/ 23Alvarez-Ossorio: Syrian Civil Society

The Syrian UprisingSyria’s Struggling

Civil Societyby Ignacio Alvarez-Ossorio

Authoritarian regimes have traditionally been disinclined to accept any political orsocial opposition and have been hostile to the development of an independent civil society that could form a counterweight to state power.

Article 8 of the Syrian constitution established the Baath party, which has preventedany independent parties from emerging since the 1963 military coup that brought it topower as “the leading party in the state and society.”1 Yet despite this systematic repres-sion, there has been a sustained effort by a small group of intellectuals and critics overthe past decade to transform the country’s political system and make it more open andaccountable.

While these activists did not ignite the uprising that has shaken Syria since March2011, their courageous defiance of Bashar al-Assad’s regime has given them high standingamong many Syrians. They may yet play a significant role in shaping Syria’s future.

Ignacio Alvarez-Ossorio is a lecturer of Arabicand Islamic studies in the University of Alicante,Spain. His recent books include Report on ArabRevolts (Ediciones del Oriente y el Mediterráneo,2011) and Contemporary Syria (Sintesis, 2009).

COMMITMENT TOFREEDOM

Bashar al-Assad’s assumption of the presi-dency in July 2000 gave rise to a brief period ofunprecedented easing of state repression knownas the “Damascus Spring” whereby dozens ofdiscussion forums and associations were created,all calling for political liberalization and democraticopenness.

This sector of Syrian civil society came to

light with the “Declaration of the 99,” signed bynumerous intellectuals including BurhanGhalyoun, Sadeq al-Azm, Michel Kilo, AbdulRahman Munif, Adonis and Haidar Haidar, whodemanded: 1) an end to the state of emergencyand martial law applied in Syria since 1963; 2) apublic pardon to all political detainees and thosewho are pursued for their political ideas and per-mission for all deportees and exiled citizens to re-turn; 3) a rule of law that will recognize freedom ofassembly, of the press, and of expression; 4) free-dom in public life from the laws, constraints, andvarious forms of surveillance, allowing citizens toexpress their various interests within a frameworkof social harmony and peaceful [economic] com-

1 Syrian constitution, Mar. 13, 1973; al-Jazeera TV (Doha), July25, 2011.

24 / MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY SPRING 2012

petition and enable all to participate in the devel-opment and prosperity of the country.2

On January 1, 2001, a group of Syrian law-yers demanded a complete reform of the consti-tution, the lifting of emergency laws, and theconcession of full civil liberties. Shortly there-after, a group of activists published the found-ing charter of their civil society committee—bet-

ter known as the “Decla-ration of the 1,000.”3 Thefollowing day, the JamalAtassi Forum for Demo-cratic Dialogue was es-tablished with the partici-pation of communists,Nasserites, socialists andBaathist critics of the re-gime, and on March 7, au-thorization was given tocreate independent orga-

nizations for the defense of human rights as wellas cultural and social associations made up ofmoderate Muslims. This group included the Is-lamic Studies Center, headed by MuhammadHabash, a progressive scholar opposed to theMuslim Brotherhood, who served as a parliamentmember. By July 3, 2001, the Human Rights Asso-ciation of Syria had been established with lawyerHaitham al-Malih as president.

In just a few months, two hundred discus-sion clubs and forums were created. Reacting tothe proliferation of spaces where the future ofSyria was being freely debated, the regimepushed back, fearful it might lose its monopolyon power. Invoking a need to maintain nationalunity in the face of external threats, beginning inSeptember 2001, the regime arrested deputies RiadSaif and Mamoun al-Homsi, economist ArifDalila, lawyer Anwar al-Bunni, and Atassi Fo-rum spokesman Habib Issa, followed in short or-der by Kamal al-Labwani and Haitham al-Malih.4All were sentenced to between three and twelve

years in jail on charges of “weakening nationalsentiment” and “inciting sectarian strife.” Otherimportant figures were forbidden to leave thecountry including Radwan Ziyyade, director ofthe Damascus Center for Human Rights Stud-ies, and Suhair Atassi, director of the Jamal AtassiForum.

In an open challenge to the regime, promi-nent figures persisted in the demand for reform.The Damascus declaration stated that the “es-tablishment of a democratic national regime is thebasic approach to the plan for change and politi-cal reform. It must be peaceful, gradual, foundedon accord, and based on dialogue and recogni-tion of the other.” This declaration also called onthe government to “abolish all forms of exclusionin public life by suspending the emergency law;and abolish martial law and extraordinary courts,and all relevant laws, including Law 49 for theyear 1980 [which made membership in the Mus-lim Brotherhood a capital offense]; release all po-litical prisoners; [allow] the safe and honorablereturn of all those wanted and those who havebeen voluntarily or involuntarily exiled with legalguarantees; and end all forms of political perse-cution by settling grievances and turning a newleaf in the history of the country.”5

The declaration was the result of efforts madeby journalist Michel Kilo to unify the main politi-cal forces, including the banned Muslim Brother-hood. Kilo had met with the group’s leader, AliSadreddine Bayanouni, in Morocco where theyagreed on a program based on nonviolence, de-mocracy, opposition unity, and political change.A further public attack on the regime, the Beirut-Damascus declaration, which called on the Syr-ian regime to recognize Lebanon’s independence,establish full diplomatic relations and demarcatethe joint border, led to a second wave of arrestsduring which Kilo and Bunni were imprisoned.6With this example, the regime tried to put a stopto its opponents’ efforts and to ensure that theirdemands did not awaken Syrian society from itspolitical lethargy.

2 “Statement by 99 Syrian Intellectuals,” al-Hayat, Sept. 27,2000.3 Gary C. Gambill, “Dark Days Ahead for Syria’s Liberal Re-formers,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Feb. 2001.4 Human Rights Watch World Report 2002 - Syria, HumanRights Watch, New York, Jan. 17, 2002.

Most Syriandissidents saw theArab uprisings asthe opportunity tointroduce majorchanges insidethe country.

5 Damascus declaration, Oct. 16, 2005.6 The Syria Monitor (Center for Liberty in the Middle East,Washington, D.C.), May 13, 2007.

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THE PEOPLE’SREVOLT

One of the dissidents’ foremostweaknesses was their inability to get theirmessage out due to draconian restric-tions on the freedom of gathering andexpression. In a 2005 interview, notedactivist Kamal al-Labwani provided an ac-curate, indeed prophetic, prognosis ofthe current situation when he cautionedthat

there is no politically mobilized street.When that happens, everything willchange. Today, the opposition is purelysymbolic, and this sort of opposition isincapable of uniting because it is basedon personalities, on the capability of singleindividuals to confront the authorities…Society is watching, and when the massesbegin to move, they will move behindthose who represent them… So right now,we are reserving space in that arena sothat when the day comes that peoplemove to the street—either because of for-eign or their internal pressures—we willbe ready.7

The fall of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali in Tuni-sia, Husni Mubarak in Egypt, along with the up-heavals in Yemen, Libya, and Bahrain, had a con-tagious effect across the Arab world. Most Syr-ian dissidents saw the uprisings as the long-awaited opportunity to introduce major changesinside the country. In an article in the Lebanesenewspaper as-Safir, the prominent Syrian dissi-dent Michel Kilo argued, “We are entering a newhistorical stage based on the primacy of citizen-ship, freedom, justice, equality, secularism, andthe rights of men and citizens.”8 After spendingfive years in prison, Anwar al-Bunni stated that“an event like this only happens once every 200

years, and it is clearly going to bring about a radi-cal change.”9

On March 10, former parliamentarianMamoun al-Homsi appealed to the Syrian people:“After fifty years of tyranny and oppression, weare beginning to see the sunlight of freedom ap-proach.”10 He openly accused the regime of re-sorting to repression, corruption, and sectariandivision to remain in power. On March 15, aftera first unsuccessful attempt, an anonymousFacebook group, The Syrian Revolution 2011,called for a second day of rage, which led to amass demonstration against the regime to de-mand democratic openness.11

Despite these appeals, few in Syria expectedAssad to follow the path taken by Ben Ali and

Alvarez-Ossorio: Syrian Civil Society

For a brief moment in 2000 and 2001, it looked asif there might be a “Damascus Spring” with theinvestiture of Bashar al-Assad and his British-bornfirst lady. But all signs of openness were soon quashedby the repressive measures first perfected by Bashar’sfather and Syria’s long-time ruler, Hafez.

7 Joe Pace, interview with Kamal al-Labwani, posted on SyriaComment blog by Joshua Landis, Sept. 2, 2005.8 As-Safir (Beirut), Apr. 16, 2011.

9 “Veteran Activist’s Demands Reflect New Syria,” AmnestyInternational, Washington, D.C., July 26, 2011.10 YouTube, Mar. 10, 2011.11 “The Syrian Revolution 2011,” Facebook, accessed Dec. 27,2011.

26 / MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY SPRING 2012

Mubarak and abdicate power. Rather, it was hopedthat the new regional developments would forcethe regime to abandon its stubborn resistance tochange and, in the face of pressure from the street,introduce reforms. As the more politicized ele-ments in Syrian society had been decimated bysuccessive waves of repression, there was littleattempt at the outset to mobilize the masses, rea-soning that they had little power to affect suchchange. Thus, the outbreak of popular rage sur-prised everyone. Suhair al-Atassi, who was in hid-ing at the time, recently said,

We have been subjected to suppression andmurder for merely calling for freedom, democ-racy, general freedoms, the release of all pris-oners of conscience, an end to the state of emer-gency, and the return of all political exiles. Atthe time, we said that any suppression wouldcause the volcano to erupt… we knew that wewere working slowly but surely toward free-dom, but we didn’t dream of a revolution likethis breaking out. It was the Syrian youth whomade this dream a reality.12

The revolt began in the southern city of Dar’aand then gradually and progressively spread

across almost the entire country. The dem-onstrations, which at first mobilized a fewthousand people at best, began to enjoy greatprestige. In Bunni’s words:

In the past, only a few of us dared to callfor freedom and human rights. We used tofeel isolated, as the majority of peopleavoided us for fear of retribution from theauthorities. After my release, I have real-ized that my demands became the demandsof the entire Syrian people.13

Initially, important sectors of the popu-lation demanded limited reforms, but Assad’sbrutal repression raised the bar. Appearingbefore parliament on March 30, 2011, thepresident made it clear that any reforms wouldnot come about as a result of popular pres-sure and that the process of political liber-alization would not be hurried. Some mem-

bers of the intelligentsia believed that the re-gime would not be able to introduce reforms with-out collapsing:

We all know that the authorities lie and theywon’t permit anyone to speak out because theregime is corrupt and dictatorial, and corrup-tion and dictatorship fundamentally contra-dict transparency and freedom of opinion be-cause the first opinion that anyone would ex-press would be opposition to the regime’s cor-ruption and tyranny and the crimes it has com-mitted. And then they’ll face arrest, interroga-tion, and a trial. They say, we’ll enact a partylaw; we’ll implement reform, but these are alllies because these authorities are incapable ofit.14

Michel Kilo added,

Syria today is experiencing an existential crisisrelated to the distribution of wealth, social jus-tice, freedom, and political participation, andthis is not going to be resolved with repres-sion. The police should be arresting killers,

12 Asharq al-Awsat (London), July 16, 2011.

13 “Veteran Activist’s Demands Reflect New Syria,” July 26,2011.14 Pace, interview with Labwani, Sept. 2, 2005.

While the turmoil that roils Syria today was notsparked by the efforts of the intelligentsia, long-time critics such as Michel Kilo and Anwar al-Bunni are, at the very least, the spiritual fathers ofthe current crop of demonstrators.

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thieves, and smugglers, but not hungry peoplewith nothing to put in their mouths.15

As the uprising spread, the Syrian regimeblamed the violence on armed radical elementsseeking to destabilize the country. Assad toldparliament that Syria was facing a conspiracyintended to provoke a sectarian war betweenSunnis and Alawites.16 The regime tried to usethis tactic to play for time in the midst of a rebel-lion that had taken it by surprise as well as tojustify the high number of civilians killed by thesecurity services and pro-government armedgroups. Repression has intensified in the ensu-ing months and spread to most of the cities, butthe security forces have failed to suppress thepopular uprising. Faced with the success of thedemonstrations, the Syrian regime was forcedto back down in July and adopt a series of cos-metic reforms to try to quell the unrest, includ-ing the initiation of a national dialogue.17 Therebels roundly declared these measures insuffi-cient and designed merely to buy the Assad re-gime more time.

As the unrest has continued, most activistshave come to believe that the protest wave hastransformed into a revolution that will bring aboutthe fall of the regime. From her hiding place inJuly 2011, Suhair al-Atassi gave an apt descrip-tion of the spirit of the demonstrations:

It’s a revolution… triggered by the Syrian peopleseeking to stand up and say that they are citi-zens and not subjects, and that Syria belongs toall its citizens and not just the Assad family.This is a revolution of the youth who are de-manding freedom and are being confronted withviolence and murder… Today Syria is witness-ing a battle for freedom by unarmed civiliansurging the ouster of a regime that has utilizedmethods of brutal and inhumane suppression.They have brutally attacked and killed the pro-testers whilst the demonstrators have nothingbut their words to defend them.18

AN OPPOSITION DIVIDED

As a result of fifty years of repressive mea-sures, it is not surprising that the recent upris-ing has been an ensemble movement with con-tributions from different players. The econo-mist and commentator Omar Dahi has identi-fied five clearly differentiated groups taking partin the unrest: traditionalopposition parties (so-cialists, Nasserites, andcommunists); dissidentintellectuals; the youthmovement, includingthe leaders of the LocalCoordination Commit-tees (LCC), which hasdriven the revolution andwas joined by other sec-tors of society; a disor-ganized cohort of con-servative Muslims; and armed Salafist groups whorepresent a minority.19

Most of these groups (with the exception ofthe Salafi elements) agreed about the need to avoidviolence, reject sectarianism, and prevent foreignintervention. On August 29, 2011, the LCCstated,

While we understand the motivation to takeup arms or call for military intervention, wespecifically reject this position as we find itunacceptable politically, nationally, and ethi-cally. Militarizing the revolution would mini-mize popular support and participation inthe revolution. Moreover, militarizationwould undermine the gravity of the humani-tarian catastrophe involved in a confronta-tion with the regime. Militarization wouldput the revolution in an arena where the re-gime has a distinct advantage and would erodethe moral superiority that has characterizedthe revolution since its beginning.20

Initially, opposition figures urged the creation

Alvarez-Ossorio: Syrian Civil Society

15 Al-Akhbar (Cairo), Aug. 9, 2011.16 Voice of America, Mar. 30, 2011.17 The Guardian (London), June 27, 2011.18 Asharq al-Awsat, July 16, 2011.

19 Omar Dahi, “A Syrian Drama: A Taxonomy of a Revolution,”posted on Syria Comment blog by Joshua Landis, Aug. 13, 2011.20 “Statement to the Syrian People,” Local Coordination Com-mittees in Syria (LLC), Aug. 29, 2011.

The Syrianregime blamedthe violence onarmed radicalelements tojustify thehigh number ofcivilians killed.

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of a new social pact between the rulers and theruled, rejecting the use of violence to force Assadfrom power. Bunni, for example, advocated “apeaceful solution to all the problems” while Kilourged “a new national contract for a peaceful andnegotiated end to the crisis” arguing that “abloody conflict must be prevented given that ex-acerbating the sectarian tensions could lead tochaos.”21 At the beginning of August, Kilowarned, “There are some who have chosen totake up arms against the regime, but they onlyrepresent a minority of the demonstrators. But ifthe authorities persist in using violence, then theywill become a majority.”22

At first, national dialogue was also defended,but as the uprising has advanced and the repres-sion intensified, most of the intelligentsia has cometo reject this option. In March, the intellectualBurhan Ghalyoun, later named president of theNational Transition Council, warned that

to get out of the crisis, the whole crisis, theuse of weapons mustbe rejected and politi-cal logic must be ac-cepted… The logic ofnegotiation and politi-cal dialogue requirescredibility and the rec-ognition of the other.23

He cautioned, however,that such an attitudeseemed lacking in Assad,who continued “to dreamabout formal reformswithin the existing regime,a regime with only one

ruler, one party, and one authority.”24

Confronted with external and internal pres-sure, the regime indicated its readiness for a na-tional dialogue, authorizing a historic meeting withopposition members in Damascus on June 27.Some members of the protest movement, notably

Kilo, Louai Hussein, and Hassan Abbas, choseto participate, yet most signatories to the 2005Damascus declaration boycotted the meeting andcontested the participants’ right to speak on be-half of the demonstrators. While Hussein con-tended that the main goal of the meeting was “toorganize a safe, peaceful transition from tyrannyto freedom,”25 Bunni argued that it would be ex-ploited by the regime and used “to cover up thearrests, murders, and tortures that continue totake place on a daily basis.”26

Then on July 9 and 10, the regime sponsoredyet another national dialogue meeting, which wasboycotted by almost all opposition leaders.“While the regime is meeting—and that is whattoday was—there are funerals in other cities, andpeople continue to be killed and arrested,” com-mented Razan Zeitouneh, a lawyer and prominentLCC member.27 Syrian Human Rights Associa-tion president Malih, likewise, declined the invi-tation, saying

Whoever attends such a dialogue with a regimethat commits these crimes is a traitor to thepeople. After 200 martyrs, 1,500 missing per-sons, and 15,000 refugees, what is there to talkabout? How can you have a dialogue with aperson who is holding you at gunpoint?28

The meeting was attended by two hundreddelegates, most of them intellectuals and politi-cians with close ties to the regime, and was pre-sented as a steppingstone to a transition to de-mocracy. Vice President Farouk al-Shara openedthe meeting with the expressed hope that “it willlead to... the transformation of Syria into a plural-istic, democratic state where its citizens areequal.”29 In a surprising development, the finalstatement exceeded expectations by raising theissue of releasing all political prisoners, includingthose arrested since the uprising began (with theexception of those involved in crimes). It also ar-

21 As-Safir, Apr. 16, 2011.22 Al-Akhbar, Aug. 9, 2011.23 Al-Jazeera TV, Mar. 28, 2011.24 Ibid.

The wideninggap betweenAnkara andDamascusmeans the end ofTurkey’s “zeroproblems withneighbors”policy.

25 Ibid., June 27, 2011.26 Ibid.27 The Guardian, July 10, 2011.28 Asharq al-Awsat, July 13, 2011.29 Al-Watan (Kuwait), July 8, 2011.

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gued that “dialogue is the onlyway to end the crisis in Syria”and strongly rejected any foreigninterference under the pretext ofdefending human rights.30 Fur-thermore, it called for deeper re-forms and stronger efforts tocombat corruption and requestedthe amendment of the constitu-tion to make it commensurate withthe rule of law, a multiparty sys-tem, and democracy.

Most Syrian activists agreedthat the offer to engage in dia-logue came too late and that theregime had lost all credibility. Inthe words of Suhair Atassi,

It has been contaminated by theblood of our people! How couldwe accept this [national dia-logue]? It came too late! This is not to mentionthe lack of trust between the people and theregime. The best example of this was the ar-rests of the artists and intellectuals who de-cided to take to the streets in solidarity withthe legitimate demands for greater freedoms inSyria. The Syrian regime was merely trying tobuy time with this national dialogue… TheSyrian opposition is united, which can be seenin its joint decision to boycott the so-calleddialogue with the authorities that have beenkilling and suppressing the people.31

In their statement, the LCC dismissed themeeting’s results on the grounds that

Syrians who have already been killed and tor-tured by the thousands will not accept anyproposals or arrangements that leave BasharAssad, the intelligence service, and the deathsquads in control of their lives.32

As the uprising intensified and the dissi-

dents’ demands grew, the need to form a transi-tion government, given the possible collapse ofthe regime, was considered. As early as April 2011,Kilo had requested the formation of “a govern-ment of national unity,” and by mid-July, Malihhad gone still further, calling for a shadow gov-ernment made up of “independent experts” thatwould unify the opposition movements and pre-pare for the post-Assad era.33

FOREIGN INTERVENTION?

The Turkish government has followed theunfolding Syrian crisis with deep concern. Inthe earliest phases of the uprising, Prime Minis-ter Recep Tayyip Erdoðan and Foreign MinisterAhmet Davutoðlu advised the regime to end therepression and democratize the country. Assadignored this “friendly advice,” generating a pro-found unease in Ankara, which was heightenedby the arrival of thousands of refugees fleeingthe besieged Syrian town of Jisr Shughour.34

Alvarez-Ossorio: Syrian Civil Society

“Damascus Spring” soon turned into a winter of discontentas critics of the regime such as activist Kamal Labwani (left)were imprisoned or exiled.

30 Syrian Arab News Agency (Damascus), July 12, 2011.31 Asharq al-Awsat, July 16, 2011.32 Declaration, Local Coordination Committees in Syria (LCC),Sept. 7, 2011.

33 As-Safir, Apr. 26, 2011; al-Bayan (Dubai), July 11, 2011.34 BBC News, June 8, 2011.

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The possibility of a full-fledged civil wartroubles Ankara, which believes that the intensi-fication of violence would significantly increasethe influx of refugees into its territory. In an inter-view with the Qatar newspaper ash-Sharq,Erdoðan stressed the importance of the ties be-tween the two countries:

For Turkey, Syria is not just another coun-try, it’s a neighbor withwhich we share a 910-kilometer-long bor-der… and with whichwe have shared inter-ests that cannot be ig-nored… We know verywell that stability thereis part of our nationalsecurity, and we areafraid that the situationwill lead to the outbreakof a civil war betweenAlawites and Sunnis.35

The widening gap between Ankara and Dam-ascus also means the end of Davutoðlu’s “zeroproblems with neighbors” policy.36 The premiseof this policy was that by way of increasing itsinternational clout, Turkey had to maintain thebest possible relationships with neighboring coun-tries and diversify its alliances. This required thatAnkara turn its attention back to the Middle East,a region that had formed an integral part of theOttoman Empire for centuries, thus filling a long-standing vacuum that no Arab regime had beenable to fill.

The Turkish government thus warned Dam-ascus that trade relations between the two coun-tries, which amount to around $2.5 billion annu-ally, could be endangered.37 It also hosted vari-ous opposition group meetings inside Turkeywith the goal of creating a road map for a post-Assad era. In mid-July, Istanbul hosted the Na-tional Salvation Conference, which elected Malih

as its president. During the meeting, Malih re-jected any dialogue with the regime: “The Syrianregime has declared war on its people, who willnot go back home until the regime has fallen.”38

The final statement from the meeting called forthe formation of a shadow government, but notbefore the fall of the regime, and expressed its willto reach “a unified approach” between the oppo-sition and the young demonstrators.

In a subsequent meeting, held in Istanbulon August 23, 2011, the Syrian oppositionagreed to create a National Transition Council(NTC) comprised of opposition members bothinside and outside the country and presidedover by Burhan Ghalyoun, a Syrian academicresiding in France.39 Despite their differences,the intensity of the repression had brought op-position members together. Basma Qadmani,their spokesperson, told the media that “the NTCrepresents the major forces: political parties andindependent figures who symbolize the Syrianopposition.” The names of Syria-based NTCmembers were kept secret to prevent reprisals.

In September, this group was renamed theSyrian National Council (SNC). It included mem-bers of the Damascus declaration, the SyrianMuslim Brotherhood, the Local CoordinationCommittees, the Syrian Revolution GeneralCommission, Kurdish factions, tribal leaders,and independent figures. One of the first deci-sions of SNC was to approve a national con-sensus charter that defined the principles ofthe Syrian revolution:

1) Affirming that the Syrian revolution is arevolution for freedom and dignity;

2) Maintaining the peaceful nature of therevolution;

3) Affirming national unity and rejectingany call for sectarianism or monopolizingof the revolution;

4) Recognizing Syria is for all Syrians onan equal footing;

35 Ash-Sharq (Doha), Sept. 13, 2011.36 See Svante E. Cornell, “What Drives Turkish-Foreign-Policy?” Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2012, pp. 13-24.37 The National (Abu Dhabi), Aug. 11, 2011.

38 France 24 TV (Paris), July 19, 2011.39 Associated Press, Oct. 3, 2011.

Militarization ofthe uprisingwould likely beexploited by theregime to presentitself as theguarantor ofinternal stability.

/ 31Alvarez-Ossorio: Syrian Civil Society

Syrian refugees, fleeing the country for Turkey,arrive at a camp in Yayladagi village, Hatay, Turkey.While refugees from the fighting continue topour across the border into Turkey, the question ofAnkara’s intervention in the affairs of its southernneighbor has divided opponents of the Assad regime.

5) Rejecting foreign military intervention.40

While the opposition members initiallyrejected any foreign intervention, voices fa-voring this eventuality began to emerge, al-beit still in the minority. During the Istanbulconference, Malih urged the U.N. to put anend to the bloodshed through political anddiplomatic pressure but soundly rejected anymilitary intervention.41 Earlier, Kilo had alsodeclared his desire “to see an exclusivelySyrian solution... reached based on a broad,complete national understanding.”42

Yet given the worsening situation, theopposition has begun to consider differentscenarios to bring the dictatorship to an end.Some favor following the Libyan examplewhere the uprising combined with foreignmilitary intervention to bring about the col-lapse of the regime: Ashraf al-Miqdad, signerto the Damascus declaration living in Aus-tralia, told Asharq al-Awsat that

the Syrian regime will never stop the repres-sion and murders, meaning that there are onlytwo options: foreign intervention or armingthe revolutionaries… International military in-tervention has become the only possible solu-tion. The other alternative would be to dividethe army, which would avoid having to armthe people.43

Although these voices still represent a mi-nority, they reflect the growing desperation ofthe Syrian opposition, which believes that theuprising may lose its muscle if none of the objec-tives are reached soon. On July 29, 2011, a groupof defectors formed the Syrian Free Army (SFA).44

By mid October, there were an estimated 10,000 to15,000 defectors especially active in the north andcentral regions. In the last months of the year,

SFA began launching some operations againstthe Syrian army.45

The LCC has tried to nip this debate in thebud, stating in a communiqué, “While we under-stand the motivation to take up arms or call formilitary intervention, we specifically reject thisposition as we find it unacceptable politically, na-tionally, and ethically.”46 At least for now, then, itseems that a Libya-style intervention is being re-jected. The communiqué stressed

The method by which the regime is overthrownis an indication of what Syria will be like in thepost-regime era. If we maintain our peacefuldemonstrations, which include our cities,towns, and villages, and our men, women, andchildren, the possibility of democracy in ourcountry is much greater. If an armed confron-tation or international military intervention be-40 National Consensus Charter, Syrian National Council, Sept.

15, 2011; Steven Heydemann, “Syria’s Opposition,” UnitedStates Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., Sept. 20, 2011.41 France 24 TV, July 19, 2011.42 Al-Arab al-Yawm (Amman), June 18, 2011.43 Asharq al-Awsat, Sept. 6, 2011.44 YouTube, July 29, 2011.

45 The New York Times, Nov. 17, 2011.46 “Statement to the Syrian People,” Local Coordination Com-mittees in Syria, Aug. 29, 2011.

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comes a reality, it will be virtually impossibleto establish a legitimate foundation for a proudfuture Syria.47

Malih concurred, “Any foreign interventionwould destroy Syria, just like what has happenedin Libya… the revolution in Syria will prevail, andthe regime will be brought down by peacefulmeans.” He added that “the revolutionaries willnot fall into the trap” of militarizing the uprising.48

An eventual militarization could have dev-astating effects and would likely be exploited by

the regime to present it-self as the guarantor ofinternal stability and toregain some of the terri-tory lost to the rebels. Thepossibility of an outbreakof civil war could haveunforeseeable effects onSyria’s neighbors since itshares borders with Is-rael, Lebanon, Turkey,

Iraq, and Jordan. As Arab League secretary gen-eral Nabil al-Arabi recently said, “Syria is notLibya… Syria plays a central role in the region,and what happens there has a direct impact onLebanon and Iraq.”49

CONCLUSION

Although the influence of opposition intel-lectuals in Syria remains limited, there is little doubtthat the Assad regime considers their demandsfor the release of political prisoners, suspensionof the state of emergency, and an end to the single-party system a declaration of war. This furtherunderscores the regime’s tenuous grip on poweras none of the members of this small opposition

group can count on a broad social base or hailfrom Syrian families boasting great wealth or longlines of politicians with the notable exception ofSuhair Atassi, scion to a prominent political fam-ily that has produced three heads of state.

Given the absence of freedom of expressionand the regime’s absolute control of the media,the intelligentsia has not been able to inculcateits message to the Syrian “street” or to mobilize it,a task that now falls entirely to the Local Coordi-nation Committees. Some are further hamperedby their past: A good portion of their members areNasserites, communists, or socialists, affiliationsthat are in decline and lack any significant popu-lar backing. Support for secularism also weakenstheir influence among the more traditional or de-vout segments of Syrian society.

Internal divisions and lack of coordinationhave also taken their toll. Some of the leadingfigures differ over core issues such as whether itis possible to have a dialogue with the regime;what the proper relationship with foreign pow-ers should be; what form a transitional govern-ment should take, and how it should rule. Thesedifferences have been apparent over the last fewmonths.

These structural deficiencies notwithstand-ing, the opinions of these intellectuals are fol-lowed by an important segment of the demon-strators, who hold the struggle by these thinkersagainst the regime in great esteem. Indeed, thisgroup of intellectuals and critics is solidly repre-sented in both the Committee for National Salva-tion and the Syrian National Council spearhead-ing the uprising. Perhaps this uncertain situationis best summed up in Malih’s words:

The opposition and the Syrian intellectualsdid not create the revolution. The revolution isthe work of the youth. Now they need politi-cal support, and we want to be by their sidesin this revolution.50

47 Ibid.48 Asharq al-Awsat, Sept. 11, 2011.49 Der Spiegel (Hamburg), Sept. 7, 2011.

An outbreakof civil warcould haveunforeseeableeffects on Syria’sneighbors.

50 Asharq al-Awsat, July 13, 2011.