The Dialectic of Normative Attitudes in Hegel's Lordship and Bondage

© 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-26228-7

LEIDEN •• BOSTON2014

Recognition—German Idealism as an Ongoing Challenge

Edited By

Christian Krijnen


CONTENTS

List of Contributors ........................................................................................ viiForeword ........................................................................................................... xiii

1. Introduction ................................................................................................ 1Christian Krijnen

2. Hegel’s Concept of Recognition—What Is It? ................................. 11Heikki Ikäheimo

3. The Paradigm of Recognition and the Free Market ....................... 39Paul Cobben

4. From Autonomy to Recognition .......................................................... 53Robert Brandom

5. The Metaphysics of Recognition: On Hegel’s Concept of Self-Consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit ...................... 67Arthur Kok

6. Recognition—Future Hegelian Challenges for a Contemporary Philosophical Paradigm .......................................................................... 99Christian Krijnen

7. The Tragedy of Misrecognition—The Desire for a Catholic Shakespeare and Hegel’s Hamlet ......................................................... 129Simon Critchley

8. Recognition and Dissent: Schelling’s Conception of Recognition and Its Contribution to Contemporary Political Philosophy .................................................................................. 143Emiliano Acosta

9. Kantian Version of Recognition: The Bottom–Line of Axel Honneth’s Project ........................................................................... 165Donald Loose

vi contents


10. Anerkennung – Ein Ausweg aus einer Verlegenheit? ................. 191Kurt Walter Zeidler

11. Recognition of Norms and Recognition of Persons: Practical Acknowledgment in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit .............. 207Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer

12. Finitude, Rational Justifĳication & Mutual Recognition .............. 235Kenneth R. Westphal

13. Inter-Personality and Wrong .............................................................. 253Klaus Vieweg

14. The Dialectic of Normative Attitudes in Hegel’s Lordship and Bondage ............................................................................................ 267Sasa Josifovic

15. From Love to Recognition: Hegel’s Conception of Intersubjectivity in a Developmental-Historical Perspective ... 287Erzsébet Rózsa

16. Friendship in Hegel and Its Interpretation in Theories of Recognition ......................................................................................... 311Jean-Christophe Merle

Index of Terms ................................................................................................. 323Index of Names ................................................................................................ 332


CHAPTER FOURTEEN

THE DIALECTIC OF NORMATIVE ATTITUDES IN HEGEL’S LORDSHIP AND BONDAGE

Sasa Josifovic

1. Outline of the Reception History

Hegel spricht hier daher keineswegs über soziale Verhältnisse zwischen einem Herren als Arbeitgeber und einem Knecht als Arbeitnehmer, wie die zwar einfallsreiche, aber eben thematisch ganz großzügige, in diesem Sinn spekulative Lektüre von Marx über Lukács [. . .] über Kojève bis zu Axel Honneths [. . .] Kampf um Anerkennung im Grunde behauptet, und wie sie leider üblich geworden ist. (Stekeler-Weithofer 2004, 60)

Hegel’s famous chapter Lordship and Bondage has advanced to one of the most intensively discussed passages in the reception history of the Phe-nomenology of Spirit,1 both, in its original version from 1806/07 as well as the compact and modifĳied version in the Encyclopedia. It inspired famous interpreters such as Lukács (Lukács 1938/1948) and Kojève (Kojève 1947), or later Siep (Siep 1979 and 2000) and Honneth to develop sophisticated theories of recognition, human interaction, and the “moral grammar of social conflicts” (Honneth 1998). It also provided the groundwork for influ-ential theories of social and psychological2 aspects of mutual recognition, including elaborate theories of human desire and its importance for the development of human self-consciousness and personal identity.3 In the reverberation of Siep’s interpretation, the relation of the lord and bonds-man has also been interpreted against the background of the natural law, while Lukács and Kojève initiated a Marxist tradition that focused on the reciprocal influence and co-constitution of class-identity and personal

1 I use Miller’s translation but I refer only to the original text.2 Inspired by Kojève’s reading, especially Lacanian scholars including Zizek contrib-

uted to a psychoanalytic theory of recognition, most famously represented by Lacan’s “mirror stage”.

3 In the fĳirst place: Kojève, Lacan, and Zizek.

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identity, desire and the system of needs, and, of course, the relation of desire/needs and personal identity. Theunissen (Theunissen 1982) even argues that in Hegel’s concept of recognition, specifĳically in the Philosophy of Right, we fĳind the prefĳiguration of Marx’s claim that the freedom of an individual is not limited by the freedom of the other individual in an interpersonal encounter: moreover, the encounter represents the offfspring of an authentically human sort of freedom and practice. Edith Düsing (Düsing 1986 and 1990) identifĳies a specifĳic diffference between Fichte’s concept of mutual recognition and Hegel’s theory of recognition which she believes to be substantially rooted in spirit. She also emphasizes the fact that the whole sphere of interpersonal recognition represents only a transitory moment and that Hegel’s theory advances in favor of the rec-ognition between the individual subject and the absolute spirit. But after all, most interpreters agree on the substantial importance of the mutual interpersonal recognition for the constitution of self-consciousness and spirit in Hegel’s philosophy.

Even 200 years after the initial publication of the thematic passages we fĳind substantial controversy concerning the relation of subjectivity and intersubjectivity in Hegel’s philosophy. Frank (Frank 1991, 31) argues that Hegel’s intellectual movement advances in favor of intersubjectivity. He even fĳinds fault with Hegel’s “dissolution” of subjectivity in intersubjectiv-ity, while Schulz (Schulz 1984) argues that Hegel’s consideration of inter-subjectivity within the history of self-consciousness represents a merely transitory moment. Similarly, Habermas (Habermas 1968) criticizes that Hegel had given up the intersubjective approach which he had advocated in Jena and reduced it to a monological concept of spirit.

Against this background and the strong consensus concerning the intersubjective importance of Hegel’s theory of recognition we notice a certain surprise reading Stekeler-Weithofer’s initially quoted statement that, at least in regard to Lordship and Bondage, this whole tradition of Hegel studies might be classifĳied as “fancy (einfallsreich)” but remains rather “generous (großzügig)” in regard to the primary subject of the the-matic chapter, and that Hegel “does not at all speak of social relations between a lord as employer and a bondsman as employee” in this pas-sage. And what is even more surprising about his approach is not the provocation of a long and strong tradition but the fact that there is sub-stantial truth in his interpretation. Inspired by Hubig (Hubig 1985) and Luckner (Luckner 1994) as well as McDowell, he argues that “Lordship and Bondage” represents an allegory on the interplay between the mind and

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body4 combined with the corresponding dialectic of self-determination and self-necessitation. He takes the relevant aspects of modern speech-act-theory and theory of action into account and argues that the primary mode of recognition thematic in Lordship and Bondage concerns the prac-tice of self-constitution. The Mind, the lord, raises the claim to determine the body but, according to Stekeler-Weithofer, it is the body, the bonds-man, who, after all, realizes the plan. Thereby the body practically recog-nizes the plan which would remain a mere aim (Absicht) if it were not executed by the body. Stekeler-Weithofer’s most interesting point con-cerning recognition consists of the emphasis of the relevance of practice. Recognition is not only a verbal commitment but the concrete act that realizes an aim, plan, end, etc., and thereby contributes to the concrete practice of self-determination.

Similarly, Cobben (Cobben 2009, cf. Cobben 2013) argues that the the-matic chapter represents the interplay of the pure self and its living body or the real self. According to his interpretation, which I strongly support, the famous life-and-death-struggle primarily represents the attempt of the pure self to prove its independence from life. But the experience of the fear of death transforms its concept of pureness as well as its concept of life and the relation between its pureness and life, which leads to a higher form of intra-subjective recognition and evolution of self-consciousness.

2. The Systematic Structure of the Phenomenology of Spirit

There is a specifĳic set of Hegelian concepts that determines the structure of the Phenomenology. First of all, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit is an exposition of “the appearance of knowledge”. In contrast to the Science of Logic, where knowledge is presented in the “pure mode of thinking”, the Phenomenology exposes it in the mode of diffference between the sub-ject and object as well as in a specifĳic distance to the authentic mode of spirit, the pure thinking. It provides a “complete” (GW 9, 56) determina-tion of the cognitive, normative and volitional structure of subjectivity, systematically organized as a series of cognitive faculties with gradually increasing achievement potentials and a gradual approximation to the

4 “Wie kann ich meiner selbst bewußt sein? Was ist das für eine Beziehung zwischen mir und mir, meinem Selbstbewusstsein und meinem Bewusstsein oder auch meinem ganzen Ich oder Selbst und meinem Leib?” (Stekeler-Weithofer 2004, 60)

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authentic performance of the absolute spirit. But, however, it consists of a series of cognitive faculties that are, without exemption, defĳicient in spe-cifĳic aspects and degrees. The complete outline of the Phenomenology of Spirit provides the complete insight into the structural determination of Subjectivity, the specifĳic relations between the subject and object of cognition in every mode of thinking, the involved faculties, their specifĳic cognitive claims, performances and achievement potentials as well as their defĳicits.

Hegel argues that the ‘new spirit’ is “the whole which, having traversed its content in time and space5 [Hegel actually speaks of expansion instead of time and space],6 has returned into itself, and is the resultant simple notion of the whole” (GW 9, 15). Thus the new spirit, the concept of spirit that Hegel advocates, represents the result of a specifĳic intellectual move-ment which is from one point of view a gradual progress of “education” or “path of the natural consciousness which presses forward to true knowl-edge” (GW 9, 55) and from the other, opposite point of view the return from the maximal expansion of spirit into its authentic and substantial mode—into itself. In retrospect, from the point of view of the complete Phenomenology, the beginning of the “series of confĳigurations which consciousness goes through along this road” (GW 9, 56), the sense cer-tainty, represents the maximal “expansion” of spirit, and every following moment represents a gradual return into itself.

This whole “history of the education of consciousness itself to the stand-point of science” (GW 9, 56) represents a masterpiece of the idealistic “history of self-consciousness”, (Düsing 1993) a concept that was originally introduced by Fichte (1799)7 and Schelling (1800)8 and received its most impressive representation in Hegel’s Phenomenology.

Basically, the idealistic “history of self-consciousness” is a systematic exposition of the human cognitive faculties organized in a very spe-cifĳic way. Inspired by de Condillac’s famous thought experiment of an

5 Miller’s translation is irritating at this point because it eliminates the most essential metaphor “expansion”. I must therefore refer to Hegel’s original text: “Er [der neue Geist] ist das aus der Sukzession wie aus seiner Ausdehnung in sich zurückgegangene Ganze, der gewordene einfache Begrifff desselben” (GW 9, 15).

6 Hegel speaks of the “succession” as a form of the “expansion” of the spirit. 7 Claesges argues that Fichte presents the fĳirst history of self-consciousness in his Foun-

dations of the Science of Knowledge from 1794. Cf. Claesges 1981 and Claesges 1974.8 Düsing argues that Schelling did not have any knowledge of Fichte’s concept as he

authored his “System of Transcendental Idealism”. I provided some evidence in support of this standpoint in: Josifovic 2008, 28.



inanimate, insentient being (a statue) that acquires the senses one after another and thus gradually awakes to sentient life (de Condillac 1754) the German Idealists develop the concept of a systematic exposition of the human cognitive faculties in the form of a successive acquisition of these faculties. Not unlike de Condillac’s statue, the natural consciousness goes through a series of educational levels thus pressing forward to its actual substance, or, in other words, the actual substance of knowledge. Hegel’s history of the education of consciousness represents a specifĳic form of the history of self-consciousness that emphasizes the return from the appearance of knowledge to the substance of spirit. But in general, the history of self-consciousness points out the successive acquisition of cog-nitive capacities.

In all types of the idealistic history of self-consciousness, Fichte’s, Schelling’s, and Hegel’s, the whole process of the education of the natural consciousness is monitored by a specifĳic instance to which in Düsings words we refer as “reflecting consciousness”.9 Thus the interpretation of the history of self-consciousness in general and the Phenomenology of Spirit in particular requires the awareness for the point of view from which a particular passage argues. On every level of the education of the natural consciousness we must distinguish the passages that expose the given state of education or the current process of its acquisition (the actual experience of education) from the passages that reflect upon the current state from the point of view of true science. Thus Hegel distin-guishes between the way things appear for the natural consciousness, or “for itself (für es)” and “in itself (an sich)”. On every specifĳic level of educa-tion the natural consciousness remains unable to perceive the content as it is given to us, the reflecting consciousness. The expressions “for us” and “in itself ” (“für uns” and “ansich” or “an sich”) normally refer to the same point of view while “for itself ” refers to the given state of the experience of education. If, for example, Hegel states that “we already have before us [Hegel: “für uns”] the notion of spirit”10 he clearly refers to the reflecting consciousness and not the natural consciousness. The latter will have to make the necessary experience, to acquire the necessary competence, before it becomes able to understand what it unknowingly encountered

9 I adapted this expression from Schelling (Josifovic 2008, 28) and Düsing who distin-guishes between “reflektierendes Bewusstsein” and “natürliches Bewusstsein” and empha-sizes that these two elements determine the fundamental structure of the idealistic history of self-consciousness. (Düsing 1993).

10 “Hiermit ist schon der Begrifff des Geistes für uns vorhanden.” (GW 9, 108).

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on this level of education. But after all, the education of the natural con-sciousness to the standpoint of science represents a gradual acquisition of the faculties that are necessary in order to make the conscious experience of specifĳic objects of cognition. On the educational level that is relevant for us reading the chapter on self-consciousness and pressing forward to concrete interpersonal recognition, the capacity that the natural con-sciousness needs to acquire consists of the ability to unify self-conscious-ness and alterity, identity and non-identity, “I” and “non-I” to the concept of “another I”, the “alter ego”.11

Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit represents a specifĳic and unique form of the history of self-consciousness and history of the education of consciousness to the standpoint of science because it is structurally determined according to the idea of self-performing skepticism (sich voll-bringender Skeptizismus) (GW 9, 56).12 In contrast to the classical, espe-cially Pyrrhonian skepticism which, according to Hegel, “only ever sees pure nothingness in its result and abstracts from the fact that this noth-ingness is specifĳically the nothingness of that from which it results” Hegel’s skepticism is based upon the principle of a “determinate nothingness, one which has a content” and to which we refer by the concept of “deter-minate negation” (GW 9, 57). On every particular level of education, the natural consciousness undergoes a skeptical examination of its ability to assert its cognitive claim by its performance. The relation between the cognitive claim that it raises and the cognitive performance by which it attempts to assert it represents the “criterion (Maßstab)” (GW 9, 58 fff.) of this specifĳic form of the self-performing skepticism.

This systematic framework provides the background for the evolution of self-consciousness as presented in the relevant chapter including the passage on Lordship and Bondage, and against this background we are jus-tifĳied to argue that this chapter presents a process of gradual acquisition of all faculties and competences that are necessary for the performance of a cognitive act qualifĳied as self-consciousness, or, in the spirit of de Condillac’s thought experiment: It presents the succession of faculties and competences that an imaginary statue must acquire in order to be able to

11 I presented a detailed analysis of the duplication of self-consciousness and the iden-tity of self-consciousness in such duplication in: Josifovic. 2008, 98 fff. and Josifovic 2009, 122 fff.

12 Miller uses the expression “thoroughgoing skepticism” to translate “sich vollbringen-der Skeptizismus”, but I do not know what to think of this translation. Therefore I prefer the reference to the original concept.



perform self-consciousness and furthermore to recognize other beings as intentional, self-conscious agents. Thus the analysis and discussion of the intra-subjective sphere of the genesis of self-consciousness must always precede the discussion of the intersubjective, social relations—and the allegedly unspectacular, simple encounter of two individuals along with the emerging process of recognition must not be imported as a tacit pre-condition of Hegel’s theory. Moreover, Hegel’s substantial contribution to the theory of recognition consists particularly of the systematic expo-sure of the involved cognitive faculties and competences. And from this point of view I will argue in favor of an intra-subjective interpretation of the dialectic of recognition as a precondition13 of the intersubjective interaction of empirical individuals. The concept of recognition that Hegel introduces in the chapter on self-consciousness refers primarily to the fĳirst-personal self-reference within specifĳic acts of self-cognition and self-constitution. It is determined by the supersession of the fundamental structure of consciousness in self-consciousness.

3. The Evolution of Self-Consciousness and the Emergence of Intra-Subjective Recognition

In contrast to consciousness to which an object is given as something other than the subject, self-consciousness is fundamentally determined by (specifĳic forms of ) the identity of subject and object: The subject is now the object of its own cognition or self-constitution.14 Hegel outlines this structural diffference at the beginning of the thematic chapter. But from the point of view of the natural consciousness the experience of this dif-ference and moreover the ability to perform in a way that justifĳies the new cognitive claim has yet to be made. On the beginning of its evolution, the newly constituted faculty of self-consciousness consists only of the ability to abstract from the content of consciousness (the object of cognition)

13 “Precondition” in the systematic sense of the history of the education of conscious-ness to the standpoint of science.

14 This chapter actually represents the transition from mere cognition, which is typi-cal for consciousness, to a series of specifĳic types of self-consciousness of which some are predominantly determined by aspects of self-cognition and some, more advanced, by self-constitution. There is a broad agreement within the discourse community on the fact that this chapter represents the offfspring of the practical sphere of self-constitution and the transition from a cognition determined by receptivity to cognition and constitution determined by spontaneity.

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and generate the certainty of its own identity. Thus it represents only the “return from otherness” and a “motionless tautology of: ‘I am I’ ” (GW 9, 104) which has lost the diffference, the “otherness” in form of objectivity. This otherness is only negated here, neither preserved nor elevated, and “since for it the diffference does not have the form of being” the newly constituted cognitive performance “is not self-consciousness”. (cf. Josifo-vic 2009, 110) The lack of otherness represents the fundamental defĳicit of this fĳirst type of self-certainty, and the intellectual movement, driven by the determinate negation, advances to a performance that counter-vails this defĳicit and generates a new form of self-certainty based upon desire. (Josifovic 2009, 112) It further proceeds to individuality, (Josifovic 2009, 116) the pure self (Josifovic 2009, 118 fff.), and, only for us, to genus (Gattung). (Josifovic 2009, 121 f.) This whole evolution is complete before the outline of the unity of self-consciousness in its duplication (Josifovic 2009, 125 fff.) and fĳinally Lordship and Bondage. This sequence of specifĳic types of self-certainty and self-consciousness represents the reason why I initially mentioned that Hegel outlines specifĳic forms of identity in his theory of self-consciousness.15

To be more precise: Hegel begins this chapter with a structural descrip-tion of self-consciousness in general:

But now there has arisen what did not emerge in these previous relation-ships, viz. a certainty which is identical with its truth; for the certainty is to itself its own object, and consciousness it to itself its truth. In this there is indeed an otherness; that is to say, consciousness makes a distinction, but one which at the same time is for consciousness not a distinction (GW 9, 103).

The sublation16 of consciousness within self-consciousness consists of a specifĳic kind of negation (negare), preservation (conservare), and elevation (elevare) of its fundamental structure. In reference to Reinhold’s so called “sentence of consciousness (Satz des Bewusstseins)”17 the German Idealists agree on a fundamental structure of consciousness (cf. Quante 2009, 96)

15 The exposition of this internal structure and its fundamental logic represents my major interest in my contributions from 2008 and 2009.

16 Hegel’s concept “Aufhebung”, of which I am not sure whether to translate it as “sub-lation” or “supersession”, implies the triad: negation, preservation and elevation (negare, conservare, elevare).

17 “Im Bewusstsein wird die Vorstellung durch das Subjekt vom Subjekt und Objekt unterschieden und auf beide bezogen”, in: Reinhold 1790, § 1.



which consists of the subject, object, and representation. According to this structure, the subject distinguishes between itself and the object in every act of conscious cognition. It furthermore distinguishes between itself and the representation as well as the representation and the object, and it relates to both (itself and the object) by means of the representation. Thus a conscious act of any arbitrary object presupposes the conscious-ness of the diffference between the performing subject, the representation, and the object combined with the consciousness that the representation relates to both. If self-consciousness raises the claim to supersede the fundamental structure of consciousness, it must fĳirst perform according to this fundamental structure. It must distinguish between itself as subject that performs the cognitive act, itself as object of its own cognition and the representation of itself by the means of which it refers to both. Every act of conscious awareness of oneself consists of three elements of which, in one sense, none is identical to the other two and, in another sense, all three refer to one and the same entity. Thus identity and diffference become constitutive elements of self-consciousness as result of the super-session of the inherent structure of consciousness.

The specifĳic meanings of identity and diffference in use are clearly defĳined. The performing subject has a representation of itself. It recog-nizes this representation to a certain extent as a legitimate expression or manifestation of itself. But at the same time it is aware of the fact that this particular representation does not embrace its total nature. Consequently, it refuses to identify fully with the given representation or, in other words, to recognize it as a fully adequate representation of itself.18

This is the broader context in which Hegel makes the ascertainment that self-consciousness “makes a distinction, but one which at the same time is for consciousness not a distinction” (GW 9, 103). But his own theory of the ideal evolution of self-consciousness in the context of the history of education is much more sophisticated because it exposes the dynamics of the detailed evolution and interaction of specifĳic normative attitudes (ele-ments of recognition) by the means of which the natural consciousness (de Condillac’s imaginary statue) acquires the capacity to perform the whole spectrum of subject-object-relations within self-consciousness.

18 Actually, in case of the self-referential consciousness the idealists tend to simplify the fundamental structure of consciousness and distinguish only between the subject and object. But what has been said above counts for this simplifĳied version without as well.

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Because of the fact that the Phenomenology of Spirit is organized accord-ing to the principle of self-performing skepticism driven by the determinate negation, we can always identify the specifĳic cognitive claim, the perfor-mance that is supposed to justify this claim and the defĳicit (Mangel) that emerges from this relation and provides the ground for the manifestation of the following cognitive claim, performance, defĳicit etc. Thus we recon-struct the dynamics of the evolution of self-consciousness in the chapter on self-certainty as follows:

Self-consciousness fĳirst negates the object of consciousness and gener-ates the “motionless tautology of: ‘I am I’ ”. It preserves it in the desire-based self-certainty and elevates it to a higher level in individuality. It negates the dependence on life which is constitutive for individuality as the natural consciousness advances to the educational level of the pure self which it strives to confĳirm in the life-and-death-struggle. What seeks to survive here is the pure self—and, ironically, it seeks its survival in the independence from “life”:19

This pure abstraction of self-consciousness consists of showing itself as the pure negation of its objective mode, or in showing that it is not attached to any specifĳic existence, not to the individuality common to existence as such, that it is not attached to life (GW 9, 111).

The defĳicit (Mangel) of this claim consists of the fact that it is only an expression of

abstract negation, not the negation coming from consciousness, which supersedes in such a way as to preserve and maintain what is superseded, and consequently survives its own supersession (GW 9, 112).

Not before the encounter of the fear of death20 will the natural conscious-ness make the experience that is essential for the further process of educa-tion: “In this experience, self-consciousness learns that life is as essential

19 The concept of “life” represents the totality of contents that an individualized self-consciousness generates in the whole series of acts of desire. Thus it represents the totality of a specifĳic form of content-determination. Consequently, a type of self-consciousness that seeks independence from “life” must accept the loss of concrete determination—and it will end up as lifeless and boring stoicism.

20 Cobben emphasizes the importance of the fear of death for the evolution of the pure self. He demonstrates the fundamental diffference between the pure self that enters the life-and-death-struggle and the pure self that emerges from the productive encounter of the fear of death. According to his interpretation, the latter, in contrast to the former, is able “to ‘recognize’ itself in its body” (Cobben 2013, 162) and it acquires this ability by the encounter of the fear of death, the “absolute lord”.



to it as pure self-consciousness” (GW 9, 112). These two elements of self-consciousness, “purity” and “life”, determine the intra-subjective dialectic of recognition. They are both of substantial importance for the evolution of self-consciousness, but they articulate two opposite normative attitudes: on one hand autonomy and on the other hand the rational capacity to respond to the normative signifĳicance of the natural world, social world or autonomously generated norms and reasons: independence and depen-dence. Thus, similar to Stekeler-Weithofer and Cobben, I interpret the interplay of the lord and bondsman primarily as an allegory on the dia-lectic of these two elementary normative attitudes.

4. The Dialectic of Normative Attitudes: Independence and Dependence

The pure self represents the given standpoint of the education of the natu-ral consciousness at the beginning of Hegel’s exposition of the duplication of self-consciousness (GW 9, 109), the unity of itself within this duplica-tion (cf. Josifovic 2009, 122 fff.), the struggle to manifest the pure self and prove its alleged independence from life (GW 9, 111), the encounter of its pure being-for-itself (“reines Fürsichsein”) in the face of the fear of death (GW 9, 114 f.) and the further progress of recognition and education in Reason and Spirit.

As we have noticed, the pure self refuses to accept any kind of depen-dence. Thus its endeavor to “manifest what it is in itself ”,21 as Hegel formulates in the Encyclopedia, is governed by the ideal of the practical manifestation of pure independence.

On the most elementary level, the independence that it strives to mani-fest concerns the relation of the subject of self-consciousness to the con-tents that determine its concrete empirical appearance—the contents or objects of consciousness. These contents are, on the most elementary level, representations. But every empirical determination is, from the point of view of the pure self, a contamination of its pureness. It inevita-bly embraces a specifĳic form of irreducible otherness22 and every kind of

21 Hegel 1830, § 425: “das zu setzen, was es an sich ist”.22 Jaspers presents an impressive exposition of such “aspects of the self ” in his chapter

on the self in “Existenzerhellung” combined with the uneasiness that the subject experi-ences in the encounter with every particular aspect. He begins with the Kantian “I in itself (Ich überhaupt)” and advances to the physical appearance, the body, the social self, the self-constituted by our achievements, self-reflection etc. In regard to every aspect, he dem-onstrates our ability to identify with it, but at the same time we feel that we are more than

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otherness is a kind of non-I (nicht-Ich). Any arbitrary empirical content of determination or self-determination contains something inadequate from the point of view of the pure self, and this inadequacy is irritating. Thus, in Cobben’s words, the dialectic of normative attitudes concerns the relation between the “pure” and the “real” self (Cobben 2013, 161) and reflects the relation between the pure and empirical self in the Kantian sense. The concept “empirical apperception” refers to a self-reflexive act of cognition that embraces a concrete, empirical act of consciousness, to which a specifĳic content (representation) is given by receptivity. This con-tent determines the empirical act of consciousness as well as the empiri-cal act of self-reference. In another empirical instant the same subject is confronted with another content of consciousness and, in reflection upon this particular cognitive act, it generates another empirical apperception. But on a higher level, the subject is able to reflect upon the series of given empirical apperceptions and distinguish between its pure nature and an arbitrary empirical representation. It claims its own identity indepen-dently from the series of arbitrary contents of consciousness. And this is the specifĳic sense in which Kant defĳines the pure apperception: “I call it the pure apperception, in order to distinguish it from the empirical one” (Kant 1787, 132).

Not unlike Kant’s pure apperception, Hegel’s pure self claims indepen-dence from particular empirical representations as well as the embodi-ment of their totality, namely “life”. But since life is as essential to self-consciousness as its pureness (GW 9, 112), the further process of the education of the natural consciousness must advance in form of a dia-lectical interplay of these two elements and not exclusively as a mani-festation of the one-sidedly raised claim. The relevance of the dialectic of independence and dependence is indicated in the title of this particu-lar subchapter: “Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: Lordship and Bondage”. Not only in the title but also in the current of the history of self-consciousness, the experience of these two elemen-tary normative attitudes of self-cognition and self-constitution precedes the social implications and associations of lordship and bondage. Actu-ally: independence and dependence represent the fundamental norma-tive attitudes that determine all lordship-bondage-relations, or, in other words: De Condillac’s imaginary statue must remain unable to perform

this particular aspect. I identify with my body to a certain extent but I claim to be more than my body. The same is the case with my social roles, my achievements etc.



even the most elementary act of recognition as long as it has not acquired the capacity to take the mentioned normative attitudes. Not before it has acquired the full competence to master the complex dialectic of indepen-dence and dependence will it become able to perform on higher levels of interpersonal recognition. The only question that remains when we con-trast Stekeler’s and Cobben’s approach to Honneth’s, Siep’s or Quante’s is: Will it acquire these competences independently or in dependence from concrete, empirical social interaction. There are references in the primary text that can be interpreted in support of each of these standpoints.23 But however we answer this particular question: my interpretation remains untouched, because the claim that “independence and dependence” represent a major concern of a subchapter entitled “Independence and Dependence . . .” does not require any sophisticated justifĳication.

The whole fĳigure of duplication and unity of self-consciousness (GW 9, 109 f.) consists of clearly distinguished elements. The pure self represents the standpoint of education as the natural consciousness begins to expe-rience the “duplication” of self-consciousness and enters the process of recognition. It claims pure independence from “life”. Thus it enters the life-and-death-struggle from which a new elementary normative attitude of self-consciousness emerges—dependence. As a result of the life-and-death-struggle and the experience of the fear of death, the natural consciousness generates a twofold representation in form of lordship (independence) and bondage (dependence). These two roles represent two elementary norma-tive attitudes as they specifĳically emerge from the life-and-death-struggle, namely as separately represented by individual agents. But there is a broad consensus within the discourse community that the process of the edu-cation of natural consciousness to the standpoint of science includes both positions as well as their interaction. Not only the bondsman, but

23 Quante (2009), for example, emphasizes the formula: “But the action of the one has itself the double signifĳicance of being both its own action and the action of the other as well. For the other is equally independent and self-contained, and there is nothing in it of which it is not itself the origin” (GW 9, 110). From an intra-subjective point of view this fĳigure could refer to the otherness of self-representation, but from an inter-subjective point of view . . . However: This passage addresses the reflecting consciousness only and it does not provide any evidence for the theory that interpersonal recognition precedes the acquisition of the ability to experience independence and dependence. But if we take the passage on labor and especially the phrase “service and obedience (Zucht und Gehorsam)” (GW 9, 115) into account, we fĳind some evidence for an intersubjective interpretation. The only question remains: Does this passage refer to the current state of education or does it represent a reflection from the point of view of the philosophizing spectator? I am not sure.

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also the lord represents a substantial level of the education of the natu-ral consciousness determined by the successful manifestation of a defĳi-cient cognitive claim.24 In the meanwhile, the experience of the fear of death transforms the relation of the pure self to its body (cf. Cobben 2013, 162) and, what is more substantial: it generates a new normative attitude that enables the self to incorporate dependence into the performance of self-cognition and self-manifestation. The pure self was initially unable to do this.

A more profound reading of Lordship and Bondage uncovers an even more sophisticated dialectic of independence and dependence between the lord and the bondsman, because it turns out that on a subtle level of interpretation the lord who has, from one point of view, successfully enforced the claim of pure independence from life is dependent from the bondsman, while the bondsman happens to be more independent than initially believed. And in regard to the relation between the lord and the object of desire, we notice that the lord has succeeded in overcoming the resistance of objectivity but he has not at all become independent from the necessitation that desire imposes upon his volition. Thus, in regard to independence and dependence, we have got the following situations:25

1. The pure self before the life-and-death-struggle2. The ostensible representation of independence incorporated by the lord3. The ostensible representation of dependence incorporated by the

bondsman4. The subtle representation of dependence incorporated by the lord5. The subtle representation of independence incorporated by the

bondsman

Furthermore the dialectic of normative attitudes includes a sophisticated spectrum of interactions between:

6. The ostensible independence of the lord and the ostensible depen-dence of the bondsman

24 Cf. reference to GW 9, 111, above.25 I focus only on the spectrum of relations between the specifĳied roles of the lord and

bondsman. But there is also a spectrum of normative relations between the self and life/nature. I omit this aspect, not because it is irrelevant but only in order to keep things as simple as possible.



7. The subtle independence of the bondsman and the subtle dependence of the lord

8. The ostensible independence of the lord and his subtle dependence from the bondsman

9. The ostensible dependence of the bondsman and his subtle indepen-dence from the lord

10. The internal dynamics of ostensible independence and subtle depen-dence of the lord

11. The internal dynamics of ostensible dependence and subtle indepen-dence of the bondsman

The diffference between the ostensible and subtle forms of every norma-tive attitude reflects the two elementary standpoints of the history of self-consciousness; and the emerging opposition between the way things appear for the natural consciousness and the way they are for us, the phi-losophizing spectators, determines the further progress of the education of natural consciousness. The progress of recognition consists of the expe-rience of the ostensible and subtle implications of normativity made by the natural consciousness. In every specifĳied role, it fĳirst makes the osten-sible experience and advances to the experience of the subtle otherness by recognition.26 Thus, as a totality, the natural consciousness gradually evolves to the standpoint of Spirit and this evolution takes place in form of a successive improvement of the cognitive, normative, and volitional performance.

5. Desire and Enjoyment: Chains and Diseases of the Feudal Mind

A closer look at the relations between the self and “life” or nature, provides us with some additional, more sophisticated material for the interpreta-tion of the role that the lord plays in this allegory. According to Hegel’s narrative, the lord has allegedly proven his independence from life in the life-and-death-struggle and he has become the master of the bondsman who still depends on life. He must maintain the claim to be independent

26 As a reference for the contrast between the way things appear in the fĳirst encounter and the way they become in the current of recognition compare: “But just as lordship showed that its essential nature is the reverse of what it wants to be, so too servitude in its consummation will really turn into the opposite of what it immediately is; as a conscious-ness forced back into itself, it will withdraw into itself and be transformed into a truly independent consciousness” (GW 9, 14).

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from the bondsman because his power over him is based upon the main-tenance of eminent dread and the avowal of dependence would eliminate this dread. After all, his concept of normativity consists primarily of the enforcement of power.

But in regard to the major interest concerning the evolution of self-consciousness, not only the relation between the lord and the bondsman but also the relation between the lord and life is of substantial relevance. And ironically, we notice that the lord who claims full independence from life—and even believes to have proven this independence –, is fully deter-mined by desire and enjoyment (Genuss) (GW 9, 113). And here we fĳind one of these implications that make Hegel such a powerful philosopher: In regard to the underlying concept of normativity we already noticed that the lord represents the claim of independence. (Sentence 2) Further-more we know that he depends on the bondsman’s labor and therefore he is not as independent as he believes. (Sentence 4) But the determination by desire and enjoyment brings the most fundamental aspect of his depen-dence to light: The lord generates the contents of his volition in response to natural inclinations. He is dependent from life.

Furthermore, we do not fĳind any evidence in this allegory that the lord is capable of incorporating the commitment to principles into his concept of independence. But principles are the most elementary constituents of the concept of autonomy in the Classical German Philosophy. Thus e.g. Korsgaard states:

According to the Kantian conception, to be rational just is to be autono-mous. That is: to be governed by reason, and to govern yourself, are one and the same thing. The principles of practical reason are constitutive of auton-omous action: they do not represent external restrictions on our actions, whose power to motivate us is therefore inexplicable, but instead describe the procedures involved in autonomous willing. But they also function as normative or guiding principles, because in following these procedures we are guiding ourselves (Korsgaard 2008, 31).

Since the lord’s concept of self-determination does not include the com-petence to generate principles, his practice of alleged self-determination is in fact external determination. He does not exercise volitional self-determination but mere volatile, arbitrary conduct. And from the point of view of the theory of freedom in Classical German Philosophy, this is scarcely more than arbitrium brutum (Cf. Kant 1787, 562, 830).

Therewith we notice a twofold substantial defĳicit of the concept of inde-pendence represented by the lord in regard to the standards of Classical German Philosophy. On one hand, independence refers to the human



faculty of free choice to which we classically refer by the concept liberum arbitrium or arbitrium liberum and which consists of the ability to over-come given natural inclinations (stimuli) by the force of reason (princi-ples, reasons, etc.). Secondly, independence refers to the Kantian concept of autonomy: the ability to determine a specifĳic kind of intelligible norma-tivity which consists of principles. The lord fails to prove independence in both ways: he is neither independent from the necessitation that the force of desire imposes upon his conduct, nor does he prove the ability to deter-mine reason-based principles that make rational choices possible. On the basis of what does the lord make his choices? According to the narrative, he is driven by desire and fĳinds his satisfaction in the mere enjoyment of the fruits of the bondsman’s labor.

Thus the natural consciousness must proceed in its education and develop a more substantial concept of independence before it becomes able to justify the claim which the lord believes to have justifĳied. And in regard to the occasionally mentioned association of the lord to the Kan-tian concept of autonomy, we conclude that the lord does not at all rep-resent the Kantian standpoint of autonomy in Hegel’s Phenomenology: He represents the standpoint that is naively conceived of as autonomy but defĳicient in regard to the underlying concept of independence.

6. Bondage: The “Truth of the Independent Consciousness”

The truth of the independent consciousness is accordingly the [. . .] con-sciousness of the bondsman. [. . .] But just as lordship showed that its essential nature is the reverse of what it wants to be, so too servitude in its consummation will really turn into the opposite of what it immediately is; as a consciousness forced back into itself, it will withdraw into itself and be transformed into a truly independent consciousness (GW 9, 114).

The continuous experience of the fear of death in combination with the “discipline of service and obedience” (GW 9, 115) contributes to a sub-stantial educational progress of the natural consciousness incorporated by the bondsman. The practice of labor as a form of “desire held in check” and “fleetingness staved offf ”27 (GW 9, 115) enables the natural conscious-ness to attain the necessary distance from the necessitating force of incli-nation and desire and to prove his mastery over nature. What the lord

27 “Gehemmte Begierde, aufgehaltenes Verschwinden”.

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believes to have achieved in form of the abstract negation, the bondsman practically achieves in form of labor—he becomes independent from the natural determination by the force of desire and the appetite for enjoy-ment. His labor does not serve to satisfy his desire but another person’s desire. He therewith attends the subtle form of independence mentioned in Sentence 5. It is not a form of social independence from the lord but a more substantial form of independence from the determination by the natural force of desire. Thus the bondsman qualifĳies for the specifĳically human kind of freedom, liberum arbitrium: The ability to determine one’s own volition and actions independently from the necessitating power of nature. This experience of freedom will evolve to higher levels through Stoicism, Reason and Spirit with all corresponding benefĳits and crises.

Conclusion

The lord, who ostensibly believes to be independent from nature (Sentence 2), is in truth necessitated by the natural force of desire and enjoyment (Sentence 5). The bondsman, who ostensibly appeared to be dependent from the lord (3) proves to be independent (6) from nature. And since the whole dialectic of normative attitudes primarily concerns the rela-tion between the pure self and life, we conclude that the whole inter-play of Lordship and Bondage provides the natural consciousness with the necessary experience to develop an appropriate concept of freedom and self-determination and engage into its practical manifestation. As a consequence of the fear of death and labor, the natural consciousness has entered the realm of the noumenal world. Consequently, it will make the experience of a strictly noumenal kind of freedom on the next level of education—Stoicism.

In de Condillac’s words: The statue has got a defĳicient concept of freedom/independence as the natural consciousness goes into the life-and-death-struggle. It maintains this concept unless it experiences the fear of death and advances to a more substantial concept of freedom/independence, which it seeks to confĳirm in the further progress of the education of the natural consciousness to the standpoint of science.

In sum, Hegel’s theory of recognition represents a substantial con-tribution to the philosophical understanding of social interactions and the phenomena that emerge from these. His whole theory of Objective Spirit represents a masterpiece of social philosophy. But according to the



specifĳic structure of the Phenomenology of Spirit, the way the narrative is organized, there is a specifĳic order of the appearance of topics. The his-tory of the education of the natural consciousness to the standpoint of science is inspired by de Condillac’s famous thought experiment and thus it exposes the cognitive, normative, and volitional structure of subjectivity in form of an imaginary process of an imaginary successive acquisition of these faculties and competences. From this point of view, the experience of the ability to take the most elementary normative attitudes, such as independence and dependence or enforcement of and response to power, precedes the concrete performance of such highly sophisticated intersub-jective relations as exposed in the chapter on Spirit.

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The Dialectic of Normative Attitudes in Hegel's Lordship and Bondage

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