Abstract The meaning of the term ‘tarka’ is not clear in the modern literature on

Classical Indian Philosophy. This paper will review different modern readings of this

term and try to show that what the Nyayasutra and its classical commentaries called a

‘tarka’ should be understood as the following: a tarka is a cognitive act that validates

a content (of a doubt or a cognition or a speech-act) by demonstrating its logical

fitness or invalidates a content by demonstrating its logical unfitness. A tarka can act

as a metatheory too. Generating certainty is, according to the Classical Nyaya, a job

assigned to an epistemic instrument (praman: a). It fails to do so when there arises a

doubt regarding it. The moment a tarka dispels the doubt, the epistemic instrument

generates certainty. Tarkas of different types will be exemplified by critically ana-

lyzing Ga _ngesa’s applications of tarka in his magnum opus Tattvacintaman: i. These

examples will clarify the definition of tarka formulated in this paper.

Keywords Tarka � Cognitive validator � Metatheory � Old Nyaya

For a number of scholars, tarka is something like reductio ad absurdum.1 They

understand it in the sense in which the Neo Naiyayika understands it. For some

scholars, it is ‘counterfactual reasoning’.2 Maybe the second understanding is a little

broader than the first one. For Matilal (1986, p. 79; 1998, p. 46), tarka is a reasoning

based on a priori principles. Kang (2010) wanted to understand the essence of tarkain terms of three features. I shall try to review these positions and finally suggest a

1 See Davis (2001, p. 154).2 See Mohanty (2000, p. 164).

N. Guha (&)Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur,Kanpur 208016, UP, Indiae-mail: nguha@iitk.ac.in

123

J Indian Philos

DOI 10.1007/s10781-011-9148-6

Tarka as Cognitive Validator

Nirmalya Guha

� Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

general definition of tarka. In order to support my claim, I shall critically examine

Ga _ngesa’s applications of tarka.

For Gotama (sutra-kara), Vatsyayana (bhas:ya-kara), Uddyotakara (vartika-kara)

and Vacaspati (tatparya-t:ıka-kara), a tarka is a cognitive act or reflection (uha) of

some kind that does not generate certainty (aparicchedaka), but strengthens one of

the options that constitute a doubt regarding a special feature of an under-informed

object. Here is a rough translation of two aphorisms from the Nyayasutra of

Gotama:

Liberation (nih: sreyasa) is attained through the knowledge of the true nature

(tattva) of epistemic instruments (praman: a), the objects represented by valid

cognitions (prameya), doubt (sam: saya), tarka etc. . .. Tarka is a form of

cognitive act or reflection, which operates through karan: opapatti in order to

know the true nature (tattva) of an object that is not known fully.3

The term ‘karan: opapatti’ has to be carefully translated, and will be translated later

in this paper. We may begin our discussion by presenting the following example of

tarka originally cited by Vatsyayana and clarified by Uddyotakara. One may have

the following question: Do somebody’s actions regulate their birth? There are two

possible answers; ‘yes’ and ‘no’. How does one know which option is correct? One

argues in the following way: (1) We see that a certain thing is caused by a specific

factor. If we do not accept the universality of causal regulation, then we have to say

that anything could be caused by anything else. (2) Everybody’s birth is different

from anybody else’s. Somebody is born as a prince and somebody as a pauper!

There must be something that causes the difference. (3) The earth, space, time,

natural laws etc. are common to all in the sense that everybody is equally entitled to

them. So they cannot be the reason for the difference in births. (4) One’s actions or

deeds (karman: ) are as unique as one’s birth. X’s deeds and birth exclusively belong

to X. (5) Therefore, we can say that one’s action is responsible for one’s birth. Thus

the form of the aforementioned tarka should be this: If one’s actions are not

responsible for one’s birth, then we cannot account for the fact that everybody’s

birth is different from anybody else’s.4 If one argues that something other than

somebody’s actions regulates their birth, then one’s argument will have many

defects that include profligacy (un-economy), reductio ad absurdum etc. The tarkathat has been applied here prefers one option, viz., ‘one’s action is responsible for

one’s birth’ to the other. This strengthened (anugr: hıta) option gets validated. The

conclusion of the tarka should be true, provided the data supplied to it are correct.

3 praman: a-prameya-sam: saya-prayojana-dr:s: t:anta-siddhanta-avayava-tarka-nirn: aya-vada-jalpa-vitan: d: a-hetvabhasa-cchala-jati-nigrahasthananam: tattvajñanan nih: sreyasadhigamah: . Nyayasutra 1.1.1; avijñ-atatattve ‘rthe karan: opapattitas tattvajñanartham uhas tarkah: . Nyayasutra 1.1.40; see Nyaya-Tarkatirtha

and Tarkatirtha (1936, 28, 320).4 katham: punah: karmanimittam: janma? bhedavattvat. . . .. so ’yam: bhedah: anekam avasthitam anityamekadravyam: pratyatmaniyatam: nimittam antaren: a na yuktah: . kim: karan: am? pr: thivyadınam: sarvapu-rus:asadharan: yat, pr: thivyadigatasya ca niyamahetor abhavat, sarvam: sarvatmakam: prasajyeta. dr:s: t:as caniyamabhedah: , tasmat karma niyamakam iti. Nyayavartika of Uddyotakara on Nyayasutra 1.1.1; Ibid,

p. 54.

N. Guha

123

Here at this point we encounter two important questions: (1) What does a tarkado? (2) How does it operate? I will try to answer these questions following the Old

Nyaya tradition. Suppose the cognizing subject S (pramatr: ) knows an object Opartially and wants to know whether O has a particular property (dharma) P or not.

There are two options available to S; either O has P or not. Each option here is a

possible epistemic instrument (praman: a) since one of them is valid (praman: ika).

I.e., some epistemic instrument must support it. When there are two contrary options

in front of S, a tarka may be applied. The tarka would weigh the two options, and

tell S that ‘this option is tenable whereas the other one is not’ (yuktayuktavicarah: ,idam: yuktam idam ayuktam iti).5 And this is what a passage from Tatparya-t:ıka says

about the cognitive operation of a tarka:

[Sometimes] possible epistemic instruments (praman: ani) that look for the true

nature (tattva) [of an object] require an auxiliary factor (itikartavyata) that will

validate them. A tarka examines the possible epistemic instruments. It vali-

dates (anugr:hn: ati) the logically fit instrument and rejects the others. Such a

validated epistemic instrument is sufficient for knowing the true nature of an

object. . .. One perceptually apprehends a bare floor and the absence of pot.

[But still the bare cognition of the absence of pot does not directly lead one to

the cognition, ‘there is no pot on this floor’.] One comes to know that there is

no pot on the floor through the following tarka: ‘Had there been a pot on this

floor, I would have seen it; for it would be as visible as the floor. I cannot see

any pot here. Therefore there is no pot here.’6

Epistemic Mechanism in Nyaya: A Prerequisite for Understanding Tarka

I may briefly state the epistemic mechanism for generating a cognition according to

Nyaya.7 A valid cognition (prama) is a non-accidentally true cognition which the

cognizing subject does not doubt.8 It is not a lucky guess. The Naiyayika thinks that

there are just four epistemic ways in which a valid cognition can be generated.

Those four ways are epistemic instruments or praman: as; namely pratyaks:a (per-

ception), anumana (inference), sabda (testimony) and upamana (analogy). Every

(ordinary) cognition is an effect (karya) since it has a beginning. And every effect

needs to be produced by a set of causes and conditions (karan: a-samagrı). The

5 yah: praman: anam: vis:ayas tam: vibhajate. kah: punar vibhagah:? yuktayuktavicarah: , idam: yuktam idamayuktam iti. yat tatra yuktam: bhavati, tad anujanati, na tv avadharayati. anavadharan: at praman: antaram:na bhavati. Nyayavartika on 1.1.1; Ibid, p. 54.6 etad uktam: bhavati praman: am: tattvavadharan: aya prayuktam: karan: ataya itikartavyatam apeks:ate.

tarkas ca praman: avis:ayayuktayuktavicaratma praman: am: yukte tattve pravartamanam anujanan pra-man: am anugr:hn: ati. tadanugr:hıtam: praman: am: tattvanirn: ayaya paryaptam. . . . tatha hi pratyaks:am evatavad bhutale pravartamanam: tadvises:an: ataya ghat:abhave ’pi pravartamanam: yady atrabhavis:yad ghat:obhutalam iva adraks:ata tena saha tulyadarsanayogyatvat, na ca dr: syate tasman nastıti tena tarken: aanujñayamanam: ghat:abhavavisis: t:abhutale pravartate kevalam evedam: bhutalam: neha ghat:a iti. Tat-parya-t:ıka of Vacaspati on 1.1.1; Ibid, p. 54.7 ‘Cognition’ means ‘jñana’ or ‘a piece of cognition’. Let us consider ‘cognition’ a count noun.8 It has to be a doubt-free cognition or niscaya.

Tarka as Cognitive Validator

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principal cause which actually generates the effect through some causal activity

(vyapara) is the karan: a or the causal instrument. In the case of felling a tree, the

causal instrument is an axe which through a dynamic connection between itself and

the tree finally fells the tree. In the epistemic context, the causal instrument is the

praman: a or epistemic instrument. For perceptual cognitions, the instrument is a

sense organ such as an eye or an ear. It generates the perception by getting con-

nected (sannikr: s: t:a) with an object. This activity of getting connected is the vyaparaor causal activity. In the case of a (hypothetico-deductive) inference (anumiti)having the form, ‘Z has Y, since Z has X’, the instrument is the cognition, ‘anything

that has X has Y too’ (which is the vyapti-jñana or cognition of pervasion). We say

that ‘Y pervades X’ if and only if anything that has X has Y too. (In the Indian model)

fire pervades smoke since anything that has smoke has fire too. Here fire is the

pervader (vyapaka) and smoke the pervaded (vyapya). The cognition of pervasion is

the instrument that finally generates the inferential cognition by getting cognitively

connected with the Site, i.e., the locus where something is getting inferred. One who

knows that anything that has smoke has fire too, sees smoke in a hill and cognizes

that ‘this hill has smoke which is pervaded by fire’. This cognition which connects

the cognition of pervasion with the Site, i.e., the hill in this case is called a para-marsa or ‘consideration’. Immediately after the consideration is born, does one

inferentially cognize that ‘this hill has fire’.9 Thus the cognition of pervasion

generates the inferential cognition through generating a consideration which is the

causal activity (vyapara). In the case of testimonial cognition (sabda-jñana), the

instrument is the knowledge of linguistic units (pada-jñana) used by the speaker. An

epistemic instrument need not always generate a valid cognition (prama); one’s eye

can take a rope for a snake. That means at least in the Old Nyaya tradition, an

epistemic instrument (praman: a) is not factive.

Tarka and Validation

Vatsayana says:

When an object O is not known fully, the cognizing subject desires to know Oas it is. Then there arises the following query that states the two contrary

options separately: Does O have the property P, or not? [A tarka] then vali-

dates one option through karan: opapatti. ‘It is logically fit that this option must

be supported by an epistemic instrument’—this is karan: opapatti. Through the

demonstration of logical fitness one argues that this option is true while the

other one is not.10

9 I am discussing anumiti somewhat elaborately because it will play a crucial role in understanding

tarkas.10 avijñayamanatattve ’rthe jijñasa tavaj jayate janıyemam artham iti. atha jijñasitasya vastunovyahatau dharmau vibhagena vimr: sati—kim: svid ittham ahosvin nettham iti. vimr: syamanayor dharmayorekam: karan: opapattya anujanati, sambhavati asmin karan: am: praman: am: hetur iti karan: opapattya syadevam etan netarad iti. Nyayabhas:ya of Vatsyayana on 1.1.40; see Nyaya-Tarkatirtha and Tarkatirtha

(1936, pp. 321–322).

N. Guha

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The options that the query consists of mutually block each other since what

underlies the query is the doubt: ‘Is this so or not?’ Neither of them generates any

certainty. In such a situation, a tarka enters the stage and strengthens one option and

dismisses its blocker.11 It provides exactly one option with a causal activity (vya-para) and validates it or dismisses an option.12 It is not a separate epistemic

instrument since it cannot apprehend any feature of the object independently; it is

just a validator (anugrahaka).13 In the case of ‘the regulator of birth’, we have seen

that a tarka strengthened one option and dismissed the others. In the example cited

in Tatparya-t:ıka, one can see a bare floor; but seeing a bare floor does not imme-

diately inform one that there is no pot on it. One needs to ‘reflect’ a bit in order to

have the cognition, ‘there is an absence of pot in this floor’. That reflection is a tarkawhich has been mentioned in the example. I would like to add another point. We

shall consider many examples of tarka in this article. I think that the cases that

involve tarkas are ‘unobvious’. The raw perceptions do not depend on tarka. Some

(hypothetico-deductive) inferences do. We shall see such inferences. In order to

know that ‘this is a floor’ one does not invoke any tarka since this is a matter of

basic perception. But that ‘there is no pot here on this floor’ is not as obvious as ‘this

is a floor’. The former demands some amount of reflection. The cases that demand

some reflection for accepting or dismissing an option may invoke a tarka.

A tarka can serve as a metatheory too. A theory can be seen as a network of

complex information brought forth by several epistemic instruments. Gotama says:

‘In a discussion that tries to understand the truth about something (tattva), one

accepts a thesis or rejects another one on the basis of the given epistemic instru-

ments and tarka. The thesis one accepts should not go against one’s philosophical

position (siddhanta-aviruddha)’.14 Here Gotama is not just talking about mere

empirical data or anything obvious. That means, according to him, a tarka does not

only operate at the basic epistemic level, i.e., the level of basic-data-generation, it

also operates at the level of theory-building. Vada is a discourse in which two sides

of a debate try to understand the true nature of something. In a vada, one rejects

one’s opponent’s theory when there is a tarka that would support one’s position and

reject the opponent’s position.

Strong and Weak Tarkas

In his Sarvadarsanasam: graha, Madhavacarya says that [according to the Aks:apada-darsana, i.e., Old Nyaya] tarkas are of eleven types.15 Perhaps before the time of

11 viruddhadharmavyudasena avirodhayan ity arthah: . Tatparya-parisuddhi of Udayana; see Dravida and

Dvivedin (1911, p. 329).12 savyaparıkaroti. Ibid, p. 329.13 praman: am: paricchedakam: , na tarkah: . tasman na praman: am. . . praman: avis:ayavibhagat tu praman: a-nam anugrahakah: . Nyayavartika on 1.1.1; see Nyaya-Tarkatirtha and Tarkatirtha (1936, pp. 53–54).14 praman: atarkasadhanopalambhah: siddhantaviruddhah: pañcavayavopapannah: paks:apratipaks:aparig-raho vadah: . Nyayasutra 1.2.1; Ibid, p. 335.15 sa ca ekadasavidhah: , vyaghata-atmasraya-itaretarasraya-cakrakasraya-anavastha-pratibandhikal-pana-kalpanalaghava-kalpanagaurava-utsarga-apavada-vaijatya-bhedat. See Sharma (1978, p. 467).

Tarka as Cognitive Validator

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Udayana, the author of Nyaya-vartika-tatparya-parisuddhi, the notion of ‘tarka’

underwent a process of semantic contraction. At the time of Udayana, it did not any

more mean ‘the cognitive act that validates an epistemic instrument’ (pra-man: anugrahaka). It started meaning ‘prasan_ga’ which is some sort of a counter-

factual imposition (aropa). It is something like the following. Suppose one wants to

know whether Y is a fact. There are two ways one can proceed now. (1) Indirect

Method: One may begin by assuming the denial of Y. If the denial of Y logically

leads one to the denial of X, which is an established fact, one would conclude that Yis a fact too. Here by counterfactually asserting the denial of Y one ‘asserts’ the

denial of a fact (here X). Denial of a fact is undesired (anis: t:a) and it has been

(counterfactually) imposed (prasakta) on a given case. This is an anis: t:a-prasan_ga or

‘an imposition of the undesired’. (2) Direct Method: One can assume Y itself. If the

assumption of Y insists one to contradict X, then Y cannot be true since contradicting

an established fact is undesired.

Not all the tarkas are based on such impositions. In Tatparya-parisuddhi,Udayana says that there are tarkas of five types; the vicious circularities of three

types (atmasraya, anyonyasraya and cakrakasraya), infinite regress (anavastha) and

reductio ad absurdum (tadanya-badhitartha-prasan_ga). In Nyaya-sutra-vr: tti,Visvanatha explicitly says that these aforementioned five tarkas are genuine tarkas;

the law of parsimony (laghava) etc. are not genuine tarkas since they do not involve

any counterfactual imposition (prasan_ga).16 We may briefly see how reductio ad

absurdum, vicious circularities and infinite regress involve a counterfactual impo-

sition. Any reductio argument begins by assuming something, say X. Then it shows

that if X is true then Y too has to be true. But it is an established fact that Y is not

true. Thus assuming X will lead one to assuming Y that is undesired or absurd. Here

is an atmasryaya (self-referential) tarka that uses a direct method: Suppose some-

body argues that ‘this pot is caused by itself’ (ayam: ghat:a etad-ghat:a-janyah: ). This

statement will be rejected on the basis of the following tarka: If this pot is caused by

itself, then let it pre-exist itself, (since a cause has to pre-exist its effect).17 Thus the

counterfactual imposition of the property of being self-caused invokes another

imposition, namely that of self-pre-existence. The invoked imposition is undesired

(anis: t:a) here. Regarding infinite regress, we may remember that the Indian Logician

would say that the chicken-egg-problem does not involve any regress since it is

valid (praman: ika). The chicken-egg series is infinite, or at least semi-infinite (in the

sense that it may have an end despite not having a beginning), and its infinity does

not invoke any undesired factor. But in a theory, not-ending-anywhere can be a

problem. Let us consider the following case. Suppose somebody says that in order to

be aware of any cognition (jñana) C1 one has to have a secondary cognition C2

which is about C1. This view is bad since it involves infinite regress. If in order to be

aware of C1, one needs C2, then one needs C3 too in order to be aware of C2 and so

on. Thus one never gets aware of C1. But it is evident that we are aware of (at least

16 . . .laghavagauravadikam: tu prasan_ganatmakatvan na tarkah: . Gautamıya Vr: tti on 1.1.40; see Nyaya-

Tarkatirtha and Tarkatirtha (1936, p. 327).17 This statement is a simplified version of the following: yady ayam: ghat:a etadghat:ajanyah: syat tadaetadghat:anadhikaran: aks:an: ottaravarttı na syat. Gautamıya Vr: tti on 1.1.40; Ibid, p. 325.

N. Guha

123

most of our) cognitions. The aforementioned view counterfactually imposes that no

one is aware of one’s own cognitions which contradicts an established fact. Tarkas

that are based on prasan_ga or counterfactual impositions can be called strong tar-kas. Tarkas that are not based on counterfactual impositions can be called weak

tarkas. The most used strong tarka is the reductio argument. That is why for most of

the Neo Naiyayikas, the primary meaning of ‘tarka’ has been the reductio argument.

Those who think that ‘tarka’ is actually ‘counterfactual reasoning’ have adopted the

aforementioned view of Udayana and Visvanatha, viz., ‘there are tarkas of five

kinds’.

Tarka as a Reasoning Based on a priori Principles

Matilal (1986, p. 79) writes that tarka ‘‘is rather an argument where we use gen-

erally the a priori principles only, or what may be closest to the a priori principles in

the Indian tradition.’’ Kang does not think that Matilal’s view on tarka was cor-

rect.18 I would like to illustrate the merit of Matilal’s viewpoint. A tarka can be

applied to an epistemological content. But it has got an abstract from, a schema.

Davis has shown the general schema for tad-anya-badhitartha-prasan_ga tarka or

reductio argument. His schema will be presented in the section on reductio argu-

ments. The following can be an example of vyaghata or contradiction: X is both Yand non-Y. The Sanskrit definition of each tarka is schematic. Visvanatha defines

anyonyasraya or mutual dependency as follows: ‘‘tad-apeks: apeks: itva-nibandhano’nis: t:a-prasan_go ’nyonyasrayah: ’’.

19 This means the following: ‘X’s dependence on

Y, which in turn depends on X, is the undesired feature that characterizes an any-onyasraya’. Such formulations use third-personal pronouns (such as ‘yat’, ‘tat’, etc.)

that serve as variables. Epistemological contents can replace the variables in a

specific application of tarka. But the tarka-schemata are always a priori.

I think this a priority is suggested by the very phrase ‘anis: t:a-apatti’. It refers to

the undesired factor a tarka brings forth. The phrase suggests that any cognizing

subject knows a priori which factors are desired and which are undesired. Con-

tradicting an established fact is undesired; therefore any strong tarka demonstrates

that the assumption that has led the arguer to such a contradiction is to be denied.

Conceptual profligacy or un-economy (gaurava) is undesired; therefore a laghavatarka or an argument based on economy prefers the most economical option to the

18 Kang (2010, pp. 11–12):

Furthermore, what is crucial is the fact that the cognition that initiates the whole procedure oftarka is itself a perceptually based one, albeit one that is insufficiently informative. If this initiatingcognition is counted as part of a tarka, one will run into serious problems manoeuvring tarkaanywhere near to a priori-based cognition. If we want to interpret the explanation given in the NBhto mean that the tarka is epistemologically void of all experiential cognition, then the only way todo so would be to constrict the procedure so narrowly as to include the logical analysis (vibhaga)of the given two alternative possibilities but to exclude any cognitive method for supplying factualdata that support either of the two. But in any case this does not keep the basic data underlying thetarka from being epistemologically grounded in experience.

19 Gautamıya Vr: tti on 1.1.40; see Nyaya-Tarkatirtha and Tarkatirtha (1936, p. 326).

Tarka as Cognitive Validator

123

others. It seems every rational being is endowed a priori with a list of undesired

things. I would argue that a priority is an important feature of tarka.

Avijnatatattve ’rthe, Vibhaga and Karan: opapatti

Kang wanted to understand tarka in terms of these above mentioned features. Let us

review Kang’s understanding of these features. Kang (2010, p. 6) writes: ‘‘Since the

object of tarka is not fully known in detail, the given representation can be neither

completely confirmed nor disproved; this is a necessary precondition for the

application of tarka.’’ This indeed is an important feature of tarka. When an epi-

stemic instrument presents an object with its special properties and the presentation

bears certainty (niscaya), then no tarka is needed. In this case, the object is

vijñatatattva. But a tarka is needed only when one has a doubt as to whether the

object under investigation has a certain property or not. In this case, the object is

under-informed or avijñatatattva. A tarka’s job is to validate one and only one

option.

The second important feature, according to Kang, is vibhaga which for him is ‘‘the

differentiating or analyzing procedure’’.20 His argument is based on the following

passages from Vatsyayana’s Bhas:ya: etasmim: s tarkavis:aye karmanimittam: janma itipraman: ani pravarttamanani tarken: anugr:hyante, tattvajñanavis:ayasya vibhagattattvajñanaya kalpate tarka iti;21 and atha jijñasitasya vastuno vyahatau dharmauvibhagena vimr: sati—kim: svid ittham ahosvin nettham iti.22 It seems Kang thinks that

when epistemic instruments cannot generate certainty, a tarka begins by distin-

guishing the possible options involved in a case.23 According to Kang, in the second

passage quoted above the distinction is made in the following way: Is it so or is it not

so (kim: svid ittham ahosvin nettham iti)? This in other words means that ‘Which of

the two options is true? Is X Y, or not?’ This physical analysis is vibhaga for Kang.

But the traditional understanding of the term ‘vibhaga’ is quite different. Uddyota-

kara very clearly says: ‘‘What is vibhaga? It is the judgment regarding the logical

fitness having the following form: This option is logically fit (yukta) whereas that one

is not (ayukta).’’24 In fact, it is very likely that ‘vibhaga’ in the second passage

(i.e.,. . .jijñasitasya vastuno vyahatau dharmau vibhagena vimr: sati) is nothing but

showing the options separately. Here is Kang’s own translation of the passage:

20 Ibid, p. 5.21 Rough Translation: In the cases such as ‘the regulator of birth’, some epistemic instruments get

strengthened by tarkas. A tarka is used in order to know the true nature of an object, through categorizing

the options that constitute the doubt.22 The second passage has been translated in the section called ‘Tarka and Validation’.23 Kang (2010, p. 8):

Tarka is a means of sizing up a certain state of affairs: all the given factual or logical possibilitiesare differentiated, and the logical and theoretical implications of them are drawn.

24 kah: punar vibhagah:? yuktayuktavicarah: , idam: yuktam idam ayuktam iti. Nyayavartika on 1.1.1; see

Nyaya-Tarkatirtha and Tarkatirtha (1936, p. 54).

N. Guha

123

Then the consideration in the form ‘‘Is this so or rather is it not so?’’ occurs,

with a distinction being made between two [possible] contrary qualities of the

object one desires to know.25

But we may notice that this distinction is not something tarka has made. It is

made by a doubt (sam: saya). For here in this case the cognizing subject wants to

know the object under investigation properly, and the following question arises in

their mind: Is this so or not? The vibhaga made by tarka is rather a categorization. A

tarka categorizes the options into two heads; logically fitting ones and unfitting

ones. I do not find any reason to prefer Kang’s understanding to Uddyotakara’s.

Let us now consider the term ‘karan: opapatti’. Vatsyayana says: ‘‘kim idam:janma kr: takena hetuna nivartyate, ahosvid akr: takena, atha akasmikam iti? evamavijñate ’rthe karn: opapattya uhah: pravartate’’26 which roughly means the fol-

lowing: ‘Is birth brought about by a caused cause, or an uncaused cause, or it is

accidental? As there is an uncertainty regarding the under-informed object, a cog-

nitive act (uha) starts operating through karan: opapatti’. Kang thinks that the term

‘karan: opapatti’ means postulating reasons for each of the three possibilities. And

the job of furnishing reasons is assigned to a tarka.27 Vatsyayana himself says:

sambhavati asmin karan: am: praman: am: hetur iti [Translation: ‘It is logically fit to

say that this option must be supported by an epistemic instrument’—this is

karan: opapatti].28 We may see what Uddyotakara has to say about this term. He

writes: ‘upapattih: sambhavah: ’. I think that sambhava is nothing but logical fitness

or tenability. It is the antonym of asambhava or un-tenability or logical unfitness. I

do not think that sambhava means ‘possibility’ in a statistical sense. It is not even

‘inference to the best explanation’. I would support my claim by examining a few

schematic forms of tarka. Here is a reductio schema (Indirect Method):

1. Z is a case of X (Premise)

2. Any case of ~ Y is a case of ~ X (Premise)

3. Z is a case of ~ Y (Assumption)

4. Z is a case of ~ X (From 2 and 3)

5. Z is a case of both X and ~ X (From 1 and 4)

6. Therefore, Z is not a case of ~ Y

25 See Kang (2010, p. 7).26 Nyayabhas:ya on 1.1.1; see Nyaya-Tarkatirtha and Tarkatirtha (1936, pp. 53–54).27 Kang (2010, pp. 4–5):

The passage in the NBh ‘‘evam avijñatatattve ’rthe karan: opapattya uhah: pravartate’’ followingthe one example of tarka (tasyodaharan: am: ‘‘kim idam: janma kr: takena hetuna nirvartyate, ahosvid akr: takena, athakasmikam’’ ity) calls for special attention. In this passage karan: opapattya is inthe instrumental case, indicating that uhah: proceeds by furnishing persuasive reasons (karan: op-apattya). This sentence suggests that the following consideration of three possibilities, eachbacked by reasons, means that tarka, too, proceeds by furnishing persuasive reasons (karan: op-apattya). According to this interpretation, the ‘‘karan: opapatti’’ in NS 1.1.40 refers to the reasonsfurnished for each possibility. Provided that this interpretation is justified, the passage ‘‘evamavijñatatattve ’rthe karan: opapattya uhah: pravartate’’ implies that uha, taken as the content oftarka, is generated by consideration of the reasons postulated for each possibility.

28 See the beginning of the section, ‘Tarka and Validation’.

Tarka as Cognitive Validator

123

This schema will generate only true conclusions provided that the premises are true.

Epistemological contents may replace the variables in the premises. If the epistemic

instruments that bring forth the epistemic content are defective, then tarka too will fail

to generate true conclusions. A reductio tarka of the aforementioned type begins by

assuming the denial of each option. The denial of the tenable one does lead the

argument to a contradiction. No other denial does so. This is the upapatti or sambhava.

Why is this karan: opapatti? Every commentator says that here ‘karan: a’ means an

epistemic instrument (praman: a). We may consider the following case. ‘Is birth

brought about by a caused cause, or an uncaused cause, or is it accidental?’ In this case,

a doubt consists of three options. The Naiyayika would say that here, only the first

option is logically fit. Any other option will lead the arguer to an undesired factor.29

A tarka is the cognitive act of appreciating the fitness or un-fitness of a given option.

Validation is nothing but assigning epistemic validity to an option O. Now ‘O is valid

(praman: ika)’ means that if one could directly check this case, then one would have

cognized that ‘O is the case’ through an epistemic instrument (praman: a). O could

have been brought forth by an epistemic instrument. One who knows that fire causes

smoke argues: ‘any case of smoke is a case of fire too; for an effect could not exist

without its cause’. The supporting reductio tarka here suggests that if one could check

all cases of smoke, then one would have perceptually known that those are cases of fire

too. The reductio tarka tells one that the option that any case of smoke is a case of fire

(i.e., fire pervades smoke) must be supported by an epistemic instrument.

According to Uddyotakara, a reflective argument (uha) can re-apprehend that

which has already been known through an epistemic instrument. Suppose one

knows through some epistemic instrument that P is true. Still one may conclude that

P by using an uha and think ‘that which I came to know through an epistemic

instrument has been ascertained now by using a counterfactual reasoning’. But in

such a case, this uha is not a tarka.30 That means an uha is an argument that leads

one to a valid conclusion, provided the other cognitions involved in it are valid.

Definition of Tarka

Tarka has already been implicitly defined in this paper. In this section, the intended

definition will be uttered explicitly. I think it is true that tarkas are based on a prioriprinciples. But this statement just tries to understand tarka from the western

29 Vatsyayana has shown how the second and the third option will lead one to an undesired factor. He

says:

yadi kr: takena hetuna nivartyate, hetucchedad upapanno ’yam: janmocchedah: . athakr: takenahetuna, tato hetucchedasya asakyatvad anupapanno janmocchedah: . athakasmikam: , ato’kasmannivartyamanam: na punar nivartsyatıti nivr: ttikaran: am: nopapadyate, tena janmanuccheda iti. SeeNyaya-Tarkatirtha and Tarkatirtha (1936, p. 54).

I am not translating this passage here.30 ubhayatha khalv ayam uho bhavati vijñatatattve ’vijñatatattve ca. . .yo ’sav arthah: purvam anenavijñatas tam evohata iti purvanubhutaparicchedaka uha ity ucyate, na tv ayam: tarkah: . Nyayavartika on

1.1.1; Ibid, pp. 324–325.

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123

perspective. What is tarka in the framework of Old Nyaya? Here is my formulation

of the definition of tarka:

yena aniscayakena uhena avijñatatattve ’rthe tattvajñanartham: karan: opapattyaekasya sambhavitadharmasya abhyanujña, aparasya anis: t:avyapyasya vyudaso vasa tarkah: .

Translation: A tarka is a reflection (i) which does not generate certainty, (ii) which

is applied in order to know whether an under-informed object has a specific property

or not, and (iii) which validates just one option by demonstrating its logical fitness

and/or demonstrates that the rivaling option is unfit since it would lead the cog-

nizing subject to something undesired.

Why should the Naiyayika say that a tarka cannot generate certainty?31 The

reason is this: A tarka lacks any epistemological content. It just demonstrates the

logical fitness of an epistemic instrument. Vacaspati says: ‘The demonstration of

the logical fitness cannot generate certainty alone; for it cannot establish itself in the

absence of a shelter (asraya)’.32 A tarka which has nothing but an abstract form has

to be sheltered in an epistemic instrument and enhance its host. A tarka just destroys

the blocker of the certainty of an epistemic instrument.

Tarka rejects an undesired content that belongs to a cognition or a speech act (such

as a statement or a question). Profligacy and contradiction are undesired. Tarka is a

cognitive act that points to profligacy in a cognition or contradiction in a statement.

I shall show later that vaiyatya tarka demonstrates the undesired-ness of the content

of a question. One may doubt whether asking such a question is valid or not. When

the undesired-ness of a content is pointed out by a tarka, the content is rejected.

I think that the Naiyatika defines tarka in terms of its incapability to generate

certainty (niscayayogyata) for a very significant reason. Without this qualification,

the definition would have been over-generalized. Suppose the cognizing subject sees

something that is five and a half feet tall and doubts whether it is a man or a post.

This is certainly a case of avijñata-tattva. This doubt can be dispelled by a per-

ceptual cognition, viz., ‘This is a man’. But the second cognition (or whichever

epistemic instrument has generated it) is not a tarka. A tarka has an abstract general

form and nothing else whereas a cognition has an epistemic content.

Ga _ngesa’s Application of Tarka

For Ga _ngesa, the primary meaning of tarka is the reductio argument. But fortu-

nately, he considers the weak tarkas such as the law of parsimony, default value

arguments etc. as tarkas. In the following section, I shall try to critically examine his

applications of tarka. Ga _ngesa uses tarkas of different types for supporting his own

position and refuting others’ positions. He has made many significant comments on

tarkas. We shall use Ga _ngesa’s applications and comments to exemplify and

understand tarkas.

31 na tv avadharayati. Nyayavartika on 1.1.1; Ibid, p. 54.32 utpatteh: svatantraya asrayasiddhataya svato niscayayogat. Tatparya-t:ıka on 1.1.40; Ibid, p. 321.

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Reductio, Contradiction and Infinite Regress

I shall first roughly define these tarkas.

Reductio (tad-anya-badhitartha-prasan_ga): Davis (2001, p. 157) presents the

general schema of this tarka as follows:

1 Pa assumed

2 (x) (Px � Qx) premise

3 Qa4 ~Qa premise

Therefore, ~Pa

We can now instantiate this schema. Suppose the cognizing subject S has a doubt as

to whether fire pervades smoke (i.e., any locus of smoke is a locus of fire) or not.

Suppose S knows that smoke is a cause of (i.e., a necessary condition for) fire. It is

evident that if X can exist without Y then X is not caused by Y. In order to dispel the

aforementioned doubt S argues in the following way:

(1) Smoke can exist without fire. (Assumption)

(2) Anything that can exist without fire cannot be caused by fire.33 (Premise since

this is evident)

(3) Smoke is not caused by fire. (From 1 and 2)

(4) Smoke is caused by fire. (Premise since S knows this)

Therefore, smoke cannot exist without fire, i.e., fire pervades smoke. (3) and (4) are

contradictory. So the assumption (viz., smoke can exist without fire) must be false.

In that case the denial of the assumption, i.e., smoke cannot exist without fire, i.e.,

any locus of smoke is a locus of fire, i.e., fire pervades smoke, is true.

Contradiction (vyaghata): ‘That which is existent is not there’,34 ‘Here is a

round square’—these are contradictions. If it is known that P, and somebody argues

that it is not the case that P, then their argument too involves contradiction or

vyaghata. Not only logical contradictions are contradictions. Ga _ngesa talks about a

behavioural contradiction.

I have already given an example of Infinite Regress (anavastha) towards the end

of the section called ‘Strong and Weak tarkas’.

33 I have deliberately avoided the conditional, i.e., (x) (Px � Qx). I believe that pervasion is the inclusion

of a set into another. Y pervades X if and only if any locus having X has Y. Thus pervasion is understood as

‘coexistence’ (samanadhikaran: ya) which is a special case of ‘existence’. In that sense, a statement of

pervasion is an ‘existential’ statement whereas implication does not guarantee ‘existence’. That is why the

statement, ‘for all x, if x is a unicorn, then x is white’ is (vacuously) true; but the statement, ‘any case of

unicorn-ness is a case of whiteness’ or ‘whiteness pervades unicorn-ness’ is false. According to the

Naiyayika, it will always generate a fallacious inference, since unicorn-ness or the property of being a

unicorn does not exist anywhere (aprasiddha).34 san nasti. Khan: d:anakhan: d:akhadya by Srı Hars:a, Chapter IV; see Vaijapurakara and Sastrı (1962,

p. 560).

N. Guha

123

Text: Tattvacintaman: i (Tarka: The Chapter on Tarka)

T-1. tatha hi dhumo yadi vahnyasamavahitajanyatve sati vahnisamavahitajanyah:syan notpannah: syad ity atra, kim: dhumo ’vahner eva bhavis:yati, kvacid vah-nim: vinapi bhavis:yati, ahetuka eva vyotpatsyata iti san_ka syat. sarvatrasvakriyavyaghatah: syat. yadi hi gr:hıtanvaya-vyatirekam: hetum: vinapi karyotpattim:san_keta tada svayam eva dhumartham: vahneh: tr:ptyartham: bhojanasya parapra-tipattyartham: sabdasya copadanam: niyamatah: katham: kuryat, tena vinapitatsambhavat.35

[Here is a tarka:] Had smoke been different from both that which is caused by fire

and that which is not caused by fire, it would not be produced (utpanna) at all. These

are the doubts [that are to be dispelled by the aforementioned tarka]: (1) Whether

smoke is caused only by elements that are different from fire or not; (2) Whether

there can be any smoke without fire or not; (3) Whether smoke is uncaused or not.

[If these doubts remained] then they would have opposed one’s own behaviour. One

hypothesizes that X causes Y by observing that X and Y are related through causal

agreement and difference (anvaya-vyatireka). If an effect E could take place without

the factor F that is related to E through causal agreement and difference, then the

following activities could not be accounted for: one who needs smoke lights a fire;

in order to satisfy one’s hunger one eats; in order to convey a message one speaks. If

Y could take place without being causally related to X, then one should not go for Xwhen one looks for Y.

Comment: Suppose S has observed that X regularly precedes Y, and Y cannot occur

in the absence of X. This means that X and Y are related through causal agreement

and difference (anvaya-vyatireka). After having observed this bi-polar relation

between X and Y, S is supposed to hypothesize that X causes Y. But S still has the

following doubts: (1) Whether Y is caused by non-X only; (2) Whether there can be

Y without X; (3) Whether Y is uncaused or not. These doubts are to be dispelled by

the following tarka: Had Y been different from both that has been caused by X and

that has not been caused by X, then Y would not have been produced at all. But

suppose S knows that Y is produced. S cannot dismiss a piece of knowledge. Thus

this tarka will insist S to accept that Y is caused by something since Y is produced.

This is how doubt (3) (i.e., ‘whether Y is uncaused’) is dispelled. Now that

‘something’ must be X since it has been observed that X and Y are related through

causal agreement and difference. Thus doubt (1) (i.e., ‘Whether Y is caused by non-

X only’) is dispelled since S comes to know that Y cannot be caused by non-X only.

Thus S concludes that X causes Y. Finally what remains is doubt (2) (i.e., ‘Whether

there can be Y without X’). While discussing reductio tarka, I have already men-

tioned how this doubt could be dispelled by the following tarka: If Y (smoke) could

exist without X (fire), let Y (smoke) not be caused by X (fire). Thus Ga _ngesa has

demonstrated how a single tarka could possibly dispel a sequence of doubts.

35 See Tarkavagish (1990, pp. 219–229, Volume II, Part 1).

Tarka as Cognitive Validator

123

T-2. tasmat tattadupadanam eva tadr: sasan_kapratibandhakam. san_kayam: naniyatopadanam: , niyatopadane ca na san_ka.36

The very fact that one goes for X when one needs Y opposes the doubt as to whether

X causes Y or not. When one has such a doubt one is not convinced of the causal

relation between two factors, and when one has such a conviction one cannot have

the aforementioned doubt.

Comment: S may have a doubt as to whether every case of Y is a case of X. In that

case, S should look at the behaviours of people. When one needs smoke one lights a

fire. When one is hungry, one eats. When one wants to say something, one talks.

These activities or general behaviours are consistently successful because every

case of Y (smoke or satisfying one’s hunger or communicating with others) is indeed

a case of X (fire or eating or using linguistic units). In general, a doubt, ‘whether a or

not’ is contradictory to either the certain cognition, ‘a’ or to the certain cognition, ‘it

is not the case that a’. Thus a doubt having the form, ‘whether each case of Y is a

case of X too’ is contradictory to the doubt-free cognition, ‘any case of Y is a case

of X’. As long as one has the former, one cannot have the latter. Conversely had one

been fully convinced that any case of Y is a case of X, one could not have had the

doubt as to whether each case of Y is a case of X. The general successful behaviours

show that nobody doubts the pervasion between smoke and fire etc. Therefore one

should convince oneself that fire pervades smoke.

T-3. etena vyaghato virodhah: , sa ca sahanavasthananiyama iti tatrapy anavasthetinirastam: . svakriyaya eva san_kapratibandhakatvat.37

One could say that: ‘Contradiction (vyaghata) is an opposition (virodha). It is

nothing but a rule having the following form, ‘that which is a case of being X cannot

be a case of being Y and vice versa’. [This is pervasion of some kind. In order to

know this rule or pervasion one has to invoke another tarka; for in order to ascertain

a pervasion some tarka is needed.] Thus there would be infinite regress (anav-astha).’ But this view is not tenable, since one’s own [successful] activities [based

on one’s convictions] would destroy such doubts.

Comment: Here is a rough translation of a passage from Khan: d:anakhan: d:akhadya by

Srı Hars:a. Suppose S has a doubt as to whether X pervades Y. In order to dispel this,

S applies the following tarka: If Y could exist without X, then let X not cause Y. The

heart of this tarka is the pervasion, ‘anything that is caused by X does not exist

without X’. Suppose S starts doubting the pervasion between being-caused-by-X and

not-existing-without-X. S needs to invoke another tarka here and ad infinitum. Thus

it leads S to infinite regress (anavastha). One may say that vyaghata or behavioural

contradiction ends the series of doubts. But this position too would be untenable; for

the heart of the behavioural contradiction is this pervasion: One who has a doubt as

to whether Y (fire) pervades X (smoke) cannot go for Y when one needs X. [We may

remember here that one who needs smoke lights a fire.] What if S doubts this very

pervasion? Then in order to dispel the doubt S needs another tarka. Thus infinite

36 Ibid, pp. 229–231.37 Ibid, p. 232.

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123

regress once again!38 Now Ga _ngesa is answering the aforementioned objection

raised by Srı Hars:a. In the chapter on the apprehension of pervasion, Ga _ngesa says:

‘One applies tarkas as long as one has a doubt. When a behavioural contradiction

puts an end to the series of doubts, no tarka is needed any more’.39 This answers the

first part of Srı Hars:a’s objection. Maybe in a hypothetical situation, S will doubt

everything. But supposing that S is a real subject with real knowledge of real

objects, we may say that S’s doubt about the pervasion between X and Y will cease

to exist the moment S will reach a behavioural contradiction. Now Srı Hars:a would

ask his second question: Will the chain of doubt really cease to exist at the emer-

gence of the understanding of a behavioural contradiction? The behavioural con-

tradiction itself is based on a pervasion which can be doubted. Ga _ngesa would once

again say that being a real subject, S would stop doubting when S reaches a

behavioural contradiction. Such is the epistemic nature of S. Let there be a perva-

sion at the heart of the contradiction. The point is that the very knowledge of the

contradiction or vyaghata tarka will dispel all the doubts. Here Ga _ngesa is merely

describing what happens to a cognizing subject in such cases.

Economy and Profligacy

Arguments based on economy and profligacy are somewhat similar to Ockham’s

Razor or the principle of lex parsimoniae.40 In the section on postulation

(Arthapattivada), Ga _ngesa says:

The tarkas based on economy and profligacy (laghava-gaurava-tarka) do not

come to a stop in contradiction (viparyaya-aparyavasayin). Nevertheless they

function as auxiliary causes for valid cognitions. Therefore, even in perceptual

or testimonial cognitions, they serve as auxiliary causes.41

That means an economy argument (laghava-tarka) is a tarka even though it does

not end in contradiction. What does it do then? This is answered in the following

section of Tattvacintaman: i.

Text: Tattvacintaman: i (Isvaravada: The Chapter on God)

T-4. na tavad anumitimatre laghavam: sahakari. . .yatra praman: e laghuguruvis:ayatasambhavati, tatra laghavasahakarita. karan: atakaryatavyapyatvadigrahake pratyaks:epravr: ttinimittagrahake upamane sabdasaktigrahakanumane tathavidhapraman: amatre

38 atha tarkasya vyaptir mulabhuta ’bhyupagamyate. tatrapi vyabhicarasan_kayan_ punar anavasthaiva.tatrapi vyaghatapadane punar ittham anavasthaiva. Khan: d:anakhan: d:akhadya by Srı Hars:a, Chapter I; see

Vaijapurakara and Sastrı (1962, p. 271).39 yavadasan_kam: tarkanusaran: at. yatra ca vyaghatena san_kaiva navatarati tatra tarkam: vinaivavyaptigrahah: . Vyaptigrahopayasiddhanta (The chapter of the apprehension of pervasion); Tarkavagish

(1990, pp. 210–212, Volume II, Part 1).40 The popular Latin version of this is: Numquam ponenda est pluralitas sine necessitate (entities should

not be multiplied unnecessarily).41 na ca vacyam: tarkan: am: viparyayaparyavasayitve abhasatvam. tatparyavasane ca tad evanumanametattarkasahayam: bahih: sattvam anumapayis:yatıti. yato laghavagauravatarkan: am: viparyayaparya-vasayinam eva praman: asahakaritvam, ata eva pratyaks:asabdadau api sahakarı sah: . See Tarkavagish

(1990, 655–656, Vol. II, Part 1).

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123

sakalatantrikaih: sahakaritvakalpanat. evam: laghavam evam: gauravam iti jñananant-aram: badhakam: vina laghunam eva karan: atvakaryatvavyapyatvapravr: ttinimittat-vasabdasakyatvanam: jñanadarsanat.42

It is not true that every inference is supported by an economy tarka. . .Where there is

a possibility of two or more cognitions and a piece of cognition is more economical

than others, only there such a tarka is an auxiliary cause for the valid cognition.

Every philosopher accepts that the perceptual cognitions of cause-ness, effect-ness,

pervaded-ness etc., the analogical cognition that enables one to know the meaning of

a word, the inferential cognition that enables one to know the semantic relation

between a word and its referent, and many such valid cognitions have economy

tarkas as auxiliary causes. For everybody intuits, ‘this is economical and that is not

economical’, and then accepts the most economical option [as the valid one]; pro-

vided the most economical option is not contradicted [by any other valid cognition].

Comment: A number of possible cognitions may compete with each other for

epistemic validity. But only the one supported by an economy tarka finally wins.

Here the law of parsimony or lex parsimoniae operates as the selection criterion.

The idea is this: In a formative stage, when several cognitions rival each other, the

most economical one is supported by the principle of economy and wins the epi-

stemic game. The winning moment marks the transition to a valid cognition. Before

winning, the cognition is not valid, but just a cognition, often unrecognized. Sup-

pose in the model M there are smoke-individuals of three kinds; each one foot high,

two feet high and three feet high. In M, fire pervades smoke, i.e., every case of

smoke is a case of fire. Raw observation has provided the cognising subject S with

smoke-individuals of all three heights. S could have cognized that ‘fire pervades all

one foot high smokes, and it pervades all two feet high smokes, and it pervades all

three feet high smokes’. But S happens to cognize that fire pervades smoke in

general. The job of the economy-based argument is to ignore the factor of height

and consider smoke-in-general alone. Pervaded-ness (vyapyatva) is perceived in

smoke in general, since conceptually ‘smoke’ is more economical than the

conjunction of ‘one foot high’, ‘two feet high’, and ‘three feet high smoke-

individuals’.43 And according to Ga _ngesa, everybody intuitively understands which

option is economical and which is not (evam: laghavam evam: gauravam itijñananantaram: . . . jñanadarsanat. See T-4). After economy is appreciated, there

arises the valid cognition. In the genesis of any valid cognition some of the factors

are ignored and some are emphasized by lex parsimoniae. In the case of the per-

vaded-ness of smoke, the height of smoke is ignored and smoke-ness is emphasized.

Another example given by Ga _ngesa can be elaborated here. He says that laghavatarka plays a role in the genesis of ‘the inferential cognition that enables one to

know the semantic relation between a word and its referent’. Such a semantic

relation is called ‘sakti’. The process of iterated learning in the Indian framework is

42 Tarkavagish (1990, pp. 76–78, Vol. II, Part 2). Vattanky’s translation of Ga _ngesa’s Isvaravada in

Vattanky (1984, pp. 235–236) has helped me translate this section.43 If Y pervades X, then Y is the perdader (vyapaka) and X the pervaded (vyapya). That means that here Xand Y have pervaded-ness and pervader-ness respectively.

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the following. The speaker asks the hearer to bring a cow. The hearer brings a cow.

Then the speaker says, ‘tie the cow’. The hearer does so. The learner observes the

whole thing and compares the pair of utterances to the pair of activities. The

expression ‘the-cow’ is common in both the utterances and there is a cow involved

in both the activities performed by the hearer. Therefore ‘the-cow’ must refer to a

cow. The expressions ‘bring’ and ‘tie’ must mean the activities of bringing and

tying respectively. There is an inference at the centre of the whole process of

language learning. How did the learner know that different parts of the expression,

‘bring me the cow’ refer to bringing, cow etc.? The learner must have inferred that

nothing but the utterance of the speaker has triggered the activity of the hearer. Here

is the sequence of inference: ‘The activity [of the hearer] (kriya) is caused by an

effort (kr: ti). The effort is caused by a cognition. That cognition is caused by a

sentence (vakya)’.44 Thus the learner infers that the activity of the hearer is causally

linked with a linguistic utterance. This inference is based on economy since no other

causal link would have been any more economical than this one.

Default Value and Specific Value

Here is a default value argument (utsarga tarka) cited by Srı Hars:a: ‘Suppose A is

somebody whose senses are working fine and who is awake. A has the cognition C.

There is no evidence that C is true. But still there is no evidence against C. In such a

case, if another person B says that C is not true, then B’s argument will be countered

by the default value argument; for somebody with perfect senses normally has true

cognitions. If somebody says that A’s cognition was true then their argument will

not be countered by the default value argument.’45

Text: Tattvacintaman: i (Saktivada: The chapter on semantic relation)

T-5. ata eva praman: yasya autsargikatve ’pi badhakabhavasahakr: taniscayad evaniscayah: , anyatha pramaprama va . . . iti sam: sayah: kvapi na syat.46

One may assume that S’s cognition C is valid (praman: ika) by default. But the

default condition for the certainty of the validity of C should be the following: There

must be a doubt-free cognition that ‘there is no factor that could invalidate C’.

Otherwise nobody could have the doubt as to whether their cognition is valid or not.

Comment: Suppose somebody with perfect senses, sees something in Sundarban(the famous forest in the vast delta on the Bay of Bengal) and cognizes that ‘there is

a snake in the forest’ (¼C1). C1 should not be doubted or considered invalid unless

there is strong evidence against it. On the contrary, suppose somebody from Sun-darban with defective eyes sees something in the middle of Berkeley Square,

44 iyam: kriya kr: tijanya, sa jñanajanya, tad vakyajanyam ityanumitiparamparaya. . . Karyanvitasak-tivadasiddhanta (The chapter on Semantic Relation); See Tarkavagish (1990, pp. 499–500, Volume IV,

Part 2).45 svasthasya jagrato jñanam: praman: yapraman: yanirdharakapraman: anupanipatavises:e ’pi vina badhamapraman: yam abhyupagacchantam: prati syat, na tu praman: yam. Khan: d:anakhan: d:akhadya by Srı Hars:a,

Chapter IV; see Vaijapurakara and Sastrı (1962, p. 568).46 See Tarkavagish (1990, pp. 497–498, Volume IV, Part 2).

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London on a cloudy day and cognizes that ‘that is a King Cobra’ (= C2). Nobody

else saw any snake there. Now there is strong evidence against C2 since there is

perhaps no King Cobra in the UK, and above all S finds that there was a rope in the

middle of Berkeley Square. The set of factors that suggests that what that person

from Sundarban saw was perhaps not a snake is the invalidator (badhaka) for C2. If

there is an invalidator for a cognition then the cognition can always be doubted. But

if there is no such factor, there is no reason to doubt the validity of a cognition.

Therefore, every certain cognition should be considered valid by default. It should

be doubted only when there is an invalidator.

Concluding Remarks

We may remember that there are tarkas of two types; strong tarka or the tarka based

on ‘undesired counterfactual imposition’ (prasan_gatmaka tarka) and weak tarka or

the tarka that is not based on any ‘counterfactual imposition’ (aprasan_gatmakatarka). Perhaps we may add ‘contradiction’ (vyaghata) to the list of strong tarkas

since it is the very essence of prasan_ga. I have already discussed weak tarkas of

four types, namely economy (laghava), profligacy (gaurava), default value (uts-arga) and specific value (apavada). We may also notice here that economy-and-

profligacy and default-value-and-specific-value are pair tarkas (yugma-tarka).

Something cannot be economical unless something else is profligate. The question

of a default value does not arise had there been no exception. I may introduce

another weak tarka. Kang makes an interesting comment:

Such questions, depending on the interpretation and analysis of them, may

lead to different kinds of mainly non-formal fallacy: the fallacy of many

questions (‘Are you still beating your wife?’), the false dilemma (‘Are you a

good man or a bad man?’) or a category fallacy (‘How many iron filings does a

unicorn attract?’). When such a question has been put forward for a tarka, an

argumentative or epistemological quandary is the guaranteed outcome, at least

from the Buddhist standpoint. Any reasonable analysis of the logical or factual

implications is beside the point, and a pseudo-analysis results. In such a way,

tarka can become an easily misused quasi-formal method.47

I would like to respond to this point raised by Kang. Such questions cannot even be

put forward for a tarka, since they will be rejected by a (weak) tarka, namely

vaiyatya. This is Srı Hars:a’s definition of vaiyatya: ‘praman: ikavyavaharyatvamasamadheyajatıyam anaucityam: vaiyatyanamakam’ which may be roughly trans-

lated as this: ‘The tarka that dismisses the content of those questions etc. whose

answers cannot be epistemologically valid or whose answer is impossible is a

vaiyatya’.48 Srı Hars:a’s examples are much more interesting than his definition. The

first example is: ‘avastuni vidhinis:edhayoh: kim icchasi’.49 Somebody who thinks

47 Kang (2010, p. 21).48 Vaijapurakara and Sastrı (1962, p. 470).49 Ibid, p. 471.

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that everything is ontologically void, empty (sunya) asks a realist, ‘Is a non-entity

positive or negative?’ A positive entity is that which has a positive existence, e.g., a

pot. A negative entity is the absence of pot. The absence ‘exists’ since there is no

pot. The realist does not think that everything is ontologically void. In this context

the most important point is this: whichever way the realist will answer the question

would assume that everything is void. Void-ness is undesired for the realist. This is

surely a fallacy of many questions. The second example given by Srı Hars:a is:

‘apratıte davadattau sa kim: gaurah: kr: s:n: o veti’.50 Devadatta is not known to any-

body. Still one asks somebody, ‘Is Devadatta fair or dark in complexion?’ This is a

category fallacy. Vaiyatya tarka dismisses both the questions by showing that they

involve something fallacious. Thus we may say that if such a question has been put

forward for a tarka, there would be no argumentative or epistemological quandary;

in fact it is to be rejected by a tarka.

It seems that Kang agrees with somebody who says that tarka is an ‘‘unreliable

speculation’’. For him, it is unreliable since ‘‘it cannot offer us a definitive solution

to the problem at hand’’ and can be misleading too.51 But if a tarka is unreliable, so

is every logical deduction rule such as Modus Ponens. A logical deduction will yield

a true conclusion, provided that the premises are true. If a tarka is misleading, so is

an epistemic instrument such as an eye; for the latter may mistake something for

something else. An epistemologist who has no complaints against logical deduction

rules or epistemic instruments should not have any problems with tarka. Strong

tarkas are like deduction rules that guarantees logical consistency. I may add an-

other point here. Most of the applications of weak tarkas (such as economy or

default value) are involuntary. One sees that a white cow has a dewlap, a black cow

has a dewlap . . ., and cognizes that ‘any cow has a dewlap’. This cognition auto-

matically overlooks all the irrelevant differences. Likewise, if there is no counter-

evidence, one accepts by default what a normal person experiences. Thus default

value plays a great role in epistemology. One cannot help these epistemological

behaviours. When a tarka is used voluntarily, it in the most cases acts as a me-

tatheory, a criterion for accepting or rejecting a theory. In such cases, these tarkas

are extensions of automatic human epistemological behaviours. For example, one

deliberately uses economy arguments to evaluate a theory. And Ga _ngesa has already

shown how an economy tarka was used in the involuntary processes of cognition-

formation. One of the jobs of an epistemologist is to describe the epistemological

behaviour of human beings correctly and to enlist the conditions under which a

cognizing subject thinks that their cognition is valid. Tarka is one such condition

50 Ibid, p. 47.51 Kang (2010, p. 21). Once again Kang (2010, p. 21):

However, this method can be utterly misleading. The universal applicability of tarka is its strongpoint, but at the same time it is a serious drawback. For any given object we can suggestalternative qualities seemingly applicable to that object, and ask which alternative is the suitableone. . . . The fact that it does not stand or fall on the basis of factual information was, I surmise, thereason for the widespread negative connotation of the term ‘tarka’. The widespread reluctanceagainst tarka in ancient Indian intellectual traditions including Buddhist disapproval of tarka asunreliable speculation could be understood on the bases of the analysis discussed in the presentpaper.

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which accounts for many epistemological phenomena. That is why Nyayasutra1.1.40 says that it is a reflection that functions in order to know the truth (tattva-vadharan: aya) of an object. Here, tattva is ‘‘‘the condition that allows for valid

representation [of the object] in thought and speech,’ in the epistemological context

of Nyaya’’.52 Under some conditions, the visual cognition ‘this is water’ is con-

sidered valid. Likewise, when one applies a tarka in order to know whether the

under-informed object O has a specific feature F, and the tarka tells one that O has

F, one considers the cognition ‘O has F’ as a valid one. As far as the objects that are

represented by an epistemic instrument are concerned, their representations must

conform to their truth. But as far as the objects that are known through a tarka are

concerned, their truth must conform to their representations. If somebody can do

away with all epistemological tools, then they can sacrifice tarka too. But for

somebody, who thinks that epistemic instruments represent objects as they are,

sacrificing tarka would be like sacrificing the baby for the bath-water. For the

Naiyayika can always attribute the defect of the conclusion of a tarka either to an

epistemic instrument or to an absence of epistemic instruments.

Acknowledgments I acknowledge my great indebtedness to Prof. Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad (AssociateDean for Research, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Lancaster University), my PhD supervisor, formaking valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I also thank Dr. Anindita Chakrabarti (AssistantProfessor, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur), forher suggestions.

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