Swiss in the French Foreign Legion

Life and warfare in Algeria 1831-1962

Seminararbeit for the Seminar: The Algerian War. History and Memory of a Conflict, 1954-1962.

FS 14 // Historisches Seminar Basel, Professor Patrick Harries.

Author: Wieland Schmid, St. Jakobsstr. 82, 4052 Basel

E-Mail: wieland_schmid@yahoo.de

Number of semesters: 8

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Contents

1. Introduction 3

2. From the „Reisläufertum“ to the conquest of Algeria

2.1. Swiss in French service

2.2. Creation of the French Foreign Legion and the conquest of Algeria

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3. „Sent there to die“- The starting years for the Swiss legionnaires

3.1. Cultivating Algeria under Swiss command

3.2. Lieutenant Cham and missing adaptation to Arab tactics of war

3.3. Number of Swiss serving in the French Foreign Legion

3.4. Bugeaud and the „razzia“

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4. From consolidation to loss. Life in Algeria from 1856 to 1962

4.1. The Swiss Legion

4.2. Armée d'Afrique

4.3. Le cafard and the daily life in the Legion

4.4. Moroccon border incidents and interwar period

4.5. Algerian War of Independence

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5. Conclusion 31

6. Appendix

6.1. Tables

6.2. Photos

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7. Selected Bibliography

7.1. Books

7.2. Articles and encyclopedias

7.3. Photos and Pictures

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1. Introduction

„Comme nos anciens nous défendrons l'Algérie contre le diable et les fellaghas avec nos

drapeaux, HONNEUR, FIDELITE nous tomberons ou nous vaincrons au combat.“1 As heroic this

songtext of the French Foreign Legion may seem it still offers a certain amount of information.

This country seemed to have had a long history as well as an exceptional importance for the

Legion as the men were even ready to sacrifice their lives for it. Another observation not as

obvious without the knowledge of the history of this unit can also be made: Honour and fidelity as

the maxim stated on the flags of the Legion since 1920, had originally been taken from the Swiss

régiment de Diesbach having served the French crown for almost 100 years.2 As we shall see this

is only one of several examples of the ties between the Swiss and the Legion. In one of the most

myth-ranked and respected military units, where foreigners from all over the world offered their

blood, the Swiss did not stand behind. Following the Legion to every corner of the world the Swiss

legionnaires also fought in Algeria, home to the Legion for 130 years.

This term paper will illustrate different aspects of the life Swiss legionnaires led in Algeria from

1831 to 1962. As foreign soldiers the Swiss offer an interesting view on a country colonized and

occupied by France. The Legion offered them the possibility to enter a field of experience outside

of Europe and to make contact with the inhabitans as well as an „exotic“ environment. This

happened in manifold ways martially or peacefully. What led to the forming of the French Foreign

Legion and their deployment in Algeria? What was the legionnaire's life in Algeria like from a

Swiss point of view? What was their involvement in combat actions? What were their feelings and

reactions towards the local population of Algeria?

These questions will be answered with the help of mostly self-made documents of former Swiss

legionnaires which include autobiographies as well as memoirs, letters, literature with an

autobiographic background and even court records which will gain importance towards the end of

the research period. It will only include a selection of available self-made documents of Swiss

legionnaires who served from 1855 to 1965.

The micro-perspective which these sources offer have to be considered carefully. Problematic areas

are the temporal gap between experience and record, memory gaps, ghostwriting and deliberate

modifications. Certain motives like money, sensationalism and politics, which also involved pro

and contra Legion opinions, influenced the perspectives of the Swiss legionnaires. To ensure a

1 Lordick, Volker: Unter der Sonne Nordafrikas. Legionär in Algerien. Stuttgart 2012, p.121. Even the most famous Legion song „le boudin“ (the bloodsausage) mentions the Swiss in the refrain: „Tiens, voilà du boudin, voilà du boudin, voilà du boudin! Pour les Alsaciens, les Suisses et les Lorrains!”2 Bodin, Jérôme: Les Suisses au service de la France. De Louis XI à la Légion étrangère. Paris 1988, p. 358.

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historical approach the sources must be compared with each other and always have to be

considered under the aspect of their environment.3 Secondary literature will help to fill the gaps

which the accounts of Swiss legionnaires do not cover, especially in the starting years of the

Legion.

The subject of Swiss in the Foreign Legion has already been in the focus of some historians,

however with different time frames and key aspects. Eveline Maradan gives us a good summary of

the history of Swiss in the Legion with her licentiate paper „Les suisses et la legion étrangère de

1831 à 1861.“ In „Endstation Algerien“ Vincenz Oertle covered the lives of Swiss legionnaires in

Algeria during the 1950s with the help of court files. The most important book concerning the

history of the French Foreign Legion is Douglas Porch's „The French Foreign Legion. A Complete

History of the Legendary Fighting Force“ for it covers and links topics like training, battles, rituals

and social environment with a great richness of details. He was able to use the archives of the

Legion in Aubagne which are usually not open for external research. Christian Koller with his

article in Tanja Bührers „Imperialkriege“ and his book „Die Fremdenlegion. Kolonialismus,

Söldnertum, Gewalt“ offers us the results of the latest research into lives of legionnaires.

Similar to Koller this paper includes primarily a view of the lives of Swiss legionnaires, but tries to

embed it in a historical context. The reason for this is because the subject overlaps with numerous

historical fields such as colonial, military, French and Swiss history.

The paper will be arranged in three parts. The Swiss have already had a long history of military

collaboration with France, which will be briefly sketched before the conditions are described

which led to the forming of the Foreign Legion and its deployment to Algeria. Thus the Swiss

involvement and their role during the French engagement in North Africa can be better understood.

In the second part the starting years of the Legion will be covered as it slowly settled into and

adapted to the Algerian warfare. The third and most important part will present the micro-

perspectives of the Swiss legionnaires concerning their experiences in Algeria until the retreat to

mainland France.

3 Koller, Christian: Die Fremdenlegion. Kolonialismus, Söldnertum, Gewalt. Paderborn 2013, pp. 14-16.

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2. From the „ Reisläufertum“ to the conquest of Algeria

2.1. Swiss in French service

The Kings of France had a particular interest in two strategic goods in Switzerland: the passes over

the Alps and the military potential formed by the inhabitants.4

The first Kapitulation between France and the Swiss Confederation was arranged in 1474. These

Kapitulationen were contracts which allowed the French to recruit troops on confederate territory.

These written contracts were important because they brought a certain control and order into the

Swiss mercenary business. The former Reisläufer5 who individually looked for employment

became a mercenary in an organized unit and was promised proper treatment and payment.6

The military migration of young Swiss males had mostly economic reasons. Due to population

growth, food shortages and poverty many Reisläufer looked for foreign service. But they were not

only attracted by money and loot but also by glory and adventure.7

During the reign of Louis XIV the Swiss regiments which stood in French service were not in

mercenary service like the German or the Scottish regiments but rather a paid ally. They were

under the jurisdiction of their cantons, whose representatives were the officers, and they had a free

choice of religion. The Swiss knew how to use their special status in France and many known

Swiss became famous field marshals or generals in French service,8 although the path of an officer

was only open to certain aristocratic or rich and influential families. Some posts were even

inheritable and this also led to a secluded and exclusive officer caste.9

On August 10, 1792, about 650 Swiss died while defending King Louis XVI during the siege of

the Tuileries Palace.10 Their courage and obedience to the crown induced the Constituent Assembly

4 Führer, Hans Rudolf / Eyer, Robert-Peter: Schweizer in "Fremden Diensten". Verherrlicht und verurteilt. Zürich2006, p. 63. 5 Reisläufer, came from the middle high German „die reis louffen“. Translated into English it would mean, go to war.The Reisläufer individually looked for employment as his service was not regulated by official contracts and thus hewas not under any control of the authorities, contrary to the mercenary who committed himself to a service approvedand mostly organized by the authorities. See: Czouz-Tornare, Alain-Jacques: „Reisläufer.“ In: Historisches Lexikonder Schweiz s. v., e-HLS, access January 10, 2014 (Printversion: Basel 2011).6 Führer: Schweizer in "Fremden Diensten", p. 60. The Kapitulation of 1474 was the first one with an official charactereven though there were already similar arrangements with different barons and German or Italian cities. See:Hochheimer, Albert: Verraten und verkauft. Die Geschichte der europäischen Söldner. Stuttgart 1967, p. 54.7 Führer: Schweizer in "Fremden Diensten", pp. 39-40.8 Hochheimer: Verraten und verkauft, pp. 166-170.9 Führer: Schweizer in "Fremden Diensten", p. 111.10 Bodin: Les Suisses, p. 268. Already in 1497 King Charles VIII established the Compagnie des Cent-Suisses, hisprivate guard which was more a show-piece than a military corps. The Swiss Guards was the unit which did the actualfighting on numerous battlefields. The French kings offered high pensions, economic concessions and toll freedom.See: Bodin: Les suisses, pp. 69-70 and Henry, Philippe: „Schweizergarden.“ In: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz s.v.,e-HLS, access January 10, 2014 (Printversion: Basel 2012).

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of the Revolution to prohibit foreign units to serve in the „new“ French Army. But under the

pressure of the Austrian invasion and under the threat of losing Paris, the government called back

4000 Swiss who had only been discharged a month before. They were placed in the Légion franche

étrangère and the Légion germanique. Under the rule of the Directory the recruitment of foreigners

was continued and a further Kapitulation brought a new wave of Swiss mercenaries. Napoleon also

depended on foreign mercenaries to cover his losses and even after the Bourbonic Restoration in

1814 the French still continued to rely on foreign soldiers.11

2.2. Creation of the French Foreign Legion and the conquest of Algeria

The Legion itself and some of its historians like to see it as a continuation of France's reliance on

foreign and especially Swiss troops12. Albert Hochheimer thinks that the Legion is most likely

comparable to the Swiss Guards regiments under Louis XIV and Louis XV13. Paul de Vallière

sees the reason of the creation of the French Foreign Legion in keeping some of the Swiss soldiers

who were dismissed by Charles X14. The Bourbonic Restoration relied in part on foreign

mercenaries to enforce the king's authority. These were at that time six Swiss regiments and the

regiment of Hohenlohe, in which all nationalities could serve. The Swiss Guards particularly

became the hated symbols of royal authority. Even in the French Army the Swiss were not popular

as they earned double to triple the wages of their counterparts in French regiments. Swiss officers

also occupied one rank above the equivalent command position in a line regiment. These positions

were mostly aquired by court intrigue and money and not by ability.15 The resentments towards the

Swiss exploded in November 1828 into a small battle between a French grenadier regiment and

the Swiss at Versailles. Two years later, during the end of the July 1830 Revolution which toppled

the Bourbonic Restoration, the civilians took vengeance on the Swiss who lost 300 men in the

uprising.16

The revolution woke the hope among many European liberals and nationalists that the new Citizen

King Louis Philippe would spread liberty and equality through Europe. But after an initial period

11 Boyd, Douglas: Die französische Fremdenlegion. Hamburg 2009, p. 79. An estimated 90'000 Swiss soldiers foughtfor France during the Napoleonic Wars. See: Bodin: Les Suisses, p. 287.12 Porch, Douglas: The French Foreign Legion. A Complete History of the Legendary Fighting Force, New York 1991, p. 2.13 Hochheimer: Verraten und Verkauft, p. 292.14 de Vallière, Paul: Treue und Ehre. Geschichte der Schweizer in Fremden Diensten. Lausanne 1940, p.721 and p. 743.15 Porch: The French Foreign Legion, p. 3.16 Boyd: Die französische Fremdenlegion, p. 80, and de Vallière: Treue und Ehre, p .720. There were already fights between Swiss and Parisian workers in July 1827 and June 1828 as well as police reports of mistreated civilians in October 1829. See: Porch: The French Foreign Legion, p. 3.

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of surprise with uprisings throughout the continent the monarchies of Europe had restored

themselves and secured their reign again everywhere.17 From every part of Europe the unsuccessful

revolutionaries, deserters and dissidents fled to France. The post revolutionary government had

unilaterally renounced extradition treaties which had been arranged in the shadow of the Congress

of Vienna in 1815. These foreigners had no money, no home and no work, which made them a

ticking time bomb for the French government under Louis Philippe.18

Porch rather sees the tradition of France offering asylum to foreign refugees, especially to those

escaping political repression, than that of hiring foreign mercenaries, which to de Vallière and

Hochheimer the légion étrangère appears to owe its existence. For him the Legion was created in

response to a short-term refugee crisis. Although he admits that the mercenary tradition offered a

solution to the crisis, the Foreign Legion was still „[...] not conceived as a corps that would

'continue the traditions' of the Swiss and the Hohenlohe regiment.“19

This opinion is supported by the fact that on August 14, 1830 the Swiss regiments were officially

disbanded and with the Treaty of Lucerne April 24, 1831 France renouced its Kapitulationen with

the Swiss Republic. The Hohenlohe regiment followed the disbandment on January 5, 1831. It

seems that the tradition of France hiring foreign mercenaries had ended. Active recruitment

through French recruiters in the Swiss cantons had stopped and this ended a more than 300-year-

old tradition. The new French government was not interested in long term employment of

foreigners any longer and was certainly not going to look for more of them outside of France.

The Legion was to be used as an outlet for the unwelcome and an asylum for the misfortunate as

War Minister Marshal Soult wrote in a letter.20 Marshal Nicolas Jean-de-Dieu Soult was a veteran

of the Napoleonic wars and the French Foreign Legion was his idea of dealing with the refugee

problem. On March 10, 1831 King Louis-Philippe decided to create the French Foreign Legion by

signing the decree which the House of Representatives had passed a day earlier. Soult combined

the idea of a regiment which was exclusively for use abroad with a still intact navy and hoped to

gain an overseas empire which could substitute the lost European Empire under Napoleon.21 Even

though there were different options for an assignment overseas the Legion was most likely to see

its first action in Algeria22 because of an incident called the Bacri Affair. This made clear that the

17 Porch: The French Foreign Legion, pp. 1-2.18 Boyd: Die französische Fremdenlegion, p. 83.19 Porch: The French Foreign Legion, p. 5.20 Porch: The French Foreign Legion, pp. 3-5. A depot was ordered to receive refugees and foreign deserters only. Foreign workers employed in France as well as non-naturalized soldiers of the Hohenlohe regiment were to be turned down.21 Boyd: Die französische Fremdenlegion, p. 83, and Porch: The French Foreign Legion, p. 1.22 Porch: The French Foreign Legion, p. 1. For example: Guadaloupe, Martinique, Greece or Italy.

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Legion was going to be primarily one thing: a tool of imperialism.23

In 1796 two Jewish merchants from Algiers, Bacri and Busnach shipped grain to the Directory to

prevent a famine in France. They sold the French debt to Dey Omar, the Turkish governor of

Algiers. The promissory notes were passed down to every successor until Dey Hussein took over

power. On the eve of a Muslim feast in April 1827, the French consul was visiting the Dey in his

palace to bring greetings of the French government as it was the custom. Hussein reminded the

consul of the unpaid debts whereupon he received a rude answer, which tempted the Dey to hit the

consul with his fly flap.24

The incident became a major diplomatic crisis and the French press clamoured for revenge. Next to

economical interests the Bourbonic King Charles X thought that a foreign adventure would distract

the people from his unpopular government. A blockade was installed but it soon became clear that

this would have little impact and so an invasion was launched on June 14, 1830. In a little more

than a year the invasion force was joined by the Foreign Legion.25

Instead of the Kapitulationen the Foreign Legion offered the Swiss the possibility to still continue

and serve France as Reisläufer. A number of mostly Swiss patricians and rich bourgois used this

option.26

3. „Sent there to die“- The starting years for the Swiss legionnaires

3.1 Cultivating Algeria under Swiss command

The first commander of the Foreign Legion was the Swiss Baron Christoph Anton Stoffel. Born in

July 1780 in Madrid he was the offspring of Jacob Stoffel, an officer in the service of Spain from

Arbon, Canton Thurgau.27 Christoph Stoffel had served France since 1807 and taken part in

campaigns throughout Europe.28 After the Napoleonic Wars he participated in the Spanish

Campaign in 1823 and retired in 1826.29

The denunciations of officers who allegedly were not faithful to the July-Monarchy led to

thousands of dismissals. The lack of officers and non-commissioned officers caused the

23 Koller: Die Fremdenlegion, p. 31.24 Boyd: Die französische Fremdenlegion, p. 81.25 Evans, Martin: Algeria. France's Undeclared War, New York 2012, pp. 8-9.26 Bodin: Les Suisses, p. 310.27 Bodin: Les Suisses, pp. 306-307.28 Oertle, Vincenz: Endstation Algerien. Schweizer Fremdenlegionäre. Dreizehn Lebensbilder der 1950er Jahre. Appenzell 2007, p. 22.29 Maradan, Eveline: Les Suisses et la Légion étrangère de 1831 à 1861. Fribourg 1987, p. 24.

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government to reinlist the demi-soldes, officers of the Napoleonic era like Stoffel who were mostly

rather old and not really up to date with new drills and tactics.30 There were diverging sentiments

about Stoffel. Some French officers described him as ignorant, inept and not worthy of a

command. Others thought that he was a brave and energetic commander and a skillful organiser.31

Nonetheless Stoffel was appointed to command the légion étrangère in May 1831 and had to try

and form a fighting unit out of these foreign revolutionaries and dissidents from different social

backgrounds. They were kept in different camps in the country to avoid any problems with French

citizens.32 In June 1831 he already complained:

„Among the 26 officers who are here, only eight are competent at their job. The others have been retired fromthe service for a long time, are foreigners or from the cavalry. It is of the utmost urgency that we be sent goodline officers who can speak German.“33

In August he asked the Minister of War to promote Swiss officers and non-commissioned officers

(NCO) to instructors, because in his eyes they were already familiar with the French administration

and could speak German. His request was not followed and so he looked for good Swiss officers

and NCOs himself. Though Stoffel found a couple of Swiss from former Swiss Guards regiments

who were willing to join, the Legion was still lacking good officers.34

By 1835, 107 foreign officers, mostly Swiss, German, Polish and Spanish served in the Legion.

The heterogeneous command and the lack of enough officers led to poor organisation, so it was no

wonder that discipline was very bad. Because of drunken brawls it was common that community

prisons had to keep up to 56 legionnaires in custody. Until the middle of May 1831 the Legion was

on the eve of mutiny and the battalion commanders had to call in the national guard to help the

police arrest the ringleaders. The decision to send the Legion to Algeria had nothing to do with its

usefulness as a military unit. Stoffel's men were sent there to die.35 In November 1831 the Legion

set foot on the land that would become its home for the next 130 years.36 The Legion was going to

form a part of the evolving Armée d'Afrique, but it only represented a minority of the soldiers.37

The overall situation in Algeria did not look good for France. The original troops who performed

30 Boyd: Die französische Fremdenlegion, p. 85.31 Maradan: Les Suisses et la Légion étrangère, p. 25.32 Hornung, Peter: Die Legion. Europas letzte Söldner. München 1989, pp. 20-22.33 Porch: The French Foreign Legion, pp. 7-8. Cited in: SHAT, Xb 726, 30 June 1831.34 Maradan: Les Suisses et la Légion étrangère, p. 25.35 Boyd: Die französische Fremdenlegion, p. 83, and Porch: The French Foreign Legion, p. 8.36 Porch: The French Foreign Legion, p. 11. We already find Swiss settlers in Algeria by 1830 mostly interested inagriculture. See: Maradan: Les Suisses et la Légion étrangère, p. 149.37 Koller: Die Fremdenlegion, p. 32. At the turn of the century the Legion counted about 12000 men out of 83000 ofthe Armée d' Afrique.

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the invasion in summer 1830 were demoralized and eager to go home.38 The National Assembly

was not sure what to do with Algeria and public support was fading. Different options were

possible: withdrawal, limited occupation or full-scale conquest. But there was a lack of consensus

and nobody came up with a clear answer what to do.39

To occupy the newly arrived Legion the commanding officer in Algeria, General Savary, Duc de

Rovigo split the Legion up, gave the various parts the least desirable jobs and sent them to the most

disease-ridden posts. For example parts of the Legion were sent into a swamp between the towns

of Boufarik and Duala, where they were to build streets. With daily hard work in breast deep dark

water, swarmed by clouds of mosquitos the legionnaires finished the work under the watchful eyes

of Stoffel in only five weeks.40 This was to be the kind of occupation which the Legion was to

perform most of the time during its first years in Algeria: building roads, tunnels or generally

doing construction work41. After only one year Stoffel was replaced by the French Colonel

Combes42.

3.2. Lieutenant Cham and missing adaptation to Arab tactics of war

From the military point of view France was in an unfavourable position. Originally the soldiers

camped outside of Algiers but were relocated behind the city walls for security reasons. Only then

Algiers became a besieged town, so General Savary decided to set up blockhouses at strategic

points to give the city some breathing space. On May 23, 1832 27 legionnaires and 25 Chasseur d'

Afrique were attacked near such a blockhouse. The Swiss commanding officer, Salomon de Musis

and the cavalry disappeared in order to get reinforcements, leaving the legionnaires under the

command of the Swiss Lieutenant Cham.43 The muzzleloaders which the Legion used at that time

only worked well at a range of 100 meters. The best effect was achieved when the men were

disciplined and stood still while one row was firing on the enemy and the other was reloading.44

After the cavalry had left, the legionnaires only shot one volley on the approaching Arabs45 and

38 Porch: The French Foreign Legion, p. 11.39 Evans, Martin: Algeria. France's Undeclared War. New York 2012, p. 9.40 Hornung: Die Legion, p. 24.41 Boyd: Die französische Fremdenlegion, p. 95.42 Bodin: Les Suisses, p. 308.43 Porch: The French Foreign Legion, p. 16.44 Boyd: Die französische Fremdenlegion, p. 93.45 The reports of the Swiss legionnaires mostly label the enemy with the term Arab although they were not alwaysnecessarily fighting against Arabs. From the Algerian War of Independence on the term changed to rebel, fellagha orfell. Heinrich Spinner was able to distinguish the different people and highlighted specific charateristics. See: Spinner,Heinrich: Algier, Mexiko, Rom. Schicksale eines Schweizers in fremden Kriegsdiensten. Zürich 1901, p. 34- 35. PaulStrupler also makes a difference between Arabs, Kabyles, and Berbers. Strupler, Paul: Fünf Jahre Fremdenlegion.

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then broke line to reach a small forest nearby. This proved to be a fatal mistake, for the men were

quickly caught up with and surrounded. The survivors were offered the choice of converting to

Islam or getting killed one by one. Except for one prisoner all refused and were massacred.

Lieutenant Cham had the doubtful honor of being the first Legion officer to die in combat.46

Apart from the Arab resistance which was led by the young Abd el-Kadr, who was declared Sultan

of the West by three tribes, the Legion had to cope with the difficult terrain.47 Algeria was a country

of glaring extremes. The coastal plain was often an unbearably hot zone of marshland, flooding,

and malaria. It lay in front of the Tell Atlas ranges, with a high plain behind it. Further south were

the Saharan Atlas mountain ranges, and then the inhospitable desert.48

But during the months of January to March the Swiss legionnaire Heinrich Spinner described the

climate at the coastal region as „healthy“.49 Frequently two extremes were still common. Either

extreme heat, which made marching with field pack a torture, or extreme cold, especially at night,

and in winter snowfall was not uncommon.50

Much of the fighting between 1830 and 1847 took place in the northern Tell Atlas, which was

formed of deep valleys, narrow passes and high mountain peaks. So it was the ideal terrain for

ambushes and hit and run tactics where local knowledge could be used to deadly effect.51

Until 1840 the strategy of the French army was to launch their heavy columns from their coastal

enclaves into the back country to counter the Algerian resistance. This strategy only worked when

the Algerians accepted the battle, which mostly did not happen. They let the French columns

exhaust themselves as they pushed their artillery and supply wagons through the roadless bled, as

the back country of North Africa was called. As soon as the French started to turn home the Arabs

attacked the demoralized and exhausted troops. Porch states:

„This was a marvelous tactical approach, for it denied to the French their superiority in firepower and disciplinewhile exploiting the superior mobility and resilience of the Arabs. The native resistance retained the advantageof surprise and was able to control the level of its casualties.“52

Frauenfeld 1928, p. 54.46 Porch: The French Foreign Legion, p. 16. Next to Lieutenant Cham three others Swiss officers died before 1850 inthe Legion: In 1836 Second Lieutenant Roussillon, in 1837 Captain Seyboz and in 1843 Second Lieutenant Berset.See: Bodin: Les Suisses, p. 310.47 Bührer, Tanja (publ.): Imperialkriege von 1500 bis heute. Strukturen-Akteure-Lernprozesse. Paderborn 2011, p. 436, and Julien, Charles-André; Ageron, Charles-Robert: Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine. Vol.1. La conquête et les débuts de la colonisation (1827-1871). Paris 1979, p. 97.48 Evans: Algeria, p. 10.49 Spinner: Algier, Mexiko, Rom, p. 34.50 Moser, Jean: In der Fremdenlegion. Erlebnisse in der Wüste Sahara und auf Madagskar. Bern 1911, p. 20, andSeiler, Hans: Fünf Jahre in der französischen Fremdenlegion. Aus meinen Tagebuchblättern. Abgedruckt in: NeueZürcher Zeitung Jg: 1914, Nr. 117.51 Evans: Algeria, p. 10.52 Porch: The French Foreign Legion, p. 19.

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The French later slowly learnt and adapted themselves to this kind of guerilla warfare, but for the

time being the desperate efforts of chasing a nomadic enemy and trying to force it to fight

European-style field battles, led France to make diplomatic advances. The French Governor of

Oran recognized Abd el-Kadr's status as an Emir over the tribes in Oranais and Abd el-Kadr

accepted French sovereignty over the parts of Algeria that had already been occupied.53

But the deadlier enemy than the natives were diseases, then called „fever“, which covered typhoid,

pneumonia and malaria. From 1831 to 1835 about 3200 legionnaires either died or were released

from service because they were too weak to serve.54

3.3. Number of Swiss serving in the French Foreign Legion

In December 1832 the Legion was organised in seven national battalions, of which the first

battalion consisted of Swiss and former members of the Hohenlohe Regiment and the second and

third battalions consisted of Swiss and Germans. The other four were Spanish, Italian, Dutch-

Belgian and Polish.55 The first batallion was commanded by the Swiss Salomon de Musis and the

second by Commander Moret, son of Swiss parents.56 Although there were three battalions called

Swiss the total number of Swiss soldiers was very low compared to the total of 3168 legionnaires

stationed at Mustapha during an inspection in that month. The inspector noted that the 94 Swiss

from the former Swiss Guards of the Bourbons were zealous. Compared to the 2196 Germans in

these battalions the number of Swiss was almost negligible. But in the eyes of the inspector they

formed the better part because the Germans were deserters, political refugees, medical students,

lawyers or obscure solicitors and therefore they had to be closely watched.57

But how come there were three battalions for Swiss and only 94 Swiss serving in the Legion? Jean

Paul Hallo's chart shows, that shortly before the departure of the Legion to Spain in 1835 the Swiss

approximately made up a quarter of its soldiers58. So how can this difference in numbers be

explained? The concept of national battalions was not watertight. For example many of the 6 th

Dutch-Belgian Battalion consisted mostly of Germans who had deserted over the Belgian frontier

and were then directed to French barracks by the authorities.59 So it is possible that a part of the

Swiss legionnaires were counted as Germans. This theory is supported by the fact, that like the

53 Boyd: Die französische Fremdenlegion, p. 95.54 Porch: The French Foreign Legion, p. 16.55 Montagnon, Pierre: Histoire de la Légion. De 1831 à nos jours, Paris 2012, p. 21.56 Maradan: Les Suisses et la Légion étrangère, p. 36.57 Porch: The French Foreign Legion, p. 14.58 Hallo, Jean Paul: Monsieur Légionnaire. L'homme et ses tradition. Paris 1994, p. 151.59 Porch: The French Foreign Legion, p. 14.

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French the Swiss needed a special permission and those who still liked to serve France and not

willing to get a permit probably signed in as Germans.60 There is still a huge mismatch between the

94 Swiss including the few who presumably signed as Germans and the 12'37861 Swiss serving the

French King in 1816. On the basis of pure numbers the idea must be abandoned that the Swiss

formed a recruitment base for the French Foreign Legion in the beginning.

Nevertheless the national battalions caused problems. After the disaster at the battle of Macta

which ended the tenuous peace with Abd el-Kadr, the Italian and the Polish battalions accused one

another of being incompetent. So Colonel Bernelle decided to mix up the national battalions. This

decision was also backed by the fact, that with the unreliable nature of national recruitment, it was

impossible to keep the battalions at full strength.62 Already in 1835 Stoffel noted: „Es war ein

Fehler, nationale Batallions aufzustellen. Die Fremden hätten sofort in gemischten Einheiten

aufgestellt werden müssen.“63

During the first few years in Algeria the Legion had spent more time in hospitals, draining swamps

or building roads than in combat thus preparing the way for colonization. After only four years in

Algeria the Legion already left its new home to find itself in a new war which almost cost its

existence. On August 17, 1835 the Legion disembarked at Tarragona to enter a new adventure in

Spain.64

3.4. Bugeaud and the „razzia“

After the ancienne Légion was almost completely sacrificed in the civil war between Don Carlos

and Isabella II. the remnants of this Legion returned to France in 1839 where most of the soldiers

reinlisted for the nouvelle Légion, which had been created on December 16, 1835. This new

formation arrived in Algeria in 1836 and was given the task to ensure the security of the Mitidja

plain south of Algiers.

The treaty of Tafna with Abd el-Kadr in 1837 gave the French time to capture Constantine, an

attempt which the French had already undertaken in 1836. During this siege against a formidable

fortified town the Legion performed outstandingly, but it was not the first time that the Legion was

praised for an exceptional combat performance.65

60 Maradan: Les Suisses et la Légion étrangère, p. 36.61 Maradan: Les Suisses et la Légion étrangère, p. 72. Maradan shows that the Legion attracted more Swiss at the endof century than at the beginning.62 Boyd: Die französische Fremdenlegion, p. 98.63 Hornung: Die Legion, p. 25.64 Porch: The French Foreign Legion. p. 21.65 Porch: The French Foreign Legion, pp. 51-52. The new Legion was recruited in haste, poorly trained and not used to

13

Abd el-Kadr continued establishing his dominion, which led to the war being resumed in

November 1839. Parallel to establishing a statelike organisation he transformed the hit and run

tactics, ambushes and sieges of isolated French outposts into a coherent strategic system. With the

nomination of Thomas Bugeaud as governor-general in 1840, the French Army finally started to

adapt to the North African warfare.66 Bugeaud showed his flexibility during the siege of a French

base at the Tafnas river which had been attacked by tribes who were allied with Abd el-Kadr in

April 1836.67 Bugeaud was given the task of reinforcing that camp and he did so by using methods

which he had learnt in the Spanish War of Independence where he had operated against guerrillas.

His views on how to fight this war were adapted for the Legion. First of all he stopped using heavy

artillery and heavy waggons. He only allowed supplies and light artillery which could be

transported by mules.68 Bugeaud stated the necessity of the mules in a letter to the Minister of War

on June 16, 1836:

„Ce qu'il faut aussi pour faire la guerre avec succès, ce sont des brigades de mulets militairement organisés, afinde ne dépendre pas des habitants du pays, de pouvoir se porter partout avec légèreté pour suivre l'ennemi surtous les points où il se retire [...]”.69

He introduced a new kind of mobile warfare different from the standard European-style battles.

This gave the initiative back to the French. The Emir was surprised by the new flexibility of the

columns and also by the massed infantry fire which replaced the heavy artillery. To make the

infantry fire more effective Bugeaud introduced a trick which he had learnt in Spain. The musket

shot was cut into four parts which were rammed down the barral on to a normal shot. This kind of

grapeshot was devastating at close range and proved very useful against an enemy who liked to

work at knife-point. With these new tactics he ended the siege and was able to defeat Abd el-Kadr

in the battle of the Sikkak river.70

When Bugeaud became general-governor he transformed his tactics into an overall strategic

system. In order to keep the operating distance of his light columns high, he set up a chain of

fortified supply depots. One of these depots was at Sidi-bel-Abbès, a town 100 kilometers south of

Oran. This town was to be transformed into a city which became the headquarters of the Legion,

linchpin and home in Algeria until 1962.71

campaigning in the African climate so that of 1600 men only about 1200 were able to fight.66 Porch: The French Foreign Legion, p. 70.67 Bührer: Imperialkriege, p.437. Before his appointment as governor Bugeaud criticized the French policy in Algeriaand pledged for a force of at least 100'000 soldiers and a colonization by European settlers.68 Boyd: Die französische Fremdenlegion, pp. 109- 110.69 Azan, Paul: Par l'épée et par la charrue. Ecrits et discours du Général Bugeaud. Paris 1948, p. 4.70 Porch: The French Foreign Legion, p. 73.71 Boyd: Die französische Fremdenlegion, p. 118.

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Bugeaud's new strategy meant two things for the Legion: marching and fighting. Before Bugeaud

took over as general-governor, the Legion had been spread out all over the country in fixed

garrisons guarded by blockhouses like sitting ducks. Now the Legion left these disease-ridden

posts and went on the road outmanoeuvering the enemy. At that time mules were rare in Algeria so

the soldiers had to shoulder most of their equipment themselves. In spite of the streamlining of the

40kg European satchel, it was still a torture to march in blistering heat. The most important thing

was to keep up with the marching column in spite of holes in the shoes and bloody feet covered in

blisters. To fall back meant to risk a painful death by the enemy.72

Because of this new mobile warfare which Bugeaud had introduced, Abd el-Kadr became even

more cautious and elusive. Bugeaud tried to make his columns even more agile and they were able

to operate for days on short rations. But if the Emir did not attack or Bugeaud could not hunt him

down he just took the battle to his „backyard“ by making war on the livelihood of the natives.73 He

introduced the razzia, a style of warfare which was going to affect the future conflicts in Algeria.

The word razzia came from the Algerian-Arabic word ghāziya which meant something like war-

raid. It was defined as a campaign of punishment or vengeance against native tribes, which were

guilty of committing a crime against France or who were otherwise unruly.74 Bugeaud made it his

strategy. He wrote:

„[...] pour les réduire, il faut attaquer leurs intérêts.: [...]; il faut s'appesantir sur le territoire de chaque tribu; ilfaut s'arranger de manière à avoir assez de vivres pour y rester le temps nécessaire pour détruire les villages,couper les arbres fruitiers, brûler ou arracher les récoltes, vider les silos, fouiller les ravins, les roches et lesgrottes, pour y saisir les femmes, les enfants, les vieillards, les troupeaux et le mobilier; ce n'est qu'ainsi qu'onpeut faire capituler ces fiers montagnards.“75

To devastate the country for years even date palms were chopped down and the wells were

poisoned. Some of the cattle was slaughtered immediatly for consumption, the rest was taken along

or scattered. For Douglas Boyd this was total war. Porch thought of the razzia more as „a form of

economic warfare“.76 It was also the start of a war of relocation which found its peak in the

Algerian War of Independence under a strategy called the guerre révolutionnaire. Those who

survived or could not hide from the razzia were taken back to the base. Young women were also

used as wives77.

The year of 1847 proved to be a big moment for the conquest because Abd el-Kadr finally

72 Boyd: Die französische Fremdenlegion, p. 119. 73 Porch: The French Foreign Legion, p. 74.74 Bührer: Imperialkriege, p.435.75 Azan: Par l'épée, p. 112.76 Porch: The French Foreign Legion, p. 74, and Boyd: Die französische Fremdenlegion, p. 118.77 Boyd: Die französische Fremdenlegion, p. 118.

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surrendered and was exiled. But there was still resistance in the mountainous regions of the

Kabyles.78

4. From consolidation to loss. Life in Algeria from 1856 to 1962

4.1. The Swiss Legion

The Legion took part in the Crimean campaign, a war ignited by the new emperor Napoleon III. It

was a controversial decision to deploy the Foreign Legion because the conquest of Algeria was so

recent. During the war a second Légion étrangère was founded which mainly consisted of Swiss

soldiers. Put under the leadership of the former federal council Ulrich Ochsenbein this „Swiss

Legion“ revived some of the traditions of the former Kapitulationen with the Ancien Régime. For

example it was commanded by Swiss officers, who had a distinct green and red uniform. As in the

old Kapitulationen Ochsenbein's men enjoyed privileges, particularly the benefit of the military

court established by the Swiss laws. Ochsenbein chose officers from influential and aristocratic

families and sent them to Switzerland hoping that they would recruit further volunteers.79

One of these volunteers was the young Emil Fischer-Miville, who was born in Basel and in 1855

worked in Paris. While in Paris he watched French troops parade and this aroused his interest in

the French Army. „Dies erregte in mir den Wunsch, Soldat zu werden, [...] um unser Glück im

Soldatenleben zu suchen und Abenteuer zu erleben, denn fremde Länder zu sehen war stets mein

Ideal.”80 When he heard that in March 1855 the French Ministry of War was forming a „Swiss

Legion“ he joined it. With 1300 other volunteers, mostly from the cantons of Bern, Vaud and

Geneva, the Swiss Legion never reached the required strength to be deployed in the Crimean War.

So on April 16, 1856 it became the 1er Régiment étranger which was sent to Algeria in the same

year. With their new Swiss Colonel Meyer from the town of Olten they were garrisoned in

Philippeville and fought campaigns in Kabylia.81

At the beginning Fischer-Miville's regiment had to fight dysentery caused by bad water and fruit.

He also suffered from dysentery but was warned by his captain not to go to the hospital in

78 Porch: The French Foreign Legion, p. 74, Boyd: Die französische Fremdenlegion, p. 120, and Evans: Algeria, p. 14.79 Bodin: Les Suisses, pp. 311-312, and Maradan: Les Suisses et la Légion étrangère, p. 45. Green and red are still considered the house colors of the Legion. See: Oertle: Endstation Algerien, p. 23.80 Nordmann, Theodor: Emil Fischer-Miville als Unteroffizier in der französischen Fremdenlegion. (1855-1858). Basel1931, p. 211.81 Bodin: Les Suisses, pp. 312-313, and Nordmann: Emil Fischer-Miville, pp. 211-228. Unfortunately Fischer's storyends in the middle of his period of service in Algeria. The second half of his story was announced but not included forthe Basler Jahrbuch of 1932 .

16

Philippeville as he would not return alive. He described the suffering in the hospitals: „Es starben

auch wirklich viele unserer Leute und meistens die kräftigsten. Die Latrinen waren ständig

belagert, und nachts lagen Dutzende in deren Nähe, die vor Leibschmerzen nicht mehr gehen

konnten.”82 Fortunately he recovered and was able to join his company which was digging out

water pipelines in the bled. There Fischer-Miville's writings show romantic scenes at the camp fire

indicating a certain grade of homesickness and melancholia among the Swiss: „Allabendlich

versammelten wir uns um das Wachtfeuer und mit Begleitung der Musik sangen wir unsere

schönen Schweizerlieder, worüber unsere Offiziere grosse Freude bezeugten.”83

4.2. Armée d'Afrique

Already in 1848 with the founding of Swiss Federal State, the government had forbidden the

arrangement of new Kapitulationen. In 1859 it passed a law forbiding Swiss to serve in non-

national parts of foreign armies such as foreign regiments because of the competition between

France and Britain enticing new Swiss recruits in course of the Crimean War . So it was still

possible for Swiss to join the national army of a nation. Because it was not clear how to classify

the French Foreign Legion, enlistment in it was tolerated as it counted as a „foreign national

troop“.84

Apart from adventures as we have seen with Fischer-Miville, the reasons for a Swiss to join the

Legion were usually as manifold as the number of the people who signed the contract. These were

mostly unemployement, poverty, wanderlust, depressions, escape from prosecution and

lovesickness. Sometimes cases were described where Swiss had signed contracts after being

intoxicated by recruiters.85 After medical examinations and a short stay at Fort Saint-Jean at

Marseille the volunteers were transferred to North Africa by ship. This trip over the Mediterranean

was often very emotional. Heinrich Spinner, who boarded the steamboat on January 16, 1864,

described these feelings:

„Obschon ich all' meinen Mut zusammen nahm, um die in meiner Brust wogenden Gefühle zurückzudrängen,und alles, was hinter mir lag, in das Meer der Vergessenheit zu versenken, so konnte ich dennoch nicht umhin,wehmütige Blicke nach der schönen Seestadt zurückzusenden, von der ich jetzt und damit zugleich von Europa,und wer weiss, vielleicht auf immer, Abschied nahm.“86

82 Nordmann: Emil Fischer-Miville, p. 230.83 Nordmann: Emil Fischer-Miville, p. 231. A similiar mood is also expressed in Gottfried Keller's poem „Schlafwandel“.84 Maradan: Les Suisses et la Légion étrangère, pp. 99-101, Porch: The French Foreign Legion, p. 133, and Oertle:Endstation Algerien, pp. 29-30.85 Oertle: Endstation Algerien, pp. 40-57, and Porch: The French Foreign Legion, pp. 177- 186.86 Spinner: Algier, Mexiko, Rom, p. 27.

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The departure from the European mainland meant a big breach in his life, as there was no turning

back because of the geographical barrier which the Mediterranean represented. After the arrival in

Mers-el-Kebir near Oran a new period began in Spinner's life. In Oran, a town of 20'000

inhabitants, he was fascinated by all the different cultures. He described the big cultural diversity

between Arabs, Moors, Berbers, Kabyles, Sub-Saharan Africans and Jews. Among the European

colonists he distinguished between Spaniards, Italians, Alsatians, French and even Swiss87. He

described the living together of all these different cultures as follows:

„Im Ganzen genommen und abgesehen von den zeitweiligen Aufständen und vereinzelten Anfällen, welchenhauptsächlich Kolonisten zum Opfer fallen, kann gesagt werden, dass die Eingeborenen sich mit denEingewanderten ziemlich friedlich vertragen.“88

In his eyes Algeria had a relatively peaceful time, which did not mean that there were no more

conflicts between the colonists and the original inhabitants. Spinner had a certain admiration for

the Arabs and Kabyles. He described them as very frugal and tough, easily bearing with hunger

and thirst. They were: „[...] abgehärtete Natursöhne, gegenüber denen wir Nordländer ein

verweichlichtes Geschlecht genannt werden müssen.”89

The recruits were quartered in a tent camp near Oran, where training began immediatly. They had

to learn the twelve movements of loading and fireing a muzzleloader. On guard duty they were

reminded that Algeria was far from being a safe and peaceful country: „[...] wobei man uns

einschärfte, die grösste Wachsamkeit zu entfalten, da die Araber schon öfters Schildwachen

überfallen und ihnen ohne weiteres den Kopf abgeschnitten hätten [...]“.90 Apart from military

training, guard duty and cleaning Spinner had also spare time to explore Oran. He described

military concerts in public parks and also wanted to visit a mosque: „[...] einmal kam mir sogar

der Einfall, das Innere einer Moschee zu besichtigen, was jedoch an meiner Weigerung, die

Schuhe auszuziehen scheiterte. Andere Länder, andere Sitten!“91

Spinner showed himself fascinated by other units who fought alongside the Foreign Legion in

Algeria. The Zouaves recruited from Kabyles, other tribes and colonists were very successful and

had a good reputation on the battlefield. He praised their excellent esprit de corps, and thought that

they got along well with the legionnaires. In contrast he saw in the Turcos, descendants of Turks

from the Ottoman Empire and North African women, half savages:

87 By 1830 there were Swiss colonists in Algeria who were particularly interested in agriculture. But this individualcolonization cost a lot of lives See: Maradan: Les Suisses et la Légion étrangère, p. 149.88 Spinner: Algier, Mexiko, Rom, p. 36. „Anfälle“ could mean „incidents“.89 Spinner: Algier, Mexiko, Rom, p. 35.90 Spinner: Algier, Mexiko, Rom, p. 38.91 Spinner: Algier, Mexiko, Rom, p. 39.

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„Physisch sind die Turcos meist hohe, kräftige Gestalten, mit blitzenden Augen, schneeweissen Zähnen,zugleich aber auch einem Ausdruck im Gesicht, der unverkennbar etwas Bestialisches an sich hat; derkahlgeschorene, nur mit einem in Form eines Büschels hervorspringenden Zopf versehene Kopf erinnertunwillkürlich an die Pfahlbautenbewohner Helvetiens.“92

They were commanded by French officers and in Spinner's eyes not very sociable. „Der Disziplin

unhold, sind es streit- und händelsüchtige Gesellen, mit denen nicht gut Kirschen essen ist und die

bei der geringsten Veranlassung zur Waffe greifen. Sie werden deshalb auch gemieden.“93

In his eyes both the Chasseur d'Afrique and the Spahis were excellent cavalry. The Chasseur

d'Afrique were a light cavalry which consisted mostly of French volunteers who were looking for a

quick advancement. The Spahis were a light cavalry made up of indigenous men used for

reconnaissance, espionage, police work and capturing deserters. Their loyalty was problematic and

not always guaranteed.94

After less than three months in Algeria Spinner and his comrades were sent to Mexico on April 1,

1864.They had looked forward to this trip but were sorely diappointed as many of them died of

various diseases and fighting against the guerillas.95

As soon as the Foreign Legion returned to Algeria from their Mexican campaign the French

government ordered a reduction of strength and by August 1867 the Legion only counted 3000

men. These were scattered among isolated posts in eastern Algeria and used in the old Legion

tradition of building roads and fortifying posts.

One who was eager to get out of Mexico was Theodore du Plessis from Nyon. In January 1865 he

had joined the Legion and been sent directly to Mexico. After the end of the Mexican campaign he

had high expectations of Algeria: „Oh! joie, nous voguions vers cette Algérie de nos rêves, terre

française où la vie serait relativement facile, où tout était à bon marché, et la vision de la patrie

rapprochée, mettait du soleil dans les coeurs.“96

Fighting and life in Mexico must have been very harsh that he praised a country in such a manner

which he had never visited before and counted as part of French soil.

Algeria was still under a primarily military and monarchist administration reflecting an

„aggressive nature of the colonial occupation“.97 Du Plessis describes how in his eyes the

92 Spinner: Algier, Mexiko, Rom, p. 41, and Bührer: Imperialkriege, p. 374.93 Spinner: Algier, Mexiko, Rom, p. 41.94 Julien: Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine. Vol.1, pp. 273-279.95 Spinner: Algier, Mexiko, Rom, pp. 42-43.96 du Plessis, Théodore: Souvenirs de mes campagnes à la Légion étrangère. Mexique et Afrique. 1865-1868. Genf1923, p. 188.97 The administration of Algeria from 1830-1914 had two phases. First a primarily military and monarchistadministration from 1830 to 1870, then a civilian, pro-settler administration from 1870 to 1914. See: Steele, Murray:Algeria: Government and Administration. 1830-1914. In: Encyclopedia of African History, Bd. 1. New York 2005, pp.50- 52.

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government treated the local people: „Le gouvernement trop exclusivement soldatesque était

brutal, trop laissé aux chefs militaire dont la plupart traitaient les Arabes comme des chiens.“98

Unfortunately for him he just arrived in Algeria during a cholera epidemic killing 500 men from

his garrison. The population was terrified, but in his eyes they were doing nothing except yelling

„god is great“. After the disease came the famine of 1867 which depopulated parts of the country.

This famine left the worst pictures in du Plessis's head that he had ever seen: „Les routes, les rues

des villes, jonchées de cadavres de femmes et d'enfants absolument nus, car pour se procurer leur

dernier morceau de pain, ces malheureux vendaient jusqu'à leurs dernières guenilles.“99

Different from his high anticipations of Algeria it did not prove to be a better place for a Swiss

legionnaire than Mexico.

4.3. „Le cafard“ and the daily life in the Legion

After the German-French War 1870/ 1871 and its deployment against the Paris Commune the

Legion changed its recruitment policy. To reduce the large number of Germans it only accepted

Swiss, Alsatians and men from Lorraine until 1880. In 1897 the Legion counted 573 Swiss but it is

possible that a substantial number of them were actually French100.

According to Porch the French Foreign Legion entered its „golden age“ in 1871. It lasted until the

beginning of World War I. As the French instrument of imperialistic warfare the Legion saw

further action in almost every operation to obtain or secure French colonial rule.101

On August 26, 1881 the French government announced that Algeria was to be administered as a

sovereign territory under the control of the Ministry of the Interior. It was declared to be French in

the same way as Normandy, Brittany or the Savoy.102

During this time an unhappy Charles Durval, a licentiate from the canton of Vaud was serving his

time in Sidi-bel-Abbès with the first regiment. Expulsed by his family because he was not willing

to agree to an arranged marriage, he left his home to find work in Paris. Broke and desolate he

decided to join the Legion. For him this action was nothing but a suitable way to commit suicide.

His time as bleu, as the new recruits were called, was very hard. Always being derided because of

his academic degree he finally tried to desert but was captured by a goum, an arabic gendarme who

98 du Plessis: Souvenirs de mes campagnes, p. 191.99 du Plessis: Souvenirs de mes campagnes, p. 193.100 Porch: The French Foreign Legion, pp. 183- 184. Frenchmen who had finished military service were allowed tojoin the Legion „à tître étranger“ in 1897.101 Koller: Die Fremdenlegion, p. 34. From 1883 to 1897 conquest of Indochina, 1892 subjugation of Dahomey, 1895conquest of Madagascar.102 Evans: Algeria, p. 19.

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was rewarded 25 francs per deserter.103 Charles got le cafard104 in Legion slang. Similar to a

depression or a feeling of pointlessness it could originate from physical demands, harsh discipline,

the unfamiliar environment or just boredom. It was compared to a kind of heavy homesickness but

usually passed after a while.105

The usual way of fighting le cafard was spending the pay on alcohol and women. The pay of 35

centimes for five days of sevice was in Durval's eyes very low. With the pay the legionnaires had to

buy consumable supplies so that they could wash and service their equipement. It is notable that in

the seventeen years between Charles Durval's and Heinrich Spinner's service the pay was still the

same.106

Sidi-bel-Abbès offered a lot of other possibilities to spend a soldier's pay. As soon as the

legionnaires had a day's leave used the Avenue de Mascara which was a straight street under big

shady trees to get into the town centre. Durval was not only impressed by the town but also by its

cultural diversity. Like Spinner he was fascinated by all the different people living and working

together. Most of his comrades visited the numerous Jewish and Christian taverns where they could

invest their money in alcohol. The soldiers were able to get a liter of wine for four sous, that is 20

centimes, or a drink called babali, which is described as a sort of absinth made out of figs.107 Even

Durval who had „[...] die instinktive Abneigung des gebildeten Mannes gegen den übermässigen

Alkohol“108 started drinking. He got into fights in the forbidden quarter of the village nègre and

was put into prison. The village nègre could also be called brothel town, where the access was

forbidden until the start of World War I when the Legion opened three supervised brothels in order

to control the contact between locals and legionnaires and to contain the spread of sexually

transmitted diseases.109 Durval took his chance to die in Indochina and he was shipped out to

Tonkin, where he survived with an injury.110

Hans Seiler, who joined the Legion in 1896, gave a description of what life in the second regiment

was like, which was based in Saida. A usual week started on Monday with a marche militaire

followed on Tuesday by an exercise général. Wednesday and Thursday were reserved for

exercices des sections and service de campagne while Friday was devoted to an exercice de la

103 Randin, Léon: Ein Schweizer in der Fremdenlegion. Zürich 1910, pp. 188-189.104 Literally „le cafard“ means the cockroach.105 Koller: Die Fremdenlegion, p. 138.106 Randin: Ein Schweizer in der Fremdenlegion, p. 145, and Spinner: Algier, Mexiko, Rom, p. 37. For example anAmerican Private or a British soldier was paid about twenty-five cents a day. See: Porch: The French Foreign Legion,p. 188.107 Randin: Ein Schweizer in der Fremdenlegion, p. 152.108 Randin: Ein Schweizer in der Fremdenlegion, p. 196.109 Porch: The French Foreign Legion, p. 387, and Koller: Die Fremdenlegion, p. 145.110 Randin: Ein Schweizer in der Fremdenlegion, pp. 197- 208.

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compagnie. Saturday was usually the day for cleaning, maintenance and inspection, while on

Sunday the legionnaires had leave. Seiler describes these activities with the boredom of daily

routine. Peeling potatoes is „mehr eine weibliche als eine männliche Arbeit“ while the field duty

exercises were more like a children's birthday party. The only thing he found challenging were the

marches with the twenty kilogram backpack.111 Physical training formed a big share in the life of

the legionnaires. Almost every day they had to do gymnastics, boxing, obstacle courses, bayonet

training or foil fencing, „[...] um die Glieder und Gelenke der Soldaten zu formen und zu

stählen.“112

Seiler was glad that in his garrison the Basler Mission had set up a station where the legionnaire

could relax, read books or newspapers of his home country. The local population did not have a

very good opinion of the legionnaires but this was mutual as Seiler saw it: „Jeder Legionär freut

sich aber riesig, wenn es ihm gelingt, irgend einem Araber ein Schnippchen zu schlagen [...]“.113 A

legionnaire did not pamper an Arab and disregarded European property concepts. Stealing from

Arabs at the market was normal for him. As Arabs often gambled in circles in the streets the

legionnaries would rush up to them and steal their money. The Arabs would only yell insults at the

fleeing soldiers, because they were probably to afraid to chase them.

In order to get rid of the boredom of guard duty and garrison life, Seiler hoped to be chosen for

duty in the French colonies. Unfortunately for him this did not happen because his remaining time

of service was too short. He was assigned to guard duty at a military prison called Ain-el-Hadjar

with inmates mostly of the Oran division. At this point Seiler wanted to clean up the rumour that

the Legion was constantly used as a pool of cheap construction workers. In his view the prisoners

did this kind of work. „[...] sie sind es auch, welche die Arbeiten ausführen, die stets den

Legionären zugeschrieben werden; sie bauen Strassen, Kanäle, Häuser, sie treiben Ackerbau, sie

machen Kies, Schotter, Pflastersteine, kurz alles mögliche.“114

4.4. Moroccon border incidents and interwar period

While France and Germany were in a political dispute over the future of Morocco at the beginning

of the new century, the Legion was guarding the border to its western neighbor in the Sud Oranais.

Morocco itself was in political disarray and nomadic tribes were regularly penetrating into

Algeria. These fast horsemen evaded almost every attempt of capture. Chasing after these bandits

111 Seiler: Fünf Jahre in der französischen Fremdenlegion, Nr. 81.112 Seiler: Fünf Jahre in der französischen Fremdenlegion, Nr. 152.113 Seiler: Fünf Jahre in der französischen Fremdenlegion, Nr. 152.114 Seiler: Fünf Jahre in der französischen Fremdenlegion, Nr. 190.

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proved to be a dilemma for the French cavalry. Either it had to leave the support of the infantry,

thereby risking ambush and attrition or it had to stay with the infantry leaving the initiative to the

enemy. What was missing was an intermediate between cavalry and infantry.115 On the initiative of

Lieutenant Jaeglé from Appenzell, mounted companies would fill the tactical gap. In fact the idea

was not totally new, rather an improvement of Bugeauds idea of the light columns. Francois-Oscar

de Négrier also experimented with mounted forces on mules which accompanied the Chasseurs

d'Afrique. His aim was not necessarily to move faster but further.116

Quicker than normal infantery but not as vulnerable as cavalry the mounted companies were

equipped with mules. Mules were very important in the Säntis region where Lieutenant Jaeglé was

from, because they could carry the heaviest loads under harsh climatic conditions. Jean Moser,

who joined the Legion in the early 1890s was assigned to such a mounted company in the Sud

Oranais. He described the mules as surer-footed than horses and more persistent as well as more

frugal. It took quite a time to learn how to work and ride with these stubborn animals. Per two men

there was one mule which carried the equipment, supplies and also one soldier. Every hour the

order „change of rider“ was given and so one legionnaire could always rest his feet without

slowing down the company. These „centaur-warriors“ could cover a distance up to 150 kilometers

in two days, but that took legionnaires and animals to their limits. In case of an alarm the marchers

were used as skirmishers to scout the area, while during an enemy engagement they formed the

first firing line. The riders left the mules with a small guard and moved up to support the first

line.117

Riding through the extensions of the Sahara, Moser experienced the landscapes of sand dunes and

small hidden paradises, oases, with green date trees where Arabs traded dates and figs not for

money but for tools and other useful equipment. Naturally for him „wurden sie schwer betrogen

oder vielmehr bestohlen.“118 Four months after their arrival in Ain-Sefra Moser left his company

and was made an orderly for a captain who had to draw a construction plan for the train line from

Oran to the oasis of Figuig. This work also involved fighting and chasing bandits who mostly came

from the Moroccon side. That there was no place for mercy is shown by the handling of prisoners

and wounded: „Die Gefangenen wurden auf dem Platze gerichtet, und zwar sofort erschossen,

ebenso die Verwundeten.“119 Those who were „lucky“ enough to be taken back to the Arab

administration building which was also used as prison, could choose to be prosecuted according to

115 Hornung: Die Legion, pp. 181-185, and Porch: The French Foreign Legion, p. 315.116 Porch: The French Foreign Legion, pp. 316-317.117 Moser: In der Fremdenlegion, pp. 186-189.118 Moser: In der Fremdenlegion, p. 21.119 Moser: In der Fremdenlegion, p. 24.

23

Arab or French law. Depending on the crime a hand, an ear or the nose was cut off. When Moser

once passed such a building he saw six ears nailed to the entrace gate. Prisoners were held in holes

shaped like funnels which were covered by an iron plate. „[...] wenn sie Wasser oder zu essen

verlangen, so schüttet man es einfach hinunter in das Loch, wo doch die Leute auch ihre Notdurft

verrichten müssen.”120 He was shocked by this kind of treatment.

As seen with other Swiss legionnaires Mosers colonial view is visible but still rather complex. On

one hand he had pity with the life of the Arabs. The houses built of clay reminded him of holes and

naturally there were no beds. He wondered how the people could bear the cold only with some rags

and barefoot. On the other hand with a mixture of disgust and respect he called the Arabs

“bärenstarke Tagediebe” who rode on their horses while their wives had to walk and carry the

heaviest loads. All in all Moser described the Arabs as: „[...] sehr starke Leute; ihre Arbeit besteht

aber aus nichts anderem als Jagen und Stehlen.”121

Eventually Moser's battalion was ordered to Madagascar. The legionnaires rejoiced upon this news

as well as Moser: „[...] auch ich freute mich ungemein; denn die Reise interessierte mich sehr,

und hauptsächlich lockten uns die fernen Kolonien, von denen uns die älteren Soldaten so manches

Abenteuer erzählten [...].”122

During the interwar period the Legion was still used as a tool of the French colonial imperialism

especially in Morocco.123

Although General Paul Rollet wanted to regroup the Legion in Morocco he later turned Sidi-bel-

Abbès into „the Legion's shrine and holy city“.124 In spite of the focus on Morocco the Legion was

still used in Algeria and contrary to Seiler's account the men were also used as building labourers.

Paul Strupler and his comrades had to continue the work of German prisoners of war. They had to

finish the train line from Tlemcen to Beni-Saf. Strupler assumed that there was a reason why they

had to build the train line: „Wieviel die Militärverwaltung und der Hauptmann an uns verdienten,

wurde uns nicht gesagt; aber jedenfalls war es genügend, sonst hätten sie uns sicher im Jahre

1924, als im Rif Leutemangel herrschte, nach Marokko geschickt.“125 So the Legion was still used

as cheap labour which did not mean that Strupler did not engage in combat. But the worst thing

120 Moser: In der Fremdenlegion, p. 26. Already Emil Fischer-Miville described similiar prisons for soldiers andlegionnaires: „Die mit „prison“ bestraften Soldaten wurden in trichterförmige Gruben, Silos genannt, gesperrt,welche feucht und voll Ungeziefer waren. Der Aufenthalt darin war also nichts weniger wie angenehm.“ See:Nordmann: Emil Fischer-Miville, p. 231.121 Moser: In der Fremdenlegion, pp. 21-22.122 Moser: In der Fremdenlegion, p. 32.123 Koller: Die Fremdenlegion, p. 35. During World War I France and the Legion could rely on a new wave of Swiss volunteers of about 14'000 men. See: Koller: Die Fremdenlegion, p. 47. 124 Porch: The French Foreign Legion, p. 383. 125 Strupler: Fünf Jahre Fremdenlegion, pp. 154-155.

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which could happen was to fall in the hands of the rebels alone.

„Wehe Dem, der den Beduinen oder Kabylen in die Hände fällt; unter den grausamsten Martern haucht er seinLeben aus, am grausamsten sind die Weiber, haben wir doch schon Kameraden aufgefunden mitabgeschnittenen Ohren, der Leib aufgeschlitzt, mit Steinen angefüllt und wieder zugenäht; auch werden sienoch entmannt.“126

4.5. Algerian War of Independence

Following the introduction of military law on June 13, 1927, Swiss could be prosecuted if they had

joined foreign service.127

This proved unfortunate for returning Swiss legionnaires but offered a new collection of sources as

the military justice opened and filed cases of every legionnaire that they could fetch. Even if not all

the returners were prosecuted the numbers of convictions can give a rough idea about the total

number. The convictions from 1949 to 1954 ran to about 200 a year. Oertle estimated that with

those not convicted about 300 Swiss joined the Legion every year and that about 2000 Swiss

served the Legion in the 1950s. This made up around 5.88% of a total of around 34'000 men

serving at the beginning of the Algerian War of Independence.128 Maradans data support these

numbers as she assumes that about 6'800 Swiss served from 1942 to 1953. They formed about 5%

of the strength of the Legion during that period.129

The files also offer a better view on motivation and professional background of the volunteers. For

example of 125 analyzed sentences 13% of the men joined because of adventurousness and

romantic enthusiasm. Like Ernst Speck who remembered with a certain nostalgia: „Getreu der

Devise unserer Vorahnen, die im Solde eines Königs von Frankreich oder eines andern

Landesherrn gedient haben , war mir Ehre und Treue ein Begriff.“ 130 So even in the 1950s some

Swiss still liked to see themselves in the old tradition of the Kapitulationen.

After World War II and the defeat in Indochina against the Viet Minh, the Legion had to handle

another insurgency in Algeria against the Front de Libération National (FLN). The growing

Muslim frustration had already been illustrated in the Sétif uprising on May 8, 1945, where the

126 Strupler: Fünf Jahre Fremdenlegion, p. 54.127 Bundeskanzlei: Militärstrafgesetz (MstG). January 1, 2014. Art. 94, sect. 1 states that: 1. Der Schweizer, der ohneErlaubnis des Bundesrates in fremden Militärdienst eintritt, wird mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu drei Jahren oder Geldstrafebestraft.128 Oertle: Endstation Algerien, p. 107 and Hallo: Monsieur Légionnaire, pp. 168-169. 129 Maradan: Les Suisses et la Légion étrangère, p. 72. She estimates that from 1831 to 1942 20'000 Swiss served the Legion, approxomatly 6% of its strength. 130 Keller, Hans: Die Wahrheit über die französische Fremdenlegion. Aarau 1954, p. 52 and Oertle: Endstation Algerien, p. 14. For further reasons see appedix 1.

25

anger against the French rule exploded. 102 Europeans were killed in a brutal manner, but the

French retaliation cost the lives of several thousand Muslims. Martin Evans saw three reasons for

the violence: Algerian nationalism, settlers acting on their own initiative and a French state which

tried to reassert national sovereignty.131 Ultimately the FLN started a new uprising on November 1,

1954 willing to secure independence by the means of armed struggle. France tried to learn from the

Maoist influenced insurgency of the Viet Minh and attempted to apply these lessons against the

FLN by formulating a new doctrine, the guerre révolutionaire, which denoted the insurgency as

well as the counter-insurgency. Analyzing the success of the Viet Minh the French found two

crucial components, guerilla warfare and psychological warfare. The weakness appeared to be the

vulnerability of the insurgents in the initial phase of the conflict, before any deeply rooted support

among the population could be established, and the highly likely dependence on logistic bases in

neighbouring states. Therefore the aim was to separate the population as soon as possible from the

insurgents through resettlement and to secure the borders to prevent the flow of supplies.

Principally the counter-insurgency also involved two possibly overlapping phases, destruction and

construction.132

Stefan Küttel, a Swiss volunteer, quickly noticed the kind of warfare the Legion instructed in basic

training: „Bald schon merkte ich, dass die Kriegsführung, auf die ich nun mit meinen Kameraden

gedrillt wurde, mit dem was ich in meiner Heimat gelernt hatte, nur wenig Ähnlichkeit hatte. Hier

wurde einzig die Guerillabekämpfung geübt.“133

Joining the Legion in 1956, Küttel quickly got a taste of how this war was fought. Rushing to help

an attacked farm of a pied noir, the legionnaires had to discover that they were too late and the

Fellaghas had already disappeared:

„Die Frau des Aufgefundenen wurde unweit dieser Stelle entdeckt. Die Leiche war aufgeschlitzt und daserwartete Baby,[...] lag neben ihr. Zwei Buben, ungefähr vier und sechs Jahre alt, lagen mit durchschnittenerKehle, keine zehn Meter von ihrer Mutter entfernt.”134

In pursuit of the suspects the village nearby was controlled house for house with the help of the

gendarmerie. It was obvious for Küttel that all the young men had already fled the village and left

behind only the women, elderly and children, who were only answering „manharf”- we don't

know, to all the questions asked. As the interrogation turned out to be useless, the gendarmerie

131 Evans: Algeria, pp. 85-92.132 Beckett, Ian F.W.: Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies. Guerillas and their opponents since 1750. NewYork 2001, pp. 159-161, and Bührer: Imperialkriege, pp. 465- 470. Important exponents of the guerre révolutionnaire:Paul Aussaresses, Marcel Bigeard, Georges Bonnet, Andrés Souyris, Charles Lacheroy and Jacques Hogard.133 Küttel, Stefan: Auf dem falschen Zug. Im Dienste der französischen Fremdenlegion während des Freiheitskampfes in Algerien. Altdorf 2002, p. 44.134 Küttel: Auf dem falschen Zug, p. 62.

26

started to distribute provisions and the medics to treat the sick, thus executing the phase of

construction.135 From 1955 onwards the Sections Administratives Spécialisées (SAS) and the

Sections Administratives Urbaines (SAU) implemented a number of programmes to improve the

infrastructure and daily life of the civilian Muslim population. Hand in hand with this

psychological campaign went a large-scale resettlement which affected two to three million

civilians. The aim of these Camps de Regroupement were on one side to isolate the local

population from the insurgents, on the other side to offer it a better standard of life. However, due

to poor preparation and lacking of funds the French could not win the trust of a Muslim population

which had been ripped out of its social structures.136

Shortly after Küttel was involved in the phase of destruction and received his baptism of fire. His

battalion swarmed out in order to sweep the hills around Mascara to find and fight Fellaghas who

were hiding on a densely wooded hill. After finally making contact with a group of 30 insurgents,

fierce fighting broke out and under the support of two T-6 air fighters his group had to advance and

encircled the enemy. The planes ensured the end of the battle:

„Nun zogen die Maschinen hintereinander direkt auf den umkämpften Hügel zu. Die erste liess etwas Grosses,Eiförmiges und Glänzendes fallen, bevor sie wieder steil hochzog.[...] keine Explosion war zu vernehmen beimAufschlag dieser Napalmbomben. Lediglich eine Druckwelle war zu verspüren. Gleich darauf legte sich eine infernalische Hitze über den Hügel. Meterhohe Flammen und mächtige Rauchpilze schossen in die Höhe.”137

The result of the attack was that the Fellaghas ran towards the legionnaires either surrendering or

firing until shot dead. The air support was an important factor against the FLN and their military

arm the ALN (Armée de la Libération Nationale), since they did not really possess any anti-aircraft

guns or missiles. It also ensured the mobility of the French forces with the deployment of

helicopters as well as the fast evacuation of wounded.138

Another prominent phase of destruction was the Battle of Algiers where the FLN leadership under

Ramdane Abbane opened a campaign of urban terrorism. Algiers was shaken by regular bombings

and the murder of the mayor of Boufarik, a town 20km south of Algiers. The answer was the

deployment of General Jacques Massu and the 10th Parachute Division which was given extensive

police power. 139

Massu and his men had to anticipate the FLN strategy, to take the lessons learnt in rural guerilla

warfare and to apply them to an urban context. For this Massu employed a system called

135 Küttel: Auf dem falschen Zug, p. 64.136 Bührer: Imperialkriege, p. 472, and Beckett: Modern Insurgencies, p. 164.137 Küttel: Auf dem falschen Zug, pp. 71-72.138 Beckett: Modern Insurgencies, p. 165.139 Evans: Algeria, pp. 189-191, and Horne, Alistair: A Savage War of Peace. Algeria 1954-1962. London 1996,, pp.183- 192.

27

Quadrillage offensif. Algier was divided into squares, each under the control of a regimental

command. The paras set up checkpoints around theses squares to control everyone leaving and

entering.140 With large-scale razzias, mass arrests and interrogations often including torture the FLN

suffered a major deafeat.141But the torture proved to be a two-edged sword, as the usage had an

influence on the reputation of France and the FLN could win international sympathies. From the

environment of urban warfare torture was transported on the battlefield.

After his return to Switzerland the legionnaire K.C. stated in his interrogation report:

„Im Kampf gefangene FLN-Leute wurden auch gefoltert, um Informationen herauszubekommen. SolcheFolterungen fanden auf dem Kampffeld statt. Was später mit diesen Gefangenen geschehen ist, weiss ich nicht.An solchen Folterungen war ich ebenfalls beteiligt gewesen, und zwar gezwungenermassen.”142

He frankly admits that he had also tortured but not on his own initiative, rather presumably by

executing an order, a statement often used to disclaim responsibility. He continues describing the

techniques used: „Man folterte die Leute, indem man sie mit Wasser auffüllte, unter Strom setzte

oder ihnen die Ohren abschnitt. Damit die Gefolterten später nichts aussagen konnten, wurden sie

nachher getötet.”143 Various forms of water torture were used during the war but the favorite form

was the gégéne, electrodes which could be attached to any part of the body, often on genitals.144

That the war was fought with great brutality and even children were not safe of violence was

reported by E.S., a deserted Swiss legionnaire. During a razzia on a village near Batna a radiopost

was found in a house where only an old woman and a ten year old girl were present:

„Aber man musste doch einen Schuldigen haben und so nahm man kurzerhand das 10-jährige Mädchen mitund Kapitän Bollmann befahl mir,... das Kind zu erschiessen. Natürlich zögerte ich, ein solches Verbrechenauszuführen, aber der Kapitän trat mich in den Rücken und drohte mir, wenn ich das Kind nicht erschiessenwerde, dann stelle man mich an die Wand... Ich erschoss darauf das Kind mit einem Kopfschuss, es war soforttot.”145

The question arises, why E.S. would confess to such a crime? Can he be believed? The case forced

the French to intervene. They did not only call the specific crime an invention of E.S. but also

other statements about his career in the Legion. Since he could prove the truth of other incidents

during his time in the Legion the Swiss court believed his side of the story, because it knew that

the French authorities would not offer legal aid or truthful information. From testimonies of other

140 Porch: The French Foreign Legion, p. 583.141 Bührer: Imperialkriege, p. 469.142 Oertle: Endstation Algerien, p. 190. On torture during the Battle of Algiers: Horne: A Savage War of Peace, pp.195-207.143 Oertle: Endstation Algerien, p. 190.144 Horne: A Savage War of Peace, pp. 199- 200.145 Oertle: Endstation Algerien. p. 233.

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former Swiss legionnaires the court was sure that atrocities were committed in Algeria but found it

highly unfair to call E.S. to account while others were acquitted because they kept their crimes for

themselves. Again a legionnaire passed the responsibility to a superior and tried to claim to have

acted under a direct order. He had every reason to keep this crime a secret but still chose to confess

it.146 So its very possible that his story was true, but it also showed that the French authorities had

no interest in investigating and uncovering a war crime committed during the Algerian War of

Independence.

In the rural areas of Algeria, France enjoyed considerable military success which was achieved by

closing off the Tunisian border with help of the Morice line and thus preventing the flow of ALN

fighters and supplies. An eight-foot electrified fence backed with minefields and 80'000 men had a

reported kill ratio of 85 per cent at the Algerian- Tunisian border by April 1958.147

Stefan Küttel, then Corporal in the 2nd Régiment étrangère de cavalerie (2nd REC) described that

for his unit the time at the Morice Line passed rather slowly so the legionnaires distracted

themselves with alcohol and officers were mostly occupied dissolving brawls. On the other hand

another company of the 2nd REC had to engage small groups of trespassers almost every night.148

After Maurice Challe took over as commander-in-chief in Algeria he applied new tactics. Challe

created the commandos de chasse. Accompanied by harkis149 they had the task to pin down FLN

units. After that Paras and legionnaires were called in transported by helicopters or tanks to

encircle the enemy units. When this was done an artillery or an airstrike was conducted and the

encircling troops would finish the job.150

On March 24, 1959 together with regular units Küttel and his regiment were involved in one of

these „search and destroy“ operations north of the 2nd REC new base in Djelfa. The regular troops

mostly consisted of young French conscripts who were not in Algeria by choice. They looked at

the legionnaires with a certain amount of admiration and thankfulness as the Legion was doing a

lot of the „dirty work“. When Küttel spoke to some artillerists he had the feeling that they were

talking to a supernatural being and that they were honored that he spent time with them.151

Together they encircled the Djebel Zemra, a mountain were FLN units where entrenched and

146 Oertle: Endstation Algerien, pp. 234- 237.147 Horne: A Savage War of Peace, pp. 263- 265, and Beckett: Modern Insurgencies, p. 164. A similiar line was built onthe Moroccan border.148 Küttel: Auf dem falschen Zug, p. 191149 Up to 60'000 harkis, as the local armed auxiliary forces were called, served France in 1958. See: Evans: Algeria, p. 250.150 Porch: The French Foreign Legion, p. 594.151 Küttel: Auf dem falschen Zug, p. 67, and p. 107. Only two percent of the total French soldiers were legionnaires butthe legionnaires formed eight percent of the dead. About 26'500 legionnaires fought in 1956 then the number fell on21'000 legionnaires between the years 1958 and 1961. See Koller: Die Fremdenlegion, p. 37.

29

waiting for the attack. Until nightfall Küttel described fierce fighting again with close air support.

According to Challe's strategy that neither the mountain or the night would be left to the fellaghas

the legionnaires kept the encirclement during the night so nobody could escape. The next day

Küttel reported that they had taken only 20 prisoners and that there were 200 dead fighters.152

Parts of the French officer corps slowly grew unhappy with the politics of Charles de Gaulle

concerning the Algerian question. Finally with the help of the 1st Régiment étranger de

parachutistes (1st REP) and other paratrooper regiments the officers and generals sympathizing

with the pied noir cause tried to overthrow Charles de Gaulle's government on April 22, 1961.

From a legionnaire's point of view Küttel described the situation as follows:

„Zu viel Kompromisse wurden eingegangen. Der bis anhin erbrachte Blutzoll schien vergebens gewesen zusein. Ein unmittelbar bevorstehender Sieg der französischen Armee und der Einheiten der Fremdenlegionwurde gefährdet. An diesem Putsch beteiligten sich, passiv oder aktiv, verschiedene Einheiten.“153

The coup tourned out to be a disaster as the regular conscript army , the navy and even the air force

refused to follow the paras and their officers. Officers who did not go into captivity joined the

Organisation Armée Sécret (OAS) to keep on fighting for an Algérie française. The 1st REP and the

regiments which followed it were dissolved. 154 The regimental command of Küttels 2nd REC was

also relieved because of showing sympathy for the revolutionaries which shows that big parts of

the Legion were not happy with de Gaulle. For Küttel the war ended in protecting oil prospectors

and hunting gazelles. It hurt him as the proud and glorious picture of the French Foreign Legion

crumbled as one officer after another was put on trial. For him a world collapsed and he decided to

desert the Legion. After crossing the border in Basel he drew an ambivalent balance of his time

with the Legion. The Legion offered him a experience which he could never have had elsewhere.

But he also had to pay a high price. He concluded: „Du hast alles verloren, was du noch zu

verlieren hattest. Deine ganze Jugend.“155

152 Evans: Algeria, pp. 189-191, Horne: A Savage War of Peace, p. 245, and Küttel: Auf dem falschen Zug, pp. 200-203.153 Küttel: Auf dem falschen Zug, p. 220.154 Porch: The French Foreign Legion, pp. 609- 613.155 Küttel: Auf dem falschen Zug, p. 230.

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5. Conclusion

Since the French Foreign Legion had set foot on Algerian soil, the Swiss had been part of its

history. During the first years the Swiss were prominently represented by a number of officers and

its first commander, Baron Stoffel. The number of the Swiss legionnaires was surprisingly low, if it

is taken into consideration that the Swiss Guards had produced a high number of unemployed

soldiers. Two reasons can be given: The French were not interested in rehiring the just discharged

and unpopular soldiers of the foreign regiments as the Legion was thought of as an outlet to fight

the refugees and deserters streaming to France from all over Europe. It can also be assumed that a

part of Swiss were either counted as Germans or joined the Legion pretending to be Germans. With

the forming of the second Légion étrangère a short revival of the Kapitulationen took place which

ended with the transformation into the 1er Régiment étranger and the deployment to Algeria. As

part of the Legion Swiss legionnaires were involved in forming the country for colonization and

also protecting it. Nonetheless they had to go through the same hardships as the other legionnaires.

Through the history of the Legion up to 1962 the Swiss legionnaires accepted the French claim for

Algeria without questioning it. They did not mention or discuss the claims of the indigenous tribes

although du Plessis noticed that they were treated like dogs. But this was rather a description of

their status than an expression of pity. The reason for that seems to lie in the picture which they had

of the inhabitants of Algeria which proved ambivalent. The Swiss legionnaires considered

themselves superior while considering the native population as savages or bandits. They did not

offer them the same property claims as for Europeans as they regularly tried to steal from or cheat

the locals. But they still considered them as strong and frugal thus offering them a certain amount

of respect and admiration.

For those Swiss with a desire of experiencing adventure and exotic countries, Algeria did not

suffice and most dreamt with pleasant anticipation of being deployed to a more „exotic” colony.

The brutality which runs like a red line through the stories the Swiss legionnaires described in

Algeria is striking. Numerous atrocities were perfomed by both sides from shooting prisoners and

civilians to torturing. The accounts show how brutally the colonization and occupation of Algeria

was conducted and that the Swiss legionnaires were also involved.

Conducting war in Algeria was very challenging throughout the years of French presence.

Conventional warfare moved to the backround and adaptation to counterinsurgency became vital

for the French to keep control in Algeria. More flexibility and mobility were crucial in this kind of

warfare and were achieved either by adapting to enemy tactics or by technological improvements.

The razzia was kept as an instrument of fighting insurgency and was taken with adjustments into

31

an urban environment during the Battle of Algiers. The reliance on native troops had always been

another instrument of fighting insurgency as we have seen with the Zouaves, the Turcos and the

Harkis.

Küttel is a good example in what kind of dilemma the Swiss legionnaires were stuck at the end of

the Algerian War of Independence. Loyal to their officers and failing to see why a successful army

should give up certain victory the Swiss legionnaires were left with the shattered remains of a once

glorious Legion. This was reason enough for Küttel to desert.

As the presented documents of the Swiss legionnaires represent only a selection of available

material there is still space for a further examination of the life of Swiss legionnaires in Algeria.

The accounts of Swiss legionnaires also offer the possibility to throw a light on other times and

areas of French history apart from Algeria.

32

6. Appendix

6.1. Tables

Reason for entry Quantity in %

1. Different offences, for example burglary, robbery, fraud, counterfeit, defalcation,bilking, act of indecency etc.

63 50

2. Poverty, hard and joyless youth, love conflicts. 22 17

3. Adventroussnes, romantic enthusiasm. 16 13

4. Miscellaneous, no obvious reasons. 11 10

5. Unemployment, low income. 5 4

6. Marriage problems. 4 3

7. Conflict with parents. 4 3

Total 125 100

Profession Quantity in %

1. Without profession (henchman, unskilled laborer, runner). 73 59

2. Industrial professions. 23 19

3. Apprentices. 14 11

4. Commercial professions. 7 5

5. Miscellaneous (bartender, nurse, farm laborer). 7 5

6. Students 1 1

Total 125 100

Both tables from: Keller, Hans: Die Wahrheit über die französische Fremdenlegion. Aarau 1954, pp. 52-54.

6.2. Photos

33

Sidi-bel-Abbès in the 1950s

34

Stefan Küttel in Djelfa Heinrich Spinner

Emil Fischer-Miville

Bombardement of the Djebel Bou-Kahil

7. Selected Bibliography

7.1. Books

- Azan, Paul: Par l'épée et par la charrue. Ecrits et discours du Général Bugeaud. Paris 1948.

- Bodin, Jérôme: Les Suisses aus service de la France. De Louis XI à la Légion étrangère. Paris

1988.

- Boyd, Douglas: Die französische Fremdenlegion. Hamburg 2009.

- Bührer, Tanja (Hrsg.): Imperialkriege von 1500 bis heute. Strukturen-Akteure-Lernprozesse.

Paderborn 2011.

- de Vallière, Paul: Treue und Ehre. Geschichte der Schweizer in Fremden Diensten. Lausanne

1940.

- du Plessis, Théodore: Souvenirs de mes campagnes à la Légion étrangère. Mexique et Afrique,

1865-1868. Genf 1923.

- Evans, Martin: Algeria. France's Undeclared War. New York 2012.

- Führer, Hans Rudolf / Eyer, Robert-Peter: Schweizer in "Fremden Diensten". Verherrlicht und

verurteilt. Zürich 2006.

- Hallo, Jean Paul: Monsieur Légionnaire. L'homme et ses tradition. Paris 1994.

- Hochheimer, Albert: Verraten und verkauft. Die Geschichte der europäischen Söldner. Stuttgart

1967.

- Horne, Alistair: A Savage War of Peace. Algeria 1954-1962. London 1996.

- Hornung, Peter: Die Legion. Europas letzte Söldner. München 1989.

- Julien, Charles-André; Ageron, Charles-Robert: Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine. Vol.1. La

conquête et les débuts de la colonisation (1827-1871). Paris 1979.

- Keller, Hans: Die Wahrheit über die französische Fremdenlegion. Aarau 1954.

- Koller, Christian: Die Fremdenlegion. Kolonialismus, Söldnertum, Gewalt. Paderborn 2013.

- Küttel, Stefan: Auf dem falschen Zug. Im Dienste der französischen Fremdenlegion während des

Freiheitskampfes in Algerien. Altdorf 2002.

- Lordick, Volker: Unter der Sonne Nordafrikas. Legionär in Algerien. Stuttgart 2012.

- Maradan, Eveline: Les Suisses et la Légion étrangère de 1831 à 1861. Fribourg 1987.

- Montagnon, Pierre: Histoire de la Légion. De 1831 à nos jours. Paris 2012.

- Moser, Jean: In der Fremdenlegion. Erlebnisse in der Wüste Sahara und auf Madagskar. Bern

1911.

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- Nordmann, Theodor: Emil Fischer-Miville als Unteroffizier in der französischen Fremdenlegion.

(1855-1858). Basel 1931.

- Oertle, Vincenz: Endstation Algerien. Schweizer Fremdenlegionäre. Dreizehn Lebensbilder der

1950er Jahre. Appenzell 2007.

- Porch, Douglas: The French Foreign Legion. A Complete History. New York 2010.

- Randin, Léon: Ein Schweizer in der Fremdenlegion. Zürich 1910.

- Sessions, Jennifer E.: By sword and plow. France and the conquest of Algeria. Ithaca 2013.

- Spinner, Heinrich: Algier, Mexiko, Rom. Schicksale eines Schweizers in fremden Kriegsdiensten.

Zürich 1901.

- Strupler, Paul: Fünf Jahre Fremdenlegion. Frauenfeld 1928.

7.2. Articles and encyclopedias

- Czouz-Tornare, Alain-Jacques: „Reisläufer.“ In: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz s. v., e-HLS,

access January 10, 2014 (Printversion: Basel 2011).

- Frémeaux, Jacques: The French Experience in Algeria: Doctrine, Violence

and Lessons Learnt. In: Civil Wars. 14:1 (2012), S. 49-62.

- Henry, Philippe: „ Fremde Dienste.“ In: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz s. v., e-HLS, access

January 10, 2014 (Printversion: Basel 2005).

- Henry, Philippe: „Schweizergarden.“ In In Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz s.v., e-HLS, access

4. July 2013 (Printversion: Basel 2012).

- Seiler, Hans: Fünf Jahre in der französischen Fremdenlegion. Aus meinen Tagebuchblättern.

Printed in: Neue Zürcher Zeitung Jg: 1914, Nr. 13, 45, 81, 117, 152, 190.

- Steele, Murray: Algeria: Government and Administration. 1830-1914. In: Encyclopedia of

African History, Bd. 1. New York 2005, S. 50- 52.

- Bundeskanzlei: Militärstrafgesetz (MstG), January 1, 2014. Art. 94.

7.3. Photos and Pictures

- Sidi-bel-Abbès in the 1950s: Oertle, Vincenz: Endstation Algerien. Schweizer Fremdenlegionäre.

Dreizehn Lebensbilder der 1950er Jahre. Appenzell 2007, p. 267.

- Stefan Küttel in Djelfa: Küttel, Stefan: Auf dem falschen Zug. Im Dienste der französischen

Fremdenlegion während des Freiheitskampfes in Algerien. Altdorf 2002, p. 166.

- Heinrich Spinner: Spinner, Heinrich: Algier, Mexiko, Rom. Schicksale eines Schweizers in

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fremden Kriegsdiensten. Zürich 1901, backside of the book cover.

- Emil Fischer-Miville: Nordmann, Theodor: Emil Fischer-Miville als Unteroffizier in der

französischen Fremdenlegion. (1855-1858). Basel 1931, extra page between p. 210 and p. 211.

- Bombardement of the Djebel Bou-Kahil: Küttel, Stefan: Auf dem falschen Zug. Im Dienste der

französischen Fremdenlegion während des Freiheitskampfes in Algerien. Altdorf 2002, p. 162.

- Frontpage: top: https://plus.google.com/117611090721430985028/posts and access January 18,

2014; bottom: Prise d'armes with Stefan Küttel (left). Küttel, Stefan: Auf dem falschen Zug. Im

Dienste der französischen Fremdenlegion während des Freiheitskampfes in Algerien. Altdorf 2002,

p. 164.

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