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Second book. Essence

The previous book had two different sides: the general ontology and the ontology of mathematical

structures. The book began from a very general method of producing examples of the most general

ontological structures: it showed how it is possible to relate any situation or state of being to other

situations and then how to combine these different situations into aspects of one “larger” or more

informative situation. After this general ontology, Hegel proceeded to construct one particular

structure type, namely, that of quantities or number systems: this was a potentially infinite structure

with a possibility to find indefinitely many “quantitative situations” and with a possibility to change

the reference point of the system in such a manner that only the relations of the situations remained.

We saw that it was possible to construct several such number systems with different qualities or

having different dimensions: the next issue was the functions from one such system to another.

Hegel constructed a variety of such functions and a whole algebra for them: indeed, we found out

that there were a number of possible function algebras depending on how the order of combinations

was determined. The purpose of this interesting construction was merely to get an example of a

series of qualitatively different objects or situations, ordered according to some quantitative factors:

then we saw how stages of such series could be interpreted as aspects of one substrate: the aspects

were in this interpretation mere quantitatively different states of the substrate. The relation of a

substrate to its aspects was then an example of an indifferent structure: it was arbitrary to the

substrate how it was divided and it was external to the aspects that they happened to be combined.

Yet, if a substrate was given, we could construct some differences from it, and if different aspects

were given, we could change one aspect into another – because they were part of one quantitative

series – and thus turn the framework of many parts into an undifferentiated unity. Hence, we had

constructed an example of a natural classification – to a state of identity and a state of difference –

and an essence or method of constructing this classification.

The subject matter of this book is the structure of essence: a rule or method by which all

aspects of a naturally interconnected structure can be constructed. The construction can mean

literal creation of the object or situation corresponding to a structure – somewhat like an essence of

a cake is a recipe telling how to manufacture the cake from given ingredients – and also a mere

discovery of the aspects of the object or situation – e.g. through the physical laws we can predict

the position of the moon in an arbitrary moment, when its position in another moment is given. Note

that in these examples one needs something else beyond the essence in order to fully determine the

required structure: you can’t bake the cake without flour and sugar. One task of this book is to

construct an example of an essence that is by itself sufficient for a construction of some structure:

this sort of essence would be what Hegel calls concept – clearly, the difference between the second

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and third book of the Logic is not as great as the difference between the first and the second book,

although Hegel’s division of Logic into objective and subjective logic would suggest otherwise. The

division of the book on essence varied very much: the divisions in Wissenschaft der Logik and in

Enzyklopädie are quite different, as some of the material from the division on appearance has been

combined with the division on essence in itself. Still, the classification of the book is quite natural,

although the first division is, once again, somewhat more important than the latter two: we first

look at an essence within one structure, then produce a framework of structures from it and finally

find a more comprehensive essence for this new framework.

1./678. A structure of essence is more informative in comparison with a mere state of being.

This is one of the first times – if not the first time – in Logic where Hegel uses the peculiar phrase

“A is the truth of B”. It seems clear that the phrase has nothing to do with what we usually

understand by truth – that is, the truth of a statement, belief, theorem or similar: Hegel is speaking

of structures – like state of being and essence – and it is hard to conceive how structure could be

true in the same sense as e.g. beliefs. The phrase appears to have two aspects. Firstly, it states that

structure A can be constructed from the structure B. For instance, when any state of being or a

group of states of being is given to us, we can construct an example of essence, that is, although we

would be aware only of externally combined structures and classifications, we could still find out an

example of a naturally interconnected structure. Note that the phrase does not necessarily say that a

particular structure of type B could also be seen as a structure of type A: e.g. although we have a

method of finding essences from states of being we do not necessarily have a justified method for

interpreting all apparently external collections of states of being as truly essential – there can be

truly external or arbitrary classifications, like the division of Eurasia into Europe and Asia.

Secondly, the phrase points out that if a structure can be justifiably interpreted as both A and

B, the statement that it is A is less informative than the statement that it is B. Thus, it is far more

informative to know an essence of a structure than merely all the aspects of the structure, because

we may find out all these aspects from the essence, and furthermore, by knowing the essence, we

know that the structure itself is essentially interconnected: e.g. it is far more important to know the

law governing the movement of the planets than merely the collection of the positions they have

been located at in the past month.

2./679. What is given is always some situation or state of being, and if we want to know the rule governing this state of

being, we must go behind the situation in order to find something else as its essence: essence is not given to cognition as

essence, but it must be constructed as the essence of some given situation – essence is later in the series of structures,

although the series need not be temporal.

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The paragraph suffers from the problematic of trying to speak of atemporal relations through

temporal analogies, somewhat like earlier Hegel tried to describe the ability to move from any state

of being to a state of nothing as becoming, although an ability does not yet imply any temporal

relation between situations. Similarly, it is not like there would first be a state of being and only

after that its essence. It is better to say that the temporality is involved only when cognition of the

structures is spoken of: we may cognize essence only after we have cognized some state of being.

Still, even this is not the whole truth, because this temporal relation between cognitions depends on

a relation of primariness between a state of being and its essence. A state of being or a situation – or

generally, a structure – can exist without any essence: witness, for instance, any arbitrary collection

without any essence. Essence, on the other hand, is always an essence of some (possible) structure

and thus always “mediated” by it: an essence is no true essence, if one cannot construct a structure

by means of it.

3./680. At first sight the movement from a state of being to its essence seems external to the state of being.

The transition from a mere structure that seems to be a mere external construct into seeing the same

structure as having an essence seems in one sense to be no true change, but only a change in

interpretation. For instance, if a person discovers a law governing the movement of planets, it is not

the planets that have changed because of the discovery, but the person and his state of knowledge:

the person can now use his knowledge to determine the positions of the planets. Generally,

scientific discoveries do not by themselves change the conditions of the phenomena discovered, but

only the condition of scientists and people who learn of their inventions.

4./681. Still, the move to essence is natural to a state of being.

Although the transition to an essence of a structure does not concern the structure, this transition is

not artificial, like an arbitrary classification would be. Indeed, if we are justified in assuming that a

structure has an essence, then the aspects of this structure must be naturally interconnected. One

might still object that perhaps there aren’t any natural structures, but only external combinations of

independent parts. At the end of the previous book Hegel tried to show a construction, by which one

could always find an example of an essentially interconnected structure, and although this

construction was based on raising the level of abstraction – from different states of an arbitrary

classification to the division of the classification itself and a common substrate behind it – it still

provided us with one example of essence.

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5./682. The most complex and informative structure is not anymore a mere state of being, but an essence: we cannot be

satisfied with states of being-here nor even with abstract state of being, which always presupposes an abstractive

movement away from states of being-here and is thus in some sense an essence – here the move to a unity is not natural,

but external to the concrete states of being. If essence is defined as such an abstraction, it is a mere artificial product,

and the differences remain in a context outside the essence and equally valid – essence is here merely in viewpoint of an

abstractive construction and in relation to another state of being.

Hegel introduces here the idea that certain categories of Logic could be understood as “predicates”

of something called absolute. The concept of absolute is properly introduced later, but we could

here surmise that absolute is some sort of structure or object appearing in many different situations

or contexts: that is, the common subject matter in some field of discussion. Furthermore, as the

name “absolute” seems to imply, it is not just any subject matter, but one that is felt to be important,

e.g. because of its complexity. Thus, when Hegel says that absolute is no longer mere being, but an

essence, he is merely insisting that we shouldn’t anymore be satisfied with mere description of

situations and structures, but that we should at least try to find if these structures have some essence

from which to understand it.

Hegel also separates the essence as he means from a pure state of being, which some person

might identify with essence. The common factor in the pure state of being and essence is that a

conscious person must find both through some construction, because in immediate life we are

acquainted with mere states of being in some framework of possible states of being. The difference

is that pure state of being or indeed any more general state of being is constructed through an

abstraction from any structure or classification – natural or unnatural: thus, I could abstract the

common factor of “living in this neighbourhood” from the group consisting of me and all my

neighbours. While essence of a structure is then in a necessary connection with the aspects of the

structure – if there is a law governing the movement of the planets, then they must obey them in

every position – an abstraction is independent of the abstracted elements and vice versa: I could

move away from this neighbourhood and thus fail to satisfy the concept of living in this particular

neighbourhood, while the neighbourhood could be filled with completely other persons.

Furthermore, while one can use essence to determine the aspects of a structure – we can determine

the positions of the planets, if we know the law behind their movements – one cannot determine on

basis of a mere abstraction the more detailed content of the elements from which the abstraction is

made: the concept of living in this neighbourhood cannot be used to determine that I live at a

particular house in this neighbourhood.

Hegel refers once again to the definition of God – or “pure essence” – as a sum of all

realities: the idea was that only some properties were thought to be “real” properties, while other

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apparent properties – the negations of realities – were mere lack of reality. Hegel has already noted

that such classification was without any foundation: all possible properties or types of situations

were real in the sense that they could be actual: darkness is as real a property of situations as light.

If God or indeed any essence was restricted to being an essence of one sort of properties, it would

be a mere abstraction in comparison to the larger framework of characteristics: one couldn’t

construct from an essence of a supposed reality an instance of a negation of that reality, for instance,

one couldn’t construct darkness from abstract light. As the supposed realities of God were usually

the hazier and more indeterminate characteristics – e.g. unity in comparison with multiplicity – one

could say that such a God had no real properties.

6./683. Our example of essence has not been constructed artificially, but through natural constructions from one aspect

of a state of being or structure to another. It is the common element of these aspects, because it can assume any of them

as its guise, but it is no abstraction, because it can be used to construct the aspects.

While an essence understood as abstraction is a mere artificial construct, an essence in the Hegelian

sense is a natural construct: the planets wouldn’t be what they are now if their movements were

governed by different laws and cakes wouldn’t be cakes if they weren’t baked according to a recipe.

Hegel clarifies the difference between an abstraction and a true essence with the familiar concepts

An- and Fürsichsein, although the latter is used with a new twist. The state or aspect of being-in-

itself is the familiar state of being-abstracted-from-a-more-concrete-state-of-being-here: both an

abstraction and an essence are “in itself” for some structure in the sense that no matter what aspect

of the respective structure we are given we can always abstract the abstract or proper essence from

it – both abstract and proper essences could be called substrates in the sense of the previous book.

The difference is that an essence is also a state of being-for-itself: as we should remember, the state

of being-for-or-according-to-itself was originally explained as a “sum” of different parts and aspects

of a structure in the sense that in it the apparently separate parts were revealed to be mere aspects of

the same object. Here, essence is not so much a sum of the aspects, but a method by which such

sum could be constructed or even the very process of construction: it is the rule by which we can

determine what parts and aspects a structure has or by which we can even find an actual use of such

a rule.

7./684. After the integration of all different states of being, the structure of essence is simple and contains differences

only as potential states that have not been constructed: but it must be possible to construct or actualize these differences,

because essence is a capacity to do so. This construction of different situations differs from constructions in the

previous phase: here these new states are instantly known as mere modifications of the original essence, although they

are in some sense also independent. We must proceed to construct these differences.

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Like in all the sections following some construction of an important structure, we begin with the

most abstract example of such a structure. Thus, the book on essence begins with a mere or

“absolute” essence: that is, we have merely some instance of a rule or method for construction of

some structure or framework of situations, but no actual structure has yet been constructed. Of

course, here the construction of such a structure or framework is quite easy: if we already have an

infallible method of creating or discovering something, what could be simpler but to use this

method for creating or discovering? Hegel points out that the construction of a new structure is

therefore different than in the previous stage: earlier, the constructed structures appeared truly alien

to the structures from which they were constructed, while here it is more natural to view the

different structures or situations as essentially connected and thus as aspects of a larger structure.

8./685. The essence is in some sense similar to a state of quantity: to both, the position in a classification is arbitrary.

The difference is that in a state of quantity the position is merely given – we can always relate a quantity to other

quantities, but there is nothing in the quantity to inform us to which it quantity it will be related – while the essence

contains information what aspects we can construct from it: these aspects are in some sense mere modifications of the

essence.

The paragraph appears to use the method in favour of some Hegel-scholars, who try to find some

deep connections between the different stages of Hegel’s philosophy and especially in the

classifications Hegel gives of different subject matters: e.g. the division of the philosophy of nature

to mechanical, physical and organic phases should correspond with the division of the objectivity

(in the third book of Logic) to mechanism, chemism and teleology. As Hegel himself mentions

explicitly only few such “parallelisms”, the stage is free for different scholars to invent the

parallelisms they need: often it is confusing what these supposed parallelisms are meant to say and

whether they should explain something.

Here, Hegel himself mentions that the essence has a similar position in the whole –

presumably, the whole of Logic – as quantity has in the book on being. But nothing much is

revealed if one just looks at an analogy between the series of quality, quantity and measure and the

series of being, essence and concept: especially, as I have suggested, at least one of these

classifications is somewhat arbitrary, and furthermore, other classification also does not consist of

parts of equal rank. The true meaning behind Hegel’s analogy is revealed by his explanation of the

similarity of quantities and essences: to both quantity and essence it is arbitrary in what manner they

are determined. Actually, instead of quantity we might as well speak also of substrate or concrete

state of indifference: the whole series of structures from the pure quantity to the absolute

indifference is characterized by what could be called a quantitative form (further reason not to pay

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much attention to the idea that the position of the different sections would be the important point in

the so-called parallelism). The difference that Hegel sees in the roles of quantities and essences is

thus explained more fully when we speak instead of the difference of quantities and substrates from

essences. When we try to determine in what possible situations a certain quantity or substrate could

exist, we cannot achieve this determination merely on the basis of the quantity or the substrate itself,

but we have to assume some given differentiation of possible states or aspects of the quantity or the

substrate. Essence, on the other hand, contains in itself the recipe of producing this differentiation –

thus, the possible aspects of the essence are more reliant on the essence or they are its reflections: a

Hegelian term which often confuses scholars and leads them to fantastic voyages and which we

shall investigate later.

9./686. The complexity of a structure of essence is in midpoint between the complexities of abstract states of being and

concepts, and we can construct essences from states of being and concepts from essences. A mere essence is only an

abstract method of construction and thus is only an alternative to a situation with no essence: we have to show how to

construct frameworks of situations from an essence. In other words, we have to construct concepts [or infallible method

of construction requiring no external matter] from mere essences [or methods requiring some external matter for

construction]: [certain] products of concepts are other methods of construction or concepts, while [all] products of

essences are mere constructed states of being.

The essence is characterized by the aspect of being-in-itself or it is merely the first negation of

states of being: both statements indicate that essence is still an abstract structure compared to

another structure. While the essence is a method or rule for constructing certain situations and

objects, one still needs some starting point for these constructions, that is, some given state of being

which to manipulate in order to produce the required results: one needs a planet in order to calculate

its next position and one needs flour, eggs and sugar in order to manufacture a cake. As the material

required by the essence is something different from the essence, the result of the construction differs

similarly from the essence: it is a situation or an object of the same kind as the material of the

construction – a planet in a new position or a cake. In the stage of concept, on the other hand, the

material required by the method is in some sense the method itself – the method of construction can

modify itself or it is just a stage of a self-modifying process – and the results produced with such a

method are further methods: somewhat similarly like a living being has a capacity to produce

objects with all the capacities the living being itself has, that is, another living being.

10./687. I) At first, we look at how an essence shows itself in itself, that is, what aspects we can construct from it when

we abstract from all external relations. II) Then we look at how the essence appears in a larger framework, that is, we

construct a classification of situations and objects from it. III) Finally, we investigate how the essence reveals itself or

we interpret the essence and its appearance as modifications of one actuality.

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The division of the book on essence is characterized by different ways to describe showing oneself,

yet, there is no need to feel mystified, as Hegel also offers a more detailed explanation of the stages

in the study of essence. Firstly, we take an essence as it is in itself – that is, we look merely at its

relation to the structure which it is essence of, but abstract from the relations that the essence and its

structure have to other structures or objects. Secondly, we construct an example of a state of being-

here from the essence – that is, we construct a classification of structures or objects and compare the

structure of the essence with other structures. Finally, we find a new essence that is “one with the

appearance” – that is, we look at the larger framework of objects and structures and try to find some

rule or method by which it could be constructed.

First division. Essence as reflection within its self

As usual, we begin with the most abstract specimen of a structure. Thus, we have an essence of an

object or situation, and we ignore the fact that beyond this object there might be also other objects.

We look at the reflection in ihm selbst: a rare concept in Hegel, which appears to indicate the fact

that we are now restricting our attention to one structure and what happens within it. Note that we

shouldn’t confuse Reflexion in ihm selbst and Reflexion in sich: the first concerns the manner how

any reflection – whatever that is – should be investigated while the second refers to a species of

reflection. The aim of the division is to break out from this limitation to one structure and from an

essence of a given structure to construct examples of other structures: given essence, we should find

existence and appearance.

The division of the first section of the Logic was one which Hegel appears to have been quite

uncertain of: in the later versions of Enzyklopädie, the material of the first section of the book on

essence in Wissenschaft der Logik was relegated into the status of first subsection of the first

section, later subsections of which consisted of material from the chapter on existence. Even the

current classification of the division consists of parts of different status. The first chapter consists

mostly of preliminary analysis – in fact, this section has almost vanished in the Enzyklopädie-

version – and the second section presents some structures that appear to be such that could have

been constructed earlier – the only new aspect is that these structures are investigated as “products”

or determinations of reflection, that is, as constructions. The final chapter considers the most

important “determination of reflection”, namely, the explanatory-causal relation introduced in the

transition to the book on essence – here the account of Wissenschaft der Logik emphasizes the

importance of this structure more forcefully than Enzyklopädie.

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1./688. Because an essence can be found only for some state of being, it at first appears to be a mere alternative that has

been arbitrarily designated as more essential: but the construction of the essence as designated structure has been natural

and the state of being is thus a mere second-grade structure, although it is not foreign to the essence.

We begin with a preliminary analysis of the relation between an essence and an object or a situation

it is essence of: at least this analysis is indicated as preliminary in this preliminary division,

although Hegel appears to give a more prominent place for it in the actual discussion. What the

analysis must consider is the claim that an essence and the respective object or situation are mere

alternatives, and furthermore, equal in status: this seems to be justified by the fact that we have

found an essence only by a movement from a previously given, independent appearing situation or

object. Thus, a planet is a different entity than a law of planetary movements, and a recipe is a

different entity than a cake: it seems arbitrary which of them we should value as being more

essential. Yet, Hegel reminds us, the transition to the essence has been natural: the object or

situation in question is really regulated by its essence or is in some sense of a secondary nature in

comparison with the essence. On the other hand, the object or the situation is also essential to the

essence, one could say: one must have something for which an essence is an essence, or otherwise,

it wouldn’t be an essence – if one has a method of constructing aspects of some structure then must

have the ability of constructing (discovering or manufacturing) an instance of such structure.

2./689. 1) At first, we look at essence as a method for constructing aspects of one whole: the different aspects

constructed are in some sense constructs, but in another sense they can be interpreted as independent structures.

The result of the preliminary analysis is that both essence and the states of being that can be

constructed by it are naturally related. Hegel describes the essence also as reflection: we shall

investigate this designation in a proper fashion later, but we could already note that it is meant to

distinguish the essence from mere states of being – essence as a reflection is a method by which to

construct different states of being. The essence of reflection can be used to construct several states

of being or structures – the reflection “determines itself”, Hegel says. Because they are constructed

structures, we can see them as constructed or “posited”. On the other hand, we may also interpret

these constructed structures as independent. Furthermore, these structures are not completely

unrelated, even when interpreted as independent, but come with a capacity of constructing them

from other structures: because of this capacity, they can also be called reflections, and because these

reflections start from other structures and end with the structures themselves, they can be called

reflections into itself.

3./690. 2) Then we must look what sort of structures we could construct with [any] reflection.

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After the preliminary first chapter and the introduction of the essence as a reflection or method of

constructing states of being, begins the true development of the issue by the construction of what

Hegel calls determinations of reflection: they are not so much manners of classifying reflection, but

classifications produced by reflections. Hegel also calls them Wesenheiten: they are not “the

essence” or the reflection that was used to construct them, but they still share some properties of the

essence – they come with a method of constructing them. What determinations of reflection one can

construct depends on what reflections one knows: here, it is the question of most general

“essentialities” that could be constructed from any reflection.

4./691. 3) We can view the essence behind these constructs as their explanatory ground: with such a ground we can

construct examples of objects existing in a larger framework.

The final chapter returns us from the task of constructing various “determinations of reflection”

back to the essence or method behind them: we “reflect” from these determinations into the essence.

What we have here is a final “determination of reflection”, but one more important than the others:

the relation of the essence to the determinations is an example of an explanatory or “grounding”

relation. Stekeler-Weithofer has identified this grounding role of the essence as a Platonistic idea: a

universal grounds its instances. Yet, he has ignored the fact that Hegelian essence is a method of

construction: thus, the grounding relation is at least quasi-causal – one could construct these states

of being with this method. The chapter also effects the transition to the existence and appearance in

a rather trivial manner: because we have a method for grounding or constructing objects, we can use

it to “ground” something.

First chapter. The semblance

We have already said that the first chapter consists mainly of a preliminary analysis of the relation

between any essence and a corresponding state of being: the aim of the analysis is to emphasize the

obvious fact that essence is a “reflection” or a method by which all the aspects of the

corresponding state of being or structure can be constructed. First two sections are the least

interesting: here Hegel goes through some inadequate manners of characterizing the relation of the

essence and its state of being. It is only the third section where the analysis of the true relation is

revealed.

1./692. A) Because essence has been constructed from a state of being, it seems like a mere alternative to it: state of

being appears to be arbitrarily designated as a mere background.

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From the first book of Logic, we are used to constructing structures from other structures, and until

now, we had had almost no reason to suppose that the constructed structure would be somehow

“more real” than the original structure: for instance, when we interpreted a finite object as infinite,

this was a mere reinterpretation that we could have denied. (Actually, this is a bit of an exaggeration:

even in the previous book there have been cases where we could have called a structure “more real”

or more informative than its predecessors, for instance, a structure of true infinity was more

informative than the corresponding structures of finity and relative or abstract infinity. Then again,

such structures usually were on the brink of being interpreted as “essences” or methods of

construction. The general feeling of the previous book and especially its later divisions was, it is

true, one where the constructions didn’t really matter.) The natural assumption is that the transition

to essence is no different: perhaps the method of producing certain structure is taken as a reference

point merely because of some arbitrary choice: it is only us who emphasize recipe over a cake or a

law over planets.

2./693. B) An analysis shows that the given state of being was not arbitrarily taken as a mere background, but showed

itself to be secondary in comparison with its essence.

The transition from states of being to essence differed e.g. from the transition from one to many in

that an essence of some state of being was no mere situation or object, but a method: furthermore, it

was a method by which this particular state of being could be constructed. Thus, the relation

between an essence and a state of being was more complex than mere relation of alternativeness

between different situations or objects: an essence explains in some sense the structure that it is

essence of, as we shall see more clearly later. Then again, mere state of being without an essence –

either “naturally” without an essence (a mere aggregate, like a pile of snow) or through abstraction

(i.e. a planetary motion for which we do not know laws) – has no true explanation or is mere

contingent happening: state of being without an essence would be – not illusory, but – unstable.

3./694. C) Finally, we see that the state of being of an essence is not foreign to the essence, but the manner in which it

can be seen: when we go through the different aspects of the state of being by the method that is essence, we use the

essence as a reflection.

The state of being is in some sense contingent to its essence: we can have a method even if we

never have seen all aspects of the corresponding structure – we may know the law of the movement

of the planets, even if we haven’t plotted all their positions at different times – and even if we never

have seen the structure at all – an actual baking of a cake is not needed by a recipe. Then again, the

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structure – or the general type of such structure – is not completely unrelated to its essence: we can

justify the assumption that something is an essence only by constructing a corresponding structure

or at least some of its aspects – a recipe is a recipe only if we can bake a cake with it. This process

of constructing the structure, by which the essence “shows itself” – that is, the actualization of a

merely potential method of construction is a process of construction – is what Hegel calls reflection

(in practice, Hegel appears often to conflate reflection as a constructive process with the essence a

method of construction).

A. Essential and unessential

The first section of the chapter is the most uninteresting: it seems like a fallback to the previous

book or an attempt to analyze essence in terms of mere states of being and their frameworks. There

was, even in the book on being, a possibility to designate one situation or object as more important

or a reference point in comparison with other situations or objects: one could, for instance, call the

present moment of time “actual” in comparison with other moments of time. Yet, this designation

was purely contextual: we could as well pick another moment of time as the actual moment by just

waiting the time to change. As a quick analysis shows, the case here is somewhat more complex:

essence is a reference point in a stronger sense.

1./695. A move to essence appears to cancel a state of being: no aspect of this state of being is anymore designated, and

we are left with an essence behind all these aspects. An essence is thus in some sense an alternative to this state of being,

and we may present essence and the original state of being in a framework of alternative situations: here, the state of

being is undesignated only when essence has been taken as a reference point. Because essence and the state of being are

mere alternatives and equally actual from their own point of view, it seems only an arbitrary choice when we pick either

one as the reference point.

We have found an essence through a movement from – or even away from – some framework of

situations and objects: we have, for instance, found a law of the movement of planets by looking at

the movements of the planets, we have found a recipe for baking a cake by once baking a cake in

some fashion, and we have found, in Logic, an instance of essence by experimenting with

differentiation and identification of states of a substrate. The essence we have found is “simple

similarity with itself”, that is, in comparison with the variable aspects of the original framework or

structure, the essence is something that repeats itself in all of them: it is the method by which any

aspect of the structure could be constructed.

Now, as we could move from the original, given framework to its essence, we could as well

move back from the essence to the original framework (or at least to some framework with same

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structure – from the law of the movement of the planets to the actual movement of the planets or

from the recipe to the actual cake). Thus, the essence seems nothing more than an alternative in

comparison with the original framework: if we regard both essence and the framework as objects,

we could say that both represent alternative types of objects in a certain classification. Recipes exist

beside cakes and vice versa: both have a sort of existence or “givenness”, and we have no reason to

suppose that either of them would be more essential than other. Of course, we can take e.g. the

essence as the reference point or the designated object, but this is an arbitrary choice: we could as

well choose the original framework as the reference point.

2./696. In comparison with the essence, we may call the state of being unessential, because in the viewpoint of the

essence it does not exist independently: because essence and the state of being are mere alternatives, essence should not

be called an essence, but merely essential.

We can position ourselves into the situation with the essence and take it as the designated or

reference point: in comparison with this reference point, the original framework or state of being

seems something different and alien to the essence – we might call it unessential. Thus, it is in some

sense unessential to the law, whether there are any planets obeying it, and it is in some sense

unessential to the recipe whether we use it to make any cakes. The essence itself can then be called

essential, but because this designation is arbitrary – it is one of mere choice – it lacks the peculiarity

inherent in the essence and its relation to its state of being: recipe and cake are not just different

objects, but recipe is something for making a cake.

3./697. The classification of essence and its state of being as essential and unessential is a mere framework of states of

being-here: we set aside the fact that one of the alternatives is a method for constructing the other alternative – the

essence is designated as essential only in relation to some arbitrary classification system. It appears artificial and

arbitrary to designate the different states of being-here in this manner: either one of them could be essential in some

sense.

The reduction of the difference between essence and its state of being to the difference of essential

and unessential is a fallback to the earlier difference between a designated and an undesignated

situation or a reality and a negation. We thus use earlier categories to describe structures of a more

complex sort: it would be like trying to describe the relationship of the law of gravity and planet

Earth in similar terms as the relationship of Earth and Moon. The obvious result is that something

essential and characteristic of the more complex relationship is lost. An essence is more essential,

from the viewpoint of the essence, but equally, the state of being is essential, from the viewpoint of

the state of being: similarly, a situation is always actual when viewed from its reference point. The

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designation of one as the reference point appears arbitrary and results from what could be called an

external construction: in their natural state the two alternatives would be equally important, and it is

only some interpretative process that designates one as the reference point and the other as a mere

background – of course, for every such interpretative process there is a contrary process that does

the interpretation in just the opposite manner.

4./698. Essence is interpreted as essential, when it is seen as a mere alternative of the original state of being: actually

essence is the method by which one can move from one aspect of the state of being to another and common element

behind these aspects. The state of being is not just arbitrarily designated as unessential, but can be naturally constructed

as a mere background.

The essence is interpreted in an inadequate manner when it is seen merely as essential or as a first

negation of the corresponding state of being: as we should remember, by first negation Hegel meant

the result of a process of moving away from an original situation or object to another situation or

object – if the situation was originally unrelated or pure state of being, it will become related to

another situation, and if it was already related to the new situation, we move within an already

existing framework of situations. Even in the book on being we met the concept of second negation:

by this Hegel referred at that time to a common object within different situations – the move to the

second negation was a move of different order than mere movement within the framework of

alternative situations. The absolute negativity that essence should be is even more complex concept:

essence is not just shared by all aspects of the state of being, but it is also the process by which one

can move within this state of being from one aspect to another. Thus, the state of being is

background or secondary entity in a more robust manner than just according to some external

viewpoint: without the essence, state of being wouldn’t be what it is. We might say that the state of

being and its aspects are mere shell of the essence, and furthermore, variable in nature, while the

essence in comparison remains always stable.

B. Semblance

In the previous section we saw that essence was not arbitrarily designated as the reference point,

because the corresponding state of being or framework of situations and objects was just a mere

external shell for the essence: without the essence, we wouldn’t even understand the framework as a

unity (e.g. the movement of planets without any law would be chaotic). Hegel chooses to call this

natural secondariness of mere states of being without an essence Schein. Kant had used this term to

refer to mere illusions in comparison with objective experience, but this is not what Hegel has in

mind: a chaotic aggregate of states of being is not illusion, but only unruly or irregular – the

15

essence does not add truth, but regularity. The section shows a rare case of untrinitary division, but

nevertheless, the division is rather artificial: the first subsection consists of a short introduction and

a separate historical contextualization of the concept Schein – a task usually left for remarks –

while the second subsection deals with the analysis of the concept and with the transition to the next

stage. Hegel shall emphasize that the Schein is still important for the essence: one must be able to

actualize a method in order to truly have one.

1./699. 1. Introduction and historical context of semblance. A state of being has been constructed as a mere external

shell: the aspects of such a shell are secondary in comparison with their common essence and they exist properly only in

this comparison to the essence – when we see state of being as a mere shell, we have constructed it as what it is, i.e. as a

mere limited context.

It is somewhat difficult to say whether Hegel is meaning by Sein some individual situation or state

of being in a framework of such situations or the whole framework from which the transition to

essence is made. In fact, both interpretations are possible. Individual situations or aspects of the

larger structure are mere Schein in the sense that they are merely “transitional” or aspectual

constituents in this larger structure. Even the framework as a mere aggregate of situations is Schein,

because it does not still show the characteristic unity which these situations make: although we

would have plotted all positions of the movement of a planet, we wouldn’t have found the law

explaining this movement. The individual situations and their aggregate are nothing – or at least

nothing stable – when we abstract from the essence or method by which the unity of these situations

can be shown. When we thus interpret these situations as mere Schein or as a mere shell, we have

constructed them in a natural manner.

2./700. State of being as a mere external shell is all that is left of it after the introduction of its essence. Still, we can

interpret this external shell as an alternative to essence: alternatives usually are in some sense or according to one

situation, but not according to another, and because a mere shell is not [in the proper reference situation], the state of

being is merely the secondary background for the essence – it is [according to the proper reference situation] only as

such background. The state of being is given, but only in comparison to a movement to the primary entity.

An situation or object that is an alternative to another situation or object is in some sense –

according to its own viewpoint – and is not in another sense – according to the viewpoint of the

other situation or object: e.g. this rock is here, but it is not there. In a simple relation of

alternativeness, both possibilities are equally good candidates for being designated: it is arbitrary

which rock in a pile of rocks is taken as a reference point. In a relation of essence and its state of

being, on the other hand, it is far more natural to interpret the essence as the reference point. Thus,

the state of being or mere Schein is more natural to take as “not-being-here” or as a mere

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background. Of course, there is a context where the state of being is the reference point or “actual”,

but this context is somehow deficient: it may be outright incorrect or then merely inadequate in

another manner, for instance, not informative enough. Thus, one possible application of the

structure of Schein is an illusory situation, which exists only as a false image of the true reality: the

word “semblance” does then provide some info on what Hegel’s concept is about. Yet, Hegelian

Schein covers also other cases: for instance, a movement of planets is not illusory, but it shows only

an aspect of the whole phenomenon, and furthermore, leaves out the most important part or the law

of the movement.

3./701. The phenomenon of skepticism and the appearance of Kantianism are given situations that do not exist

independently of a subject: both skepticism and Kantianism resulted in denial of any knowledge of primary reality, yet,

they both accepted the content of what was given, but merely supposed it was not completely real – they could not then

construct the different aspects of this external shell, but had to accept them as mere given. No idealism is any better than

skepticism in overcoming this reliance on given: in skepticism, the content is given; the representations within

Leibnizian monad cannot be consciously produced by the monad; Kantian appearance presupposes some given

affections; even Fichte supposes that some determinations rise inexplicably within the subject and limit it.

Hegel often associated skepticism – especially its “modern” or Humean version – with idealism, by

which he meant then not idealism in his own sense – structural monism – but a philosophy where

the role of conscious subjects was somehow exaggerated. Here, skepticism and idealism serve as

examples of philosophies where the structure of Schein plays an important role – even so important

that the essence behind is usually forgotten or ignored. In skepticism – and it is obviously ancient

skepticism Hegel is discussing here – this ignorance is just natural. Ancient skepticism consisted of

a conscious rejection of all definite truth commitments: thus, sceptics could at most say things like

“it seems to me that...”, but wouldn’t ever state that things were really so. Sceptics had quite an

arsenal of arguments against philosophers who thought some limited aspect of the world as it

appeared would be the final truth behind everything. Hegel can well accept such a critique of

limited positions, but he cannot tolerate the fear of scientific investigation that sceptics also often

showed: although officially sceptics held that they were still searching for the truth, they often

merely satisfied themselves with how things appeared to them – just as long they didn’t insist this

appearance was the truth. The result of a total skepticism would then be return to the ordinary

conceptions of people: the external shell would be accepted as the only thing we could know,

although it would also be understood to be mere shell or appearance in some sense – there might

still be something beyond it. Hegel misses in skepticism the investigation of the essence of this shell,

that is, methods and rules by which one can show connections between different aspects of what

appears to us.

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Hegel’s earliest example of idealism is Leibniz, although it is somewhat unclear whether

one should call him an idealist and whether his philosophy has anything in common with skepticism.

Hegel emphasizes the idea of a monad as windowless: representations and determinations of the

monad arise within monad or are not determined by anything external. Of course, Leibnizian

philosophy speaks also of God who created all the monads and who also placed them in a

harmonious state, but as Hegel has pointed out earlier, it is difficult to see how a single monad

within its closed state could ever come to know of this larger standpoint: for a monad, world is

limited to its own representations. Furthermore, even monad itself cannot consciously produce its

representations, but they arise almost deterministically, according to the laws of the monad,

incomprehensible also to itself. Thus, Hegel fears that Leibnizian idealism falls to the same trap as

skepticism and forgets all attempts to show connections between different representations of a

monad. True, Leibniz does scientific investigations and he argues for the existence of necessary

knowledge of God and world, but it is unclear how a Leibnizian monad could by itself come up

with the principles on which Leibniz’s arguments are based.

Kant is a more natural candidate for the sort of skeptical idealism Hegel is interested of.

True, Kant is, according to some interpretations, fighting skepticism, but his solution actually

resembles the attitude of ancient skepticism in some measure: one can have knowledge of things as

they appear to us, just as long as one denies that one knows something of things as they are in

themselves. It is unclear whether Kant would have called things as they appear to us as less real

than things in themselves: one could argue convincingly that Kant, on the contrary, has upheld the

reality of our ordinary life world more than early modern philosophers who thought it consisted of

mere internal representations. Yet, this is no great and original achievement in Kant’s part: one

could say that even ancient sceptics raised the value of what appears to us by stating that it is the

only reality we are (as yet) capable of knowing, and furthermore, Hegel’s own philosophy is

strongly against any search of a reality beyond the things here and now.

Still, Kantianism fares in other facets better than skepticism, because Kant at least attempted

to find some necessary connections between different facets of the reality appearing to us. But

Hegel couldn’t accept Kant’s terminology that made those necessary connections into subjective

conditions of human cognition: Kant merely assumes there are such necessities and then just tries to

explain why there should be such, while he should show us methods of discovering or producing

such necessities, Hegel is saying. In addition, Kant never proceeded far enough in the actual

determination of laws of appearance to please Hegel: even the Metaphysical principles of natural

science is far behind Hegel’s own philosophical agenda of constructing a model of all important

facets of the world of appearance. But the most important criticism Hegel launches against Kant’s

attitude towards appearance is that important moral concepts in Kant require a basis in a faith on a

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world and things beyond experience: at least a faith on the liberty of persons from the laws of

appearance, if not a belief in God and immortality.

Final example of idealists in Hegel’s list is Fichte who is famous for rejecting the concept of

a thing-in-itself. As Hegel appears to be aware, Fichte merely stopped speaking of such things in

themselves, because he couldn’t find any reason for assuming such things. Then again, Fichte

accepted that a human subject does not produce all content by itself, but that sensations arise in a

human being in some inexplicable manner: there could be things behind them, but we do not have

any justification for assuming such things, although it is natural that we should suppose them.

Fichte even less than Kant managed to get to the concrete task of constructing necessary

connections between different facets of the world, although his idea of constructing examples of

basic categories or ontological structures by showing instances of them in human thought is a

precursor of Hegel’s own Logic.

4./702. 2. Analysis of semblance and transition to reflection. In some sense an external shell is independent of the

essence: yet, we don’t have to construct essence from this independent aspect of the external shell, because we have

seen that essence can be constructed from any [independent] state of being. Instead, we have to show that the

characteristics of the external shell can be seen as modification of the essence and that this modification can be

integrated back into essence.

After the short historical intermission we return to the true philosophical description of the

“semblance”. We know that the external shell can be interpreted as independent of the essence: we

can e.g. regard movement of the planets as lawless and chaotic and thus abstract from the law

governing their movement. Yet, we don’t have to show anymore that this apparently independent

framework of objects and situations is connected to an essence: firstly, we saw in the previous book

that from any state of being or structure it is possible to construct some essence – although not

necessarily the essence of this structure, because the structure in question may be “essenceless” or

mere external aggregate – and secondly, because we are dealing with a structure that is justifiably

interpreted an external shell of something, it is just presumable that we already have the ability to

construct the essence from it – we couldn’t say that e.g. the movement of the planets is an external

shell, if we wouldn’t know that their movement can be described in a lawlike manner. The true

problematic of the section is converse: we have to show that the connection of essence with its shell

is necessary – we have to show that the shell is a modification or aspect of the essence. Furthermore,

we then have the smaller task of showing how one can return from this “external” aspect of the

essence or method back to the method itself.

5./703. The characteristic of the external shell is that it is given as a mere background in comparison with essence, but a

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state of being is such a natural background, because the essence is a method by which one can potentially move away

from it and thus “destroy” it. This state of being is given or actual in some sense, because it can be seen a modification

or aspect of the essence as a substrate: indeed, the essence remains same in different situations resulting from its use and

can thus be interpreted as a mere state of being or object. It is thus natural to interpret the external shell as essence in its

aspect of being taken as a mere situation or object: yet, this aspect is known to be a mere aspect or background in

comparison to its aspect as a method.

It is paragraphs like these that some Hegel-scholars love because they can be used to prove almost

anything and that make Hegel unappealing for many non-Hegelians. Yet, behind the almost

mystical sounding shell there is a simple tale to be told. A state of being that is a mere external shell

or background for some essence is in some sense given – we have e.g. a cake here, planets moving

over there etc. – but in another and more proper sense mere background – single cakes and

particular positions of planets perish more easily than recipes and laws behind them. Now, if we

begin from the “negative” aspect of the external shell, this negativity or secondariness is caused by

the fact that even if the shell or a particular moment of it is given, we may always move away from

it: if we are given a cake, we may eat it and bake a new one, and if we are given a position of

planets, this position will soon change into new position. We may move between the different

aspects of the framework, and we may also move away from the whole framework to the abstract

essence – rule or method – behind it. Indeed, this possibility of moving to and fro within the

framework and away from it just is the essence: essence of planetary movement is the method by

which one can discern the future and the past positions of the planets from the current position.

Thus, the “negativity” or mutability of the shell or “semblance” is just the “negativity” of the

essence or method.

The other aspect of the external shell is that it is still given in some sense: we have here an

actual position of planets or an actual cake at some stage of baking. Hegel notes that we could

interpret these particular positions as a modification of the essence. This particular construction

should be familiar from the previous book: if there is some common element between different

situations we could interpret these situations as mere aspects of this larger unity. Now, essence is,

Hegel says, “similar to itself”: no matter what particular aspect of the external shell we take, we can

always use or apply the essence or method in it – we can apply the law of the motions of planets in

every particular position of planets. In other words, we may regard the essence as a common

substrate of the different situations in the external shell, and when we interpret the essence in this

manner, we regard it as a mere state of being or object existing in a state of being. Thus, the whole

external shell or aggregate of different situations can be seen as a modification of the essence or as

the essence understood as a state of being in comparison with the essence understood as a method:

an embodiment of the essence, we might say – e.g. a series of particular positions of planets can be

20

seen as an embodiment of the law of the motion of the planets. Essence thus has two aspects – being

a state of being and being a method – first of which is secondary in comparison to the latter.

6./704. Aspects of an external shell were its possibility of being replaced – which still was the substrate behind the shell

– and its possibility of being designated or actual state of being – but only in a context: these aspects are also aspects of

the essence – the shell is nothing external to the essence but the manner of essence showing itself.

The conclusion of the previous paragraph was that the moments or aspects of the external shell

correspond to aspects of the essence. The shell is, in some sense, something that can be overcome –

that is, we can construct something else from it – and it is just this construction which is more

essential and stable than the mere shell and its individual states of being. In another sense or context,

the shell is some state of being that might happen to be actual, but this actuality or designatedeness

occurs only in certain limited contexts. These moments were also aspects of the essence: essence is

the construction connecting the different aspects of a structure or a framework of situations, but it

can also be seen as embodied in this framework. The analysis has shown that we are justified to

assume there is also a necessary connection of essence with its shell: essence is just this possibility

of moving from its one embodiment to another, and without showing such a movement we

wouldn’t be justified in calling it essence – e.g. a recipe isn’t a proper recipe, if we cannot show

how to make cakes with it, and a law is no true law, if we cannot use it to determine positions of

planets.

7./705. The external shell is the aspect of being a mere situation or an object for the essence: essence has such shell,

because we can use it to construct a determinate modification of it. We can also instantly interpret the result of this

modification as a mere aspect of the essence, because an essence is [at least in some context] an independent structure

connecting aspects of being-a-method and being-a-state-of-being. The original method can be interpreted as something

given: yet, we can also separate this method or essence as given from the method as method – finally, we may interpret

this apparently independent aspect of the essence as a mere aspect.

Hegel presents here some minimal constructions involved in every essence: thus, on their basis one

could construct a minimal essence, that is, an essence that could be discovered despite what other

essences there might be – similarly as pure state of being was the state of being that could be

constructed from any state of being. Firstly, an essence must have an external shell or we must be

able to modify essence in such a manner that we construct the aspect of essence that could be called

its embodiment: in effect, we have to have some means by which to find a particular state of being

for which the essence could be an essence – for instance, if law of the motions of the planets should

be the essence of that motion, it should contain also a method for discovering some particular

position of planets, e.g. by looking. In other cases the “shell” or embodiment of the essence might

21

be at least partially manufactured, like a cake can be manufactured with a suitable recipe if the

proper ingredients are given. The simplest example of such a construction is the familiar

objectification of structures in a somewhat new form: while in the previous book we often used to

take situations or states of being as examples of objects, here we should take essences or methods as

objects. Thus, a pure essence would be a method containing the construction of interpreting or

taking methods as objects: given no object, we could then introduce the method itself as a new

object.

The other sort of construction needed in every essence is then the contrary possibility of

interpreting every proper state of being or object as being a shell of the essence: thus, a law of the

motion of the planets as the essence of this motion requires, in addition to the method of

discovering positions of planets, at least the method of recognizing these positions as accounted by

the law. Similarly, if a recipe is to be an essence behind cakes, we must be able not just to

manufacture cakes by its help, but also to recognize proper objects as cakes. Hence, a pure essence

must contain, beside the construction of objectification, also the possible construction of

interpreting all proper situations and objects as being constructible from this essence.

8./706. A mere shell is a state of being that exists only in comparison to a more essential alternative: it explicitly

contains the aspect of being-a-mere-background. The mere shell is given as something inessential or it is given with a

method of moving away from it: thus, it contains in some sense the essence as a possibility of moving to the law behind

it.

The paragraph seems to be based on mere verbal trickery: Schein is other than itself or negative

against negation and thus negativity related only to itself – what should these words mean, one

wonders. Still, the issue Hegel is dealing with is rather simple. The external shell is in one sense

something “non-existent”, that is, it is not an entity of the primary level. Still, it also is in some

sense, but only in comparison to the essence or as its background or aspect: it is secondary entity

dependent on the essence. Thus, the external shell or background is a non-independent or secondary

situation or object, and it is now constructed as such a secondary entity: in the current context, it is

even given as secondary – we “see” or know e.g. that the particular positions of the planets are

variable and unstable. Because the shell is merely secondary or mere aspect, we know that there

must be another aspect of the same situation or object, which is primary or essential in comparison

– if we are justified in calling something a mere shell or even illusion, we must be able to construct

an example of the essence behind this shell or illusion. External shell contains thus the possibility of

constructing an essence, and this possibility or capability is in fact one important aspect of the

essence as a method: we saw in the previous paragraph that every essence contained at least one

construction for discovering or creating “embodiments” of the essence and one construction for

22

recognizing these embodiments as having the essence. Thus, an external shell, when it is justifiably

constructed as a shell, contains an aspect of essence: if we recognize the motion of planets as

showing some law, we already know something of that law.

9./707. The process of embodying the essence in an external shell is in some sense dependent only on itself and can thus

be interpreted as an independent structure: on the other hand, any apparently independent structure in this context can

be interpreted as a mere aspect from which we can move away. The method of moving between these interpretations is

essence: we may interpret the external shell as the essence, but also as a modification of and even as a mere aspect of

the essence – going through the external shell is the natural manner in which the essence can be shown to be an essence

of something.

We may begin with an external shell that we are justified to call an external shell: because of the

justification, we must have the ability to move away from it, perhaps to another aspect of the same

shell or even beyond it to the essence. We have a possible process of moving within and away from

the external shell – e.g. the possible process of going through different positions of planets and

finding the law that governs them – and we can take this possible process or method or ability to

achieve it as a new object: given process or “negativity”, we may construct something “independent”

or a state of being with an object from it. Then again, this constructed situation or essence as a mere

object is only an aspect of the whole structure – e.g. law behind the movements of the planets as a

mere description and a recipe as a mere writing in a paper wouldn’t be true essences, if we couldn’t

move back to the concrete framework they are essence of, that is, if we couldn’t observe

movements of planets and bake cakes.

The movement here resembles the reciprocal movement between structures of (bad or

contextual) infinity and finity in the previous book. The difference is that there the stable, unified

structure was supposed to be “infinite” or perfect and the structure with differences and possible

changes was “finite” or imperfect: here, on the other hand, Hegel explicitly calls the possible

process of moving within different aspects of the external shell as infinite. Like in the previous case

the alternating movement could be seen as aspects of one method – the true infinite – this can also

be done here. Here, this method of moving from the mutable aspects of the external shell to an

“abstract essence” and from that back to the shell is nothing but the true essence: a true law or true

recipe is not just words in a paper, but something that can be applied to concrete cases. Thus, Hegel

is justified in calling the movement to, within and away the external shell the “showing” of essence

of itself within itself: this is aa abbreviated manner of saying that a true essence of a state of being is

a method by which this state of being can be constructed and it is known to be such a method,

because we can construct the required state of being.

23

10./708. We may construct a state of nothing from any state of being and a [non-empty] state of being from a state of

nothing, and this ability to do both constructions is more informative than either state of being. Here, we have begun

with an essence compared to a state of being, which is first arbitrarily and then naturally designated as secondary in

comparison: in this context of essence against a state of being, the essence has been interpreted as a mere state of being

or as a mere object, although it is also a method of moving between different states of being or situations – the first

interpretation of essence is merely aspectual. We are justified to move away from this interpretation, because we have

shown first that the state of being is naturally secondary in comparison with essence and then that the state of being as

an external shell is natural for essence as a method of moving from a given state of being to a process and back: this

movement [or the ability to it] can be called reflection.

Hegel returns us briefly to the very beginning of Logic, where we first constructed the most abstract

state of being or a state of nothingness and then noted that this state of nothingness could be taken

as an object in a new, non-empty state of being: the third “moment” in the series was then the

discovery of a state or method of becoming, or actually it was no true discovery, as we merely noted

the fact that we clearly had the ability to construct states of nothingness from any state of being and

non-empty states of being from states of nothingness. Here, Hegel notes that this method of

becoming was the truth of the two previous structures: in fact, we could say it was their essence,

because it was a method by which both smaller structures could have been constructed. But in that

particular phase of Logic, we ignored this intrusion of essence for now and concentrated on the less

important fact that we now had constructed an example of two possible and related situations or

Dasein.

Because the character of becoming as a method wasn’t properly noted, the transition from

being to nothing and back seemed like an unexpected turn of events. Now Hegel is paving way for

the introduction of a more conscious use of constructions. We have just completed another

movement between different situations or contexts: we began by interpreting a state of being and its

essence as equally important, then we reinterpreted the state of being as naturally secondary and

finally we noted that the state of being was no illusion, but a natural embodiment of the essence. In

the first interpretation, the essence was interpreted as a mere object: e.g. we had a law or recipe as

an ordinary object that could be compared with planets and cakes – perhaps in a written form. Then

we noted that the essence is not just another object, but a method that can be used to regulate

objects and situations of the “external level”: written laws of movement or recipes can be used to

predict motions of planets or to bake cakes. In fact, this application of essences or methods in the

determination and change of the supposedly external shell is what justifies the assumption that they

are essences or method. This conscious use of methods – or in general, actual application of some

activity – is what Hegel calls reflection, in comparison with a mere becoming followed from an

“unconscious” use of methods: or this what it is supposed to be – in practice, Hegel sometimes

conflates the essence as a method and the reflection as a use of that method.

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Simplest form of essence

25

C. Reflection

We began by interpreting an essence as a mere object or a state of being among others: thus, it

seemed arbitrary that we had designated just it as more essential than others. Quick analysis

showed that this designation was natural and that other objects and states of being were, on the

contrary, mere external shell in comparison. On the other hand, this external shell was not foreign

to the essence, but it constituted an aspect of essence in which the essence could show itself to be

essence: essence, in effect, is some method or rule (or in general, a latent activity) for constructing

all aspects of a structure, and in order to show that it truly is such a method or activity, we must be

able to construct or “reflect” different aspects of this structure.

In the following section we finally get to do something more than mere preliminary analysis

of an essence and its relation to the corresponding structure: Hegel’s aim is to show that we can

show examples of methods of construction where the result of the construction is somehow natural.

The section shows a rare case of a natural classification. We begin with a pure essence or

reflection, a possibility of which was mentioned already in the previous section: an ”empty process”

moving from a state of nothing to another state of nothing. Such a pure reflection is then interpreted

as an activity externally modifying some independent situation. Finally, we show that even in such a

case of an ”external reflection” some constructions or reflections natural to the situation could be

found. Examples of such natural methods of construction are two that we have already seen – firstly,

a rule saying that any method could be embodied as a state of being or as an object (e.g. by writing

it down), and secondly, a rule saying that any state of being or object embodying some method can

be recognized as such (in effect, activities of differentiation and identification).

1./709. The external shell or “shining” is the use or reflection of method or essence, but interpreted as a given state: the

word “reflection” refers more to the process where this “state of shining” is only one aspect.

Scheinen refers literally to a flow of light from some object and reflection means obviously the

return of such a flow – or at least a change of its direction – after it has hit some foreign object: thus,

Hegel’s description of the Schein as the first phase of reflection and of the proper reflection as the

reflection after it has returned to its source has quite a literal meaning. Important is to apprehend the

meaning behind this illustration. Schein or external shell is embodiment of essence or a method of

construction, but if we conceptualize it as a “shell”, we still think of it as a state of being: that is, as

something static and inflexible. When we are talking of reflections or constructions, we admit that

we are not dealing with anything static, but with processes, and indeed, processes that are in some

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sense explained by the essence or methods of construction: the lawful movement of planets is an

embodiment of the laws and the baking of cakes is embodiment of recipes.

2./710. An actual use of an essence as a method involves movement through different aspects of a structure, but this

separation of differences is mere external shell. In the phase of being, we merely moved from one state of being to its

alternative possibilities: here, on the other hand, the alternative of essence is mere alternation of different states of being,

which is known to be secondary or mere external shell – the movement does not relate the essence to something beyond

it, but goes through its own aspects. The beginning of the movement or the essence is the method for constructing this

movement: it is not just a first state of being nor just a common substrate of the aspects, but the very process of going

through these aspects.

It might seem that nothing crucial has really changed from the phase of being: even there we used

constructions to change situations. But the difference is that there the constructions were made, as it

were, unconsciously, that is, we concentrated only on the different states of being and generally on

the fact that there were different possible situations. Here, on the other hand, the methods or

activities of construction have themselves been taken as the subject matter. In the context of the

previous book, we began a construction with some situation or object and ended up with another

sort of situation or object. In this context, we begin with a method and move to the application of

this method: this application is in some sense different than the method, but the method is also the

essence or explanation of this application – the essence is “first” in a stronger sense than a mere

beginning of a process is “first”. Furthermore, the essence is also not just a common substrate

behind different phases of some process, but the instigator and rule regulating this process.

3./711. The application of an essence as a method is [on the viewpoint of the corresponding state of being] a movement

from a state of nothingness back to itself: the final result of the movement can be interpreted as being identical with its

beginning, and the whole movement can be interpreted as a more informative structure or state of being. This

interpretation of an application of essence as a static structure is possible only because we have moved through its

different aspects, similarly as essence can be interpreted as essence only because we can apply it.

If we abstract from the fact that the movement of reflection or application of essence known as

application of essence goes usually through some concrete structure, we may call the whole

movement a transition from “a state of nothing” to “a state of nothing”: the beginning and the end

of the movement – the essence or the method of construction – are empty, according to the context

of concrete objects. For instance, a law regulating the movement of planets is not an object in the

same sense as the planets are; similarly, a recipe, as a method and not as a written guide, is not an

object like cakes are. Even when the products of the construction are abstractions, we may

justifiably say that the method used in producing them is of a different nature: thus, the methods

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used to construct structures of the previous book differ in some sense from the structures produced

by it. The emptiness of the method is even truer in the case of a pure reflection or essence, where

there is no other “mediate stage” between two states of nothingness, but the embodiment of the

essence as an object – we might say that this pure reflection is just an empty process with nothing

changing in an empty situation just like pure being was an empty situation with nothing in it. Of

course, we may then interpret the method and its application as a new structure and thus in some

sense compare it with other structures, but this interpretation is dependent on the process of

applying the essence: we wouldn’t be justified in calling the reflection a structure if we wouldn’t

have gone through with it.

4./712. If we are given a pure method of construction, we may use it to construct instances of more complex

constructions.

5./713. 1) Let us begin with the pure reflection as a construction of itself.

The concept of a state of pure being had a twofold meaning – it referred to any state of being, as

long as we abstracted from its relations to other states of being, but also to a particular state of being,

namely, the state of being that didn’t contain any other state of being, that is, the state of

nothingness. Similarly the concept of pure or absolute reflection could refer to two things: firstly,

any reflection is in some sense pure, as long as we abstract from the fact that the possible mediate

stages of the reflection are in some sense independent of the whole, and secondly, the most abstract

sort of reflection is pure in a more concrete manner – it has no other mediate stages, but the

embodiment of the essence or method. Hegel calls this pure reflection also “positing”: actually, as it

becomes obvious later, all reflections or constructions are positing or constructing in the sense that

they, indeed, posit or construct something. The difference between pure and other reflections is that

pure reflections require nothing, but their own existence: e.g. given a method of embodying

constructions, perhaps through writing its rules, we can use this method to embody itself.

6./714. 2) We may then find an example of a reflection that begins from something given which it modifies externally.

A pure reflection has no beginning, or in other words, it begins only from itself: that is, it is a

method that requires no given object to work with. A pure reflection can still be used to construct

something, as we shall see, and then any reflection or construction applied to this result of previous

construction will have a beginning: this beginning is, as Hegel says, “pre-posited” or presupposed

by the reflection or construction. Such a construction modifies the original object or situation: it

may be a concrete change or then a mere alternate interpretation of the beginning. In any case, it

seems arbitrary and external in comparison with the beginning: the beginning does not require a real

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or interpretational modification and it may even be harmed by it.

7./715. 3) We may finally use some reflection or construction to integrate the presupposed beginning [because it

exemplifies some general structure]: the beginning is then in some sense presupposed as independent and in another

sense it is taken as a mere aspect of that general structure, that is, it is determined by some essential characteristic.

Most external reflections or constructions are just that: they modify or interpret the given situation

or object in a manner that is not compatible with what is given – they are misinterpretations, one

might say. But all interpretations of given are not merely external: some tell correct and even

important aspects of the situation or object involved by relating them to a structure. A construction

recognizing the given situation or object as an example of such structure in a manner “integrates”

the given as a mere aspect or modification of that structure. Yet, in another sense the given is still

independent: one must have something given in order to begin the construction. Thus, this new sort

of construction is not pure, but it is not merely external either. Hegel calls such a reflection or

construction determining, which characterizes it quite well: it can be used to recognize true

capacities of a situation or an object.

1. Positing reflection

It has been common to interpret Hegel’s reflection in general and especially the pure reflection as

referring to the structure of self-consciousness. Indeed, one could say self-consciousness is

reflection and even pure reflection: in self-consciousness we contemplate ourselves – we take us

and our abilities as objects – and then recognize this object of out contemplation as being ourselves.

Yet, we have seen that there are reflections or constructions that are not instances of reflections:

e.g. our example of a pure reflection which consists of writing the rules governing the reflection

down and admitting they are rules of a reflection is hardly a self-conscious act – indeed, it is

unclear whether even consciousness is involved or whether we could build a machine that might

follow these rules. In any case, the expression “(possible) application of a method of construction”

indicates better what a Hegelian reflection involves, especially if we remember that the construction

might be one of mere discovery and thus need not imply any conscious manufacturing of objects.

In this subsection we study pure reflections, that is, reflections or constructions that do not

need any material: note that this purity may be only contextual – one might argue that e.g. our

example of a pure reflection would require, in another sense, some material by which to write down

its own rules. The final purpose of the study is to show that even from such a pure reflection one

could find an instance of a reflection modifying something given: in effect, we have to construct

something given from a given method of construction – one clear possibility of such a construction

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is obvious.

1./716. External shell is a mere background, but it is not a background for a different situation or object, because its

essence can be interpreted as identical with it: the framework of arbitrary states of being is a result of using the essence

or method of construction.

We begin where we left off at the end of previous section. We face a seemingly meaningless

variability or aggregate of different situations and objects, for instance, the arbitrary appearing

movements of planets. Yet, we now know that this seeming meaningless is merely seeming or just

an external shell: there is regularity in the variability and apparent arbitrariness, or we have a

method by which to construct different sides of the aggregate from one another in a rule-bounded

fashion. The external shell is still nothing foreign to this rule or method: it can be interpreted as a

mere modification or embodiment of the method as an essence. The situations and objects and even

their variable process or arbitrary aggregate is only an aspect of the method, or they are the result of

the application of the method: e.g. movement of the planets is what we discover when we start to

observe the current position of the planets and to calculate their future positions. It is also a mere

middle stage in the whole movement which ends in the reaffirmation of the correctness or

applicability of the method: the movement of the planets verifies the law, like baking of a cake

shows that we are able to make cakes.

2./717. When we apply the method of construction to its own process, we move away from its application into a stable

state: we have then a process with a mobile and immobile phase – the application of construction and the construction

as something given. Thus, in some sense the use of construction leads to its own embodiment, in another sense it leads

to its own destruction: furthermore, these both possibilities are mere aspects of the application of construction.

Terminology like “negativity related to itself as negating of itself” may seem rather unattractive, but

the idea behind the conceptual jungle is rather simple. One must understand negativity as the

method of construction used to change one situation or object to another. Thus, when negativity is

related or applied to itself, we merely begin with a state of many different situations and objects and

possible constructions between them – the external shell or the variability of differences, e.g. the

movement of planets – and then we use another construction to move away from this apparent

variability to something stable behind it, that is, an abstraction of essence – e.g. a law behind the

movement of the planets. What one must still understand is that these both stages – variability of

situations and abstract substrate behind it – are mere aspects of one structure connected by a

possible construction: one can move from the abstract substrate to the concrete variability and back

– from simple law to motions of planets and back.

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3./718. The simplest form of reflection or construction starts with nothing given and ends with nothing given or starts

and ends merely with itself: we may interpret this process of construction as something given and as a modification of

the method of construction. The interpretation of the construction as a process and its interpretation as a given are not

truly different: the change of interpretation changes really nothing. What is given and static in one sense – the method

of construction – can be in another sense applied as a process.

The two previous paragraphs were more of a summary of the result of the previous section: they

investigated some general characteristics of all reflections. Now we finally proceed to the actual

issue of the section, namely, the pure reflection or construction: we either abstract from the possible

middle stages in the application of reflection or then we pick out a reflection with no middle stages.

The result is a “movement from nothing to nothing”, that is, a construction beginning with nothing

given and ending, in some sense, with nothing given – note that the construction itself is here not

understood as something given: thus, we may begin with a method of recognizing methods of

construction and use it to itself, in order to notice that it is also a method of construction. Of course,

we can also interpret the construction and the process resulting from its application as a given

structure: we can take methods as objects, name them etc. Still, the moral of the previous

paragraphs holds even of pure reflections: a pure method of construction as a static given is still not

similar to an unmoving stone, because we can apply a given method of construction repeatedly.

Furthermore, the pure method of construction as a given or as an object does not essentially differ

from the same method in use: question is more of a viewpoint.

4./719. When we apply a pure construction to itself [that is, to a situation with no object], the only result is the pure

construction as a given [object], but we can again use the pure construction to this construction as an object in order to

return to the empty beginning. The state of having construction as a given is merely something posited or an aspect of

construction: this is the external shell of pure reflection and its apparent beginning – actually, it is merely a result of

construction, or the only material for pure construction is something that it provides for itself.

A pure reflection contains a possibility for an eternal return to beginning in a lawlike manner: e.g.

we have a machine that is programmed to write down the rules guiding its behaviour, if it confronts

an empty paper, and to wipe any writing away, if it recognizes that the writing contains some rules.

The stage between the states of emptiness or nothingness contains something, namely, the

embodiment of the reflection or method of construction itself. This embodiment is in some sense

given: it is an object that can be manipulated by the method. Yet, in another sense, it is merely

temporary or one phase in the whole process. We have seen earlier examples of structures where an

object or situation is merely an aspect of a larger whole, but in these examples this aspectualness or

secondariness was usually one of interpretation: we couldn’t really say should they be viewed as

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independent. Here, on the other hand, the secondary aspect is in a more natural sense secondary: it

is only an embodiment of the method or essence, or it is a product of using the method – it is

posited or constructed by it. In some sense we can still say that it is independent: it is the material

that the method requires in order that we can move to the next phase in the use of the method – e.g.

the machine couldn’t recognize the rule, if it were not written down. Yet, the embodiment of the

method or essence is in another and more essential sense dependent on the method: it wouldn’t exist

without the application of the method.

5./720. The embodiment of the method or activity is constructed purely, because the method is the beginning and the

end of the process: in another sense, the given embodiment is separated and independent of the method. The application

of the method changes the situation with mere method as a method, thus, the result of its application differs in some

sense from the method as a method – we have discovered an independent object in some sense. We can interpret the

given embodiment as a mere construct, but we can also change this interpretation with a new application of the method

and then the embodiment seems independent: the construction has presupposed something differing from itself –

although in another sense this differing object or situation is a mere modification of the same construction. The

embodiment or the apparent beginning is a product of a method of creating objects: in order that we can return to

essence, we must first discover or make something from which the return can be made.

In the previous paragraph the embodiment of the construction – its result, we might say – was

interpreted as a mere construct: that is, as something that didn’t exist independently of the

construction. On the other hand, we may as well interpret it as something that is already there

before the construction. Indeed, the result of the construction is, in a sense, only the construction

itself or its embodiment: surely the construction must exist, before it can be used. In effect, we have

now changed the interpretation of the relationship of the construction and its embodiment: we

begun by interpreting the construction as a true creation or “position”, but now we have interpreted

it as a mere discovery or “presupposition” – we have “cancelled” the interpretation that the

embodiment of the pure construction or reflection has been constructed. Of course, the following

move in the course of reflection is return to the mere construction as a method: the embodiment is

revealed as a mere embodiment. Yet, this return wouldn’t be possible without a previous situation

with this embodiment: we have to first manufacture or discover something, before we can further

process it – or reflection in itself (return to the abstract situation with mere essence as a method)

requires presupposition (discovery of a starting point of the return).

6./721. The abstract state of an identical essence can be constructed only by first separating something from it: we

discover its embodiment and find the essence again by reinterpreting this embodiment – in another sense, we can find

the embodiment only after a return to the essence. The return from the discovered situation is in a sense the original

discovery: the embodiment as a discovered object or situation can be found only as something to be discarded. On the

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other hand, the discarding of the embodiment is a return to the abstraction of mere method: such an abstraction can

indeed be interpreted as a mere embodiment, while the construction of such embodiment is the true essence.

We may interpret the relationship of the essence or method and its embodiment as one of actual

construction and one of mere discovery of something already existing. It may seem that we should

choose one or the other as the correct interpretation: surely something is either made or discovered

by us, but not both. Yet, it seems that in this case we cannot answer this question in a satisfying

manner because of a certain circularity in the relationships of the construction and the discovery.

Indeed, there is certain circularity involved, but this is, on a closer look, not very problematic. The

construction of the embodiment of the essence is a simple supposition or description of existence:

the existence of the method of construction becomes clear to us only after the embodiment has been

made, that is, after we have taken the method as an object.

The seeming problem is that we must use the method before we can view it as an

object: the embodying of the pure method of construction just is its application. Of course, this is no

true problem: we have merely used the method without knowing that we are using a method, that is,

we have constructed without having any justification of calling it constructing. After we have done

this constructing in an unconscious manner, we can then recognize its result as a method, and

furthermore, as a method that we can interpret as having been there all along. Thus, for a first-time

user of the method the process unfolds as if in an instant: something appears and at once we know

that we have constructed it and that the result of the construction is merely an embodiment or aspect

of the method of the construction, which we then become aware of in an almost instantaneous

manner. We then can interpret this sudden process anew, as a result of using the method for

embodying it to us: this interpretation then presupposes that the method has actually been in

existence before it became to exist for us. Hegel’s description of the pure reflection remains at the

level of what happens to the user of the method or reflection: in that context there is no primary

interpretation, but two equally good alternatives to choose of.

7./722. The process of applying construction bounces between two different situations: the supposition of the beginning

of its return is justified only by the return – we can justify the use of construction only by using it. In a sense, the pure

construction just begins by itself: it can be equally well interpreted as a manufacturing or as a discovering.

The same question whether the method of construction existed before its application can be raised

of other constructions beside the pure reflection. In cases where the method of construction is more

of a method of discovery based on some regularity, the probable answer would be that the method

existed as this regularity: e.g. it seems plausible to suppose that we could have always detected

some laws governing the movements of the planets if we had been there to observe them. On the

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other hand, when the method in question is more of a manufacturing of something, the case is

completely different: e.g. we could say that a method for baking cakes didn’t exist before someone

truly baked a cake. The pure reflection is a sort of minimal member of both groups: it is in some

sense a mere method of discovery – it is the possibility of discovering itself, one could say – but

because of its minimality it doesn’t depend on anything foreign and thus resembles a method of

manufacturing. It is this ambiguous nature of pure reflections that makes it difficult to decide

whether they existed before their application.

8./723. A pure method of construction is in one sense a method and in another sense something differing from a method

[or something given], and because of this, it can be applied to itself.

Hegel summarizes previous investigations into a neat and apparently contradictory form: pure

reflection or construction is both itself and its “being not”, and it is itself, because it is its negative,

because only then the cancelling of the negative is its coming together with itself. The apparent

contradiction is, on a closer look, a mere Hegelian contradiction, that is, it describes the same

phenomenon from two different aspects. A pure construction is itself, that is, in some sense it is a

method or process of construction. Then again, the only material a pure construction uses is “itself”

or its own embodiment: this role of a pure construction as being its own material is its aspect of

being “not itself”. Furthermore, a pure reflection is itself only because it is also “not itself”: that is,

it is the nature of a pure reflection that it is a reflection which has its own embodiment as its

material. Thus, when we “cancel” or “integrate” the embodiment of the pure reflection – when we

recognize it as a method and apply it – we at the same time can return to the embodiment – we have

proven that we can interpret the pure reflection as existing object.

9./724. In one sense, the given material of pure reflection is a mere construct that cannot be separated from the

construction: in another sense, we may separate this material from other possible materials of construction – in this

context we may interpret a reflection as starting from something truly given and externally modifying it.

Up to now we have investigated a pure reflection, that is, simplest possible form of a method of

construction which consists in nothing else, but embodiment of the method and the recognition of

this embodiment or objectification as objectification of a method. Here it seems reasonable to

identify the material of the construction and the construction itself: the material is the method itself

taken as an object. We would like to now, firstly, find or manufacture instances of constructions

which are not so pure, that is, where the material and the construction could be separated: secondly,

we would like to show that a pure reflection could also be interpreted as an “impure” or external

reflection, as Hegel calls it. The tasks are completed easily: if the pure reflection we are using is a

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construction that can be used to identify some characteristic of an object given to it – at least

whether it is an embodiment of this method or not – we just need new objects in order to see the

same reflection as external. As Hegel says, from any given situation or object – even from the

embodiment of the object – it is possible to construct other situations and objects: this we learned to

do in the previous book through different constructions. Thus, all we need to do is to multiply

objects and situations given to us. Because of this multiplication, there are bound to be materials for

construction that are not identical with our original construction: it differs from something ”other”.

Indeed, we are now more justified in interpreting the original material or the embodiment of the

method as different than the method: the method as an object or given belongs to the “class of

givens” that differs from the “class of methods” – we are, in a sense, interpreting two different

aspects of the same entity as different sorts of entities. Thus, we have constructed a context where

our original method of construction is external, that is, differs from its materials.

2. External reflection

We have just investigated any instance of pure reflection or construction, for instance, a method for

writing the method itself down and for recognizing from any writing whether it embodies a method

of construction. We then noticed that such a pure reflection can itself be interpreted as an external

reflection, if we just can find some new material for the reflection or construction: this we have

learned to do in the previous book, e.g. by taking a situation with something given as a new given

object. Thus, we could write a description of the writing that embodies our exemplary method: such

a description would not then be an embodiment of any method – although it would be a description

of such an embodiment – and hence, the application of the original method of construction to it

would be external. Now we begin to study these external reflections, that is, methods of construction

where the material for the construction differs or can be naturally interpreted as differing from the

construction: or actually Hegel usually refers by external reflection to interpretative constructions

– an external reflection compares some general structure with a given object or situation. The aim

of the subsection is to find examples of determining reflections: that is, interpretations of situations

or objects that reveal some essential characteristics of what is interpreted.

1./725. An absolute or pure reflection or construction needs only its own embodiment as its material: an external or real

reflection or construction, on the other hand, requires a material differing from itself. We have thus, in a sense, two

reflections: firstly, the given object that is used as a material comes with a construction of integrating all its aspects into

a unity, while the second construction is then applied to this first construction – the material of the construction is in

some sense identical, but in another sense different than the construction used to it.

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Hegel begins with an introducing description of what external reflections are. He also calls them,

just this once, real reflections: this does not mean that e.g. pure reflection would be somehow unreal,

but that external reflection involves a “real”, instead of an “ideal” difference – the object of the

construction differs from the construction, while in a pure or absolute construction it was only an

embodiment of the construction itself. Now, Hegel makes a perplexing statement that the reflection

is “doubled” in an external reflection. We might think that this would just refer to the example of

external reflection constructed in the previous subsection: there we learned that we could interpret a

case of pure reflection as an external reflection. But Hegel seems to say that it is not just a particular

case of external reflections where the material of the reflection is also a reflection or construction,

but all of them. We might perhaps say in a more comprehensible manner that every potential

material of an external reflection or construction comes with a construction of its own, which Hegel

calls “reflection in itself”. The name is meant to be understood in a quite literal sense: the reflection

or construction starts from somewhere and moves “within itself”, that is, we begin with a group of

different aspects and interpretations of an object or situation and view them as mere aspects of this

one unity – this is the familiar construction we have called idealization. Thus, if we have a possible

object of interpretation or characterization, we may decide to look at the object as a whole of its

possible interpretations. The other reflection Hegel mentions is then obviously the construction that

focuses the interpretation of the given object or situation in some of its aspect, whether it is essential

or external to what is given.

2./726. An external reflection depends on something given, which is not its mere embodiment or construct: what is

given is primary, while its relation to the reflection as something different is secondary or mere external aspect of the

given. In one sense the reflection constructs the object [or posits it in some context], but this construction is in a more

adequate sense secondary: the reflection finds what it constructs [or modifies]. In one sense, the material differs from

the construction, but this difference is external to the material: the whole relation to the construction is arbitrary to what

is given. Similarly, we could interpret finite objects as mere aspects of an infinite object, but this was a mere external

interpretation.

Hegel plays with the word voraussetzung. In some sense, when we make an “act” or application of

external reflection or construction, we also posit or construct the object that is material for the

construction: yet, in another sense, we merely construct it as “not-constructed”. This apparently

complex phrase hides a simple idea. When we posit or construct something A as something B, we

merely either interpret or modify the A in such a manner that is looks like or turns into B: the A

itself need not be constructed or manufactured by us, but it might exist before our construction.

Thus, we may easily construct A as not being constructed by us: that is, we may interpret A as

something that has not been manufactured by us – like I can well interpret the book in front of me

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as not being written by me. Of course, it is external for the book whether I interpret it in such

manner or not: the book exists without my help, no matter whether I happen to agree with its

independent existence or not.

Hegel makes an interesting comparison with the transition from finity to infinity. The

material of this transition or construction was a state of finity: that is, a state with many differently

classified objects that must then be in some sense “imperfect” or incapable of existing in some

context. We have seen that such finities can be interpreted as mere aspects of an infinite unity, but

as Hegel admits here, this interpretation does not change the fact that there still are finities in some

sense: Hegel has not proven that all finities would be actually aspects of an infinity, but he has

merely pointed out one possible interpretation of them.

3./727. External reflection is a construction connecting two separate structures: we have something given and a

construction of a general structure integrating many givens, and these can be connected by determining the given

through the construction.

As we shall see more clearly in the future, Hegel uses the structure of syllogism to describe a path

from one situation or structure to another and even a method by which to connect two apparently

separate structures. Thus, in external reflection we begin with two distinct entities. Firstly, we have

that which is given to us, whether it is a situation or an object: say, an event of a rock falling into

the ground. Secondly, we have some “reflection in itself”. Earlier Hegel meant by this expression a

capacity to integrate different aspects of one situation or object into a unity, and the meaning of the

term is actually same, except that the situation or object in question is of a different level – now it is

some general structure common to different objects and the capacity in question is one of seeing an

individual instance of such a structure as a mere aspect of such a structure. The act of external

reflection or construction then consists of a combination of the given with the general structure: we

determine the situation or the object as being an instance of this structure.

4./728. Although external reflection or construction in some sense interprets the given in an intrusive manner, it also

supposes the independence of the given: in a yet another sense, the reflection or construction posits the given as

compatible with the construction. In this interpretation we have constructed the given as sharing its structure with the

reflection: reflection does not just interpret or modify the given in an external manner, but also gives back its

independence – by moving away from the inadequate interpretation we interpret the given in an essential manner. Thus,

it is possible to interpret an external reflection as a method of construction for finding an essence of something given,

that is, as a determining reflection.

An external reflection was an interpretation or modification of a pre-existent situation or object: it

shows only one aspect or possibility of the whole given and thus gives us only a restricted

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understanding of it. Furthermore, it was external in the sense that it was indifferent to the given

situation or object that it was interpreted in this manner. Despite of these shortcomings, an external

reflection reveals something of the given. Firstly, it shows that it is possible to interpret the given in

this manner, and secondly, it also contains the admission that this interpretation is not the whole

truth of the given: that is, if we know it to be a mere external reflection – e.g. if we knowingly give

an inadequate description of the events of the Second World War and admit this inadequacy, we

have still thought the essential fact that there is more to this war than what we have told. In effect,

we have the possibility to integrate one aspect emphasized by the interpretation to the whole story

of the given. Indeed, we already noted that every given situation or object came with such a

possibility or method of construction: it was the “reflection in itself” involved in every independent

subject matter. When we thus take this “natural” reflection as the object of our investigation and

note its existence, we have found an instance of an interpretation that tells us something essential of

the given – a determining reflection, as Hegel calls it. Furthermore, this essential interpretation or

determining reflection is something that is an aspect in the external reflection, when it is understood

as an external reflection or mere interpretation: we have thus managed to see one side of an external

reflection as “immanent” to the object or situation interpreted.

Remark

The concept of reflection, especially in its ordinary or at least philosophically more common

meaning as some sort of mental looking of the content of one's consciousness, was under a heavy

criticism in Hegel's days. One might say that this was just one form of the criticism against

philosophies with heavy emphasis on human reasoning capabilities: it was felt by some that human

reasoning powers were somehow inadequate to discover the true nature of the things. Although

Hegel does not restrict his concept of reflection to this "mental reflection", his account of external

reflections and of the possibility to find determining reflections from them – of interpretative or

modificatory constructions and the possibility to find essential interpretations – can clearly be used

to defend the capability of reflection in finding relevant information. This defense Hegel presents in

this remark.

1./729. Usually reflection refers to a subjective movement of judgment, which compares something given with general

characteristics: for instance, Kant separates determining judgment – judgment of subsuming particulars under a given

law or general characteristic – from reflective judgment – judgment of finding general structure of a given particular.

Kant’s reflection thus is a movement from particular to general: on the one hand, we externally interpret the particular

as a mere instance; on the other hand, we find its essential characteristic.

2./730. My account of reflection differs from Kantian reflection, which is mostly external. On the other hand, Kantian

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reflection can be interpreted as pure, because the interpreted given is inessential in comparison with the universal.

A clear statement that by reflection Hegel does not refer merely to the mental process called

reflection is given in these paragraphs: Hegel states that usually reflection refers to such mental

process, and this reminder would have been unnecessary if Hegel himself would have used the word

“reflection” in this manner. Indeed, in the next paragraph Hegel clearly admits that reflection, as he

understands it, is not something that belongs essentially to consciousness. Instead, as we have seen,

reflection in Hegel refers to all constructions or methods of constructions, but particularly in this

remark to what could be called interpretative constructions or methods: the possibilities of

interpreting something given as an instance of a universal characteristics or structure.

Hegel relates this idea of an interpretative construction to Kant’s idea of reflective

judgment: the ability of finding universals for given particulars. If we restricted Hegelian reflections

to mental processes of Kantian sort, Hegel’s external and determining reflections could be seen as

two classes or aspects of reflective judgments: the relating of a particular to a universal or law

governing it is arbitrary to the object, but at least in some cases this relating reveals something

essential of the object. Indeed, Hegel even notes that a determining reflection could be interpreted

also as an absolute or pure reflection, that is, as a reflection with nothing but itself as material: here

we, firstly, identify the reflection used to recognize universals in individuals and the recognized

universal, and secondly, note that the individual can be interpreted as a mere external shell of the

reflection, which is supposed to be its essence. Note that Kant’s determining judgment should not

be equated with Hegel’s determining reflection, because former appears to be merely an instance of

syllogistic thinking: if all x characterized by this universal have a certain property, then this x has it

also.

3./731. Modern philosophers [like Schelling] have spoken against external reflection as an unnatural method. Yet, the

classifications constructed by reflection are more stable than mere given classifications: reflective classifications

contain within them a method of constructing these classifications from other reflective classifications.

The prime example of the modern philosophy which has regarded reflection as an antipode of the

absolute method was the Schellingian school of philosophy, although one could see hints of this

attitude in Jacobi and Hamann and their criticism of enlightenment and reason. The point of the

criticism against the reflection is simple: the absolute method should be like an immediate

apprehension of the whole nature of its object, while (external) reflection merely emphasizes one

limited aspect of the object. Hegel is, undoubtedly, against any such possibility of seeing in one

vision all aspects of the object involved: in order to view a totality – even a limited one – we must

have at first analyzed different aspects of the object and then interpreted these aspects as belonging

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to the unified object as mere aspects. A vision can at most give us a limited view of the object: it

shows us an object in one context and in one situation, but leaves all the other situations and

contexts unnoticed – a change of the context would then change the vision. The characteristics that

we find through reflection, on the other hand, have the advantage of being at least relatively stable

and essential. Reflection in this context is an ability to discover a certain characteristic or aspect in

an object: thus, a characteristic discovered by such an object comes with an ability to awaken and

actualize this characteristic or aspect – the determinations of reflection are powers and abilities of

objects. For instance, we may hear immediately a certain beautiful note sung by a person, and this

particular sensation of a beautiful sound vanishes as fast as it has appeared; on the other hand, if the

person in question has a talent for singing, he may produce such beautiful sounds at will – thus,

musicality is a more essential characteristic than an arbitrary production of a beautiful sound.

3. Determining reflection

We began the investigation of reflections from a pure or absolute reflection, that is, a construction

that did not need any given material, but was used only to identify itself as a construction. We then

noted the possibility of finding instances of other constructions, some of which were external

constructions or constructions using some given material and interpreting it: indeed, we could view

the original pure construction as external, if we interpreted the construction as construction and

construction as material of construction as different objects and not merely as different aspects of

same object. Then we noted finally that some of the characteristics found by the interpretative

construction were essential to the interpreted given: for instance, we could justifiably say that the

given object or situation was an independent entity in different contexts. The task of the chapter has

then been actually fulfilled: we have found instances of essential characteristics or abilities of

objects and situations, and we could now just move on to the next chapter that investigates some of

these essentialities. Yet, Hegel remains in this position for a while and offers a brief analysis on the

general structure of these essentialities. The subdivision of the subsection is rather arbitrary: first

we compare external reflections with pure reflections and generally reflections with states of being,

then we define the notion of a “determination of reflection” – an essential characteristic or ability

of something – and finally we compare these essentialities with qualities of states of being.

1./732. A determining reflection is in some sense pure, but in another sense external.

2./733. 1. Comparison of positing and external reflection. External and determining reflections begin from a given

and construct some general and perhaps essential characteristic of the given, while pure reflection needs no external

given. Thus, the result of a pure construction is properly not independent of the reflection, but a mere construct: it is

merely as an aspect of the construction.

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Hegel begins by identifying determining reflection as a “unity” of pure and external reflection: note

that this does not mean that we would have “produced” the concept of determining reflection

through some sort of synthesis of earlier concepts – it just tells us that there is something in

common with determining reflection and both of the earlier reflections. Thus, Hegel classifies

external and determining reflection together as reflections or constructions that need some

independent material: indeed, one needs to have something given in order to interpret it in some

manner. A pure or positing reflection, on the other hand, is merely the construction of making this

reflection itself an object and noting it to be a construction: thus, the only material it needs is its

own embodiment. The common element between the determining and pure reflection is that they

both tell something essential of their materials: thus, materials of both constructions can be

interpreted as secondary in comparison with the reflection. Then again, one cannot properly

interpret pure reflection as having an independent material: or at least when such an interpretation is

made, the reflection is not anymore pure. Hegel notes that this speaks against pure reflection: it is

not so complex construction, because it cannot be applied to all sorts of materials.

3./734. The result of [pure] construction differs in some sense from construction, but in another sense is merely an

aspect of the construction. A state of being-here was a given state of being-within-some-classificatory-system-of-many-

different-states-of-being: here, a similar structure is a state of being-constructed, which is a state of being-in-a-

classificatory-system-based-on-an-essential-construction – thus, it is a mere aspect of the construction. A state of being-

constructed is connected both to states of being-here and to essences or constructions. One may think that a given

classification would be more essential than constructed, but the case is actually converse: a constructed classification is

openly a mere aspect of an object, while in a mere classification of states of being-here this is always hidden – a state of

being-constructed is secondary only in comparison with essences.

Hegel returns to the question that was briefly mentioned already in the previous remark: whether it

is better to just accept immediately given impressions of objects or situations or to take them as

mere interpretations or constructs. Hegel’s answer is that it is more informative to know that some

impression of an object is a mere secondary aspect of the object – an object as it is seen in some

situation or context – than to believe that this impression is all that there is of the object to know. Of

course, knowing a constructed aspect of the object is still uninformative in comparison with

knowing the essence of its whole structure: on the other hand, knowing this essence is just knowing

how the object looks in different contexts and in what ways it is possible to construct these different

contexts.

4./735. 2. Determinations of reflection. A mere construct is just some characteristic in an arbitrary classification: when

the construct is in some sense independent – when the construction is in some sense external – the construct contains a

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method of seeing itself as independent – such a constructed aspect is a determination of reflection [or an ability of the

given].

Earlier we have met the phrase “being posited”, which refers to any state of being that is in some

sense a result of a construction and thus secondary. Now, such a construct could be a “mere

construct”, that is, it might have no independent nature, but would be a mere external shell for the

construction itself. Thus, an embodiment of a pure reflection – the method of construction

interpreted as an object – would not exist in any sense without the reflection or method of

construction. On the other hand, in some cases the construct is a mere interpretation or modification

of a previously existing object or situation, and in these cases the object or situation is in some

manner independent of the constructed interpretation: it comes with a construction of its own by

which all these other constructs can be seen as mere aspects of a unity. Thus, a planet would exist

even before we characterized it as moved by some laws, and even the ingredients for a cake would

exist, before they were turned into a cake. In cases where the constructed interpretation or

modification is essential for the independent object, Hegel calls this construct a determination of

reflection: this would be an ability of an object to be interpreted or modified in a certain manner.

5./736. A constructed classification differs from a given qualitative classification: in a given classification, an object or

situation just is related to something else, while in a constructed classification, the classified objects or situations are

truly independent – a quality belongs to a state of being, while a determination of reflection belongs to something stable

that can and must exist in many different contexts. It appears arbitrary that a state of being has a certain quality and it

may thus change its quality which then vanishes, while a determination of reflection is something that we can always

construct from any aspect of the underlying unity.

Earlier Hegel compared states of being-posited with the qualitative states of being and in the

previous paragraph he compared mere states of being-posited with determinations of reflection:

here the triangle is completed by a comparison of qualitative states of being and determinations of

reflection. A short recap of the basic characteristics of all these notions is perhaps in place. a) Mere

qualitative states of being are characteristics of situations and objects that just happen to be given as

characterized by these qualities in some arbitrary context, without any insurance that we could

reconstruct them as having these characteristics. For instance, a particular shade of green in a tree

seen in an arbitrary lighting could be such that we might never again see in our lives (of course, if

we gain the ability to predict when the lighting is suitable for the shade to occur, the characteristics

is revealed to have been a determination of reflection.

b) Mere state of being-posited is a (qualitative) state of being, the occurrence of which is

governed by the use of some method of construction and which cannot even occur in any form

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without the use of this method. For instance, a state of recognizing oneself as a conscious person

cannot occur without the application of a method of recognizing something as conscious. Unlike a

mere qualitative state of being, a pure state of being-posited can be always reconstructed through

the use of the method of construction: e.g. we just have to think ourselves in order to note our own

consciousness.

c) A determination of reflection is a state of being-posited that characterizes a situation or an

object that could exist without the use of the method of construction: thus, it is an interpretation

showing an essential characteristic of the situation or the object. For instance, a law of the

movement of the planets shows something essential of the planet involved, although planet also has

other characteristics in addition to being governed by the law. A determination of reflection, like

any state of being-posited, can be reconstructed through the use of the method, but unlike in a mere

state of being-posited, an object or situation characterized by this determination is independent of

the method of construction.

6./737. Because determinations of reflection come with an infallible method of construction, they are like small and

independent essences: they are determinations that can be always constructed. Although we can compare a

determination of reflection with another determination, we may always return from this comparison back to the original

determination – such determinations are the proper shell for essences, or they are essences that can be constructed from

some original essence.

Hegelian essences are not mere general structures, but general structures together with a method of

construction: they are not just something common to a group of objects, but something that can

always be exemplified, at least if the necessary materials are given. Now, aspects constructed in the

application of such a method of construction to some given object – essential modifications or

interpretation of the object, that is, its “determinations of reflection” – are also general

characteristics that come with a method of construction: thus, they too are Hegelian essences. Of

course, compared with the “whole” essence, these aspects are more abstract and less informative:

for instance, in comparison with the whole personality of a human being and the conglomeration of

all her skills, her ability to sing is a mere fragment. Hegel even uses the somewhat artificial word

Wesenheit to characterize such an aspect: this is nothing more than a convenient way to note that

this aspect is an essence in some sense, but that there is a “larger” essence behind it. As Hegel notes,

the essence or reflection has “gone out of itself”, that is, the method has been used in discovering

further methods of construction. Indeed, this could be done with any method of construction. This

still doesn’t mean that there wouldn’t be some “atomic” or basic reflections or method of

construction: there would just have to be many of such abstract or basic constructions –

constructions that were implicit in any method of construction – and these basic constructions

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would be constructible even from one another.

7./738. A determination of reflection has two aspects: it is in some sense a mere construct, but in another sense it can be

seen as independent method of construction. In the first sense [or in comparison with a wider method of construction],

this determination is a secondary entity constructed as a secondary entity: it can even then be infallibly constructed, but

this is irrelevant [to the wider method] and it is given as a mere variable aspect: in this sense, the application of the

original or wider method of construction does not result in anything differing from the original method. In the second

sense or taken as independent, the determination is independent and something that can be infallibly constructed.

Hegel once again emphasizes the two different aspects within any Wesenheit or “small essence”. At

first sight, a “small essence” is nothing or only secondary when compared to the “true” essence. A

singer can sing songs, but she can do a lot more: she is a person who can e.g. walk, sleep, eat, think

herself, imagine things, hope for something and lots of other things implied in her humanity and

personality – in comparison with this unity of skills called her essence the ability to sing songs

seems a minor detail that could well be accounted for by the more informative essence. In another

sense, such a “small essence” is as good an essence as the larger one: we may abstract from all the

other aspects constructed or explained by the essence and concentrate on this one detail of it –

indeed, we can even integrate some of the other aspects into this one detail. Thus, we may look at a

person from the viewpoint of her ability to sing: if she is a good singer, we may even be able to see

most of her life from the viewpoint of this ability – it may have been e.g. the ability that led the

person to her career as a professional singer.

8./739. 3. Further differentiation of determinations of reflection and qualities. Determination of reflection is in one

sense a mere construct or secondary in comparison to a more informative method of construction: in another sense, it

contains an independent method of construction. These are different aspects of the same entity: when it is seen as

constructed, we integrate it into a larger unity, but when we integrate everything to it, we give it an independent

subsistence – thus, a determination of reflection contains a natural way to construct other situations or objects. The

position of a qualitative state of being in a classification might be external to the object classified, but a determination of

reflection contains a natural relation to some classification. If we construct something else from a qualitative state of

being, the original situation vanishes, but in a reflection of determination this modified state can be seen as a mere

aspect of the original situation – although we can always construct something else from it, we can also always return

back to it.

It is somewhat hard to understand why this particular paragraph has been separated as an

independent subsection, when it merely continues the discussion of the proper nature of the

determinations of reflection, especially when compared with qualitative states of being. Here Hegel

emphasizes the fact that reflections of determination or determinate abilities or methods of

construction have essential relations to other states of being. Indeed, if something truly has an

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ability to do something, this means that there must have been states of being or situations where it

has been able to show this ability: that is, there must have been situations where the ability is not yet

in active use – e.g. in order that a person truly has an ability to sing, there must be situations where

she doesn’t yet sing, in order that she could have an occasion to prove her singing ability. Thus,

every determinate method of construction comes with a method of showing something else:

furthermore, this “method of differentiation” is not just some external construction, but a natural

ingredient in the determinate method – in comparison, a method of discovering other qualities from

a given quality may be external to the original quality (it is indifferent to a blue object, if we can use

it to find red objects). Furthermore, every determinate method of construction comes also with a

method of finding the original method from such a constructed different situation: we could call it a

“method of identification”. Clearly, these two sub-methods are part of any determinate method of

construction, and as we shall see in the next chapter, they are the most abstract determinations of

reflection there are.

Glossary:

Wesen = essence; the method or the latent activity, by which some situations or objects could be

constructed

Unwesentliche = what is unessential or mere undesignated background according to some

viewpoint

Wesentliche = what is essential or a designated reference point according to some viewpoint

Schein = ”glow”, what something looks like; situation or an object that is somehow instable and so

points to an activity regulating it, which it embodies in its instability

Absolute / sich selbst beziehende Negativität = ”absolute/self-related negativity”; activity or process

continuing and sustaining itself through some alternative situations or states that are in comparison

instable, for instance, movement from one alternative aspect of some structure to another (e.g. from

essence to some group of situations embodying the essence and back)

Reflexion = ”reflection”; generally any process embodying an activity

Absolute/reine Reflexion = ”absolute/pure reflection”; process moving from an empty situation (in

some sense) to another empty situation (again, in some sense; in another sense or according to

another context these situations might be full of things)

Reflexion in sich = ”reflection into itself”; process by which some activity integrates all its products

to itself and so retains or regenerates itself in some environment that is external to it

Setzen = ”positing”; constructing, that is, making it so that something exists in this context what did

not exist at earlier stage in the same context; mostly manufacturing or making something, but might

also mean finding something

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Gesetzsein = state of being-posited-or-constructed; something (situation, classification, object etc.)

that is, because of some activity or construction

Voraussetzen = ”presupposing”; constructing something as not constructed; finding something

Äussere Reflexion = ”external reflection”; process which determines (e.g. interprets or modifies)

something that is independent of the process and contains the possible activity of becoming

independent of the external process

Bestimmende Reflexion = ”determining reflection”; process which reveals some essential ability or

method of construction in something that is independent of the process

Reflexion auf Anderes = ”reflection to other”; process revealing or even making something different

from the activity of process