Hegel's Logic of Finitude

Hegel’s logic of finitude

Rocıo Zambrana

� Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Abstract In ‘‘Violence and Metaphysics’’ Jacques Derrida suggests that ‘‘the only

effective position to take in order not to be enveloped by Hegel would seem to

be…to consider false-infinity…irreducible.’’ Inversely, refuting the charge of lo-

gocentrism associated with Hegelian true infinity (wahrhafte Unendlichkeit) would

involve showing that Hegel’s speculative logic does not establish the infinity of

being exempt from the negativity of the finite. This paper takes up Derrida’s

challenge, and argues that true infinity is crucial to Hegel’s understanding of ideality

as a question of normative authority, which does not fall prey to logocentrism.

Through an exposition of the dialectic of the finite and the infinite in Hegel’s

Science of Logic, I argue that true infinity is not an ontological category that

eliminates division, but rather refers to the metalogical standpoint involved in a

philosophical account of determinacy. Although fully achieved at the end of the

Logic, the metalogical standpoint that Hegel elaborates in the Seinslogik under

the banner of the true infinite already clarifies that determinacy is a product of

normative authority that is itself precarious.

Keywords Hegel � True infinity � Bad infinity � Idealism � Absolute Idea �Science of Logic � Logocentrism

In the famous dialectic of the finite and the infinite in the Science of Logic, Hegel

infamously argues that true infinity (das wahrhafte Unendlichkeit) is ‘true,’ since it

does not fall into the problems of the bad infinite (das schlechte Unendliche)—an

endless series or infinite progress that renders infinity finite. As an endless series,

bad infinity is best represented by the mathematical infinite. As an endless progress,

R. Zambrana (&)

University of Oregon, Eugene, OR, USA

e-mail: [email protected]

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Cont Philos Rev

DOI 10.1007/s11007-012-9219-8

bad infinity is analyzed as the consequence of Kantian and Fichtean morality.1 As

endless displacement perpetuated either by a sequence that proceeds to an infinitely

smaller amount or by a ceaseless striving to a goal that is forever beyond reach,

infinity is limited. In being beyond reach, infinity itself cannot relate to the finite.

What results from this becoming-infinite of the finite and the becoming-finite of the

infinite is a ceaseless alternation between both—a back and forth between two forms

of finitude. This alternation is held in check by true infinity, which reestablishes

unity by purportedly eliminating all division. In stopping an infinite regress or

progress, the true infinite secures the possibility of the true and the good.2 Hegel

therefore provocatively argues that ‘‘it is not the finite that is the real, but the

infinite.’’3

In ‘‘Violence and Metaphysics’’ Jacques Derrida suggests that ‘‘the only effective

position to take in order not to be enveloped by Hegel would seem to be, for an

instant, the following: to consider false-infinity (that is, in a profound way, original

finitude) irreducible.’’4 Derrida is one among many twentieth-century critics of

Hegel who maintain that the notion of true infinity commits the project of

speculative logic to the most extreme form of logocentrism.5 The finite for Hegel,

Derrida elsewhere notes, is mere transition within the infinite return of the Idea. The

finite is transitoriness, incessant cessation or vanishing, while the infinite is the

eternal ‘‘Idea’s return to self-presence.’’6 The ideal rather than the real is therefore

the true for Hegel. True infinity is accordingly seen as the notion underlying, among

other things, Hegel’s view of history as the triumphant march of reason, which

remains unscathed throughout ‘‘the restless succession of individuals who exist at a

time and then disappear.’’7

Derrida develops the thought of false infinity as irreducible perhaps most

famously under the heading of differance. Differance establishes a constitutive

difference that undermines the very possibility of anything being in-itself. Derrida

describes differance as a movement that produces differences, and then qualifies the

statement by suggesting that it is the very ‘‘origin of differences.’’8 How should we

understand this claim? The most compelling framework has been proposed by

Martin Hagglund, who argues that the infinite delay of differance follows from the

1 For a Fichtean response to Hegel, see Martin (2007).2 See Gasche (1994); see also Gasche (1986).3 Hegel (1969a, p. 149; 1969b, p. 164).4 Derrida (1980, p. 119). See also, Derrida (2004, p. 253): ‘‘Finitude becomes infinitude, according to a

non-Hegelian identity.’’5 See, e.g., Derrida (1997, p. 24): ‘‘Hegel…undoubtedly summed up the entire philosophy of the logos.

He determined ontology as absolute logic; he assembled all the delimitations of philosophy as presence;

he assigned to presence the eschatology of parousia, of the self-proximity of infinite subjectivity.’’ See

also Derrida (1982a, p. 74) and (1997, p. 27).6 Derrida (1982b, p. 74).7 Hegel (1988, p. 88). See Derrida (1982b, p. 121), where he argues that Hegel’s notion of infinite reason

is precisely what ‘‘coordinates teleology with an eschatology, a theology, and an ontology.’’ See also

Derrida (1982b), esp. the discussion of Hegel and Husserl.8 Derrida (1982c, p. 11).

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constitution of time.9 Such delay is also a deferral that establishes dependence on an

other—spatiality as such, material support, and so on—as necessary. The spatiality

of material support enables the retention of a now that passes away as it comes to be,

but is itself exposed to a future that may erase it.10 To consider bad infinity as

irreducible, then, is to establish finitude as an ‘‘unconditional condition.’’ It is to

establish the temporal and spatial character of all that is. Consequently, the

precariousness of the finite cannot be overcome.

Refuting Derrida’s charge of logocentrism would accordingly involve showing

that speculative logic does not establish the infinity of reason as exempt from the

negativity of the finite. This paper takes up Derrida’s challenge, and argues that

clarifying the status of das wahrhafte Unendlichkeit is crucial to understanding the

theory of determinacy that Hegel lays out in the Science of Logic.11 True infinity is

central to grasping Hegel’s understanding of ideality as a question of normativeauthority. Rather than an ontological or onto-theo-teleological category that

establishes the infinity of reason beyond the negativity of the finite, true infinity

refers to the metalogical standpoint involved in a philosophical account of

determinacy.12 This standpoint moreover clarifies that determinacy is a product of a

normative authority that is structurally precarious, which is to say, finite.

It is clear that the significance of true infinity for Hegel cannot be overstated. He

calls it the ‘‘fundamental concept of philosophy,’’ and argues that it is the ‘‘principle

of all philosophies.’’13 If philosophical inquiry seeks to clarify distinctions with

which the intelligibility of nature and spirit is determined, Hegel maintains, ‘‘all

philosophy is a form of idealism.’’14 In fact, Hegel provocatively writes, a

‘‘philosophy which ascribed veritable, ultimate, absolute being to finite existence assuch would not deserve the name of philosophy.’’15 All philosophy is idealism,

since it proposes to give an account of reality. Philosophy, as well as religion and,

let us add, science, accounts for individual existent things on the basis of ‘‘an

other.’’ They are ‘‘posited’’ (gesetzte), Hegel says, by an other. ‘‘Water, matter, or

atoms’’ are examples of principles of ancient and modern philosophies that rendered

reality intelligible.16 Including Thales’ ‘‘water,’’ however, these are ‘‘universals,

idealizations.’’17 They provide intelligibility to things in their sensuous singularity.

9 Hagglund (2008).10 Ibid., p. 18.11 In addition to Pippin (1989, 2008), Pinkard (1996, 2002), Brandom (1991, 2005, 2009), and Houlgate

(2006), to whom I refer throughout, important contributions to the debate concerning the status of Hegel’s

idealism include Dusing (1976), Hartmann (1977), Fulda (1988), White (1983), Westphal (1989), Stern

(1990, 2009), Duquette (1990), Siep (1991), Horstmann (1999, 2006), Longuenesse (2007), de Boer

(2004), Winfield (2006). For an overview of the debate, see Kreines (2006).12 Cf. Pippin’s use of ‘‘metalogical’’ in (1989, p. 248).13 Hegel (1975, p. 140; 1969a, p. 154; 1969b, p. 171; 1969e, p. 202).14 Hegel (1975, p. 140; 1969a, p. 155; 1969b, p. 171; 1969e, p. 202).15 Hegel (1969a, p. 155; 1969b, p. 171); my emphasis.16 Ibid.17 Ibid. Translation follows Di Giovanni, Hegel (2010, p. 124).


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Individual things are thus idealized. They are idealized ‘‘in principle, in their

concept, still more in Geist, that is, as aufgehoben.’’18

Rather than ontological principles of reality, principles and concepts of account-

giving are rules for making normative distinctions.19 They are non-empirical

constraints that allow for determinacy, since they render something intelligible.

Concepts and principles are constitutive for Hegel, however, because they sustain

normative distinctions that structure a way of life, a shape of Geist: institutions,

practices, modes of individual and collective understanding and self-understanding.

Yet these distinctions are themselves a product of and sustained or debunked by

Geist—by concrete practices such as scientific inquiry or religious tradition.20

Normative distinctions are thus sustained on the basis of their authority, that is, their

currency, bindingness, or actuality (Wirklichkeit) within shapes of Geist.Philosophy is accordingly a metatheoretical endeavor, since it gives a

justification of principles of explanation (e.g., Thales’ water). Philosophy thereby

gives an account of the authority of any given principle within concrete practices of

determination.21 Indeed, as Hegel famously put it, philosophy is ‘‘its own time

comprehended in thought.’’22 Yet Hegel’s speculative logic is metalogical, since it

gives a formal ‘‘account of account-giving.’’23 Speculative logic thus operates on

what I have called a hyperbolically formal level.24 It clarifies that determinacy is

ultimately a matter of normative distinctions within shapes of Geist. It does so by

establishing that reason is self-authorizing.25 In establishing that reason is self-

authorizing, speculative logic makes explicit the inseparability of the real and the

ideal. If the determinacy and hence intelligibility of something is the result of

normative distinctions, ideality is the ‘truth’ of mere reality. For this reason, Hegel

argues that ‘‘the opposition between idealistic and realistic philosophy is meaning-

less.’’26 We cannot speak of either the real or the ideal without thinking through

18 Ibid.19 Robert Pippin insightfully argues that ‘‘Hegel’s theory of concepts is a theory of ‘ought’s,’ rules telling

us how to make categorical distinctions, principles that govern material inferences, that prescribe what

ought or ought not to be done, and so forth’’ (2008, p. 97). Cf. Pippin (1989). For an assessment of shifts

in Pippin’s interpretation of Hegel, see Zambrana (2010b). See also Brandom (1991, 2005, 2009).20 On the paradoxical structure of Geist as a ‘‘product of itself’’ and its roots in Kant’s notion of

autonomy as self-legislation, see Pippin (2008) and Pinkard (2002).21 The Phenomenology of Spirit is accordingly a theory of modernity, and the specifically modern idea of

freedom as self-determination. Similarly, the Philosophy of Right is an account of right in light of Hegel’s

contemporary institutions. See Habermas (1990), Pippin (1997), and Pinkard (2002). See also Zambrana

(forthcoming).22 Hegel (1991, p. 21).23 Pippin (2008, pp. 13, 19, 49, 53).24 Zambrana (2010a).25 Now, the Logic itself is also metatheoretical. That reason is understood as self-authorizing is part of

the legacy of modernity. That is to say, an understanding of determinacy as a result of reasons rather than

appeal to an unquestionable authority is part of the legacy of modernity. In the Logic, however, Hegel is

providing a formal or structural account of this claim. See Pinkard (2002).26 Hegel (1969a, p. 155; 1969b, p. 171).

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their inseparability. This also means that we cannot speak of either the finite or the

infinite without thinking through their inseparability.27

The dialectic of the finite and the infinite in the Seinslogik is the first moment in

the Logic when this metalogical standpoint is achieved.28 This dialectic is, I will

argue, a systematic undermining of an oppositional understanding of finitude and

infinity. Bad infinity is the effect of understanding finitude and infinity in absolutely

oppositional terms. The claims of absolute finitude and infinity collapse, since each

in effect revert into the other. This reversal reveals that each is dependent on the

other. In thematizing their inseparability, true infinity resolves the contradiction that

is generated by an oppositional understanding of these notions. True infinity is thus

the comprehension that neither finitude nor infinity can be held as absolute, pure

notions, since neither is self-subsistent. True infinity, then, is the metalogical

standpoint that makes explicit that the notions of finitude and infinity should be

understood as constitutively impure.

By undermining absolute conceptions of finitude and infinity, Hegel takes issue

with, on the one hand, reductive accounts of finitude which deny the ideality of

reality and, on the other hand, reductive accounts of the infinite which establish it as

beyond being. These accounts generate and sustain not only a two-world

metaphysics but also a distorted view of the status of determinacy—practical as

well as theoretical. Absolute notions of finitude and infinity distort ways in which

we articulate the determinacy of action, self, and society. They distort views of

institutional rationality, forms of self-other relations, and modes of justification.29

Absolute notions of finitude and infinity also distort philosophical articulation and

justification of determinacy itself. They contribute to misunderstanding the status of

ideality, conceptual change, and the relationship between philosophy and what

Hegel calls the ‘‘real sciences.’’ All in all, absolute notions of finitude and infinity

distort our understanding of the relation between reality and ideality. In contrast,

Hegel argues that to think finitude consistently involves thinking infinity, and to

think reality consistently involves a notion of ideality.

Now, Stephen Houlgate has recently given a sophisticated defense of Hegel’s

notion of the true infinite against Derrida’s charge of logocentrism. According to

Houlgate, if one wishes to successfully challenge Hegel’s notion of infinity, one

27 Thus in the first pages of the last chapter of the Logic—‘‘The Absolute Idea’’—Hegel writes that

‘‘[p]hilosophy has the same content and the same end as art and religion, but it is the highest mode of

apprehending the absolute Idea because its mode is the highest mode, the Notion. Hence it embraces those

shapes of real and ideal finitude as well as those of infinitude and holiness, and comprehends them and

itself’’ (1969a, p. 824; 1969c, p. 548). I will say more about the absolute idea below.28 The dialectic is, Hegel says, a ‘‘detailed example’’ of the ‘‘nature of speculative thought,’’ given that it

elaborates the status of ideality as inseparable from reality. See Hegel (1969a, p. 152; 1969b, p. 167). Cf.

Lau (2006, p. 57), who also speaks of the true infinite as ‘‘meta-theoretical,’’ and as a ‘‘comprehension of

finitude from within finitude.’’.29 Throughout his philosophical career, Hegel’s favorite critical target is Kantian formalism and its

metaphysics of Verstand, which he argues underlies notions of individual freedom that distort the

fundamentally intersubjective and hence social nature of freedom. Indeed, time and again Hegel launches

trenchant critiques of what in his early work he called ‘‘positivity,’’ and ties his critique not only to

Kantian Moralitat but also to a Kantian Verstandeslogik. See, e.g., Hegel (1971, 1977, 1991). See also,

e.g., Lukacs (1975), Ormiston (2004), Honneth (1996, 2000, 2010), Nuzzo (2007), and Comay (2010).


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must show that ‘‘being is consigned to endless finitude and repetition or conditioned

by irreducible differences that render its union with itself impossible.’’30 Houlgate

declines pursuing this strategy, however, for methodological reasons. It is ‘‘less

critical’’ than Hegel’s presuppositionless philosophy.31 In focusing on mediating

conditions for determinacy (e.g., time), Derrida ‘‘takes more for granted’’ than

Hegel. Derrida simply assumes rather than shows that being is conditioned by

irreducible difference. Unlike Derrida, Houlgate maintains, Hegel refuses to begin

with presuppositions about being. The self-uniting character of the Idea is not a

founding premise but the logical consequence of the category of being. By opening

the Logic with the thought of pure being, Hegel is able to arrive at the nature of

being.32 Indeed, according to Houlgate, speculative logic spells out what is logically

entailed by thought’s awareness of sheer being.33 What is made explicit in thought

thinking itself is thus not merely a category of thought; it is also a structure of being.

The true infinite is accordingly the ontological structure of self-relating being

logically implied in the preservation of being despite the demise of finite things.

‘‘[T]ruly infinite being,’’ Houlgate writes, ‘‘…is simply the process whereby being

unites with itself through the demise of finite things.’’34

While Houlgate’s reading of the opening of the Logic is unmatched in its clarity

and precision, his commitment to reading the Logic as both a logic and an ontology

leads to an understanding of the true infinite that gives new grounds for reading

Hegel as the most powerful of logocentric philosophers.35 Houlgate’s gloss on

ideality helps specify what he takes self-relating being to be for Hegel. Ideality,

Houlgate maintains, implies the ‘‘self-determination of logos or the Idea at work’’ in

the finite.36 This claim is not restricted to a moderately rationalist view that

determinacy involves the contribution of non-empirical constraints (concepts,

principles) or historically specific practices of determination. The claim is rather

that nature and spirit are rational thanks to the self-determination of logos, which

remains unscathed throughout the demise of finite natural or geistige things.

Houlgate suggests looking ahead within Hegel’s system to shed light on his

understanding of ideality. He clarifies the notion of ideality by turning to Hegel’s

30 Houlgate (2006, p. 440).31 See Houlgate (2006, chap. 3). Cf. Winfield (1989) and Maker (1994).32 The literature on the opening of the Logic is vast. Hegel’s insistence on presuppositionlessness has

been a critical target since Schelling. As will become clear below, I maintain that it is rather the end of the

Logic that allows us to asses the status of Hegel’s idealism.33 Ibid., pp. 115, 135, and also 9: In providing ‘‘an analysis of the basic categories of thought,’’ Houlgate

maintains, Hegel’s Logic ‘‘presents being itself in its immanent logical self-determination.’’.34 Houlgate (2006, p. 438). ‘‘Finitude is what every something itself proves to be,’’ Houlgate also

maintains, ‘‘and infinity is what finite being itself turns out to constitute’’ (ibid., p. 436).35 Houlgate certainly stresses the centrality of negativity in Hegel’s philosophy. Yet he sees negativity as

establishing that being is self-relating. Houlgate insightfully analyzes what he calls Hegel’s critique of

categorial purity. However, he suppresses the thought of categorial impurity, arguing that the constitutive

impurity of logical categories establishes the rationality of being in itself. See Houlgate (2006, pp. 285ff.,

esp. 302–303).36 Houlgate (2006, p. 425).

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notion of Geist. As we will see, for Houlgate, spirit follows the development of the

Idea, which ‘‘cannot be controlled or manipulated by human beings.’’37

While I agree that we find instructive examples of ideality in Hegel’s discussions

of Geist, I will argue that they make clear that Hegel understands ideality as a

question of normative authority that is always precarious and not ontologically self-

determining. Although we would need to advance to the Begriffslogik to see Hegel’s

position in full, I maintain that precisely Hegel’s notorious notion of the absolute

idea establishes that determinacy is ultimately a matter of normative authority.38 As

the unity of the theoretical and the practical, the absolute idea elaborates that

determinacy is ultimately a matter of the authority of reason, rather than appeals to

givens.39 Hegel thus elaborates a consistently critical philosophy in the Logic tied to

his theory of normativity. The Logic indeed ends with Hegel’s discussion of the

absolute idea as absolute method. Absolute method, I will argue in closing, is the

successor concept to true infinity. In giving an account of the account of

determinacy offered in the Logic, absolute method is the metalogical standpoint that

Hegel first articulates under the banner of the true infinite.

The most productive route to clarifying the status of Hegel’s claim that finitude

and infinity are inseparable is articulating the nature of the contradiction that is bad

infinity. I will therefore track the series of reversals that lead to the bad infinite and,

eventually, to its resolution in the true infinite. A finite something, Hegel tells us, is

that which finds its truth in its end, in the fact that it will inevitably cease-to-be

(Vergehen). ‘‘When we say of things that they are finite,’’ Hegel writes, ‘‘we

understand thereby…that…nonbeing constitutes their nature and being.’’40 Thus

understood, finitude is ‘‘negation pushed to its extreme,’’ which reinstates the

‘‘opposition between nothing and ceasing-to-be as opposed to being,’’ an opposition

which gives rise to the dialectic of being and nothing with which the Seinslogikbegins.41 Like the category of nothing, finitude is here ‘‘fixed negation,’’ sheer

37 Ibid.38 The Logic as a whole, I suggest, is an account of determinacy via an immanent critique of realist and

foundationalist accounts of determinacy. Accordingly, Hegel begins the Seinslogik with the opposite of

the absolute idealist position that he defends in the Logic, namely, a metaphysical realism that affirms the

possibility of unadulterated access to being. Hegel’s exposition in the Doctrine of Being establishes that

implicit in realism is transcendental idealism. The failures of a realist model show the irreducibility of the

structures of reflexivity involved in determinacy. In the Doctrine of Essence, Hegel specifies the limits of

the transcendental-idealist position implicit in realism. Transcendental idealism thematizes the irreducibly

mediated character of determinacy, but does not acknowledge that determinations of reflection, a logic of

ground, or the notion of force, for example, do not entail metaphysical dualism. In the Doctrine of the

Concept, Hegel makes explicit what is implicit in the two previous philosophical models. A logic of the

concept makes explicit that determinacy implies the inseparability of reflection and its objects. However,

a logic of the concept does not establish the ontological reality of actuality (Wirklichkeit). It rather makes

explicit the normative structure of actuality. See Pippin (1989) and cf. Houlgate (2005).39 Hegel’s theory of determinacy makes no concessions to empiricist, realist, or transcendental idealist

appeals to the given: whether raw sense data, rational principles, manifold of intuition, and so on.40 Hegel (1969a, p. 129; 1969b, p. 138).41 The Logic begins with the following fragment: ‘‘being, pure being, without any further determination’’

(1969a, p. 82; 1969b, p. 81). The pure indeterminacy of being, he notes, is but pure emptiness; nothing is

intuited in this empty thought. Pure being is ‘‘nothing more nor less than nothing,’’ Hegel continues. In

trying to think pure being, we find ourselves thinking nothing. Nothing, however, has a ‘‘meaning’’—it is,


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negativity.42 The nature of the finite, we are led to believe, derives from it having no

affirmative moment. Accordingly, the non-being of the finite is made ‘‘imperishable

and absolute.’’43

This first reversal sets the tone for the subsequent ones. It mirrors the dialectic of

being and nothing that opens the Logic. We are thus here again encountering the

logical character of becoming.44 What is significant about becoming is the character

of the reversals that take place: what is meant by the category of finitude is not what

is actually said. What is said when finitude is understood as absolute—incorruptible

negativity—is, in effect, the infinite: To say that perishing is the finite’s

‘‘unalterable quality’’ is to say that the nonbeing of the finite is ‘‘eternal.’’45 Hegel

will exploit the inversion of what is said (sagt) and what is meant (gemeint)throughout the dialectic of the finite and the infinite. Indeed, he transitions from bad

infinity to true infinity by noting that one must only be aware of what one is saying

in order to grasp the notion of true infinity already present before us.46 Rather than

pointing to the role of language in Logic, reversals of the said and the meant answer

to the philosophical strategy that Hegel pursues throughout the book.47 Speculative

Footnote 41 continued

or rather is being thought. To think nothing is accordingly to think something that is, although something

that is purely indeterminate, which is to say: pure being. ‘‘Nothing is, therefore,’’ Hegel writes ‘‘the same

determination or rather absence of determination, and thus altogether the same as, pure being’’ (ibid.).

This passing over of one into the other does not collapse one into the other, however. Being and nothing

are distinct, though inseparable (untrennbar). Hegel describes this passing over as ‘‘vanishing’’ (Vers-chwindens) of one into the other (1969a, p. 83; 1969b, p. 82), and argues that ‘‘[t]heir truth is, there-

fore…becoming, a movement in which both are distinguished, but by a difference which has equally

immediately resolved itself’’ (ibid.). Becoming—the inseparability of being and nothing—is a ‘‘deter-minate unity in which there is both being and nothing’’ (1969a, p. 105; 1969b, p. 85). Following Pippin, I

maintain that Hegel is here rehearsing the main tenet of idealism: the incoherence of immediacy (1989,

pp. 189, 183). Rather than the opening of a critical logical-ontology, the dialectic of being and nothing is

the first move of Hegel’s systematic reductio of realism pursued in the Doctrine of Being.42 Hegel (1969a, p. 130; 1969b, p. 139).43 Ibid.44 Houlgate (2006, p. 395).45 Hegel (1969a, p. 130; 1969b, p. 139).46 Hegel (1969a, p. 143; 1969b, p. 56).47 Famously, in the Preface to the Second Edition of the Logic, Hegel writes: ‘‘The forms of thought are

first set out and stored in human language’’ (1969a, p. 31; 1969b, p. 20). Further on he clarifies that in a

science of logic the ‘‘forms of thought have been freed from the material in which they are submerged…’’

(1969a, p. 33; 1969b, p. 21). A science of logic leaves language behind and examines basic categories of

thought, subjective and objective principles (from the principle of non-contradiction to mechanism as a

principle of objectivity), practices of judging and inferring, the structure of normativity, and so on. These

are distinguishable from particular languages on the basis of their universality. They are, indeed, a priori,

since they are non-empirical constraints involved in determinacy. This is one strand of Hegel’s

continuation of Kant’s idealism, though he extends Kant’s paradigm by arguing that a theory of

determinacy concerns Geist rather than questions of knowledge narrowly construed. Accordingly, the

dialectic of the said and the meant is part of Hegel’s philosophical strategy in the Logic. Indeed, it is a

crucial component of Hegel’s insistence on immanent critique. See Bernstein (1991, p. 188) and Lau

(2006, n. 16). Cf. Houlgate’s discussion of language in Houlgate (2006, chap. 4). Cf. also Di Giovanni

(2010).

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logic makes explicit what is implicit in concepts under scrutiny. If absolute claims

revert to their opposite, then the challenge lies in thinking them together.48

For Hegel, the reversal of absolute finitude into absolute infinity—of perishing

into eternity—needs to be further clarified.49 ‘‘[T]he point is,’’ Hegel writes,

‘‘whether in thinking of the finite one holds fast to the being of finitude and lets the

transitoriness continue to be, or whether the transitoriness and the ceasing-to-becease to be.’’50 Hegel takes this to make explicit not that finitude is itself beholden

to its own demise, and hence is itself so conditioned, but rather that sheer negation is

negated. It is crucial to see why he thinks this. In holding on to a notion of sheer

annihilation, pure nothing resurfaces. Yet Hegel has already shown in the opening

of the Logic that pure nothing is an impossible category, since its assertion is but an

assertion of pure being.51

The finite, for Hegel, is fundamentally self-transcending. Within the Seinslogik,

the notion of limit (Grenze) is necessary for any account of determinacy. Something

is specified in distinguishing itself from other finite things. The notion of a

limitation (Schranke) follows from the notion of a limit. Any limitation traces what

is and what is not, which is to say that it determines what it is by relating it to what it

is not. This already announce the notion of das Sollen, since to say that something

both is and is not is to establish what it is with relation to what it should be. What it

is not has been established as essential to it. What is generated, however, is not

determinacy but lack of determinacy insofar as the finite is always reaching for its

essence, which is now deemed to be beyond it.52

The negation of absolute finitude as sheer annihilation is the transition to a

consideration of infinity. In denying any affirmative character to the finite, we

cannot account for finitude, that is, for the continuation of the finite. According to

Houlgate, Hegel here is noting that, in its demise, a finite thing leaves a trace of

itself.53 This trace is a negative that is also a positive. A finite thing’s demise

generates other finite things. When we burn a piece of wood, for example, it is not

nothing that comes of it, but smoke, ashes, etc.54 The wood is no longer, but it

leaves a negative of itself in smoke, which is another, positive finite thing: smoke.

The demise of a finite something gives way to another finite something that comes-

to-be of it, and so on to infinity. This endless continuation implies a preservation of

the finite in its transformation into other finite things. Preservation implies the

infinite.

All of this assumes, however, that Hegel’s exposition makes an ontological claim

about finite things—a claim about the alteration of things55—rather than a claim

48 Cf. Hegel’s discussion of sense-certainty in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Notice that in both texts

Hegel is making explicit that immediacy—especially the immediacy of any beginning—is untenable.49 Hegel (1969a, p. 131; 1969b, p. 141).50 Ibid., p. 130; p. 140.51 Ibid., p. 131; pp. 140–141.52 See Rose (1981, chap. 6).53 Houlgate (2006, pp. 395ff.).54 See Taylor (1977); quoted in Houlgate (2006, p. 394).55 See Houlgate (2006, p. 196).


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about what the concept of finitude entails and is shown to assume.56 Houlgate takes

the explication of the constitutive alterability of the finite to show the ontological

construction of infinite being out of the demise of the finite. Unlike Houlgate, I

argue that Hegel is questioning the cogency of the category of finitude understood as

absolute. Hegel is spelling out what is implicit in the notion of finitude in order to

think finitude consistently. Thus far the claim is that a consistent thinking of finitude

involves more than sheer demise. Understanding finitude as sheer negativity cannot

be maintained.

Although we are confronted with the fact that thinking finitude involves thinking

infinity, this insight first leads us to construe endless finitude as a qualitativelydifferent type of being. Thinking of a finite something involves thinking of a process

of coming-to-be and passing away that exceeds it.57 Unlike the finite, endless

finitude is supposedly invulnerable to ceasing. In being invulnerable to ceasing,

‘‘[b]eing, absolute being, is ascribed to the infinite; confronting it, the finite thus

remains held fast as its negative.’’58 Infinity is construed as affirmative being

because through the negation of negation it has gained identity with itself.59 Infinity

is therefore the ‘‘other of the finite,’’ and hence is ‘‘burdened with the opposition to

the finite.’’60 Both finitude and infinity are understood as absolute at this point: The

finite is finite only insofar as its nature is nonbeing, and the infinite is infinite only

insofar as its nature is being. The finite is the ‘‘sphere of determinateness, of

realities,’’ and infinity is the ‘‘void, beyond the finite.’’61

The result of this opposition is the alternating movement between finitude and

infinity that comprises bad infinity. Hegel characterizes this movement as

‘‘tedious,’’ and states that it is ‘‘a perpetual repetition of one and the same

content.’’62 It is the alternation of one and the same content because, in asserting

that the infinite is the beyond of the finite, they are in effect ‘‘two finites.’’63 Since

neither finitude nor infinity reaches the other, these two absolutes, these two

infinites, are rather two finites. While, as we saw above, the reversal of finitude into

infinity questioned the notion of absolute finitude, the reversal of absolute infinity

into finitude calls into question the notion of absolute infinity.

Bad infinity, then, is a twofold contradiction: Understanding infinity as beyond

the nonbeing of the finite reverses infinity to the negative of the finite, a nothing, a

‘‘void.’’ In holding on to the claim that they are absolutely opposed, the finite and

the infinite reveal that they are bound to each other, that the identity of each is

56 In the Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel writes: ‘‘something becomes an other; this other is itself something

therefore it likewise becomes an other, and so on ad infinitum’’ (1975, p. 138; 1969e, p. 198).57 Strictly speaking, this gives rise to the first version of the bad infinite as progress to infinity, namely,

qua endless series (Hegel 1969a, pp. 142f.; 1969b, pp. 154f.). The second version, endless striving, is a

consequence of this first version of the bad infinite, since the endless series leads to a qualitative different

notion of being.58 Hegel (1969a, p. 130; 1969b, p. 140).59 Ibid., p. 137; p. 150.60 Ibid., p. 139; p. 151.61 Ibid.62 Ibid., p. 142; p. 154.63 Ibid., p. 144; p. 157.

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dependent on the other. Bad infinity makes explicit that neither absolute finitude nor

absolute infinity can be maintained in its purity because the alternation reveals that

‘‘each is in its own self and through its own determination the positing of its

other.’’64 In order to assert its own being, the other must emerge as other to it

(endlessly).65 The reversal of otherness into dependence reveals the entanglement

between the finite and the infinite. What is recognized is their inseparability, which

had been ‘‘concealed in their qualitative otherness.’’66 True infinity is ‘‘implicitly

present and all that is required is to take up what is before us.’’67

The crucial question however, is how the inseparability of finitude and infinity

should be understood. Houlgate argues that ‘‘truly infinite being is nothing apart

from finitude but is simply the process whereby finite things constitute being that

unites with itself.’’68 Although he is correct to note that Hegel is taking issue with

dualist conceptions of infinity, which would hold that the infinite transcends the

realm of the finite and thereby exists separately from the finite, true infinity should

not be understood as the process whereby being unites with itself. It is rather the

comprehension of the inseparability of the concepts of finitude and infinity. Hegel

glosses this comprehension as the becoming infinite of the finite, and as the

becoming ideal of the real.69 The becoming infinite of the finite is a movement

toward a consistent way of thinking finitude and away from thinking infinity as an

ontological notion of being that is beyond the finite.

Now, Hegel speaks of the true infinite as a return to self and hence a restoration of

being.70 Such ‘‘restoration,’’ I argue, should be understood as reality that is

determinate. This mediation is what Hegel speaks of as the ideality of reality. True

infinity is a restoration because the entanglement of the finite and the infinite is a

finding of ‘‘its own self in the other of itself.’’71 Hegel takes this finding of the one in

the other to collapse the dualism of the finite and the infinite. However, this is a return

to self of both the finite and the infinite, so there is still some work to be done to

collapse and not reinstate the duality. ‘‘[B]oth finite and infinite,’’ Hegel writes, ‘‘are

this movement in which each returns to itself through its negation; they are only as

mediation within themselves, and the affirmative of each contains the negative of

each and is the negation of negation.’’72 This return to self, Hegel argues, is a

negation of the negation that each is for the other.73 What does this mean?

64 Ibid., p. 141; p. 153.65 Ibid. ‘‘In each,’’ Hegel also writes, ‘‘lies the determinateness of the other’’ (ibid., p. 143; p. 156).66 Ibid.67 Ibid. ‘‘In saying what the infinite is, namely the negation of the finite,’’ Hegel writes, ‘‘the latter is itself

included in what is said; it cannot be dispensed with for the definition or determination of the infinite. One

only needs to be aware of what one is saying in order to find the determination of the finite in the

infinite.’’.68 Houlgate (2006, p. 428).69 Hegel (1969a, pp. 149ff.; 1969b, pp. 165ff.).70 Ibid., p. 150; p. 165.71 Ibid., p. 146; p. 159.72 Ibid., p. 147; p. 161.73 Ibid., p. 149; p. 163.


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Recall that Hegel characterizes the dualism of the finite and the finite infinite as

the duality between determinateness (or reality) and the void. Accordingly, Hegel

characterized the finite infinite as the negation of the finite. We arrived at a notion of

infinity as that which is beyond the finite by rejecting our initial notion of finitude as

sheer annihilation. This is crucial for understanding Hegel’s obscure suggestion that

we think of infinity as a return-to-self through a negation of this negation. Because

the finite infinite—the infinite qua the beyond of the finite—is but the negation of

finitude as sheer annihilation, the negation of the negation is a rejection of infinity as

beyond the finite. This double negation is a return to the finite, to reality. It is,

however, a restoration because the finite is now understood as ideal. ‘‘[I]deal being

is the finite as it is in the true infinite—as a determination, a content, which is

distinct but is not an independent, self-subsistent being, but only a moment.’’74 That

reality is ultimately ideal answers to Hegel’s insistence that determinacy involves

more than the finite as the merely perishable. Determinacy is a product of non-

empirical constraints that exceed yet makes possible individuation—non-empirical

constraints that, because of their iterability, exceed the finite qua merely perishing

or vanishing.

Hegel accordingly argues that ‘‘[t]rue infinity taken thus generally as determinatebeing which is posited as affirmative in contrast to the abstract negation, is reality in

a higher sense than the former reality which was simply determinate, for here it has

acquired a concrete content.’’75 Understanding Hegel’s provocative claim that true

infinity is ‘‘reality in a higher sense’’ is crucial. It is misleading to claim, as

Houlgate does, that in characterizing the true infinite as reality in a higher sense

Hegel is suggesting that there is a ‘‘nisus toward self-consciousness within the

logical structure of being.’’76 Being itself, in other words, would prove to be

rational. I argue in contrast that the true infinite is reality in a ‘‘higher sense’’ insofar

as it is the consistent thinking of finitude. The qualitative shift from bad infinity to

true infinity, in other words, is a transition from a dualistic understanding of finitude

and infinity to a consistent understanding of finitude.

This qualitative shift allows us to avoid reinstating the ontological duality that we

have seen Hegel criticizes through the notion of the bad infinite, since it is a

‘‘change in standpoint’’ for understanding the relation between the finite and the

infinite, or the real and the ideal.77 True infinity in effect allows the comprehension

and thus resolution of the inconsistencies of absolute notions of finitude and infinity.

True infinity clarifies what it means to think finitude consistently, since it articulates

the constitutive perishing or vanishing of the finite together with its iterability and

alterability. To say that true infinity is a consistent thinking of finitude thus means

that the notion of finitude also involves the notion of infinity, that the notion of

reality implies a notion of the ideality of reality. In thematizing the ideality of

reality, true infinity is a metalogical standpoint that raises the status of thinking from

finite to infinite.

74 Ibid., pp. 149–150; pp. 163–164.75 Hegel (1969a, p. 149; 1969b, p. 163).76 Houlgate (2006, p. 426).77 Hegel (1969a, p. 154; 1969b, p. 170).

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Ideality, then, is the finite qua moment of a process that exceeds it. Note that to

contrast the ideal and the real by aligning the former with the infinite and the latter

with the finite would lead us back to the one-sidedness that the notion of the true

infinite is supposed to resolve.78 For this reason, I argue that Hegel is here calling

into question the strict opposition between reality and ideality. The crucial point is

that implicit in such an opposition are incoherent notions of finitude and infinity. By

undermining absolute conceptions of finitude and infinity, Hegel takes issue with

reductive accounts of finitude that, in thinking finitude on the basis of annihilation,

deny the ideality of reality. Hegel furthermore takes issue with reductive accounts of

the infinite that establish it as the absolute other of the finite and hence as beyond

being. For Hegel, such notions of finitude and infinity distort our understanding of

the relation between reality and ideality.

At his point, it is helpful to turn to Hegel’s philosophy of action for an illustration

of such distortions.79 Indeed, Hegel’s philosophy of action provides instructive

examples of what he takes to be reductive notions of finitude and infinity. As we

will see in a moment, Houlgate too follows this strategy. Analyzing Hegel’s account

of action will thus also help to clarify the differences between Houlgate’s reading

and the one I have proposed. To begin with, Hegel takes issue with reductive

notions of individuality that do not take into account the infinity of agency. Hegel’s

famous critique of physiognomy and phrenology in the Phenomenology of Spirit is

most relevant, since it shows the distortion that occurs when the finite is severed

from the infinite. Indeed, specifying the character and the behavior of a person by

referring to physiological aspects alone in effect reduces the character of an agent to

her immediate corporeality. Physiognomy and phrenology seek to establish a law-

like relation between an individual’s inner states and her organic nature. The

mental, they suggest, is in a strict causal relation with the physical. Physiognomy

seeks to establish a causal relation between an agent’s facial expressions and her

character. Phrenology seeks to establish a causal relation between the brain and

spinal cord or the skull and the individual’s dispositions. The ‘‘actuality and

existence’’ of an agent is thereby, Hegel argues, reduced to a ‘‘thing.’’80

Against such a reductive view, Hegel argues that human action is inexhaustible.81

Human action cannot be explained merely on the basis of a science of capacities,

inclinations, and propensities.82 Indeed, it cannot be explained only on the basis of

the body.83 These sciences cannot capture the complexity of an individual life

extended throughout time and subject to change and alteration in light of variable

78 Ibid.79 See Pippin (2008), Bernstein (1996, 1997), Speight (2001), Quante (2004), and Laitinen and Sandis

(2010).80 Hegel (1977, p. 200; 1969d, p. 249).81 Notice the significance of the dialectic of the said and the meant in these sections. Again, it is central

to Hegel’s strategy of making explicit what is implicit in a given concept or position on the basis of the

commitments that they express.82 Hegel (1977, pp. 199–200; 1969d, pp. 248–249).83 Hegel (1977 pp. 185ff.; 1969d, pp. 322ff.). See Quante (2008) and MacIntyre (1976).


123

social conditions.84 In contrast, Hegel argues that individuality is the result of

action. ‘‘The true being of a person,’’ Hegel writes, ‘‘is rather his deed. Individuality

is actual in the deed.’’85 The crucial point, however, is that the determinacy of a

deed depends on its reception within social space, in addition to depending on the

agent’s description of her actions. It is only through intersubjective uptake and

public accountability of an initial intention unfolded publically over time that an

action (what was really done) and an agent’s character can be determined.

Accordingly, the character of a person can only be described and furthermore

assessed in light of actual deeds. The temporal extension of a deed and the

intersubjective nature of what was done establish that agency is infinite.

Agency is infinite, furthermore, given the normative expectations involved in

establishing actions as intelligible, which is to say, determinate. Institutions and

modes of individual and collective self-understanding, Hegel argues, are crucial for

establishing what was done and for establishing what was done as right or wrong,

normal or deviant, in compliance or subversive. Yet the normative expectations

structuring institutions are themselves never fully determined. They are revisable in

light of internal contradictions that lead to the collapse of their normative authority.

They are also reversible, given that they can generate opposite meanings and

effects. In Hegel’s famous account of Sophocles’ Antigone in the chapter on Geistwe see that Antigone and Creon act on the basis of normative expectations within

Greek Sittlichkeit.86 Creon forbids Polynices’ burial, thus transgressing divine law,

the law of the family. Following the divine law, Antigone buries her brother, yet

such an act is considered a transgression of the law of the polis. It is only on the

basis of the reversals that both Antigone and Creon suffer that their character or, in

the case of Antigone, individuality is determined.87 Indeed, both act in accordance

to expectations that structure their social roles, yet both find the meaning and effects

of their actions reversed. The inexhaustibility of action as well as of the normative

expectations that structure the social context in which an individual acts establish

the infinity of finite agency.

Similarly, we find examples of what Hegel takes to be reductive notions of

infinity in his critique of that which is beyond rational articulation or intersubjective

authorization. Revelation and moral intuition are ways of thinking of the infinite

reductively, since they are cut off from the possibility of giving reasons as the

source of their normative authority. Hegel’s most nuanced account is perhaps his

critique of the beautiful soul in the Phenomenology. The moral genius, one version

of the figure of the beautiful soul, is most relevant to our discussion, since it is a

figure of radical subjectivism.88 An ethics of conscience, Hegel argues, maintains

84 See Hegel’s famous reference to Shakespeare’s Hamlet: ‘‘A variety of ideas may well occur to us in

connection with a skull, like those of Hamlet over Yorick’s skull…’’ (1977, p. 201; 1969d, p. 250). The

infinity of a life is called forth when Hamlet sees Yorick’s skull.85 Hegel (1977, pp. 193–195; 1969d, pp. 241–242). Translation follows Pinkard (forthcoming).86 See Pippin (2008, esp. pp. 265ff.).87 Bernstein (2010).88 For assessments of debates concerning Hegel’s critical targets in these sections (the Romantics, Sturmund Drang, Rousseau, Fichte, Goethe) see Harris (1997, esp. vol. 2, pp. 460 ff.) and Beiser (2009). See

also Pinkard (1996).

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that duty is ‘‘the law that exists for the sake of the self, not the self that exists for the

sake of the law.’’89 The moral genius emphasizes his capacity for binding himself to

any maxim of his choosing.90 In fact, the moral genius takes his capacity for binding

as divine.91 He contemplates the divinity of his actions as his own divinity. Now, the

moral genius insists on absolute purity as a form of authenticity. Thus, he retreats

from everyday life. The worship of the moral genius, however, requires life within a

community of moral geniuses, where absolute sincerity is supposedly possible.92

The moral genius is for this reason a form of religious fanaticism.93 Yet the

community of moral geniuses is the inverse of the unhappy consciousness. Rather

than placing all authority in another world beyond this one, moral geniuses place all

authority in their own selves. In so doing, they take themselves to be beyond rational

articulation and intersubjective authorization.

Like any agent, however, the moral genius must act—‘‘something must be

determined by the individual.’’94 Yet action compromises moral purity and,

moreover, the absolute authority of the self. In the dialectic of acting consciousness

and judging consciousness that continues Hegel’s critique of the beautiful soul,

Hegel makes explicit the failures of radical subjectivism. Judging consciousness (a

version of the beautiful soul) regards acting consciousness as evil because, in acting,

she has asserted her particularity but demanded universal recognition. In denying

recognition to acting consciousness, the beautiful soul reveals himself to be

hypocritical, since he regards this denial as evidence of his own conscientiousness.95

The contradiction between his insistence on purity and the irreducibility of action,

however, leads the beautiful soul to madness.96 Indeed, the beautiful soul

understands that, in action, purity and authority are compromised. In addition to

hypocritical, the beautiful soul has revealed himself to be the ultimate expression of

the ‘‘narcissism of the moral standpoint.’’97 His insistence on authenticity, on

absolute purity, has been shown to be a form of self-involvement. Rather than

responsiveness to others, moral authenticity has led to moral indifference. The

crucial point is that agents reveal themselves in action, and hence retrospectively,

rather than in intention, and hence ex ante.98 They are not the sole interpreters of

their deed; they cannot give final meaning to their actions. The infinity of radical

subjectivism is thus shown to be finite, irreducibly dependent on intersubjective

determination.

Houlgate also finds examples of ideality by turning to Hegel’s notion of Geist.Recall that Houlgate glosses true infinity as the truth of the finite insofar as ‘‘all

89 Hegel (1977, p. 387; 1969d, p. 468). Translation follows Pinkard (forthcoming).90 Hegel (1977, p. 397; 1969d, p. 480).91 See Beiser (2009, p. 221).92 Ibid.93 See, e.g., Verene (2007, p. 89).94 Hegel (1977, p. 390; 1969d, pp. 471–472).95 Ibid., p. 405; p. 489.96 Ibid., p. 407; p. 490.97 Beiser (2009, p. 222).98 See Pippin (2008).


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finite things are moments of the process of uniting-with-itself that beings proves to

be.’’99 He adds that true infinity can be illustrated by Hegel’s account of marriage or

the state, which are ‘‘self-relating wholes’’ or ‘‘processes’’ in which an individual,

by coming to form intimate bonds with others, acquires a new quality.100

Presumably this means that one is not only an individual but also a citizen and a

wife, since these institutions articulate social expectations and entitlements. They

thereby provide the basis for accounts of individuals that exceed an order of

explanation qua natural being. This would mean that an account of one’s actions

would refer to one’s standing as a citizen or wife, rather than to one’s standing as a

natural creature. Houlgate, however, explains his reading of infinity by appealing to

the Idea as the self-determining logos that although immanent in the finite is not

compromised by finitude. In fact, Houlgate writes that the logos ‘‘cannot be

controlled or manipulated by human beings.’’101 To be sure, Houlgate does not

argue that Hegel maintains that the finite and the infinite exist separately, since this

would reinstate the dualism that Hegel has collapsed. Houlgate rather argues that the

infinity of reason exists unscathed within the realm of the finite. The infinity of

reason is accordingly not subject to intersubjective authorization and de-authori-

zation within a shape of Geist.102

Hegel’s philosophy of action, I argue in contrast, illustrates that determinacy is

the result of a normative authority that is fundamentally precarious. The

inexhaustibility of action as well as of the normative expectations that structure

the social context in which an action is done establish the infinity of finite agency.

The irreducible dependence on externality and on intersubjective recognition that

may challenge one’s sense of self establish the finitude of infinite agency. The

point is that the determinacy—which is to say, the rationality—of agency and of

collective life is precisely a matter of manipulation of human beings in a context

that exceeds them. Rather than the self-determination of logos at work in the

finite, the inseparability of the finite and the infinite establishes the precariousness

of the ideal itself. This is not to say that ideality is precarious because it is

corrupted or compromised by reality—by action, for example. Hegel’s point is

that ideality itself is finite—precarious—since it does not secure the full

determination of the finite.

We are now in a position to return to Derrida’s gloss on Hegel’s notion of the

absolute idea and answer the charge of logocentrism. Recall that, like Houlgate,

Derrida speaks of the Idea as infinite self-relation. The Idea for Hegel, Derrida

accordingly maintains, is the eternal self-presence of reason that remains unscathed

throughout the demise of the finite. To answer the charge of logocentrism, then, one

must assess the status of the closing of the Logic and its seminal discussion of the

absolute idea and idea as absolute method. It is true that both the absolute idea and

99 Houlgate (2006, p. 431).100 Ibid.101 Ibid., p. 425.102 Furthermore, becoming aware of the infinity of reason is crucial, Houlgate argues, since we should

seek to become ‘‘willing agents of infinite self-determining reason’’ (ibid., p. 426).

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the absolute idea as method are self-relating, and thus a mode of self-coincidence.

The crucial question, however, is how to understand self-relation and self-

coincidence.

I argue that both notions are self-relating in implying that reason is self-authorizing. The authority of reason does not amount to self-presence, but rather to

concrete practices of determination that establish determinacy on the basis of

reasons rather than givens. Indeed, Hegel’s argument is that precisely because

reason is self-authorizing determinacy is a matter of concrete practices of

determination—a matter of Geist. While the idea designates the structure of

authorization involved in determinacy, absolute method gives an account of the

account of determinacy offered in the Logic via the notion of the idea. The absolute

idea as method is thus the successor concept of the true infinite. It is the metalogical

standpoint that gives an account of the idea. Method is, in other words, the

philosophical standpoint implied in any account-giving.

Hegel opens the last chapter of the Logic by stating that the absolute idea is the

unity of the theoretical and practical. Yet the absolute idea does not eliminate all

opposition encountered in specifically Kantian notions of theoretical and practical

cognition.103 It is not the elimination of the gap between knowledge and its object or

the will and its good. Rather, the absolute idea contains the ‘‘highest degree of

opposition.’’104 It manages the gap between cognition and the given found in both

theory and practice by appealing to reason itself, rather than to the authority of any

given. Accordingly, Hegel argues that the absolute idea is ‘‘free subjective notion

that is for itself and therefore possesses personality.’’105 The ‘truth’ of any given

matter at hand is established through reasons. The truth of determinacy is thus not

only the concept, but also the authorization of the concept—what Hegel calls

idea.106 Instead of the full determination of reason, however, it is precisely because

determinacy is ultimately a matter of reason that accounts of nature or Geistradically change over time.107 They gain and lose authority over time within specific

shapes of Geist.The absolute idea thus elaborates the role of normative authority in determinacy.

It provides a philosophical justification of the claim that concepts and principles that

render nature and spirit intelligible are based on normative rather than ontological

distinctions. It clarifies, in other words, that ontological commitments that fix the

103 See Hegel (1969a, p. 824; 1969c, p. 547). See Zambrana (2010a, pp. 109–112) for a systematic

reading of Hegel’s important engagement with Kant in the chapter on Cognition crucial to the reading of

the absolute idea proposed here.104 Hegel (169a, p. 824; 1969c, p. 548).105 Ibid.106 See Hegel (1969a, p. 587; 1969c, p. 257) and Pippin (2008, pp. 34, 98ff.).107 It is crucial to understand that determinacy is ultimately a matter of normative authority. This is not to

say that it is only a matter of normative authority, for Hegel’s idealism would indeed be spinning in a

frictionless void, to borrow John McDowell’s famous phrase. As I have suggested, authority refers to

concrete practices of authorization that respond and at the same time give determinacy to material and

social reality. Reality and ideality are inseparable for Hegel, as we have seen. See, for example, Petry’s

Introduction and explanatory notes to his translation of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature (1970), where he

shows Hegel’s consistent engagement with the scientific developments of his time.


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determinacy of nature and spirit are precisely commitments based on normative

distinctions. These commitments can be said to be ontological only in the sense that

they are authoritative—namely, have currency—within discursive and institutional

practices of nature and Geist: within scientific inquiry or within artistic practices,

religious tradition, political institutions, and so on. A metatheoretical or philosoph-

ical assessment of specific determinations is therefore a matter of realphilosophie—

of a philosophy of nature and a philosophy of Geist. At the hyperbolically formal

level of logic, the point is that determinate being is not only reality that is always

already concept, but also idea: concept that is authoritative, yet whose authority is

an institution that requires reasons to be upheld. Concrete forms of determination

can therefore always lose their grip, they are institutions to be maintained but can

also be debunked.

To arrive at the standpoint of the absolute idea, then, is to have given a

philosophical account of the role of normative authority in determinacy. The

Logic is therefore an account of account-giving. It is a philosophical articulation

and justification of the claim that determinacy is ultimately a matter of normative

authority. Accordingly, absolute method is a mode of ‘‘self-knowing,’’ Hegel

argues. It thematizes the account of determinacy given in the Logic.108 As such, it

is the metalogical standpoint that gives an account of the account of determinacy

provided in the Logic. It is an account, in other words, of the theory of account-

giving offered in the Logic. Reason is therefore self-authorizing in a second sense.

It is presupposed in an account of itself. The Logic is hence not only a

philosophical account of the role of normative authority in determinacy. It also

makes explicit the self-authorizing character of reason. Rather than full presence,

the ‘‘self-proximity of infinite subjectivity’’ (of the Idea) has to do with the self-

authorizing character of reason.109 In being self-authorizing, reason is infinite.110

Instead of escaping the fate of the finite, however, the true infinity of reason

makes explicit that determinacy is precarious. The infinity of reason establishes

that determinacy is a matter of Geist—the result of concrete practices that sustain

or debunk specific forms of determination. The authority of any idea is thus

structurally precarious—finite.

Acknowledgments I am grateful to J. M. Bernstein, Richard J. Bernstein, and Angelica Nuzzo for

insightful comments on early drafts of this work. I presented versions of this essay at the 2009 meeting of

the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy and at the 2011 meeting of The Society for

German Idealism held at the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association. I would like to

thank Karen Ng and Matthew Congdon, my co-panelists at SPEP, for stimulating conversations about

Hegel’s Logic, and Martin Donougho, who delivered an excellent response to my paper at SGI, for his

thought-provoking comments. I am also grateful to comments by an anonymous referee, which helped me

clarify my arguments at crucial junctures. Finally, I would like to thank Martin Hagglund, for the many

insightful discussions about Hegel and Derrida that we have shared, and for his helpful comments on this

essay.

108 Method is the ‘‘self-knowing Notion’’ (1969a, p. 826; 1969b, p. 550). See Zambrana (2010a,

pp. 112–118) for a systematic reading of the absolute idea as method. Cf. Nuzzo (1999, 2005).109 Derrida (1997, p. 24).110 Cf. Pippin (2008, p. 64).

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