The BRICS and the South Atlantic: Emerging arena for South–Southcooperation

Adriana Erthal Abdenur*, Maiara Folly, Kayo Moura, Sergio A.S. Jordão and Pedro Maia

Institute of International Relations, PUC-Rio, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

Over the past decade, power dynamics within the South Atlantic region haveundergone significant changes. While the area has historically been dominated byNorth–South ties, both in terms of material flows and with respect to politicalinfluence, more recently there has been a surge in cooperation between developingcountries within this space. As trade, investment and other forms of exchange anddialogue increase among actors from within the region (notably between SouthAmerica and Africa) and with states located outside the region, the BRICS countriesbecome more relevant to the South Atlantic. Individually, they have become relevantplayers in the South Atlantic’s economic, political and security dimensions.Collectively, as inter-BRICS flows and political coordination intensify, new config-urations of cooperation emerge within the South Atlantic. These initiatives suggest thatrising powers are contributing towards making the South Atlantic – long dominated byNorth–South ties – a space where South–South cooperation and norms predominate.

Keywords: South Atlantic; BRICS; Brazil; ZOPACAS; South–South cooperation;IBSA

Introduction

Over the past decade, the landscape of actors shaping power dynamics within the SouthAtlantic region has undergone significant changes. In addition to being home to countriesthat have experienced economic growth and adopted more assertive foreign policy anddefence stances, the region’s natural resources increasingly attract actors from outside theimmediate vicinity. The intensification of South–South cooperation – both intra-regionaland trans-regional – has yielded new configurations of cooperation and coordinationacross the South Atlantic, ranging from trade and investment to military ties. Despitethese changes, the region remains under-analysed, with most of the international relationsliterature pertinent to this area of the world concentrating on the continental dimensionsof Latin America and Africa. This article treats the South Atlantic as a distinct anddynamic geopolitical space. More specifically, it analyses the changing role of the BRICSstates (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) – both collectively and individually– within the South Atlantic region along three dimensions: the political, economic andsecurity arenas.

The BRICS may seem at first like an odd point of departure for studying the SouthAtlantic. Only two of the BRICS – Brazil and South Africa – are located within theregion, and the grouping as a whole has no geographically specific discourse, including

*Corresponding author. Email: abdenur@bricspolicycenter.org

South African Journal of International Affairs, 2014http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2014.972442

© 2014 The South African Institute of International Affairs

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with respect to the South Atlantic. Indeed, the social science literature on the BRICS hasaddressed these countries’ relevance to a variety of crosscutting themes, from globalgovernance to development cooperation. By examining the BRICS’ role within the SouthAtlantic region, we situate the relevance of this incipient institution geographically,shedding light on how changing relations of power among key rising powers can reshapedynamics at a regional level.

Indeed, within the changing scenario of the South Atlantic, the BRICS countries havebecome more relevant to the region, both individually and collectively. Brazil and SouthAfrica have been driving forces behind the new trends in trans-South Atlanticcooperation. Even the BRICS states that are not located within the region – India, Chinaand Russia – have strengthened their presence within the region, becoming more salientwithin local discourses about development and globalisation. Moreover, as inter-BRICSrelations deepen, new multilateral configurations begin to appear within this space.Collective initiatives by the grouping relevant to this space include the IBSAMAR navalexercises, held off the coast of South Africa, and the BRICS cable project, which isexpected to cross the South Atlantic, directly linking South Africa and Brazil.

These initiatives, among others, suggest that the South Atlantic is becoming a spaceof predominantly, if not exclusively, South–South cooperation – one that is not restrictedto ties among local actors, but rather a hub for broader relations among developingcountries. This is a significant shift from the traditional North–South ties that havedominated the South Atlantic since the colonial era. Although states like the US and theUK continue to be important players within the region, their geopolitical priorities lieelsewhere, creating – if not a true ‘vacuum of power’– at least a series of windows ofopportunities within the South Atlantic region that are being seized by other actors,including the BRICS. This scenario suggests that, within a context of eroding UShegemony and the emergence of alternative power hubs, the power disparities that makeWestern liberal institutions a key tool through which to lock in a ‘favourable order’ arediminishing.1 According to Ikenberry, the BRICS are likely to shape regional institutions‘because they can be shaped to reflect their interests and presences’.2 Within the SouthAtlantic, this behaviour may translate into a space that is a geopolitically separate arenafrom the North Atlantic, despite US and European efforts to create deeper linkagesbetween the North and South Atlantic. In this respect, the BRICS’ stress on respect fornational sovereignty helps local states, especially Brazil, to transform the South Atlanticinto an area that is not dominated by US-imposed norms.

The article is structured as follows. First, we provide a historical background to theSouth Atlantic region, from the colonial era to the post-Cold War period. Next, weanalyse the presence of the individual BRICS states, examining their economic, politicaland military role within the South Atlantic. We then consider the relevance of the BRICSas a political grouping to the region, examining some of the concrete initiatives as well asoverall influence. Finally, the conclusion analyses the consequences of these shifts forpeace and prosperity within the region and offers key directions for further research.

The South Atlantic in historical perspective

Although the South Atlantic is often defined in traditional cartographic terms – manypolicy documents and textbooks demarcate the region in terms of specific latitudes andcontinental shores – here we adopt a less rigid definition of this space. Instead, we refer tothe South Atlantic as a political imaginary whose degree of identification oscillates acrosstime, as well as according to the general understanding of local actors.3 This malleable,

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dynamic concept of region permits a more nuanced analysis of power relations betweenactors (state and non-state), and it enables us to better understand the relevance of statesnot located within the region. For instance, Buzan and Waever argue that regions areconstituted through practices and discourses that establish patterns of friendship andenmity, structuring their dynamics of power.4 Thus, grasping the regional dynamicsrequires analysis of the strategies and perspectives of actors (state and non-state alike)within a particular geopolitical space.

Although the South Atlantic Ocean was important to indigenous populations livingalong its margins before the colonial era, the geopolitical relevance of the oceanic spaceemerged more broadly only with the Portuguese expansion into Africa and, later, what isnow Brazil. The Portuguese were followed by other Europeans who engaged incolonialism, extraction and commerce. The transatlantic trade, which included slaves,was so central to the European economy that the South Atlantic also became rife withconflict, disputes and piracy. As the traditional European colonial powers lost their gripover Latin America and their former colonies gained independence, flows between LatinAmerica and Europe (including the slave trade) declined. In addition, the next wave ofimperialism focused more on Africa and Asia than on Latin America, further reducingexchanges across the South Atlantic.

The South Atlantic in the war years

With the US entry into the First World War, international attention focused on the NorthAtlantic. The US assisted Europe in the war efforts by sending troops and deployingbattleships, and economic ties across the North Atlantic strengthened as US exports toEurope tripled.5 In contrast, some of the South Atlantic countries whose economies werebased on commodities exports – essentially, agricultural products – experienced a sharpdrop in European demand. Brazil, whose economy relied heavily on coffee exports, sawthe demand for these exports decrease considerably. In addition, the 1914 opening of thePanama Canal allowed cargo ships direct passage between the Caribbean and the Pacific,contributing to the decline of maritime transport in the South Atlantic. After the war’send, there was an intensification of North transatlantic commercial political and financialflows, notwithstanding a temporary dip owing to the Great Depression of the 1930s.

During the Second World War, once again, the geography of global conflict remaineddistant from the South Atlantic, although the region was not entirely outside the scope ofthe war. German U-boats patrolled the area and torpedoed merchant ships, includingseveral Brazilian vessels. Many South Atlantic states and colonies participated in the warefforts, including Brazil (by sending troops to fight for the liberation of Italy), Argentinaand South Africa. The US set up an air force base in Natal, South Africa and in northeastBrazil, and an Allied base was established in Freetown, Sierra Leone. Allied incursions inAfrica included a 1940 attempt to take the port of Dakar, where the gold of the Banque deFrance and the Polish government-in-exile had been stored under Vichy France control.The Western Task Force, led by General Patton, aimed to seize and secure FrenchMorocco, particularly Casablanca and the Atlantic port of Safi. South Atlanticpopulations also participated in war efforts outside the region. Soldiers from the GoldCoast region in Western Africa formed the Second West African Infantry brigade,contributing 65,000 men to the 1944 Battle of Myohaung, which drove the Japanese outof Burma. Moreover, in 1943, the US established the Fourth Fleet to protect its interestsin the South Atlantic. However, despite these fragmented events and participations, theSouth Atlantic was never among the primary theatres of the Second World War.

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During the Cold War, the US concentrated its economic and defence efforts along theNorth Atlantic and Pacific through the Marshall Plan and the creation of NATO (theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organisation) and ANZUS (the Australia, New Zealand, UnitedStates Security Treaty). Trade, investments and financial flows between these actors alsointensified, despite the creation of the Bretton Woods institutions. In addition, the globalsecurity governance architecture that emerged out of this period overlooked the SouthAtlantic; none of the five UN Security Council permanent seats were allocated to SouthAtlantic states, although Roosevelt lobbied to include Brazil as a sixth member.6 As theCold War continued, parts of the South Atlantic became sites of ideological confrontationbetween the two blocs. In Angola, for instance, different groups received support fromthe US, the Soviet Union, Cuba, China and South Africa. In South and Central America,several countries that deepened ties to the Soviet bloc became targets of US-led efforts tocontain the spread of communism. The presence of a Communist state – Cuba – withinthe Caribbean also made the area strategically important during this period. However,apart from the Cuban missile crisis, the South Atlantic and its surroundings generatedrelatively little attention from the international community as major conflicts took placeelsewhere, including Korea, the Middle East, Vietnam and Afghanistan.

With the intensification of the Cold War nuclear arms race, nuclear bomb tests wereconducted elsewhere in the world. Only one known test was conducted within the SouthAtlantic: Operation Argus, undertaken by the US in 1958 near the Tristan da Cunhaarchipelago. Nuclear bomb tests also spared Antarctica, which was transformed into anuclear weapons-free area as well as an environmentally protected region starting withthe 1959 Antarctica Treaty (later expanded into the Antarctic Treaty System, ATS). Sincethe South Atlantic is the main gateway to Antarctica, the subsequent expansion of thenumber of ATS members has helped to insulate the region from direct geopoliticalcompetition.

In the last decade of the Cold War, the South Atlantic gained space within debatesabout international security owing to the Malvinas/Falklands War. In 1982, Argentina – atthat time, one of the US’s main allies in South America – clashed with the UK over thearchipelago; the UK sent substantial naval forces, including nuclear propulsionsubmarines, and used its string of island territories across the South Atlantic to back upits naval power in the area. The war ended with British victory, enabling the UK toconsolidate and expand its military capacity within the region. The Malvinas/FalklandsWar was the first major modern armed conflict in the South Atlantic, allowing the UK toestablish an operational military presence in the region. However, because the US alignedwith the UK and other South American countries stayed out of the conflict, the strategicfallout of the Malvinas/Falklands war to actors within and outside the region was limited.

In terms of South Atlantic institutions, one important landmark was the formation,through the cycle of meetings in the 1970s that eventually led to the creation of the UNConvention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), of a coalition comprising African andLatin American countries. This group defended the expansion of territorial waters and thecreation of exclusive economic zones at sea. In 1986, states from both sides of the SouthAtlantic launched the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS), designedto keep the South Atlantic a zone of non-nuclear proliferation and to boost cooperationamong its members.7 These initiatives did not have the same weight or dynamism asinstitutions created in other regions, including NATO and the Association of South EastAsian Nations (ASEAN). Proposals to establish a South Atlantic Treaty Organisation(SATO), along the lines of NATO yet bringing together Brazil, Argentina and the US,

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were never realised for a variety of reasons, including resistance or lack of interest bySouth Atlantic states.8

With the end of the Cold War – and particularly after the terrorist attacks ofSeptember 11 2001 – the US and NATO began turning attentions toward the Middle Eastand Central Asia. NATO reconfigured itself into a rapid-response force designed to dealwith the new security threats of the post-Cold War period, with a self-appointed mandateto operate beyond its traditional geographic region. So far, however, NATO interventionshave not extended to the South Atlantic region.

South–South ties

Meanwhile, the economic growth of several key states along the South Atlantic, bothemerging economies and smaller states, generated a resurgence of interest in the Atlanticregion. Not only did countries such as Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria and Angola developgreater economic and security interests in the South Atlantic, but there was also a newdrive to deepen South–South cooperation, including in trans-regional terms. This drivewas part of a broader wave of cooperation among developing countries. Unlike previousefforts at South–South cooperation – such as those stemming from the 1955 BandungConference – initiatives undertaken after the turn of the millennium were accompanied bysubstantial economic power.

In addition to the individual role of these states and their associated non-state actors,there were new institutional developments within the South Atlantic. As cooperationbetween South America and Africa deepened, broader coalitions such as the India, Brazil,South Africa Forum (IBSA) and BRICS also brought together key regional actors withinnew multilateral configurations. The Africa–South America Summit, geared at strength-ening political solidarity, has gathered heads of state on three occasions so far (2006,2009 and 2013). In addition, at the initiative of Angola and Brazil, an effort was launchedto revitalise ZOPACAS, adapting it to the post-Cold War period: rather than simplyfocusing on peace and non-proliferation, the platform promotes a variety of concretecooperation efforts in defence, security and development.

During this period, rising powers developed even greater interests outside of theirimmediate vicinities. Economically, the search to diversify trade and investment partnersbecame vital with the 2008 onset of the global economic crisis, when demand andinvestment from Northern countries shrank significantly. Politically, a new impetusemerged to form and consolidate coalitions among developing countries, giving newsubstance to South–South cooperation and political alignment. Among these, the BRICShas become a particularly salient grouping whose members maintain interests and rolesbeyond their immediate vicinities, and who contest certain established norms ininternational relations.

The advent of BRICS

The original grouping, BRIC – one of several loose coalitions that have emerged sincethe end of the Cold War – was initially launched to create greater political alignmentbetween Brazil, Russia, India and China. The grouping held its first head of state summitin Yekaterinburg, Russia, in 2009, followed so far by meetings in Brasília, Sanya, NewDelhi and Durban (in 2011, South Africa officially joined the group, broadening theacronym to BRICS). In 2014, the sixth BRICS summit was held in Fortaleza, Brazil, andat the end of the meeting, the members announced the creation of two new institutions: a

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new development bank devoted primarily to large-scale infrastructure development, and acontingency reserve agreement. Over time, the grouping’s agenda has broadened toencompass a variety of themes in economic, political and security relations, ranging fromthe global economic crisis to development cooperation. Perhaps the single most salienttheme of BRICS’ meetings and summits has been the member states’ shared desire forreforming international institutions, based on a consensus that the norms and rules createdafter the Second World War have long favoured Western countries and have lost efficacywithin a changed international scene. While consensus within the coalition has beendifficult to achieve in the field of international security, primarily because the BRICSconsist of two permanent seat holders at the UN Security Council (Russia and China) andthree aspirants to such seats, the grouping agrees on the need to democratise keydevelopment organisations, especially the International Monetary Fund and theWorld Bank.

At the same time that the BRICS states and the grouping as a whole were becomingmore relevant, the 2008 onset of the global economic crisis, which began in the US sub-prime mortgage market, affected the advanced economies more profoundly. This has ledsome analysts to argue that there is a degree of erosion of US and European power. Therelative resilience of the rising powers within this scenario contributes to the perception ofa window of opportunity in which to step up calls for governance reform and in which toproject power. In addition, with the ‘pivot to Asia,’ the US has begun paying lessattention to the South Atlantic, creating opportunity for rising powers to enhance theirrole within this space. For instance, despite the July 2008 formal reactivation of the USFourth Fleet, which was in charge of patrolling the South Atlantic (among other areasadjacent to Latin America) from 1943 to 1950, there has been no movement in thedirection of a greater US presence in the region. For instance, no new permanentlystationed vessels have been assigned to the revitalised Fourth Fleet.

Thus, the political, economic and security relevance of the BRICS must be analysedboth with respect to the individual states, all of whom have acquired some degree ofglobal reach in their economic and political affairs, and in reference to the grouping as acollective entity, insofar as it constitutes more than the sum of its individual parts.

Emerging actors in the South Atlantic

In this section, we examine the role of the BRICS countries in the South Atlantic, boththose that are located within the region (Brazil and South Africa) and those that are not(India, China and Russia), as well as the relevance of the grouping as a collective actor tothe South Atlantic. We treat these not as monolithic actors, but rather as groups of stateand non-state actors that sometimes operate through complex articulations. Drawing onpolicy documents and data from non-state actors (including international organisations,media outlets and state-owned as well as private companies), we identify key interestsand strategies adopted by the BRICS within the South Atlantic.

BRICS states located within the South Atlantic: Brazil and South Africa

Brazil and South Africa are both diverse democracies marked by deep inequalities. Thesetwo countries’ positions as regional leaders, underscored by the relative size anddynamism of their economies, are nonetheless contested by their respective neighbours inSouth America and Africa. Despite the challenges, over the past decade, these two rising

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powers have worked to foment South–South ties across the South Atlantic, between eachother and with other states.

Brazil

Although Brazil – possessing the longest coast on the South Atlantic – has always beenconnected to the South Atlantic, for most of its history as a state, Brazil’s defencethinking focused primarily on the River Plate and Amazon regions. It was under theperiod of its military regime (1964–1985) that Brazilian strategists began to pay moreattention to the South Atlantic, in part because intensifying globalisation made maritimetrade more important. In addition, the emergence of newly independent states in Africaoffered new opportunities for economic and political relations. The 1973 oil shockcontributed to Brazil’s decision to reverse its stance siding with Portugal and startsupporting these new countries, diversifying its own relations. In the 1970s, Brazil thusdeepened ties with African countries, including several along the South Atlantic.Although Brazil played a key role in the creation of ZOPACAS, in the 1980s and1990s Brazil’s relations with Africa declined as Brazilian foreign policy prioritisedpartnerships with the advanced economies and with the Southern Common Market, alsoknown as MERCOSUR, created in 1991. Two notable exceptions to this trend wereBrazil’s relations with South Africa, which intensified after the end of Apartheid in 1994as both countries sought to consolidate their democratic regimes, and with Namibia,which requested Brazil’s assistance in building up its navy shortly after its independence,in 1991. The two countries signed their first agreement in 1992, and two years later Brazilbegan to provide naval training and equipment to Namibia.9 As for Brazil’s own maritimepower projection in the South Atlantic, it remained weak, restricted by the limitations of asmall fleet. Brazil’s nuclear weapons programme, which never yielded completedweapons, was discontinued, and Brazil signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1998.

Around the turn of the millennium, Brazilian interests in Africa increased.MERCOSUR signed a Preferential Trade Agreement with the Southern African CustomsUnion. In addition, under the administration of Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva (2003–2010),Brazilian foreign policy discourse began stressing the need to boost South–Southcooperation, with Lula undertaking an active presidential diplomacy in this regard.Despite a desire to establish regional hegemony in South America, Brazil encounteredsignificant contestation by neighbours such as Argentina, Chile and Venezuela, optinginstead to project itself as a global player through initiatives such as developmentcooperation and the BRICS.10 Brazil was experiencing a period of relative growth,fuelled in part by surging Asian demand for its agricultural commodities, and largeBrazilian firms became more internationalised, often with financial backing from theBrazilian Development Bank (BNDES). The rapid growth of some African economiesattracted some of these corporations, and the global economic crisis further intensified thesearch for new economic partners among other developing countries. Brazilian civilsociety entities also began articulating with their African counterparts in developmentcooperation as well, occasionally, in contesting development cooperation initiatives.

During this same period, Brazilian defence policy-makers also began attributinggreater importance to the South Atlantic, in effect redefining Brazil’s strategic vicinity toencompass Atlantic Africa. This new emphasis is reflected in the defence policydocuments such as the 2008 National Defence Strategy and the 2012 White Paper, bothof which elevate the South Atlantic to the same degree of importance previously accordedto the River Plate and the Amazon.11 The government also undertook a naval upgrading

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and modernisation project, which includes the acquisition of additional vessels as well asthe development (in partnership with France) of a nuclear propulsion attack submarine inaddition to four conventional submarines. The government justifies these projects as waysto enhance Brazilian deterrence capacity within the South Atlantic, especially given thediscovery of large reserves of pre-salt oil within Brazil’s maritime Exclusive EconomicZone. Other strategies include Brazil’s request, filed with UNCLOS, to expand its legalwaters based on surveys of its continental shelf and carried out under the banner of the‘Blue Amazon’ campaign to generate popular support for Brazil’s maritime power build-up. Finally, Brazil has boosted its research efforts in Antarctica, including a planned new,expanded Antarctic base after fire destroyed most of Brazil’s original installationsin 2012.

As Brazilian actors and interests in the South Atlantic diversify, new securityconcerns have also appeared within Brazilian discourses about the region. Brazil’sengagement with Guinea-Bissau, a fellow Community of Portuguese-Language Countriesmember, includes its leadership of the UN Peacebuilding Commission Country-SpecificConfiguration, and has entailed not only providing development cooperation, but alsoworking on security reform sector efforts under conditions of high political instability.Moreover, a surge in piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and the growing transatlantic drug tradehave prompted the Brazilian government to pay greater attention to security issues inAfrica. These interests and concerns have continued to grow under the government ofBrazilian President Dilma Rousseff, who has restructured the debt of 12 Africancountries, most of them located on the South Atlantic, and worked to boost developmentcooperation by opening an office of BNDES in South Africa.12

South Africa

As for South Africa, the second largest economy in Africa and the only state situatedbetween the South Atlantic and Indian oceans, it has also become a key player in theSouth Atlantic region. Prior to 1994, owing to its tense relations with some Africanneighbours – in part a result of its Apartheid-era destabilisation campaigns meant to haltthe spread of communism in Africa – and the widespread, if not universal, condemnationof its segregationist regime by many other states, South Africa became increasinglyisolated from world politics. At the same time, South Africa was once the only localnuclear power in the South Atlantic, having produced several nuclear weapons through aresearch programme that lasted from the 1960s to the 1980s.13

The Apartheid regime, anticipating majority rule through upcoming elections,dismantled its nuclear programme, thus making South Africa the first nation in theworld to voluntarily give up all nuclear arms, eventually signing the Non-ProliferationTreaty. However, South Africa’s isolation during the latter part of the Cold War wasreflected in its non-participation in the initial launch of ZOPACAS. In light of its growingisolation, the South African government tried to foment bilateral cooperation withcountries across the South Atlantic not only in economic terms, but also with respect tosecurity and political ties. It promoted joint air–naval exercises and encouraged visits ofhigh-ranking officers of Latin-American armed forces. Owing to the pressure of theinternational community to maintain Pretoria’s isolation, many of these initiatives, suchas exchange programmes for military training and arms transfers, were carried out insecrecy. During the Malvinas/Falklands War, South Africa denied the UK permission touse its naval base at Simon’s Town as a logistic support station for British operations inthe South Atlantic.14 In terms of trade, a South Africa–South America Chamber of

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Commerce, established in 1970, allowed for a modest increase in the exchange of goodsacross the South Atlantic.

With the end of Apartheid in 1994, South Africa worked to strengthen itsinternational ties through multilateral and bilateral initiatives. At the same time,democratisation on both sides of the South Atlantic helped the region’s states to findcommon political ground for deepening cooperation. Moreover, South Africa has grownacutely aware of its maritime dimension, including its marine and mineral resources andthe importance of its maritime trade routes (96% of South African exports are transportedby sea), putting the defence of its territorial waters among the new government’spriorities. Nonetheless, building up maritime power remains a long-term project, mostlyowing to scarce resources: South Africa’s military budget is limited, comprising only1.2% of its GDP. Although defence expenditures are difficult to compare across states,this rate seems to be lower than most key players within the South Atlantic.15

Indeed, within the South Atlantic, one of the main challenges for South Africa hasbeen to help guarantee the stability of the oil-rich Gulf of Guinea. South Africa hasencouraged regional efforts, mainly through the Economic Community of West AfricanStates (ECOWAS). Besides strengthening its ties with African partners, South Africaviews cooperation with countries on the other side of the South Atlantic Ocean asbeneficial. It has signed bilateral military agreements with several Latin American statesand participates in security initiatives designed to tackle trans-oceanic illicit activities –not just piracy but also drug-trafficking, arms-smuggling and poaching.

In multilateral terms, South Africa has participated, since the mid-1990s, in theATLASUR annual naval exercises with Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay, deepening tieswith these countries’ armed forces and strengthening the message that the defence of theSouth Atlantic region is a matter for Southern Hemisphere states.16 In 1994 South Africajoined ZOPACAS, calling for multilayered cooperation that extends beyond defence andnon-proliferation to include development, poverty alleviation and technology transferamong the states of the South Atlantic rim. In addition, South Africa has hosted theIBSAMAR trilateral exercises, which have brought Brazilian and Indian navies to itscoast for a series of joint exercises and simulations of increasing complexity. Finally,South Africa – an original signatory of the Antarctic Treaty – has an Antarctic base aswell as a national programme (SANAP) to foment research on the continent.

South Africa has also stepped up its transatlantic trade. Between 1994 and 2013,South Africa entered into a total of 45 Bilateral Investments Agreements, 40% of whichwere signed with African and South American countries. At the multilateral level, in 2000South Africa signed an agreement to create a free trade area with MERCOSUR, with theobjective of enhancing trade ties among the countries through trade liberalisation,economic cooperation and the development of closer relations. The global financial crisishas underscored the importance of diversifying South Africa’s export markets away fromEurope, leading many South Africa-based companies – including mining corporationsAngloAmerican and IMPLATS – to classify South America as a strategic market. SouthAfrican companies have also carried out minerals exploration in Brazil through jointventures. Furthermore, the second largest South African company (SASOL) is operatingin oil fields in São Paulo state. South Africa’s financial sector has also boosted its South–South ties within the region. Standard Bank, the largest African banking group asmeasured by assets (approximately $183 billion), operates in 18 African countries as wellas in Brazil and Argentina.17

South Africa’s defence industry has also expanded its ties across the South Atlantic.The largest manufacturer of defence equipment in South Africa, DENEL, is currently

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developing a fifth generation air-to-air missile, the A-DARTER, as part of a cooperationproject between the Brazilian and South African air forces. Although South Africa’slocation between two oceans means that its strategic vicinity straddles multiple regions,its interest in the South Atlantic clearly has been growing, and its evolving identity as adiverse democracy has served as a new basis for trans-South Atlantic cooperation sincethe demise of the Apartheid regime.

BRICS From Without: India, China, and Russia in the South Atlantic

Although the remaining BRICS states are not situated geographically within the region,they have become important players within the South Atlantic, not just economically butalso, increasingly, from a political standpoint. This section examines the roles of India,China and Russia, followed by the relevance to the South Atlantic of the BRICS as acollective actor.

India

The Indian presence in the South Atlantic originated when Indian traders establishedearly communities across Africa, and grew when Britain took indentured labourers fromIndia to its other colonies around the South Atlantic.18 The number of persons of Indianorigin in countries along the South Atlantic Ocean includes 1.2 million in South Africa,0.5 million in Trinidad and Tobago, 330,000 in Guyana, 140,000 in Suriname and 30,000in Nigeria.19 To boost its links with such communities, in 1937 the Indian governmentfounded the Indian Overseas Bank, which provides financial backing for India’s diasporacommunities around the world. In 2004, it established the Ministry of Overseas IndianAffairs, which nurtures networks with and amongst Indians overseas and promotes tradeand investment, development and technology initiatives.

Twenty years after India’s independence, it began developing a role in the SouthAtlantic. In the 1960s and 1970s, even though India’s development model was inward-looking, its government signed several treaties and agreements with Latin Americanand African states, covering economic, cultural and scientific cooperation; partnersincluded Brazil, Argentina and Guyana,20 as well as Senegal and Cameroon. Yet it wasonly after the end of the Cold War and with India’s appearance as a rising powerthat its role in the South Atlantic intensified and diversified. India’s bilateral tradewith Africa has flourished particularly rapidly. From the 1990s until 2011, these flowsincreased from $1 billion to $32 billion. Since the turn of the millennium, some 70Indian companies invested in 130 greenfield projects in Africa, totalling $25 billion;Indian FDI outflows to Africa increased from $243 million in 2000 to $2.4 billion in2008.21

The energy sector, especially oil and gas, has become one of India’s priorities in theregion as India works to diminish its dependence on Middle East oil and to find newways to sustain economic growth.22 Energy security concerns have prompted India todeepen ties with the region’s major oil producers, including Nigeria – where India hasovertaken the US as the largest export market – as well as Venezuela, Angola,Democratic Republic of Congo and Colombia. More recently, the Indian governmenthas expressed hopes that Indian companies will take part in Brazil’s pre-salt oilprospecting auctions.23 The major Indian player in this area is the stated-owned Oil andNatural Gas Corporation, but the Indian government has also facilitated investments inagriculture, infrastructure and industry, and has granted credit lines to Guyana, Suriname

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and Congo. Private sector firms are also involved in the pharmacy, services, constructionand telecommunication segments; India’s Airtel, for instance, operates in 19 Africancountries. India sometimes accrues political benefits from these exchanges; for instance,its loans are often reciprocated with support for India’s bid for a permanent seat in the UNSecurity Council. Finally, India has sought to boost trade with the MERCOSUR statesthrough the Fixed Tariff Preferences Agreement signed in 2003.

This cooperation – like that of the BRICS in general – is typically carried out under adiscourse that stresses horizontality and mutual benefits, stressing the common identity ofIndia as a fellow developing country. In addition, in countries with large numbers ofpersons of Indian origin, Indian cooperation rhetoric emphasises the historical andcultural links formed by those diaspora communities. Finally, the Indian governmentfrequently identifies India as a fellow diverse democracy in dealing with Brazil, Nigeriaand South Africa.

In terms of security, India participates in the trilateral IBSAMAR naval exercises,described in greater detail below. In addition, in 2007 India carried out two significantdefence cooperation initiatives in the South Atlantic:24 an agreement to provide Gabonwith expertise in disaster management and healthcare, and a memorandum ofunderstanding to carry out exchanges in military training and information technologywith Nigeria. The spread of non-traditional threats in the South Atlantic has also raisednew concerns for India, whose merchant vessels have suffered pirate attacks in the IndianOcean. As a result, it has been joining debates and initiatives to combat piracy within theGulf of Guinea for, as one Indian strategic analyst has stated, it is just a matter of timebefore Indian ships patrol the African coast of the South Atlantic.25 Finally, Indiamaintains a presence in Antarctica through its Indian Antarctic Programme, which isanchored in two permanent bases on the continent.

China

Like India’s role in the South Atlantic, that of China is relatively new, but it has increasedin a much more dramatic way. Despite the geographic distance separating China from theSouth Atlantic, changes in Chinese foreign policy since the end of the Cold War havebeen keenly felt within the region, with a surge of Chinese actors and interests. Thispresence encompasses not only the Chinese state, through its proactive bilateral andmultilateral diplomacy and development cooperation agreements, but also a vast numberof companies (both state-owned and private sector) and the region’s Chinese diasporacommunities, some of which are – like those of India – centuries old.

China’s economic interests in the South Atlantic centre on importing mineralresources and other primary products from partners in Africa and Latin America whileoften exporting manufactured goods. Recent discoveries of non-renewable energy sourcessuch as oil and natural gas – including pre-salt oil – have attracted Chinese attention,especially given the region’s stability as compared with other oil-producing parts of theworld, including the Middle East. In addition, China has become an essential tradepartner to most countries within the South Atlantic region, having surpassed the US tobecome the top commercial partner of Brazil, Venezuela, Nigeria, Angola and SouthAfrica, among others, with part of its trade and investments in the region motivated byconcerns about China’s food security.26

Like other non-Atlantic BRICS, China’s political relations with South Atlantic statesencompass multilateral forums, including the UN, the Bretton Woods institutionsand regional organisations such as the Inter-American Development Bank, as well as

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coalitions such as the G-20 and the BRICS. Through the latter, China collaborates withother developing countries within the South Atlantic to call for reform of globalgovernance institutions. In addition, China increasingly frames its cooperation as aconcrete alternative to assistance from advanced economies. This competitive stance hasincluded efforts to woo countries on both sides of the Atlantic that still recognise Taiwan,furthering Beijing’s One China Policy.

From a security standpoint, China’s top concerns remain in Asia and the Pacific, andthe Chinese government does not have a regional policy for the South Atlantic. However,its deepening involvement in the region has made China more concerned about securingkey trade routes, including those near the Gulf of Guinea. In addition, China hasincreased contributions to peacekeeping operations as part of its soft power strategy,including in Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Congo and Côte d’Ivoire.

Although China’s perspective of the South Atlantic is still centred on the continentaldimensions of Latin America and Africa, its growing involvement and familiarity withthe South Atlantic has helped to increase awareness of and interest in the region. InNovember 2013, a fleet of three warships visited Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires, andthe Chinese navy has also made port calls in South Africa. Perhaps more than any otherBRICS, China has developed a keen interest in Antarctica. Since 1983, it has set up fourAntarctic stations and is establishing a fifth, along with a significantly increased budgetfor Antarctic research.

Russia

Russia’s presence in the region has not been quite as visible as that of China, but it hasalso grown considerably over the past decade. While there are few historical precedentsfor this contemporary presence, in 1819, Russian explorer Thaddeus von Bellingshausencrossed the South Atlantic and claimed to be the first recorded person to see the Antarcticcontinent, in 1820.27 A significant state presence in the South Atlantic was onlyestablished during the Cold War, when the Soviet Union helped several African coloniesto attain independence, backing socialist regimes and financing groups opposed to theregion’s capitalist governments. The USSR developed a variety of interests in the SouthAtlantic, viewing local states as promising markets for arms sales as well as importantsources of minerals. South America, on the other hand, remained firmly within the USsphere of influence. Despite Soviet attempts to penetrate the region by financingcommunist groups and guerrillas, the USSR’s role in Latin America was predominantlyan indirect one.

In the post-Cold War era, the Russian presence in the South Atlantic has noticeablyincreased. Russia’s 2013 Foreign Policy Concept mentions Russian interests in bothAfrica and in Latin America.28 According to the text, the Russian government is trying todiversify its economic and political partnerships on both continents. Russian outreachefforts around the South Atlantic have focused on Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, Angolaand South Africa, as well as international organisations including MERCOSUR, theSouth African Development Community and ECOWAS.29 In terms of security, however,Russia’s Maritime Doctrine, released in 2001, stated that NATO’s growing influence inthe Atlantic diminishes the need for Russian maritime activities in the region.30 Thisstance may of course be revisited in the wake of NATO’s actions elsewhere on the globefollowing the annexation of the Crimea from Ukraine in 2014.

To underscore Russian interests in Latin America and Africa, Russian PresidentDmitri Medvedev (2008–2012) made several visits to the region, including the first visit

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of a Russian head of state to Venezuela (2008) and Nigeria (2009).31 When Medvedevvisited Caracas, the Russian Navy, in its first trip to South America since the collapse ofthe Soviet Union, carried out a joint military exercise with the Venezuelan Navy.Medvedev’s successor as president, Vladimir Putin, also travelled to the region in 2013,visiting South Africa for the fifth BRICS Summit and to sign a strategic partnership withSouth Africa that foresaw Russian assistance with the development of South Africa’snuclear industry.32 In 2014, with the Ukraine crisis already underway, Putin flew toFortaleza, Brazil for the sixth BRICS summit, and used the occasion to make bilateralvisits to Cuba, Nicaragua and Argentina in addition to meeting several Latin Americanheads of state in Brasília.

Both private and public companies from Russia have interests in South America andAfrica, including the Gazprom Group, VTB Group, Rusal, Alrosa and Technopromex-port. The Russian national defence export company, Rosoboronexport, has signed majordeals with Venezuela, Brazil and Angola to sell helicopters, technology, air defencesystems, fighter jets and tanks. Because Brazil is hosting the 2014 World Cup and the2016 Olympics, its government is negotiating with Russia the purchase of air defencemissile systems and anti-aircraft portable missiles. In 2013, Brazil and Russia agreed todeepen military cooperation, creating working groups for the cybernetic and spacesecurity sectors and establishing a political-strategic dialogue for defence and interna-tional security.33 Russian airship company RosAeroSystems has proposed to transportpeople and equipment to Brazil’s pre-salt oil platforms, arguing that airships are cheaper,more stable and need less fuel than airplanes.34

With Angola, the Russian government signed the Angosat Project Contract, a jointproject to launch the first Angolan communication satellite. The project brings togetherthe Angolan government and Russian companies, with financing from a consortium ofRussian banks led by Vnesheconombank. In Venezuela, the Russian National OilConsortium operates in hydrocarbon prospecting and exploration in the Orinoco Riverbasin. Finally, in Guinea, the world’s largest aluminium company, Rusal, has a hugebauxite and alumina complex, responsible for more than 30% of the company’s bauxiteoutputs (more than 5.3 million tonnes per year); it has also become the largest foreignemployer in Guinea.35

Russia also has growing interests in minerals prospecting within the South AtlanticOcean. In 2012, Russia signed a contract with the International Seabed Authority toexplore polymetallic sulphide in the Mid-Atlantic Ridge, between Cape Verde and theCaribbean, for 15 years.36 As for Antarctica, because of Bellingshausen’s voyage, theRussian government claims part of the continent; the USSR was one of the originalparties to the Antarctic Treaty and began installing scientific bases on the continent in1960. Russia currently operates six Antarctic stations.

The BRICS’ collective relevance to the South Atlantic

In addition to the individual states’ roles within the South Atlantic, the BRICS’ relevanceto the region also increases as the political grouping becomes more institutionalised andlaunches concrete projects, including some with a specific South Atlantic component.Notable among these is the project of the BRICS cable network, first proposed in 2011 bySouth Africa at the third BRICS summit, held in China. During the 2012 summit, theBRICS states announced that they would seek to establish a network of undersea fibre-optic cables linking major cities in the BRICS countries.37

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The network would originate in Vladivostok (Russia) and pass through Shantou(China), Singapore (Singapore), Chennai (India), Port Louis (Mauritius), Cape Town(South Africa) and Fortaleza (Brazil) before ending in Miami (USA). If completed, thecable will be the world’s third largest chain of transmission cables. South Africa’sparticipation expands the network’s reach because the country is also embedded in twoother network transmission cables: the West African Cable System, which links SouthAfrica to the UK via the African coast, and the SEACOM network, which supplies boththe West and the East African networks with underwater and land fibre-optic high-speedcables.

The cable project has gained new relevance owing to ongoing debates about cybersecurity, since fibre-optic cables are often targeted by electronic espionage interceptionefforts. As intra-BRICS relations deepen, the amount of data that is exchanged acrossthese countries increases, creating new needs for securing the flow of information. Inaddition, the BRICS cable project claims to seek to democratise cyberspace, makingroom for new actors and diminishing the influence of the US and its allies in how theInternet is governed. This aspect of the cable project seems aligned with recent efforts,led by Brazil within the UN, to press for international regulation of electronic espionage.

Finally, the BRICS cable project can be considered as part of the search for greaterautonomy by the BRICS countries, diminishing their dependence on the advancedeconomies for information technology and exchanges. Since a considerable portion of theBRICS cable network project will cross the South Atlantic, the project will make theregion a nexus for connectivity among actors hitherto geographically distinct, giving thisspace new strategic relevance.

While the BRICS cable project is the most concrete proposal put forth so far in thearea of security, a December 2013 meeting held in Cape Town that brought togetherrepresentatives from the BRICS states’ national security institutions suggests that thegrouping’s security agenda is broadening.38 The meeting, held in preparation for the 2014BRICS summit in Brazil, touched not only on cyber security, but also on terrorism andpiracy, with working groups established to explore potential areas of collaboration. InFebruary 2014, Brazil proposed that the BRICS collaborate in Antarctica through jointoceanographic expeditions and research using the five countries’ bases.

Given the incidence of piracy within the Gulf of Guinea and violent insurgencies,including those labelled by some states and entities as terrorist initiatives, these dialogueshave direct bearing on peace and stability within the South Atlantic. In fact, the BRICSstates have stepped up discussions regarding conflict resolution in general. Given theirsomewhat overlapping stances regarding respect for national sovereignty, the search foralternatives to military interventionism may have direct bearing on armed conflicts withinthe region.

Beyond the realm of security, the upcoming launch of the BRICS development bankis also relevant to the South Atlantic. The institution represents the beginning of effortsby the BRICS to coordinate action and to formulate alternative norms within the field ofdevelopment cooperation. While the issue of whether the BRICS promote an alternativestate-led development model is still the subject of hot debate, they increasingly presentthemselves – including through the political grouping – as offering alternatives to North–South relations. Given the prevalence of poverty and inequality in many parts of theSouth Atlantic, the normative role of the BRICS in development could bring directconsequences (positive or negative) to partner states and their populations.

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Conclusion

For centuries, the South Atlantic was a space characterised by North–South ties, withcolonial and then advanced economies dominating economic, political and securityrelations with countries on both the Latin American and African sides of the SouthAtlantic. Even Antarctica – arguably the southernmost ‘border’ of the region – wasexplored primarily by states located within the Northern Hemisphere. Over the pastdecade, this article has shown, the growing role within the South Atlantic of developingcountries – including rising powers located outside the region – has significantly alteredthe power dynamics of the region, either alongside or (in some places) in place of waninginfluence from the advanced economies. In other words, the South Atlantic is becoming aspace where South–South ties predominate.

There are both accidental and conscious forces behind these shifts. The globalisationof rising powers’ economies, including their trade in commodities and the expandingreach of their investments, accrue within the South Atlantic region through anincremental process that is not always state-led. At the same time, the political projectof reviving (indeed, reinventing) South–South cooperation in more concrete, coherentways than had been achieved during the Cold War has generated new alignments andmotivations. The ZOPACAS, for instance, is clearly meant to keep South Atlanticdefence issues a matter for Southern Hemisphere states, which entails the exclusion ofactors that have a long history within the region.

While the US and European states are still significant stakeholders within the SouthAtlantic, the region’s relations are characterised by a growing complexity. The BRICScontribute to this complexity both individually (i.e. as sets of actors related to a specificBRICS state) and collectively, as the grouping reaches new levels of institutionalisationand begins launching concrete projects and showing some degree of political coordina-tion on issues such as military interventionism and cyber security. The BRICS, bothindividually and collectively, are contributing towards the erosion of US hegemony –precisely at a time when the US has limited capacity to project power in multiple placesoutside of its immediate vicinity – thereby helping to create a zone of primarily South–South exchanges and influence. While this process started out unintentionally, andprimarily through economic insertion, the grouping has, through projects like the BRICScable, increasingly realised the changing strategic significance of the South Atlantic.These findings suggest that, rather than simply using regional institutions to challengeNorthern norms, as Ikenberry and Wright predicted, the BRICS can also use trans-regional spaces to contest the current order, even if indirectly.

At the same time, it is worth noting that, in all cases, the BRICS states’ growing rolewithin the South Atlantic entails a complex mix of (and articulation between) state andnon-state actors, as well as very heterogeneous local responses to rapidly changingdynamics triggered by these emerging actors.

Overall, the current scenario suggests that there is significant continuity in the SouthAtlantic, in the sense that external actors are still important to the South Atlantic region.On the other hand, the ‘new’ external actors, such as the BRICS from outside the region,seem less interested than their predecessors in pursuing conflict-related goals orobjectives structured around zero-sum ideological confrontations such as those seenduring the Cold War. Instead, for now these actors are motivated primarily by the pursuitof material resources and, on a secondary plane, political alignments that may translateinto further gains, for instance within multilateral forums. However, interests aredynamic; they change across time as states accumulate presence and influence within a

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particular area of the world. What seems clear from the analysis presented here is that therelevance of the BRICS to the South Atlantic is a long-term trend rather than a fleetingstate of affairs.

As such, their impact on local states and populations in the South Atlantic is deservingof greater scrutiny. Despite the BRICS’ largely overlapping discourses of horizontality andmutual benefit, these emerging flows and influences are not devoid of power imbalances:the BRICS bring new asymmetries to the region, even as they help to fuel growth andcreate pockets of prosperity within both the South American and African sides of theSouth Atlantic. Although there is growing competition among the BRICS themselves,including over markets and natural resources, this competition does not preclude commoncontestation of existing norms. For instance, insofar as the BRICS represent concretealternatives to Western models of governance and development, their increasing influencehas political and even ideological repercussions for societies within the South Atlanticregion. Given these possibilities, further research on the South Atlantic should examine thepoints of tension and receptivity that have surfaced within the region with respect tothe BRICS. In addition, recognising that there are other emerging players adding to thenew dynamics of competition and cooperation within the region, future analysis of thechanging panorama of the South Atlantic could examine the role of external states suchas Iran and Turkey, as well as local players such as Nigeria and Argentina. Such analyseswill help to shed further light on the changing dynamics of the South Atlantic.

Notes on contributors and acknowledgementsAdriana Erthal Abdenur (Ph.D. Princeton, AB Harvard) is a professor at the Institute of InternationalRelations of the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio). Maiara Folly, KayoMoura, Sergio A.S. Jordão, and Pedro Maia are students and researchers at the Institute.

The authors wish to thank the Pro-Defesa programme, a joint initiative by the Coordenação deAperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nivel Superior (CAPES) and the Ministério da Defesa, forsupporting this research.

Notes1. Ikenberry GJ, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order

After Major Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.2. Ikenberry GJ & T Wright, ‘Rising powers and global institutions’. Policy Report. New York:

The Century Foundation, 2007.3. Neumann I, ‘A region building approach to Northern Europe’, Review of International

Studies, 20, 1994, pp. 53–74.4. Buzan B & O Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.5. Rockoff H, ‘U.S. economy in World War I’, EH.net, Tucson, 19 October 2013.6. Garcia EV, ‘De como o Brasil quase se tornou membro permanente do Conselho de Segurança

da ONU em 1945’, Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 54.1, 2011, pp. 159–177.7. UN, ‘Declaration of a Zone of Peace And Co-operation in the South Atlantic’, New York, 27

October 1986.8. Hurrell A, ‘The politics of South Atlantic security: A survey of proposals for a South Atlantic

Treaty Organisation’, International Affairs, 59.2, 1983, pp. 179–193.9. Medeiros RC, ‘O Acordo de Cooperação Militar Brasil–Namíbia como instrumento de

consolidação da Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul’, Revista Marítima Brasileira,122.7/9, 2002, pp. 167–190.

10. Malamud A, ‘A leader without followers? The growing divergence between the regional andglobal performance of Brazilian foreign policy’, Latin American Politics and Society, 53.3,2011, pp. 1–24.

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11. Abdenur AE & DM Souza Neto, ‘O Brasil e a cooperação em defesa: a construção de umaidentidade regional no Atlântico Sul’, Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 57.1,pp. 5–21.

12. O Documento (Cuiabá, Brazil), ‘BNDES inaugura escritório de representação na África doSul’, 6 December 2013.

13. Van Wyck J, ‘South Africa’s nuclear future’, South African Institute of International AffairsOccasional Paper 150. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2013.

14. Leyses A, ‘South Africa’s relations with Latin America (1966–1988)’, Unisa Centre for LatinAmerican Studies Occasional Paper 6. Pretoria: Unisa Centre for Latin American Stud-ies, 1992.

15. World Bank, 2012. Defence expenditures: Brazil 1.5%; Russia 4.5%; China 2%; India 2.4%;Angola 3.5%; Namibia 3.4%.

16. Jordão SLM, As Perspectivas de Cooperação Bilateral e Multilateral, entre o Brasil, e osPaíses do Continente Africano, para a Consolidação da Segurança Marítima do AtlânticoSul. Rio de Janeiro: Escola de Guerra Naval, 2009.

17. Standard Bank, Our Business. Johannesburg (n.d.), http://corporateandinvestment.standardbank.com/CIBGlobal/about-us

18. Pravasi Bhartiya Divas Meeting, South Africa. Indian Diaspora, pp. 71–88.19. Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, ‘Population of non-resident indians (NRIs): Country

wise’, New Delhi, 2012.20. All the treaties and agreements cited in this paragraph are available at: http://www.mea.gov.in/

bilateral-documents.htm?53/Bilateral/Multilateral_Documents21. Barka BH & M Kupukile, ‘India’s economic engagement with Africa’, Africa Economic Brief,

2.6, 2011.22. Neves MS, ‘A China e a Índia no Atlântico Sul’, Relações Internacionais, 38, 2013,

pp. 71–94.23. Seshasayee H, ‘Tapping into Latin America’s oil’, Americas Quarterly, 4 November 2013.24. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, ‘India’s foreign relation 2007: Section V

Africa’, New Delhi, 2007, http://www.mea.gov.in/images/main_2007.pdf25. Quartz S & L Vine, ‘New global navy challenges U.S. dominance on the seas,’ Government

Executive 17, May 2013.26. Myers M, ‘China Eyes Latin America to fill its kitchen cupboard’, Caixin Online, 1 August

2014, http://english.caixin.com/2014-01-08/100626498.html27. There is debate about who actually first saw Antarctica: while Russians say it was

Bellingshausen, the British insist that it was Edward Brandsfield, and the Americans claimit was Nathaniel Palmer.

28. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, ‘Concept of the foreign policy ofthe Russian Federation’, Moscow, 12 February 2013.

29. Arkhangelskaya A & V Shubin, Is Russia Back? Realities of Russian Engagement in Africa.London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 2013.

30. Russian Federation, ‘Maritime doctrine of Russian Federation 2020’, Moscow, 27 July 2001.31. President of Russia, ‘Map of Visits Abroad’, Moscow, President of Russia website, 2013,

http://kremlin.ru/visits32. ‘Putin offers help to South African nuclear industry’, World Nuclear News (London), 28

March 2013.33. Ministério da Defesa, ‘Brasil e Rússia decidem ampliar cooperação em defesa’, Brasília, 16

October 2013.34. Hora P, ‘Pré-Sal Atrai Fabricante de Dirigíveis da Rússia’, Petronotícias, 19 April 2013,

http://www.petronoticias.com.br35. Rusal, ‘Guinea’, Moscow, 2013, http://rusal.ru/en/development/social_investment/gvinea.aspx36. International Seabed Authority, Contractors, Kingstown, International Seabed Authority

website, n.d., http://www.isa.org.jm/en/scientific/exploration/contractors37. Brics Cable, ‘BRICS cable network’, BRICS Cable, 2013, http://www.bricscable.com/

network/. See also The Voice of Russia (Moscow), ‘BRICS countries are building a “newInternet” hidden from NSA’, 28 October 2013, http://voiceofrussia.com/2013_10_28/BRICS-countries-are-building-a-new-Internet-hidden-from-NSA-7157/

38. ‘BRICS officials meet on national security’, Shanghai Daily, 6 December 2013, http://www.shanghaidaily.com/article/article_xinhua.aspx?id=185480

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