Questioning Textbook Truth: Suicide Rates and the Hawthorne Effect

PATRICK D. NOLAN t

Advocacy and interest groups routinely make fantastic and shocking claims in an effort to motivate the public to respond to what these groups perceive to be important but neglected social problems and/or incipient "crises." When closer scrutiny impeaches these claims, these groups lose a measure of credibility, and the general public grows increasingly cynical of them and of the social sciences whose data and research presumably support the claim. Similar temptations and dangers may face sociology. I raise the possibility that the teaching of discredited findings and discoveries and the use of gimmicks that challenge conventional wisdom and common sense may turn our students off and trigger the same distrust and cynicism engendered by advocacy groups. Ironically, giving in to the temptation to shock and surprise rather than to inform and enlighten may foreclose the very real opportunities that exist for engaging our students and the public in the enterprise of sociology.

To increase their legi t imacy and to mobil ize the public to eradicate what advo- cacy groups see as serious but neglected social problems or incipient crises, such groups have repeatedly shocked and appalled us with startling "facts" about our society. Memorab le examples include the fol lowing:

�9 There are 3 million homeless in America, 500,000 of which are children. �9 50,000 children are abducted by strangers every year. �9 150,000 females die of anorexia annually in the United States. �9 Domestic violence is the leading cause of birth defects in the United States today.

After the shock subsides and the headlines fade, however , every one of these " f ac t s " - - a s well as numerous others that could be a d d e d - - h a s been found to be a gross exaggeration, a distortion, or a simple untruth. To wit, at the time:

�9 There were probably a total of 500,000 to 600,000 homeless, of which 35,000 to 40,000 may have been children (Vobejda 1991, Gilbert 1994: 22).

�9 The actual number of children abducted and endangered by strangers was probably some- where between 67 and 550 (Gilbert 1994: 19, Richardson 1991: 97).

�9 The average number of deaths annually from anorexia was probably less than 100: there were 101 deaths in 1983, 67 in 1988, and 54 in 1991. The gross overestimate was probably caused

Patrick Nolan is professor of sociology at the University of South Carolina. He has been teaching introduc- tory sociology for nearly thirty years, has published a number of articles on macrosociology and ecological- evolutionary theory, and is coauthor of the sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth editions of Human Societies: An Introduction to Macrosociology.

Nolan 107

by the confusion of number of fatalities with the number estimated who suffered from the affliction: 150,000 to 200,000 (Sommers 1994: 11-13).

�9 Finally, domestic abuse is not a cause of birth defects; the claim is simply untrue (Sommers 1991: 12).

Interestingly, in many cases when these fantastic claims were shown to be false, their untruth was considered by many to be less important than the good that re- suited from the increased attention and the efforts at remediation that their trum- peting in the media produced. We appear to be witnessing a resurgence and per- haps an incipient institutionalization of the "benign lie" as a tool for social change.

Benign Lies?

More than two thousand years ago, Plato's (1970: 106-108) protagonist Socrates, normally a tenacious champion of truth, hesitantly floated the idea of telling the citizens of an idealized community a fictitious s tory--a "benign lie" or "conve- nient fiction" (i.e., the allegory of the metals)-- to produce greater attachment to the commonwealth, and to promote more willing acceptance of their differing roles and statuses in it. 2 What would drive this normally tireless truth-seeker to suffer the propagation of a falsehood? It was the belief that, on balance, the good this untruth would promote greatly outweighed the intrinsic evil of lying.

I fear that a large and perhaps growing number of sociology textbook authors may believe this, t o o . 3 In their zeal to convince undergraduate students, university administrators, and the general public that sociology is a legitimate and important endeavor, or to effect positive social change, they may focus more on what is "good to think" than what is strongly rooted in fact. They may try to shock and surprise their students with startling facts, and may try to convince students that much of what they believe to be true about society has been shown by sociologists to be wrong. These tactics may generate some energy and interest in the short term, but I believe they are ultimately self-defeating and self-destructive.

Do sociologists, wittingly or unwittingly, teach discredited ideas to undergradu- ates? I thought it would be instructive to check the treatment in introductory sociol- ogy texts of two longstanding though thoroughly debunked sociological canards: the "Hawthorne effect" and Durkheim's claim that Protestants have higher suicide rates than Catholics. To this end, my graduate assistant and I gathered all the intro- ductory textbooks we could locate from unsolicited publisher mailings and from colleagues in our department to see whether or not they affirmed these claims. 4 Although it is by no means a scientific or probability sample, a quick perusal of Table 1 will show that the twenty-four texts we examined comprise a broad range of offerings, including the best-selling, most popular introductory texts in sociol- ogy. 5

The Hawthorne Effect

Perhaps the most widely publicized and discussed example of a serendipitous discovery of a hidden and baffling aspect of human behavior is the so-called Hawthorne effect. 6 Supposedly, productivity in a Western Electric plant increased not because of changes in material incentives, systematic hiring and firing, or in-

108 The American Sociologist / Fall 2003

c reased m a n a g e r i a l d i sc ip l ine , bu t b e c a u s e the " u n a n t i c i p a t e d c o n s e q u e n c e " o f be ing s tudied m a d e the worke r s feel " spec ia l . " This d i scovery , la ter l abe led the " H a w t h o r n e ef fec t ," can be summar i zed as fol lows:

The researchers concluded from both the primary and the derivative experiments that measured experi- mental variables had little effect, but that the unmeasured quality of human relations of workers to management and peer group was responsible for most output improvements observed in the first four experiments (Franke and Kau11978: 624).

In short, the real change had been that m a n a g e m e n t had taken an interest in the two groups of workers . They were given special t reatment and special status com- pared to the rest of the workers. The attention apparent ly raised morale and morale raised product ivi ty . (Per row 1979: 91)

The p rob lem with this "happy thought" (Perrow 1979: 91) is that, as critic after critic has pointed out, there is virtually no empirical support for it in the Hawthorne study. After reviewing the study and finding that virtually all the changes observed could be accounted for m u c h more pa r s imonious ly in te rms of personnel changes and changes in mater ia l rewards, one critic was m o v e d to ask:

How is it that nearly all authors of textbooks who have drawn material from the Hawthorne studies have failed to recognize the vast discrepancy between evidence and conclusions in those studies, have fre- quently misdescribed the actual observations and occurrences in a way that brings the evidence in line with the conclusions, and have done this even when such authors based their whole outlook and orientation on the conclusions reached by the Hawthome investigators.'? (Carey 1967:416)

The first statistical analysis of the studies ' data further supported the conclusion that there was no m y s t e r i o u s H a w t h o r n e effect . A c c o r d i n g to F r anke and Kaul (1978: 630-31), mos t o f the obse rved var ia t ion in worker output:

appears to have resulted from imposition of managerial discipline, which included better performing replacement workers as well as ... disciplinary example ....

They concluded, therefore , that:

To assume that output changes resulted from unmeasured changes in the human relations of workers therefore seems injudicious, even though it was the assumption of the Hawthorne researchers and has been accepted and built upon by many social scientists over the past several decades (Franke and Kaul 1978: 638).

M o r e o v e r :

This concept of influence upon an experiment through the experiment itself was found either erroneous or misleading by Cook and Campbell (1976), Katz and Kahn (1966), Parsons (1974), and Rubeck (1975). Sommer's (1968) conclusion that the "errors" called placebo or Hawthorne effect need themselves to be evaluated and understood, is most pertinent (Franke and Kaul 1978: 637).

M o r e r e c e n t l y , a c r i t i c r e f e r r e d to the H a w t h o r n e E f f e c t as "a g l o r i f i e d anecdote"(Kola ta 1998). It is also interesting that, as with many myths, bel ief in the Hawthorne effect seems to have grown stronger with the passage of time. There is little direct ev idence of a H a w t h o r n e ef fec t in the or iginal research. (Jones 1992: 455):

Nolan 109

I found essentially no evidence of Hawthorne effects, either unconditionally or with allowance for direct effects of the experimental variables themselves ... I must also conclude that the Hawthorne effect is largely a construction of subsequent interpreters of the Hawthorne experiments (Jones 1992: 467).

H o w is the H a w t h o r n e e f f ec t p r e s e n t e d to i n t r o d u c t o r y s tuden t s s o m e t w e n t y o r th i r ty y e a r s a f te r these c o m p e l l i n g r e fu t a t i ons? H a l f o f the texts in m y nonsc i en t i f i c

s a m p l e o f i n t r o d u c t o r y tex ts , i n c l u d i n g s o m e o f the m o s t w i d e l y u sed , a f f i r m the H a w t h o r n e e f fec t . O n l y t w o are at a l l s k e p t i c a l o r c r i t i ca l : C o l l i n s and M a k o w s k y 1998, a n d P o p e n o e 1995.

A few of the many quotations that could be adduced will illustrate their view of this effect.In time, the researchers realized that the employees were working harder ... simply because people were paying attention to them. From this research, social scientists coined the term Hawthorne effect to refer to a change in a subject's behavior caused by the awareness of being studied (Macionis 1999: 40, emphasis in the original).

They felt they had acquired a special status by being selected [for the experiments]; they got to know one another as a kind of "elite"; they tried to perform the way they thought the researchers wanted them to perform. This kind of reaction is known as the Hawthorne effect. In short, just studying a group is likely to affect its behavior, perhaps more than the other causes the investigators are trying to discover (Smelser 1995: 96, emphasis in the original).

Their behavior apparently was influenced by the greater attention being paid to them in the course of the research (workers liked the feeling that management was interested in them) and by the novelty of being subjects in an experiment (Schaefer and Lamm 1999: 49).

Table 1

Textbook Position on Existence of Hawthorne Effect

Yes 50 % No 50 %

Bryjak and Soroka, 2d Edition (p. 28) Calhoun et al., 4th Edition

Collins and Makowsky, 6th Edition* (pp. 188-189) Curry et al.

Eshelman et al., 4th Edition (pp. 79-80) Gelles and Levine, 6th Edition

Farley, 3d Edition (p. 37) Giddens 1991

Henslin, 2d Edition (p. 131) Hughes et al., 5th Edition

Landis, 8th Edition (pp. 24-25) Kammeyer et al., 6th Edition

Macionis, 7th Edition (p. 5) Levin, J., 2d Edition

Popenoe, 10th Edition (p. 47) Levin, W., 4th Edition

Schaefer and Lamm, 6th Edition (p. 10-11) Newman, 2d Edition

Smelser, 5th Edition (pp. 96-97) Nofz

Thio, 5th Edition (p. 36, 41-42) Stark, 7th Edition

Thompson and Hickey, 3rd Edition (p. 50) Tischler, 6th Edition

110 The Amer ican Sociologist ] Fall 2003

It was concluded that the presence of the observers had caused the workers in the experimental group to feel that they were special (Popenoe 1995: 47).

In all fairness, Popenoe does allude to Franke and Kaul's (1978) criticism, but he concludes the discussion with the following

However, even if the original conclusions of the Hawthorne study must be revised, they nonetheless raise a problem that all social scientists must confront: The fact that research subjects who know they are being studied can change their behavior, v Throughout the social sciences, this phenomenon has come to be called the Hawthorne effect (Popenoe: 47, emphasis in the original).

He also uncritically presents the Hawthorne results in a later boxed insert (pps. 422-24) titled "Sociology and Work Organization."

Rather than dying from the stake that the many critics have pounded into its heart, the Hawthorne effect extends its life, in part by mutating and transforming itself into what Webb et. al. (1966: 13) label the "guinea pig effect. ''8

[The Hawthorne Effect is] the change in subjects' behavior that occurs when they know they are being studied (Henslin 1995: 131).

Knowing that they are participating in a scientific investigation, subjects may change their behaviors or attitudes in ways not fully known to the researcher, thus invalidating the results of the study (Bryjak and Soroka 1994: 28).

Protestant and Catholic Suicide Rates

A key component of Durkheim's attempt to demonstrate that even the most in- dividualistic acts are structured by their social contexts was his argument that people believing/practicing different religions would have systematically different rates of suicide. One specific piece of evidence, widely cited as an exemplar of the appro- priate application of the scientific method to social phenomena, was his compari- son of the suicide rates of Protestants and Catholics. Either because of the differing levels of integration produced by differing rituals and ceremonies, or because of the differing degrees of individual i ty promoted by these be l ie f two systems, Durkheim argued that Catholicism provided a greater prophylaxis against suicide than did Protestantism.

To test this hypothesis, he calculated rates of suicide for political states grouped on the basis of the religions of their inhabitants. According to the figures he pre- sented, the suicide rate (per million population) was 190 for Protestant states and only 58 for Catholic states (Durkheim 1951: 152). Yet when Whitney Pope (1982) tried to reconstruct these figures from the original data used by Durkheim, he found them to be closer than that: 187 and 87 respectively (Pope 1982: 64). Furthermore, weighting the state averages by their respective populations moved them even closer together and actually reversed their ranking: 93 and 97 (Pope 1978: 206).

If it is unfair to expect Durkheim to have had the statistical sophistication to weight the averages by population size, Pope notes that, had Durkheim used his earlier categorization of states (developed before he had developed this specific hypothesis) the averages would have been 92 and 85 (Pope 1978: 207). The most

Nolan 111

pruden t in fe rence a soc io log i s t cou ld d raw f r o m these data w o u l d be that there is no d i f f e rence in the suic ide rates o f Ca tho l i c s and Protestants . Tha t is, we canno t reject the null hypothes is . Fur the rmore , subsequen t research has f o u n d few cons is - tent d i f f e r e n c e s in the su ic ide ra tes o f P ro t e s t an t s and C a t h o l i c s (e.g., P o p e and Dan ige l i s 1981, B a n k s t o n et. al. 1983, P e s c o s o l i d o 1990).

H o w is D u r k h e i m ' s c l a im t rea ted in c o n t e m p o r a r y s o c i o l o g y tex t s? 9 The data indicate it is even m o r e wide ly a f f i rmed than the H a w t h o r n e effect .

Two- th i rds o f the i n t roduc to ry texts p resen t this " f i nd ing" in a f avorab le light. Aga in , a few quota t ions will serve to il lustrate their t rea tment o f this claim.

Specifically, Durkheim found that men, Protestants, wealthy people, and the unmarried had significantly higher suicide rates than women, Catholics, and Jews, the poor, and married people. Durkheim reasoned that the differences had to do with s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n . . . . [I]ndividualistic Protestants were more prone to suicide than Catholics and Jews, whose rituals foster stronger social ties. (Macionis 1999:4-5 emphasis in the original).

Table 2

Textbook Position on Durkheim's Argument that Protestants Have Higher Suicide Rate Than Catholics

Yes 67% No* 33%

Bryjak and Soroka, 2d Edition (p. 14) Curry et al., 1997"

Calhoun et al., 4th Edition (p. 32) Eshelman et al., 4th Edition*

Collins and Makowsky, 6th Edition (pp. 110-111) Giddens 1991"

Farley, 3d Edition (p. 25) Kammeyer et al., 6th Edition*

Gelles and Levine, 6th Edition (p. 25) Landis, 8th Edition*

Henslin, 2d Edition (p. 13) Levin, J., 2d Edition*

Hughes et al., 5th Edition (p. 13) Popenoe, 10th Edition*

Levin, W., 4th Edition (P. 399) Smelser, 5th Edition*

Macionis, 7th Edition (p. 5)

Newman, 2d Edition (p. 12)

Nofz 1994 (p. 2)

Schaefer and Lamm, 6th Edition (pp. 10-11)

Stark, 7th Edition (p. 193)

Thio, 5th Edition (p. 40)

Thompson and Hickey, 3rd Edition (p. 20)

Tischler, 6th Edition (p. 17)

*The text may discuss Durkheim's study of suicide, or the fact that he argued religion affected suicide rates, but it does not specifically affirm the claim that Protestants have higher rates than Catholics. For instance, Landis (1992) is critical of Durkheim's suicide research, but he does not address this empirical claim.

112 The American Sociologist / Fall 2003

He fur ther states that: "A cen tu ry later, s ta t i s t i ca l e v i d e n c e stil l suppor t s Durkhe im ' s ana lys i s" (Macionis 1999: 5). But to support this lat ter s ta tement , he presents ev idence o f d i f fe rences in current rates o f su ic ide in the Uni ted States by race and sex? l~

To their credit, Landis (1992) and Collins and Makowsky (1998) raise criticisms of Durkheim's analysis, but for Collins and Makowsky the criticism actually amounts to additional i f backhanded, praise of the analysis and the theory it purported to test.

Durkheim's Suicide is a classic work, and it survives as a model of how to use empirical analysis to corroborate general theory. It does have various shortcomings. The data are not entirely reliable, and there were mistakes in the analysis. Moreover, Durkheim did not fully explain suicides. After all, not everyone who is Protestant commits suicide, even if he or she is unmarried, highly educated, and so on. (Collins and Makowsky 1998:110-11).

Therefore, despite the documented f laws in the empirical basis of this claim, Durkheim's analysis of the effects of religion on suicide not only still is presented in an extremely favorable light, but is held up as a living model of how we should conduct sociological research and test theories. Even more ironic is the fact that seasonal variation (the careful reader will note that the rates move opposite of the way that integrat ion would predict) and sex (why do men have a higher rate of suicide?) posed some of the most serious challenges to Durkheim's theory by sug- gesting a alternate "biological" explanation of suicide. Yet these variations often are presented as some of the strongest evidence supporting it!

Discussion

Only a much more detailed examination of a wider sample of introductory texts and topics would show how widespread is the teaching of questionable or discred- ited ideas, jl But what we have found here is sufficient cause for concern. Coupled with the use of the already-decried gimmick of challenging what students and the public think they know about societies, such as the so-called "common sense" tests (see Goldberg 1991: 205-12), ~2 these texts threaten to provoke anger and disillu- sionment in the very publics we are trying to persuade.

A number of other related rhetorical practices and postures often adopted by sociologists also deserve mention. Notable examples include the following:

�9 Cynically shifting from rates to numbers (and vice versa) to make points (e.g., welfare and race);

�9 Treating the incidence of something as equivalent to its prevalence (e.g., class and crime); �9 Adjusting for inflation but not for changing family size when examining income trends; �9 Focusing on the decline in the relative share of income going to the lowest-paid population

segments, while ignoring the fact that their incomes (net of inflation) have increased; �9 Choosing an atypical value as the reference point for a trend (e.g., using 1970, an unusually

low point in inequality, as base for examining trends in the distributions of wealth and income in the United States);

�9 And, similar to the Hawthorne effect, treating as "mysterious" things that are actually quite intelligible in ordinary terms (e.g., race and gender income gaps). Even if our students and the public don't have the information or skills to expose and debunk these practices, because the practices don't ring true, they engender general cynicism and distrust.

Nolan 113

Whether one is persuaded by his specific sociobiological arguments or not, it seems to me that Goldberg was actually doing sociology a service by challenging a number of its cherished claims on the basis of the logic and evidence offered to support them. For, regrettably, I am increasingly in agreement with his conclusion

that:

Sociology is rapidly becoming nothing more than a series of ideological claims that do not merely fail to address the research evidence, but claim the opposite of what the evidence suggests. Authors of introduc- tory sociology textbooks seem to care more that their students believe that which [the author thinks] is good for the student than that which is true (Goldberg 1991: 128).

I think we are doomed as a discipline and as a profession if we continue down this path. For ultimately, we may be held accountable for what we have taught (or not taught) to our students.

But I don ' t think we have to continue on this path. We do have skills and knowl- edge that are valuable, important , and interesting. Rather than get t ing "in their face" or foisting discredited "facts" on our students, we can engage them and our publics in the enterprise of sociology. What do we know about societies? Why are they organized the way they are? W h y do they change? We should reinforce the value of our students' experiences (particularly those who have returned from years running households or laboring in the workplace). But we should be clear that their exper iences are o f a very recent and atypical i nnova t ion - - indus t r i a l s o c i e t i e s - - and of a limited geographical and temporal slice of those atypical societies to boot. We do not have to insult our students or their intel l igence to teach them about sociology and social phenomena. Such knowledge and instruction will have more lasting value and more relevance, and in the long run will bring sociology greater leg i t imacy and credibil i ty than will the teaching of surprising, but quest ionable, "facts" and the use of gimmicks.

Notes

i. I thank Sang-moon Kim for his help in assembling and analyzing the introductory texts, and Paul Nisbet for his help in reviewing recent research on religion and suicide. A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the session, "Philosophical Foundations of Sociological Knowledge and Applied Sociol- ogy," Joseph Gittler, organizer and presider, at the Annual Southern Sociological Society Meetings in 1995, in Atlanta, GA.

2. The term pseudos has also been translated as "noble lie" (Conford 1970: fn., 106) not so much because it was high-minded, but more because of its scale (i.e., it was a whopper).

3. It is not clear that one can generalize directly from the content of textbooks to the beliefs or practices of teachers of introductory sociology or of sociologists in general. But there is good reason to believe that, in order to maintain or increase their market share, textbook publishers attempt to appeal to the widest range of instructors and sociologists.

4. An effort was made to locate the latest edition, but in some cases an earlier edition had to be used. Interestingly, in cases where a later edition did become available during data collection, the treatment of these topics was usually virtually unchanged.

5. Although publishers like to keep their sales figures confidential, I have been told by someone in the business of marketing sociology textbooks that the best sellers are believed to be, in order of their sales: Macionis, Henslin, Shaeffer & Lamm, Kornblum, Gelles & Levine, and Applebaum & Chambliss. An unsolicited mailing of three popular introductory texts--Macionis, Smelser, and Popenoe - - from the marketing department of Prentice Hall first prompted this examination, and provided the empirical basis of the much more limited Southern Sociological Society version of this paper.

6. A comprehensive examination of the Hawthorne experiments and the empirical basis of the Hawthorne effect can be found in Gillespie (1991).

114 The American Sociologist ] Fall 2003

7. This characterization is reminiscent of the "all-powerful individuals" who peopled the societies studied by "individualists" (Mayhew 1980).

8. Mention of the Hawthorne studies is notably absent from the examples of the "guinea pig effect" cited by the authors of Unobtrusive Measures, however.

9. Pope's thorough and compelling critique of Durkheim's analysis and theory was first published in 1978. One would expect that such a carefully crafted, closely argued, and copiously documented text would have had a major impact. Nonetheless, despite the University of Chicago Press's issuance of it as a Midway Reprint in 1982 (to keep it in print), the book has been out of print for some time. Durkheim's original remains readily available, however.

10. To wit: African American men 12.4, African American women 2.0, White men 21.3, White women 4.9 (Macionis 1999: 5).

11. It is worth noting that this issue is not limited to sociology and sociologists; see Huff's, now-classic, How to Lie with Statistics; Monmoniter's How to Lie with Maps; and Best's Damned Lies and Statistics. And it is by no means the only problem or challenge facing sociology today; see Cole's What's Wrong with Sociology?

12. As I was writing, it occurred to me: Does psychology do this? Chemistry? Biology? Anthropology? Is this a sign of our insecurity and lack of confidence in what we do and know?

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