CRO CENTRO DI ATENEO

PER LA DOTTRINA SOCIALE DELLA CHIESA

The Veritas Series

Belief and Metaphysics Edited by Conor Cunningham and Peter M. Candler, Jr

Christ, History and Apocalyptic: The Politics of Christian Mission Nathan Kerr

The Grandeur of Reason Edited by Conor Cunningham and Peter M. Candler, Jr

Languishing Perfection: The Emergence and Distortion of the Christian Telos Anthony D. Baker

Phenomenology and the Holy: Religious Experience after Husserl Espen Dahl

The Pope and Jesus of Nazareth: Christ, Scripture and the Church Edited by Adrian Pabst and Angus Paddison

Proposing Theology John Milbank

Protestant Metaphysics after Karl Barth and Martin Heidegger Timothy Stanley

The Recalcitrant Imago Dei: Human Persons and the Failures of Naturalism J. P. Moreland

Tayloring Reformed Epistemology: Charles Taylor, Alvin Plantinga and the de jure Challenge to Christian Belief Deane-Peter Baker

Theology, Economy and Ecology: A New Paradigm Edited by James Noyes and Adrian Pabst

Theology, Psychoanalysis, Trauma Marcus Pound

Transcendence and Phenomenology Edited by Conor Cunningham and Peter M. Candler, Jr

The Truth is the Way: Kierkegaard's Theologia Viatorum Christopher Ben Simpson

VERITAS

The Grandeur of Reason

Religion, Tradition and Universalism

Edited by Peter M. Candler, Jr

and Conor Cunningham

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in association with The Centre of Theology and Philosophy

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'The Transfiguration' by Edwin Muir, 1965, is from Collected Poems, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 198. Permission sought.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication data

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978 0 334 04346

Typeset by Regent Typesetting, London Printed and bound by Lightning Source UK

1006552902

Centre of Theology and Philosophy xi

Centro di Ateneo per la dottrina sociale della Chiesa xiv

Veritas Series Introduction xvii Foreword by Angelo Cardinal Scola: The Fullness of Reason: Religion, Tradition and Universality xix Contributors xxviii Acknowledgements xxxiii Introduction

I A Worldly Church: Politics, Theology, and the Common Good 9

Stanley Hauerwas

2 Deliberation, Reflection and Responsibility 29 Oliver O'Donovan

3 The Authority of Tradition as True Universalism: Lord Acton's Political Philosophy 47

Alessandra Gerolin

4 The Mystery of Reason 68 John Milbank

5 Human Dignity and Human justice in Theological Perspective 118 Joan Lockwood O'Donovan

6 Sovereign Reason Unbound: The Proto-Modern Legacy of Avicenna and Gilbert Porreta 1 3 5

Adrian Pabst

7 The Rise and Fall of the Kantian Paradigm of Modern Theology Johannes Hoff

8 The Corrupt Mind and the Renewed Mind: Some Qualifications on the Grandeur of Reason from Pauline, Kantian and Schopenhauerian Perspectives Richard H. Bell

9 The Subjectivity of Truth and the Grandeur of Reason Christopher Ben Simpson

10 Hegel and the Grandeur of Reason Graham Ward

II Hans Urs von Balthasar and the Unwelcoming of Heidegger Cyril O'Regan

I Z Reason and Anti-Reason in Whitehead, Henry and Deleuze

James Williams

13 A Science of (en) Christ? Francois Laruelle

14 Beyond Faith and Reason Stratford Caldecott

I5 The Wax Nose of Reason: Responses to Ratzinger's Faith Tracey Rowland

16 The Transfiguration, Orthodox Ascetics and Politics Phil Gorski

17 2war Instinkt aber nicht Raisonnement': From Hume to Wittgenstein and Back? 372. Fergus Kerr, OP

18 Towards Imagining God: Augustine, Reason and 167 Ontology 398

Jeff Olsen Biebighauser

19 Knowledge by Illumination: The Grandeur of Reason According to Augustine 417

197 Lydia Schumacher

zo 'The Sleep of Reason': Reason, Gothic and the Grotesque 43 2.

zi8 Alison Milbank

2.1 The Immanence of the World Beyond 444 2.3z Quentin Meillassoux

22 The Logic of Christian Humanism 479 Peter M. Candler, Jr

z64 Name and Subject Index 501

Z99

316

332.

345

362.

8

The Corrupt Mind and the Renewed Mind: Some Qualifications on the Grandeur of Reason from Pauline,

Kantian and Schopenhauerian Perspectives

RICHARD H. BELL

Introduction

In this chapter I put forward some aspects of what cduld be called a 'Theology of Mind'. I will consider some of St Paul's striking comments about the mind in the Epistle to the Romans. I will then develop his idea of mind by using a philosophical framework based on Kant and Schopenhauer. One of the outcomes of the chapter will be to consider what the Grandeur of Reason may mean from the perspectives of Paul, Kant and Schopenhauer.

But first, what do the ancient Greeks and [ Hebrews say about the Grandeur of Reason? As is well known, the ancient Greeks had an exalted view of reason and the mind. Plato understood vors ('mind') to be the highest part of the soul. The mind is the ruling principle of pure thought and he describes it as the pilot of the soul.' Moreover, the Greeks postulated' a fundamental relationship

I See Plato, Phaedrus z47c: 'For the colourless, formless, and intangible truly existing essence, with which all true knowledge is concerned, holds this region [above the heaven] and is visible only to the mind, the pilot of the soul (tPuxils Kuikpvirri)' (Harold North Fowler, Plato: Euthyphro; Apology; Crito; Phaedo; Phaedrus, LCL 36, Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press, 1995 [1914], PP- 475-7. He goes on to speak of the 'divine intelligence' (0Eoii StdvoLa) which is nurtured on mind

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between mind and God.2 For Aristotle, the vas is immortal and divine; it is the most important part of the human person and is the embodiment of the divine.' The link between vows and the divine is also characteristic of Stoicism. See Epictetus 2.8.2: 'What then is the true nature of God (T1.3 oi) oi,aLa koi);)? ... It is intelligence (vows knowledge (Errio-Tfip.r1), right reason (XOyos. opens ).'4

Together with vas there are a whole series of words derived from the same root, one of the most important for our purposes being athvoict, the act or faculty of thinking. Aristotle, for exam-ple, distinguishes between three types- of Sidvoict: practical, poetic and theoretical science (Trdo-a Sicivota i TrpaKT1Ki eEcopriTudi).' The cognate verb vow originally meant receiving both sensual and mental impressions' but later, owing to philosophical use, was understood only in the mental sense.'

In moving from pagan writers to the Septuagint we discover that words with the root vows are used sparingly. So vas (`mind') and its cognate vow CI perceive', 'I understand') are used just 35 times; 8Lcivoia (`understanding') is used more frequently, 75 times. The sparing use of these words can be partly explained by the fact that Hebrew has no substantive corresponding to vas.' In the Hebrew Bible the seat of the intellect is the 'heart' (n,'7, :;1..'?); this is related to the 'will' and right conduct.' It is nearly always translated with

(vas) and pure knowledge Wrricriiii-ri dr6pa-roc) and the 'intelligence of every soul which is capable of receiving that which befits it'.

2 See Gunther Harder and J. Goetzmann, 'Reason, Mind, Understanding', NIDNTT 3: 122.-3.

3 Nicomachean Ethics 1177a 14-19; 1177b 28-32. 4 W. A. Oldfather (ed.), Epictetus I, LCL 13i, Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard

University Press, 1989 [19251, pp. 258-9. 5 Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.1.5 (A 993 b zi). See the discussion in Richard H. Bell,

Deliver Us from Evil: Interpreting the Redemption from the Power of Satan in New Testament Theology, WUNT 216, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007, pp. 246-7.

6 See, e.g., Homer, Iliad 15.422-23: 'But Hector, when his eyes beheld his cousin ("EKTcop 6' the 1.,61-1cr€1, dvaket, ix fallen in the dust in front of the black ship ...' (A. T. Murray (ed.), Homer: The Iliad II, LCL 171, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press/London: Heinemann, 1985 [1925], pp. 136-9).

7 Cf. Ernst Wiirthwein, `vo6u) KTX', TDNT 4: 948-49. See, e.g., Plato, Republic 6.5o7b.

8 The closest is 'understanding'. 9 One could say that in the Old Testament there is no clear distinction between

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Kap&a but in 6 instances it is rendered vois I° and on 38 occa-sions by SicivoLa. The intellectual faculty in the Old Testament is most clearly seen in the use of the verb vow which renders 7 (`to understand').

The Old Testament emphasizes that understanding is a gift of God and is not an independent achievement of human beings. This is related to the striking distinction the biblical witnesses make between God and humans. We have seen that pagan Greek thought sees rea-son as the link between God and humans. The biblical witnesses say something rather different. It is the case that reason is rooted in God and indeed in Christ." But already the Old Testament wit-nesses make it clear that there is a fundamental distinction between God (who is 'spirit') and humanity (which is `flesh').12

There is, in addition to what one can call this ontological dis-tinction between God and human beings, the distinctions etween a holy God and a sinful humanity. This is found throughout the bible but is particularly strong in the writings of Paul, and it to his writ- ings that I now turn. r'

`theoretical' and 'practical reason'. Contrast Aristotle. who distinguished between a `practical mind' (vas TrpwcriK63) and a 'speculative mind' 9EeopriTiK63) (De anima 432b-433a). Likewise in Nicomachean Ethics 1139a 27-29 he distinguishes between practical and theoretical thinking (6idivoia TrpaKTiKii, 6icivoia OciopriTiKij). The practical mind of Aristotle, concerned with applying the mind to technical science, came to issue eventually in the 'practical reason' of Kant.

RD On one occasion in LXX, vas renders the Hebrew word 'spirit' (rr). This we shall see is highly significant for Paul's understanding of the Christian mind.

I I So Pope Benedict in his Regensburg address, 'Faith, Reason and the University: Memories and Reflections', points to the significance of XOyoc (`word', 'reason') in John

12 Cf. Friedrich Lang, Die Briefe an die Korinther, NTD 7, Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986, p. 46, who points to Gen. 2.7 and Isa. 3 1.3 . Indeed Lang argues that this is one of the clues to Paul's argument in I Cor. 2.14. Here Paul speaks of the `unspiritual' person (43uxiK63) who does not receive the spirit of God. Such a person is contrasted to the 'spiritual' person (TrvallaTiKos). This contrast is very unusual for Greek anthropology where 'soul' (t-liuX-6) and 'spirit' (Tri)Eriiiia; see also yobs) were closely linked and which stand in contrast to the material body (aCilla). Paul's view probably comes from Gen. 2.7 LXX: 'and God breathed upon his face the breath of life; and the man became a living soul' (Kai 6)036cyrIa€1) Els TO TTIDOCYCO1T011 aOToO TIVOTIV CW1713, Kai ETEVETO O di3Opoi-rros- Els l uX>1u (Cicyai, ).

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Paul on Reason and the Fall

I begin by examining Paul's arresting statements on the 'mind' in Romans I. In v. 2a he says human beings 'became empty in their thoughts' (4.orrauilencrav Ev T01,3 SiaXoyia[lois airr63v) and that `their senseless hearts became darkened' (o-Ko-riaerl etai)vE-ros airrCov Kap6Ca). Then in v. 28 he makes the devastating statement that God gave up humankind to a 'corrupt mind'. Romans 1, like much of the letter, is not straightforward, and I must put Paul's comments in context. In v. 18 Paul speaks of the eschatological judgement" which is coming upon humankind who 'suppress the truth in unrighteousness'. This truth is the 'revealed reality of God' and the suppression of this is seen by Paul as a deliberate as opposed to an unconscious act. Paul continues in I.I9-2oa: 'For God in his knowability (-re yvtocr-rOv TOi 0€a) is manifest to them, because God has revealed himself to them. For since the creation of the world God in his invisibility (Ta dopaTa ain-a), namely, his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived (vool5p.Eva Ka0opdTai) in the things that have been made.'" The crucial point to emphasize here is that God takes the initiative in making himself known. And it is here that the root 'mind' (vows) appears in the participle vooi*Eva which modifies the verb Ka0opd-rai (ca0-opetco = to discern clearly). The sense is `to see with the understanding', an oxymoron which receives some resolution through the instrumental dative TOI3 Trou'jimmy (`through the things that have been made'). Paul can then conclude that since this knowledge of God is manifest in the world, humankind are without excuse.

Before proceeding it is worth emphasizing that this knowledge of God which is available to human beings is personal knowledge; it is not merely a knowledge of God's attributes." Further, this knowledge does not come about by means of a process of logical deduction. Rather than seeing God 'out of the things that have been

13 Richard H. Bell, No one seeks for God: An Exegetical and Theological Study of Romans 1.18-3.2o, WUNT 106, Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998, pp. 12-18.

14 My translation (see Bell, No one seeks for God, p. 37). 15 In fact, simply by 'knowing' God's attributes yield no true knowledge of God.

God cannot be simply 'identified' or 'defined' by listing his attributes. One of the problems with much inter-religious dialogue is that gods of different religions are identified by comparing the attributes. See Bell, No one seeks for God, pp. 90-118.

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made' (EK Ta) Tromid-ruiv) he is seen 'in the things that have been made' TOL Trove(Iacav).16 In comparison to much Hellenistic thought Paul says little in Romans 1.19-2.0 about the, mechanism of coming to a knowledge of God.I7

Many theologians in developing a 'natural theology' from this passage make the mistake of stopping here. But the next stage in the argument, the fall of humankind, is crucial. In I.zi Paul argues that although human beings had a knowledge of God, this knowledge was not retained for they failed to acknowledge him: they failed to glorify God and failed to give thanks to him (6L6-ri yvov-T-€3 Toy BEev oUX 63 0€61, e',56Gtcyci TIkapf.aTriaav). Rather `they became empty in their thoughts' (aXX' 4.ct-raLAflaav TOL 8ffiXorytallois airCtiv) 'and their senseless hearts qiecame darkened' (Kai alco-riaeiri iicriNETos otirrthv Kap81.a). By speaking of the `thoughts' (SictXoyiap_o0 and the 'heart' (Kap6(a), Paul is emphasiz-ing the 'intellectual' dimension of the fall." So because there was no acknowledgement of God or giving thanks to God, knowledge of God was essentially lost.

One of the consequences of this fall is that God gives up human-kind to all forms of idolatry, immorality and, above all, a corrupt mind (cis dSOKLIiov vobv; Rom. i.z8). We have here this crucial word yobs and there has been considerable disagreement among New Testament scholars as to the meaning of this term in the various occurrences in Paul's epistles.' The tendency has been to argue that Paul is speaking of a way of thinking rather than an organ of thought. In particular, Gutbrod understands vac as that

16 Ulrich Wilckens, Der Brief an die Romer (Rom EKK 6.1, Zurich/ Einsiedeln/Koln: Benziger/Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1978, p. io6.

17 Bell, No one seeks for God, pp. 79-80. Compare Philo De praemis et poems 43, who speaks of 'truly admirable persons' who have 'advanced from down to up by a sort of heavenly ladder and by reason and reflection happily inferred the Creator from His works (dare TOt' prycol, )' (F. H. Colson (ed.), Philo VIII, LCL 341, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989 [1939], pp. 336-7).

18 The precise nature of this 'intellectual' element is not clear. Johannes Behm, `KapSia D: Kap6(a in the New Testament', TDNT 3: 612, classifies 'heart' in Rom. 1.2.1 as both 'the seat of understanding, the source of thought and reflection' and `the one centre in man to which God turns, in which the religious life is rooted, which determines moral conduct'. The meaning in i.z4 is ascribed solely to the latter (which could be described as 'practical reason').

19 The term is only used in Luke 2.4.45; Rev. 13.18; 17.9 outside the Pauline corpus.

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Richard H. Bell

which sets the will in motion and guides it; like his teacher, Adolf Schlatter, he understands it as practical rather than theoretical reason.2° However, vas here and elsewhere (Rom. 12.2; I Cor.

6) encompasses both what came to be called 'theoretical' and `practical' reason; further, Paul in referring to vas is not just con-cerned with a way of thinking but rather with an ontological view of mind. It is mistaken, as many do, to reduce vas simply to a `constellation of thoughts and assumptions'.21

Returning to Romans i, we see that although knowledge of God is essentially lost, there remains some residual knowledge of God's principle of retribution: Romans 1.32 says that human beings know of God's decree, that those who practise immorality deserve to be condemned.22 The significance of this 'residue' is that it points to one of the roles fallen reason can play, namely some limited form of 'practical reason'. But as far as knowledge of God is concerned, human beings fail miserably and create idols. They create images of God which are essentially human constructions.23

Participation in Adam

Although Adam is not mentioned explicitly in Romans i, the narra-tive of Genesis 3 as fundamental to Paul's argument;24 further the

zo W. Gutbrod, Die paulinische Anthropologie, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1934, P. 49: Das Denken ist also nicht in erster Linie eine theoretische Fahigkeit, sondern durchaus eine "praktische". Das rechte Tun and das rechte Denken stehen in unmittelbarem, unaufloslichem Zusammenhang.' On Schlatter's (and Gutbrod's) approach, see Robert Jewett, Paul's Anthropological Terms, AGAJU io, Leiden: Brill, 1971, p. 365.

21 Jewett, Anthropological Terms, p. 450. He claims that the understanding of vas as 'the constellation of thoughts and assumptions which makes up the consciousness of the person and acts as the agent of rational discernment and communication ... is demanded by Paul's reference to receiving the "mind of Christ" in 1 Cor. 2.16 and the consignment of sinners to a "reprobate mind" in Rom. 1.28 ....' In a paper delivered in Cambridge I argued that 'mind of Christ' in I Cor. 2.16 should be understood in an ontological sense rather than simply meaning 'mind set'. The same is true for Rom. 1.28 also.

22 Bell, No one seeks for God, p. 61. 2.3 Cf. Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, ET; New York: Harper

& Row, 1957, although, of course, he wished to attack Christianity as such a construction.

24 Bell, No one seeks for God, pp. 24—z6, 48.

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`fall' as narrated in Romans i emphasizes the fall of the human mind. But when Paul returns to the fall later in chapters 5 and 7, the emphasis switches to a more fundamental aspect of the human person, which I term the 'soul' (and will clarify this in a moment). In Romans 5.12, he relates the fall of the human person to partici-pation in Adam's sin and a very similar picture emerges in Romans 7.7-25. One reason this stress on participation in Adam emerges in the epistle is because from Romans 3.21 onwards, where he speaks of saFvation in Christ, he employs ideas of participation in Christ. Just as participation in Christ is the key to redemption, so participa-tion in Adam is the key to the fall, a pattern which emerges clearly in Romans 5.12-21. And, as I have argued elsewhere, the 'soul' is one way of understanding how this participation comes about." For just as the 'soul' is the key entity in participating in the atoning death of Christ, so the soul is the key entity in understanding participation in Adam (even though Adam is a 'mythical' figure). The existence of a supra-temporal 'soul' is an anthropological implication of the participation of which Paul speaks; such an understanding of the `soul' also has some basis in Old Testament anthropology where the body is often seen as a manifestation of the soul, and such a view seems to be assumed in many New Testament texts also. So the 'soul', as I am using the term, is not primarily a cognitive entity (this is a common assumption in philosophical discussion); rather it is a supra-temporal entity and could be understood as the 'body in itself'. The human soul is something which only God can truly perceive for he can encounter us in a timeless way, without a point of view in space and without thinking in English or Italian or any particular language.26

This language of 'thing-in-itself' Ming an sich') iaturally brings us to the world of Kant and Schopenhauer. For the 'thing-in-itself Schopenhauer used the term 'will'27 and in doing so he managed

2.5 I have argued this point at length in Bell, Deliver Us from Evil, pp. 189-291. 26 See Geoffrey Warnock, in Bryan Magee, The Great Philosophers, Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 1988 [1987], p.- 185, Bell, Deliver Us from Evil, pp. 227— 8.

27 Some may be surprised that I use the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer. However, he did develop a most remarkable philosophical system which has great insights into both 'art' and 'science'. Also, although he was an atheist he happened to be a great admirer of Paul, Augustine and Luther.

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to create considerable confusion." Nevertheless, it proved to be a highly suggestive term (and had he not used it we would not have the Nietzsche and the Freud we now know). Sometimes Schopenhauer used 'will' to mean the supra-temporal 'thing-in-itself' and some-times he uses it in a temporal sense. If 'soul' is related in some sense to the Schopenhauerian we can appreciate anew Paul's devas- tating view of 'fallen human nature'.29 The fallen human being has a drive for idolatry (see the previous discussion of Rom. 1.18-32). He is driven both by a corrupt 'will' and a corrupt 'mind'. But there is a subtle difference between Schopenhauer and Paul. For Schopenhauer, the principal faculty (corresponding to the Stoic 'HyEtioviK6v) is not the intellect but the will. The intellect is not so much 'the guide and leader, like the footman who walks in front of the stranger'; rather 'the relation of the two [will and intellect] is that of the strong blind man carrying the sighted lame man on his shoulders'.3° The 'fallen person', according to Schopenhauer, is driven by the 'will' as the master and the mind seems to be a help-less servant. The mind does not appear to be corrupt; it simply has severe limitations.3 ' Paul, on the other hand, seems to give more weight to the mind and, as we have seen, stresses the corrupt nature of it.

Since Romans 7.22-23 is often appealed to in arguing for a non-corrupt mind (and willing) in conflict with evil actions, I must say a few words about these verses. Paul writes: 'For I delight in the law of God in my inmost self, but I see in my members another law at war with the law of my mind, making me captive to the law of sin

z8 In the section on 'Mind and its Relation to the Soul and Body', I will examine more closely Schopenhauer's understanding of 'will'.

2.9 This is partly taken up by Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, Volume I, ET; New York: Dover, 1966 [1958], pp. 404-08 (i.70). He speaks of our relationship to Adam and finds great insight in the works of Augustine and Luther.

3o Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, Volume II, ET; New York: Dover, 1966 [1958], pp. zo8—o9 (2.19) (Arthur Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung II , ASSW 2., Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1004, p. 269). Giinter Zoller, `Schopenhauer on the Self,' in Christopher Janaway (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, P. 2.4, explains that the latter is a fable of the eighteenth-century Swiss writer J. F. Gellert.

31 A good overview of Schopenhauer on reason is given by Julian Young, Schopenhauer, London/New York: Routledge, 2005, pp. 32-52.

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that dwells in my members.' I take the view that Paul its speaking of the non-Christian." Further, the conflict of which he writes in not a conflict within the person (an inner subjective congict). So he is not speaking of a conflict between a good mind and evil actions." Rather he is speaking of a 'trans-subjective' conflict: to conflict of which Romans 7.14-2.3 speaks is not a contradiction within the unregenerate person in Adam; rather the unregenerhte person is himself the contradiction:4

Paul therefore has a pessimistic view of the human person. The person in Adam has a corrupt `mind'; the same can be said of the `will' which manifests itself in evil actions."

Participation in Christ

Just as the mind becomes corrupt by participation in Adam, so the mind is renewed by participation in Christ. Here participation means a dying and a rising with Christ. I understand this in an

32. This is clear, for example, in the fact that Rom. 7.14 speaks of being 'sold into slavery under sin'. This cannot apply to the Christian as is clear in Rom. 6.15-23.

33 Otfried Hofius, 'Der Mensch im Schatten Adams. Romer 7,7-2.5a', in Paulusstudien II, WUNT 143, Tiibingen: Mohr Siebeck, zooz, p. 146, gives an example of such an inner conflict in Euripides, Hippolytus, 375-83. I quote just 380-3: 'That which is good we learn and recognise, yet practise not the lesson, some from sloth, and some preferring pleasure in the stead of duty' (Arthur S. Way (ed.), Euripides IV, LCL i z, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press/London: Heinemann, 1980 [1912], pp. 192-5).

34 Hofius, `Mensch im Schatten Adams', p. 149: 'Der Widerspruch, von dem in Rom 7,14-23 die Rede ist, ist nicht ein solcher in dem adamitischen Menschen, sondern der adamitische Mensch ist selbst dieser Widerspruch' (his emphasis). See also Hans Conzelmann, An Outline of the Theology of the Mew Testament, NTL, ET; London: SCM Press, 1969, p. 23 I, who speaks about 'a trans-psychological condition'. This view that Paul speaks of a trans-subjective condition goes back to Rudolf Bultmann, `Romer 7 und die Anthropologie des Paulus', in Exegetica: Aufsatze zur Erforschung des Neuen Testaments, Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1967, pp. 198-2.09.

35 Again it is important to stress that the willing of the good in Rom. 7.15, 16, 18, 19, zo (the verb eau.) is used) does not describe an 'empirical' person in Adam. Hofius, `Mensch im Schatten Adams', p. 139, writes: 'Das Verbum meint hier und dann auch im folgenden — wie in Gal 5,17 — "das gute, mit Gottes Willen einige Wollen", das Wollen dessen, was Gottes "heiliges" und "geistliches" Gesetz gebietet' (quoting Paul Althaus, Der Brief an die Galater, NTD 8, 6th edn, Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962, p. 48).

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ontological sense. Through faith the Christian really has died with Christ on Calvary and risen to new life. This I understand in terms of the supra-temporal 'soul': the totally corrupt soul of the human person participates in the 'soul' of Christ. Paul never speaks about a tjivx-ii of Christ. But he speaks of the etv9pcoTros Jesus Christ (Rom. 5.15-19); he speaks of Christ being sent in the form of sinful flesh (Rom. 8.3 ); he speaks of the blood of Christ (cf. Lev. 17.i i).36 This humanity of Christ is not to be set against his divinity.37 Likewise, his 'human soul' is not to be set against his divinity. Therefore by participating in Christ via his soul we are participating in his essen-tial nature, both his humanity and his divinity.

How then does this participation in Christ relate to our issues of faith and reason? The first point to emphasize is that the renewal of the human person and the human mind can only take place through faith in Christ. Such faith has a dual aspect in Paul. First, it is a means of achieving union with Christ." This is a crucial aspect of faith which has been neglected by those who emphasize the cogni-tive aspect of faith. Such faith is to be understood as God's work (and exclusively God's work) in bringing our soul together with that of Christ's. Thereby we participate in Christ's humanity and divinity. The second aspect of faith is the conscious understanding that comes about as a result of this union with Christ. When Paul speaks about faith in Christ he certainly includes this rational aspect of faith in that the Christian believes certain things to be true.39

It is by coming to faith in Christ that the renewal of the mind occurs. Paul sometimes speaks about this renewal of the mind in

36 Note the significant use of 6, Tri) airrob otTlia-ri in Rom. 3.z5 (Richard H. Bell, 200; 'Sacrifice and Christology in Paul', Journal of Theological Studies 53, p. 19).

37 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Volume III: The Doctrine of Creation, Part 2, ET; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 196o, p. 46: 'In Paul ... Christ is man not in contrast to the fact that elsewhere He is termed the Son of God, but because He is Son of God, and expresses and demonstrates Himself as such in the fact that He is man.'

38 So when Paul speaks of being united with the form of Christ's death in Rom. 6.5 (Et yap o*.gyu-roi yEy6vap.€1, T4 6p.ouLp.a-n T0i) OavdTov a1 TOU ...) the presupposition is that this is only possible through faith in Christ.

39 See Otfried Hofius, 'Wort Gottes und Glaube bei Paulus', in Paulusstudien, WUNT 51, Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1989, pp. 155-7. However, he perhaps overemphasizes the rational element: Ter Glaube ist fur Paulus ganz elementar ein Fur-wahr-Halten dieser ... assertorischen Satze und Aussagen' (p. 156, Hofius's emphasis).

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terms of the work of the Holy Spirit." But another way of looking at it is to build upon this idea of participation in Christ. In order to examine this it is necessary to discuss the relationship of the 'mind' to the 'soul' and 'body'.

Mind and its Relation to the Soul and Body

Discussing mind and its relation to the soul and body is like bring-ing together three hornets' nests. In the limited space available I will outline my view.

As I have argued the 'soul' is crucial for understanding the nature of participation in Adam and in Christ. Let me repeat that I under- stand the 'soul' to be a supra-temporal entity which is not necessarily cognitive in nature (hence it does not correspond to Kant's own term 'soul' (`Seele') as it occurs, for example, in the 'Paralogisms of Pure Reason'). The 'soul' can be understood as the body in itself. Therefore the 'a priori intuitions' Ca priori Anschauungen') of space and time do not apply. Since the `soul' is a supra-temporal entity one cannot, strictly speaking, speak of the 'soul' being 'renewed'. The soul is related to the human body, a temporal entity through-out his history from embryo through to teenager, mid" age, old age and then through to the resurrection body. The body is a spatial and temporal manifestation of the supra-spatial and supra-temporal soul.

If the body and soul are to be so understood, how does the mind fit in? And how, ultimately, does participation in Adam and Christ via the 'soul' result in the corruption and renewal of the mind respectively? In order to deal with this I shall draw on Kant's phil-osophy of mind supplemented by Schopenhauer's understanding of the mind and the 'will'. Then I will come to some conclusions on the relationship of the mind to the body and the soul. Neither Kant nor Schopenhauer provide an adequate framework and at some points they fundamentally disagree on issues such as 'practical reason's° But in my view they both pose some crucial questions

4o See especially i Cor. z.6-16, which will be discussed in a forthcoming book on the `Theology of Mind'. See also Rom. 12.2, which implies the work of the Holy Spirit.

41 See Schopenhauer's 'Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy' in Schopenhauer, World I, pp. 514-15.

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and provide some crucial answers upon which the Christian theo-logian can build.

The mind is fundamental to Kant's argument in the Critique of Pure Reason but it is not easy to determine his understanding of `mind' since there is no sustained discussion of it42 and he employs a number of terms which carry different connotations. The three terms I want to focus on are 'Seele' (`soul'), `Gemile (mind) and `Subjeke (`subject' ).43 Much secondary literature makes little attempt to dis-tinguish between the two terms 'Seele' and `Gemiit'." However, Kant appears to maintain a distinction and consequently I shall refer to 'Seele' and `Gemiit'. 'Seele' is often translated as `sour;45 but this I find to be rather misleading and most philosophers recognize that Kant is in fact speaking of `mind'.46 The term 'Seele' appears to be used to point to the self conceived rationalistically and is used in theological and ethical contexts. It has a metaphysical aspect and emphasizes the contrast between human and non-human.47 Whereas `Seele' is unique to human beings and is related to the 'metaphysical self' which can engage in 'practical reason', `Gemiit' appears to be used for mind as an 'organ of thought' or 'a corporeal sense of sensation and self-affection'.48 The term appears at the beginning of `The Transcendental Aesthetic' (A19 B3 3 ) (quoted below). Kemp Smith comments that Im]ind (Gemiit) is a neutral term without metaphysical implications. It is practically equivalent to the term which is substituted for it in the next paragraph (A19 B3 4), power of representation (Vorstellungsfahigkeit):49 A number of texts sug-gest that a distinction should be drawn between the two terms:

42 Andrew Brook, Kant and the Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 95, points out that in no major work of Kant (apart from the Anthropology) is there such a sustained discussion.

43 The other terms are `Selbse (`self') and `dieses Ich oder Er oder Es (das Ding) welches denket' (`thing which thinks') (Brook, Kant and the Mind, p.

44 See, e.g., Brook, Kant and the Mind. So he regards the terms Kant uses for `mind' as 'extensional equivalents' (p. I 1).

45 See, e.g., 'The Paralogisms of Pure Reason', in Norman Kemp Smith (ed.), Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant (with a New Introduction by Howard Caygill), Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, pp. 328-83.

46 Hence the book by Karl Ameriks, Kant's Theory of Mind: An Analysis of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason, Oxford: Clarendon, z000 [1982].

47 So in Kantian terms only human beings have a `Seele'. 48 Howard Caygill, A Kant Dictionary, BPD, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p. 210. 49 Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'

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see Aus Semmering: liber das Organ der Seele,s° Anthropologie," not to mention the Transcendental Aesthetic (discussed later). Just as the `Seele' is related to the 'metaphysical self' so the `Gemiit' is related to the 'empirical self'. It is also striking that whereas `Seele' can only apply to the human person, Kant's `Gemiit' can be applied to both humans and, in many respects, to animals.52

(with a New Introduction by Sebastian Gardner), Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 81.

5o 'By the term mind one understands only the capacity (animus) which puts together the given representations and brings about the unity of empirical apperception, but not the substance (anima) in the sense of its nature which is quite distinct from matter, and from which one thereupon abstracts' (my translation). Wilhelm Weischedel (ed.), Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Piidagogik, erster Teil. Immanuel Kant. Werke in Zehn Biltiden. Band 9, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1983, p. 256: `tinter Gemiit versteht man nur das die gegebenen Vorstellungen zusammensetzende und die Einheit der empirischen Apperzeption bewirkende Vermogen (animus), noch nicht die Substanz (anima), nach ihrer von der Materie ganz unterschiedenen Natur, von der man alsdann a bstrahiert.'

5 I Mary J. Gregor (ed.), Immanuel Kant: Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974, P. 39: 'Its perceptions [i.e. those of inner sense] and the (true or illusory) inner experiences built up by connecting them are not merely anthropological — in anthropology we abstract from the question of whether man has a soul (in the sense of a separate incorporeal substance) — but psychological — in psychology we believe we perceive such a thing within us and regard the mind, which is represented as the mere power of sensing and thinking, as a separate substance dwelling in man.' (Wilhelm Weischedel (ed.), Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Padagogik, zweiter Teil. Immanuel Kant. Werke in Zehn Banden. Band ro, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1983, p. 456 (Szz, BA 58): 'Die ,Wahrnehmungen desselben [i.e. innerer Sinn] und die durch ihre Verknupfung zusammengesetzte (wahre oder scheinbare) innere Erfarhung ist nicht blofg anthropolog4ch, wo man namlich davon absieht, ob der Mensch eine Seele (als besondere unkorperliche Substanz) habe oder nicht, sondern psychologisch, wo man eine solche in sich wahrzunehmen glaubt, und das Gemiit, welches als blofges Vermogen zu empfinden und zu denken vorgestellt ist, als besondere im Menschen wohnende Substanz angesehen wird.')

52 Kant himself dismissed animals as 'irrational' (Anthi.6iology § ). Obviously the `Gemiit' of the human being is qualitatively different to that of an animal but that does not deny that animals have `Gemiit' (i.e. an ability to form representations). An example where the human `Gemiit' is distinctive is seen in the conclusion of the Critique of Practical Reason (and engraved on Karity's memorial plaque in Konigsberg). 'Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and more steadily we reflect on ttiem: the starry heaven above me and the moral law within me' (Lewis W. Beck (ed.), Critique of Practical Reason, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956, p. 166); ("Zvvei Dinge erfiillen das Gemiit mit immer neuer und zunehmender Bewunderung,:und Ehrfurcht, je offer

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Now both these sense of 'mind' have relevance for our discus-sion of the 'reprobate mind' and the 'renewal of the mind' in Paul: `Seele' points to the metaphysical aspect of 'mind' with a special emphasis on 'practical reason'; ‘Gemiit' points to the mind as an. `organ of thought' and has relevance for the way we form repres-entations. For Paul the 'reprobate mind' has not only a distorted vision in regard to what is right (i.e. there is a problem with the `Seele') but also the `Gemi.it' is misfunctioning in that inappropri-ate categories are employed in the perception of the 'world'. I will return to this but first I will attempt to give an answer to the ques-tion how the mind (both 'Seele' and `Gemiit') is to be related to the `soul' and 'body'.

Regarding 'Seele' and its relation to the body, Kant, rightly in my view, excluded both materialism and Cartesian dualism. Gardner puts Kant's case against materialism as follows: 'According to tran-scendental idealism, material bodies are not things in themselves but objects of outer sense, and an object of outer sense is necessarily (analytically) not an object of inner sense. A thinking subject "inas-much as it is represented by us as object of inner sense" cannot be "outwardly intuited" (A3 57), so it cannot be material.'" Regarding Cartesian dualism, it is well known that a fundamental problem of this approach is that two things of different ontological kinds (namely body and mind) cannot interact. Kant affirms that this is a problem if minds and bodies are things in themselves. Again I quote Gardner in summarizing Kant's response:

But for Kant, all that the heterogeneity of mind and matter con-sists in is that they are two species of appearance, mind consisting of objects of inner sense and matter of objects of outer sense: they differ not 'inwardly' but in their mode of appearing ... The worry

und anhaltender sich das Nachdenken damit beschaftigt: Der bestirnte Himmel fiber mu; und das moralische Gesetz in mir.' Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft Az88 Wilhelm Weischedel (ed.), Schriften zur Ethik und Religionsphilosophie, erster Tell. Immanuel Kant. Werke in Zehn Banden. Band 6, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1983, p. 300). Further, if it is the case that `Gemiit"provides a linkage across the three theoretical, practical, aesthetic/teleological sections of the critical philosophy' (Caygill, Kant Dictionary, p. zio) then the `Gemtit' of an animal is clearly more restricted than that of a human being (I am assuming animals have no sense of 'practical reason' or things such as the `sublime').

53 Sebastian Gardner, Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason, RPG, London/New York: Routledge, 2.004 [19991, P. 244.

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regarding how mind and body are:related is thus overtaken in the perspective of transcendental idealism, which answers that mind is related to matter in the way that the thinking'subject is related to outer objects ... 54

But what about ‘Gemiit'? Caygill points out that `Gemut does not designate a substance (whether material or ideal) but is in the position or place of the Gemfitskraft (the Getnfit's powers) of sens-ibility, imagination, understanding and reason.'ss The term `Gemiit' is not used in the sense of 'mind' or 'soul' as in Descartes; rather his idea of Gemiit 'remains close to the meaning the term possessed in medieval philosophy and mysticism, where it referred to the "stable dispositions of the soul which conditions the exercise of all its facul-ties"'." Kant thereby wished to bypass the problems of mind—body relations in Cartesian dualism (developed again in Aus Semmering: fiber das Organ der Seele).s7

Kant speaks of two aspects of `Gemiit' at the very beginning of the Transcendental Logic:

Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind (Gemiit); the first is the capacity of receiving representa-tions (Vorstellungen) (receptivity for impressiOns), the second is the power of knowing an object through thee representations (spontaneity [in production] of concepts). Through the first an object is given to us, through the second the object is thought in relation to that [given] representation (which is a mere determi-nation of the mind)."

54 Gardner, Kant, p. 245. 55 Caygill, Kant Dictionary, p. zio. 56 Caygill, Kant Dictionary, p. z To, referring to E. Gilson, History of Christian

Philosophy in the Middle Ages, New York: Random House, 1955, pp. 444, 758. 57 Note that for Leibniz, `Gemije is feeling as opposed to understanding.

For Kant 'the mind (Gemiit) is all life (the life-principle itself); and hindrance or furtherance has to be sought outside it, and yet in the man himself, consequently in the connection with his body' (James Creed Meredith (ed.), Immanuel Kant: The Critique of Judgement, Oxford: Clarendon, 195z, p. 131); Wilhelm Weischedel, (ed.), Kritik der Urteilskraft und Schriften zur Naturphilosophie. Immanuel Kant. Werke in Zehn Banden. Band 8, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1983, p. 3.7o: `... weil das Gemiit fur sich allein ganz Leben (das Lebensprinzip selbst) ist, und Hindernisse oder Beforderungen auger demselben und dock im Menschen selbst, mithin in der Verbindung mit seinem Korper, gesucht werden mussen'.

58 Norman Kemp Smith, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 92 (A5o B74). See Wilhelm

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So the `Gemiit' is disposed either passively or actively. A similar pattern is found earlier in the Transcendental Aesthetic. So at the very beginning we read:

In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of know-ledge may relate to objects, intuition (Anschauung) is that through which it is in immediate relation to them, and to which all thought (Denken) as a means is directed. But intuition takes place only in so far as the object is given to us. This again is only possible, to man at least, in so far as the mind (Gemiit) is affected in a certain way. The capacity (receptivity) for receiving representations through the mode in which we are affected by objects, is entitled sensibility (Sinnlichkeit). Objects are given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields us intuitions; they are thought through the understanding (Verstand), and from the understanding arise concepts (Begriffe)."

Again a little later we see that the Gemiit can be passively affected by external sense but can also be actively affected by inner sense. This text is especially interesting since it draws a distinction between `Gemiit' and 'Seele':

By means of outer sense, a property of our mind (Gemiit), we represent to ourselves objects as outside us, and all without ex-ception in space. In space their shape, magnitude, and relation to one another are determined or determinable. Inner sense, by means of which the mind (Gemiit) intuits itself or its inner state, yields indeed no intuition (Anschauung) of the soul (Seele) itself as an object; but there is nevertheless a determinate form [name-

Weischedel (ed.), Kritik der reinen Vernunft, erster Teil. Immanuel Kant. Werke in Zehn Banden. Band 3, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1983, p. 97: `Unsre Erkenntnis entspringt aus zwei Grundquellen des Gemiits, deren die erste ist, die Vorstellungen zu empfangen (die Rezeptivitat der Eindriicke), die zweite das Vermogen, durch diese Vorstellungen einen Gegenstand zu erkennen (Spontaneitat der Begriffe); durch die erstere wird uns ein Gegenstand gegeben, durch die zweite wird dieser im Verhaltnis auf jene Vorstellung (als block Bestimmung des Gemats) gedacht.'

59 Norman Kemp Smith, Critique of Pure Reason, 65 (A19 B33); Weischedel, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 69.

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ly, time] in which alone the intuition of inner states is possible, and everything which belongs to inner determinations is there-fore represented in relations of time."

In view of this it seems reasonable to distinguish between `Gemiit' and 'Seele'; further such a distinction is to some extent reflected in Kant's understanding of the 'self'. Kant in fact ended up with three selves for which he has received some criticism. First, there is the empirical self (related to ‘Gemiit' and empirical psychology and anthropology); second, there is the metaphysical self (related to `Seele' and rational psychology); then, third, there is the self which is neither empirical nor metaphysical but transcendental or 'per-taining to the conditions of the possibility of experience'.6 ' This third understanding of 'self' (and by implication 'mind') is related to what Kant calls the 'subject'. The subject is not actually in the world but is at the boundary of the world. Such a 'subject' is then related to the 'object' or the world of phenomena. It is at this point that it is appropriate to make a transition to the philosophy of Schopenhauer.

The transition from Kant to Schopenhauer is helpfully summar-ized by saying that according to Schopenhauer, 'appearances are nothing but "representations" (Vorstellungen) in the human mind with no independent extramental existence'. Further `[4n a radical departure from Kant's agnosticism regarding the things in them-selves, [Schopenhauer] identifies the latter with the will as revealed in the human mind in conative and affective self-experience and subsequently recognized as the essence of all reality, human as well as non-human.'62 Regarding the subject, he speaks of the subject of knowing and the subject of willing. Therefore the subject of

6o Norman Kemp Smith, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 67-8 (Azz—z3 B37). Weischedel, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 71: Wermittelst des aufkren Sinnes (einer Eigenschaft unsres Gemtits) stellen wir uns Gegenstande als aufier uns, and diese insgesamt im Raume vor. Darinnen ist ihre Gestalt, Grote and Verhaltnis g'rgen einander bestimmt, oder bestimmbar. Der innere Sinn, vermittelst dessen das Gemiit sich selbst, oder seinen inneren Zustand anschauet, gibt zwar keine Anschauung von der Seele selbst, als einem Objekt; allein es ist doth eine bestimmte Form, anter der die Anschauung ihres innern Zustandes allein moglich 1st, so, dA alles, was zu den innern Bestimmungen gehort, in Verhaltnissen der Zeit vorgestellt wird.'

61 Zoller, 'Self,' p. 21.

6z Zoller, 'Self,' p. zz.

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Richard H. Bell knowing, this 'elusive I'," can, in Schopenhauer's words, 'never be known or become object or representation'." So what the 'subject of knowing' actually comes to know is not itself but the 'subject of willing'. So within us 'the known as such is not the knower but the wilier'. Schopenhauer then argues that 'the identity of the sub-ject of willing with that of knowing by virtue whereof (and indeed necessarily) the word "I" includes and indicates both, is the knot of the world, and hence inexplicable. ... whoever really grasps the inexplicable nature of this identity will call it, as I do, the miracle par excellence'.65 Perhaps the unity of the subject of knowing and the subject of willing can be answered by employing again the idea of the 'soul'. For if we go again to a level deeper into real-ity, into the ultimate reality of the world, one comes, I suggest, to the human soul, the 'thing-in-itself', which can be related to what Schopenhauer called

I now draw together some of the fundamental insights of Kant and Schopenhauer on the 'mind' and the related 'self'. Kant, as we have seen, has three selves, and related to these are three concepts of minds. One way of representing the relation of the 'subject' to `Seele' is by having an inverted cone. At the bottom we have the `point' of the cone which corresponds to the 'subject' on the bound-ary of the world. This is then related to 'Seele' (the cone above) which is the metaphysical mind, the mind concerned with 'practical reason'.67 By contrast Schopenhauer's view can be represented by a

63 Cf. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990 [1949], pp. 186-9.

64 Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, ET; LaSalle: Open Court, 1974, p. 210.

65 Schopenhauer, Fourfold Root, pp. I-12 (4z). Arthur Schopenhauer, Kleinere Schriften, ASSW 3, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2004, p. 171: 'Die Identitat nun aber des Subjekts des Wollens mit dem erkennenden Subjekt, vermoge welcher (und zwar notwendig) das Wort `Ich' beide einschlidt und bezeichnet, ist der Weltknoten und daher unerklarlich. Wer aber das Unerklarliche dieser Identitat sich recht vergegenwartigt, wird sie mit mir das Wunder KaT' [schlechthin] nennen.' Zoller, 'Self,' p. 26, points out: 'For Schopenhauer the non- causal structural correlativity that holds between the subject of cognition and the subject of willing ultimately amounts to their identity.'

66 Schopenhauer's understanding of 'will' is rather complex: see the summary given in Bell, Deliver Us from Evil, pp. 217-18.

67 If there is any link between the 'reason' of the unregenerate person and God, this is where it is to be found. Hence the symbolism of the inverted cone for the `Seele'.

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The Corrupt Mind and the Renewed Mind cone which is the right way up with the tip representing the subject and the base representing the Schopenhauer, by rejecting `practical reason', effectively dispenses with the inverted 'cone' of Kant." My rather bold suggestion is that both these cones could be brought together therefore forming not just a 'cone of personhood' but a `diabolo of personhood'.7° The base represents the being of the person's 'soul' in the depths of the world. The mid-point is the subject of the person on the boundary of the world. The upper cone represents the person's 'practical reason' which is related to the 'divine' which points beyond this world.

One of the striking things which emerges from this analysis is that human beings consist of disparate elements. There is the realm of `Seele' above, the subject on the boundary of the world and the `soul' in the depths of the world. Added to this is the `Gemiit' of the 'empirical self' (which, as we have noted, is not a substance but is rather the capacity to form representations and brings about the unity of empirical apperception). After Kant much energy was exer-cised in trying to relate the various parts of the self.71 As a Christian theologian I suggest that it is God who holds the various disparate elements of the human person together: God is an anthropological necessity. God through his Holy Spirit is the integrating principle.72

We come now back to the question as to how the corruption and renewal of the mind is to be understood in Paul in the light of this Kantian and Schopenhauerian framework. As indicated participa-tion in Adam and in Christ occurs via the 'soul' (the very base of

68 Such a cone of personhood is illustrated in Bell, Deliver Us' from Evil, pp. 253—

4. 69 I consider this to be a problem for Schopenhauer's philosophical system.

For a useful critical assessment of Schopenhauer's moral philos'ophy, see Young, Schopenhauer, pp. 181-6. The only case where I have found Schopenhauer's ethics reflected in the New Testament is Eph. 'He who loves his wife loves himself.' Such a statement is based on the view that man and wife are 'one flesh'. Cf. Schopenhauer's view of altruism: since human beings are one at the level of the `noumenon' then by helping others one is helping oneself and conversely by harming others one is harming oneself.

7o Such a `diabolo' was not developed in Bell, Deliver Us from Evil because I was not considering the issue of 'practical reason'.

71 One such attempt was that of Fichte. See, e.g., Ginter Zoller, Fichte's Transcendental Philosophy: The Original Duplicity of Intelligence and Will, MEP, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

72 Bell, Deliver Us from Evil, pp. 228-9.

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the `diabolo'). By means of this participation the human person is corrupted in Adam but transformed in Christ. And this transforma-tion, according to my model, works from the bottom up. So the `mind' (subject and 'Seele') is renewed as is the `Gemtit' (not repre-sented by the diabolo).

Conclusions

Let me attempt to draw some conclusions, particularly on the `renewal of the mind'.

I Just as in some sense our participation in Adam results in a cor-rupt mind, so our participation in Christ results in a renewed mind. This renewal can be explored theologically by means of the work of the Holy Spirit; but how is one to understand it in terms of participation, a central theme in Romans?

One could argue that participation in Christ via the soul has an effect on the body. The person who has died and risen with Christ will experience a resurrection body in a new phenomenal world. Is it then so unreasonable to claim that the person who has died and risen with Christ will also have a transformed mind? Although it is not unreasonable to claim this, it is conceptually difficult to understand because it is by no means clear how the `mind' both in terms of `Seele' and `Gemiit' is related to the body and then to what I have termed 'soul', the 'body in itself'. In the above discussion I have outlined a possible way of relating 'mind' to 'body' and to 'soul'. So, with Kant, both a materialism and a Cartesian dualism was rejected. But I should add that although I would agree with Kant that the mind is not a 'substance', it does nevertheless 'emerge' from the 'soul'. This is suggested by Schopenhauer's understanding of the 'intellect' and the 'will'.73

2. The renewal of mind could be understood in terms of new 'cat-egories'. Such categories are, according to Kant, formed by the

73 See, e.g., the remarkable chapter on 'The Primacy of the Will in Self-Consciousness' (Schopenhauer, World II, pp. 201-44). Using the image of a plant, he likens the relationship of the 'will' (`Wille') to the 'intellect' ('Intellekt') to the root's relationship to the corona. 'The root is what is essential, original, perennial, whose death entails the death of the corona; it is therefore primary. The corona, on the other hand, is the ostensible, that which has sprouted forth, that which passes away without the root dying; it is therefore secondary' (p. zo3).

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`Gemiit'. However, these categories are not fixed as in Kant; they are culturally conditioned74 and, one can add, are spiritually con-ditioned. Just as inappropriate categories can be employed by the corrupt mind which give rise to an inappropriate perception of the 'world' so a renewed mind can employ appropriate categor-ies. This is also relevant to theological discourse!'

3 The renewed mind is intrinsically related to 'practical reason'. Through participation in Christ via the soul the `Seele' and the `practical reason' is renewed. See Romans 12.2: ',Do not be con-formed to this world, but be transformed by the renewing of your minds, so that you may discern what is the will of God; what is good and acceptable and perfect.' The purpose of the renew-ing of the mind (Ti1 avaKaivcoaa Tor) voess) is that the Christian `may discern what is the will of God' (.E Ls Tc 6oKt. *is TL TO eaflp.a TOU °Ea). By employing 8oKwisiCav (`to discern') it is emphasized that the corruption of the mind of Romans 1.28 (-rrap80.K€1, airrois 6 0E63 &Ls- 61 661-Q11ov voi)v) is being reversed.

4 The renewed mind is one that can exercise 'judgement' not only in the area of morals but also in the area of theology.76 For ex-ample, the renewed mind has the capacity to look at the great variety of biblical texts and to make out of it Christian theo-logy. In my view one sees this theological judgement at its best in theologians such as Athanasius, Augustine, Luther, Calvin and Barth.

5 The theme of the conference held in Rome was 'The Grandeur of Reason'. It is fitting that the conference title has been explored in the light of Paul's great epistle sent to the Christians of Rome. To some extent I think this 'grandeur' has to be qualified. For Paul stresses at the beginning of the letter the corruption of the mind as a result of the fall. But through participating in the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ the mind can be renewed such that the Christian can discern what is the will of God.

74 Cf. Bryan Magee, The Philosophy of Schopenhalier, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1997 [1983], pp. z33-4. One can take the idea of `categories' beyond Kant by saying, e.g., that categories are involved simply in the language we employ.

75 Theological discourse can so often lead astray in using inappropriate categories.

76 Compare (in a rather. different context) the emphasis Kant places on th6 `faculty of judgement' )'Urteilskraft'). See Weischedel, Kritik der Urteilskraft.

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