A MISSED CHANCE FOR PEACE: ISRAEL AND SYRIA'S NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE GOLAN HEIGHTS

In the Middle East “no war is possible without Egypt, and no peace is possiblewithout Syria,” as suggested by former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in

the 1970s. From 1991 to 2000, Syria entered into extensive peace negotiations withIsrael, another key actor in the Middle East. The objective of this article is to under-stand these negotiations, which involved periods of intense discord as well asmoments of rapprochement. Spectacular progress was made, for instance, between1993 and 1995, when the “Rabin deposit,” Israel’s promise to withdraw from theGolan Heights to the 4 June 1967 border and thus allow Syria to recover access toLake Tiberias, was proposed to the U.S. mediator. The two actors came close to anagreement but failed to put an end to the Israeli-Syrian conflict at theShepherdstown negotiations in January 2000 and the Asad-Clinton summit on 26March 2000 in Geneva. What lessons can be drawn from the process which tookplace between 1991 and 2000 in terms of the actors’ objectives, motivations andperceptions of each other? Why did the talks fail to produce an agreement? Whatwas the weight of water in stimulating or blocking the process?

A heated debate has taken place since the 1990s. Did successive Israeli govern-ments seek a genuine peace agreement or was it a deliberate strategy to neutralizeSyria while seeking a final arrangement with the Palestinians? What about the lateHafez al-Asad’s true intentions? Surely, his domestic legitimacy relied on the contin-uation of conflict with Israel? On the other hand, was he not experiencing doublepressure, both from the international level as well as internally as the Syrian peoplegrew tired of war? And was water a primary concern to him in reaching a satisfyingagreement? Many studies and firsthand accounts have provided a narrative of theIsrael-Syria peace negotiations and the ambiguous role played by the U.S. mediator.1

The Syrian position has remained largely unknown, except for the publication in1997 of an extended interview with the head of the Syrian delegation to Washington,former ambassador and current minister of foreign affairs, Walid al-Moalem.2 In this

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A MISSED CHANCE FOR PEACE: ISRAEL AND SYRIA'S NEGOTIATIONS

OVER THE GOLAN HEIGHTS

Marwa Daoudy

Journal of International Affairs, Spring/Summer 2008, vol. 61, no. 2.© The Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York

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highly unusual display of candor, he described the first round of face-to-face discussionswith Israel. However, many questions have remained open regarding the Syrianvision of peace, the evolution of that vision over time and the impact of regionaldynamics on the peace process. By providing firsthand testimonies of key negotiatorsand official documents obtained from Syria, this study aims to shed new light onSyria’s constraints and opportunities and their impact on the actors’ bargainingpositions and perceptions.3 One cannot but question the underlying negotiationpuzzle: In a situation of historical conflict over land and water, and clear asymmetricalpower, what brought the two actors together to discuss peace? What was the roleof water in the ongoing discussions and from the perspectives of the various actors?What incentives could resume such discussions after the breakup of Shepherdstownand Geneva in 2000?

The main conclusion of this study is that structural and process-related variableswere decisive in shaping the negotiation process and the lack of full agreement.Below, I will explain why the negotiations failed and what the prospects for peaceare today. In addition to the strategic weight carried by the capture of territory, twoadditional issues increased the stakes: security and water. This paper will focus onthe latter.4 Water will appear as a catalyst for conflict but also cooperation, and oftenat the same time. I will analyze this issue in the context of the initial armisticeregime in 1949, the negotiations launched by the United States in 1953, the ensuing1967 conflict and the occupation of the Golan Heights by Israel and the peaceprocess that began in the early 1990s.

Since the collapse of Israel and Syria’s peace talks in 2000, major internationaland regional events have drastically influenced domestic and bilateral bargainingdynamics: the death of Hafez al-Asad and the rise to power of his son Bashar, the2003 U.S.-led war in Iraq and the forced withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanonin April 2005. Therefore, evaluating the likelihood that peace talks will resume andthat conflict over land and water can be resolved in the new regional context requiresa thorough analysis of all of the obstacles leading up to the peace. As I will show, thisis a story of a missed opportunity. Drawing on conceptual tools from negotiationanalysis, I will examine the structure and the process of the discussions that tookplace. But first, I will highlight the physical landscape where the conflict over landand water occurred.

TTHE JJO R D A N RRIVE R BBA SIN GGE O G R A P H Y :: LL I T T L E BBIG RRIVE R

The Jordan River is generally considered to have an average flow of approximately1,400 million cubic meters per year. The river rises as three spring-fed streams: theHasbani in Lebanon, the Banias in Syria and the Dan in Israel. The three watercoursesmeet at about 14 kilometers upstream of the once-drained Huleh Lake—the former

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border of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) between Syria and Israel—before constitutingthe Jordan River itself. The river’s annual flow at the exit point of the Huleh Valleyis estimated at 640 million cubic meters. Sixteen kilometers downward, the upperJordan meets with Lake Tiberias, also called the Sea of Galilee and Lake Kinneret,where its annual flow is diminished to about 550 million cubic meters. A combinationof evaporation (140 million cubic meters) and extraction by irrigation canals in theBissan Valley (60 million cubic meters) reduces the flow to an amount of 440 millioncubic meters at the exit point of the lake. At that point, the Yarmuk River, its largesttributary, joins the Jordan. The Yarmuk rises in Syria and forms the border betweenSyria and Jordan in its lower reaches. The lower Jordan runs from its meeting pointwith the Yarmuk until it discharges in the Dead Sea, over a distance of about 100kilometers. The total length of the Jordan River from its three spring sources to theDead Sea is about 360 kilometers.

The Jordan River is one of the most frequently studied transboundary water-courses in the world, and the allocation of its flow has been the source of conflict fora considerable period of time.5 At the heart of the Israel-Syria negotiations lies asmall territory of 20 square kilometers. This disputed piece of land determinesaccess for Syria to the lake’s waters and the Upper Jordan Valley. The history of theconflict over land gives an overview of explanatory variables of the land/water nexus.

TTHE NNE G O T I A T I O N SST R U C T U R E :: HH I S T O R Y OF CCO O P E R A T I O N

AND CCO N F L I C T OOVER LLAND //WW AT E R :: 11994499 TO 11996677

The identification of the negotiation structure is crucial for understanding theprocess and the outcome of negotiations. Structural variables impact the optionsavailable to actors. They are usually defined within the context of bilateral dynamics,and include influencing variables such as the history of mutual relationships,cultural perceptions and the distribution of power.6 This study will not address theunderlying theoretical debates, but it is worth mentioning that power is ingrained inthe structure of interaction.7 In understanding the context in which Israel and Syriaentered into extensive negotiations, it is important to address the most significanthistorical variables in relation to conflict over land in the aftermath of the War of1948 and the fight for scarce water resources, and to disentangle the impact ofmutual perceptions.

Ear ly WWater DDisputes aand NNegot iat ions : 11951 tto 11954

Following the signing of the Sykes-Picot Accords of 1916, which distributedspheres of influence over Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq between France and GreatBritain, respectively, intensive discussions took place between the two mandatorypowers after the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Under the influence of claims made


A Missed Chance for Peace


by the World Zionist Organization for a viable Palestine with sufficient waterresources, the British Mandate negotiated in 1922 a modified common border—thePaulet-Newcombe line—which placed Syria under French Mandate 10 meters awayfrom the eastern shores of Lake Tiberias.8 Inclusive of the mouth of the YarmukRiver, the Jordan River north of Tiberias and the Huleh and Tiberias Lakes withinthe territory of Palestine, the new frontier was ratified in 1923 without beingrecognized by Syria, as the border was drawn during French rule preceding thecountry’s independence in 1946.9

The armistice conventions between Israel and Syria were signed on 20 July1949.10 The Arab-Israeli boundary problem was launched when temporary lines ofdemarcation were established to separate opposing forces, partly on the basis of thecurfew lines of 1949.11 Syria, along with other Arab nations, insisted that a peaceregime would be conditional upon return of the borders established in the UNresolution of 1947. Israel maintained control over the zones it received in thePartition Plan, with an additional 3,600 square kilometers taken from the Arab side.Iraqi and trans-Jordanian troops, on the other hand, occupied 3,700 square kilometersin the area allocated to the Palestinians. This “addition” carries particular signifi-cance because the zone encompasses the region inclusive of the sources of the Jordan(north of the Huleh and Tiberias lakes), the Yarmuk triangle south of Lake Tiberiasand the western part of the Jordan River. It gives the upstream actor the power tosecure access to water while controlling the quantity left to downstream users. Syriaagreed to withdraw from the 32 square kilometers it occupied on the Israel-allocatedshare, under the strict condition that a DMZ would be established between the twoparties. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was put incharge of supervising the DMZ for the UN Security Council.

The main purpose of the armistice conventions was to stop the hostilities, notto define political borders along lines of demarcation, which were considered to betemporary military positions at the time of truce.12 This was intended to be apreparatory phase for a full resolution of the conflict, which would include a peacetreaty delineating a border settlement between belligerents. The ambiguity of theregime and the property rights fertilized the contentious regional relations thatprevailed up to the climax of the 1967 War. Two crises, in 1951 and 1953, betweenIsrael and Syria coincided with the commencement of Israel’s water plans, mainlyfor the development of irrigated agriculture.13

In 1951, Israel began draining swamps in the Huleh region to transform aninundated and malaria-infested area into agricultural fields. Reports from theUNTSO had shown that the aim of the Israeli project was to “lower the water levelof Lake Huleh and to dry the marshes north thereto,” in order to prevent the levelof the lake from rising to 1 to 2 meters in the winter and flooding the area to the

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north.14 However, the projects were considered illegal operations according to DMZrules. Following Syria’s complaint to the Mixed Armistice Commission and later tothe UN Security Council, the latter adopted a resolution, ordering Israel to “ceaseall operations in the demilitarized zone.”15

The UNTSO report also put forth the notion that no sovereignty, neitherIsraeli nor Syrian, should apply to any part of the DMZ. Drainage works werereported at Banat Yakub, within the DMZ, relating to Israel’s diversion canals setin 1953. Israel was granted permission to drain the Huleh marshes as long as thedrainage operations did not have any repercussions on Arab property. Nonetheless,in 1955, and in accordance with Israel’s Seven Year Plan, construction work operationswere again initiated with the objective of diverting water from the Jordan Riverinto the Banat Yakub area of the DMZ. In effect, Israel had already started toclaim sovereignty over the Jordan River and the DMZ. These demands werestrongly rejected by the Syrians and UNTSO. Finally, despite ongoing sessions atthe United Nations on the issue, it was the U.S. threat to discontinue financial aidto Israel that put a halt to the construction works.16 However, these works hadalready achieved their objective of diverting the waters and their flow to Arabvillages substantially decreased.17

The JJohnston NNegot iat ions : 11953 tto 11954

Negotiations over water commenced in the 1950s, under the patronage of U.S.envoy, Eric Johnston. In the second half of 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhowerdesignated Johnston to be his personal representative with the rank of ambassador,and instructed him to attempt to generate a regional water allocation agreementamong the then co-riparians of the Jordan River basin in order to allocate the availablewater resources. The principal reason for this was to attempt to derive a solution forthe many thousands of Palestinian refugees who had been displaced from historicalPalestine during the 1948 War with Israel. This functionalist approach to waterallocation was intended to trigger a spill-over effect, which would commence withcooperation on water-related issues, but extend later to political matters includingthe delineation of borders, and the eventual return of Palestinian refugees.18

The Johnston Plan was finalized on 30 September 1955, after two years ofregional negotiations and shuttle diplomacy. The negotiation sequences revealcompromises on both sides (e.g., the Arabs accepted an increase of Israel’s share to40 percent of the waters instead of the 33 percent originally suggested, despiteIsrael’s contribution of 23 percent) and agreed for storage of the Yarmuk waters inLake Tiberias on Israeli-controlled territory, but under international supervision. Inaddition, Israel agreed to international control over the stored waters of LakeTiberias.19 In the end, however, the basin-wide proposal made by the Americans was




rejected for several reasons. In the first place, a climate of mistrust between theArabs and the newly created state of Israel contributed to its defeat. Second, theAmerican approach stressed the need to start with economic cooperation aroundwater issues while putting aside political issues such as borders and the return of thePalestinian refugees.20 It has often been suggested that a main obstacle to concludingan agreement was Arab refusal to give de facto recognition to Israel according to theterms spelled out in the Johnston Plan. However, despite their hesitation to formallyrecognize Israel, Syria and the Arabs’ counter-plan of March 1954 allocated a 20percent share to Israel out of the total or water distributed. The Johnston Plan wasrejected by both Arabs and Israelis when a separate peace plan was put forth by U.S.Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in 1954, which included an explicit recognitionof the 1949 lines of truce and an agreement on the city of Jerusalem.21 Johnstonhimself recognized the limited prospects for the plan to induce cooperation aroundthe river.

The 11967 WWar: WWater aas DDriver oof CConf l ic t?

The failure to cooperate over water clearly exacerbated the conflict betweenSyria and Israel in the following years. As later revealed in the published diaries ofIsraeli Foreign Minister Sharrett, “to mention just a few of many examples, politicaldecisions concerning the occupation of the rest of Eretz Israel were taken as early as1954, although implemented in 1967.”22 Many border incidents that paved the wayto the 1967 War were linked to unilateral water projects undertaken after thecollapse of the Johnston negotiations. Border clashes started to target hydraulicinstallations.23 Thus in 1962, Syria described Israel’s hydraulic projects as a “threatto peace and security” in a formal complaint to the UN Security Council.24 Sincemembers at the Arab League meeting of 1964 also decided to divert the waters of theJordan River tributaries, Israel targeted hydraulic works in Syria and Jordan, whileintensifying its bombing of Syrian territory between January and June of 1967.

The occupation of 70 percent of the Golan Heights and the Upper MountHermon by Israel resulted in the seizure of the Upper Jordan River in its entirety. Thewar had a substantial impact on the water flow to Syria and altered the availablehydrological options. One of the major geopolitical gains for Israel was a change inits riparian position from partly downstream to fully upstream. Since the onset ofthe occupation, 60 percent of Israel’s water has also been taken from the JordanRiver. Syria was denied access to the Upper Jordan waters, thus losing 125 millioncubic meters of annual water flow from the Banyas River, as well as 125 millioncubic meters from the Dan River. Taking into account Syria’s considerably higherdependence on other sources such as the Euphrates River (65 percent of its totalwater volume), the capture of the Banyas waters and the Golan Heights carried a

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significantly higher symbolic weight in relation to territorial and national integrity.The Banyas and Hasbani waters, expeditiously diverted to the national carrier, andthe aquifers of the West Bank enabled Israel to alleviate its water deficit.

Forty years later, the two actors were brought to the negotiating table by theUnited States. Syria’s efforts at constituting a united front against Israel in the nameof Pan-Arabism and the defense of Palestinian rights, which began in the 1960s,peaked after the decline of Egyptian influence, following the Camp David accords of1979. A tentative coalition of Arab powers, including Lebanon, the Palestinians andJordan, was sought by Hafez al-Asad to contain Israel’s power.25 In the 1980s, hisobjective was to achieve a military balance of power with Israel—an obsession with“strategic parity” that would also guide his peace strategy in the 1990s—by workingactively at bridging bilateral power asymmetries to avoid engaging in peace talks froma position of weakness.26 The ensuing peace negotiations in the 1990s initiated amixed process over land and water, revealing what is referred to in negotiationliterature as permanent tension between conflict and cooperation.27

AA MM IX E D NNE G O T I A T I O N PPR O C E S S :: WW AT E R AS A CCA T A L Y S T

FOR CCO N F L I C T AND CCO O P E R A T I O N :: 11999911 TO 22000000

Actors , CCore IIssues aand IInterests

The last sections have shown how conflict over water was at the heart of Syriaand Israel’s interests since the 1950s. Water will also become a core issue in theirensuing peace negotiations. A process of negotiation stems from the will to defendone’s own interests and the realization of common interests among the differentactors, even if the benefits of a mutual agreement become evident only in the long-term. The negotiation’s core issues are thus linked to “the perception, even unclear…ofthe real interests that will be debated.”28 The real interests of the negotiation processsometimes remain implicit and distinct from the ones that are explicitly underdiscussion.29 A distinction can be made between intrinsic interests—when theresolution of an issue has a per se value, independent from other concerns—andinstrumental interests, which value the quality of an agreement by its benefits andlinks with other related issues.30

This section will show that Israeli domestic politics and concerns over waterplayed a significant role in both Yitzhak Rabin’s and Ehud Barak’s fear of reachingfinal settlement on the basis of full withdrawal from the Golan and its restitution toSyria. Domestic concerns also paradoxically impacted late President Hafez el-Asad’sconcerns about not appearing in Syrian and Arab public opinions as having madeexcessive concessions over land and water under Israeli and American pressure.31 Itis worth noting that Syrian public opinion had been actively induced by the regime




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into accepting the end of conflict and peace with Israel, and this was a significantevolution of collective mentalities in the early 1990s. The recovery of the GolanHeights and its water resources has indeed constituted an intrinsic interest for Syriafor reasons of internal political legitimacy, but also to put an end to an asymmetricalconflict. For Israel, the occupation of the Golan Heights has rather been an instrumentto satisfy security concerns and objectives towards regional economic integration.

Before accepting the United States’ invitation to the Madrid Conference in1991, Asad reminded U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III of the continuousimportance of this territory for Syria, about twenty-four years after the 1967 War:the expulsion of 130,000 civilians from 139 villages (constituting today a populationof about 500,000 inhabitants), while a population of 16,000 Syrians still lived underIsraeli rule.32 Ambassador Dennis Ross later commented about the importance forAsad to preserve Syria’s “dignity and honor.”33 In effect, recovering national territoryand resources became a personal challenge to the Syrian leader who had been servingas defense minister during the 1967 War.34 This territorial conquest, resourcecapture and later annexation in 1981 carried additional strategic weight as no bufferzone existed anymore between the two foes: Israel had positioned its powerful armyand a sophisticated early warning station on Mount Hermon at about 35 kilometersfrom Damascus, thus making Syria more vulnerable to ground attacks.

Water , TTerr i tory aand PPeace : 44 JJune 11967 oor 11923 BBorder?

The Peace Process, which was launched in Madrid, adopted a twin-track strategy,which combined bilateral talks on core or high-politics issues and multilateraldiscussions on related issues such as water.35 Syria resisted the United States andIsrael’s attempts to frame negotiations over water as part of technical or low politicsissues. Because of this, Syria refused to join the multilateral talks. Instead itproposed that these matters, including water, should be discussed in bilateral talks.Syrian actors felt that high-politics matters such as the return of occupied land andthe end of the Arab-Israeli conflict must be addressed first. Clearly, Syria’s negotiationstrategy was to impede a parallel process that, by dissociating cooperation over waterfrom ending land occupation, would lead to the implementation of a de facto wateragreement. This was Israel’s primary concern in Syria’s opinion, with no incentive toreturn occupied land and resources, which was in fact Syria’s primary concern.

Both parties viewed land and water as a high priority. Their positions clashed overtwo geographical borders, which, in effect, determined their hydrological separation:the 4 June 1967 line for Syria, and the 1923 international border for Israel. Betweenthe two lies a small territory of 20 square kilometers, which determines access forSyria to Lake Tiberias and the Upper Jordan Valley. Syria insisted on a withdrawal tothe 4 June line, instead of the 9 June line, which corresponded to the start of the Israeli




incursion in the Golan Heights. This was based on its interpretation of UN SecurityCouncil Resolution 242, which stated the “inadmissibility of the acquisition ofterritory by war” and requested the “withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territoriesoccupied in the recent conflict.” Described by Hof as the “status quo line,” the 4June 1967 border would also allow Syria to regain access to water and the city ofal-Hamma, considering that Syria had access to northeastern shore of Lake ofTiberias until the 1967 War.36 Some analysts have argued that claiming a virtualborder, such as that of 4 June 1967, which appears on no map, would leave asideterritories occupied by Israel in the DMZ, in violation of the 1949 armistice agree-ments.37 They have therefore suggested that negotiations address the 20 July 1949border, the only border which has ever been agreed upon by the two parties besidesthe post-conflict lines of 1967 and 1973.38 Israeli critics of the 4 June 1967 lineargue that Syria also acquired this territory by force, between 1948 and the signatureof the armistice agreements in 1949, in contradiction with the spirit of SecurityCouncil Resolution 242. Instead, they insisted on the 1923 border, which Syria hadnever recognized. Israel’s motivation in claiming the 1923 border was largely based onthe will to keep the Jordan River sources under its sovereignty.

Some Israeli strategists have also addressed the issue of the common border froma “hydraulic security” perspective, thus implying a full control by Israel of all surfaceand groundwater resources from the Golan Heights. A study carried out by the JaffeeCenter for Strategic Studies of the University of Tel-Aviv, under the direction of theformer head of intelligence services, General Aaron Yariv, delineated a “zone ofhydraulic security” including water resources within Syria and Lebanon underIsraeli control, i.e. tributaries of the Jordan River, including Banyas, Hasbani,sources in al-Hamma and wadis in the Golan Heights, as well as land along theJordan River and Lake Tiberias. Initially kept secret, the map would later be revealedand published in Haaretz in 1993.39

The PProcess

While water did not officially appear on the negotiation agenda before the WyeRiver Negotiations of 1995-1996, it did, however, permeate all interactions overterritory and final borders from 1992 to 1995.

The first five bilateral talks, from the fall of 1991 to the spring of 1992, started offin the context of mutual mistrust and accusations. A clash in respective negotiationformulas set the climate: Yossi Ben-Aharon, the head of the Israeli delegation, laterrevealed his rejection of Syria’s offer of “peace in exchange of land,” saying that“peace is fluid, flexible and reversible, when territory is concrete and irreversible.”40

The Syrian legal advisor recalled that meetings consisted of confrontations over eachside’s interpretations of the different UN Security Council Resolutions.41 Yitzhak


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Shamir, then prime minister of Israel, later admitted that his participation wasmotivated by the will to please his American ally and the conviction that theexperience would stop there.42

Turning PPoint : RRabin’s ““Depos i t” aand tthe WWater and PPeace BBorders : 11992 tto 11995

In the next phase, territory and security, rather than water, appeared to bearcrucial importance. But Rabin’s promise for full territorial withdrawal carried significantweight for water sharing. Ross later wrote about Rabin’s “great respect” for Asad,who the prime minister considered as “tough but loyal to his word,” referring to Syria’sscrupulous respect of the disengagement agreement of 31 May 1974, after theKippur/Ramadan War of 1973.43 Itamar Rabinovich, an academic specialist onSyria, was appointed head of the Israeli delegation. During the sixth round ofnegotiations, Rabinovich departed from Shamir’s “peace for peace” formula, andstated that “Israel accepted Resolution 242 in its entirety within peace discussionswith Syria.”44 For the first time, Israel conceded to the territorial nature of theconflict. In a summary of its positions based on the UN Security Council resolutions,Syria set the agenda for the upcoming negotiations, with the underlying principlebeing “peace in exchange for territory.”45 A linkage was also made with the need tofinalize an agreement with the Palestinians. This agenda would run all of theconsecutive discussions with Rabin, establishing the four pillars of the table ofnegotiation: security arrangements—including the establishment of demilitarizedzones on an equal basis on both sides—normalization, borders and steps for withdrawalfrom the Golan Heights. In the ninth round of bilateral sessions, following BillClinton’s election in 1992, each side reaffirmed its peace formula; Syria, by reassessing“total withdrawal for total peace” in response to Rabin’s declaration that “the depthof peace will be determined by the depth of withdrawal.”46 Diplomatic contacts ledto the promise, made by Rabin to the United States, called the “deposit” or the“pocket,” referring to a promise they could put in their pocket for a full withdrawalfrom the Golan Heights to the 4 June 1967 line, in exchange for full normalization.47

Ross has extensively described the process leading to the promise and its deliveryto the Syrian President, in August 1993.48 On the Syrian side, the timeline set byRabin for a full withdrawal over five years was questioned by Asad, who also high-lighted for the first time the importance of water for both parties.49 This secret andoral clause constituted a turning point for Syria, which started to give credit toIsrael’s statements about making peace.50 In a further clarification of the notion of“full withdrawal,” made by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher during hisvisit to Damascus in July 1994 and as requested by Syria, the “response by PrimeMinister Rabin was that full withdrawal would consist in a withdrawal to the line of




4 June 1967.”51 In exchange, Syria asked for a withdrawal up to the 4 June 1967line with a dismantlement of all Israeli settlements, and accepted public diplomacyin favor of global peace.

One question remains unanswered today, which carries significant consequencesfor the continuation of the process: Was Rabin’s promise through the Americansmade in order to accelerate Israel’s other bilateral tracks, mainly with thePalestinians? In other words, were they simultaneously playing on both tracks togain maximum leverage?

The DDeposi t FForgone: MMiss ing tthe OOpportunity tto FFinal ize LLandand WWater AAgreements

The secrecy of the deposit was requested of the U.S. mediators by Rabin, who wasconcerned about leaving “time to the Israeli public opinion to digest this agreement”and the Israel-Syria track was put on hold for a few months.52 Israel’s strategyappeared to play one track against the other: Changing from the “Syria first” option,Rabin was giving Palestinians the choice of a possible agreement before Syria, thusextracting additional concessions on their part and the signing of the Declaration ofPrinciples between Yasser Arafat and Rabin in Washington, DC on 13 September1993.53 For Syria, a separate peace between Israel and the Palestinians represented ablow to its linkage strategy, which aimed at reinforcing Arab positions. Syria’s claimfor regional peace would, from then on, solely address the recovery of the GolanHeights. The Asad-Clinton meeting in Geneva in January 1994 ended with an officialdeclaration by Asad that Syria had made a “strategic choice” for peace, and was readyto develop full diplomatic relations with Israel in exchange for full withdrawal.

On the Israeli side, many first-hand witnesses have later questioned the impactof Rabin’s deposit. The existence of the commitment was never questioned, but itsinherent ambiguity opened the door to later controversies and questioning overwater after Rabin’s assassination on 4 November 1995. While admitting to regularclaims by Syria for the 4 June 1967 line, and therefore its demand for full access towater, Rabinovich described Rabin’s commitment as a “hypothetical approach,”while hinting at “occasional verbal concessions.”54 Uri Sagie, a former head of Israelimilitary intelligence services who would later uphold the necessity of a settlementwith Syria within the Israeli establishment, recalled Rabin’s anger when Christophersaid that the deposit had been conveyed to the Syrian side, emphasizing that thepromise had been specifically made to the Americans and transmitted to the Syrianswithout his authorization.55 Helena Cobban noted in her book that American officialshave admitted writing the word “commitment” when summarizing the negotiationsessions.56 On the basis of Rabin and Christopher’s clash and Rabin’s insistence forconfidentiality, Patrick Seale concluded that Christopher had been manipulated by


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a shrewd Rabin, eager to neutralize Syria while seeking a settlement with thePalestinians.57 Upon Rabin’s request, Clinton managed to convince Syria’sAmbassador Walid al-Moallem to attend the 13 September signing ceremony for theIsraeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles in Washington, DC, thus showingSyria’s support to Israel’s settlement with the Palestinians. Rabinovich provided asimilar account when he wrote that, while conscious of the need to eventually settlewith Syria in light of Oslo and the signing of a separate agreement with Jordan,Rabin was not in a hurry anymore.58 In his account of his years as Rabinovich’ssuccessor at the Wye River talks from 1995 to 1996, Uri Savir qualified Rabin’scommitment as a verbal and ambiguous agreement.59 Ross adopted the same line ofinterpretation by describing the deposit as a conditional commitment on the part ofRabin to withdraw.60 However, Ross would also quote Israel’s legal advisor to theWye River talks, Joel Singer, who qualified Rabin’s deposit as a “big mistake.”61

Peres , tthe UUnwil l ing HHeir : TThe WWye RRiver TTalks , 11995 tto 11996

American and Israeli sources reveal the ignorance, on the part of Shimon Peres’signorance of the existence of the deposit when he became prime minister afterRabin’s assassination. He was informed by Clinton on the day of Rabin’s funeral.Peres committed to respecting the promise, though he would not have made ithimself. In a meeting with Ross, Peres expressed his will to act fast, but warned thatIsrael’s public opinion would not accept withdrawal to the 1967 line.62 He informedClinton in December 2005 of his readiness to “fly high and fast” and that “itdepended on what Asad wanted.” Asad paved the way for the talks to resume byqualifying Peres as a “leader with vision, imagination and creativity.”63 Syria wasaware of Peres’ vision of a Middle East turned into a zone of common economicdevelopment—water being an important foundation. The Wye River Plantationdiscussions were held in December 1995 and January to February 1996. The with-drawal to the 1967 border was not put on the negotiation agenda but Israelisrecognized that “the United States had received a verbal and conditional commitmentfrom Rabin on the issue.”64 Rabinovich would later write that two new issues wereintroduced to the agenda: water and economic cooperation. For the first time, waterwould be discussed simultaneously with land and security arrangements, thusacquiring formal recognition.65 Discussions would be narrowed to details and practicalsettlements. As a former minister of defense under Rabin, Peres’ concern was alreadyto “[bring] the Syrians within 10 meters from Lake Tiberias.”66 Israel attemptedalso, with no success, to break the linkage made between Syria and Lebanon. Thetalks were interrupted when Peres announced in February 1996 the rescheduling ofanticipated elections. Later events—in the shape of targeted assassinations of Hamasleaders, suicide bombings in Israel and Hezbollah-fired rockets—culminated in April




1996 with Israel’s bloody incursion in southern Lebanon and the massacre ofLebanese civilians in a UN compound near Qana. Peres lost the elections in May1996 and the election of Benjamin Netanyahu put an end to an already weakenedprocess and to any hopes for cooperation over water. Netanyahu conditioned theresumption of talks on the basis of no pre-established tracks. Asad refused anddemanded a continuation of negotiations on the basis of Rabin’s prior commitments.67

The SShepherdstown NNegot iat ions , JJanuary 22000: Barak oor tthe EEnd oof HHope

Newly elected in 1999, Barak’s primary objective consisted of fulfilling his electoralpromise for a pacific withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon and the securitizationof the northern border by impeding an escalation with Hezbollah. This could beachieved through a peace agreement with Syria. Addressing Syria’s primary concernover the recovery of their land would be a means to this end, while leaving thedelineation of territorial and hydrological borders aside. The Israeli negotiators alsoseemed concerned with the potential return of 500,000 Syrian refugees to the GolanHeights and the impact of their use on the quantity and quality of the commonresources.68 This would turn water into an integral part of the process until 2000.

Barak decided to test through Ross whether the Syrians would accept a borderwith no access to water.69 Renewed and indirect contacts between Israel and Syriawere initiated by the American administration.70 Secret meetings were organized byRoss in Switzerland in the summer of 1999, and the Israeli representative, Uri Sagie,declared that Israel accepted “the principle of withdrawal up to the 4 June line.”Further meetings in September 1999 in Maryland addressed the question of eachactor’s respective positions on the ground on 4 June 1967. Syria insisted on aterritory of 200 meters along Lake Tiberias, while Israel made claims to territoriesin the east and northern territories beyond the 1923 border. Following a high-levelmeeting in December 1999 between Ehud Barak and Syria’s minister of foreignaffairs, Farouk al-Shara, in Washington, DC, Syria accepted a new negotiationformula: the resumption of talks on the basis of what had been accomplished in thepast. Negotiations started in January 2000 in Shepherdstown, West Virginia. Walidal-Moallem would learn from former U.S. ambassador to Israel, Martin Indyk, in2002 that under pressure by the Shas Party, which threatened to leave the coalitiongovernment, Barak had informed him upon arriving in the United States that he hadno intention of activating the committee on borders at Shepherdstown.71 Thismeant that core issues relating to the delineation of borders were left out atShepherdstown. Barak’s primary concern throughout the few rounds of negotiationhad been to show the Israeli public that he could retain Israel’s total access to water.He was extremely concerned about opinion polls showing a decline in his popularity.72


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He made further claims to over a hundred additional meters on the northeasternshore of Lake Tiberias, and about ten additional meters on the shores of the JordanRiver. The offer was firmly rejected by Syria because it became convinced of Barak’sunwillingness to achieve a real and lasting settlement over common borders andresources. However, progress was made over security arrangements and an agreementwas reached over territorial withdrawal stretched over a period of two years at a ratioof demilitarization of 10 meters of land within Syria in exchange for 5 meters in Syria.Syria also agreed to the maintenance by Israel of a pre-warning station in the GolanHeights for a period of ten years, under the condition that it would be supervised bythe United States and France. For Syria, these concessions were conditional on Israel’sacceptance of the 1967 border, but some flexibility was shown over a 50-meter line offthe lake.73 Pressed by sickness and time, Asad made further concessions in relationto water. The Syrian water negotiator in Shepherdstown agreed to the establish-ment of a joint management board that would oversee waters flowing from Syria toLake Tiberias. Ross mentioned that the Syrians were ready to offer verbal guaranteeson the subject.74 In his memoirs, Clinton would qualify Syria’s negotiation positionsas open-hand offers.75 The draft agreement was leaked to the Israeli press, puttingboth sides under pressure. When Syria’s concessions were leaked in the Arab press,Asad put an end to the talks.

A final and last chance to finalize the agreement was left to an Asad-Clintonsummit on 26 March 2000. Barak decided to put all bets on the summit, risking totalsuccess or irreversible failure. The content of Clinton’s proposals to Syria was draftedbetween Barak and Ross, who later expressed his doubts regarding Syria’s acceptance ofBarak’s terms of agreement: Israel would keep a portion of 400 to 500 meters on thenortheastern shore of Lake Tiberias, which suggested the delineation of a final bordermuch beyond not only the 1967 but also the 1923 border.76 Ross decided nonethelessto back Barak and convince Clinton to organize the meeting. Repeated leakages in thepress had finally impacted Asad’s confidence in the process, but he nonetheless agreedto the meeting.77 Accounting for the Syrian leader’s total disinterest in Clinton’smention of “a mutually accepted border,” Ross explained the shift on the basis of Asad’sconcerns regarding his succession and the potential destabilizing effects of a risky peacetreaty. When interviewed, Syrian negotiators contested this explanation.78 According tothem, Asad made the decision to travel to Geneva despite a fatal disease to which hewould succumb less than three months after the summit on 10 June 2000 because hethought an agreement on substantial issues was within reach. Clinton started themeeting by voicing Barak’s preferences, i.e., the acceptance on the part of Israel of the1967 border under the condition that it secured sovereignty over the waters of LakeTiberias and the Jordan River. A new border would need to be drawn. Asad concludedthat Israelis “did not want peace” and put an end to the meeting.


CCO N C L U S I O N S AND LLE S S O N S TO BE DDRAWN

A combination of structural and process variables explain the incentive todiscuss peace and the failure to reach a final agreement on water. Water has been apermanent concern to both actors in their negotiation strategy, regardless of whetherit was being explicitly or implicitly expressed through borders. In this context, Rabin’sand Barak’s hesitations, Asad’s mistrust and the United States’ biased mediation allcontributed to the breakdown of negotiations. The parties’ negative perceptions ofeach other contributed to a general climate of mistrust, and Asad was especiallysuspicious of Rabin and his successors. He believed that Israeli negotiators weretrying to manipulate him into accepting peace in order to neutralize Syria’s positionin Lebanon and Palestine. Asad therefore sought to send a clear message, whethernegotiating in person or through American emissaries, that any lasting peace wouldhave to be based on a full recovery of the Golan Heights. Although he was preparedto compromise his vision of a full peace between Arabs and Israelis, he kept firm onthe principle of full withdrawal to the 1967 line, thus claiming recovered access toLake Tiberias and its water resources. While he was ready to discuss the specifics ofthe Israeli withdrawal, including a phasing out of the Israeli withdrawal from thedisputed territory, and even some form of mutual assurance, the basic bargain ofsovereignty, territorial integrity and land/water for peace was non-negotiable. In short,Asad was convinced that accepting peace on any other terms would be accepting whathe perceived as Israel’s hegemony in the region.

Time is a well-known source of power in negotiations.79 It played an extremelyimportant role in these negotiations and worked at various levels. Syria’s ministerof foreign affairs, Walid al-Moallem, was certain that Israel was trying to gain timein order to normalize relations with Palestinians and Jordanians and to weakenSyria’s alternatives.80 This would have been a rational tactic on the part of theIsraelis since whoever is more patient has more power. How patient were theSyrians? Refusing pressure and short-term gains, Asad appeared to have a long timehorizon from 1991 to 2000, while Rabin, Peres and Barak felt the heat of electionsand opinion polls. Towards the end of negotiations, these time preferences wereinverted. Asad became increasingly impatient to reach a settlement and this weakenedhis hand by giving Barak the impression that he would be ready to concede on totalwithdrawal to 1967 borders.

In retrospect, we know that significant progress was made on joint managementof water resources, in addition to security and diplomatic relations between 1993and 2000. For Syria, the purpose was to reach an agreement that would guaranteefull sovereignty over pre-1967 Golan, access to water and territory and the return ofSyrian refugees to their land. Syrian concessions would include joint supervision ofcommon water resources, demilitarization on both sides based on the principle of




territorial asymmetry, maintenance in the Golan Heights of an early warning stationunder international control and complete normalization the Asad regime also wasactive in lifting the “peace with Israel” taboo domestically. All this was part of theenvisaged peace package.

The death of President Hafez al-Asad in June 2000 and the rise to power of hisson Bashar al-Asad, combined with the worsening of Israeli-Palestinian relations, theBush administration’s post-September 11 “War on Terror” and its close links withAriel Sharon have made matters worse. More recently, the 2003 U.S.-led war in Iraq,the December 2003 sanctions—both economic and diplomatic—against Syria, theforced withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon in April 2005, the targeting ofSyria for regime change and the UN Security Council’s March 2006 inquiry into thekilling of Lebanon’s former Prime Minister Hariri have severely deteriorated theprospects for peace. In 2003, Bashar al-Asad asked to resume negotiations withIsrael.81 Israel, however, was highly skeptical of this initiative and was advised by theUnited States not to respond.82 In 2005, Bashar al-Asad again emphasized his “greatinterest in peace negotiations with Israel,” while insisting on the Madrid negotiationformula of land for peace.83

Following the heavy regional and international pressure, Syria has since thenshown less interest in re-launching peace talks with Israel from a position of weakness.Instead, it has sought to reinforce regional alliances, with Iran, Hezbollah, Hamasand Islamic Jihad, establish good neighborly relations with Turkey and influencepolicy in Lebanon and Iraq. Both Syria and Israel have pursued a strategy of mixedsignaling. Both sides spread rumors that the other side mobilized in the GolanHeights in the summer of 2007. Israel launched a surprise attack in northern Syriaon 6 September 2007. According to the U.S. media, the alleged reason was nuclearcooperation with North Korea in that area.84 Somewhat astonishingly, the militarycampaign took place at the very time Track II meetings informally gathered Israeliand Syrian negotiators in Europe.

Time has had the effect of hardening positions and making the prospect of peacemore remote. After 1995, this is a story of no opportunity. Neither side would budgeon land and water. Before 1995, the bargaining space included full withdrawal of theGolan Heights and there was a reasonable expectation of a mutually beneficial deal,which would also lead to water cooperation. At that time, the Israeli prime ministerpreferred conceding the occupation of the Golan Heights to the status quo prior to1991. Syria accepted abandoning its traditional Arab nationalist stance againstIsrael. With the assassination of Rabin, these preferences were turned upside down,and any prospect for a durable peace became doomed as well. Positions hardenedfurther in the post September 11 geopolitical context. Why resume peace negotiationsin this unpromising environment? There are at least a few upcoming changes that

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could serve as turning points. Syrian rule is likely to remain constant for the fore-seeable future along with the Syrian position on the Golan Heights. Therefore, anyprospect for agreement must be based on other developments. First and foremost, anew U.S. administration might play a more conciliatory role. For other reasons aswell, the United States might find it expedient to adopt a more neutral role as arbi-trator between Israel and Syria. With pressure mounting over Iraq, the UnitedStates has an interest in preventing further destabilization in the region. Likewise, anew Israeli government is likely to enhance prospects for a mutually rewardingagreement. Including more actors in negotiations—Europe and Turkey forinstance—may also give peace a better chance. Thinking creatively about how to setup resilient regimes to govern the conflict over water, territory and security can alsogo a long way in raising the peace appeal. Any territorial settlement that leaves wateraside or any water settlement that ignores final borders, and more significantly anysettlement that does not fully address both issues, is doomed to failure. For tenyears, Syria and Israel have negotiated issues vital for their prosperity and security.Now it is in both parties’ hands to revive and finalize the peace that was so near.

NOTES

1 Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Hyperion, 2003); Moshe Ma’oz, “CanIsrael and Syria Reach Peace? Obstacles, Lessons and Prospects” (working paper, Rice University, JamesA. Baker III Institute for Public Policy: 2005); Jeremy Pressman, “Mediation, Domestic Politics, and theIsraeli-Syrian Negotiations, 1991-2000,” Security Studies 16, no. 3 (2007), 350–381; Dennis Ross,Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux,2004); Itamar Rabinovich, The Brink of Peace: The Israeli-Syrian Negotiations (Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press, 1998); Patrick Seale and Linda Butler, “Asad’s Regional Strategy and theChallenge from Netanyahu,” Journal of Palestine Studies 26, no. 1 (Fall 1996), 27-41; Patrick Seale, “TheSyria-Israel Negotiations: Who is Telling the Truth,” Journal of Palestine Studies 29, no. 2 (Winter 2000),65-77.2 Walid al-Moalem, Journal of Palestine Studies, 26, no. 2 (1997), 81-94; Sadik al-Azm, “The View fromDamascus,” New York Review of Books 47, no. 10 (15 June 2000). 3 See Marwa Daoudy, “Le long chemin de Damas, la Syrie et les négociations de paix avec Israël,” LesÉtudes du CERI, no. 119 (November 2005a). Documents which were given by Deputy Minister forForeign Affairs Walid al-Moalem, during a research trip to Syria in the spring of 2005.4 For a discussion on security dimensions refer to Daoudy (2005). 5 Sharif Elmusa, Water Conflict: Economics, Politics, Law and Palestinian-Israeli Water Resources(Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1998); Anders Jägerskog, Why States Cooperate overShared Water: The Water Negotiations in the Jordan River Basin (Linköping, Sweden: LinköpingUniversity, Department of Water and Environmental Studies, 2003); D.J. Phillips et al., “The JordanRiver Basin: 1. Clarification of the Allocations in the Johnston Plan,” Water International (2006). 6 Christophe Dupont, La négociation: conduite, théorie, applications (Paris: Dalloz, 1994); WilliamZartman and Jeffrey Rubin, eds., Power & Negotiation (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan,2000).7 For an extensive theoretical analysis of power and water negotiations in the Middle East, refer to MarwaDaoudy, Le Partage des Eaux Entre la Syrie, l’Irak et la Turquie: Négociation, Sécurité et Asymétrie desPouvoirs (Paris: CNRS, 2005). 8 Hussein Amery, “The Role of Water Resources in the Evolution of the Israeli-Lebanese Border,”GeoJournal 44, no. 1 (1997), 19-33.




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9 Salman Abu Sitta, “The Line of 1967 and 1949,” Middle East Insight 15, no. 1 (2000), 21. 10 United Nations, “Treaty No. 657: General Armistice Agreement (between Israel and Syria, signed on20 July 1949),” in United Nations Treaty Series 42 (New York: United Nations, 1949), 327-353.11 These “provisional” borders were maintained until 1967 when additional territorial conquests on thepart of Israel moved the borders further within.12 United Nations Security Council, Communication dated 20 July 1949 from the United NationsActing Mediator on Palestine to the Acting Secretary-General Transmitting the Text of an ArmisticeAgreement between Israel and Syria, 20 July 1949, Art.V,§1.13 The State of Israel Government Yearbook, 1951-1952. 14 United Nations Security Council Official Records, Letter addressed to the General Secretary from theChief of Staff of the UNTSO Document S/2049 (New York: United Nations, 12 March 1951), 17, 20. 15 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 93, S/2157, 18 May 1951.16 United Nations General Assembly, Report by the Secretary General (New York: United Nations,Document A/2663, 9th Session: 1 July 1953-30 June 1954). 17 United Nations Security Council Official Records, Report dated 23 October 1953 by the Chief of Staffof the UNTSO in Palestine submitted to the General Secretary for the Security Council (New York:United Nations, 1953, S/3122), 25.18 David Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics (New York: St. Martin Press, 1975); D.J Phillips etal., Transboundary Water Cooperation as a Tool for Conflict Prevention and Broader Benefit-Sharing(Stockholm: Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Global Development Studies, 2006). 19 Marwa Daoudy, “Israel, Syria, Jordan and the Question of the Jordan River Waters: 1948-1967” (MAThesis, Geneva: Graduate Institute for International Studies, 1991). 20 Samir Saliba, The Jordan River Dispute (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968); Myriam Lowi, Waterand Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin (Cambridge, England: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1993); Tarek Majzoub and Guy J.M. Le Moigne, Les fleuves du Moyen-Orient (Paris:L’Harmattan, 1994). 21 “Address by Secretary Dulles made before the Council of Foreign Relations: The Middle East of 5September 1955,” Department of State Bulletin 33, no. 845 (Washington, D.C.: State Department),378-380.22 Livia Rokach, “Israeli State Terrorism: An Analysis of the Sharett Diaries,” Journal of Palestine Studies9, no. 3 (Spring, 1980), 3-28. The term “Eretz Israel” refers to “the Greater Israel” as envisioned by someof the Israeli leaders. 23 United Nations Security Council Official Records, S/4270, S/5084, S/5092, S/5098, S/5401, S/5395,S75396, S/5401, S/6061, S/6208, S/6243, S/6248 (New York: United Nations, 1960-1965). 24 United Nations Security Council Official Records, Letter dated 2 March 1962 from the Representativeof Syria to the President of the Security Council S/5084 (New York: United Nations, 1962), 87. 25 This strategy is qualified by Patrick Seale as the “Levant doctrine.” Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria: TheStruggle for the Middle East (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1988). 26 Asad avoided asymmetry in military and economic resources, external alliances, the capacity to mobi-lize resources and the costs of no agreement. 27 David Lax and James Sebenius, The Manager as Negotiator, Bargaining for Cooperation andCompetitive Gain (New York: Free Press, 1986). 28 Bertram Spector and Amanda Wolf, “Negotiating Security: New Goals, Changed Process,”International Negotiation 5, no. 3 (2000), 409-426; Pol Derrien, Mener et réussir une négociation (Paris:Les Editions d’Organisation, 1977), 35. 29 Vadim Udalov, “National Interests and Conflict Reduction,” Cooperative Security: Reducing ThirdWorld Wars, eds. William Zartman and Victor Kremenyuk (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995),61-77.30 Lax and Sebenius (1986), 71.31 According to Syria’s chief legal negotiator, Riad Daoudi, each decision taken by Hafez al-Asad in relationto the peace talks was valued in terms of potential impacts on Syrian public opinion. Riad Daoudi (principal


legal advisor and negotiator, Syria), in discussion with the author, 10 September 2005. 32 Tayseer Marai and Usama Halabi, “Life Under Occupation in the Golan Heights,” Journal of PalestineStudies 22, no. 1 (Fall 1992), 78-93. 33 Ross (2004), 73, 142.34 Seale (1988), 185.35 Edward Kaufman, Joy Oppenheimer, Aaron Wolf and Ariel Dinar, “Transboundary Fresh WaterDisputes and Conflict Resolution: Planning an Integrated Approach,” Water International 22, no. 1(1997), 37-47.36 Frederic Hof, Line of Battle, Border of Peace? (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Insight, 1999). 37 Sitta (2000), 21-24.38 Chibli Mallat, “Les frontières syro-israéliennes en droit international: le déblocage à travers la ligne de1949?” (working paper, University St-Joseph, Beirut, 15 July 2000). 39 Zeev Shiff, “The Censored Report Revealed,” Ha’aretz, 8 October 1993.40 Yossi Ben-Aharon, “Negotiating with Syria: A First-Hand Account,” Middle East Review of InternationalAffairs 4, no. 2 (June 2000). 41 Riad Daoudi (principal legal advisor and negotiator, Syria), in discussion with the author, 12 May2005. 42 Ross (2004), 72. 43 Ibid., 90. 44 Rabinovich (1998), 54, 57. 45 Helena Cobban, Syria and the Peace, A Good Chance Missed (Washington, D.C.: Strategic StudiesInstitute, Special Report, 1997).46 Rabinovich (1998), 76. 47 Ross (2004), 111-112.48 Ibid.49 Ibid.50 “Meeting of 4 August 1993 between Mr. Warren Christopher and late President al-Asad in the pres-ence of Mr. Dennis Ross,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Syria. 51 “Meeting of 19 July 1994 between Mr. Warren Christopher and late President al-Asad,” Ministry ofForeign Affairs, Syria. 52 Ross (2004), 112. 53 Thus leading the Palestinian side to label the discussions held between Israel and Syria as “the otherwoman.” Ibid., 99, 573. 54 Rabinovich (1998), 105, 239.55 Uri Sagie, “The Israeli-Syrian Dialogue: A One-Way Ticket to Peace?” (working paper, James Baker IIIInstitute for Public Policy, Rice Univerity, Houston, Texas, October 1999). 56 Helena Cobban, The Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks: 1991 to 1996 and Beyond (Washington, D.C.: UnitedStates Institute of Peace Press 1999), 73. 57 Patrick Seale (journalist and Middle East specialist), in discussion with the author, 19 May 2005. 58 Rabinovich (1998), 239. 59 Uri Savir, The Process: 1,100 Days that Changed the Middle East (New York: Vintage Books, 1998),268.60 Ross (2004), 514.61 Ibid.62 Ibid, 225.




63 Ibid., 231, 234; Seale (2000), 77. 64 Savir (1998), 278. 65 Savir (1998). 66 Rabinovich (1998), 57. 67 Albright (2003), 606. 68 Norwegian analyst (wishing to remain anonymous), informally involved in Arab-Israeli tracks, indiscussion with the author, January 2007. 69 Ross (2004), 521. 70 Patrick Seale’s shuttles between the two countries were significant in bridging the contact betweenAsad and Barak. He describes Barak’s drawing of an arch of peace, which relied mainly on an agreementwith Syria. Patrick Seale (journalist and Middle East specialist), in discussion with the author, 19 May2005. See Ross, 520–523.71 Walid al-Moallem (chief negotiator and later Syrian minister of foreign affairs), in discussion with theauthor, 3 and 25 May 2005. 72 Pressman (2007), 369. 73 Ross (2004), 560. 74 Ibid., 554. 75 Bill Clinton, My Life (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2004), 886. 76 Ross (2004), 575-578. Ross mentions the use made by Barak of maps dating back to 1967 instead of2000, thus giving Israel an additional portion of about 1 kilometer instead of 500 meters, as water lineshad been retrieving under the combined impacts of droughts and withdrawals by Israel’s National WaterCarrier (Ross, 2004), 575, 580. 77 Clinton (2004), 945. 78 Walid al-Moallem (chief negotiator and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Syria), in discussion with theauthor, 25 May 2005. 79 Ariel Rubinstein, “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,” Econometrica 50, no. 1 (1982), 97-111. 80 Walid al-Moallem (chief negotiator and later Syrian minister of foreign affairs), in discussion with theauthor, 3 May 2005. 81 President Bashar al-Asad, New York Times, December 2003. 82 Ori Nir, “US Advice to Israelis: Don’t Start Syria Talks,” Forward, 23 January 2004.83 Bashar al-Asad (president of Syria), in discussion with the author, 2 March 2005; “Official Position ofPresident Bashar al-Asad on Peace Negotiations,” MFA, Syria, 2005. 84 New York Times, 11 September 2007; Washington Post, 15 September 2007; Seymour Hersh, “AStrike in the Dark,” New Yorker (11 February 2008).

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A MISSED CHANCE FOR PEACE: ISRAEL AND SYRIA'S NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE GOLAN HEIGHTS

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