Technogeopolitics and the Struggle for Control of World Air Routes, 1910-1928

Political Geography 20 (2001) 635–658www.politicalgeography.com

Technogeopolitics and the struggle for controlof world air routes, 1910–1928

David L. Butler *

Department of Geography, University of Cincinnati, PO Box 210131, Cincinnati, OH 45221-0131,USA

Abstract

This paper introduces and encourages the use of technogeopolitics, the recursive relationshipbetween technology and geopolitics, as a lens for analysis. Through this lens the paper exam-ines the role of Britain, the United States, Germany and France at three international aerialconferences held in 1910, 1919 and 1928. At these conferences, the four nations’ geopoliticalpositions are strongly influenced by each nation’s current level of aviation technology. Simi-larly, the level of technology each nation has developed at each conference is representative ofthe nation’s choice to invest, or not invest, in aviation technology, creating a technogeopoliticalrelationship. Key issues at each conference revolve around the concepts of aerial sovereigntyand freedom of the air, the inclusion and exclusion of nations from aerial trading blocs, cross-Atlantic aerial relationships and the rise of US commercial air power in the Western Hemi-sphere reflecting each nation’s attempt to assume control of the air in particular geographicalregions around the world, usually at the expense of other nations. 2001 Elsevier ScienceLtd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Technogeopolitics; Technology; Geopolitics; Sovereignty; Aviation; International conference

Aviation must be considered from an international standpoint. An ability tocover great distances in a relatively short time makes it a leading factor in worldintercourse.

Every advance in transportation has stimulated commerce and brought peopleinto closer contact with each other. One after another the fears and prejudices ofisolation have been overcome as methods of communication and transport

* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-513-556-3421; fax: +1-513-556-3370.E-mail address: [email protected] (D.L. Butler).

0962-6298/01/$ - see front matter 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.PII: S 09 62 -6298( 01 )0 0006-3

636 D.L. Butler / Political Geography 20 (2001) 635–658

improved. Aviation, with its great speed and freedom of movement, is too power-ful an instrument of progress to be long confined by the remaining artificial restric-tions left over from an age of provincialism.

Aviation does not concern one nation alone. Its ultimate value lies in bringingthe various countries of the earth into closer contact. It is not possible to developair transport and communication in its broadest aspect without the co-operationof the entire world. (New York, 5 July 1930, Charles A. Lindbergh)

Introduction

Charles Lindbergh alludes to a major principle of civil aviation; it is inherentlyinternational in scope because it ideally ignores traditional physical, political, econ-omic, and cultural barriers on earth by flying rapidly and covering vast distances,thus bringing nations closer together both economically and politically. Because civilaviation is inherently international, nation-states have a vested interest in how thistechnology develops and what influence the technology leverages against the state’sability to control its borders, a central theme of this paper.

The goal of this paper is twofold. One is to introduce the concept of technogeopol-itics and offer it as one method for analyzing geopolitical events that are stronglyinfluenced by technological factors. Second, this paper focuses on three internationalaerial conferences held in 1910, 1919 and 1928. The conferences’ broad goals wereto debate, define, and inscribe aviation into international law through treaties. Thecase studies examined highlight the position of four nations at the three conferences:Britain, the United States, Germany, and, to a lesser extent, France. These nationswere chosen specifically for two reasons. One, they were key nations at the time,vying for hegemony.1 Two, each nation played a vital role, directly or indirectly, inat least one of the conferences and primary documents exist outlining their strategicpositions on civil aviation issues. The exploration of each country will examine howaviation technology influenced each of these nation’s geopolitical realities, and whatinternational agreements or state action emerged from each. It was through theseconferences that each state’s specific geopolitical position emerged regarding thenew aviation technology and more importantly, how a nation’s geopolitical stancechanged as aviation tilted in or out of their favor.

Technogeopolitics, theories, and technology

This research began with an interest in aviation technology and geopolitics,specifically early international aviation conferences. As secondary sources wereexamined, questions as to the motivations of specific countries on particular issuesat the conferences emerged; specifically, why would a country change its geopolitical

1 For detailed descriptions of World Systems Theory and hegemonic transition, see Hugill (1993) andTaylor (1993).

637D.L. Butler / Political Geography 20 (2001) 635–658

position on a fundamental key issue from one conference to another? Most authorsexamining aerial conferences, probably because of limited knowledge of aviationtechnology, argued from a strict political or economic position, missing key insightsinto how technology can influence geopolitical decisions.2 Since traditional lensesdid not answer the questions sought in this research, a new lens was created thatcould help explain motivations of representatives at the conferences. The new termcreated to fulfill this vacuum is technogeopolitics. In this paper technogeopolitics isused to examine geopolitical processes, in particular the recursive relationshipbetween technology and geopolitics.

The historical geopolitical literature is ripe with new theories, geopolitical insights,and models. However, these theories are often undermined by technologies as theyare created, adopted and evolve. Transportation (and telecommunication) techno-logies are a particular problem since they challenge fixed notions of geography byovercoming time and space as many old texts on geopolitics can attest. This wideexpanse between new theories incorporating a fixed notion of current technology, andthe unpredictability of technologies in the future can be bridged by technogeopolitics.

Some scholars of geopolitics realize that technology is a key process in geopoliticsand make important observations regarding technology, however the process of tech-nology is never incorporated directly into geopolitical theory. Instead, it is seen asa unidirectional force which is kept to the side because of lack of knowledge of thetechnology or because its incorporation would be too messy. For example, in outli-ning the concept of strategy and geopolitics, Gray and Sloan (1999) state:

This relationship between the geographical environment and the decision-mak-ing process is a dynamic one; it is dependent upon changing levels of transportand weapons technology. This dynamic aspect is one of the most important linksbetween geopolitical theory, geography and strategy. It illustrates the pivotal nat-ure of the continuing exchange between theory and history. (p. 3)

Furthermore, Lonsdale (1999) states:In reference to the relationship between technology and geopolitics, it is

important to remember that geopolitical theory has often rested on the premisethat technology can help shape the geopolitical world. (p. 137)

All three authors highlight the importance of technology in their passages, but thespecifics of the technology and the recursive relationship with geopolitics is neverexplored, thus leaving the technology as a mere historical footnote instead of keyincorporated processes. These gaps in analysis reinforce the need for a technogeopol-itical lens to examine the relationship between technologies and geopoliticaldecisions both historically and in the present.

2 The assumption of many authors is that political and economic forces drive the creation of thetechnology naturally, never examining the true messy history of technological creation and evolution.


The potential of technogeopolitics is exemplified by Fig. 1 in which Dicken (1998)reproduces a popular map of global shrinkage from 1500 to the 1960s. In this map,the earth is shown to ‘shrink’ as advances in transportation technologies are adopted.Though representative of a basic understanding of transportation technology, theauthor of the map ignores the geopolitical implications of the use of technology, andthus technogeopolitics.3 If we are to begin to understand in more detail the relation-ship between technology, politics, geopolitics, economics, and culture, it is impera-

Fig. 1. Global shrinkage 1500 to the 1960s. Source: Dicken (1998) (fig. 5.3, p. 152).

3 It has been suggested that geopolitics is implied within this map. If this is the case, consider theanalysis as an unfolding of the information which is embedded within Fig. 1.


tive that we move beyond these instrumental, but now outdated, maps and create newcartographic representations which reflect a more detailed understanding of recursiverelationships. A technogeopolitical map representing the reach of jet aircraft in the1960s would be a heavily distorted cartogram rather than the bottom image of Fig.1. The cartogram could represent only one country since nations sign bilateral aerialtreaties. Therefore, for an accurate image of global aviation, one would have to createa specific cartogram for each nation representing not only each country’s bilateraltreaties but also the range of aircraft in their respective civilian jet fleets, somethingthat differs unevenly. Though complicated, this is a next step in analysis and rep-resentation examining the complexity and nuances of many geopolitical relationships.

Geopolitical theories and decisions are based on a specific understanding of acurrent level of technology. States have historically used transportation and com-munication systems to control sovereign political and economic space. In writingsby Mahan (1890) (p. 25) and Mackinder (1919) (pp. 110–111) this is shown quitewell. So that trade could continue and sovereignty remain intact, specific treatieswere signed between nations defining corridors of trade by land and water(Slotemaker, 1932: 62–63). These treaties maintained a state’s economic stabilitywhile at the same time minimizing any potential threat to its territorial sovereignty(Richards, 1912: 19; Rosenne, 1996: 320; Murphy, 1994: 210; Johnson, 1982: 52).In short, as statesmen realized the use of new technologies allowed for more, better,and faster access to their political and economic space, they initiated conferencesand treaties defining and limiting each state’s ability to use the new technology andthus its influence on each other. Airplanes and dirigibles were such technologies.

Aircraft had the unique ability to fly over and thus potentially disregard all naturaland man made barriers. This extension of the geography of transport into the airforced nations to reevaluate their potentially vulnerable position vis-a-vis othernations, triggering an international debate over how to define the air space aboveevery nation (Richards, 1912: 9,18; Hutchinson, 1944: 4).

By 1910, the most powerful land-based and sea-based nations realized that thebalance of power between them could shift with emerging geography-defying avi-ation technology and initiated the first in a series of aviation conferences designedto define states’ positions in this new medium and to minimize the potential loss ofsovereign control over their respective states.4

1910 Paris conference

By means of rapid mechanical traction it has brought men nearer together, somuch nearer socially, economically, physically, that the old separations intonations and kingdoms were no longer possible, a newer, wider synthesis was not

4 These early aerial conferences were not without precedent. The early 1900s was a time of manyinternational conferences including those focusing on radio and telegraphy, monetary issues and trade.


only needed, but imperatively demanded. And far down, under the soaring eagles,was England, four thousand feet below perhaps, and looking very small and defen-seless indeed in the morning sunlight... that little island in the silver seas was atthe end of its immunity...(Wells, 1908)

At the request of the French government, 18 European countries sent delegationsto the Paris International Conference of Air Navigation in May 1910 with the purposeof examining international civil aviation (Colegrove, 1930: 48; Phillips, 1918a).5

With advances in aviation, highlighted by German dirigible flights and Bleriot’sEnglish Channel flight, governments began to take notice of this technology andwhat it might mean for the security of their nation (Gollin, 1989: 134). At the confer-ence, two polarized positions emerged. One led by Dr Johannes Kriege and M. LouisRenault, the German and French delegates, respectively. These delegates argued forfreedom of the air above all nations. The British delegate, Rear-Admiral Sir DouglasGamble, argued for sovereignty of the air (Phillips, 1918a; Warner, 1926: 278; Gol-lin, 1989: 136).6 The Germans/French suggested that7

[a]ccess to the seas is not the privilege of all countries, and the right of thosewhich do not have it to establish their own commercial fleet... cannot equal theadvantage of being situated at the seashore. On the contrary, air space is abovethe territory of every country, without exception, and the whole of the humanrace can take advantage of it (Wagner, 1970: 4–5).

The British replied that:

[t]he bed-rock fact is that the user of the air cannot be treated as a thing distinctfrom the user of the territory beneath it; If that be so it follows inevitably fromthe admitted principles of International Law that States are entitled to absolutesovereignty in the air space above their territories.

Freedom of the air conflicts not at some points only, but at every point withthe interest of the State below, because there can be no user of the air which doesnot to some extent affect the security or the administration of that State. If weturn, on the other hand, to the principle of State sovereignty of the air we find thatit requires no Convention to make it effective, but that it is the natural outcome ofexisting International Law (Richards, 1912: 9,14,27).

After one month the British representative requested a break in the proceedings

5 The nations in attendance included Germany, France, Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland,Belgium, Great Britain, Italy, Portugal, Rumania and Serbia. The other six are not accounted for inthe documents.

6 For a detailed analysis of the British position at the 1910 conference see chapter seven in Gollin(1989).

7 A French jurist, Paul Fauchille, first introduced the German and French position in 1902 (Hutchinson,1944: 4).


of the conference to consult with his government (Inter-Ministerial Commission ofCivil Aeronautics, 1918). The conference never reconvened. In 1911, the BritishParliament passed the British Aerial Navigation Act, which maintained the air aboveBritain, her Empire, and her Dominions, was sovereign and inviolable.8 This enactedinto law the British position at the 1910 conference and initiated other Europeannations to follow with similar national legislation temporarily closing the debate overinternational aviation (Dobson, 1990: 6).

The position of the British cannot be understood fully without realizing that Britainwas No Longer an Island (Gollin, 1985). German Zeppelins had the range to fly toBritain and other distant parts of Europe from Germany non-stop removing Britain’straditional natural defense, the English Channel (Fig. 2).9 It was in Britain’s nationalinterest, especially under the potential shadow of Zeppelins, to argue for aerial sover-eignty. It is clear that the British found Germany, and its commanding lead in avi-ation development in the form of Zeppelins, to be a technogeopolitical threat. Thisis exemplified by the British Secretariat of the Committee of Imperial Defense whichproduced a strategic analysis of German motivations behind their position at theconference. The 23 June 1910 document stated that

Fig. 2. Technogeopolitics 1910: the range of German Zeppelins from German territory in 1910. Note:this map does not accurately predict all political boundaries of pre-war Europe; however, the point ofthe map still holds true. Source: author.

8 The Act did not go into effect until 1913.9 Also of interest in Fig. 2 is that most nations in attendance of the 1910 conference were within the

non-stop range of Zeppelins flying from German territory.


From a glance at the map of the North Sea it would appear extremely probablethat the real object is to tie the hands of the minor Powers adjacent to the GermanEmpire, and to deprive them of the right of making regulations prejudicial to thefree passage of German airships.

Consider, for example, the use of German airships during a war between Ger-many and Great Britain. It seems very probable that Germany may hope to com-pensate for her relative inferiority in cruisers suitable for scouting by the use ofher great superiority in dirigible balloons …the strategical areas which Germanywould most desire to watch would be… areas [in Britain that] lie across the terri-tory of minor powers, viz. — Belgium, Holland, and Denmark.

If these powers can be induced by International Convention to admit the prin-ciple of equal treatment to foreign and home airships, thereby surrendering theright to make regulations directed against foreign airships, it will be possible forthe German airships (other than military) to move freely across them during awar with Great Britain without the fear that, in the event of an unpremeditateddescent, they may be liable to detention, confiscation, or other…regulations.(Cab. 18/26.

‘The Strategical Aspect of Certain Proposal before the International Conferenceon Aerial Navigation’, 23 June 1910, quoted in Gollin, 1989: 138–139)

The military vulnerability of the British Isles was proven shortly thereafter inWorld War I by the use of Zeppelins by Germany to drop terror bombs on Britishterritory. Similarly, German aviation was an economic threat. With Germany’s com-manding position in the air, it could now not only access (or destroy) markets ofadjacent countries but any nation within its range. Clearly this was a threat to Britainand her trading empire.

The 1911 Aerial Navigation Acts significantly limited Germany’s access to othernation’s markets by air and thus limiting its ability to project its emerging economicprowess and political and military aspirations. Britain’s 1911 act eliminated thepotential free and unchallenged economic monopoly power in aerial transportationGermany could have earned with her exclusive control over Zeppelin technology.The British feared Zeppelin encroachment into its political and economic spheres ofinfluence, while Germany saw these airships as a liberating technology because ofthe potential free access to the aerial ocean above all nations.

The French delegate, a jurist, M. Louis Renault, was not persuaded by the Britishdelegation’s direct and indirect arguments against freedom of the air at the conference(Gollin, 1989: 155). The reason for Renault’s unmoving position was the belief thatFrench aviation technology was more advanced than the British and thus would allowthe French more access to other nations than she would have to give up. To reinforcethis point Lord Esher, a member of the Standing Sub-Committee of the Committeeof Imperial Defense stated:

I am concerned to make these remarks and suggestions because in view of theGerman fleet of airships, and of the use of aeroplanes in the recent French maneu-vers in forecasting the probabilities of the next great war… Great Britain may


find herself labouring under grave disadvantages (Cab. 4/3 CID 119-B ‘Secret’Note by Lord Esher. 6 October 1910, quoted in Gollin, 1989:154).

Another possibility for the strong French stance is the proximity to Germany. Itmight have been more geopolitically astute for France to ally itself with an adjacentneighbor who has advanced aerial technology than to isolate itself by refuting theGerman position and thus refusing them aerial access. In any case, the cordialitybetween France and Germany on international aviation would soon end and theywould emerge in future conferences as bitter enemies.

Interestingly, the US was absent from the 1910 Paris conference. The Times(London) stated “The United States is the only important country which is not rep-resented” (The Times, 1910). As Fig. 2 demonstrates the farthest range of any aerialvehicle in 1910, the German Zeppelin, did not come close to the Western Hemi-sphere. Though not documented, it can be postulated that the US, historically anisolationist state, was not threatened by the range of German dirigibles or by Germannationalism and therefore did not find it necessary to attend the conference. Thisposition has parallels in later diplomatic correspondence. On 3 July 1914, PaulRenard, President of the Permanent Commission on International Aeronautics inFrance invited the US to an international congress on aeronautics organized by hisorganization. The invitation, sent to the Secretary of State from Myron T. Merrick,the American Ambassador in France, stated:

By reason of the constantly growing interest in matters pertaining to Aeronaut-ics and in view of the communications and the discussion which will occur atthis Congress, we beg to ask you, Mr. Ambassador, to be good enough to causeyour Government to be represented by a delegation whose presence would be forus a most precious encouragement. (Merrick, 1914)

The Counselor of the US Secretary of State forwarded a copy to the Secretary ofWar (Lansing, 1914a). In responding for the Secretary of State, Robert Lansing wroteto Merrick “this government regrets its inability to accept the invitation so cour-teously extended” without further explanation (Lansing, 1914b). It appears that theUS government’s position on international aviation was one of relative isolation fromthe growth of flying technology in Europe.

In evaluating the conference and its ramifications, it is evident that the Britishwere able to temporarily put a halt to German aerial economic expansion by national-izing aerial sovereignty. When the 1911 act passed Parliament, other nations,especially Germany, had no legal access into the airspace above Britain or her colon-ies. This eliminated the potential lucrative air routes the Zeppelins would use to openmarkets in passenger and cargo transport and to threaten military locations. The actgave the British some breathing room to play catch-up technologically with Germanyand France. No longer could Britain depend exclusively upon her historical role asa sea power. Exemplifying this position, a General Staff Memorandum stated:

The comparative security of the United Kingdom as contrasted with ContinentalStates depends no doubt on our insularity, but only so long as that insularity is


coupled with superiority at sea…it is submitted that, if aerial navigation becomesa practicable art, if air-ships can be designed able to move with reasonable cer-tainty and to drop explosives with reasonable accuracy on war vessels, docks,magazines and factories of warlike stores, neither our insular position nor therestrictions which we may now seek to impose will avail us. We shall, in suchcircumstances, have to rely on acquiring and maintaining, if not air command, atleast air equality, by constructing air-ships capable of defeating the air-ships ofan enemy, and by developing guns and other appliances capable of destroyingthose airships. (Gollin, 1989: 142)

The 1910 conference was the first international conference in which the two basictheories underlying the development of civil aviation and its relationship to the statewere publicly debated, thus clearly exemplifying that the line between civil andmilitary aviation was at least blurred if not non-existent. Between 1910 and WorldWar I, there were no more international conferences convened and the Germans andthe French continued aeronautical develops while the British began their own avi-ation programs in hope of catching their European rivals. World War I forced theevolution of Zeppelin and airplanes even further than in peacetime all the whilehighlighting the geopolitical and hegemonic ambitions of Britain, Germany, andeventually the US. The technogeopolitical aspirations for control of the air wouldemerge again in 1918.

1919 Versailles Convention

In December 1918 the French Charge d’Affaires ad interim invited the UnitedStates, Great Britain, Belgium and Italy to a conference on aerial navigation (Phillips,1918b). Woodrow Wilson, on the advice of his cabinet, declined the invitation statingthat it would interfere with the Versailles Peace Treaty’s examination of civil aviationthat was ongoing (Polk, 1919; Wilson, 1919). Italy and Belgium accepted the invi-tation. In light of the US response, Lord Milner of the British delegation suggestedthat a council be set up with two goals. One, advise the Peace Conference regardingcivil aviation matters and two, draft a convention for international aviation, thustruncating US concerns. Two representatives each from the United States, the BritishEmpire, France, Italy, and Japan and five other representatives elected from theremaining states would comprise the committee (Milner, 1919). To persuade theAmericans to join, the President of the Council and President of the Interallied PeaceConference, Georges Clemenceau, wrote to Woodrow Wilson:

Indeed, the clauses for aerial protection seem to me to have at least an impor-tance equal to the clauses for military and naval protection; and it is of the greatestinterest to have a study made by competent personalities of the measures to takeagainst the eventual constitution of a Germany military fleet. I cannot insist toostrongly on the imperious necessity of this study on account of the proximity ofGermany to London, Brussels, Paris and Rome. (Clemenceau, 1919a)


Attached to the letter was a preliminary list of questions for the committee toconsider including:

Examination of measures to be taken for prohibiting the possibility of the exist-ence of a German aerial fleet; eventual interdiction of aeronautic construction inGermany. (Clemenceau, 1919a)

Woodrow Wilson accepted the invitation and appointed Major General Mason M.Patrick, United States Army, and Rear Admiral H. S. Knapp, United States Navy,as the US representatives to the committee (Crew, 1919). To explain why militarypersonnel were chosen over civilians on the committee one only need to examine aletter from Clemenceau to the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the President of theUnited States, and the President of the Italian Council.10

The necessity of a Committee composed of both civilians and military menarises from the fact that all civilian aviation is more or less adaptable to militarypurposes, and consequently the solution given to any problem of civil aviationfor this very reason reacts on the military situation. (Clemenceau, 1919b)

During the Versailles Peace Treaty, Britain, France, and other lesser Europeannations actively sought to reduce Germany’s ability to develop civil aviation byacquiring all her aeronautical equipment, dislocating her aviators, and withdrawingher right of territorial sovereignty (US Department of State, 1942: 616). The finalpeace treaty included:

Section III, Article 200 — Until the complete evacuation of German territoryby the Allied and Associated troops, the aircraft of the Allied and Associate Powershall enjoy freedom of passage through the air, freedom of transit and landing.

Part XI — Aerial NavigationArticle 313 — The aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall have full

liberty of passage and landing over and in the territory and territorial waters ofGermany, and shall enjoy the same privileges as German aircraft, particularly incase of distress by land or sea.

Article 315 — All aerodromes in Germany open to national public traffic shallbe open for the aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers, and in any suchaerodrome such aircraft shall be treated on a footing of equality with German

10 The other representatives at the initial meeting in April 1919 included Major General J. Seely andMajor General Sir S.H. Sykes of the Royal Air Force for Britain; Colonel Pauldhe of the French MilitaryAeronautics and Capitaine De Vaisseau Chauvin of French Naval Aeronautics; Mr Se. E. Chiesn of theItalian Parliamentary Deputy for Aviation and General Moris of the Italian Military Aeronautics; and forthe Japanese, Major General K. Tanaka of the Imperial Japanese Army and Mr Kamakawa. The lesserpowers were represented by: Capitaine de Fregate Armando Buriamqui of the Brazilian Navy; Mr DeBoustamente of Cuba; Colonel A. Mazarakis of Greece; Colonel J.M.R. Norton de Mattos of Portugal;Colonel D’Etat and Major Thomas Dimitresco of Roumania; and Chef d Escadron Mirko Marinkovichof Serbia (telegram to Secretary of State of the US from Sharp, 3 April 1919) (League of Nations,1930: 166).


aircraft as regards charges of every description, including charges for landing andaccommodation. (Woodhouse, 1920: 157–159)

The Versailles Peace Treaty, because it included specific limitations on Germanaviation, was the blueprint from which the 1919 Versailles Aerial Convention wasbuilt. On October 13th, 1919, the committee on aerial navigation completed a draftof the convention related to rules and regulations on the international movement ofaircraft. The most important geopolitical statements to emerge from the conventionwere Chapter I, articles I, II, and V.

Chapter I, Article I states:The contracting States recognize that every state has complete and exclusive

sovereignty in the air space above its territory and territorial waters.Chapter I, Article 2 states:Each contracting State undertakes in time of peace to accord freedom of inno-

cent passage above its territory to the aircraft of other contracting States, providedthat the conditions laid down in the present Convention are observed. Regulationmade by a contracting States as to the admission over its territory of the aircraftof the other contracting States, shall be applied without distinction of nationality.(Woodhouse, 1920: 51)

Article V of the aerial convention states:No contracting state shall, except by a special and temporary authorization,

permit the flight above its territory of an aircraft which does not possess thenationality of a contracting state. (Conveation Portatnt, 1919)

Article I allowed all nations complete control of the air above their state. Britain’saerial technological advantage after the war encouraged her to support Article 2,allowing open access to all nations for civil aircraft to promote aerial commerce(The Times, 1919: 11E). The apparent contraction by the British in the support ofaerial sovereignty and open access is explained by Dobson as a British political andeconomic opportunity (Dobson, 1990):

Realizing that there was potential for commercial gain and, perhaps moreimportantly, that they needed good communications with the Empire, both ofwhich would involve flying over European and Middle Eastern nations, the Britishwanted to combine air sovereignty with a liberal formula to facilitate services.(pp. 6–7)

The dismantling of Germany as a civil aviation power allowed Britain’s domesticairlines to flourish on international routes while the heavy hand of the allies slowedGerman civil aviation. Germany’s physical position in Europe meant that most Euro-pean airlines would pass over German airspace. The limitation of Germany’s sover-eignty allowed Britain to fly over, land, refuel, and take-off again within Germanterritory en route to eastern Europe and its empire without dissent and saving bothtime and money (Fig. 3).


Fig. 3. Technogeopolitics 1919. The range of a military de Havilland D.H.4 fixed wing plane convertedinto a civilian airliner. Source: author.

Given a free passage over Germany…there lies open a route across level fieldsand plains for virtually the whole width of Europe, and the trip from Bordeauxby way of Paris, Amsterdam, Berlin and Moscow to Kazan or other cities inCentral Russia can be made without ever crossing land more than fifteen hundredfeet above sea level. Germany holds the key. (Warner, 1926: 284)

The French delegates were apparently motivated by fear and revenge at the Peaceand Aerial Conference. The French demanded that Germany be stripped of its aerialability, both military and civilian which was reflected in an air treaty she devisedin 1918, which formed the basis of the 1919 aerial treaty. The French documenttitled ‘Regulations for Air Navigation’ (1918) states:

In 1910, four Powers which are now the enemies of France, were present atthe Conference, along with Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland. Thereis no question of treating the first four like the five others…: the reciprocal free-dom of navigation can only be granted with full confidence, to the States whichalone, from war to victory, have drawn their bonds closer. The European alliednations represented at the 1910 Conference, and the United-States of Americaalone, will be invited to exchange their views, from which, on the morrow ofVictory, the first great convention law of the air will spring. (Phillips, 1918b).

The French obviously had geopolitical interests they were attempting to leverageat the conference, but these aspirations, unlike the other nations, did not show upin the primary documents, which in itself might mean that their strategy was unclear


to their allies as well. Whatever the geopolitical aspirations, the French and theBritish made sure that the Germans were reduced in capacity to make profit andwar, thus elevating their own economic and military potential.

Britain and France’s strongest military and commercial rival before and after thewar was Germany. Article V of the 1919 Convention had one main purpose, toexclude Germany from participation in international aviation by forbidding her air-craft to enter other nation’s airspace (Office of the Solicitor, 1920).Germany could not join the aerial convention until 1 January 1923 (Colby, 1919).

However, with delay signing the treaty and slow ratification, many nations, includ-ing Britain, worried about a German backlash to the 1919 Convention. In a letter tothe United States’ ambassador at a conference, Lord Darby stated:

So long as the Protocol is not signed no neutral State can join the Convention:the result of that state of affairs is that Germany is trying to arrange a Conventionof her own with neutral States, a Convention which she may be able to start inopposition to that of the Entento. The question is therefore much more urgentthat [sic] it appears. (Roper, 1920)

In reflecting specifically on article V, and its consequences, Dr Alfred Wegerdt,the Ministerialrat in the Reich Ministry of Communications stated:

Germany, who could not but regard this clause as being directed especiallyagainst her, was thus precluded from sharing on equal terms in the developmentof inter-national aviation. (Roper, 1929)

Furthermore, Warner (1926) reinforces this point stating that not only Germany,but also all neutrals were punished due to this clause:

To take only a single instance, air traffic with Germany was of vital interestto the Netherlands, and while Art. V remained in force that traffic could be main-tained only at the expense of Dutch adhesion to the Convention. Dutch inabilityto comply with the terms of the document [would] have made Dutch airplanes inturn outlaws within the Allied countries. (Warner, 1926: 281)

The US, like Britain in 1910, was playing the role of an underdog in aviationdevelopment. This was made abundantly clear by the American Aviation Missionwhich included both high level government appointees, high ranking military person-nel and representatives of the American aviation industry. The task of the mission,the final report of which was labeled confidential, was to assess European status onaviation, vis-a-vis the United States after World War I. The final report, dated 19July 1919, made the following conclusions.11

11 This report, which mentioned the aerial conference within the text, must have influenced the USposition at the conference.


That Italy, France and England realize fully the importance of aircraft in themilitary-naval and civil-commercial aspect and propose to encourage the generaldevelopment of the art through Governmental aid to commercial industry.

That Great Britain has come to consider the dominance of the air as at leastof equal importance with threat of the seas and is frankly and avowedly planninga definite policy of Aerial Development to that end.

That the rapid adoption of aircraft to the commercial uses of Peace is every-where being studied and planned. That because of its great speed and range ofoperation, oceans, state and even countries are being passed over with a greaterfacility than are townships and countries traversed by the motor car. (Crowell,1919)

The US government apparently realized that it was falling severely behind inaeronautical development. The report concludes:

But America has loft [sic] its development to other nations, and too late, realizedthe mistake of this neglect. She has paid the price!…Upon the breadth of viewand vision of those in control of America’s policies, depends our future as an AirPower. (Crowell et al., 1919)

One impetus, which drew the attention of the American government, was a Ger-man plan to fly a Zeppelin from Germany to the US non-stop before the Treatystipulations were activated. In light of wartime achievements, in particular the spec-tacular flight of the LZ-104 in late 1917 (Hugill, 1993: 261), such a transatlanticservice was clearly possible. In response to this German activity, the US governmentstated that: “the government would not permit the establishment of such a serviceeven if seriously attempted” (New York Times, 1919: 1.7).

As technological underdogs, the US had to take a geopolitical position to makesure no country advantageously accessed her market to their advantage. The two-fold strategy to accomplish this included the following.

1. To keep the German civil aviation active as long as possible during the Peaceand Aerial Conferences. This helped enable them to compete with the dominantBritish and French rivals. To accomplish this, during the Peace Treaty negations,the US argued with the Europeans over the definition of civil and military aircraftand made certain Germany was allowed to have a civil aircraft program (USDepartment of State, 1942: 619).12

2. The Americans chose not to ratify the 1919 Aerial Treaty and instead develop anational aviation program within their country partially in response to fears thatthe European nations would soon try to access the US with regular flights overthe Atlantic.

12 Germany’s aerial sovereignty was not returned until 1925.


The logic of the US position is highlighted by the British commercial secretaryin Berlin in 1921 who recalled statements from Junkers, one of Germany’s foremostaircraft designers. The secretary states:

[T]he Allies and particularly England will have cause to regret the action theyare now taking, as it is certain to impede their own aerial development which ina small continent like Europe is entirely dependent upon close co-operationbetween all countries. Professor Junkers thinks that the situation created in aircraftconstruction by the Ultimatum will be largely to the benefit of the Americanswho have ample space to develop their civil aviation on a large scale and willnow be able to do so without serious European competition. (quoted in Hugill,1993: 278)

This is further reiterated by a report within the US War Department examiningthe 1919 Treaty and the ramifications if Mexico and eventually Germany shouldsign the treaty.

…in case some Mexican Government should become a signatory to the AviationConvention, to the flight of German planes over Mexican territory and thus nearthe American boundary. It is conceivable that such a right of flight might beexercised by Germans in a way highly distasteful to the United States. (Bacon,1920)

By the end of 1919, Britain dominated the ICAN and was pushing for ratification,the US isolated itself from European events in the hope of developing a technologi-cally advanced national aviation network to stem European expansion, Germany wasshut out of all international events and France was attempting to recover from thewar. The convention was eventually signed by 27 countries. By 1929, 26 countrieshad ratified the treaty, seven of which were under the power umbrella of Great Britain(Roper, 1929: 7). Though the US thought isolation would give it time to play catch-up in aviation technology, it was racing against a strong Atlantic tide:

The development of aviation is progressing so rapidly at this time that it isdifficult even for those in close touch with it to keep up with its progress. Duringthe past two months the Atlantic has been crossed four times by aircraft; first bya seaplane of the American Navy, second, by an airplane of Great Britain, andfinally, by an airship of Great Britain which has twice demonstrated its ability tofly between England and America. All of this has been accomplished without theloss of a single life. (Crowell, 1919: 14)

1928 Pan American Convention

In 1928, at the Fifth Conference of American States in Havana, the US delegationinitiated the Pan American Aerial Conference. The delegates to the conference wrote


the Pan-American Aerial Treaty which followed a similar structure as the Versaillesand Madrid Treaties. Article I of the Pan American convention defined aerial sover-eignty while Article IV articulated freedom of passage. The remaining articles out-lined the technical requirements and qualifications of aircraft of member nations.

Though the Havana treaty was similar in construction to the 1919 treaty, therewere four major areas of difference. One, Havana was a move toward hemisphericregionalization (Americanization) of international aviation, unlike Versailles thatattempted produce a European and Global aviation structure. The Americans wanteda unique non-European aerial treaty which would both encompass the Western Hemi-sphere while at the same time limiting European access. A State Department officialwho was in charge of keeping track of Latin America made the following statement.

[The] Director of Aeronautics in the Department of Commerce concluded thatthe long and complicated regulations embodied in the annexes to the convention[Versailles 1919] would not be suitable to this country. The Department of Com-merce has been operating under its own air regulations, which have been adoptedin pursuance of authority conferred upon that Department by the Air CommerceAct of 1926 and it has no present desire to attempt to make these regulationsconform to the more complicated regulations attached to the Paris Convention.(Treaty Division, 1928: 1–2)

To reinforce his view of Western aviation, Herbert Hoover, the Secretary of Com-merce and a key player in both domestic and international aviation development inthe US, asked the Secretary of State, Frank Kellogg to remove the 1919 Conventionfrom further consideration by his department or the Senate since the US now hadthe Pan American Convention13 (Hoover, 1928).

Two, the technical stipulations outlined in the Havana treaty were sufficientlystringent to enable Pan Am Airways’ dominance of the Hemisphere since most ofthe 37 articles highlighted requirements from which only the technologicallyadvanced US could immediately meet and thus immediately reap the benefits.

Three, the US government and aviation industry was still concerned about Euro-pean aviation technology and its ability to access the US market. This fact is exem-plified by a letter to Senator Frank B. Willis of Ohio from P.W. Litchfield, VicePresident of The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company. In his confidential letter,Litchfield urges Willis to vote against the 1919 Treaty if it came to the floor for avote because if ever ratified, the treaty would put the US lighter-than-air industry ata disadvantage to Europe and threaten US national security. Specifically, Litch-field stated:

The airship…will be built principally in very large sizes…only one or two shipswill be under construction at a time. It does not lend itself to quantity production

13 Since the US Senate never ratified the Versailles Treaty, it was still in committee and could havebeen sent to the floor for a vote anytime at the request of the Executive Branch.


method which other wise would offset the differential in labor costs here inabroad…

America has the non-inflammable helium gas, an asset of very great value. Noother nation has helium. But if the high safety value of helium is to be utilizedin passenger-carrying airships we must pay the price for that greater safety.Roughly, a helium ship will be about 30% larger than the hydrogen ship…

If the Air convention is ratified without reservations for lighter-than-aircraft itwill mean that foreign ships, built more cheaply, flown more cheaply, andoperating, let us say, between Europe and the United States, would keep Americancommercial ships out of the air.

It is important to the national defense that America have not merely the facili-ties, technique, experience, machinery, equipment, etc. to build airships, but alsohave companies actually operating airships in national and international transport,since not merely the ships themselves but flying fields, hangars, mooring masts,experienced flying and ground crews would be immediately at the disposal of thegovernment in emergency.

I believe that the difference in cost can be substantially equalized by legislationproviding that 50 per cent of all commercial airships operating between this coun-try and other countries be American-built and of American registry. (Litchfield,1925: 2–5)

This letter is representative of aviation companies that helped encourage protec-tionist policies allowing these companies a dominant position in a closed market.

Four, the treaty redefined the Monroe Doctrine to include the air. The US Presi-dent, Calvin Coolidge, in a speech in Havana following the signing of the aerialtreaty stated:

Properly understood, it [the US] is opposed (a) to any non-American actionencroaching upon the political independence of American States under any guise,and (b) any acquisition by any non-American Power of any territorial controlover any American soil by any process whatever. (Speech by President Coolidgeat the Conference, Department of State, 1928: 578) (italics mine)

By reasserting itself as the dominant nation in the Western Hemisphere and realiz-ing its vulnerability to foreign aircraft both economically and militarily, the US inthis treaty set the stage for a single US airline, Pan American Airways, to dominateinternational aviation in the Western Hemisphere as the US’s ‘chosen instrument’all-the-while excluding the aircraft of other nations (Davies, 1988: 214) (Fig. 4).Clearly the US used the Havana convention to let nations both in the Western Hemi-sphere and in Europe know that it would not tolerate infringement on its sphereof influence.

The European distaste for the Havana Conference can be viewed in The Times(London). The section titled ‘French Criticism’ stated that the conference represented“the essential Imperialist policy of the United States in the Western Hemisphere”.Questioning the US position, the French continued “Is not the Monroe Doctrine, of


Fig. 4. Technogeopolitics 1928. The unfueled international range of fixed wing civil airplanes from theUnited States and the unfueled reach of German Zeppelins from Germany and the Iberian peninsula in1928. Source: author.


which the United States government is careful to secure recognition by EuropeanStates with which it signs arbitration treaties, a mere instrument of hegemony?”;“The United States Government wishes to ‘outlaw’ war, but reserves the right topolice countries in which it has ‘vital interests’” (The Times, 1928). Though no‘official’ archival documents examine the French and British positions regarding the1928 conference and Coolidge’s reaffirmation of the Monroe Doctrine, it is generallyunderstood that The Times is a voice of the state and that the positions printed tobe official or unofficial policy.

The ‘Fascist View of the Conference’ also reported in The Times, stated “…theprinciple of independence of every American State so loudly proclaimed on thisoccasion cannot conceal the real fact, which consist ‘in a hegemony which the UnitedStates exercises directly and militarily down to the Panama Canal and in an economicinvasion of the most distant and richest countries of South America’” (The Times,1928). By convening the 1928 Conference and by enabling the development of PanAmerican Airways as the dominant airline in the Americas, the US was able toreclaim political and economic control over the Western Hemisphere and thwart anyEuropean eyes focused on the Americas.

All 21 nations attending the Havana conference signed the Pan American conven-tion. Of the 21 nations who signed the treaty, 16 ratified it (Hutchinson, 1944: 6)legalizing and legitimizing US hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.

Summary and conclusions

This paper has the goal of introducing technogeopolitics as a new lens thoughwhich specific geopolitical insights can be made, in particular, instances where tech-nology was a leading factor. In order to show how technogeopolitics could be used,three international civil aviation conferences were examined through this lens high-lighting key insights within the primary documents of four nations. Table 1 summar-izes each nation’s particular geopolitical position at each conference based upon theadvanced nature of their domestic aviation industry.

In examining these conferences with technogeopolitics, five common themesemerged: (1) states pursue specific technologies to enhance their geopolitical pos-itions; (2) states react to other states’ technical developments geopolitically whichin turn affects their own geopolitical position; (3) if a state is technologically imma-ture it will use its power to restrict access by other nations to enable it time tocatch up technologically and compete on a level technological field; (4) if a state istechnologically mature vis-a-vis its commercial and military rivals, it will push forthe most liberal aerial policy allowing a comparative advantage to its aircraft andgoods in foreign markets; and (5) at any given time technological developments mayevolve at such a rate as to potentially wipe out any geopolitical gains or losses fora nation, thus forcing states to reexamine their geopolitical foreign policy and poss-ibly call for a convening of an international conference to address their concerns.

Technogeopolitics is not limited to historical international aviation conferencesalone. One example today is the examination of the debate over the United States’


Tab

le1

Goa

lsof

each

natio

nat

thre

ein

tern

atio

nal

avia

tion

conf

eren

cesa

1910

1919

1928

Uni

ted

Stat

esD

idno

tat

tend

Lob

byfo

rfa

irtr

eatm

ent

for

Ger

man

yL

imit

orst

opE

urop

ean

acce

ssto

the

Am

eric

asK

eep

aeri

alec

onom

icco

mpe

titio

nal

ive

inR

e-se

cure

Am

eric

asas

US

area

ofE

urop

ein

fluen

ceC

reat

eM

onro

eD

octr

ine

ofth

eai

rw

ithPa

nA

mer

ican

Air

way

s

Bri

tain

Aer

ial

sove

reig

nty

asth

ein

tern

atio

nal

norm

Rem

ove

Ger

man

y’s

aeri

also

vere

ignt

yN

otin

vite

dL

imit

Ger

man

aeri

alac

cess

Dis

man

tleG

erm

any’

sav

iatio

npr

oduc

tion

prog

ram

Fran

ceA

eria

lfr

eedo

mas

the

inte

rnat

iona

lno

rmR

emov

eG

erm

any’

sae

rial

sove

reig

nty

Not

invi

ted

Full

acce

ssto

Eur

ope

byai

rD

ism

antle

Ger

man

y’s

avia

tion

prod

uctio

npr

ogra

m

Ger

man

yA

eria

lfr

eedo

mas

the

inte

rnat

iona

lno

rmL

obby

toke

epae

rial

sove

reig

nty

Not

invi

ted

Full

acce

ssto

Eur

ope

byai

rL

obby

toke

epav

iatio

npr

oduc

tion

prog

ram

aSo

urce

:au

thor

.


(US) national missile defense (NMD) system. Prior to intercontinental ballistic miss-iles (ICBMs), strategic bombers and traditional military hardware and personnel pro-vided deterrence. After ICBMs, a new theory was adopted to meet the current techno-geopolitical reality, mutual assured destruction or MAD (Schelling, 1960; Rhodes,1989). MAD defined the Cold War strategic balance of power. The US is currentlytesting a new NMD that could potentially thwart enemy ICBMs, and thus challengethe current MAD philosophy (Paul, Harknett, & Wirtz, 1998). If the missile defensetechnology is adopted and deployed, then new theories and philosophies will becreated to accommodate the new technogeopolitical reality and supplant MAD. Simi-larly, technogeopolitical debates surround the Internet and other information techno-logies that have the potential to redefine the reach of the state and the concept ofterritorial sovereignty, much as aviation did beginning in 1910 (Mathews, 1997;Keohane & Nye, 1998).

Technogeopolitics is not an omnipresent tool to examine all geopolitical eventsover time. Instead, it is a specific lens that can be used in particular geopolitical ortechnological instances to help us understand the diplomatic position of partiesinvolved. Though potentially limited in the number of uses because of its focus ontechnology, technogeopolitics is a powerful tool allowing keen insights into the oftenchaotic field of geopolitics. In conclusion, this author encourages the adoption oftechnogeopolitics as one of the many lenses and tools in examining the past, present,and future state actions, especially considering the recent literature suggesting areevaluation of traditional definitions of the state and sovereignty (Luke, 1996: 491).

Acknowledgements

Thanks to the Universities and Grants Office, United States Department of Trans-portation (DOT) that helped fund part of the research for this paper. I would alsolike to thank Jeff Birkenstein and Stan Brunn at the University of Kentucky, PeterHugill at Texas A&M University, and Byron Miller at the University of Cincinnatifor helpful comments and suggestions to this manuscript. Also thanks to the threeanonymous reviews whose comments and suggestions improved this paper substan-tially.

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Technogeopolitics and the Struggle for Control of World Air Routes, 1910-1928

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