SOUTH AFRICA IN THE BRICS-AFRICA RELATIONSHIPAmbitions, Challenges, and ParadoxesFolashadé Soulé-Kohndou

De Boeck Supérieur | « Afrique contemporaine »

2013/4 No 248 | pages 31 - 43 ISSN 0002-0478ISBN 9782804185558

This document is a translation of:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Folashadé Soulé-Kohndou, « L'Afrique du Sud dans la relation BRICS-Afrique », Afriquecontemporaine 2013/4 (No 248), p. 31-43.DOI 10.3917/afco.248.0031--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Translated from the French by JPD Systems Available online at :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------http://www.cairn-int.info/article-E_AFCO_248_0031--south-africa-in-the-brics-africa.htm--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

How to cite this article :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Folashadé Soulé-Kohndou, « L'Afrique du Sud dans la relation BRICS-Afrique », Afriquecontemporaine 2013/4 (No 248), p. 31-43.DOI 10.3917/afco.248.0031--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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South Africa in the BRICS-Africa Relationship I

South Africa in the BRICS-Africa RelationshipAmbitions, Challenges, and ParadoxesFolashadé Soulé-Kohndou

South Africa’s place among the BRICS raises a number of issues. Seen from a macroeconomic point of view, the small size of its GDP, its growth, and its population make its inclusion in this group of large emerging economies questionable. The invitation extended to it in December 2010 to join the group was first and foremost the result of diplomatic initiatives. This paper analyzes the diplomatic strategies South Africa deployed in order to join the group and demonstrates its diplomatic instrumentalization of its self-appointed status as leader in Africa and linchpin of the BRICS-Africa relationship. This instru-mentalization, which primarily serves its own interests, did not take place without causing a number of undesirable effects.Key words: South Africa – BRICS – diplomacy – South-South relations – NEPAD – Nelson Mandela – Thabo Mbeki – Jacob Zuma

Since 1994, post-apartheid South Africa has followed a foreign policy oriented mainly toward the strengthening of South-South relations, that is, with developing countries. Under the apartheid regime and despite the arms embargo, international sanctions, and the political, diplomatic, and economic isola-tion of the country, South Africa’s foreign policy was oriented largely toward the North and in particular Europe and the

United States, who were traditional partners of the Union of South Africa. In determining its earliest foreign policy immediately following the abolition of apartheid, the African National Congress (ANC) openly adopted a diplomatic line that favored links with the South.

This new focus resulted in the country increasingly joining bodies and groups that bring developing countries together, with South Africa actively seeking to play a leadership role in these groupings.1 During Nelson Mandela’s presidency, South Africa’s foreign policy was governed both by the universal

Folashadé Soulé-Kohndou is Doctor in Political Science at Centre d’Études

et de Recherches Internationales (CERI - Sciences Po, Paris) and Research Associate with the

Global Economic Governance Program (Oxford University).

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II BRICS and Africa: Ambitions and Realities of an Influential Group Afrique contemporaine 248

1. ANC Policy Document, “Foreign Policy Perspective in Democratic South Africa,” December 1, 1994.2. Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), “Strategic Plan 2007–2010.” Following Jacob Zuma’s election as president of South Africa in 2009, the DFA became the

Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO)3. The IBSA Dialogue Forum was formed in June 2003 in Brasilia and included India, Brazil, and South Africa.4. Speech by South African Minister of International Relations Maite

Nkoana-Mashabane to the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) on the subject of “The Relationship between South Africa and the Emerging Global Powers,” November 1, 2010.

foreign policy principle and the strengthening of relations with all countries, but with priority given to African countries and those countries of the South with whom the apartheid government had had impaired relations. As soon as apartheid came to an end, South African President Nelson Mandela announced that South Africa would thereafter focus on strengthening South-South rela-tions so as to counter any economic isolation (Mandela 1993). Positioning South Africa as a country of the South and promoting South-South relations emerged as the priority issue in foreign policy for each successive government and is cited as a key objective in the then Department of Foreign Affairs’ strategic plans.2 In fact, this priority is part of the training curriculum for candidates planning a career in the South African diplomatic service (Muller 1998).

Several strategies have been put in place to build South Africa’s identity as a country of the South whose destiny is primarily regional and international. One of these is the forging of coalitions with developing countries within mul-tilateral organizations. From 1994 under Nelson Mandela, South Africa sought to enhance its position through such coalitions and expanded alliances with the G77 and the Non-Aligned Movement (among others) so as to break out of the isolation in which it had been trapped under the apartheid regime. South Africa then continued to position itself as a country of the South during Thabo Mbeki’s first presidency in 1998, rooting itself in Africa through the formation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the strength-ening of the former Organization of African Unity into the African Union in 2002, including its regional African organizations. Even outside of regional and subregional organizations, South Africa maintained a vigorous activism in forging international coalitions within multilateral organizations but also in launching cooperation forums of varying degrees of formality. These coalitions were aimed at specific goals, such as challenges to agricultural subsidies in NAMA+11 (Non-Agricultural Market Access), the G20+, and the WTO.

This strategy went through various phases, especially from 2003 during Thabo Mbeki’s second presidency, with the growing rise to power of emerging countries and an increasing awareness of these new actors’ potential inf luence. Under Thabo Mbeki, South Africa’s foreign policy was character-ized by its closer engagement with emerging economic powerhouses such as Brazil and a strengthening of the low-level relations that had been maintained with India and China. This mobilization was implemented with the Group O5 campaigning for membership of the G8 for Brazil, Mexico, India, South Africa, and China before the creation of the G20, whose formation had been

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South Africa in the BRICS-Africa Relationship III

ensured through the individual impetus—and sometimes the joint efforts—of India, Brazil, and South Africa. Thabo Mbeki also proposed the formation of a G-South or G8-South grouping, to act as a counterweight to the traditional G8 and to persuade it to adopt a series of undertakings regarding trade, debt relief for developing countries, social policies, and development aid. He perceived this as an opportunity for developing countries to coordinate their approach as fellow members and to assume a more active role in international organizations so as to advance the South’s interests (Landsberg 2006). One of the outcomes of this joint approach was the IBSA forum.3 This priority persisted under the presidency of Jacob Zuma and was given form in 2009 through South Africa’s diplomatic activism toward entry to the BRIC forum.

South Africa’s Activism for Joining the ClubThe 2006 formation of the BRIC diplomatic club, arising from a Russian initiative at the United Nations, did not at first include South Africa. From 2009, the initial decision to deploy the BRIC coalition in classic summit diplo-macy style also excluded South Africa. This was not a casual act. At the time, BRIC regarded itself as a political and diplomatic manifestation of the origi-nal “BRIC” acronym given it by Goldman Sachs, the investment bank that had identified these emerging economies as future global economic powerhouses and that did not include South Africa.

BRICs meetings, which took the form of annual summits, excited South Africa’s interest and led it to express its intention of joining the group at the time of its first summit in 2009 at Yekaterinburg, Russia, thus becoming the first country to show interest in joining the group.4 Maite Nkoana Mashabane, the South African minister of international relations (DIRCO) wrote a letter to

Table 1 – Characteristics of BRICS economies

GDP (US$) GDR growth

Population Surface area (km2)

Military expenditure (US$ ‘000s)

Brazil 2,476,652,189,879 2.7 198,656,019 8,514,880 36,882

Russia 1,899,086,233,311 4.3 142,960,000 17,098,240 51,594

India 1,872,845,406,804 6.3 1,221,156,319 3,287,260 36,115

China 7,314,432,078,359 9.3 1,344,130,000 9,600,000 90,221

South Africa 401,802,218,556 3.5 50,586,757 1,219,090 5,291

Sources: World Bank, World Databank, World Bank Indicators, 2011; International Institute of Security Studies (IISS), Military Balance 2011 (for military expenditure).

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IV BRICS and Africa: Ambitions and Realities of an Influential Group Afrique contemporaine 248

5. “South African Minister on South Africa Joining BRIC for a Better Africa,” interview with M. Malcomson, Counsellor at the South African Embassy in Beijing, Forum on China-Africa Relations (FOCAC), March 23, 2011.6. Dimitri Medvedev, the Russian president, mentioned South Africa’s interest and candidature at the 2010 G20 summit in Seoul, “News Conference Following G20 Summit in Seoul,” November 12, 2010.

7. For a list of the various presidential visits, inbound and outbound, see www.dirco.gov.za (“News and Events”).8. “BRICS Will Offer Huge Opportunities for South Africa: Zuma,” Hindustan Times, April 21, 2011.9. For example, the delegations accompanying the August 2010 presidential visit to China consisted of 371 business leaders, while the June 2010 visit to India

consisted of 226. This participation exceeded that of the 213 business leaders taking part in the March 2010 presidential visit to the United Kingdom, which has long been a partner for South Africa (Grant 2011).10. BASIC consists of Brazil, South Africa, India, and China.11. “BRIC Becomes BRICS, but Will This Be Good News for South Africa?” Engineering News Online, January 14, 2011.

the various heads of states expressing the country’s wish to do so,5 thus marking the launch of intense diplomatic activism and a lobbying campaign toward the four members.6 The campaign mobilized South Africa’s traditional diplomatic forces, principally the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), in favor of South Africa’s candidature with the four BRIC countries. This was taken further by President Jacob Zuma, who undertook a number of presidential visits to these countries to promote (among other things) South Africa’s candidature: to Brazil in October 2009, India in June 2010, and China and Russia in August 2010.7 Interactions with Brazil and India in the context of the IBSA forum provided an opportunity for South Africa to submit its candidature and express its moti-vations to these two emerging countries. The double summit of heads of state and government of both IBSA and BRIC held in April, 2010, in Brasilia offered a convenient supplementary platform for South Africa, primarily through its president and its minister of international relations, to promote South Africa’s candidature to the various BRIC representatives but especially to China and Russia, who were present on that occasion. South Africa’s candidature rested on two key elements: the need for African political representation, with South Africa positioning itself as the ideal candidate because of its membership in the G20 as the sole African country among Member States; and its position as economic gateway, especially for foreign direct investment (FDI) by BRIC mul-tinational corporations.8 South Africa thus positioned itself as a key—perhaps even an indispensable—actor for BRIC-Africa relations. Non-state and private actors also participated in this lobbying campaign, convinced of the opportu-nities for investment, and particularly for joint ventures, it offered. Foremost among these were business associations such as Business Unity South Africa (BUSA), which was formed in 2009 and had a privileged collaborative role with the Department of Trade and Industry, but also the large business delega-tions that accompanied presidential visits to BRIC countries.9 South Africa’s participation in other emerging country coalitions such as BASIC10 provided an established platform on the fringes of the negotiations over climate change that took place in November 2009 for rallying support from these emerging countries for its candidature. The South African diplomatic campaign aimed at

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South Africa in the BRICS-Africa Relationship V

individual emerging BRIC countries as well as Russia eventually bore fruit and led to the December 2010 invitation to South Africa to the third BRIC summit in 2011 in Sanya, China.11

A Diplomatic Success for the Zuma GovernmentSouth Africa’s membership in BRIC which officially became BRICS at the Sanya summit in 2011 represented a diplomatic success for the Zuma government. Forums such as IBSA or BRICS met its priorities and foreign policy interests and allowed South Africa to project its identity as an emerging international player beyond being an accepted regional powerhouse in its immediate sub-region. To this end, South Africa relied equally on active regional diplomacy together and an international focus while cultivating the image of being the principal African economic leader, spokesperson for the South, and bridge between North and South. This position meant adopting middle power strate-gies, relying on coalitions and diplomatic alliances in order to leverage political inf luence, with BRICS members sharing these diplomatic strategies. As mem-ber of these emerging country forums, it was now possible for South Africa to create the image—even if only symbolically—of being the leading emerging African power.

Besides these two external instruments, South Africa’s activism in these emerging country forums also served the domestic purpose of legitimizing South Africa’s foreign policy under the presidency of Jacob Zuma. In contrast to his predecessor, Thabo Mbeki, who performed a wide-ranging role as head of the ANC’s foreign relations in the apartheid period, Zuma had less experience and was deemed to be more interested in domestic policy (Landsberg 2014). While his predecessor was deeply involved in several major foreign policy initiatives, primarily the restructuring of the African Union, the formation of NEPAD, and mediating roles in a number of regional African crises as in Sudan and Côte d’Ivoire, Jacob Zuma’s foreign policy during his first presidency showed less signs of activism. Achieving South Africa’s entry into BRICS can be therefore counted as a personal success for Jacob Zuma and his minister of international relations, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, and represents the principal foreign pol-icy success of his first presidency (2009–2012) (Landsberg 2012).

An African or a South African Agenda?South African leaders involved in promoting South Africa’s entry into BRICS have mainly portrayed it domestically as part of the African agenda, one of the main pillars of South Africa’s foreign policy. South Africa positions itself openly as the foremost partner for emerging countries in their political relations with African countries, citing as justification its active role in launching regional initiatives on the continent, such as NEPAD or even the African Union, but also as the sole African country in the G20, in which other continents, such as

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VI BRICS and Africa: Ambitions and Realities of an Influential Group Afrique contemporaine 248

12. “South African Minister on South Africa Joining BRIC for Better Africa,” Engineering News Online, January 14, 2011.13. “The BRICS Leaders-Africa Dialogue Forum Retreat, ” www.brics5.co.za14. “The BRICS Leaders-Africa Dialogue Forum Retreat, ” www.brics5.co.za

15. “Russian Development Bank Can Be Ready by 2015, ” Russian Times, July 21, 2013.16. The BRICS bank envisages funding projects in BRICS countries, emerging countries, and other developing countries. “Statement by BRICS Leaders on the Establishment of the BRICS-Led Development Bank,” Durban, March 27, 2013.

17. “BRICS Agree to Capitalize Development Bank at $100bn,” Russian Times, September 5, 2013.18. “Durban Touted as Home of BRICS Bank,” Business Report, November 4, 2013.19. “Will the BRICS Development Bank Settle in Shanghai?” Financial Research Center, Fudan University.20. “BRICS to Set Up Trade Liaison Group,” BuaNews South Africa, April 20, 2013.

South America, have greater representation, with both Brazil and Argentina as member States. This position as African spokesperson relies on South Africa’s official rhetoric as presenting itself as “the voice of Africa,” the “representative of Africa,” aiming to further BRICS’ position as a “more globalized organiza-tion” and “representative of four continents” and to make it possible for South Africa “to carry Africa’s voice outward.”12

This attitude caused a number of strong domestic reactions in South Africa, criticizing the adoption of a position as political leader of African states without prior discussions with these states, which did not necessarily regard South Africa as the political leader for African interests on the world stage, and even less so on platforms such as BRICS (Qobo and Soko 2011).

The Occasional Inclusion of African States. Once South Africa became part of the BRICS group, it was obliged to justify its membership vis-à-vis its African counterparts at both the national and the regional level. However, sev-eral sectors of South African civil society were critical, mainly the academ-ics (Dube and Qobo 2013) but also some factions within the ANC, such as the ANC Youth League, which criticized South African leaders for having rushed to join BRIC without assessing the issue properly or having consulted other African states in this endeavor (Shivambu 2011). The fifth BRICS summit, held in Durban in 2013, was a test for South Africa as it was organizing its first summit. South Africa took the opportunity to respond to criticism of its instru-mentalization of its African agenda and convened discussions at a parallel con-ference entitled “BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration, and Industrialization, which brought together African leaders and representa-tives of regional organizations such as NEPAD and the African Union. This parallel conference, held on March 27, 2013, on the sidelines of the summit, brought together BRICS heads of states and governments, the current presi-dent of the African Union (Benin), the African Commission (South Africa), and the sitting presidents of eight African regional bodies as well as a represen-tative of the NEPAD initiative for infrastructural development. Although the objective of this conference was to strengthen relations between BRICS and African countries, it was also an opportunity to announce BRICS’s intention to provide technical assistance to African states through the African Union and

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South Africa in the BRICS-Africa Relationship VII

NEPAD in the form of capacity-building projects, promoting access to technol-ogy, data exchange, and support for infrastructure development.13

South Africa’s decision to bring together various regional bodies at the BRICS summit was a means of both responding to criticism of its exploitation of its African credentials domestically and of soliciting the inclusion of these African organizations in BRICS projects. However, this was an occasional inclusion, and there was neither an indication that it was to be repeated or formalized at future summits despite a request by African states,14 nor that the BRICS would adopt a clear African agenda.

The BRICS Financial Institutions: What Leeway for South Africa? Further evidence of BRICS involvement in Africa came in the form of an announcement at the Durban conference agreeing to the creation of a BRICS development bank, with financing to be destined mainly for African and Asian countries. However, the proposed creation of such a development bank posed a number of questions. The projected creation of a BRICS bank,15 scheduled for 2015, was presented by South Africa as a means of sourcing additional finance for sustainable infrastructure and development projects in Africa.16 The second main financial institution—a contingent reserve agreement—which acts as a precautionary reserve fund to tackle the volatility of their local currencies was also formed with an authorized capital of $100 billion. However, South Africa’s ability to inf luence the focus and direction of this mechanism may be limited. Of the initial capitalization, $41 billion will be contributed by China, $18 bil-lion by Russia, India, and Brazil, respectively, and only $5 billion by South Africa.17 In circumstances where voting weight is linked to the initial capital-ization, South Africa runs the risk of being a minor player, with reduced ability to exercise any inf luence and have any sway over the decision-making process. Moreover, South Africa’s preference for the head office of the BRICS bank to be located in Durban18 is in contention with China’s wish that it be set up in Shanghai.19

A Win-Win Deal for South Africa?The pivotal role South Africa hopes to play in the BRICS-Africa relationship raises a number of questions as regards the advantages the country might gain from this. At the economic level, the benefits could be limited. On the one hand, the inclusion of South Africa in BRICS permits two key South African agen-cies for economic diplomacy, namely the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) and the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), to gain direct access, together with their counterpart agencies, to BRICS markets, and makes it possible collectively to raise funds and to form bilateral financial partnerships with them. For example, the IDC is exploring a variety of co-financing part-nerships with the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES).20 However, besides these partnership opportunities, South Africa’s participation in BRICS and its

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VIII BRICS and Africa: Ambitions and Realities of an Influential Group Afrique contemporaine 248

21. Dianna Games, “South Africa as Africa’s Gateway: A Perspective from Business,” SAIIA, March 2012.22. Games, “South Africa as Africa’s Gateway: A Perspective from Business.”

23. Games, “South Africa as Africa’s Gateway: A Perspective from Business.”24. “CADF Opens West African Office in Ghana,” Bloomberg, November 11, 2011.

25. “Team 9 Opens a New Innings in India-West Africa Relations,” The Financial Express, March 6, 2004.

positioning as gateway to emerging African economies creates a series of com-petitive challenges for the South African economy. The first is the emergence of other African markets that also position themselves as gateways to Africa and are streamlining their regulations and infrastructure in order to attract invest-ment. The competition from ports of entry for freight is growing from other African ports, especially Maputo (Mozambique), Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania), Mombasa (Kenya), and Walvis Bay (Namibia), and even Dubai (United Arab Emirates) is offering itself as a forwarding point into East Africa, in direct competition with Durban, where increased taxes on products and freight makes the latter less and less attractive (Games 2012). As regards air transportation, the growth of airlines carrying both freight and passengers from Kenya (Kenya Airways) and Ethiopia (Ethiopian Airlines) places them in direct competition with the South African airline, South African Airways. Though well positioned in 2012 with the largest network of intra-African connections, South African Airways has gradually lost market share in the face of the growth of competing businesses that has resulted in business travelers from BRICS countries prefer-ring other airlines. For example, Brazilian business leaders operating in West Africa are taking advantage of the Rio de Janeiro/São Paulo–Lomé connec-tion opened in July 2013 by the Ethiopian national carrier, Ethiopian Airlines, rather than an alternative route passing through South Africa.21

The second challenge is domestic as foreign investors are showing signs of weariness in the face of increasing labor costs, lack of technical expertise, and the specter of policies aiming at nationalizing mines raised by Jacob Zuma’s government, thus forewarning of state intervention in the South African busi-ness world. All this is increasingly driving investors toward other markets with strong growth, particularly Nigeria and Ghana, which also aspire to play the role of gateway to Africa for foreign investors from BRICS by relaxing their internal regulations to favor investment.

South Africa’s pivotal economic position is now being challenged.22 As part of its global outward expansion strategy, Brazil maintains a network of relationships with Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa, focusing not only on strengthening cultural and political relationships but also on the economic opportunities these offer. For example, Brazilian companies prefer the port of Luanda (Angola) as a port of entry, in direct competition to South Africa.23

The third challenge is political. Although some emerging BRICS coun-tries such as China rhetorically give South Africa priority as principal partner in their relations with other African states in clubs such as BRICS, pride of place is in fact given to bilateral relations as Chinese business and political leaders

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South Africa in the BRICS-Africa Relationship IX

manage their political relations with African states directly from Beijing. For example, the China Africa Development Fund, initially set up in Johannesburg, has since opened local offices in Ethiopia, Ghana, and Zambia.24 Other BRICS member has its own political platforms in African countries. This is the case for the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), the India-Africa Forum, and the Techno-Economic Approach for Africa-India Movement (TEAM 9) program, which comprises India and nine francophone African countries.25 Brazil also manages its African relations through the Africa-South America Cooperation Forum- initiated and driven mainly by Brazil- and promotes the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP), through which Brazil maintains its relations with such countries in Africa. Meanwhile, Russia is rethinking its strategy for economic and political involvement in Africa using links it maintained with several African states that had weakened during the Cold War. In 2009, Russian president Dimitri Medvedev made presiden-tial visits to Egypt, Nigeria, Namibia, and Angola, and was on each occasion accompanied by large delegations of business leaders (Arkhangelskaya and Shubin 2013).

Is advancing the BRICS-Africa relationship a winning strategy for South Africa? With South Africa presenting itself as the gateway to Africa, South African companies frequently find themselves in competition with those of BRICS countries and China’s. In particular as Chinese companies are taking over swathes of the South African market within southern Africa (see map), but also in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly as regards infrastructure, mining, manufactured goods, and textiles, causing a loss in South Africa’s market share (Vieira and Alden 2011). However, BRICS benefits from the inclusion of South Africa because representing different continents confers this diplomatic club a more global character. Moreover, the occasional contact with heads of state and representatives of regional African organizations provides a supplemen-tary framework as a platform for strengthening bilateral relationships between BRICS and Africa, increasingly eroding South Africa’s role as Africa’s repre-sentative in BRICS.

Table 2 – Growing Competition from Other Regional African Powers in Attracting Worldwide FDI

Inflows of foreign direct investment (by year, 2008-2012)

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Millions of US$

South Africa 9,006 5,365 1,228 6,004 4,572

Ghana 1,220 2,897 2,527 3,248 3,295

Nigeria 8,249 8,650 6,099 8,915 7,029

Source: UNCTAD statistical database (www.unctadstat.unctad.org) .

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X BRICS and Africa: Ambitions and Realities of an Influential Group Afrique contemporaine 248

26 Jim O’Neill, “South Africa’s Presence Drags Down the BRICS,” Mail and Guardian, March 23, 2012.

27 “Africa Investment: South Africa, the Tiny BRIC in the Wall,” Reuters, March 21, 2013.

Limits to a Self-Appointed RepresentativitySouth Africa’s proclaimed position as spokesperson for African concerns has a number of limitations. For those looking at the BRICS club from an economic and financial perspective, South Africa’s weak GDP has caused several ana-lysts to query the value of its inclusion in a diplomatic club whose very acro-nym is first and foremost based on the members’ economic performance. For example, the economist Jim O’Neill, who coined the BRIC acronym, believes that the South African economy is too small relative to the other BRICS mem-bers and does not share similar characteristics with them. He further believes that South Africa weakens the group and that other emerging economies such as Turkey, Mexico, Indonesia, or even South Korea more legitimately deserve

South Africa: Maritime Hub between Asia and Southern Africa

1

Thanks to its strategic geographic position at the southern tip of Africa, South Africa is located at the intersection of international maritime trading routes from Asia. The port of Durban, which handles 2.6 million tons each year, is Africa’s premier port. South Africa’s position as a hub in the shipping of freight from abroad and from Asia in particular also serves as a two-way platform for trade flowing to the interior of Southern Africa.Sources: F. Folio et al. 2001. L’Espace Géographique Paris: Belin, available at: www.sacu.int; www.sadc.int; “Annual Report 2012/2013,” National Department of Transport, Republic of South Africa; “L’Afrique du Sud voit grand pour le port de Durban,” Jeune Afrique, March 29, 2013.

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South Africa in the BRICS-Africa Relationship XI

membership in the group.26 South Africa’s limited capacity for providing fund-ing for BRICS’s financial initiatives, particularly for foreign exchange reserves, means that due to its economic limitations, it is seen as a brake on the group’s initiatives.27 South Africa’s inclusion in BRICS is thus considered by a num-ber of analysts, especially South African analysts, as adversely affecting South Africa’s image (Qobo and Soko 2011).

South Africa’s political role as representative of African interests para-doxically results in its increasing isolation vis-à-vis its regional peers, who do not unquestioningly recognize South Africa’s political leadership and regard South African initiatives as being driven mostly by its own national interests (Mokoena 2007). This has been apparent since 2003, when President Thabo Mbeki chose to attend the inauguration of Brazilian president Lula da Silva rather than that of the Mozambican president taking place on the same day (Soulé-Kohndou 2010). Moreover, South Africa’s leadership role showed itself to be suspect at major international negotiations at which South Africa appointed itself as spokesperson for Africa, for example at the international climate nego-tiations in Copenhagen in 2009. In this respect, South Africa’s position is how-ever far closer to that of Brazil, India, and China within the BASIC group than to that of other African countries. That is, South Africa is one of the largest emitters of greenhouse gases in Africa and is somewhat more on the defensive as regards commitments for their reduction than other African countries that produce less (Qi 2011).

ConclusionSouth Africa’s membership in BRICS is seen as a success for South African diplomacy, giving it a pivotal role to play in BRICS-Africa relations. This posi-tioning bolsters its foreign policy objective of assuming the role of leading African spokesperson in the international arena. However, this membership better serves the foreign policy interests of South Africa than those of Africa as a whole. Although South African leaders rhetorically claim its membership as an opportunity to promote African interests, it allows South Africa to attract international attention by associating itself with powerful emerging economies despite its smaller economic size and weight. While the other BRICS members participate in their own right and not as representatives of their respective continents or subcontinents, doubts remain concerning South Africa’s ability to activate its foreign policy concerns, and foremost its African agenda within BRICS beyond its questionable claim to represent Africa.

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XII BRICS and Africa: Ambitions and Realities of an Influential Group Afrique contemporaine 248

Qi, Xinran. 2011. “The Rise of BASIC in UN Climate Change Negotiations.” South African Journal of International Affairs 18 (3): 295–318.

Qobo, Mzukisi, and Mills Soko. 2011. “Creating More Walls Than BRICS.” Mail and Guardian, January 7.

Shivambu, Floyd. 2011. “We Rushed to Join BRICS.” African National Congress Youth League 24th National Congress (ANCYL), Gallagher State, Midrand, SA. June 18.

Soulé-Kohndou, Folashadé. 2010. Puissances émergentes et multilatéralisme: Le cas de l’Afrique du Sud (1999–2008). Paris: L’Harmattan.

Vieira, Marco Antonio, and Chris Alden . 2011. “India, Brazil, and South Africa (IBSA): The Paradox of Regional Leadership.” Global Governance 17 (4): 507–28.

Landsberg, Chris. 2012. “Continuity and Change in the foreign policies of the Mbeki and Zuma governments” Africa Insight, vol. 41, n°4, March, 1 - 16.

Mandela, Nelson. 1993. “South Africa’s Future Foreign Policy.” Foreign Affairs 72 (5): 86–97.

Mokoena, Refilwe. 2007. “South-South Cooperation: The Case for IBSA.” South African Journal of International Affairs 14 (2): 125–45.

Muller, Marie. 1998. “Current Developments in South African Diplomacy.” In Modern Diplomacy, edited by Jovan Kurbalija, 115 pages, Pretoria: Diplo Publishing.

O’Neill, Jim. 2011. “Building Better Economic BRICS.” Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper 66, November 30.

Bibliography

Arkhangelskaya, Alexandra, and Vladimir Shubin . 2013. “Is Russia Back? Realities of Russian Engagement in Africa?” In Emerging Powers in Africa, edited by C. Alden. LSE Ideas Report, London School of Economics.

Dube, Memory, and Mzukisi Qobo. 2013. “Unpacking South Africa’s BRICS in Africa Equation.” Opinion Analysis, SAIIA , March 26.

Games, Dianna. 2012. “South Africa as Africa’s Gateway: A Perspective from Business.” Policy Briefing 46, SAIIA, March.

Grant, Catherine. 2011. “State Visits as a Tool of Economic Diplomacy: Bandwagon or Business Sense?” Occasional Paper 87, SAIIA, July.

Landsberg, Chris. 2006. “IBSA’s Political Origins: Significance and Challenges.” Centre for Policy Studies 8 (2): 4–8.

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