.de: "VS-vertraulich" - Atommeiler und Anti-Terror-Schuto - Rechte Critter bleiben auf der Strecke;Dirk Seifert 6. Mai 2014 http:llumweltfairaendern~de/2014/05/vs-vertrauiich-atommeiler-und-anti-terror-schutz-rechte-

dritter-bleiben-auf-der-streoke/, singesehen im November 2014

STERN 2014 Stern: Juist wird von ,,Paketkopter" angeflogen: 24. September 2014, http://www.stern.ds/wirtschaft/news/dhl-te-

stet-drohnen-juist-wird-von-paketkoptsr-angeflogen-2140565.html; singesehen im November 2014

TAGESSCHAU 2014 Regierung leitet Untersuchung sin, Drohnen Uber Frenkreichs Atommeilern; 30.10.2014; http:llwww.tagessohau.de/

suslend/drohnen-u eber-ekw-in-fran kreioh-101 .html

WELT 2009 Die Welt: Orai blkftlinge fliehen per tHelikopter; 23.07.2009; http://www.walt.de/vermischtas/artiole4180865/Orsi-

Haeftlinge-fliehen-mit-dem-Helikopter.html; singesehen im November 2014

Al: Sites et types de centr'ales nuckeafres en France

La _France compte aujourd'hui 58 r6acteurs & eau sous pression r~partis sur 19 sites. uls se

rfipartissent en trois catfgories (paliers en fonction du type construction) [ASN 201 1]

* 34 r~acteurs de La catfigorie 900 MWe, r~partis en paliers

* GPo (Bugey, _Fessenheim),

* CPi1 (Le Blayais, Dampierre-en-Burly, Gravelines, Tricastin) et

* CP2 (Chinon, Cruas-Meysse, Saint-Laurent-des-Faux),

* 20 rfiacteurs de La cat~gorie 1300 MWe, rfipartis en paliers

* P4 (Flamanville, Paluel, Saint-Alban) et

* P4 " (Belleville-sur-Loire, Cattenomn, Colfech, Nogent-sur-Seine, Penly)

* 4 rfiacteurs de la cat~gorie 1450 MWe ou

* N4 Serie (Chooz, Civaux).

En ,,gras", sont mises en relief Les centraLes nucl~aires desquelles on sait qu'il y a eu des

survols de drones jusqu'g maintenant (fi l'•tat du 08/i 1/2014).

Construction d'enceinte de confinement

Rayon int(•reur

Hauteur du b~timent

E~paisseur de Ia paroi

E~paisseur de Ia paroi de la coupole

Rev•=tement interieur

reacteurs a eau sous pression reacteurs a eau sous pressiondu palier 900 MWe du palier 1300 MWe

A parol simple [in] Az double paroi [in]

18,50 22,50

60,35 65,95

0,90 0,90

0,80 0,95

0,006 Inexistant

Ddnomi- Pays/ Auto-nation Constructeur nomie

[h]

Vitesse Portee/[kmn/h] longueur/

hauteur [in]

40-70 1,46/1,57/0,38

85 0,36

Poids Charge En application depuis / chez[kg] utile les forces militaires[kg]

ALADIN•° Allemagne/EMT

Honeywell E~tats-Unis/RQ -16 T- HonywellHawk • Aeospace

Puma AE22 Itats-Unis/AeroVironment

RQO-11 Etats-Unis/Raven • AeroVironment

46

4

7,7

2005/Allemagne, Pays bas

2007/E~tats-Unis

3,5 83 2,8/1,4

1,5

6

6-7

32-81 1,4

6,1

1,9

40

90(Leer)

LU NA 24

RQ -7Shadow200 •

Allermagne/EMT

Ettats-Unis/AAICooperation

70

148-250

4,17/2,36/0,87

4,27/3,4/0,86

2012/ Etats-Unis,Danemark, Su~ie

2003/ Etats-Unis,

Royaume-Uni, Australie, Italie,Danemark, Pays bas,Espagne, R~publique tchoque

4 2000/Altemagne

25,3 2004/Ettats-Unis, Su~ie, Italie,

Australie

30 2005/Allemagne

100 1 996/E~tats-Unis, France,

Belgique

KZO • Allemnagne/Rheinmetall

RQ -5A USA, IsraelVHunter

27 Northrop Grum-

man

2,5 120-210 3,42/2,26/0,96 168

21 250 10,50/6,90/1,7 885

Denomination Fabricant/ Charge Vitessesource utile [kg] [km/h]

4

Diametre/ altitude de vol Autonomiehauteur [in] [in] [min]

Y-Copter

Oktocopter

Hexacopter

HT- 6 (Hexacopter)

HT- 8 (Octocopter)

HT-8 C180(Octocopter)

General View(Allemagne) •

High-TechGmbH(Allemagne)2•

6

8

1,8

2,65

2,60

Aucune information disponible

60

70

65

0,63/0,35

0,90/0,45

1,00/0,26

14

20

18

Kein Geld von Industrie und Staat

aa

1. Introduction ......................................................... 42. Do drones pose a danger to nuclear power plants? ....................................... 6

3. Vulnerability of French nuclear power plants to terrorist ettacks..................... 10

4. Scenarios of terrorist attacks on a nuclear power plant using drones 12

5. Limits of countermeasures................................................................... 16

6. The effects of serious accidents............................................................ 20

7. Conclusion ...................................................................................... 23

8. Footnotes........................................................................................ 25

9. Sources .......................................................................................... 26

A report by OipL Phys.Oda Becket, Hannover

Commissioned by Greenpeace e.V.

Foreword by Heinz Switsl, Greanpesce nuclear expert

Published is Noovember 201 4

* ~ 01,,110,,~,,V.. 04o04,1gl1. 0204578,1.10410. 2,1. 040000 18.0 -10117 0.4.1. 14o,,olr..otd.. 0, 8.50.0. 211,1 O,,.1.1 041.10 01,,110.01,

5 7

In recent weeks, a nomlbet of still unidentihied drones flying over Freinch nuclear powerplants (Nil'.) have attracted the attention of thle puiblic and rof authorities. I he French

power comiipanty and NI'? operator, ElectricitY' de Frarnce (EdF I aninouncedl late in October

that drtoies hlad been observed o~ver varions nruclear piower plants since 5 October 20 t 4.

]TAGFSSCIIAII 2or4y

These flights had taken place either late in the evening, during the night ot early to thc

morning. On t 9 October they had flown oiver boir NP'ls located far from each other, and ont

the next day over threce other N Fls, irdircatintg that this wax a well coordinated actiort.

{NZ7 0t41

Arcording to the media, the drones were sometimles oily 20 to 30 cetntinmeters wirle, but

sonmetitres two meters wide atnd therefore could potentially tarry smialler quantities of

explosives. Fern after France's minister of the interior derclared thtat special units of thle

Gendarerisere deployedl for the surveillanrce of N~l's since aoo7, had ieeceiverd orrders to

'neutralize' these flying objects, unirlentihied drones still flewy oser Frettcf Njijis a number

of times. 1BZ 20i4]

Drones flew oeri NI'ls belonging to energy group EdF, as well as over the CLA mr Sarlay

arid Areva s Ia Hague nuclear facility. Altogether 2f surli flights hare brett counted sri far.

GREFNPiEACF 20141

This paper will not go into the many speculative ifeas regarding the backgrounrd of curre'nt

events. The subjec t oii this shsort expert ropinion is rather thre question of what dangers are

assririatedf with such drrone Ilights weree they toi be carried out fiy a trerrorist group.

There are 5f tiiireat reactors at 19 locations in France. In comiting years, sotor of theis will

reach a servirm' life. of 40 years. I he lark of experienced pesrsottel itn the future dtre to a

high retireitetit rate itt roting years, the agtrng of lnmaterial cdar to high str ess over a lung

period of tinie, attd above all the design related inadequacy of ptotectiiin againsrt external

hazards all piose risks that are ittcreasingly signifirant. Its Iightt of the curtront siturationi, the

NPt~s at Fe'ssenheiim, Gravelirnes atid Cattenoos sear France's easternr bottlers with llelgiirm

Luxersbriurg, Gerrmrany atsd Switzerland will be used as exaisiples to investigate thte risks that

cats arise I rot terirorist attacks.

Ever since ithe terrorist attacks of i i Septensher zoolt itt the Iliited Stairs, the pistetitial

threat ol attacks sin critical nerve centters hats hercoimi a fouris of piublic attention. liublic

debate conretstratecl for a lung tiroe on tIre threat to nurcltar primwer plants poised by terrorist

attacks usitng conmmerciaf aircraft. In reality, a stuch greate r numbnier of attack scenariios are

coticeivtable. 1Ihr older French N fP5 l9oo MWI classl in particitlar are stultnerable to a vatrirty

of attacks biicause they are not adequately protected against extertnal hazards. IFurthrertmore.

roitparedl to today's leverl of scinene atnr ter Itinolrgy. thteitrdesignss have seritorts flaws in

dissruptuiitottinaageissenti

T'o weigh the datigers related to terrorist attacks, wce need to de~stribe souse scetnarios in

greater detail and estimiate the eflect of agents tueed oti a tiutlear power plant. The public alsoi

hsas a right to this intf ortmation.

1 Te probabitlity of au terrorist attack cannot hi' detertmittid using tradlitiortal isethtrods fur

calculating probabilities. lBnt expertittie sax srowtt thtat once a tetrcciiste gronup derides on

art altarck, it is htighcly likely to hr successful. I he hijackers is 1it Septetmber zoo t were ablet

to learn etnough abrout priotittg in arec thibri goal. arid thery were able to gaits crittrol of all

aircraft a' plairteri.

During the follnwing discussion on the risk of terrorist attacks, no indications will he miade or thooghts

enpreosed that coold hane instroctionet character end be "helpful in planning or carrying nout an

attack. For thisl reason, the scenarios and discusslionts in thre report are consciously formulated with

great caution end hane avoided describing seonetinev details. Terroristo w'th thw skills, knowledge and

resoorces to carry out eftective attachs will trod no onforrmation hors that they do not elready haen

or can gain ecceso to. However, in presenting the scenaerios end outcomes, the eothor eals made

sore that restrained wording woold not serfiously compromise the salidity of the reOrt or the reader's

ondeortanding of dts content.

8

The use n of nmatnicd mili tary systinirs {(IMS) pitt in easing ini arottedf conflicts. Airborn~ieweapiois systenis p iombat drones) arc! used, for exaiipli, in Afghianistan liakistani arid

"vi'nc, Al WARD 1 20i 3f This sectiorn will assess whether critch systenms currcntly arc oir will

becomeiti a threat toi Freinch) niucleaifrpower plants

A drone is anl aircr aft that flies withbunt a htumanl pilot oni board aind otost he eremotely

controlled friom a great distance oi c prigranmced bficore it leaves thre groond tr IIy onic or

seve rd routes, Ba-acally, a drone is a reusable, olnloalrlred :airrie-rsyste-ii that caii be equippced

with •scioirs as well1

as weapoins. Ither ftrerfuertly iused iceross fror dfroneis arc riuioanned

aerial vehicle" (fAVf iir Unm/anned acrial system" IAN). ALWA RD I 20•11

Military drones hrave different sizes, tanginig fromit a few c entriceters tii thre sizc of a

iroorierciral jetliner. A cormnrorn classification of drornes differentiates, their iiitoi the forllowinig

I ategiiies according it, flight duratiocir range aild ahtitiude.

* initi (i houni a few kilomneters /irwj,

* tactical (several frourrs / <300 kin / nw tri rierdiumrr arid

* strategic (' ao tours/ tooo kin/mredliumt it high). •ALWVARD I aot3

Althiorigh tfrere are currently ait estimtated 900 dIiffeetiiii dfrconc rypfc' iin develropment ariocndh

thie wiorld, niost ctf themu ace not ar ued drones. Most if the drfrcrics tired today for irrilitar p

puifrrpses are dfeployedf fur recoiririaissarire, Serisrir iai kages otf rrptical sensors. irnfraredr

canir-ras, radar, ocr sericcrs tic rnricritror electromagitetic signals alloiw acrqnisitiorrrirf high

resirlutionr aerial imtages arnd trainsirissioin of cive irrages through satellite icr acid frased radio

conrtarcts to ira, I activity on the grouirnd in recal tiiiis. Al WA ROT aol•

fut it is undtcisputed-r that thre unpio taice oif drcones as art irtstrumre-it liir sirvesillance w sill

keep increasing. I he techncrology fir, this drone fin tritri has made rapid advani is in rec'ent

dlecades. CSS acoto Military rceconnraissanc e protiuries artd Collects inifirotat iio in portenti al

aird real ippornernis andi arnalyses it. Military operiiationrs are firsd In operationral andu tactical

rintelligence artd hattlefield reconntaissanrce.

lOne esxairple rcf a idirone used foc sirt-ecillance is the- ALADIfN, a mini ifdcroe dephiliyed fry

se-viral NATO ccounrtries fcor operat ionral servic:e. ITfic ALADlIfN systrenr iofitaris dfetailedf

stirveillance arid recocnrraissarcce in~rif ti onaic~ it rieal tnie. It is a poi irtale systeiri andfdIocs tnot

nieedf a ririway. ft is i.5 m~iete-rs Icing aind has a nwing sparc tif r 4( inctees. Its riarxiimuri takc

nfl wright is 4 kilns. fEMT 2ot4al

A secrornd esamrple otf unmoannecdt aerial siurveillarnc- fur ironittoirig, iden-itifying artd ccc aturug

iorrrrrratrion inc cc-il tunle is the LIINA •.ysti-n, whith Isirs a carnge-of ciii(,, than utica kilo etriii-cc

an flight durtatrior rif uure chair di horsrr- Diii to it, icioduilar fraytoaf rdesigni IlNAt ant

hi- i-ippe in fc- i fiircre with ific latest payloads. Dire sprcrial featurce is its ability icc g li-e

iiniroweiecd witfi a subusrcerret rcstartinrg of its eriginec Ihle arir rift is laanchc-d Inora a

ligfhtwecighct, scoundcless fitungee catapuilt w hitch catn fce fchtecd tip Inio r tlsfport, F i MI aoer

ft was tfi-eIUntiedi btates iin parictiular that neiarly a tc-iadfc ago Icegaci cifuippicig surve-illanccc

dronesi- with weapionis (thre lrc-cator arid thce Rc-apcer fin e-xarcple- arid decveloiping sprcial

arm~tii corcbat dlronres (°ucnmianned-c combat ac-ia i wvihiclcs,, or tfCAVs) for targeted aic to+grotunrd attac ks. IThey tired air iii groiund rccikr-is (sutcf as thre Ifellhire) that wire oirigicrally

ft-vtli pc-d ftr refliccipters and conrrcfat lets.• Iicy wc-refbest cisc-ldc or ccmbat rctissionrs cfurincg

thet Kccscvrc War f-cfuipped wrtfr lasc-r target riarker s. they rcdcentif-ef potenttial targets that

iculdf fce subfseqcfue-ntly destrotyr-i fry mannr-c airi raft. 1ffAVs arc- rntw being devlc- opedccc with

fbigge-r paylcoacds fhighcec speedfc cud bc-tier stealtfh fi-atres (iie bc nerarly irisisififi toi radar).

Al WARDI aoc3 C.( b aoroI

I rowevecrf-epe-rdfirg oni the dlesiri-ld range and miissciision s ii~ arrred cfrrtc- systeris rie•d

adcdit ircial rinfrastruciiture. Opt-ratirug drones wifth a farge range cc-cfires having ruicrways as

well as uairnternarce antd ccrifprrerrt facilities fEccn siaIllee tactical dirones reqi-crie runwttsays.

rrurtfhermreic thr-sc- aircraft dependisc icr relirble- navigationr systemrs and srftabl data and

cciiiocrcnieatrror links focrPrpirotinig. ALWARDO I ot3

liir thics reason we can genrerafly assiumie that ter-rccrist groupi~sfi rtcnt prosscess sich I large-

arrcecf dronc- systc-ms. Buit this cart icharngc inl the- firri c. Expects rev a threat l tic e p cfoteintiaf

ii ansfIr c-tf cfrornc Isystenis) toi ierrorisis or rrtsrcrgerrts whit coiulcd cisc fthei r itargeted atta, ks

ifa hi ave so far fitc-r Icycndc iltre irrmearns. ]AlWARDT 20l il 1o date. military use has not

nintided simaIlIt-ceasily trarnsporrtabife drontes cart ying "standtarcl wecaponts or epilosive

ciricuniticors.

Ixperctrs bclieve- thatir orsicder air1

e dclcsfoprment rnd1

tcstirtg woucldl be reqcrired iii cisc-

torrrcrrrccialfy arvailafrlrerctpcrrcc-rts tor cornstrtrtt a clroce writh laigc-r rarnyc, fpayloraf, fligfht

staftility acid ccon~rtol rcecharrismcs IAlWAR DI don3

Smrall civ-rlian cicir drones dc-a~r racly avaclafile fcor purrchase in ger-atly varying cirntc-Is.

ICivilian dlrcones arc- cistafly r alle-d -lnutirriocpters" (ike~ the "cu-tin ifter"I. Thcey arc freqcuentfy

tusec fcrr aerial ifhoitographip fun thecy can fhasc a variety oI othlc rises. The Deiisi fc I'cit

dlefploys the "Pakctkropter" drtone itr airlift ptdikage-s of pharucaccertic ais to jiuist arc island cit

the- Norih 'cca Ifpayload of r a kgi [STFRN aor4I

Act ording icc antalyses by thce ronsirmer ELcy trorcics Assoctaticonc (CF Al, the globlal mtarket for

lisiiarn dtroncs will rceach , •;o riillitor cdcllars inc aocr5 Thrs is air iricrecase iof 55 frcncit 0o-cc

doi 4 arid equcates to thec salc- oi art estimatced 400000o units. Dronie sales are espccted to reachI

frbilliort 1S dcclfars ii inst fice yeai s. Accordfing iii CEA, drornescc tirtued to riontitour sports

c-ccnrs or sicppcorct sc-arch and ri-scutic operations arid there accrirnaity orther cccil(i -vafil rises.

Ahhficrghc c iviliari dhricie that rcoi Id trancspoirt si-vt-cal kifogracrs if explosivcs ire rare, they

ace already ioncricrccrr ally isvail afl. [Ihe Hf it ( Ch tforonc-carn carry a a., kg pry tad at a

sfpeedl if 55 kin hr Iir a flrghct lastring cif tido ircircnries Lf fEG IFI f doH 0tyl t he Hexacofpter

a dfrir-onewthf Ii arms and alicigeeri Itt- imotors, act trarnsfport traals weighring uifi ic i kg. Its

ranutfature-r risc-s a salcs slorganr that says, rctcgfhly: -rmall droneris harge- dcrines itt c-arch

fits riwi drcrne'. l;[NFRAIVII W 20,4)

10 11

It appears that ( hinar is aireadly sontemuplatinig p~repJaratiions lot the threat posedl hy such

tuini drones. Arc ording to, thtr state news agent y Xinhua. China Ihis d~eVeloped a laser

delefnse systeim designed to shout clown low flyinug drones. Thl-, system~ ran elutuflate sinall

urnrrranrc'd aiti raft within r radius of two krlornr'tr's. It tire, withnlrive Is'con'r~ds rI lositirig

a tar get arid is inrtenrded as pirrotestion against tirriorist attar Is, The 5 ioiparny dev'eloping rlre

system claims that normally it wourlid be the rib eii sharpshoorters arid hielicopters ti finerS(lt p

suchI drones, but thleir rates oit suciress are not high arnd thle lark of prer~isioni Can lead to

unwanted damage. Itomes cr, iirnioarirri'd driones arie relatively rinexpensise and easy tit ulse

miakinig ihenir attrar tivee for restirists fIlCH I ER aol 4

ri tlre rirrtext irt tertririst attack sierrarios, rinsvilirig for e'xrrrrle~ insidler s wosrkrrng at a

rius ear poiwetr plant, drone's Iroadedl with explosives s sould po~se I significant risk (see Sestirir

4.} Theoretically, we wourldf nit espect onie drorne with a rim ramounrt rif esplorsives, crashring

arbritrarily itt irs rrr ar nuclear [nrwet plant, to Mi.sse a direst darrger tc the' iritigirty oii the

NPl' flit forscing tise s rash orl siewrra drones, ear h carryitrg severarl kilois cr1 r xphersies, courili

create a darigerours situaiottn Althouigh tibe sarfsty systerms in arr NPP1 or relesvart etrergernsy

rresasrrres worrld presrirtably keep'1 the sitriationi irderr icrnt~rol, nro uriC counlr frrlly guarantee

thrit radiroar ive niaterials would riot be releasedf as a C otisi'rlisnti r's such ani attar k. Olderr

Ftren h rnucIear powe~tr plants, in parrircular, arce vurlnerable tor external hazards and alsor have

dlesign flaws that irake it diifirut n to safely iianiage' in insisten!t airdent (siee ectioni 3).

l)rones lnadedl withr explosive is Coritli possibly rdestrony the esterrnal piower sirpply and martei

i omiponents of the' internal porwer supply and eimiergenicy powter' supply, is sdariage oilier

ion on1 isiints and parts of ifhe systerir

If liii examople, t hc internal poiwer supply is dlestroryed fry exp~losive's this dlarrage sarnnot Ire

riparired quir kly enorugh. If switrlrhrg over to intrrunal powe'r fails andI thie errergetriy psowse

suplply alsoi fails rilce tor tire attai k irs besaursi' iistarkes Cave breen made irndeperndenitly, tfre

operating stew irurst rise rmobile' eqiiipmri tio gerrerate primer itr i soling tIre fuel inl tIlt'

reactor cor' and inl the cooling piornd

There tsr' Certai opierationsal sitriaitios (esixrhrige oI furl elensiertsl when the' safe

mnanagemenCrt of an arcident ca hrr Ireurne oinly within a few hotrrs. If here breaks nut itt secwirrI

plarces on the NPI'ls grondrnss, ills'p raifr'rlrg re rm Cay tiot fit abiht ti get sconrtril river thi'

slitratrion arid Comprilletely prcevetrt thre release' Ci I aisatron atid rtladioactivc' part ci Is. Thle EAR N

rapid dfeploryrrenrt fur re reededrs tio support tire operating s rew dores riot has• tbe i • h eady brt

ioperationi untril a4 Inours afttr an incident/acirdent occurs.•

A shorirt rir nit oir fire irn a trarrsfirnirer carl rave' rcexpctsr'I d i iosequrences. Isollitwing

a i tiasiormeirneth' inl aoo7 at tfire Krrrrnrnllel rnuctar primer plant it Germariv, a series sif

uinexpertedl tehiCrrcal and oirganiizationtal breakdoiwtrs arisedf a ifritp in coolarnt in tfrre reartoto

fir essrcre ve ssel. O perational inecperiere sir tar at thle Fesserhiii'ir, r avelirnes arnd C atierrori

irislear power plant s gives rise' tiC Irars that the' faiflire (Cf systrirts ir sorrpontenrts mould

iworsen an as i dent situatrioni

hour's sari ying simaller airrCunrts oii iplirsivs C'sould alsoi be uisid against thie opercatinrg (rew

attd sir iii ity p('scrionel aird thuls siippoit te'rorrrst attn k5

fry art, arnd and mater.

Stlhnin i riiidloneis alsor porse r Inhret if they tic' used, lik'e theirilitaryg, firs seCo~lrnarissanC~e"'

Drosnes canl Crrsrrtal i'Clrlit et ie iririges oii al NPt' s ground', its rs'sorrrcrss Iala tIllt strategie's

used fry its sir ulinty persontnel I his ciould subfstarntially ini reiJse the' piifrobrbr srcicess oii in

attack and irake citurnole "attractive' los a tirronrist groucp.

I he interntirn hcr' is rno tri spes5 ilate albourt wfhr plarired arid car rsrid urn the sre et dronrer

flysivers, and Iori what reasoni. Rather, tIne iquestiont is w hi'thei these clun( flyovrsis post' a

threat if te'rrorisst or scnriminal gi Cups air r espirnsible furtilierri

Ihis shirt texp ert opginritns sobihie tirve is iii irnvesrigate wherfher there at're rions'ervablel tercror

sienrioriss thnat irake Ciiiue rr'tehdowrn ahntost rurvitable. 1ri oither worirds, conund airluautc

cause darnage' tlhar woiuld itniak it iimpocss ible tor apply measurers tsr preve'ntr thre emnissionr co1

radiatiorn or radio ractire prat ltihs

hIr view iii the' ivailability ind portentrial Crses ol dtronesarril irking tinslrrC'hraifitry sif 1rini I

ousclear potwer plants irrto i r( rIunt, thre'e hasic sce'narrios sieei to be Crost plarrsibrle

* An explosivies attark srippoirtedi Iby sio ealled irnsdiders Beifoirehlandt. dlrines srcessf ully

prac tire approachring rthr N 'I'

* Pre'arartioirs fur a poitentiial aerial attack This irislrries inC panic rilar tier sirgatrng thi'

Nfl's fptrotetsion systerms ind alsor grtheririg detarised intellrge'nse sin thre primer pilant's

gesrindil rrnd its securrrty rurasuires.

* Pre'parationrs toe a potnitr'ial grorrrnd aittak Thirs m ficludes grathering inrirmarionist alirrit

the' N Ills grounds indl its rcurrent seccir y sneasirces (rnurrifer of pe'rsruinsle C esponcsi

pattierCs irnd times, andI sir forishf.

lherse ifrees piossibrlities will lii' ifiscrissi!d in Srection 4-

Moist of thes flyov ers arC' a ude'onrrstratio~n cif powec by th firefrople' cesponsible' for them. We

sari ontly spieril ate abourt their ihterntiors. lerltaps the pitiple senidinig dlroines oirer tso many

nuclear gowri ipllants suek iii distract attenitio feromi arn alrieidy seli'stid targel fry d isperiising

attenrtionriiisr' a wide' arrea Perhraps Clii ea~sic'st targe't is alrready amonirg thiose' ire onnoi'tered.

ft is alsoi ironirierable that this demornrrstrationr ii gums's will iie fsrllrrwed Iry a virs sreroios

lthseat flinraa tsrrorist ori ci iriniral groirps Etrni s' Cs highly decpe'rldenit un rnt Ieri posses

and rioldt fir i a rial dlilemimia. About three r turtih sitf its iete triers5 is row ge'rer'ated Iromr

irislcar enr'rrgy, arid eurrerrt planninrrg firese'ies Chit this shari' will still hi' 50 pl'cent in a025.

Air attack ol a truclsar porwer filart ioilrd lie att ractilee for a tirrorist geroip herarise ol its

rinmediate's clest sin powier ge'rirration, ins symbolic character, anri thre glitbal attention

it wotcddlsi rec'ive. Nuclear enrergy is cs'eer as thre 'fpitorne of trefdrological derve'lopment.

F'rrthtetnriort'. this tsechinolotgy has a dourble c iviliani/rmilitary r haractes antI a surccessfurl atiark

Crn a niuicrCa frower plari nt situ' ciurntry is it thre sanis tris' art attack On CC ll NPls atroundr

thi' wosrld.

12

'13

A total of 95 presilizaed water re'airt',s are op, nratedi at 19 liii feat iower plant sntes ilnFrante T'Ihey are classified into three group> tsee Appendix Atl.

Fesehim, is t the 9oo MW lass tModel C. I) and is the rrldest stdlI operating NPPf in>

Frani e (startuip in 1978). It is triose ti, the German/French Iborderihaoint 3o kilometers front

F-reiburg.

(jritneinres is the largest nor liar poiwer plant iii Frano', with all six if its reai tors ini the

9oo MW class I Modef C hI. Rear tuis r to 4 heganiopjurating in i 98o/Sr. anrl reactor arid 6

folloiwedl in i 195. Itle power plant is ion the I-rench r oast Ibetween tCalais andf Dunkirki i

Ciitr'tirt fias frour relitoe> in ithe i 3oo MW rlass (Motlel P4 ) These' rear tort btegari

operatring hetweeni 1987 andt i 99a. thie priwer plant is ont the Mosiel River, atotit 9 kilomieters

front the botrderr to Litxernbtrrrg atnd clote to the Germran t ity of Triter.

The ireactort at etterreheinr atnd Grriverirrrex are partitctlarly viulnerabile tri external hazard>

he'it treactor tore> are surrounirded hty a relatively thin-walletf contratinrent xvessel I tfittkniess

90 ( i). rhs des'igrn nit longer ref lects tcutrrerit standfartds in siretire arni tet hnorlogy. llannerrs

regardi a thickness of ahout a. neters Is requisitte firt new ttons>turtio un projerts.

The r rittarinliterit vessel ericrites the prinmary circuit aitd thre reactitr ptretsurre vessel

cenitt nning tfrre fuel. It is supposedt'i tir pretentr the estcare o1 tradioat rivre eritisiont tor fte

atmrospihere (in the ievent of coolant lotss. ftrr irritantcil and tri froteit the systeim againstt

exteirnaf hazardfs.

Ifire reactor> at ('utteririrri are lrrtter pirotertrif hut strill not prritectrer enough against external

hazarilt Thery are en Iosed1

hy a doinble walled containmelttt vessel, hut these wall> are nott

very thick 190 cmil.'

Atter they are removedr froir the reatctot torie, spernt fiiel eleirient>, are storedf int a rcrrilirng

pond1

frtr at reast twir tor three year> ThIns pont is in a separate' huirrlfig that rs not atfeqoately

protiected againstO external hiazarts. Atcorduning tri ASNS the Frenelbf ii frui telafety ainthority

these' buililirgs at all sites fiate a thin iretal rooif and therir rconcrette wills aie trot thu k

(30 r ii) ASN adoi i onstrutir n t dettails tin ftriidinrgs for spentr ttel are riot avatiaftle.

LARF aOt2i

Frenirhfntinterr pnwe r pianrts fhave nuimerousi known diesigrn flaw> whinch make theri

ouineraitit toi terrorist attack> a> nell at eartfhqutakes arid firiredi, At tire saire tiniii. it it

knoiwr that tfhey lark ineatsirei to rmaniage a sirioust accident , espetctally if se'verai hiockt an'

affetettd at tire sartic trire tir if the acc iidnrt arffec'ts tfir ttoini g porndi

Olii nuclear power ptlanrts, int particutlir withr reactotrs itt the 9~o0 MW ciass, ibut alsit tr thte

i~oo MW r lit>, hate a rniumber of detign flaw> that fhegighete tfhe prsibtiilities for artttck arid

even intcreatse the poti-rntial "tticcets. of a tterr orist attarck.

rhitie are mader clear in the fotllowitrg scentario of tortaf poiwir failure Istationr friarkirtt irt

SBO)1 irrurin ig at Fessenertir'i.

Fesserntheuii' tintternal powetr' sulppiy systeri inicludes' a marin grid t iinrtrtiontr d atf trierevw-

grirf itrinec turn. If thie extierial grin oneti onti trr faifs, poweit suipply it suipposedt tir iilt

>afeguardedr iiy tiiatiii ,r irfrrrk geerairtor Ittartioi tsipply I Ifsupplyll Irrite tfr th isorttrt alto

faulst the reatrot girt' thrriigh iii autrrtratrt eiii r1 rgtrny shtdrotwrinr Ficrurlhrniote, tire startof bothi emiirrgency diesel gent atorir suipplyinig titte safetry reiatred syste'ms is airurto atir ally

tiriggerred by elrctric pcowurr. (Onei reergenrr dfiestrl grenriatrir i alt sufpiy eniorghi priwi tor

tcintro1

l'tessetial tystenrsit

Ii a trtitationl whn-it ervergeucy porrwer rtsirsed. tfte regtiiitrroperatiornal tteedinrg rif tfre srtearr

genrtitatort stors irtt thecrefrore tin' eiriergieriry freedwater systent IFEFWS) tt supptlosed to start

ttp aitutomatitcally StteartI >titlsupposed t In' relieasret ttr thle atmotsplhere tftrottgh tfre steart

vilve' (V(C it . [fir' chetirral airferndrolum ciontrroi systier IC VSi it supposedt't tir maiintaint

prrimiary dr it it priturssu- tsuppiy titling watterlirot thi turin toolaniit pntinpa, and critneri tfie

bo~itirunteg liproress reqirited frrr shurtdo~rwrin, st eke IS f lIT ad0t2a

Ilit' eiti rgerrcy prrwer sluprpry has1 a lowter cdegreer irf redifiintarity tfiarr tfiat of Ger'rman ticltear

potwer plants, fotr txatipie, antd is tfihefretre prorir to failtirte. teytond tihat, all litre> in the'

emetrrgec'ty tetti inl tysteit arid tfhe emetrrgiencv toioling intl nxrftsida hiat rentoval systenr

rtely on a sinigle re'servoirpr itt liotk a frighiy re'levant wrak split in tir isi of satrety.

8OKO-IN0 IFU'tlIt adrl

itrcaus> in these dfetigrn flaws anif becaustr'systerm arid r titptitliet faihlt it ia itbie etpern d~t

Itfdie trr inaterial igirng arri a tpoor safe'ty cut ture}, theret is no giiaranteer that thie i'itergenriry

powter siupply systert tart operarte withoitt fail itt that all essintial systtens can> function weil

enotttghi tri meiet riequi'iemenrtsx

Con't( expoutrer ra tr akre plar it tithirt ilt a fiw houtt frs t eit tiereatr pretsure' vesstel it

trorplettely opent rfirinrg thei exchiange'i ofti' elt'riirnrs iand thir poiwer stupply irt roth biou ks

ctimpetetily fails at the taint ttrinr.

Iliri to thesetr flaw> rrnr tfre very shourt ti te axafilablie orrrntervrntittrn, tire FreriIinch fuear

safety authtorrty, ASS, hat rcalled Itir retifitftriig by5 ten s a otrf a ihirdeiit ne saety tore'i

ltrowevtr, such retrohittirrg is nort tlie for comipretcon until adol, arid onrry sirallt'r dlies{ e

geireratorir are hering pro>vided fur a trarntitional perciodi tit sipltrrt hattiry tiipiply.

10KOfINStIIIU faOua.j

Int thits rrtpect, it art evenrt octurt Ii whirihi tire tiotal powrer surpply from both hlock genrarr-tors,

ittetieheirr NI' iht> tither defir it> O0t) I NSTI I itT adl i a

* Fhe're are nou ireasures- in ptreirr ut guiarairtee thit inteitgttry rtf tire' rntlting prirnd. Tihere

is ien ptroteciturn againstr exterrnai threrats iot againstt the los> iii watri Itrou the ponirr

Ithrritgh link> in adfliiortg pipets).

* The positioiiuni ofaut8t systtr'ni is far bteiiw ithe livel ni tiht Rhitie bypratt rchanrnel,

eainiutrg thrat tire etruire grirtirds of tim' piarut face rt'l potrerttia risk iti firionitrg.

Iherert art' afso irnritationrs tba~t tiice safety cltuinre itt Friiretntl ci~ar powesrr plant> it poorti In

Atigrst ad r thte ASS frirnid i5 detfects itt taet8 relervanit cr no neniittrts dutring rtatdoii tests

an C arteririr 4bitt htigh inimber' anif titie taicty iriated sigrnificancei of tfite defe'rts aiitrw tix tor

irnfir that thie orlrrators tawarenresstof tatinty it nort wiry prrronoiunred. IMAJFR ao a In ti

respect r wie cart assutue that a iot of tuinin-rntihri iierd t de 'el eist at t've'ry NP'P that wiouilt lead to

tin' flinttitirtal fairlire iot rirtrfnpnlr'tts nt tytterrs irt case itt arttn h dc'rett/ar ccridet

it hur erilreiri, a pnit safety cuttirte errnuot age>s carryitg nut a rerrorist arttick wiithr fir'

14

I Insideirs are' at ceast as much of a threat to nuicltar poster plants as terrorist attacks frontoutside. Ehe threat posed by rnsiders is therefote given a lot of attention in initernatoional

dsussion. (Oie expe~rt pohntcd out at thle internation/al N UN(C'• roon erens e that thniostIOt

dlangirous thsing abouit insidlers is their knotwledlge whirls they always carry with them atrif

05cr hirft there is noi control HONEI.O 1110 ao5l5to calledl reliability Itests are susfpposedf to present the hiring of people who iould betcote

initernial perpet ratoi s isl not eat posset plants. Althoulgh thise' tests tompl iate the inhiItration

of perpetrators into N Ifs, they tainlot completely preveist it. It retetitly fbetame kntown thtat a

Belgian iihasdist I Ilyass Bfoighalab) wotrked ftir three years as a terhnitcian for Vinssotte Wilrijk

before he le'ft for Syria in Ntisembser ao12 i afIs joh gate hito access to the set urity area sof the

Dtoel iiiclear power plant. BRIENSEI S aoi.4

The current sliortage si trainred personiiiel aiit the' increasedf use of oiitutseiietinpani iis opest'i

up niore oppourtunitiies ftir teurorists tit work ii an N PIf' if itily for a sfhitrt tiiie. If atioteintial

attai ker tinte siicceedls iii set't iii tg a lull at a niiiier cipoiwei platit, tbtin he/she ran rs'truit

more iiiside'rs eithiet tfhrouighi ieotlogitcif p'euisasisn, bribruty ttr llat kuoail

Oiie ith the ititit impoirtanut ptrottec'tive iteasure's agaiinst attaisks hsy iiisiideirs is the four eyes

prinittplc. fHowever, this it inieffectivt' if there are seceratl pe'rpetratoirs insult' tht' plant. It tan

also fit uunde'rineidi fly i arelessitess, sloipplitiss or a genecrally pootr sia sty i tillt tre.

Oppiirtitiitie's liii itisitders niighst itsludfe act s of sabsitage tin safety re'levaitt valsves diining

refpair tor lnahlieinanit wo srk. loch aii incident appareintly siticurredl early ini August it ithe

Dloil NPl' sn Ielsginis when Block 4 hadf so hi' shuit doswis at aii iiischueduiled tiiie beii ause'

90onoo litt'rs os1

till luaketd out its the stiein triinlsie are'ai I he' Belgiatn antti te'rrosr agent y OCAD

is inivestigatting thse tase. FLANDERS 20i14

The'ri' are sliterise 'effes tivesi •eiiat its invotlsiing resisde peirpitratorsx bitt thi' itiost feasible'

apfpeair tos lit attascks with esfilosives. Patrt isularly danutgeroiuts at i attncks whir h usc enfllosiwes

at critis al poitnits ini tfhe NP F' en s-c siall aonitiits if explolsives (weighsing just a fc'w kilos}

ouilif trigge'r a tore itehtdtwit with tli'e large tiale iteh'asc it1

raidiatiisn ansI radioanctive

fparti Ites

V•t' iiniist etfpert that a terrosrist ittaick witfh thie partitcthat sit itt itnsiders sutissi lie

"stirsessfullys tsncliised witfhin otst a few nitnittes. tt is dutf tuistsl whit'tser st'scurity fpeisotitel

at ais NP wounssld fit afble tii prevcitt a wc'll prepairc'd arias k . Meutbers itt thei sti uirity startf

right itsn ibit iisvolsveds as rtisitfirs. ft is ionu tivabile ths'y tiil~d smuggle we'ipons tsr

explotsive's isti lisildiitgs ot hiilp etiell s tri siisiggle itinm in,

ft is i iiicesails'e thsat dro tnes wouild hi' used tit supporit an explossive's attack,

ft is alsio concisisable tfsat sevtral drittiss osildf 'dcl iwi thi' ixplosui'ls. Estuiiititiis shotw

that ktnowledfgeatble tiesisders wiould inei'd Iets thans to kilos if e'xploisiv'es tit tr igge'r at sir'

nsehtdswn, 'tseveral dfronie typs's rcoilid dfelis'er thfts aintstiit wtitfhout aity dhiffitctlty si~isi they

hays' ta plc' litad call itties ansh arc appfartently ahle' tit fly tics' tntuciia fpower platits w ithoutsi

ititerfences'ss lerhaps the ret s'it drotite flights wcr'ett u cessfisl pras tit e ritts.

Mtoreovier dronies sosldf suippoirt an attack thsroughf aeita iobse'rs'ationi atit, if tieif hr. ittack

security pesionnisl w itfi smaller e'xposives stas•, tie stittilar wetaponry.

A a2oso stisdy doniii fur Grieenpstealcssets filatii cV. e'xamineusd thei iffect ief firsig a pi~rtablslaint itatnk giiisc'd 0 capoit at aii uhf Gci iain oucer patlonser pslant, fBeauise' it its perfsoriiani e

sletifhrationis aind its pitteittial availability, the AtI 14 f(Koi tt F "' was s hosen. lit adfditioni tio

shapestd t farge warhetads, this weafptn caii also fti e theirititiaris w arheadfs that iise' flaitsssafle

ssubstance's sto obtain a lirge' sdestirucitic,' e'ffect. ft [CRK R 2o icI

sIimpioveds armorr technolssogy atid adiffittiulla arimort for artiored vtesicle's haivc' ledI is evei

ne'w'er andf timproves'd poirtable, sfiisuldc'rfiredf, antitiaink guided wceaponss A [GAW anstitanik

gitifide weapotn). Asove' all its rent tisdciasd's the t'ffectivs'iess of t'wite fwaifea Ihis incri'ati'd

bsy liaps aiid boiundst. Shaped't scharge w arfheads iai' siedt ad thi'iisobaric warheadls fiats' also

bitin sfew','Itpsd foir stime we'aposns systeits.

'Metentrn irutor pittrsitg w eapoiss coutld alsoi he asisssd at tnuclear powser fplants -tfc' misste

effet tics' the weiapons thiine r ore oisequen'ttial sutcf alt attack. l~T' intrease iii pe'rfsimnanui

lii imetics of w sifalo tysteils posiecs a contilmeiisiiateicly greater poiteltitat ifanger to nucliear

poiwer planits.fit' tecfhntsial poissifislity if raptif tiran' su t sy re'loaiintg siinplifie's an attaik ands allows fiti

strikuing muitltiplei targets. I fit'lighte'r wc'tght aisi eisc if usc' alsos sitiphsy iaiii'uve'r aiti thus

aii attamck. fBECKf R 2005l

I'ortablc' ittitanik wseapsons atre asailable' it great iniumsbers isi tfie slack itairket lii'saiise thety

are casy tit trainspoirt anid t ui onea. Abosvi' all, howttertm , thety cats bs iffesctiv'ely c'iiploiye'd

agaistst 5virtiou tatrgets

fte AT- 4 is a thirif gc'its at issi psrtabl' iantitank guimde'd we'aponm a wsapont systeit

dfe'vlopt'd by the Russian icomnpaisy KBPt for deplosymenst agaitist hi'avy armnor Iratige. too

ti 5,00 nmetc'rs), Ihi' stansdard watrfiead is a taindeim shapesd rftargc' that ait piert e iz 2 ei

lnmsssogenisz'd steel arcuor pslate tsr aboit 3i of e steel retlrifstcc's t tns c'te. fBesidfes tfhe talitfem

sfhapsed s harge warheasd thieie exists a thirissobaris swarheadf for usie agaitist soft targets aisd

fort ifirationst. 'IfT' expfloisive' psowi'r of this wirheadf is eq uivale'nt to the s'sflosivs' sower tif 50

kg if expflotsives (TNtl.

The guidfe'd rutcket is hasiti heds diirsttly ftriit its transcport ands firing cssitasiei. " his alloiws

foi cc'ry tapiud iritig readfinoss aisi a reclatisely fast rate' ifft ie (loaiding tities: 30 secindfs.

tii addfittion to tfic idaylighit siptitcs tfie tiupiti biring e'qiiipme'nt ss equippedt with a thiermial

itmaging sdevice thut allows targetsiig at asigftt ft is postsiblel to sii tins' targc'itig decvice is

stttti aneouttisly iimutuil tsw'o fitiiig ilatfitrnis ansI thtus enigage a sitiglc' target with twit ret kits

siiiiiltaiiiiously [ARBMY 20 i41,

ft iiiust bei gc'nec'illy asssutsed tfhat it moult1

bc' poissiflc' fit, a postititial attiac'er toi illegally

oibtain ansI At 1i4 ittcluditig ant ihlary scottponuetts. The'riiisfbaris warhecads tray already hive

fei'i ulsesd hty iischtviuttal ti i irursts hut this ratniist bet xshlstaistuite'd too% to dati'

T hit AT i 4 it soldh wsurlfwtilt'. In i994 the fuist dep loyablel systents weis' delivs'rc'd to the'

Ruissians arisedf foures c This w eapont systrut was site iuf tfhi fbiggust hits' it ths' I 1ffF ano9

wecapoiss faur ini Ittaubhih. NOVOS If 2007 h, b;2009. Iii tfi'e meanititot the wreapont systiuti has

situ e'xpotrte'd tot suveral itthir sostintruess AR MY act 4)." ' he il50or' stid| Iineaptuns systuetus

sue in worldwide' irtculatisot ths' sasier it will be iir teririirrst iorgatiuzationsi to gut their

hansssf ott thc'in Its this contescxt, it us alsot tre'saint tt noiti' that thu traqsinarul) recenutly usedu

"17

this weapon against the i'xttreitist group Islamic State {IS) it the iraqi prov'ince of/l)iyali

A shaped (hlarge wat rhead i (nsists o[i a holbiow

iietal tontell eased with explosives Ulpon itmpact with the target the ixploesive is igniteid

Thle stream of metal (shaped icharge spike'; created strikes tihe tat get wtith very high veliir ty

(several thousand ileters per sesrond). Warheadis of third-generalion weapon systenis are

already capable of petnetratitng about iii thick armor steel or abioit 3no thick steel reinfoticed

c onrrete.

The effect eii the' therinobarti weapoti or aerosoil

bombts (FAE fuel air explosive) is based on the ignition of a flammable substani e dispersed

in the air.3 A theriiisbarii warheati sonsists ot a ieontainer I onttaiting a flamlnable siubstance

two eulilostwe r harges are ilsef tto igtnite it: thie ftist t fharge fitnily idisperses till fuel in thte

air creating a fuel air mixture. rir atrosol A fcew tenths of a secondt later the'secotii chatrge

ignsitex the aerosol lotuif tfie ensuinug dleflagratioin moiiirs almost simithatneously withiti a to

tii 40 it diameter sphere.

I he piriniary elicit of tfherimobarir warheads is di fieved tftrought hie shtock wave icreated biy

the clef lagration that destroys buildiftgs atid erquipnient. The blast ecleeit lasts iotnsiderably

liinge'r tftati is tite case with rittvetitional explosives. I he overpressure rif tite detiinatniti

ran reach tfhree mega pascals ff0 bar). Outside Ifhe chouf fthe explolsive sftm k w ave travels at

tixer 3km a secondi hii atrddiiitn aeroisol fonibs hlave a cotnsiiferabsly stronger teat effevct thati

{onvenitiotial esxpiosixves. Tfhe teitperature r iilid real f 2.500 toi fo d00iegrees C elsius. )tither

dlamage is diotie iiy the vacuilnil effet t. Th ftecxplotsion sucks oixygetiout ot tihre a itr t eatiing

a strotig iltider pressure tfhat attracts inovabile objes ts atid tftis learl to further destriictiiot

If foirtiheie roonms, e.g. bunikers, are targeted, tite fuel tant petnetrate theii atid thus r reate

cotsidierabhe dlestriiction, EC 20oi4. FAb a014

A few years ago firitig lists using a modiell ciltistrilti tut were {otititii ted itt iRussia to test

tule vuhltetabulity tit nicideiti weapilns systemos oii a new fiotirih genieraiiition type iii realclii.

the Atl14 was usied as the weapon systemt Cotnrlulsion:i iliier thi aitat k scitnario of thi' firitngtests a iorie liehdoiwxni act ciien otilif be ausedi. BEC KER dzorno

tile itoifiwitig presetnts atn atialysis oti a poissible attatck sicetarioi itlvilvinig the firting of a

Al i 4 w eapons system. Ihi' initent is tiet to describe thi' nilost efit ctise i'tethtoci hut rathier toi

Atialogous to the fRuss xiiibritig test, it is assulmedi thtt twoi grotips of attarkers ieaich

with at least twil personsi witldlt iarty oitli the attack. At thei begitnitttg iii tue altar k thi'

terrorists wriuld hi' il a hiidden position aboilt ieo to i ooo in away irtro the' redsctot with

a cleat vitw ofi a small ariea iii the building. Btoth griopfs wiolid siiiulitaneously hise shapedf

charge' tiutlitios ii siewtill idiubhlt salvo. iTs his wiiilii be fultoltife iiy tilt firing iii seviralI

thieriiiibarii warheiads. lhey wiuldi lsc' ain aititng devit e lio itit tilt sailie tatr'et area.

Ihie shaiped i barge tnuliiottlls rO~llid peni'trate the steel reittitri ii coiiclite if thi' esternial

iititainimetnt shril wvithoutt cdiificulty since' Ills thiicktirss of the will is onily i9o eni Ihe shiaped

itargi' spike' woutldt lose' abouilt a thtirdi cii its eticrgy ottil mpact so fiat it oiild htave' etloilgh

liftt at least iii i crtais areas. to idextioy' saitty relevattt terfhtical r iosponlents. However, since

siuiihildtiagi' wotilld bi' r'latlxw'ly liii ifizitd, thisi t'xe'tts costtii lii raslteied iby the' s'curtitc

systieti of i tiemu ina tower 1ilantii' Be'aiise' of thi'suusceptibdity ot ouldc'r nicidea 1tpow'e

pilatnts toi disrupltionis atii tin' we akness itt thiti itncidentt iiiatag i'!itc'i cotitrols, holw'ever' a

Evity shapledi charge otnitiotnt woiildi create oitiiy a x ry situtli penietratioin hoh' oih the

estetior t iitite coititaitiiletit. Oltt e i'uterior suit' htowe've'r ti'e coticrete would bc' iuosetned itt

a iiciiiuar patterni aroittnd the' etntratnce hosle. W~ithi a itigh deigrei' of aci uracy it cati bei assumlit~

thiat iseveral shots at the' saine'target area would cieait' a sui1 1a l'lltoeing as we'l as c racks iti

thlis salutl acea of thi' will. throuiigh that oipeinutg thi' aeriisol of thei thet tuobatis warheadi

wouolbe hi'frred oteitileIl intecriiir of the rators tit uiildinig. !h l' tit oii the hi st therniouiric

waritcati witlld fir Ill intiireass' Ills' sie iei thi' iifenlltg in thei prei'oilily damiagedi wail Itre.

I Its disitructivi' force'of tile ftoluwitng the'riobaric wtrihetads rioiiit theni deivlop fir inltl

the saiely visst'l I iti sito5 k warve would distroiy several sri irity rilivatit ciolponilits, Ih

heiat woiiildi lUSt' senisors andl controtils iii iiiisiiiiictiiit Itt atiy casi' thi' if et of therosobar i

explosionts wiisidi fit spretdi ivir a widie area sit that several resitidtidany systenis itighlt bi'

impari tti siliilttluhanssly. It is itightly problabli' that its'e treuisite' rorlting of thie reaicito sore

woiulid t ompletely fail atnd wiutili fie very diifbic itit liestitre' withitit a sitort per'iodi if tulle.

A cori ienleihdown wouiili thten iie practlitally iteit'siailei Sitn e thti lontaintme'nt vessel wciiilr

have a leak ini it from Isaihistit pinitur tuhi moi'iiist dfangeroius atcicident woutldi resultl: a iorie

liii risitli iii thei Ruissiat birinig te'sts alliiw concluisioits ii ts'b dratwo tit thi' potentital cuts{ is

itt ltiat kitnd iii a stinks' rt a I ir'nch nuchiai poiwl plitit. lit' e'xt'rtial protetis n otit ii he

reictoii ill Fessenhfeii attd Guravelinets {as is thi' case with tii 34 ildier tiilcear poiwe'r pltaits

with rieators in tihe 900 MWh I lass) is relatively sligilt. At the saute tiile miultipie sihots with

tite A1 i4 we'aponl sy ,sitim iroit several htuitdre'i omcters distance woulid be poissible' If extint

tiheriiobiric warhiads netre aisoi uise'i Sillit anl ittat I cotilti ause' a t n'oir' ltdiowtn accident

at colslpintiId by thi' re'le'aseiel ritsideale'lc radiiioastivity.

the ibuildhing fur sitorinig fuels elementtis would likewise' stistatin gruat daniil'g itt tite e've'it iii

such ait atlasck sie'narioi. It wiotld liter iii lii assiinied that. Is a icontseqfuentt I ot tilt atta k, the'

titling witir trout thi' iiolinlg potid woildi drtin hilt andi Ihat coolitig coldi trot hi' restoredI

quickly e'noiigh I ihe resuht a serious ac-itiielt with large aiiiiuints of radioativ ity released

(see chtpte'r 6)

ittoniis rouiid suppoirt thius atatack iith in its pre'parationu adii duiritng its l xii uitilili Ili

eslilple tietailed itiagery iroit the dlrotne couild hi' ised to select a suiitable' site fur

suurh a attack scrnario anii recotnnsoiter its sec'curity persontttel (tiheir rolutinles. itateriel.

riiniuiiicatiotns caipability, eli . Dutt)ng Ilhi attack tite dirotie oiters Itie potssibiiity of

enigagtig se1 iiiity pe'rsonntiel withi sitailer e'spltsivc'x itt. sit that thte ittack sit nartit stotld

Ihits' art' airy tnuiiber of otheri coniceivaile' attatck scenai'oit s beisideits uivlslg a ii c 'ercial

airlinter icot a ilriot tatta k f riiii itt' air. Tiiie daugc'r iii a terroir aitatak frioti tile' aii ix

Ilartirilarly hligh f tllt ratuors at thte titlhlal powier planits ill Fe'ssc'ihei't anid lratelinues as

it is fen all 1•4 Fritnch real toiis ii titi 9oo MW cliss tce' tllese ire' proit'cteid freini e'x'teral

'ifecis by a relatively thsiin 90 Sm) contiaitinment vessel will.

An iiirliiiist ittack iiy h( i'iopiter is litit' Oi Srevital tutu eisuabt' act if attirk Si snat lls built

18

an attack is relatlively slimpie to e'xecute since a hielic lpter i5s avery iaiieiiveiafcl aiii rattSin1 e he! iiopters are also readily availabile, tiey could be iconceivably used fiy tel rorists.'

ill tel linual pc ereqilisiti's Ini the suciciss' of such i sicenari o ace present ni thle case of

hielicoptersi

For suir i an attack a terrocrist group weould hav e tic obtaini possi'ssiOii of a helicopster, noal it

with a large quantity of explosives, fly flie loaded helic opter tic the N 'IP and ther e detonate a

large quamtity o~f exOplosives

It is relatively simple for ticrorists to get possessioni of a fielicop~ter. I ying felicopters even

foc pc vate puirpoisies is a gi owing trend. A helic opter, e, g for sightseeing flights, ran hix

booked ci oiliy placecs. As thii folloiwincg example shows it would alsoc he pocssible to hIcark

a heliiofplii withi its pilot: using a helicopter three prisoniers esi aped a prison in llruges

Btelgirui. I wo~c p srilis had pireviiiisly taken tice pilot of the hieiiicoptec hostage, they bothi

icretindedl to he iiiirists who chtail hoked a siglhtseeing flight. {WI- LI oo91

ILoaduicg a Inrge iquantity of explosives is simple: a hielicoipter ran land and take oiii at many

plai is celatisvely easily. It needs only a relatively sulall area. For examuple, a lhelic iiptei i oild

land at a hiddlen site andi the'rcbe iccaloaeid with exploisives, the poissibcle nailed weighct cii

a hlicopter is rouccghly ahoict c tin. Evein smaller heluenoters ieocld icc loaderd with several

hunidrled kiloigraics. flhe perliissilcle loaided weight if a helicopter would alloiw Icci the

loadinig ccl a ucisidlerahile ailciotln oi rexpclosives.

Gettiniig tic the target with a hcelircipter is iibvioucsly posisille. With a cc cisinhg speed ovec 2o0

km aic hoiii a helicopcic' has a relatively hcigh speed. It canc the're'tore fly tic a ncmilear pow er

plant svery I cic kly so th at the intel itiron ol lthe terrorists woucld nco ixe eviident prioir tic ilce

altar k. With a Iccil capacity oci several hundred cliter a hel iioputc has a large r ange (severial

huncred kiloomecers

Dccc to its easy tic cise aidh pilecise steelriig as will as thce case cc o cfchld g cviei in scial Iarieas

{e.g. oni rootis otl hospitals), a hcelii opter was piredestiined liir re'si e i~i'e. P~rec isely thiese'

characte ristic s cenable terrisi it~s tc ice a hrelii cpter as aweaponl agailist a ncciilear power

plant. A hielieoher caloafe with a large' qaint ity oci explosive's can hi' easily Ilownc Icy terror1ists

into a dct alinmient wall or thic ful elicci icts ficildin1g. Ove iflighcts by dfronces inc rec ent wseeks

hasv' rivealeifdcl p cifi weakicess iii lthe ccc cal incconutoiricg of Frenich clii ear power> plaids cciid

ahbose all c ltce clefenisc against sucih potential11c>K a ia icks Ifrth' air. lrhe doneis ouicill also

haci' gathere'd omaterial for tici lei'tailedl prepalaitionl cct all altal k

It is poissiblel to1t1 igger in c'xplicsciois oh hbcillings: With thei helpi of a fielci opfter qfuantities

ccl c'sxploscvs cs cif orei> than un0 kg mould hi' iscid. lIn addiitioin tfhey chouldf also fcc altar fci tic

thc' bucilding. Thce et1cc o[ xclo ~ccsive's is lirgest whe'n the'y ice broucghtt into dilict and lose

is puossiblel' iontia I w dit ich stri uct'r tic ice' flilvc upl. A lc'c minuite's would he sufhfic iet itc

atta1 fi tIle iliacgc' and ifetoncate the explicsivr's I-hit is not enciough ticcec for alertedf seet ruty

fuores ccr piolic e Icc pre'vc'nt 11he acition. T-ht hr'ing thec ease. a "sici cessf uil" actcion Outst Ibe

issuimed, 1his is all thle conic true if thei attac k is supsportedi withf dirones tic insvestigate

tlce cucrrint situiaticon (liatuion adud iitiv'ity of s'eiclriy pe'rsonicel, eli. I ir Icc attac thoisi'

pier sionncel

Altc'riatic'ely, a siceiid atlia ker culd1

cc ish a heliropter liiade'd with exploicives into0 thei

braidicng. Icc siich casec a laugi quantity iof Iue1

would inicise 11he exte'nt of tlic' potenical

dlaacge'. 11i ally esent it dust Ice' ssumnedu thit Icilcorists coruld dertonale a large fucantlity iiie'xplolsiwe's at a scictaicle puildt

Nu1c liar poiwer p]liltis ai e not designced agacinst detoniatiocis of eplousc>ives. lioitec tic n IciOc/

r'xpoicivers is siupposedsti ixcfc acihclsieve Iy clot allowcig expliosives tic Icc stocred in tice vimitly

of 11cce power planit.

A widecly cisid exploisive' is tr iiitricliiuol {I N' ~ Ihit, among otheci thinigs, is also user1 iin

ltce mlilitary fur weaponls and explcisiw s''. fLxig a rich' of thumb we can istcicate herei

what quanctity cii I NT woiuld bei re'quirecd to achides c the cioiplete' pe'nertratiocn of ticce sinigle'

waledc steil reinforrrcd 11cn rt cc'iocitaciine'nt shcell. A mucltiple iithi qu11jiantity ccc heceasily

iransfcorted Icy herliroplier. Thie saudh is tirie' lioi lice' bcildincg uiseid for sticrinig speic ftirl

elemenits. (uGite ltce actouinit l t'xpclisiwc's thcat a he'lieopte'r call transpocrt, ticce de'strucctcion

of thce douleccci wilhlec slntructre of ltce inu Iac powr'c plaid at C attc'coii call also not1 be ruled

fLallinig cccii rete' ribble weighicng Inc s, shcek waie's and shcakinlg froen the dletonaioiu n cl thiac

quiantity oif expliosiv es ci elt'eclively cla elf explolsivei char gex cioild caise' heasy ilacage'

within th' icontainiccenti shelI add interiup the1 iccillinig ccl the' ciactoc ccd diii to that

dlestricticon siclhi iehi Iiciling icoucl lilt ice reutored. lhecci is a hcigh proibability thcat it woucldf

cesuclt ic a ccci' iieltdocwn acccIdent w ithi release' of c ocnsccderablc' aclnoucits cl racdiocaetivity

Radioacttivity ri'li'ase's Icc likewise' hc' fc'are' if thi' cplosioni iclnpacts the lcccccfccg ussed to

stoir' sfcent fuel e'lc'e'ents. 1h fccuecl ele'me'nt storiage hccildinigs of all Frenchl nuccleci power'

plants hasve a thinc wualledI stil>ture. It is I herifct'r picssihle' that explicsives couccld i ause'

oicsidecrablel daouage' Ic the strueture cause lice loss o[ its corolciig watir. Cotciineriieasiiir's

hemsic nei'thec' aviulablel icoc pocssiblce, a large' release if radliac~tivicy into thlt ctmoisphetc'

would hi', u wicdcavicfle. I Sec I haptir 6f

D~roneis couldf suppdfort such ccl attac k both ccc its prep1 arationc acid ducring its c'xeectitccn. I-or

i xample, detaied iciagiery Iio ricilhe droei' iciuld ibe used to selei I a suitable landiiig siti' for

lice heclieopte'r and the' picint lioi attic hiicg e xplosive's and tic iiionnociter iiiecurity persioncel

fldciel ruineiirs, clateriel, iciccinuciuc atuons ilapability, cli.). During thec attack ltce droneic

oifiei s the po:ssibility o|l iengaging sie uc ity persc miil with smcalhir expclosixves, c't. so thai the,

exploisives iculid Ice' attacihedi add deitoiate'd in hindefred.

C o sicc

his light oif all thec steps re'qcire'd, a ii'rrorist attalck ccsccg a huelic opltec is a re'lative'ly scimle~i

attack scenario to esi'c cte witfi a high probalcicty oti c acsin g c itast Ic~loph c onse'qcenies.

IOviirflights Icy diiones hcavi' uade' it eleic that exustinig sec crity cueascices Iccr Frc'cc Inucc lear

power clints cancnot pre've'nt suchci anl attaek. At thce same' tiiie tle poss ibility of scipporting

scud anl attack wtit hdronies is ocbvioucs

I on/n/niccc'c ticrnlanc sitr icty officials sccii tic view sue h all ilitc k as a gecuicine threat. I huii,

gratings wire' recenotly insutalled til a bilfding ioh tici' NPPl at hhokdlorf lice' sigiufccifii a e

whichi was cud otciliiaicly dlis cosed liii ceasons oci seerecy. Aicicrchng tc sdp uclatiloi these

gratilugs ac' le dsuigned Ic hinderc' clii landicncg ccl hel i cpters. SI-EIl~ I- o14an

21

Sficrt term shiitdowni if the reactor: lthe volnerrability at a nucc lear power plalnt to attal ks atarty ttine sat bie gelnerally Ireducnelf y shlutting tfheli dlown., A shutdowni done as a short telrm

cciascire against increased danger, however, does not arroinplishl very nchi f

A d~i iive' pirolem 10 b real tar sahcty Ies in the flls thlat althouighl a cjiick tinterrup~tionl ic

the niutlear rlhainl realtion ian he achieved by a fast shiitdowtt, that doe ss nothing to stopf

hceat developiog tfhrough the radioiactive delay of the fuel (so called decay heat). Thns, if tie

coolintg fails, a ieeftdown cof tlce colre can icucr r within a sfhort period cif tince. After shutdfown

heat dervelocpllent initially drcops rather qcicrkly. A timely sfhutdfown tctn rerfuce this dec ay

heat atcr thscis slcw thle prcces s ol eccreccieitehdo%,n

Est ilates ndcclrate that the shlitltdownl mulst take place lover weeks ccr lilonthls pricr to tlce

attack in corcler fccr there' tcc be sofhicient lttle tco take inlterventiton oieascires, Ict acty evenc

thc' rhancres ccl sutcessfuil coiuntermoeasuresc are he'ttec for a real dor that htcs hbeti shcit docwnc

Where applceahle, the c adiccactiecty released is alsoc less sitcce socmte ccl ctie shocrt fla~lflife

radfioistoftoes It' g iccditcc'if 3 I l as already ciostly ldesayedf. HI 1RyCH 20041

Sctrengthencng protelctioct of thce far ility: One optiont for del etncftg against terroct |st atttaiks is

to strengthsen the facility s protec tion. I his inlc odes ioeasucres sucih as cincreasintg the tnccilcer

acid lltariament sct srcurite piersonnllel, extcendinlg fellsing, erertting hat riers ott approascfis,

ets. Details 5cic erncing siich Iiileastrres arce il~t pcublished; stillc' the i tch ccl Septc'mbher annl

hocwever. sccoce ccl ticsct htve ccc cdcciit alrcady heecc implemlentedf i pcrac tics'

l'rtcectlicon againcst attacks by land ace docuhtless icp~rocvedf by stcrh leacsures. As the cdrccnc

ocverflighcts shocw they are col less help agaticst attacks frocn thec air.

E very Fretnch nucclear pccwer plan~t is gciarcded by a special unit of thec Gcendarctierie. Ai ccordicng

to itiecia repcorts, on 3°(I Ocihtoe 2014 getndarlnIes tececvelf plnl'cissilcn to lcric{ ncfdccnec

flyitcg dyer thle sites ccl nciilear pccmer planits but shltsitng ill ltce dcre ticcn of nuc fear IaIi litiesc

thleltcelses is prcohibitecd ILU IJ WORT anoc4) Th' sliestiont alcic appeals tic hr wfhat w'eapcons

arc' suitable ficr that apurfpose. Ill accy rase, tfter tIlls accthority tl here was tssuedf the're havc'

beln ccther droccne Ilighlts over his Isar powcr lacilcties.

Nsicfly zon~es attd aliti aicrsraft weapolts: iti France llyitcg cceer nuld ear pocwer plants withini

a radius of 5kit alsd at a heigfht belom nono cc is prochibt'i [tcd ' Esec Frnh Air fotrcec is

respcoclsile' fcor itoniitorinlg thcs aicrspasce, Altfhocigh ccc fly zonies arotitcc tnucelac power ifantst

rieduic c the' risk icf an ccidetal crsashe's, this nseasurce has no ec'frt agailict a tasgeted'c attack,

e' g wills a hcll'oiccnccr. Dtrione oscrflights sraye a' tiia'les licw vallie of liii fly ltoness cbs iccic,.

Likew ise, acrrIcorce iinte'reptccrs catn colttribuite ratly mcargintalfy In the piroterccion of lenchcI

Ilc~clets powel plants, I Iccretic ally it wciuld hr pccssfible lccr sI raitbledi titerseptocrs to shotuci

dowtt a htetcicocles that hadl hceen recorgnizedc itn titmec as havintg a tel rcrict intentc, Hcwcevrc it

Is hardly tic hc espccIt'd fthat the intterceptolrs sccild get the're ill Itme Aftser beilg alerted the'y

reqcuire at least iy rninili' toc takteocf andd a few ctinuctes cliore tic arrives at thei llic car powe'r

plantit l)nrclng fthat tcill' fcowe'secr, a he'lisiopte'r cucldf I leer a distance' if 70 ktt ft is thrfocre'cic

all thlt m~ore' ciiprccalcl thsat at1 that distance 'the tirroiesI inten'ltioin dc thte hclicocfter ciicldf

fcc r'colgnc~siled

f~trtci clarly thc iolidcr iiic lar cpccwer planits wit lbreasctors it thle 900 MW i lass, but alsoc Ilher 3n MW class. esfcicit Ill atrray ocf decsigni flaws that Ittreas' thte potlctia!~c "siiccecss" of a

tecriorist atlas k I iniplemetht'ttg strictIll passive mceacsuires at NPPI sites c anltcot ccolipentsate' fcr

thlese' fasts.

(It Iti' whicleI~c the'ffcstu'isenss ocl all protctliv' tceiascdts actc'idcubtfcul All ctcncccivahle

fprotcI lice pirceventl' cive esiires call Ice os'crscodle by thc' imoaginlation iof all attac Ecr tlid icr Icytie correspondic n g strentgthls atcc weapontry ccl thle attatrking grouip. Ihsis Ifappies alsco to a~ttacks

Icy latd, cin partic cufar. fhoweve'r tic attacks frcccc tltc air acls fty waisater samhcbneds Ittac ks.

Miostly, the dangcer cl te'l lcrist attac k silt hut sar poiwer palants are ~l cscicsly doiwnsplcyi'd

Eli c' itentccctiocn tsmacde ltlat thte i nulear potwers fpatnts Ice sillfli cintly scuscre'ldchut, fut

conthfeidetiafity recsons, ccc ditails can he giwt'm osic hifts is a lim cichas fccecn dersisively

rontrccdic ted by drcone overfl ights, For onte thtilg Ills' operators andi oflihraus appecar tic he

pocwerIless to tel idinate thes ccverf lights andc Ics antttttecr they' ar' obcligecf Itc asscimte thtat altec

',urc a large tnutmbesr of spcy fltghsts tfhe existin~g security measuctres ire lidw knodwni.

A higchf prcctectiont level ocffsering a giods opporctunit y tic clef etnd igaintst atlaks k5 csccfs bc'

pronvided onscly bcy comcprehcetsiv c m' ilitary sccuIrity i~e thle stationi~ng of grounld IItoips withc

protcctive potsiticons, anltinirraft bacttcries, fast pcatrol bsoats attcd cmbat divetrs aon thec wacter

its. such Icmililtai cation ccf tfhe enccrgy bustttcss, howcever, appears tc Icc cict'teahile ill an opn~t

cemocaicrtr soitsety. HfRtIR H 30041

Itesitdecs Ithat thcere' Ire specifhr risks associate'd with succh omeascire's Wce~ilcapon fcc' berigge'redi

adicid tttaly or thtrough I teccnical dfefcts s. Civilians c ouild be thce vctli mc tc dlefenlsive

tieastile' triggcercec thtrcughl a scippddst'f ccr acitccf thtreat.

Itc addcit ion we afpons rcai tlsco sause' damage In thi' nclear pow'efr taif y. Thtsy ccculdf

evsetcn 1 inti ntionafy Ice cice fagaincst thec facility if ocilitary psersonttncl wcre hrihced lcy te'rrosr

citgcanizations Icr octhe'rwcste recruitc'd. Eve't thei c aptosce attc takeoveer cl cfdettnscve' pcsitiocts Icy

lerroc Ists cacnnot li'es ex cclccd.ed, ltR5C~f 2o41

[taere is a high proaihfility that under thle terroar sienat alas ouitlined's ii tfhis repaoa t reatolirsthus atta Leaf w oulld suffer a uncotiroiirllafile loass ifI loolinig ititeriaf iand thurs experienr alaa

faire mehtdfwn at[his would he the variant of a litre iiltifdiwnt watfh fth rist dfaigerious anid

flolst serrious I onseaquenltes: a a tre aaeltdfowna with anl opera rssntainnuaantl shafI. Rarfita~tivrity

wiiiilr titun far released cespecially early (withira a few houars) s aiana' itnoe of the restraintis of

the seruriay shell would he asailahle even fiat a trial ptertiod if taint'. fa additinata the level

wounld he especially hitgfa Aftar a longe r dfelay a piortion oif tht' radioar live isotopes thtat

wouiafd he released f roma the aaah eat foal a oas wouttd preacipitate doawn to roldear surfaces

wiftr hin fthbildatag. Ibhs fac tor that reafates exterior rele'ase of radioaiaatavity as fosa wfaeaa tlie

acontaaitnmett aveasel as fiteacfhi'fd, fte adfvancre warninag aima' for a arelease woldf atheti far airly

a law fhouirs. he ifuatatity of voalatile raadioisottope's (a'.g. a a"iati a f7) a eleaseif woalrf ha' an tfar

at ia of" haloran 5° tafd 190% 'af fti' acrre insventatory.

[far fate1

elemenraa rt calinag pondias at Frenchf aat uiear ponwer palants aire aria lorateda wathata lthe

ronaaaaam('aat structiara' lint ratfher nast tat at ira a sep'1arate fiiildfing. learuase of the low 'tre'ngth

if athe watlls atf raoofs if ata' farilding, ftie colaing fprond as ptartar alarly vulfneirab le.

A terroriast altark thtat leaf tat severet damaaga' an h' hauildatag aouldf •aus t oss'I" a afar ah aaoaling

flutid (water).' This wotild fail doe tio fhe dr'ray fheat ao the heat'inrg of the' fhie storedl

inisidfe Fuel fthat tad fbeei estrar ted ontly a slort a tiae earlier ftrim thea rear ant wooldf giarlerate

a refaatvr'ly haigha atataaitt of feata atad rana riarl a ta'aipetatutoe of 9001 wvithin a fae' hoiurs. At

that te pr'iiarraire at'e ftaler ela'tae't larkalittg tutbes aiade' if aiffaloy woitldf hiarna an afar opern

tat. Thte faire as sery aria and atannot ha' extitigisfheaf with w atar. Wiitfhit the aiaolring [ia'ir at

railaft spir'ad tat oafar faael e'le'aaents that woaldf othferrwisr' alit teat up so rapidfly. Thlut fth'

entiar' ainventory o fta ah coolinag ponda aaar c o sl t e. }AfSA RIZ ann031.

Ilta ignaitionra ziiatrafaty tfrrougfh tartaart watfh ait is affeletatedf if, afar tearrorist attack alsao

dfanages athr fuaef e'l'aeents ata tha' asin. re.g. frotat falfitng rubfbfle ora fragaetartiati nr. Smiall

zar aloy a haips (an it gitaae al teatiuorataares as low as 20nnC

WAith the' los's nf ootlatat tn fti' a taolitng pondfs inataetatntions art' prar aiaally aaapaassihlr'.

As staln as atie wrater htas flowedf ant naf afar' fasira tnot onaly tha' rrarlinag hata alsot ftie 'fhieldinag

effert of aha' waster is last. Thear radfaoartavaty lr''e' at athe ittea atraounf tha' hasan, horwever, wall

tactr'asr' dirastir ally ata other areas of afar'elbaildinag. Aroiuntd fta' maarginas of tha' fbasina drosagr's

wall ar'afh afaout too 'itves ra ('iy/It. Al.VAREZ anofi Ita afar area if tir' hasitn . lingeritag taime

aif aitly a ftew mirteitais waotald fe fatal. f-sen at a0 n diaafsltarc a'dosage levels al atie area

at iaat a m av i ha' b e'xpeteffd {ASN 201 ii.

'Sevrre dafamage to ftie acoolang poandsf le'afdsn to atosiferabl eest aff aari Iadtioa ittvity, nO dafata

alt'e atiounatn if radfioactivity re'lrasr'd aiterfa afifs si tratrit fats tait fien afeteraianerd e'ithar'

tharouagfhtf feitinatt air aftarougha prr{isa antalysis. Arordfitag to gat~zinefalatr' etll' in a 1JS satadfy

faowever, an'on% to io ', if ftie rcesiu inas aentaary ral the filali woautd fat relreaeed froam tfae

bauifrfing {Al VARE! ann II-

Tfhe rcooling pondi ait ht'n NPl at ( aatt'enoaa is designea'd to faiiir a toatal aif (a o fuaa' e'lr'aeaats.

[A'N ant ii A poraiont aif thr' ataserlaory lair) mutost. fhow'ever. her kepat friee fi to aaunplanned'

aaaloaafinag if the fort' Tfans, ii naarmasl opra~t'ttios paraovistion is miadfe for a mlaximumta lotad aof

437 fuel e'le'mae'nts. ' ffaowes'r. afata as aor'afe r ifth a houle' thet rtmfar t afufet e'le'aaents fitatad

i tat ltor' ariha Iofr rtal taanoitt aif relevatat rtadioiasotope Icesuaia 137 athat fan expected an faa

refeiasef as a resailt oaf afar tr'rror attar Ls rfisscassedf fteri' art' tharefori' ahuout afar saile as thre

aitoiattt releasa'a from Ifae reartlar aatre. Theay a tiuld e'v'aeat a'i'ed that hy a mtultiplr' if fioie

In afar e'v'nta aaf ita aaaea'ltdfowna with ata uteri rontiltiain 'et sfhelI than' wouald fba only

ata e'x'it'emly stinai alnoatatt oaf tiotatt' eaaa curate ft'tieppulafae. fat ta r ev ilutifon sfhouald gal

w rontg, fitaen dep'1 enrding upon lt'e wratfair, faiidrr'rs if thouttstanfs oaf people roatldf aerrave

injuiraious atad sro er'time's life tfraeate'ring rfosages taf radi atin attafa tha' v Iainiay of tha' faralaty

al ht' rarfiataiio poaisoanirig ran faa expertraf arid at ga ata dfistanrc's. aronside'rahli' hong aerial

contsequenceafis lahovr' all cancerrr anda geanetar daf age tat saubse'quetnt genierationas).

A letrlant fr'dferal-statr' ao iiaa niiaiaatiota eeral ir' thara simualatedf a nurclear r atastrophfer al

alt' Emaslatna N 'P rat a7 Septembifer ant rfe'moin'tratedf tfaat Ge'riaany as tarly ainsiffairaentfy

prep1 areid for a atalalear art idenat. fan the sinlutlatio tart ate popuilatiton was taut wartied ontatl tiat

rrfadiaetai've tlutd fada ahtarfy rat'h ad amilliorns of propile.

A poartrayaf of fthe possifale aotaseifaetaces ra aa ar accireat ifae tat r'xce''dfig dfesiga imails is

asvailafale frroaa tlte re"sults aif afa'e liseRisk Itroject ffFLXRI 5K ano14 Tite 'rope taf aIfis fajetiaf

tlalsjot aifudd the' ralrarlationt oaf radiorfogica a eonasrrtartareas iardfar fi8 artual weatfher sfeaiartlts

art a rept esenatat ave year (1995). ft was assuaaerf fthat n0' of atie (:r! tar enat orarry of restitla I3

woaalaf be re'leasedf atatea these'saen'rioaIs at rarh fa tifaar rfartoirs- at Fesseoenh i., (raxelaes

anrf Catlertoloa. The rr'lease' otader aft!teartrailist attark scenarios dfiscussedi he'r'e aitldf lie avata

gar'atar. As a a rniequiernar, somr' 's'lr'rted rasults wat'frepresntedf and hrrief1y disa ussedf. faa

addfittitna ahe' asirt-n I 7 depoasationts foapuitte'd werae graphir alfy dr'pirteal sirire fthey proitdte

an idea oftfr tal lng-teehIrrm itotlttitatiols. At rordinrg tat tht' IA FA. areas watfh resailun t 37 soil

onirtattiaranatio aif atatre tfaan 40 kg qinm' art' afeeraed aonaannataaadrraaa rf stra afhe popuaalation ala

saua f atreas arldf hue expe11ted to faece've ati effertive' afose of atirare ftharn a tuosy an thae first year

Undeft wveatfhea atorditiolls fortesponiaafng tla athose rita a arniary 1t995 the' radfioactiiaty

re.le'ase'r awouild] aaaontarinate frsiuta I1f7 soil rornttaminationrs af aboutai innn LIBF o'fa)at a aow

st rip iti Franc e at soufthern Geranary. Ira adfdftiona all aif Switzerlanda andi signifiantal parts aof

Austria woulrf fbe r ortanaataaaedf

Release's of radfiioativity at a w'eatfhe' sitraition like thrat on Ita Septeaibirr 1995 wauald sevelealy

lfa fle~ elgiauma an paartiiulalat

A release' of rafaaoartivat iti uder weratfher rardiafaiarrs lake those' pre'vailing ian 29 Juner 1995

wiotldf alase aeaontanatrnatioins ahbovr all art Fttore. Bel'giumta woalrf fae pi ratiralfy a aoatplettly

aotitralititai'df [sari tat atea an w'e.ste'rn Ge'rmanry woauldf ha'aaarataiaaraala'af.

In lfaa'serondr axataple tfa ie wathfar sitatiaion as it as as oti a5 Jatariary 1995 wararla releist'

radioactalaity primtarify Ira Gr'r tatny. fn a a alatively large area large atairirrts of rceiaasum iJ7

rrotitaminaataion (afbolt aono kfI ala). Eatn raatr'e ttafd arras if 'iwetfat wourld have'

flinlaaaanatitirt

24

Ifrnder weathea aconditions like thoseaon ii May 1999 a narroiw strip of Ft trite iwould bevery heavily otntanitiated ft eshlian t 17 soil iaritanhiratioiis of imore than taco Sq to}

In addition, part of Italy would lie tontaminated.

Radioictive releases, under the weather sjituationa lake that on 9 October 1995 would tot on y

a aottaminate all of auxetabouarg hait also at a very high level ci agh contlamination lev els

would result in flelgaun, the Nethirlands and Get taany

Figure 1 :possible CS 137 depositioens after a serfious accnidentt at the NPP Gravelinses

Thle resolt aif this short esliert repaort as that, a tatrary tat what stlfacials aant oiperatorsmaitaiaaan, thatra has been a dfanger fratit dlraoe flights over IFrenich nauclaear paower plants

sinlie the fegitaring of Il lctoer aOt4. Nail only the droane oiverflights theaase'lves fata also ltha

iabiith ly sal sricairily tIbs ials tat explain atnd presenst snail act icily are gratundis fair corarerrn.

Most of tihe lthne the dfanger Iraom terrorist attatcks in aliaslear power plants as dfelaiaerate'ly

played doawa. It is argued that nauclear fiower plants are sialhi ernlly seacured futa fur

aonaiadentliality reasons no deitails can ha rifeasead. These argaumtents are dratuatically

aitatradacted lay the dlrone' osieflights: Fiat atre thling it appears that opetrataaas aila officials arte

powerless to at tal hic osvetflaflagh anad fair anoatfher. at attisat ow he assumedf iftet potentially

uiaessfai reaaariraaassarare flights that existinlg sea arily alleasairas arte naaa knotwna.

Prat edrinag Iraota the hypoalthesis that a teersoia st sir craiminally tmotivatedi gritap as respontsiblel

fair these afrorie oaearflightls, this report has reviewed the resuiltitng danger.

In their Olilitary ~appllircatiaras, dftres tinchalutringsiatlerpairtabaieones have assaimedl

ant reaseid apiapotarnce as anl irastrititlenItit faretaonnroiatterarag anal tonitoraing potenartial

opponirentls rin thalt roh', iraore tiachnoloigy has~ itade rapida froagress ini rat aeit dfecades

tat date, there ha'is beeran iianialatary appl iscalimnat smaller, easily tranispoirtab le idratnes with

"statndarif armaamaernt oir that ate equippedf with '. g. exp1 loisive ariurinitirns

I-hissever, acisviian dramaes carpabhlt at1

pa~yloadas at1

a kg art' availafale that, e.g , catild he atined

with esxtlutsw'es.

fiat to the'ir dlesigrn flaws anal spfti'a a susc eptibillily to disaatarup io it catnrta hae railed' Gait

tfhat ati altatak particularly ira the 34 oldest I rana f nuucle'ar potwet platits, using explosavsa'

a arryinag dirones rgatinst seineti aratical terse a aratar saof re faa |lily would rasuatillia art evenit that

a auth riot faa iiiasteraed by Ilae' seaurity syste'mas arid the emeargarny metasaares aif the' operaating

taiti sat thiat radioactive ntiaterials womuldf be raftased.

VThae goaal oal fths shiort repiart hotsever is lto examitne whrethear terrorast attatkI saertarios using

adroties is rontceiviaba' anal whethler as aaarnseqiuerne a tiara' ttehdtown waoldf lie prastat ally

inaevitable;, aailliothe wordls, an attack that woualaf auaise' slilarages fair whiala aitaervtertaora

mreasuares tia biandar the release of a radi oactivity wouilaf ba ittpoassihle'.

lan light if fi ath tatal situataiarn ar the asvailabiflaty atid eatplstyabiaflyity frdrones trid

a a tisiadetrig fit{ vailneiraabiity if French rnucalear power platats at Fessenheiar ii ravelintes tral

I attertaom, thttt'e aiiaanda ertal variants apupear tat lie tiaraseivible:

* Variant r . darones supfposrt ata esplosives stinke by inasiaferis. fstiimiates rtiadiatte that ait

ainforatatd atasafer woaaldh taead lass t[tan a o kg of s axloasives to trrgge'r a a trs' mreltdoawn.

This qapntitay could ha'al dlarierd by a vary satall riataiber of dfrotias waithoutt any

adaffis tlly hectaise thair fpayhard as sail farent and it is aofviousa that thay ian fly oser

atonaic poiwer plarnts unhinaadaered. Garafienthe afirtae tacitflights ira rateant wiaks it catiiiatt

be riafea taut that suta I landiantgs werae succea ssfually fprastitedl.

* Vat |ant a. a muiiltaiple strike' sar the. conrtairnmen'at shall using iin antitank gtaided's wtefaaon.

If theraitlttbrit warhesads wart' also useds ian AT i4 I reain sev eral hiaradrail aitefrs dl~istanc

atalal ca iise' a core itetltdoiwiaaal/ a rcidn wisthr saansidterlable ratdiatactive' rileases. Ilti'

draoa' avarItlights otaght Ili a' lihaf as theiar gatal to rcaoattaiatatr' details at1

ita' sites'an

ifheir sat arily. In addiditrio, afrones coualid tat as an iierial looakaout anal sundera scitaina

saairiumstanties, atiaack sat tait) piet sonnitl wiath exploivesis air the like

Figure 2: possibte CS 137 depositforsa alter a seriouui ancfident at the NPP Feusasehearn

Figure 3: possible CS 137 depositions alter acserioots eonident at the NPP Catterrnsm

27

* l'lao 3 preparationai tori fairpoteial aerial *attak. i.g. using a eliecopter. With ataheadlded assist~aniae of drone ov erflights tfie sti ategies, resounr es and etfec iv isniss of

couantermneasuares of the oaperatoar and oiffiaials aaulaf be tested. tile droioesaaould function

toa a ceartari eo<tairt as "trial laa~llaons" At thle saina tanace details aif tfie sate anal ats secuait ay

a aoala fae raeoniaoiterea. The droiae oveerfligfhts demoanstrate tfhat tfie cxasting sri tarity

ajeasure, aae inot effectie l ha i [s applies appaarently nora onily to surprise ac tioins,,aout also

fara actions tfhat a an be expeciteal.

llndaea all the lea aai sacenarios researatcitd here tfieire as a highi probability th~at tfie resalult |aii

attac k oar thle reactoar laaaldinogs woualad be a core aaehdaow'n wath ait opena conataiiwnaeiat shell.

t he expacrted ree ia se l radiactivitasay in such riaseIs i partacaalaa ly haigh anad woaala began a few

hiaauls alteir telt attack. Thus, theae wouald be oanly very tattle parobalilly 10o little, laiiae tan the

rrjaaaiead evacuaatiaon oat the popaulaaea

lie bailcliiag used foar storing fuael lerlemeats waould alsoa sustaia greeat damaaage aaide lr te

,att~aak seaaaraaas exaamined haara Tfaeaeesalt woaull Ire a seraoaasaaa alieol wath releases sat high

ansaaaranas of radiaaa tasaty.

Measuaies thaat aaauldl be uised anider snore carirau staitaes to reduaae tfie eaahirabiality aif anr

atoiralc powei faliat tia tarriarast attai k do niat exast, tiet shiutdorwia af the reactlir paroavides oinly

agsignificaiat ana renae air sea alaity it at is rdone weeks before thle altarck takes 1a1c.a cOIlily tbeia

as Ihae rdecayr htiat suthi aenatly alimiaiashed~ so as ha gaain signaifairanly aaaore taiae faar avaalable

acoaanteroaeasuaaes. Ahthouagh at as auiestaianable awhether these woaldl lie saatbicut Ia paraevent

releases of racdaioacticity, it woaild praavide Iimue frtat protective oreasaures fire the poapulace. Tia

ltilat extent thie F renach sapervisory attic als at ASN sholaa da gave veely serious conasiderationa ta

arideriang the shau adaowis of the liretaitrs at least auit i the recelat inc ident s ala be cla abed.

A paresentattaaian at tfae radiaolaogaal rconsequaencaes arl a severe ,acaadeant triggeread lay the

terroir attacks dlasa assead above aat a NjaP rear lir at C attenaoaa. I essaenheaa oal (ai avehlaaas

adearaoistrates Ifhat adepending ian the weather aaniditaaions oraly aaaantriaes faat( i i p aatclar

ltelgaaaa, Geraaanyuat aeaabouarg. Swisal rianad arrl - aiascr) waoilad aexpaeraece wiarh arcas cat

cal aantaaaataorn.

Ira ordfer to comrrpletely assess iraod weaqih raaaalear arasks it as ess iaraal lao view tifae eatire' spetr llar

oa] danlaaer eeperrieaefe by terereasra[im !e paiblia hasa a faatdaraentaal raicfht to thatl. Via the otfaer

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30

A total Id 511i ,essur zed water real tols are opeiated at 19 NI') sites in France, lilhy Itre suib-divided into /rbti lassers )sa ne c Iiltrtll lion type) Ac N aoi i i:

* 34 Reactiirs o tihe 900 MW ic lass, duivided into the Iiolliwimlig series

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* P'4 (Flamanville, l~oaiuel, Saint Alban) and

- l4 (Belleville sur-Lorre, (attenomn, Golfech, Nogent sur Seine, Penly}

* 4 Reai tire ii thle 1450 MISS (l,1,ssil

* N4 Srties (Chogz, (ieiiwv)

Thle iiiiilear plower plants showii ii "bliiare' desigiiate those' 1tirol a1e knowin to lace expeer

enced driiie heel hlights tn date ).iai of 0 Niv. 2014.

Pressurlzed we ter reactors

800 MW Class

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Inner radius

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65,95

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Y'-Copter

Oktocoptar

Hececoptor

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Kaine Angaban vorrhanden

HT-116 (Hexrecoptee) High-TechHT- 8 (Octccoptar} GmbH

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1.8 60 0,63/0,35

2.65 70 0.90/0,45

14

20

2,60 65 1,00/0,26 18

/ Greenpeace eNV, Honlgkorgstraf~e 10. 20457 Hamburg, Tel. 040i3 06 !8-0, maVl~greenpeace.de. www.greenpeace.de10117 Berlin, Tel. 030,30 88 99-0 Wolfgeeng Lohbec k , Nicoline Hees C Bente Stechowske/Greenpeece

21107 Hamburg Druclrweltee GerbH, Bahreefelder Str, 101 A. 22755 Hamburg 2000 E~emrplare 09/2013

~Mercenetrege 19-20,Der Plotterreum, Rethedammrr 8,

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