Storytelling, Dharma, and the Path to Liberation in Advaita ...

The Narrative Shape of Orthopraxy:

Storytelling, Dharma, and the Path to

Liberation in Advaita Ved@nta

James Madaio*

Oriental Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Czech Republic*Corresponding author: [email protected]

Abstract: This article analyses how Vidy@ra>ya, a fourteenth-century AdvaitaVed@ntin, reads and re-tells life stories of exemplary sages to determine and es-tablish duty, or dharma, on the Advaita Ved@ntic path to liberation. Drawing onhis Javanmuktiviveka, I show how Vidy@ra>ya’s extrapolative, exegetical ap-proach to life stories is shaped by hermeneutical concerns of the Dharmas@stratradition, which entails a narrative theology sensitive to the details of canonical lifestories. In particular, the article closely examines Vidy@ra>ya’s interpretation ofepisodes in the life of Y@jnavalkya from the BPhad@ra>yaka Upani

_sad; R@ma,

Suka, Janaka, and Bhagaratha from the ‘Laghuyogav@si_sbha’; as well as the story

of Nid@gha from the Vi_s>upur@>a. I demonstrate how Vidy@ra>ya’s reading of

these narratives, including his diagnostic assessment of the soteriological status ofthe protagonists, engenders and authorises orthopraxy on the path to liberation.While setting out these issues, I pay particular attention to the way in whichnarrative accounts serve not only as theologically rich sources from which prax-eological and theological positions are determined but also as examples inVidy@ra>ya’s argumentation.

Vidy@ra>ya’s Javanmuktiviveka and the renouncer context at SPngeri

In public memory, M@dhava-Vidy@ra>ya1 (d. 1386) is heralded as a pre-eminentscholar and propagator of vedic dharma who played a pivotal role in establishingtheVijayanagara kingdomduring the timeof theDelhi Sultanate. Although epigraph-ical evidence calls into question Vidy@ra>ya’s Merlin-like (Jackson 2005, p.18) role inthe founding of the kingdom,2 later tradition, popular by at least the sixteenth cen-tury, depicts the Sangama kings3 as having built the kingdom on the advice of thesage.4 What is undisputed is that the Sangama brothers were ardent patrons ofVidy@ra>ya’s ritual-learning institution or mabha5 at SPngeri6 and that they rever-ently honoured and patronised themahants, ormabh@dhipatis, of themabha, includingVidy@tartha, Bh@ratatartha7 (d. 1374), and Vidy@ra>ya.8 The former two mahants are

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recognised by M@dhava-Vidy@ra>ya as teachers9 (Narasimhachar 1916) and, alongwith Sa:kar@nanda10 and M@dhava-Vidy@ra>ya’s brother, S@ya>a,11 collectivelyform the best-known group of scholars linked to SPngeri during this period.An inscription from1346marks the famous vijayotsava, or festival of victory, held at

SPngeriwith all five Sangamabrothers in attendance alongwithKikk@yitai, thewidowof Ballala III (d. 1342), the last Hoysala king. What exactly this festival, which com-memorates the conquering ‘of the earth from the eastern to western ocean’ (EC 1902,Vol. VI, p.92), signifies about the origins of the Vijayanagara kingdom is disputed. Theinscription, however, commences with Harihara I (d. 1357) honouring Vidy@tartha,referring to him as a guru of the highest splendour, and it documents the donation ofnine villages to Bh@ratatartha and his disciples ‘for the performance of rites’ (EC 1902,Vol. VI, p.92). An inscription from1356 records king Bukka I’s (d. 1377) visit to SPngeriand his donation to Vidy@tartha, ‘the lord of ascetics’ who ‘surpasses the sun’, for ‘thelivelihood of the servants of the mabha and for the bhikshe (food) of the ascetics’(ARMAD 1933 [pub. 1936a], p.119).12 The name Vidy@ra>ya, however, appears in astone inscription dated 1375.13 In this inscription, Vidy@ra>ya is the recipient of twovillages, the income of which is earmarked for the feeding of twelve brahmins andnightly worship at the temple at Kunupu, as well as daily offerings to LordVidy@sankara (UVAT 1985, pp.84–6). In a frequently cited inscription from 1384,Harihara II (d. 1404), the third Sangama monarch, donates to two of Vidy@ra>ya’sstudents. The inscription includes the notable proclamation: ‘by the glances full oflove of Vidy@ra>ya, the chief of ascetics, he [i.e., Harihara II] acquired the empire ofknowledge unattainable by other kings’ (ARMAD 1933 [pub. 1936a], p.136). In an in-scription from 1386, which marks the death of Vidy@ra>ya, Harihara II establishes abrahmin settlement (agrah@ra) about a mile from SPngeri called Vidy@ra>yapura (cf.ARMAD1916 [pub. 1917], p.19). In this inscription, Vidy@ra>ya is referred to as the ‘thesupreme light incarnate’, the sun who expands ‘the nectar of the knowledge of non-dualism’ (ARMAD1933 [pub. 1936a], p.142). In addition to the fact that kingHarihara IIwas a devoted disciple of Vidy@ra>ya, it was during the latter’s tenure asmahant thatthe mabhamade considerable advancement in patronage and property, demonstrat-ing ‘. . .Vidy@ra>ya’s importance for the enhancement of Sringeri’s greatness’ (Kulke1985, p.133). It is clear that by the time of Vidy@ra>ya’s ascension to the ‘throne’ atSPngeri, themabhawas, as A. K. Shastri (1999 [1982]) put it, a ‘dharma-sa:sth@na’, i.e., arevenue generating, self-sustaining ‘estate’, which had garnered a cadre of ascetics,brahmin settlements (agrah@ra), and temple complexes. Historically, this landedproperty was also a centre of dharmas@stric adjudication, which functioned as ajudiciary even after independence from colonial rule (Gnanambal 1973; Shastri1999 [1982]).14

The implicit audience of Vidy@ra>ya’s Javanmuktiviveka (JMV) is Advaita Ved@ntinrenouncers (sa:ny@sins), called paramaha:sas, who, presumably, held allegiance tothemahant of the SPngerimabha. In an inscription dated 1386, Vidy@ra>ya is referredto as the chief preceptor (@c@rya) of the paramaha:samendicants (ARMAD 1934 [pub.1936b], p.140), a title used often over the next few centuries for themahants at SPngeri

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who rule the ‘kingdom of yoga’ (EC 1902, Vol. VI, pp.190–206). The JMV, indeed, is akind of ‘handbook’ or paddhati that delineates the dharma or duty of paramaha:sas,which includes a variety of yogic practices.15 Paddhatis are a subclass of the broadliterary designation nibandha, which are ‘digests’ on various judicial issues (Lingat1973, pp.107–8). Many works of this type present lists of authoritative citations onvarious topics, while some, such as the JMV, develop and ‘establish’ positions usingthe literary device of a debate between a prima facie interlocutor and a conclusiveinterlocutor (p+rvapak

_sin-siddh@ntin). Although independent texts (i.e., they do not

depend on a singular source or m+la), nibandhas quote heavily from dharmas@stricsources and deal ‘. . .eitherwith the entire spectrumof dharma orwith selected topics’(Olivelle 1997 [1995], p.4), e.g., yatidharma or the dharma of renouncers (sa:ny@sins).Within the brahmanical context, sa:ny@sins are ‘. . .boundby the dharma of the fourth@srama [ormode of life], often referred to asmok

_sadharma’ (Olivelle 1986, p.54).16 Thus,

to speak of yatidharma—orwhat is to be done by renouncers17—in anAdvaitaVed@nticcontext necessarily entails the soteriological project of realising non-dual liberation,the highest good of human life.18

Vidy@ra>ya’s concern with establishing the path and praxis of renunciation isevident from the very start of the JMV: ‘Iwill explain’, he says, ‘the difference betweenthe renunciation that is achieved through the desire to know (vividi

_s@sa:ny@sa) and

the renunciation for the gnostic (vidvatsa:ny@sa)’.19 I return to both stages of renun-ciation shortly but it is worth pointing out that Vidy@ra>ya defers discussion of whathe considers lower categories of renunciates (i.e., kubicaka, bah+daka, and ha:sa),noting that ‘the customary practice (sam@c@ra20) of these [renouncers] have beenaddressed by us in the exposition on the [email protected] Here the [renouncer ofthe] paramaha:sa [class] is distinguished’.22 Importantly, Vidy@ra>ya explicitly linksthe JMV to his vy@khy@ on the [email protected] What is certain is that the M@dhavawho authored the Par@sarasmPtivy@khy@, popularly known as the Par@saram@dhavaya(PM), who refers to himself as the lineage preceptor (kulaguru) andminister (mantrin)of king Bukka I,24 and who honours Vidy@tartha and Bh@ratatartha as his reveredteachers, is also the author of the JMV, a text ascribed to Vidy@ra>ya in all extantmanuscripts and in secondary references by later Advaita Ved@ntins. It is likely,therefore, that ‘Vidy@ra>ya’ is the name adopted by the polymath M@dhava whenhe underwent formal renunciation (cf. Narasimhachar 1916, pp.18–19; Kane 1930,p.378; Filliozat 1999 [1977], p.19; Kulke 1985, p.129). Vidy@ra>ya’s reference in theJMV to the sam@c@ra of renunciates signals his concern for setting out the dharma ofparamaha:sa class sa:[email protected] One suspects that the JMV is meant, in part, to con-tinue the earlier, short discussion on renunciation in the Par@saram@dhavaya26 (PM)and tooffer a definitive account of theduties ofmendicantswhohold allegiance to the‘dharma-pabha’27 at SPngeri.28

Inwhat followswewill be pursuing the exegetical aspect ofwhat I call the narrativetheology (Madaio 2016) of the JMV, which determines dharma, or ‘what is to be done’,on thepath to liberation (mok

_sam@rga) throughanextrapolative readingof life stories,

which are applied as authoritative examples in the debate simulated in the text. It is

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well known that scriptural stories, which are inherent to the sources of Ved@nta, playan important role in the teaching and exegetical strategies of Advaita Ved@ntins. Inthe works of Sa:kara, for example, origination stories are viewed as figurativeaccounts subservient to the higher purpose of pointing toward Advaita Ved@nticmetaphysics. Other approaches to narrative demonstrate methods of allegorisingthat extract advaitic meaning in order to provide instructive illustrations (SuthrenHirst 2005). Broadly, however, in the early period of the tradition, theological andorthopraxic positions are not derived from a close reading of the lives of sages. Anextrapolative approach to life stories, however, comes to the fore in Vidy@ra>ya’sJavanmuktiviveka, which, I argue, demonstrates an applied narratology shaped bythe hermeneutical concerns of the Dharmas@stra tradition.29 Before turning to howVidy@ra>ya’s reading and re-telling of stories relate to the notion of customary prac-tice, we will first set out his account of the two stages of renunciation mentionedearlier, i.e., the renunciation that is achieved through the desire to know (vivi-di

_s@sa:ny@sa) and the renunciation for the gnostic (vidvatsa:ny@sa). This is important

because Vidy@ra>ya views the life stories we will be discussing later as engenderingand anchoring key positions related to precisely these issues.

The dharma of Advaita Ved@ntin renouncers

According toVidy@ra>ya, ‘even though the state of paramaha:sahas been establishedas the same [for both vividi

_s@sa:ny@sa and vidvatsa:ny@sa], a sub-distinction

(av@ntarabheda)mustbeacceptedbecause theyareof thenature of oppositedharma’.30

What is ‘opposite’ about the dharma of these two stages of renunciation is that theirdisciplinary aim is inverted. As Vidy@ra>ya explains, ‘for the renouncer who seeksgnosis, recognition of reality (tattvajn@na) is principal while disappearance of the[activity of the] mind (manon@sa) and effacement of [impure] latent tendencies(v@san@k

_saya) are subsidiary; however, in the case of the renouncer who is a gnostic,

it is just the opposite’.31 In thatway,what distinguishes the two stages of renunciationis that during the renunciation that is achieved through the desire to know (vivi-di

_s@sa:ny@sa), tattvajn@na, and the disciplines utilised for it, are the principal dharma.

However, during the renunciation for the gnostic (vidvatsa:ny@sa), manon@sa andv@san@k

_saya, and the practices utilised to achieve them, are the principal dharma.

On the disciplines associated with the interrelated32 aims of tattvajn@na, manon@sa,and v@san@k

_saya, Vidy@ra>ya indicates that ‘the means of tattvajn@na33 is listening

(srava>a), etc., the means of manon@sa34 is yoga, and the means of v@san@k_saya35 is

developing opposite tendencies [i.e., soteriologically efficacious or pure tenden-cies]’.36 So, during vividi

_s@sa:ny@sa, the renouncer comes to the recognition of reality

(tattvajn@na) by principally carrying out the ved@ntic triple method; that is, ‘by listen-ing (srava>a), reflection (manana), and deep contemplation (nididhy@sana), performedcorrectly’.37 Coming to this recognition, however, requires a quiescentmindaswell asa non-ego or object orientation, which is cultivated through the supportive or sub-sidiary disciplines associated with manon@sa and v@san@k

_saya respectively.38 After

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recognising the non-dual nature of reality, the ‘enlightened’ renouncer, who is nowconsidered a gnostic or ‘knower of brahman’—referred to variously as a vidvat, jn@nin,tattvavit, or brahmavid—is then enjoined to undertake the renunciation for the gnostic(vidvatsa:ny@sa). It is during vidvatsa:ny@sa that one ‘should carry outmanon@sa andv@san@k

_saya for javanmukti’.39 In other words, having recognised the nature of reality,

the gnostic should neutralise (abhipbh+) the various obstacles that may arise after

non-dual awakening by continuing to practise the disciplines for manon@sa andv@san@k

_saya. The fruition of vidvatsa:ny@sa is liberation-while-living (javanmukti),

i.e., the stabilised or unflinching knowing of ‘the all-encompassing essence’,40 whichis ‘a state beyond [dharmic] injunctions and prohibitions’.41

It is worth underscoring here that Vidy@ra>ya understands the Advaita Ved@nticproject, including both stages of renunciation, as working within the strictures ofvar>@sramadharma but ultimately culminating in its transcendence.Within this brah-manical context, the general conception of personhood is of ‘one who has beenenjoined’ (Freschi 2012); that is, one who is responsible to act in specific ways asdetermined by the injunctive demands of dharma, which cultivate and subjugate livesacross gendered, familial, regional, and caste-specific modalities. According to theaccount in the JMV,42 even a knower of brahman remains enjoined, as it were, due tothe possibility of a sense of agency emerging on account of obstacles that may ariseafter awakening. The javanmukta, on the other hand, who has secured non-dual know-ing through vidvatsa:ny@sa, has ‘done what has to be done’ (kPtakPtya43) and is there-fore considered ‘one who has transcended the order of the classes and modes of life’(ativar>@sramin) since there is no longer the possibility of any sense of agency oridentification with the mind–body complex, which is inscribed by injunctions andprohibitions.

Sages as exemplars

AlthoughVidy@ra>yadoesnot follow this explicit sequence (or all of its steps) ineveryinstance, when an important termor technical issue is raised, he defines or character-ises it (lak

_sa>a), anchors his definition in an authoritative source (pram@>a), and

provides an illustrative example (ud@hara>a). This process, then, grounds the defin-ition to the point it is considered settled or established (siddha).44 In many cases, anauthority in the form of a sruti ‘statement’ is cited; however, in other instances,Vidy@ra>ya appeals to a scriptural narrative about a sage. His exegesis of such storiesentails not a mere extraction of philosophical positions but a close reading of narra-tive details, which is attentive toplot and character development. Early on in the JMV,when justifying his characterisation of vividi

_s@sa:ny@sa, Vidy@ra>ya makes explicit

his method of drawing on the lives of sages and transferring the norm derived fromsuch accounts to his contemporary context.45 After identifying Vidy@ra>ya’s meth-odological self-disclosure below, we will turn to specific cases that demonstrate howVidy@ra>ya’s reading and retelling of life stories fosters and authorises his account ofthe path to liberation.


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According to Vidy@ra>ya, given that a yearning to see the ‘great, unborn Self’(mah@n aja @tm@, BPhad@ra>yaka Upani

_sad [B@U] 4.4.22 at JMV 1.1.6) has arisen through

the performance of practices such as vedic recitation (ved@nuvacana) in this life oranother, mendicants renounce (pra

pvraj) desiring (

pi_s) the ‘experience of the Self

(@tm@nubhava)’.46 Vidy@ra>ya, however, stipulates: ‘and this renunciation [i.e., vivi-di

_s@sa:ny@sa], which is the cause of [non-dual] knowing, is twofold: [the first] consists

in themere abandonment of rites (karma) that cause rebirth [and the second] is of thenature of a mode of life (@srama) consisting in carrying a single staff and proclaimingthe prai

_sa [formula]’.47 Vidy@ra>ya acknowledges here both a formal renunciation

carried out as a mode of life (@srama), and an informal wandering, which does notapparently follow @sramic norms. He further indicates that theAdvaitaVed@ntic pathmore broadly is open to women and men48 of the proper internal disposition even ifthey do not formally renounce.49 On this issue, Vidy@ra>ya notes: ‘when, due to somecause, those in the studentship, householder, and forest-dwelling [mode of life] areblocked from adopting the renunciate order, there is no opposition to the mentalrenunciation of action for the purpose of gnosis evenwhile carrying out the dharma ofone’s own mode of life’.50 While this point has been under-appreciated in character-ising the reachof theAdvaitaVed@ntapropagatedat SPngeri during this period,whichwas not limited to formal renunciation, what is important for our purposes isVidy@ra>ya’s justification for why this informal, mental renunciation is also valid:‘because we see many gnostics of this type in the world and in the Srutis, SmPtis, Itih@sas, andPur@>as’.51 In other words, in determiningwhat should (or could) be done on the pathto liberation, Vidy@ra>ya defers to the precedent established by the lives of sagesrecorded in scripture, or whatmight be called ‘canonical life narratives’ (Bruner 2004[1987]), which provide exemplary cases for determining dharma.While on the level of formal theology, dharma is rooted in the timelessness of the

Veda, there is consensus among scholars of Dharmas@stra that ‘the ultimate source ofdharma in a legal sense was custom’ (Lariviere 2004, p.616).52 Along with the other‘roots’ (m+la) of dharma,53 i.e., sruti, smPti, and what is pleasing or satisfying to oneself(@tmatu

_sbi), customary practice (@c@ra) serves as the principal means by which stand-

ards of behaviour are determined in context-sensitive situations and recordedthrough a process of textualisation. Normative models of behaviour are establishedin reference to the conduct of ideal, competent, or good exemplars, who are ‘disci-plined’ (i.e., si

_sba) at following Vedic norms, and whose actions are therefore instan-

tiations of ‘what is to be done’ in particular contexts.54 Although descriptions ofexemplars differ within and across traditions,55 in Dharmas@stra they are regardedas ‘knowers of Veda’ or ‘knowers of dharma’. Gautama andManu, for example, refer tothe ‘practice of those who know the Veda’,56 ?pastamba to the ‘conventions of thosewho know the dharma and the Vedas’,57 and Vasi

_sbha to the ‘custom of the si

_sbas

[si_sb@c@ra]’.58 P.V.Kane (1946, p.826) notes that in the ‘. . .quest to findoutwhatdharma

is in the varying circumstances of life, the practice of those who may be called si_sbas

furnish us with the necessary criterion or norm, i.e., si_sb@c@ra [or the conduct of an

exemplar] is the touchstone for judgingwhether anact is in consonancewithwhat the

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s@stras require us to do’. Discerning the practice of exemplars, who are ‘viewed asindividuals setting the standard’,59 thereby provides ‘a means whereby law [i.e., dutyor “what is to be done”] could be “discovered”’ (Lariviere 2004, p.615) in specificspheres of life and in relation to different groups. I argue that a variant of thismethodof ‘discovering’ what is to be done on the path to liberation is evident in Vidy@ra>ya’sexegesis and employment of the life stories of exemplary sages, which are culled fromabroadly conceived notion of scripture. From this vantage point, scriptural resourcesprovide a living repository of canonical life narratives fromwhich the properly learn-ed exegete can determine dharmic norms.

The story of Y@jnavalkya and the sequence of renunciation

In the above discussion, we saw howVidy@ra>ya correlates the soteriological projectof Advaita Ved@ntawith the dharma of different stages of renunciation, noting that aninformal or mental renunciation is possible for women and men of the appropriatedisposition who are prevented from entering the renunciate order. Importantly,Vidy@ra>ya derives his position that an internal renunciation is possible becauseenlightened sages, who have not undertaken formal renunciation, are seen in theworld and attested to across scriptural genres. In the next sections of this article, wepursue Vidy@ra>ya’s extrapolative reading of life stories as a means of determiningdharma. In doing so, we will pay close attention not only to the stories Vidy@ra>yadraws from but also how he interprets and employs them as examples inargumentation.The first exemplar we will consider is the Upani

_sadic sage Y@jnavalkya,60 who is

depicted in, amongother places, the Satapatha Br@hma>a and the concluding sectionofthat corpus, the BPhad@ra>yaka Upani

_sad (B@U). Considered as the sage who received

the formulas of the White Yajurveda from the sun (cf. B@U 6.5.3), Y@jnavalkya’s dis-courses in the BPhad@ra>yaka Upani

_sad have been particularly influential in the for-

mation of Ved@ntic theologies. In the third chapter (adhy@ya) of the BPhad@ra>yakaUpani

_sad, Y@jnavalkya debates eight interlocutors at a sacrifice sponsored by king

Janaka, which is designed to determine who is the most learned. These dialogues,which take up the nature of sacrifice, death, immortality, @tman, and brahman, featureY@jnavalkya’s well-known exchange with the female sage G@rga and his ‘head-shat-tering’ debatewith S@kalya. Elsewhere, Y@jnavalkya is portrayed approaching his twowives, Maitreya and K@tyayana, in order to reach a settlement before departing, i.e.,before he takes up the renunciatemode of life. When his learnedwifeMaitreya poign-antly asks: ‘if I were to possess the entire world filled with wealth, sir, would it, orwould it not, make me immortal?’ (B@U 2.4.2 in Olivelle 1998, p.67), a profound dis-cussion about immortality ensues.Vidy@ra>ya considers the story of Y@jnavalkya in the BPhad@ra>yaka Upani

_sad as

providing an exemplary account of a sage from whose life norms about orthopraxycan be deduced. Later in this article, we will pursue ways in which the life ofY@jnavalkya informs Vidy@ra>ya about the soteriological status of a ‘knower of


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brahman’ vis-a-vis a javanmukta. Our present concern, however, is how Vidy@ra>yaestablishes and substantiates the sequence of renunciation by drawing on an episodein the life of the sage. Vidy@ra>ya proclaims:

Now we will describe the renunciation for the gnostic (vidvatsa:ny@sa). Therenunciation for the gnostic is brought about by those who have recognisedultimate reality (paratattva) through the proper practice (samyaganu

_sbhita) of

listening, reflection, and deep contemplation. And that is what Y@jnavalkya car-ried out (sam

ppad).61

Vidy@ra>ya then turns to certain details of Y@jnavalkya’s life derived from theBPhad@ra>yaka Upani

_sad:

For example, while in a victory-seeking debate, the venerable Y@jnavalkya, thejewel among knowers, defeated [interlocutors] beginning with ?sval@yana bypointing out truth in various ways. In a dialogue concerning detachment,[Y@jnavalkya] enlightened Janaka through numerous concise and detailedexplanations. [And] wanting to awaken Maitreya, in order to quickly turn herto the truth, Y@jnavalkya introduced the [rite of] renunciation [for the gnostic],which was to be carried out by him. Thus, having awakened her, he declared therenunciation [for a gnostic62]. That is mentioned at both the beginning and endof the Maitreya Br@hma>a [which depicts Y@jnavalkya’s dialogue with his wifeMaitreya]:

Now as Y@jnavalkya was about to undertake another mode of life (vPtta),Y@jnavalkya said: ‘Maitreya, I am about to set out from this place’ [B@U 4.5.1–2].

Having said, ‘So now, Maitreya, you have the instruction. This is all there is tothe state of immortality’, Y@jnavalkya took up the renunciate life [pra

pvraj]

[B@U 4.5.15].

The renunciation for the gnostic is also recited in the Kohola Br@hma>a,[which depicts Y@jnavalkya’s conversation with Kahola Kausatakeya]: Havingrealised @tman as such, giving up desires for sons, desires for wealth, anddesires for worlds, br@hma>as take up the renunciate life [B@U 3.5.1].63

Commenting on the last quotation above, B@U 3.5.1, Vidy@ra>ya explains: ‘the termbr@hma>a does not signify the caste; [rather,] the intendedmeaning is that fulfilmentthat is the direct realisation of brahman by themeans of listening, reflection, and deepcontemplation’.64 Aswe saw in the above passage, Vidy@ra>ya holds that Y@jnavalkyawas such a br@hma>a, or knower of brahman, when he was engaging in ‘victory-seek-ing’ debates. Notably, Vidy@ra>ya reads the story of Y@jnavalkya as indicating that itis precisely the renunciation for the gnostic, or vidvatsa:ny@sa, that the sage carriedout after he instructed Maitreya. It is worth recalling Vidy@ra>ya’s earlier assertionthat vidvatsa:ny@sa is brought about by those who have recognised ultimate realitythrough listening, reflection, and deep contemplation. It is therefore implied that

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Y@jnavalkya had already come to awakening through listening, etc. Grounding hisposition in the life story of Y@jnavalkya, Vidy@ra>ya recapitulates his original claimmaking sure to include the practices associated with each renunciation, which is partof his extended argument:

Indeed, we say, for this very reason, that this renunciation [for the gnostic] isthe result of and different from the renunciation that is the means [i.e., viv-idi

_s@sa:ny@sa]. In the same way that listening and so on are to be carried out

(samppad) by the renouncer who seeks gnosis for the recognition of reality

(tattvajn@na), manon@sa and v@san@k_saya are to the carried out by the renouncer

who is a gnostic for the purpose of javanmukti.65

WhenVidy@ra>ya concludes his argument above by stating that renouncerswho seekgnosis should carry out listening, reflection, and deep contemplation in order torecognise reality (tattvajn@na), etc., he employs the same verb (i.e., sam

ppad) he

had used to describe how Y@jnavalkya undertook the renunciation for the gnostic.However, instead of using the conjugation for the distant past, he uses the optative,indicating his prescription that such practices are to be performed in order to con-form to the appropriate model of behaviour.66

Narratives of exemplars as examples in argumentation

In the above section, we have seen how Vidy@ra>ya’s moral reasoning about what todo in the world was through a determination of the precedent of an exemplar. In thecontext of the JMV, the story of Y@jnavalkya, however, serves not only as a paradig-matic life story fromwhich norms about conduct in theworld can be deduced but alsoas another kind of ‘example’—that is, the dP

_sb@nta or ud@hara>a—in Vidy@ra>ya’s

argumentation. The steps of reasoning evident in Vidy@ra>ya’s account about theproper sequence of renunciation are as follows:

1. vidvatsa:ny@sa is different from and the result of vividi_s@sa:ny@sa;

2. vidvatsa:ny@sa is brought about by realising brahman through listening, re-flection, and deep contemplation, i.e., the principal practices carried outduring vividi

_s@sa:ny@sa;

3. this is seen in the case of Y@jnavalkya;4. Y@jnavalkya, after becoming a knower of brahman (implicitly through the

practice of listening, etc.), then carried out vidvatsa:ny@sa (i.e., afterinstructing Maitreya);

5. vidvatsa:ny@sa, the principal practices of which are manon@sa andv@san@k

_saya, is therefore different from and the result of vividi

_s@sa:ny@sa.

Although Vidy@ra>ya does not exactly follow the fivefold Ny@ya syllogism, a keyaspect of his argumentation is ‘the fundamental importance given to the citation of


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an example’, which ensures that ‘public’ acts of reasoning are grounded in partici-pants’ ‘frames of reference’ (Ganeri 2012, pp.33, 14). In the present case, the commonground, or point of reference, is the exemplary life of a sage recorded in a sourceconsidered authoritative by the interlocutors in the text’s debate.67 What is import-ant to keep inmind, however, is that Vidy@ra>ya does not approach the lives of sagesas instantiations of perfected behaviour at all periods of their life; indeed, forVidy@ra>ya the lives of sages are paradigmatic insofar as their faults and shortcom-ings are also instructive for determining dharma. Later we will see that rather thanuncritically emulating or valorising sages such as Y@jnavalkya, who is implicitlyunderstood as a teacher of advaita,68 Vidy@ra>ya’s attention to narrative details leadshim to highlight certain unsavoury flaws exhibited by the celebrated sage. While thisreading supports Vidy@ra>ya’s view that faults, such as impure tendencies, persist inknowers of brahman (who are not yet javanmuktas), it is also fostered by a close readingof Y@jnavalkya’s life story.

R@ma, Suka, Nid@gha, and the safeguarding of gnosis

Vidy@ra>ya inherits the view, already evident in the commentaries of Sa:kara, thatthe realisationof brahmandoesnotdissolve theappearanceof themind–bodybecauseit is sustained by operative, or already fructifying, pr@rabdha karma. On Vidy@ra>ya’saccount, the arising of karmically determined experiences may cause agitations thatobstruct (pratibandha) non-dual knowing. Other obstacles may arise if the gnostic, orknower of brahman, has not sufficiently secured manon@sa and v@san@k

_saya.

Vidy@ra>ya, indeed, detects such post-gnosis obstacles in the lives of canonical sagesand among contemporary practitioners.69 In light of this, following the exemplarymodel of Y@jnavalkya discussed above, Vidy@ra>ya enjoins a further stage of renun-ciation, i.e., vidvatsa:ny@sa, which entails a programme of practice that neutralisesobstacles that may arise after non-dual awakening. The renunciation for the gnosticculminates in liberation-while-living or javanmukti, which is beyond any agency oridentificationwith a separate self. Thekeypurpose (prayojana) of achieving javanmuktiis precisely the securingofnon-dual knowing (jn@narak

_s@). Thus, a javanmukta, unlike a

knower of brahman, has transcended all possible obstacles and is thus beyond allinjunctions (or what the Mam@:s@ tradition calls codan@ or vidhi).In the proceeding discussion, we will follow challenges asserted by the fictive

interlocutor (p+rvapak_sin) regarding the very possibility of post-gnosis obstacles.

These challenges elicit Vidy@ra>ya’s appeal to standards determinable through areading of exemplary lives. We will first detail Vidy@ra>ya’s exegesis of the story ofR@ma and Suka from the ‘Laghuyogav@si

_sbha’70 (LYV) and then turn to the story of

Nid@gha from theVi_s>upur@>a. Later, in the next section, wewill pick up on objections

put forth by the p+rvapak_sin, which engender Vidy@ra>ya’s exegetical engagement

with the lives of Janaka, Y@jnavalkya, and Bhagaratha. While it is given thatVidy@ra>ya creatively develops the surplus of meaning provided by his sources,

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our concern here is with his interpretation and application of the life stories ratherthan with the ways in which he departs from his sources.Calling tomind the foundational Advaita Ved@ntic view that the scripturallymedi-

ated realisation of brahman is none other than liberation, the p+rvapak_sin challenges

the coherence of asserting the need for a further renunciation to secure non-dualknowing: ‘in the case of the recognition of reality arisen through proper ways ofknowing what is the possibility of obstacles that are seen to require safeguarding?’71

Vidy@ra>ya replies that ‘when there is lack of mental quiescence (cittavisr@nti), un-certainty (sa:saya), and error (viparyaya) may result’,72 which, he explains later,‘obstruct the fruit of the recognition of reality (tattvajn@na)’.73 We will return toviparyaya shortly, but Vidy@ra>ya elaborates on the nature of sa:saya as follows:

Ignorance and error only obstruct liberation. Uncertainty, however, obstructsboth [worldly] enjoyment and liberation because it is suspended between twoalternatives that are opposed to each other. When one engages in gainingsa:s@ric pleasure, it is hindered by discernment with regard to the path toliberation. And if there is progress on the path to liberation, it is interrupted bydiscernment rooted in [the values of] sa:s@ra. There is, therefore, no pleasurefor the one characterised by uncertainty, thus, in every way, uncertainty is to becut off by one who seeks liberation.74

Vidy@ra>ya sees precisely this type of post-gnosis sa:saya evidenced in the life ofR@ma in the so-called LYV,75 awork that Vidy@ra>ya calls the ‘V@sisbhar@m@ya>a’.76 Aswe will see shortly, although R@ma is portrayed as having attained transcendentinsight in the story, he is left deeply anguished and unable to perform his duties.Recalling an early episode in the V@sisbhar@m@ya>a’s telling of the R@ma story,77

Vidy@ra>ya explains that ‘Visv@mitra points out the uncertainty (sa:saya) of R@ma,who was a knower of reality (tattvavit) before [he had established] mental quies-cence’.78 In other words, according to Vidy@ra>ya, despite having recognised thenon-dual nature of reality, R@ma suffered from uncertainty or indecision until heeventually secured mental quiescence. Let us first unpack the contours of the R@mastory in the V@sisbhar@m@ya>a, which dramatises the way to liberation (mok

_sop@ya),

before returning to Vidy@ra>ya’s argument about the need for safeguarding gnosisafter awakening.79

At the start of the V@sisbhar@m@ya>a (¼LYV), the virtuous prince R@ma is depictedas engaging in frolic and games after departing from school. He is subsequentlyovercome by a longing to visit pilgrimage sites, forests, holy places, and hermitages.Having obtained permission from his father, king Dasaratha, and Vasi

_sbha, the

Brahm@-born teacher (guru) and family priest (purohita) of the solar lineage(s+ryava:sa),80 the prince departs with his brothers and wanders the world visitingauspicious places. When R@ma returns to the palace in Ayodhy@, he contentedlydiscusses the customary practices of the regions (des@c@ra,81 LYV 1.1.26 cd [MU1.3.6 cd]) he had seen. He engages in gnostical conversations with Vasi

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undertakes a hunting expedition with an entourage, and performs various rites. Overtime, however, the fifteen-year-old R@ma falls into a deep sadness; he becomes paleandwithdraws from conversation and interaction as if he were ‘painted in a painting’(lipikarm@rpita, LYV 1.1.36d [MU 1.4.7d]). It is during R@ma’s debilitating period ofdesperation that Visv@mitra, the royal sage who became a brahmin through asceticpractice, arrives in Ayodhy@. Visv@mitra requests Dasaratha to dispatch R@ma on hisbehalf in order to defeat terrible demons who are thwarting the undertaking of asacrifice. During a contentious debate between a reluctant Dasaratha and a persistentVisv@mitra, the prince’s attendants report R@ma’s melancholic state to the king. It isexplained that R@ma remains alone and uninterested in mundane pleasures. Herefuses food, does not take up his duties, and questions the value of wealth andpossessions. Hearing this report about R@ma, Visv@mitra asserts that the prince’senervating confusion is notmere folly but a ‘dispassion that is caused by discernment(viveka)’.82 When R@ma is queried about his state of being, he variously bemoans how‘mind is the cause of all objects’ (citta: k@ra>am arth@n@:, LYV 1.2.50a [MU 1.15.25a])and he laments the ruin of time, the inescapability of old age, and the captivating butsuffering-inducing traps of desire, women, wealth, youthfulness, and even life itself.His insight into the nature of reality and the vicissitudes of sa:s@ric life leave theprince in a paralysing liminality, unable to enjoy the abundant worldly pleasuresavailable to a royal nor the perfect serenity of a javanmukta.In his reading of the R@ma story, Vidy@ra>ya draws attention to Visv@mitra’s re-

sponse to R@ma’s lamentations. Having already pointed out that R@ma’s condition isindicative of genuine discernment, Visv@mitra diagnoses the prince by referencing asimilar case of affliction undergone by Suka, son of Vy@sa. Vidy@ra>ya quotesVisv@mitra’s assessment as follows:

Oh R@ma, most excellent of gnostics, there is nothing else for you to know. Withyour own subtle intellect, you have come to know everything.

Your mind, which has known what is to be known, requires merely quiescenceas in the case of Suka, son of revered [email protected]

R@ma and Suka together provide Vidy@ra>ya with two life stories that furnish thestandard by which Vidy@ra>ya asserts that safeguarding gnosis (jn@narak

_s@) is neces-

sary after the recognition of reality (tattvajn@na).84 Before detailing the story of Suka,it is worth recapitulating Vidy@ra>ya’s argument. His supposition, implied in thep+rvapak

_sin’s query mentioned above, is that safeguarding gnosis is required after

tattvajn@na; this is the case because a lack of mental quiescence, which may causeuncertainty and error, is seen in the lives of gnostics. As support for this position,Vidy@ra>ya cites the life story [email protected]@mahere serves asVidy@ra>ya’s example forwhy safeguarding gnosis is necessary after tattvajn@na because Vidy@ra>ya considersthe prince a ‘knower of reality’ (tattvavit) who is afflicted due to lack of quiescence,which, in this case, leads toa crippling uncertainty (sa:saya). Indeed, it is explainedbyVisv@mitra, who is implicitly a javanmukta, that although R@ma has ‘come to know

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everything’, he requires merely quiescence (visr@nti) as in the case of Suka, to whomwe now turn our attention.In the V@sisbhar@m@ya>a (¼LYV), Suka,85 who is of pure intelligence (amalaprajna),

asks his father onMountMeru: ‘Oh sage, howdid thebedlamthat is sa:s@ra arise?Andhowdoes it becomeextinguished?Ofwhat extent [is it]? Forwhom[has it arisen]?Andwhen?’86 In response, Vy@sa correctly and completely explains the truth to his son.Suka, however, dismissively thinks to himself ‘I previously realised this’ (ajn@si

_sa:

p+rvam etad aham, LYV 1.3.28ab [MU 2.1.16ab]). Recognising his son’s dismissivestance, Vy@sa simply proclaims ‘I do not know’ (n@ham j@n@mi, LYV 1.3.29d [MU2.1.17d]) and tells his son to seek out Janaka, king of Videha, and that ‘from himyou will obtain everything’ (tasm@t sarvam av@psyasi, LYV 1.3.30d [MU 2.1.18d]).When Suka arrives at the gate of the palace, Janaka, in order to test Suka, tells theguards tomake himwait for seven days. Afterwards, Suka is brought to the courtyardfor another seven days, and then, for seven more days, into the women’s quartersfilled with charming ladies, food, and various enjoyments. These passing delights andanxieties, however, do not seize or pull away Suka’s mind; rather, he remains like thecool rays of the full moon: pure (svaccha), silent (maunin), and joyful (mudita). Janaka,recognising Suka’s joyful nature87 and that he has fulfilled all desires and completedall duties of this world, grants Vy@sya’s son an audience, saying to him: ‘what is yourrequest?’ (kim ahita: tava, LYV 1.3.40c [MU 2.1.28c]). Suka, then, asks Janaka the samequery he had put to his father: ‘Oh teacher, how did the bedlam that is sa:s@ra arise?Andhowdoes it becomeextinguished?Quickly, tellme truthfully!’88 Janaka, however,communicates to Suka the very same answer he had received from his own father.Suka, in response, points out that he had already realised this through his own dis-cernment (viveka) and that it is likewise stated in the s@stras. Suka gives voice to hisrealisation as follows: ‘this [is the] conviction (niscaya); namely, that this execrablesa:s@ra, which is without basis [and] which arises through one’s own mentalconstructions (vikalpa), is destroyed on account of the dissolution of one’s ownconstructs’.89 Hearing this, Janaka confirms that there is indeed no higher conviction.What is important to keep inmind forourpurposes is that forVidy@ra>ya, Suka and

R@ma had come to the recognition of reality (tattvajn@na) but due to lack of mentalquiescence remain troubled by uncertainty. In Vidy@ra>ya’s retelling of the story ofSuka, he sets out the events as follows:

Suka, however, having first known the reality (tattva) just on his own was thenuncertain about it. Having asked his father [i.e., Vy@sa], [he was] taught by hisfather in the very same manner. Even then [he was] uncertain about it. So, herespectfully approached Janaka. . ..90

After this summation, Vidy@ra>ya quotes Suka’s ‘conviction’ regarding the baseless,thought-constructed nature of the world and he cites Janaka’s response, whichassures Suka that there is no further understanding beyond what he has realised:‘there is nothing here other than the spirit-soul (pu:s), which is immutable, whose


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nature consists entirely in consciousness. [It appears] bound by the power of one’sown fabrications but without fabrications it is freed’.91 Vidy@ra>ya continues byquoting Janaka’s reassurance to Suka that he has attained what is to be attained(pr@ptam pr@ptavyam) through his complete thinking (p+r>acetas@) (LYV 1.3.50ab[MU 2.1.41ab] at JMV 4.1.13), while imploring him: ‘You do not descend into theseen [i.e., into objects of awareness]. Oh brahmin, [you are] liberated. Release theconfusion’.92 Vidy@ra>ya then quotes the ending of the story:

Taught in this way by the great-souled Janaka, Suka silently settled into one’snatural state that is ultimate reality. Free from trouble, fear, and exertion,without desire, separated from uncertainty, he went to the summit of [Mount]Meru, which is exemplary for the purpose of concentrative absorption(sam@dhi). Having stayed for ten thousand years in the condition of non-conceptual concentrative absorption (nirvikalpasam@dhi),93 he was extinguishedin the Self like a lamp without oil [i.e., like a drop of water into the ocean(salilaka>a iv@mbudhau, LYV 1.3.54 [MU 2.1.45])].94

Vidy@ra>ya’s reading of the V@sisbhar@m@ya>a is sensitive to that work’s depiction ofhow some sageswho have ‘attained the supreme reality’ (pr@pte pare vastuni) may stillhave amind that is not quiescent, which leads to lacking confidence (visv@sa) in whatwas realised (cf. LYV 1.3.23 [MU 2.1.11]). As Vidy@ra>ya puts it: ‘therefore, even whenreality (tattva) is recognised, uncertainty arises for one bereft of quiescence like [inthe cases of] Suka [email protected] that [uncertainty], like not knowing, is anobstacle toliberation’.95

It is worth noting here that in the V@sisbhar@m@ya>a, after telling the story of Suka,Visv@mitra explains that R@ma has the ‘characteristic’ (lak

_sa>a, LYV 1.3.56b [MU

2.2.3b]) of a mind that has ‘known what must be known’ (jn@tajneya, LYV 1.3.56a[MU 2.2.3a]) and thus he no longer relishes or enjoys (

pruc, LYV 1.3.59c [MU

2.2.8c]) objectual experiences. It is precisely the reassurance received from themouthof a good or wise person (sanmukha) that is mentioned as the reason why R@ma will,like Suka, achieve the ultimate peace (LYV 1.3.60 [MU 2.2.11]). This underscores thecritical role that an authoritative, ‘good’ personplays in this settling process,96which,in the case of R@ma and Suka, is required to reassure them of the validity of theirradical insight and to set their mind at ease. Vidy@ra>ya, indeed, emphasises theV@sisbhar@m@ya>a’s frequent insistence on the need for ‘associationwith good people’(e.g., s@dhusa:gama, LYV 5.10.128b [MU 5.93.34b] at JMV 3.2.3) and that ‘you shouldpractise in relation to what is ascertained by the authority of the gurus and s@stras’(gurus@strapram@>ais tu nir>ata: t@vad @cara, LYV 2.1.15 cd [MU 2.9.41 cd] at JMV1.3.31).Returning to the JMV, it will be recalled that Vidy@ra>ya’s initial claim about the

necessity of safeguarding gnosis was because uncertainty and error (viparyaya) mayarise in a gnostic, or knower of brahman, if there is a lack ofmental quiescence. Havingdemonstrated the obstacle of uncertainty in the lives of R@ma and Suka, Vidy@ra>ya

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turns to the story of Nid@gha from the Vi_s>upur@>a97 (Pathak 1997–99), which he

understands as demonstrating the possibility of error after realisation. Vidy@ra>yaexplains that error is of the nature of contrary understanding (viparatabh@van@),98

which is suggestive of how an erroneous view entails a ‘turning around’ or ‘inversion’of the true state of affairs, which overlaps with the Advaita Ved@ntic sense of super-imposition. The valence of error, or viparyaya, is shaped, and linked to sa:saya, when,citing Bhagavadgat@ 4.40, Vidy@ra>ya glosses asraddh@, or lack of trust, with vipar-yaya.99 Error, or contrary understanding, is, in this context, closely connected to aform of trust, i.e., certainty in the non-dual understanding of reality and its status asthe highest good. Vidy@ra>ya sees this sense of post-awakening viparyaya evidencedin the life of Nid@gha, who is taught by Obhu in the Vi

_s>upur@>a (VP),100 a work that

sets forth its own advaita-inflected stance or what might be called ‘Vi_s>vadvaita’

(Goudriaan 1994).101 Obhu and Nid@gha, notably, attain a certain prestige in relationto the teaching of advaita (broadly construed) as their frequent appearance togetherin later literature suggests.102

At the start of the Obhu–Nid@gha story,103 the sage Obhu, a son of Brahm@ who‘naturally’ understands the nature of reality, is portrayed as having imparted thetotality of knowledge (prad@t ase

_savijn@nam, VP 2.15.4c) to his disciple Nid@gha. It is

explained, however, that ‘[although] Nid@gha is one who had attained true know-ledge, thatObhudidnot reflect onhis inclination towardnon-duality’.104 Indeed, afterone thousand years had passed, Obhu went to see his student Nid@gha. When hearrives, Nid@gha, a ‘knower of yoga’105 (yogajna, VP 2.15.7c), is finishing the vaisvadevaritual, the ‘sacrifice pertaining to all gods’, perhaps here indicating the ceremonialoffering of cooked food before eating.106 Nid@gha extends the respectful receptionduly afforded a guest and invites the as-of-yet unrecognised visitor to join him for ameal at his home. After Obhu eats the sweet foods he had requested, Nid@gha asksObhu if hewas satisfied with the food, where he is from, andwhere he is going. Obhu’ssharp replies deconstruct assumptions embedded within Nid@gha’s mundane ques-tions. Obhu, for example, distinguishes the elemental body that undergoes hunger,thirst, contentment, etc., from the self,107 which is not joined (

pyuj) with states and is

ever satisfied (i.e., in its own nature). Undermining Nid@gha’s sense that the self hasmovement and positionality in an entitative world, Obhu states:

Given that this spirit-soul is omnipresent, all pervasive like space – [questionssuch as:] ‘Why? Where? To what place will you go?’ – how is [saying] this evenmeaningful? I neither go nor come, nor [is my] residence in one place. You arenot you, and others are not others, neither am I even myself.108

In reply, Nid@gha says: ‘hearing these words of yours, my confusion is destroyed’(na

_sbo mohas tav@kar>ya vac@:sy et@ni me, VP 2.15.33 cd). Obhu, who characterises

his advaitic teaching as the highest good (param@rtha, VP 2.15.34d), underscores hisinstruction: ‘Know that the entirety of theworld is one andwithout division, [it] is thenature of the highest self that is spoken of as V@sudeva’.109 Despite his earlier claim


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about the dispelling of his delusion, it becomes clear that Nid@gha has not firmlysecured anon-dual realisation. After one thousandyears,whenObhu returns, the sageseesNid@gha coming back fromthe forestwith kindling sticks and kusagrass. Nid@ghadoes not recognise Obhu, and a humorous exchange ensues when the latter asks theformer what he is doing. In this short dialogue, Obhu skilfully poses questions thatundermine Nid@gha’s sense of directionality (i.e., ‘above’ [+rdhva] and ‘below’ [adhas],VP 2.16.11 cd) and the identity of apparently distinct entities. After such queries,Nid@gha recognises that his interlocutor is his beloved teacher Obhu, whosemind has the perfected impression of non-duality (advaitasa:sk@rasa:skPta,110 VP2.16.16ab). Obhu, then, succinctly imparts the essence of the highest truth (para-m@rthas@ra): ‘the non-duality of all’ (advaitam ase

_sata$, VP 2.16.18d). Through his

teacher’s instruction (upadesa), Nid@gha ‘became intent on the supreme non-duality’(advaitaparo ’bhavat, VP 2.16.19d).It will be recalled that Vidy@ra>ya tells the story of Nid@gha in support of his claim

that error may arise after tattvajn@na if there is a lack of quiescence. As Vidy@ra>yaputs it, ‘Nid@gha is also an example of error’.111 As evident from Vidy@ra>ya’s sum-mation of the Nid@gha story, non-dual awakening is not necessarily stable112 and, inthe case of Nid@gha, requires repetitive instruction from a liberated teacher:

Out of supreme compassion, Obhu went to Nid@gha’s house. Having repeatedlyawakened him, [Obhu] departed. Although awakened, Nid@gha is one who lackstrust in the essence of his [i.e., Obhu’s] teaching. Having acquired the error(viparyaya) that ritual actions alone are the cause of the highest human good,[Nid@gha], in the same way as before, performed ritual action. The teacher [i.e.,Obhu], out of compassion, returned again and awakened [him], thinking: ‘Let itnot be the case that the student deviates from the highest human aim’. Eventhen, [Nid@gha] did not give up the error. However, by the third awakening,[Nid@gha] abandoned the error and attained quiescence.113

Perhaps picking up on the fact that in the Vi_s>upur@>aNid@gha is portrayed perform-

ing the vaisvadeva sacrifice and, onObhu’s third visit, carrying kindlingwood and kusagrass, Vidy@ra>ya holds that Nid@gha lapsed into a ritualist understanding of reality,an inversion of the Advaita Ved@ntic view of the highest good. From this vantagepoint, although Nid@gha was awakened, he lacked trust in the truth of the non-dualteaching, returning to the erroneous belief that ritual performance is the cause of thesupreme aim. Vidy@ra>ya’s assessment that Nid@gha resumes the practice of ritualaligns with what Vidy@ra>ya elsewhere calls the ‘addiction to ritual performance’,which is a subset of impure v@san@s associated with tradition (s@stra).114 It will beremembered that impure v@san@s may persist after tattvajn@na if one has not suffi-ciently subdued them before realisation.115 Indeed, v@san@, not unlike the vital force(pr@>a), is linked to the arising (ud

ppat) of the mind and its stimulation (pra

par) (cf.

JMV 3.2.12–14), from which various forms of agitation ensue. Following the LYV,

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Vidy@ra>ya positions v@san@, mind, and pr@>a116 as constituting an interrelatednexus, each evocative of, and closely identified with, the other:

As long as the mind has not disappeared, there is no effacement of latenttendencies. As long as latent tendencies are not effaced, the mind is not paci-fied.117 From the power of latent tendencies, there [arises] the pulsation ofpr@>a, and through that [pulsation of pr@>a], there [arises] latent tendency.118

The movement of the air/breath of pr@>a is exactly the same as the movementof the mind. Effort should be made by the highly intelligent to end the pulsationof [email protected] By means of the firm practice of breath control [cf. JMV 3.4], and bymeans of the methods of postures and diet [cf. JMV 3.3] that were skilfullypresented by the teacher, the pulsation of pr@>a is restrained.120 By giving uplatent tendencies and through the cessation of the pulsation of pr@>a, the mindbecomes the condition of mindlessness. Therefore, do whichever you want.121

In that way, the interdependent122 disciplines for manon@sa and v@san@k_saya, when

understood as the principal dharma of vidvatsa:ny@sa, are intended to counteractobstacles that arise after realisation, which are understood in relation to the inter-twined psychophysiological functionality of the transmigrating being; namely,v@sanic conditioning, the activity of the mind, and the flow of pr@>a.Having cited the lives of three exemplary sages, R@ma, Suka, and Nid@gha, which

collectively attest to the possibility of post-gnosis obstacles, Vidy@ra>ya concludes:

Therefore, on account of the obstacle defined as the obstruction of the fruit ofthe recognition of reality, safeguarding [of gnosis] is necessary for one whosemind lacks quiescence due to the possibility of uncertainty and error. However,for one whose mind is quiescent – when through the disappearance of the mindthe world is dissolved – what possibility is there of uncertainty and error?123

In other words, the life stories of R@ma, Suka, and Nid@gha demonstrate that uncer-tainty and error, which obstruct non-dual knowing, are possible for a gnostic wholacks mental quiescence. In order to safeguard non-dual knowing, the gnostic shouldpractise the disciplines formanon@sa and v@san@k

_saya (not only before but also) after

the recognition of reality in order to neutralise potential obstacles. The apotheosis ofmanon@sa is nirvikalpasam@dhi, the quintessence of quiescence, wherein the story ofthe world, which revolves in the representations of the mind, is ‘dissolved’.124

Although Vidy@ra>ya upholds that the javanmukta is active ‘in’ the world withoutany blemishes or obstacles whatsoever, he also likens the final stage of javanmukti toan imperturbable and enduring [email protected] When modelled through the‘seven stages of yoga’ (JMV 4.1.34) adapted from the LYV, this is called turya, whichentails the state of absorption in theonenatural condition (svabh@vaikani

_sbhatva-) and

the utter non-apprehension of difference (bhedasy@nupalambhana-) (LYV 3.9.123 [MU3.118.15] at JMV4.1.44).Wewill recall that in the storyof Sukadetailedabove, after theson of Vy@sa received clarifying reassurance from Janaka, he was ‘separated from


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uncertainty’ and remained in nirvikalpasam@dhi until he was ‘extinguished in the Selflike a lamp without oil’.

Y@jnavalkya, Bhagaratha, and the persistence of latent tendencies

The biographies of R@ma, Suka, and Nid@gha discussed above provide authoritativestandards by which Vidy@ra>ya asserts that uncertainty (sa:saya) and error (vipar-yaya) are possible after tattvajn@na if there is a lack of mental quiescence. This, there-fore, indicates the necessity of continuing to practice disciplines for manon@sa afterawakening in order to restrain themind and, ultimately, to bring about the cessationof mental events. As noted, Vidy@ra>ya also posits that impure latent tendencies(malinav@san@) may persist after the recognition of reality and ‘obstruct the stabilityof knowing in the gnostic’.126 Vidy@ra>ya therefore holds that the gnostic, or knowerof brahman, should continue to carry out practices for v@san@k

_saya after awakening,

which, along with the disciplines for manon@sa, are enjoined as the principal dharmaduring the renunciation for the gnostic (vidvatsa:ny@sa). In order to counteract theimpure tendency of pride, for example, Vidy@ra>ya teaches the practice of discern-ment: ‘. . .onewho is afflictedby impure latent tendencies, suchaspride of knowledge,pride of wealth, pride about the customary practice of [one’s] family, etc., ought topractice discernment (viveka), which is antithetical to those [impure tendencies]’.127

As an example of the application of viveka, Vidy@ra>ya cites the following verses fromthe storyof Janaka in theV@sisbhar@m@ya>a (¼LYV), anarrativewewill turn to shortly:

Those who are at the height of the great ones today, plummet downward withindays. Come on, mind! How can there be confidence in your greatness?

Where is the wealth of kings? Or where are the worlds of Brahm@? They arepast and gone. How can you be so confident?

Crores of Brahm@s have perished. Constant successions of heavens have dis-appeared. Kings have vanished like dust. How can I enjoy my [brief] life?

The closing and opening of the eyes of those [like Brahm@] is the dissolution andarising of worlds. Even beings like that are destroyed. What is the worth of abeing like me?128

Vidy@ra>ya’s claim that continued practice of viveka, such as modelled in the aboveverses, may be necessary after tattvajn@na to subdue impure v@san@s, provokes thefictive interlocutor, who points out that discernment, between that which is eternaland non-eternal (nity@nityavastuviveka), is considered one of the four means(s@dhanacatu

_sbaya) to gnosis (JMV 2.8.6). In an obvious reference to the preliminary

qualities establishedby Sa:karaat the start ofhis commentaryon theBrahmas+tra,129

the objector holds that discernment must precede the recognition of reality. Thep+rvapak

_sin asserts that to apply discernment after the recognition of reality, as a

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means of effacing latent tendencies in order to secure liberation-while-living, is animproper ‘dance’. Vidy@ra>ya responds as follows:

This is not a problem. [The view that] knowledge of brahman [arises] afterwardsfor someone who has accomplished the fourfold means [i.e., viveka, etc.] is thegreat royal path practised by, and common to, all people. However, merely byhearing the song of the perfected beings (siddha), the recognition of realitysuddenly arose for Janaka, like a fallen fruit from the sky, due to the ripeningof the mass of [his] earlier merit. Therefore, [the view that] this discernment(viveka) is practiced for quiescence of the mind, [which is asserted] in thissection, is a proper ‘dance’.130

Vidy@ra>ya upholds, and does not see his teaching as contradicting, what he calls the‘royal path’, which assumes the traditional, preliminary qualities required for under-takingan investigation intobrahman.131However, citing the remarkable awakeningofJanaka in the V@sisbhar@m@ya>a (¼LYV), a figure we have already encountered abovein the narrative of Suka, Vidy@ra>ya acknowledges the possibility of a sudden(akasm@t) realisation that is ‘like a fallen fruit from the sky’ (@k@saphalap@tavat132),whichoccursoutside the typical soteriological sequence. Janaka isportrayed asenter-ing a delightful garden, wherein he hears the song of invisible, perfected beings, orsiddhas, who are chanting about the reality of the Self (@tmatattva, LYV 5.1.22 [MU5.8.9]) and the power of discernment (viveka), the latter being compared to Indra’sthunderbolt (vajra) (cf. LYV5.1.29 [MU5.8.17]). Havingheard the siddhas’ pristine songabout non-duality, Janakabecomes fearful, departs fromhis retinue, andundertakes aprofound inquiry into thenature of experience. The king questions the transitory andmomentary character of empirical life, the insignificance of the human lifespan,kingship, andwealth, and bemoans the tendency to identify with, or claim ownershipover, the ‘delusion consisting of an empty body in a bad dream that is the night ofsa:s@ra’ (sa:s@rar@tridussvapne s+nye dehamaye bhrame, LYV5.1.43ab [MU5.9.25ab]). Itis through this process of reflection, initiatedmerely through hearing the song of the‘verywise, eminent siddhas’ (vibudhais s@dhubhis siddhai$, LYV 5.1.57ab [MU5.9.63ab]),that Janaka is quickly enlightened: ‘I am awakened! I am awakened! I have seen thethief of the Self. I will strike him down right now. For too long, I am struck by themind’.133

Vidy@ra>ya holds that Janaka, due to the ripening of his past merit, merely neededto hear the chant of the enlightened siddhas to initiate a complete inversion, orturning around of his attention from objects in the world and toward a critical inves-tigation of experience. In that way, Janaka may not have previously developed in thislife all of the qualities associated with the Sa:karite fourfold means, which qualify aperson as eligible for enquiry into brahman, nor studied under an accomplished teach-er, and yet he quickly gained full awakening. Although Janaka is cited here as a specialcase, Vidy@ra>ya’s reference to this life story allows for the possibility of a sageachieving non-dual liberation outside of the disciplinary specificities of a


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Sa:karite samprad@ya, although it is assumed that such a sage must have met thenecessary qualifications in a previous life.While the story of Janaka demonstrates an exception to the typical soteriological

progression in Advaita Ved@nta, so that awakeningmay occur ‘like a fallen fruit fromthe sky’, Vidy@ra>ya did not directly respond to the objector’smain challenge regard-ing the sensibility of practicing viveka after the recognition of reality. Indeed, whilegranting the example of Janaka, the p+rvapak

_sin doubles downby asserting that viveka

is synchronouswith gnosis (jn@na) and therefore impure v@san@s donot continue aftertattvajn@na. Indeed, thep+rvapak

_sin challenges thecoherenceofVidy@ra>ya’s position

that the practice of pure tendencies (suddhav@san@bhy@sa), such as discernment(viveka), should be carried out after tattvajn@na:

Now, since it is fruitless for the renouncer who is a gnostic to undertakelistening, etc., which are the means to knowing, and since one should notundertake that which is impossible to do, not do, or do otherwise, given thenature of knowing, what kind of practice, even subsidiary, could there be [forhim]?134

As we may now expect, Vidy@ra>ya justifies his position that the practice of purev@san@s is necessary after awakening by appealing to the life stories of canonical sages:

No, although there is a lack of the continuation of those [impure latent ten-dencies] in Janaka, the continuation of them are seen in Y@jnavalkya,Bhagaratha, etc. Assuredly, there was ample pride of knowledge (vidy@mada)in Y@jnavalkya and his interlocutors, U

_sasta [C@kr@ya>a], Kohola

[Kau_satakeya], and others, because they were all engaged in a victory-seeking

debate.135

In terms of the argument involved here, Vidy@ra>ya claims that impure v@san@smay persist in a gnostic or knower of brahman. This is so because impure v@san@s areseen to persist in gnostics, such as Y@jnavalkya and Bhagaratha. Vidy@ra>ya, then,takes up the story of Y@jnavalkya, which returns us to the exemplar whomVidy@ra>ya had utilised to determine that vidvatsa:ny@sa is different from and theresult of vividi

_s@sa:ny@sa. Although Vidy@ra>ya considers Y@jnavalkya to be an au-

thentic knower of brahman, he holds that the account of him in BPhad@ra>yakaUpani

_sad 3 indicates that he is not without flaws; indeed, he points out that the com-

petitive theological debates depicted in thatwork demonstrate that Y@jnavalkya, andhis interlocutors U

_sasta, Kohola, among others, were prideful about their learning

and desirous of victory.The p+rvapak

_sin does not challenge Vidy@ra>ya’s claim that Y@jnavalkya was ar-

rogant but that he was actually a knower of brahman. In particular, the fictive inter-locutor alleges that Y@jnavalkya did not have ‘proper knowing’ (samyagvedana), i.e.,knowledge of brahman (brahmavidy@), but that he hadonly a circumstantial or indirect

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(parok_sa) understanding (JMV 2.9.3,5,7). In reply, Vidy@ra>ya points out that the dia-

logue had for its object of inquiry the direct and immediate understanding of brahman(JMV 2.9.4,8, cf. [email protected]), which ensures that Y@jnavalkya and his interlocutors wereindeed knowers of brahman (brahmavid). After responding to other doubts raised bythe p+rvapak

_sin relating to the status of a gnostic vis-a-vis onewho is liberated-while-

living, Vidy@ra>ya asserts that:

Y@jnavalkya, however, during the period of his life wherein he was desirous ofvictory [in debate], was not of this type [i.e., liberated-while-living] due to thefact he still needed to carry out the renunciation for the gnostic (vidvat-sa:ny@sa) for the purpose of mental quiescence (cittavisr@nti). He was not merelydesirous of victory but also had a great thirst for wealth (dhanatP

_s>a).

Consequently, driving off the thousand decorated cows that were placed infront of the many knowers of brahman, he even declared this: ‘We honour thoseestablished in brahman, but we only desire the cows’ (B@U 3.1.2). . . . On accountof this, the rest of the knowers of brahman, having thought that their prize wasdriven off, were angered. And, overcome (paravasa) with anger, [Y@jnavalkya]killed S@kalya by casting a curse.136

In the above passage, Vidy@ra>ya argues that during the period of Y@jnavalkya’s lifedepicted in BPhad@ra>yaka Upani

_sad 3, Y@jnavalkya was a knower of brahman who

remained susceptible to impure tendencies and was therefore not yet a javanmukta.In particular, Vidy@ra>ya draws attention to the sacrifice sponsored by Janaka atwhich the king of Videha announces that whoever is the most learned is entitled tothe luxurious prize of a thousand cows, each of which is adorned with pieces of gold.Without having demonstrated his superior learning, Y@jnavalkya presumptuouslytells his student S@masravas to take the cows. Vidy@ra>ya assesses Y@jnavalkya’sactions in this story—including his flippant claim that he only desires the cows—asindicating not only a yearning for victory, betraying a sense of self-importance, butalso a thirst for wealth, or a continued investment in the acquisition of objects.Vidy@ra>ya points out that when Y@jnavalkya, whose ‘mockery of the brahmins [atthe debate] is unmistakable’ (Fiser 1984, p.75), claims Janaka’s prize, it angers(cukrudhu$, cf. B@U 3.1.2) the other knowers of brahman. These gnostics subsequentlychallenge Y@jnavalkya to a theological disputation, which culminates in the death ofthe last debater, Vidagdha [email protected] On Vidy@ra>ya’s reading of the story, it wasprecisely because Y@jnavalkya was overcome with anger (krodha) that he killedS@kalya by casting a curse;138 namely, the well-known declaration ‘your head willshatter apart’ (m+rdh@ te vipati

_syati).139 Unlike in the case of the gnostic Y@jnavalkya,

for a javanmukta, Vidy@ra>ya argues, there is no possibility of anger (cf. JMV 4.3.4)since v@san@k

_saya has been achieved, which entails an unfaltering inner coolness

(anta$satalatva-, JMV4.5.7) characterisedas the extinctionof thirst (tP_s>@y@$ samanam,

JMV 4.5.8). Having demonstrated that a gnostic, or knower of brahman, remains sus-ceptible to impure v@san@s through his careful reading of an episode in the life of the


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sage Y@jnavalkya, Vidy@ra>ya asserts his conclusion, which is a restatement of hisoriginal thesis: ‘What more is there to say? Impure latent tendencies persist inknowers of brahman beginning with Y@jnavalkya’.140 It will be recalled, however,that Vidy@ra>ya had mentioned two sages whose lives evidence the persistence oflatent tendencies after tattvajn@na: Y@jnavalkya and Bhagaratha. Having demon-strated his claim through the life story of Y@jnavalkya, Vidy@ra>ya now turns tothe account of the famed Bhagaratha, a descendent of Sagara, a king of [email protected]

In both the R@m@ya>a andMah@bh@rata, Bhagaratha is depicted as having forced theGang@ down from the sky to the earth in order to perform funerary libations for thesixty thousand slaughtered sons of Sagara, who could only reach heaven if thewatersof the Gang@ purified their ashes. After being granted boons for his extreme asceti-cism (first by Brahm@ and then by Siva), Bhagaratha secured an heir and caused theGang@, through the mediation of Siva, to be brought down to the earth, which led tothe heavenly ascension of his slain ancestors.142 While these events are part of whatmight be called themainstream story of Bhagaratha, Vidy@ra>ya refers to the esotericrendering of his life in theV@sisbhar@m@ya>a (¼LYV). Following apattern among someother characters portrayed in the MU/LYV (cf. Madaio 2019), the highly virtuous(paramadh@rmika) Bhagaratha undertakes an investigation into the nature and futilityof worldly life. Frightened (bhata) by the sa:s@ric condition, with an anxious mind(udvignama>as), he consults his teacher (guru) Tritula. After an initial exchange pro-voked by the king’s query about how to end all suffering (du$kha), old age (jar@), death(mara>a), delusion (moha), etc.,143 Tritula assures him that the @tman is ‘omnipresent,eternal, [and] neither sets nor rises’ (sarvagato nitya: n@stam eti na codayam, LYV6.8.18 cd [MU 6.78.24 cd]). In reply, Bhagaratha petitions his preceptor as follows:

Oh great sage, I know that consciousness-only is all pervasive, peaceful, pure,imperishable [and] something other than the body, etc. But, oh master, myunderstanding on this point is not clear. How can I be one whose cognition isalways limited to this?144

Not unlike R@ma and Sukha, Bhagaratha is shown in the above passage to have anunderstanding of non-duality, but one that is not stabilised. As the dialogue proceeds,the king asks his teacher: ‘oh great fortuned one, tell me how the I-state, whichhas been rooted for a long time in this body of mine like a tree on a mountain, isdiscarded’.145 In reply to his student, Tritula elaborates:

If you have pacified all identifying distinctions, are fearless, have relinquished allimpulses, have become free from all possessions and have given the entirety of yourroyal fortune to your enemies, [if] you have pacified your individuality, and havecast off the urges of the body, [if] you wander while seeking only alms, and haveeven given up me, then you will become higher than the highest.146

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Following Tritula’s instructions, Bhagaratha renounces all of his possessions andrelationships, including his kingdom, which he gives to his enemy. Taking up thelife of an ascetic, he wanders anonymously, finally attaining quiescence in the Self(pr@pa visr@ntim @tmani, LYV 6.8.38d [MU 6.79.8d]). After the people of a nearby king-dom, whose king had died, beg Bhagaratha to become their monarch, he agrees andtakes up the role of a king. Now implicitly a javanmukta, who is impartial (sama),dispassionate (vatar@ga), unselfish (vimatsara), and quiescent in mind (s@ntamanas),Bhagaratha later undertakes extreme tapas for thousands of years, which brings downthe Gang@ (eponymously known as the ‘Bh@garatha’) for the crossing over of hisancestors.What is particularly important for Vidy@ra>ya’s interpretation of the Bhagaratha

story from the V@sisbhar@m@ya>a (¼LYV) is how the king is initially portrayed ashaving an understanding of non-duality but one that is not stable. Indeed, despiteasserting that it is consciousness alone that is all pervasive and quiescent, the kingasks his teacher how the I-state or egoity, which is rooted in the felt sense of being abounded, embodied being, can be completely given up.Vidy@ra>yaunderstands the I-sense as an impure tendency; as he puts it elsewhere: ‘impure tendencies, such as theI-sense, personal ownership, desire, anger, etc., arise in the present birth, withoutinstruction from another, due to the intense conditioning [that is acquired] overmany lives’.147 And it is precisely the continued presence of impure v@san@s, suchas the I-sense or egoity, that causemental disturbances, which Vidy@ra>ya detects inthe life story of Bhagaratha: ‘while ruling his kingdom, even though he had realisedreality, Bhagaratha lacked mental quiescence (cittavisr@nti) due to impure latent ten-dencies (malinav@san@). . .. Having renounced everything, Bhagaratha, after sometime,was peaceful’.148 On this reading, althoughBhagarathawas a knower of brahman,who had a genuine realisation of the non-dual nature of reality, it was necessary forhim to undergo a profound renunciation, which led to the subduing, or giving up, ofimpure v@san@s. In thatway, just asVidy@ra>ya sees the life stories of R@ma, Suka, andNid@gha as demonstrating that uncertainty and error are possible if mental quies-cence is not established before tattvajn@na, the paradigmatic lives of Y@jnavalkya andBhagaratha evidence how impure tendencies, such as greed, anger, and egoity, persistafter awakening if they are not sufficiently effaced before realisation. As noted above,mind and v@san@, in conjunctionwith pr@>a, form an interrelated nexus thatmaps thesubtle functionality of the transmigrating being, which is critical to understandingwhy the disciplines that bring about tattvajn@na, manon@sa, and v@san@k

_saya are

enjoined simultaneously, but with different emphasis during vividi_s@sa:ny@sa and

vidvatsa:ny@sa.

Conclusion

The works of the patronised scholars aligned with the SPngerimabha during the earlySangama dynasty can be rightly described as ‘totalising’ (Galewicz 2009; cf. Pollock2001) in their construction of an encompassing brahmanical episteme, which, it


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should be emphasised, positions the highest good in relation to Advaita Ved@ntictheology. There is, indeed, a striking breadth and orchestrated coherence toM@dhava-Vidy@ra>ya’s extensive oeuvre,149 which invites extratextual speculationon the interplay between the author’s sacerdotal aims and the imperial agenda of hispatrons. Innovatively expanding on the nature of renunciation adumbrated in thevoluminous commentarial exposition on the Par@sarasmPti, the JMVhas functioned asa kind of governing text within Advaita Ved@nta on issues associated with renunci-ation and yoga (Madaio 2016). Our principal interest in this article, however, has beenin identifying and exploring a key feature of the JMV’s narrative theology, whichreads and retells canonical life narratives in order to discern and establish dharma onthe path to non-dual liberation.Vidy@ra>ya’s scriptural hermeneutics does not brush over stories of sages asmere-

ly rhetorical or eulogistic in favour of sifting out philosophical statements that dis-close advaitic truth; rather, it is through a close reading of life stories that orthopraxyon the path to liberation is established. Taking seriously plot and character develop-ment, Vidy@ra>ya assesses the liberative status of canonical sages, including particu-lar afflictions and appropriate remedies. The stories serve not only as scripturalsources from which praxeological and theological issues are determined but also asexamples inVidy@ra>ya’s argumentation,which is critical to the substantiation of hisclaimswithin the text’s simulated debate. Drawing on the lives of Y@jnavalkya, R@ma,Suka, Nid@gha, Janaka, and Bhagaratha, among others, Vidy@ra>ya illumines the pathto liberation through biographies that establish not only what is normative but alsowhat is possible. Through this method of storytelling, the narratives of sages shapethe lives of practitioners, who conform to, and are informed by, exemplary narrativemodels.

Funding

Research for this article has been funded by the Czech Science Foundation (GACR),within the project 21-31380S.

Acknowledgements

My thanks to Patrick Cummins for many helpful comments, as well as JonathanDuquette, Rembert Lutjeharms, Lucian Wong, and the anonymous reviewers.

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Notes

1 The identity of M@dhava and Vidy@ra>ya has been a long-standing issue of debate,particularly since there were multiple M@dhavas during this period. As I demonstratelater in the article, the M@dhava who authored the Pur@>as@ra, Par@saram@dhavaya (orPar@sarasmPtivy@khy@), K@lanir>aya (or K@lam@dhava), and Jaiminayany@yam@l@ (and theauto-commentary) is also the author of the Javanmuktiviveka (JMV), a work ascribed toVidy@ra>ya. See infra 23. There is textual evidence, not elaborated here, that suggeststhis same author also wrote other Advaita Ved@ntic works, presumably in the latterportion of his prolific career. As explained later, it appears Vidy@ra>ya is the nameadopted byM@dhavawhen he underwent formal renunciation. Throughout the article,I refer to Vidy@ra>ya when referencing the JMV but opt for M@dhava (or M@dhava-Vidy@ra>ya) when citing or implicating works that were written under the nameM@dhava.

2 As Filliozat notes, ‘no contemporary inscription referring to the event attests to thefoundation of the city under Vidy@ra>ya’s council’ (Filliozat 1973, p.xxv). Over a cen-tury ago, this observation had already led to the suggestion that ‘it is likely that he [i.e.,Vidy@tartha, who was Vidy@ra>ya’s predecessor and guru] helped the royal brothers infounding the Vijayanagara kingdom, though his disciple Vidy@ra>ya is generallybelieved to have done so’ (ARMAD 1916 [pub. 1917], p.15).

3 Emerging between 1336 and 1346, the Sangama dynasty was followed by the Saluva(1485–505) and Tulluva (1505–65).

4 On later depictions that implicate Vidy@ra>ya in the founding of the kingdom but alsodiffer onvariouspoints, seeARMAD (1928 [pub. 1929], pp.15–21; 1932 [pub. 1935], pp.100–23; 1933 [pub. 1936a], p.145) and Wagoner (1993, 2000). Vidy@ra>ya’s advisory role inestablishing the kingdom is mentioned in the c. 1535 chronicle of the Portuguese traderFernaoNunes, seeFilliozat (1999 [1977], pp.132–3), and in the c. 1800 travelogueof FrancisBuchanan (1807, p.114).

5 For a helpful discussion of the multifaceted nature ofmabhas, see Stoker (2016, pp.9–11).6 Despite an absence of evidence for an Advaita Ved@ntic mabha at SPngeri before the

fourteenth century, i.e., the mabha ‘. . .is not mentioned in inscriptions till the time ofVidy@tartha. . .’. (ARMAD 1916 [pub. 1917], p.11), tradition holds that it was one of thefour (or five) institutions founded by the eighth-century Sa:kara during his legendary‘conquest of all directions’. On SPngeri, see Venkataraman (1969), Shastri (1999 [1982]),and Clark (2006). More generally, on the fivemajormabhas, and contemporarymabh@d-hipatis (i.e., the Sa:kar@c@ryas or jagadgurus), see Cenkner (1995 [1983]).

7 The most well-known works attributed to Bh@ratatartha, who was a disciple ofVidy@tartha, include the Vaiy@sikany@yam@l@, DPgdPsyaviveka, and possibly theVivara>aprameyasangraha. He is also the author of the Pancadasa , although quite a fewlater Ved@ntins hold that Vidy@ra>ya also penned portions of that (likely composite)text.

8 See the 1386 copper plate grant of Harihara II (ARMAD 1933 [pub. 1936a], p.142) foreloquent descriptions of Vidy@tartha, Bh@ratatartha, and Vidy@ra>ya. The inscriptionalrecord, and praise verses in M@dhava-Vidy@ra>ya’s works, support the view thatVidy@tartha was the most important teacher at SPngeri during the emergence of theVijayanagara kingdom, perhaps even ‘the greatest’ (ARMAD 1916 [pub. 1917], p.15)mahant of the lineage.

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9 AtK@lanir>aya 1.5 (Tark@lank@ra 1885, p.5) it is explained: ‘For the very foolish people inthis world (iha), the J@hnava [i.e., the Gang@] is the one ford. For all of those for whomright discrimination has arisen, [the one ford] is Vidy@tartha [i.e., lit., the ford of know-ledge], who is pure by nature. It is said that Bh@ratatartha grants the primary happinessfor all. On account of affection for them, mymind has expanded and I have [as a result]the ability to discriminate [in this work]’. vy@m+nh@n@m iha tanubhPt@: j@hnava tarthameka: | vidy@tartha: prakPtivimala: sadvivekoday@n@m k sarve

_s@: tat prathamasukhada:

bh@ratatartham @hu$ | tadbh@v@nme vipulamanaso niscaye saktir asti kThe Javanmuktiviveka(JMV) commences with the following benedictory verse: ‘I pay obeisance to him, thegreat lord Vidy@tartha, whose breath are the Vedas, who fashioned the whole world onthe basis of the Vedas’. yasya ni$svasita: ved@ yo vedebhyo ’khila: jagat | nirmame tamaha: vande vidy@tarthamahesvaram k JMV 1.0.1. Citations to the JMV follow the Sanskritand numbering in Goodding’s (2002) critical edition. On the importance of the afore-mentioned verse from the JMV, which also features in the commentaries on the vedalinked to M@dhava, his brother S@ya>a, and a team of brahmin scholars, see Olivelle(1981b).

10 Sa:kar@nanda is an important but understudied figure who authored, among otherworks, the T@tparyabodhina , which is a commentary on the Bhagavadgat@, the?tmapur@>a, and numerous glosses (dapik@) on a variety of Upani

_sads.

11 ‘The one whose mother is Sramata, whose father is the glorious M@ya>a, whose twobrothers are S@ya>a and Bhogan@tha, who are [partnered like] mind and wisdom,whose s+tra is the Baudh@yana, whose [Vedic] branch is the Yajur, whose lineage isthe Bh@radv@ja, that one, indeed, is the all-knowing M@dhava. That M@dhava, who is apromoter of all of the Pur@>as and Sa:hit@s [and] a defender of the beauty of the smPtis,commences the commentary on the Par@sarasmPti for the acquisition of what is desiredby people and taught in the smPtis about this world and beyond’. sramata janana yasyasukartir m@ya>a$ pit@ | s@ya>o bhogan@thas ca manobuddhisahodarau k yasya baudh@yana:s+tra: s@kh@ yasya ca y@ju

_sa | bh@radv@ja: kula: yasya sarvajna$ sa hi m@dhava$ k sa

m@dhava$ sakalapur@>asa:hit@pravarttaka$ smPtisu_sam@par@sara$ |

par@varasmPtajagadahit@ptaye par@sara-smPtivivPttau pravarttate k Par@[email protected]–8 in Isl@mapurkar (1893, p.4–5).

12 As noted by Galewicz (2009, pp.57–8, 67–9), at Jaiminayany@yam@l@ 1.3, king Bukka isidentified with Siva’s form of preservation, which is one of the five forms of the god. Inthe auto-commentary or vistara (Goldstucker 1865, p.3), the point is partly elaboratedas follows: ‘Among these five forms, he, i.e., the king, assumes the role of preservation.The sageVidy@tartha, shining in the self of this embodied form [of the king], is said to bean embodied form beneficial to the entire world. Because this king is the highestbrahman spoken of in Ved@nta [i.e., the Upani

_sads], and because he is Mahesvara’s

form of preservation taught in the [Saiva-]?gama, and because the sage Vidy@tarthashines as present in the self of him [i.e., the king], this king’s omniscience is thereforecertainly apparent from the court of scholars to the cowherds’. tatra t@su m+rti

_sv aya:

bh+p@la$ sthitim+rti: dhatte | tasy@m+rter @tmani lasan vidy@tarthamuni$ kPtsnasya jagato’nugr@hik@ m+rtir ity ucyate k yasm@d aya: bh+po ved@ntokta: para: brahma yasm@cc@gamokt@mahesvarasya sthitim+rtir yasm@c ca sravidy@tarthamunis tad@tmani sa:nidh@yaprak@sate | tasm@t sarvajnatvam asya r@jna utkar

_se>@vidvadangan@gop@lamaviv@dena


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pratibh@sate k For an approach to the mutual legitimating power dynamics entailed inthedeification and identificationofVidy@tartha andBukka, seeGalewicz (2009, pp.54–7,63–71). The Saiva allegiance of the Advaita Ved@nta tradition at SPngeri, closely linkedto the temple complex ofVir+p@k

_sa (Verghese 1995, pp.17–22), the tutelary deity of the

kingdom, is well-known.13 There are copper inscriptions and kanitas that purport earlier events that feature

Vidy@ra>ya (e.g., UVAT 1985, pp.33–68), which align with elements of the hagiograph-ical traditions prevalent in the sixteenth century. Filliozat (1973, pp.xiv–xv), for ex-ample, argues forcibly against their historical veracity.

14 The dharmas@stric tradition of local adjudication, which runs parallel to state govern-ment forms of law, provided a means by which ‘the standards of orthodoxy and right-eousness of a given locale or group could continually be adapted to the needs anddesires of its subjects and at the same time continue to be strictly enforced. . .. The[Sanskrit dharmas@stric] texts, although given theoretical primacy and treated withrespect, were most likely used as validators of decisions based on local circumstances.The texts informed and gave weight to the opinions of local adjudicators, but they didnot confine or predetermine their opinions’ (Lariviere 1989, p.760). During the lastcentury, the mahant at SPngeri was ‘assisted by a number of teachers well versed inHindu scriptures. He consults them on problems involving reference to Dharma-sastras. The mata has a Dharmadhikari (supervisor) who gives his opinions and deci-sions onallmatters involving interpretation ofDharma-sastras. . . .Allmatters of caste,moral conduct and ritual obligation are referred to him either by individuals or groups’(Gnanambal 1973, p.6).

15 By the fourteenth century, the yoga of Patanjali had become a kind of pan-brahmanicaltechnology (Madaio 2018, p.18, f. 47) thatwas, like the closely related tapas (cf. JMV 4.2),the purview of renouncers. It is well known that the JMV features a considerableamount of meditational yoga from P@tanjalayoga (e.g., Fort 1999) but there has beenlittle attention paid to the important role of yogic material derived from theLaghuyogav@si

_sbha (LYV) (Pa>asakara 1985 [1937]), an abridgement of the Mok

_sop@ya

(MU), such as in relation to pr@>a (see infra 116). Later inscriptions demonstrate howyoga was an important element of the self-representation of SPngeri mahants. An in-scription from 1602, for example, refers to Narasi:ha Bh@rata, themahant of SPngeri atthat time, as devoted to yama, niyama, etc., of the eight limbs of yoga (EC 1902, Vol. VI,p.191). The development of yogawithin Advaita Ved@nta would continue throughmul-tiple influences (e.g., Bouy 1994), including the important alignment of AdvaitaVed@nta with Sravidy@, which later tradition links back to Vidy@ra>ya himself and ahost of prominent, early Advaita Ved@ntins. On tantric influencedmethods of yoga andsubtle body technologies in the contemporary self-representation and practices ofSPngeri mahants, see Schwartz (2017).

16 ‘The only clear historic relationship between a puru_s@rtha [or aim of human life] and an

@srama [or mode of life] is found between renunciation and liberation. The [brahman-ical] tradition is unanimous that the last @srama is devoted solely to the pursuit ofliberation, or at least the world of Brahm@’ (Olivelle 1993, p.218).

17 Onemight also render dharma as ‘the thing to be done’, or ‘what is to be done’, followingMedh@tithi’s commentary on Manu (i.e., tasya [dharmasya] kartavyat@svabh@vatv@t), seeGaneri (2012, p.59, f. 7).

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18 As Vidy@ra>ya puts it, ‘the ultimate liberation is the ultimate aim among other aimssuch as heaven, etc.’ arthe

_su svarg@di

_su paramomok

_sa$ param@rtha$ at JMV 1.3.16 (gloss-

ing LYV 2.1.2 [MU 2.5.4]). On the highest good or sreyas, see JMV 1.3.17 (glossing LYV2.1.3 [MU 2.7.30]) and LYV 2.1.5 (MU 2.9.24) at JMV 1.3.19. On liberation as the nature ofthe ultimate serenity (or ‘bliss’), see sukh@tisayar+patva- at JMV1.3.6, param@nandar+pa-at JMV 1.6.8, and param@nanda- at JMV 1.6.18.

19 vak_sye vividi

_s@ny@sa: vidvanny@sa: ca bhedata$. JMV 1.0.2.

20 In the Dharmas@stra tradition, @c@ra is one of the four sources (m+la) for determiningdharma and, along with legal procedure (vyavah@ra) and penance (pr@yascitta), is one ofthree topical divisions often featured in dharmas@stric works.

21 For this portion of the Par@saram@dhavaya (PM), also knownas the Par@sarasmPtivy@khy@,see Isl@mapurkar (1895, pp.160–79). This section has been edited and translated byOlivelle (1986). When citing the PM on renunciation, I follow Olivelle’s numbering andtranslation. Roughly 2300 pages in the printed edition, the PM is considered ‘a work ofauthority on modern Hindu Law in southern India’ (Kane 1930, p.375). The last sectionof the text, i.e., the vyavah@ram@dhava, is an extensive appendix on jurisprudence. Onthe PM, see Burnell (1868, pp.xii–xiii), Jolly (1928 [1896], pp.71–2), Lingat (1973, p.114),Kane (1930, p.375), and Olivelle (2010, p.53). For a translation of the section on inher-itance in the vyavah@ra chapter, see Burnell (1868); on renunciation, see Olivelle (1986);and on issues pertaining to untouchability, see Aktor (2008).

22 ete_s@: tu sam@c@r@$ prokt@$ p@r@sarasmPte$ | vy@khy@ne ’sm@bhir atr@ya: paraha:so

vivicyate k JMV 1.0.11. The paramaha:sa class renouncer, the one who seeks liberation(mumuk

_su, JMV 1.0.5; PM 13 [Olivelle 1986, p.128]), has the highest degree of detach-

ment (vair@gya, virakta) and realises non-dual freedom in this world. See JMV 1.0.2–13.Unlike the path of the paramaha:sa, which is the direct means to knowing (‘s@k

_s@d

vijn@nas@dhane’ at JMV 1.0.5; PM 13 [Olivelle 1986, p.128]), the ha:sa class renouncerrealises the nature of reality in brahmaloka. The bah+daka and kubicaka class renouncersare characterised by a less intense form of detachment and are differentiated by theirphysical strength (cf. JMV 1.0.9; PM 13 [Olivelle 1986, p.127]). The bah+daka apparentlyhasmore vitality or youth and is therefore capable of an austere, itinerant lifestyle. Thekubika, on the other hand, ‘. . .because of their declining strength, beg food from theirrelations and eat it, each in his own house’ (PM 22 [Olivelle 1986, p.129]). On the dis-tinction between these types of classifications, also see N@radaparivr@jaka Upani

_sad

(Olivelle 1992, pp.197–201), Bhik_suka Upani

_sad (p.236), Turay@tat@vadh+ta Upani

_sad

(p.328), BPhatsa:ny@sa Upani_sad (pp.245–51), Paramaha:saparivr@jaka Upani

_sad

(p.262), and S@by@yanaya Upani_sad (pp.282–4).

23 M@dhava also connects his commentary on the Par@sarasmPti to his work on calendricalissues, the K@lanir>aya (K@lanir>aya 1.4 in Tark@lank@ra 1885, p.4): ‘Then,M@dhav@c@rya, having commented on [the exposition of] dharma in thePar@sara(smPti), laboured diligently at the determination of the time of the perform-ance of that [dharma]’. vy@khy@ya m@dhav@c@ryo dharm@n p@r@sar@n atha | tada-nu

_sbh@nak@lasya nir>aya: vaktum udyata$ k And in his auto-commentary to the

Jaiminayany@yam@l@ (Goldstucker 1865, p.3), M@dhava sets out the coordinated natureof his intellectual productions: ‘Earlier, for the benefit of all classes and modes of life,


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the sm@rta dharma [i.e., duties not explicitly based on an extant veda] was commentedupon by means of the Pur@>as@ra, the commentary on the Par@sarasmPti, etc. Now, forthe specific benefit of brahmins (dvija), [he] begins a commentary on the srautadharma[i.e., ritual action explicitly enjoined in the veda]’. sarvavar>@sram@nugrah@ya sm@rtodharma$ p+rva: vyy@khy@ta$. id@na: dvij@n@: vise

_s@nugrah@ya srautadharmavy@-

khy@n@ya pravPtta$. Putting aside the broader implications of his comprehensivescholarly venture, which is linked to the commentarial project on the veda (cf.Galewicz 2009, pp.284–5, f. 782), the above disclosures establish that M@dhava wasthe author of at least the Pur@>as@ra (Pathak 1999), Par@saram@dhavaya, K@lanir>aya,and Jaiminayany@yam@l@(vistara). This M@dhava, as already pointed out, is also the au-thor of the Javanmuktiviveka. On M@dhava’s likely authorship of the so-calledOgvedabh@

_sya and the Yajurvedabh@

_sya, see Slaje (2010). I must defer for elsewhere a

more thorough exploration of M@dhava-Vidy@ra>ya’s oeuvre, which is not limited totheworksmentioned here. For a helpful collation of key passages related toM@dhava’scorpus, see Tark@lank@ra’s (1885) Sanskrit Introduction (‘Bh+mik@’) to the K@lanir>aya.In relation to these works, and also texts by M@dhava-Vidy@ra>ya’s cotemporaries atSPngeri, Minkowski (2011, p.210) noted that ‘. . .the attention of the non-dualists beganto shift towards metaphysical or cosmological issues’. Although these issues are im-portant, it is worth noting the significant engagement of non-dualists at SPngeri withDharmas@stra and Mam@:s@, and, as particularly evident in the JMV, the theoreticaland practical matters of renunciation and yoga, intimating certain currents of whatFort (1998) more generally termed ‘yogic advaita’. The institutional structure atSPngeri, whichwasmarkedly expanding during this period, not only supported asceticsbutwas embeddedwithin a broader asceticalmilieu, which the source texts cited in theJMV shed light on (cf. Madaio 2016).

24 At Par@saram@dhavaya 1.1.4 (Isl@mapurkar 1893, p.3) it is explained: ‘In the same way as?ngiras was the lineage preceptor andminister of Indra, Sumati of Nala, Medh@tithi ofSaibya, Dhaumya of Dharmasuta, Svaujas of the King of Vainya, Gautami of Nimi, theone who has the inward seeing, who is the companion of Arundhata [i.e., Vasi

_sbha], of

the virtuous and powerful R@ma, M@dhava is likewise [the kulaguru andmantrin of kingBukka]’. indrasy@ngiraso nalasya sumati$ saibyasya medh@tithir | dhaumyo dharmasutasyavainyanPpate$ svauj@ nimergautami$ k pratyagdP

_sbir arundhatasahacaro r@masya

pu>y@tmano | yadvat tasya vibhor abh+t kulagurur mantra tath@ m@dhava$ k In light ofthe crucial role the LYVplays in the JMV, themention ofVasi

_sbha andR@maheremight

suggest that this teacher–student relationship had particular significance for howM@dhava-Vidy@ra>ya conceived of his relationship to Bukka I and Harihara II.

25 On the conduct of renunciates, see usage of vPtti in PM 43 in Olivelle (1986, p.120), cary@at JMV 5.4.1, vyavah@ra at JMV 5.1.15, bhik

_s@carya at B@U 3.5.1 (at JMV 1.2.5), and vPtta at

B@U 4.5.1 (at JMV 1.2.3). On dharma, see JMV 5.1.15 and the further examples below.26 The section of the PMwherein Vidy@ra>ya discusses renouncers quotes numerous sour-

ces also cited in the JMV and there is also verbatim textual reuse of the PM in the JMV.27 Themahants, or heads of the estate, as itwere, are depicted in later epigraphy as holders

of the ‘dharma-pabha’, e.g., see the 1652 inscription in EC (1902, Vol. VI, p.95).28 By the fourteenth century, systematic reflection on dharma within brahmanism had

shifted from vedic sacrifice to the duties associated with the classes and modes of life(var>@sramadharma). As Davis (2013 [2010], p.62) points out, ‘the centerpiece of thedharma system in this refashioned form, then, is a structure of synchronic (var>a)

James Madaio 359

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and diachronic (@srama) social arrangements (dharma) in which individuals find mean-ing in life through their efforts to appropriately place themselves in the larger scheme’.It is within the var>@sramadharma framework that any group, whether pertaining tocaste, family, locality, gender, vocation, etc., is inscribed with its own dharma, duty orobligation, which is incumbent on members of that collective. Group specific injunc-tions are none the less so for renouncers (sa:ny@sin), whose pursuit, by the fourteenthcentury, had already been institutionalised within the brahmanical fold. This renoun-cer context is, indeed, precisely that of the JMV, which, as indicated above, establishesthe dharma of paramaha:sa class renouncers, the fulfilment of which is liberation. Onthe technical details relating to the dharma of renunciates, which, although expressednegatively as the renunciation of ritual, includes detailed regulations, see Olivelle(1992, pp.60ff.).

29 It is worth noting that a number of the life stories, quotations from key source texts(e.g., the LYV), aswell as extended prose passages from the JMV surface in later AdvaitaVed@ntic works, such as Madhus+dana Sarasvata’s sixteenth-century G+nh@rthadapik@[Pa>asakara 1936], which evidences its own narrative approach to ‘paradigmatic indi-viduals’ (to borrowHaberman’s [1988] phrase used in context to the Gaunaya tradition).While it has been noted elsewhere that Vidy@ra>ya influenced Madhus+dana, I firstpointed out that there is verbatim textual reuse of the JMV, without attribution, in theG+nh@rthadapik@ (cf. Madaio 2016). For examples, see infra 34, 35, 36, 69, 114, 116, and121. The reuse of the JMV in the G+nh@rthadapik@ is one of a number of importantindications of how the JMV was crucial in the transmission and integration of notonly the LYV but also broader issues pertaining to yoga and renunciation in post-fourteenth century Advaita Ved@nta.

30 sam@ne ‘pi paramaha:satve siddhe viruddhadharm@kr@ntatv@d av@ntarabhedo ’pyabhyupagantavya$. JMV 1.2.24. The division between the paramaha:sawho is a knower(vidvatparamaha:sa) and the paramaha:sa who seeks knowing, as well as their corre-sponding renunciations, is evident in the Par@saram@dhavaya. Indeed, Olivelle rightlypoints out that Vidy@ra>ya did not newly introduce the distinction between the re-nouncer who seeks knowledge and the renouncer who is enlightened. The two cate-gories are already mentioned by Y@dava Prak@sa (eleventh century), ?nand@nubhava(thirteenth century), and are intimated in the Paramaha:sa Upani

_sad, a work that

Vidy@ra>ya writes a commentary on throughout chapter five of the JMV. Olivelle, infact, holds that Sa:kara ‘envisaged a similar distinction’ (Olivelle 1986, p.56).

31 vividi_s@sa:ny@sinas tattvajn@na: pradh@nam, manon@sav@san@k

_say@v upasarjanabh+tau;

vidvatsa:ny@sinas tu tadvaiparatyam; ata$ sah@bhy@sa ubhayatr@py aviruddha$. JMV2.3.2. Also: ‘due to having contradictory properties there is a great difference betweenthem’. ato viruddhadharmopetatv@d asty ev@nayor mah@n bheda$. JMV 1.2.32. In differentcontexts, the categories of tattvajn@na, manon@sa, and v@san@k

_saya are employed in

reference to not only soteriological-eudaimonic goals but also the disciplines throughwhich each goal is realised. So, for example, manon@sa can be used in reference to notonly mental quiescence (also called cittavisr@nti), which, at its culmination, is the dis-appearance or cessation ofmental events, but also for the group of disciplines bywhichquiescence is achieved, e.g., yoga.

32 Following the LYV, Vidy@ra>ya argues for the interdependence of tattvajn@na, man-on@sa, and v@san@k

_saya, see JMV 2.1.1–2.2.16. This mutual causality entails that the

disciplines for each should be practised simultaneously albeit with different


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emphasis—i.e., principal vs. subsidiary—depending onwhether the aspirant is carryingout vividi

_s@sa:ny@sa or vidvatsa:ny@sa. In that way, a secure or stabilised realisation

necessitatesmanon@sa and v@san@k_saya. Conversely, unwavering establishment ofman-

on@sa and v@san@k_saya ultimately requires tattvajn@na because it is the recognition of

the non-dual nature of reality that renders the apparent multiplicity of the sa:s@ricworld incapable of catalysing mental agitations and impure tendencies (associatedwith various forms of objectification and identification). Similarly, mental quiescencecannot be truly established unless one has uprooted latent tendencies, since suchtendencies, in conjunction with the pulsation of pr@>a, provoke the activity, desires,and afflictive states of an intentional mind (and vice versa). We will return to thecritical importance of this interdependence later.

33 ‘The recognition of reality (tattvajn@na) is this conviction: All this is just the self, butwhat is phenomenally cognised – colours, tastes, etc. – consist of the illusion that is theworld’. ida: sarvam @tmaiva, pratayam@na: tu r+paras@dika: jaganm@y@mayam na tv etadvastuto ’stati niscayas tattvajn@nam. JMV 2.2.8.

34 ‘Due to transforming in the form of a continuous flow of mental fluctuations, like thecontinuous flow of a lamp’s flame, the substance that is the inner-organ is called themind (manas), on account of its consisting in mentation (manana). Its disappearance(n@sa) is a transformation in the form of cessation having discarded the transformationthat is the form of mental events. And, in that way, Patanjali composed the s+tra: “Transformation of the cessation variety, in which the string/continuity (anvaya) ofmental fluctuations (citta) are moments (k

_sa>a) of cessation (nirodha), happens when

there is the appearance of the residual impression of cessation and the disappearanceof the residual impression of activation” [P@tanjalayogas@stra 3.9]. Residual impressionsof activationdisappear. Residual impressions of cessationappear. Amoment connectedwith cessation is strung together (anvayate) with themind (citta). This should be under-stood as the disappearance [of the events of] the mind’. pradapajv@l@sa:t@navadvPttisa:t@nar+pe>a pari>amam@>atv@d idam anta$kara>adravya: manan@tmakatv@nmana ity ucyate. tasya n@so n@ma vPttir+pa: pari>@ma: parityajya niruddhatv@k@re>apari>@ma$. tath@ ca patanjalir yogas@stre s+tray@m@sa: vyutth@nanirodhasa:sk@rayor abhib-havapr@durbh@vau nirodhak

_sa>acitt@nvayo nirodhapari>@ma [P@tanjalayogas@stra 3.9] iti.

vyutth@nasa:sk@r@ abhibh+yante; nirodhasa:sk@r@$ pr@durbhavanti; nirodhayukta$ k_sa>as

citten@nvayate; so ’ya:manon@sa ity avagantavyam. JMV2.1.3–5. On thedisciplines used toachieve manon@sa, see Madaio (2018, p.15, f. 25). Given that manon@sa, not unlikev@san@k

_saya, is a term of art among later Advaita Ved@ntins, it is worth noting that

Madhus+dana Sarasvata, while commenting on Bhagavadgat@ 6.32 in hisGunh@rthadapik@, reproduces verbatim, without attribution, Vidy@ra>ya’s definitionof manon@sa above (although he does not include the quotation from theP@tanjalayogas@stra).

35 ‘The cause of specificmental events such as anger and the like – [events] that are arisingsuddenly, without considering antecedent [causes] and subsequent [consequences] – isa latent tendency (v@san@), which is a residual impression (sa:sk@ra) located in themind, because [these latent tendencies] aremade to stay in themind through repeatedhabituation. The effacement (k

_saya) of these latent tendencies is the non-arising of

anger, etc., even when there is an external cause [for anger], when [pure] latent

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tendencies, such as equanimity and control of the senses, etc. are firm and occasionedby discernment’. p+rv@parapar@marsam antare>a sahasotpadyam@nasyakrodh@divPttivise

_sasya hetus cittagata$ sa:sk@ro v@san@, p+rvap+rv@bhy@sena citte

v@syam@natv@t. tasy@s ca v@san@y@$ k_sayo n@ma vivekajany@y@: s@ntid@nty@div@san@y@:

dPnh@y@: saty api b@hyanimitte krodh@dyanutpatti$. JMV 2.2.5–6. Vidy@ra>ya drawsheavily on the LYV, as well as other sources, in his rich discussion of v@san@, seeMadaio (2018, 2021). On the methods to achieve v@san@k

_saya, see Madaio (2018, p.15,

f. 26). As he does with Vidy@ra>ya’s definition of manon@sa, Madhus+dana Sarasvataquotes verbatim the first portion of Vidy@ra>ya’s definition of v@san@k

_saya in the

Gunh@rthadapik@ (cf. his commentary on Bhagavadgat@ 6.32).36 tattvajn@nasya srava>@dika: s@dhanam, manon@sasya yoga$, v@san@k

_sayasya pra-

tik+lav@sanotp@danam . . .. JMV 2.2.16. Again, in his commentary on Bhagavadgat@ 6.32,Madhus+dana Sarasvata repeats this verbatim without attribution.

37 samyaganub$itai$ srava>amanananididhy@sanai$ at JMV 1.2.1. Vidy@ra>ya uses the term‘anu

_sbhita’ here, a participle derived from anu

psth@, the same prefix and root from

which ‘anu_sbh@na’ derives. I suspect, in fact, that Vidy@ra>ya’s usage of ‘anu

_sbhita’ is

meant to indicate a ‘particular performance of dharma in a practical context’ (Davis2004, p.824).

38 In that way, the prerequisites for knowledge of brahman established by Sa:kara (seeinfra 129) are correlatedwith pure v@san@s and overlapwith dispositions required in thedevelopment of manon@sa (cf. Madaio 2018, p.17). Further, the cultivation of purev@san@s can be understood to map the path to liberation. Indeed, ‘bondage is just thebondage of latent tendencies [and] liberation is just the effacement of latent tenden-cies’ (bandho hi v@san@bandho mok

_sa$ sy@d v@san@k

_saya$ at LYV 4.5.20ab [MU 4.39.19ab]

at JMV 2.6.2).39 ‘In the sameway the renouncer seeking gnosis should carry out listening (srava>a), etc.,

for thepurpose of tattvajn@na, the renouncerwho is a gnostic should carry outmanon@saas well as v@san@k

_saya for the purpose of javanmukti’. yath@ vividi

_s@sa:ny@sin@ tatt-

vajn@n@ya srava>@dani sa:p@danay@ni, tath@ vidvatsa:ny@sin@pi javanmuktaye man-on@sav@san@k

_sayau sa:p@danayau. JMV 1.2.16.

40 ‘There is “coolness” [for the javanmukta] not only because he does not have an afflicted/hot [mind], but also because there is awareness of the all-encompassing essence. This isthe characteristic definition of javanmukta’. na kevala: sa:t@p@bh@v@c chatalatvam, ki:tu evam parip+r>asvar+p@nusa:dh@n@d api. iti javanmuktalak

_sa>am. JMV 1.5.26.

41 vidhini_sed@tatatva- JMV 1.9.30.

42 In the Par@saram@dhavaya (PM), which was written at an earlier period of his career,Vidy@ra>ya does not distinguish between the knower of brahman and a javanmukta,which is one of the critical distinctions he sets forth in the JMV, which he substantiatesby appealing to the life stories of sages.

43 Reference to the onewho has (or has not) ‘donewhat has to be done’ occur numerouslyin the JMV (cf. JMV 1.2.31; 4.4.4, 8–12; 5.1.31, 36; 5.4.45–46).

44 This sequence is explicit in Vidy@ra>ya’s discussion of the ‘mind’ (cf. ‘lak_sa>a’ at JMV

2.5.2, ‘pram@>a’ at JMV 2.5.4, ‘ud@hara>a’ at JMV 2.5.6, and the reiteration of the threewith the declaration that the definition of themind is now settled [siddha] at JMV2.5.7).


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45 This can be characterised as a form of case-based reasoning, which ‘begins with one ormore prototypical exemplars of a category, and reasons that some new object belongsto the samecategoryon the grounds that it resembles in someappropriate and context-determined manner one of the exemplars’ (Ganeri 2012, p.37).

46 This is Vidy@ra>ya’s gloss on ‘pravrajanti’ from the well-known passage at B@U 4.4.22,which serves as his principal source for grounding the renunciation for gnosis.

47 aya: ca vedanahetu$ sa:ny@so dvividha$, janm@p@dakakarm@dity@gam@tr@tmaka$, prai-occ@ra>ap+rvakada>nadh@ra>@dy@sramar+pas ceti. JMV 1.1.10. The prai

_samantra is the

declaration ‘I have renounced’ (sa:nyasta: may@), which marks one’s entrance intothe @sramic order of renunciation. For Vidy@ra>ya’s references to the prai

_samantra, see

JMV 1.1.10, 2.6.10, 5.1.30, 5.1.39–40, 5.2.29. On the prai_sa formula, see Olivelle (1975,

pp.75–83; 1981a, p.269).48 Notably, Vidy@ra>ya cites the exemplary case of Maitreya, who is described at

BPhad@ra>yaka Upani_sad 4.5 as a brahmav@dina , when he asserts that women are entitled

(adhi þ pkP) to the internal or mental type of renunciation (JMV 1.1.13–15), whichculminates in knowledge of brahman. In that way, it is precisely the story of the femalesage Maitreya that provides an authoritative model that gives rise to and anchorsVidy@ra>ya’s position on the eligibility of women for non-formal renunciation andnon-dual realisation.

49 In the JMV, Vidy@ra>ya is not explicit on var>a restrictions.50 brahmac@rigPhasthav@naprasth@n@: kenacin nimittena sa:ny@s@sramasvak@re pratibaddhe

sati, sv@sramadharme_sv anu

_sbhayam@ne

_sv api vedan@rtho m@nasa$ karm@dityago na

virudhyate. . .. JMV 1.1.14. Drawing on the BPhad@ra>yakav@rtikas@ra and theAnubh+tiprak@sa, Marcaurelle (2000, p.190) argues that for Vidy@ra>ya ‘physical renun-ciation becomes indispensable onlywhenone cannot overcomedistractions’. AlthoughI am cautious about some of his arguments related to var>a, it is worth noting thatMarcaurelle sets out a convincing case that for Sa:kara knowledge of brahmanwas notdependent on formal renunciation but on the renunciation of agency. The point is alsoclearly applicable to the JMV since Vidy@ra>ya holds that the path of Advaita Ved@ntadoes not necessitate a formal or physical renunciation but may also be carried outthrough themental renunciation of action, i.e., giving up the sense that one is an agentof action. This is perhaps partly why it is not difficult for Vidy@ra>ya to draw from thelives of sages, such as those in the LYV, who did not formally renounce.

51 srutismPtatih@sapur@>e_su loke ca t@dPs@: tattvavid@: bah+n@m upalambh@t. JMV 1.1.14.

52 Terms used to indicate custom include @c@ra, anu_sbh@na, sa la, samaya, sad@c@ra, and

si_sb@c@ra.

53 See, for example, chapter one in Lingat (1973).54 ‘ForMedh@tithi, a tenth-century commentator on the LawsofManu, Dharmas@stra, the

texts and tradition of Hindu jurisprudence, can . . . create the “disciplined man” (si_sba)

who is so imbued with the spirit of the Veda, the perfect revelation, that he can createdharma (law or merit) through the force of his own personal substance’ (Davis 2008,p.100).

55 ‘A reading. . .of the Mam@:s+tras (1.3.15–18) and the commentaries and subcommen-taries thereon reveals the liberality with which custom is treated – anything goes aslong as it is the practice of those persons the community holds virtuous. This principleis carried to the most extreme lengths by Mitramisra who says that the customs of

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S+dras are dharma for S+dras even though they obviously cannot be based on any S+draelders’ familiarity with the Veda’ (Lariviere 2004, p.618). With reference to the gram-marian tradition, Deshpande (1994, p.168) notes that ‘while the Si

_sbas of Patanjali are an

idealized contemporary elite community, for BhartPhari, the Si_sba-O

_sis belong to the

ancient golden age of pur@kalpa. . .’.56 ‘The Veda is the source (m+la) of dharma also the tradition (or smPtis) and practice of

those who know the Veda’ (Gautamadharmas+tra 1.1–2 in Kane [1946, p.825]). ‘The rootof the Law is the entireVeda; the tradition andpractice of thosewhoknowtheVeda; theconduct of good people; and what is pleasing to oneself’ (M@navadharmas@stra 2.6 inOlivelle 2005, p.94).

57 ‘We shall propound the acts (that produce merit) which are evolved from conventionsand practices; the authority (for finding out the dharma) are the conventions of thosewho know the dharma and the Vedas’ (?pastambadharmas+tra 1.1.1.1–2 in Kane [1946,p.825]).

58 ‘Dharma is declared by the Vedas and SmPtis; on failure of these two the practice of thesi

_sbas is the authority (for finding out what dharma is). . .’. (Vasi

_sbhadharmas+tra 1.4–5 in

Kane [1946, p.825]).59 ‘Both in grammar and in dharma, then, si

_sbas come to be viewed as individuals setting

the standard and whom others should look up to if they want to learn correct Sanskritand proper dharma’ (Olivelle 2006, p.181).

60 On Y@jnavalkya, see Fiser (1984) and Lindquist (2005).61 atha vidvatsa:ny@sa: nirupay@ma$. samyaganu

_sbhitai$ srava>amanananididhy@sanai$

paratattva: viditavadbhi$ sa:p@dyam@no vidvatsa:ny@sa$. ta: ca y@jnavalkya$sa:p@day@m@sa. JMV 1.2.1.

62 AlthoughVidy@ra>ya does not specifically use the phrase ‘renunciation for the gnostic’here, it is contextually obvious. As cited above, he starts this section of the JMV notingthat ‘now we will clarify the renunciation for the gnostic’ (atha vidvatsa:ny@sa:nirupay@ma$) and it is precisely the account of Y@jnavalkya quoted here that servesas his authoritative source for positing this renunciation. Further, a few sentences aftermentioning that Y@jnavalkya ‘declared the renunciation [for the gnostic]’, Vidy@ra>yarefers to another episode in B@U where ‘the renunciation for the gnostic is also men-tioned’ by Y@jnavalkya (quoted above).

63 tatha hi, vidvacchiroma>ir bhagav@n y@jnavalkyo vijiga_sukath@y@: bahuvidhena

tattvanir+pa>en@svalayanaprabhPtan pravijitya, vatar@gakath@y@: sa:k_sepavist@r@bhy@m

anekadh@ janaka: bodhayitv@, maitreya: bubodhayi_sus tasy@s tvaray@ tattv@bhimukhy@ya

svakartavya: sa:ny@sa: pratijajne. tatas t@: bodhayitv@ sa:ny@sa: cak@ra. tad ubhaya:maitreyabr@hma>asy@dyantayor @mn@yate: atha ha y@jnavalkyo ‘nyad vPttam up@kari

_syan

maitreyati hov@ca y@jnavalkya$ pravraji_syan v@ are ’ham asm@t sth@n@d asmati [[email protected]–2],

et@vad are khalv amPtatvam iti hoktv@ y@jnavalkyo pravavr@ja iti ca [B@U 4.5.15].kaholabr@hma>e ’pi vidvatsa:ny@sa @mn@yate eta: vai tam @tm@na: viditv@ br@hman@$putrai

_sa>@y@s ca vittai

_sa>@y@s ca lokai

_sa>@y@s ca vyutth@y@tha bhik

_s@carya: carantati [B@U

3.5.1]. JMV 1.2.1–5.64 na c@tra br@hma>asabdo j@tiv@caka$ . . . srava>amanananididhy@sanai$ s@dhya: brah-

mas@k_s@tk@ram abhipretya ‘atha br@hma>a’ ity abhihitatv@t. JMV 1.2.7. Vidy@ra>ya shortly

thereafter notes that for such a person brahman is being directly experienced(aparok

_se>a anubh+yam@na-, JMV 1.2.12).


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65 b@nham. ata eva s@dhanar+p@t sa:ny@s@d anya: phalar+pameta: sa:ny@sa: br+ma$. yath@vividi

_s@sa:ny@sin@ tattvajn@n@ya srava>@dani sa:p@danay@ni, tath@ vidvatsa:ny@sin@pi

javanmuktaye manon@sav@san@k_sayau sa:p@danayau. JMV 1.1.16. Vidy@ra>ya also cites

the J@b@la, ?ru>i, Paramaha:sa, and N@radaparivr@jaka Upani_sads in drawing the distinc-

tion between vividi_s@sa:ny@sa and vidvatsa:ny@sa. See JMV 1.2.17–37.

66 Wezler (2004, p.639–40) points out that there is a difference between custom or‘. . .@c@ra before its realization – the authoritative, ideal model of behaviour – and @c@rain its actual and practical realization. Good conduct is thus realization of custom. . .andthis conduct, the recollected tradition, is itself again a model and example for others’.Likewise, Hacker (2006, p.490) notes that dharma is a ‘. . .concretemodel of behaviorwithpositive significance for salvation that somehow exists already before its performanceand waits for realization, or rather it is a collection of suchmodels. Dharma in perform-ance then is conduct that corresponds to this model, adharma conduct that deviatesfrom it’.

67 On the ‘intrasystemic’ intervention carried out through the dialogue of the JMV, seeMadaio (2016).

68 The lives of sages depicted in authoritative works provide not only a living source of@c@ra, which can be drawn on in order to establish contemporary norms, but alsoaccounts of @c@ryas. Etymology is insightful on this point. Davis, having noted that‘glosses for @c@ra [e.g. sa la, anu

_sbh@na, etc.] frame @c@ra as an embodiment of or per-

formanceof dharma’, he alsomentions that ‘. . .@c@ra as character [e.g. sa la] ismost likelythe underlying form for the derivative term @c@rya, or teacher, “one who possessesgood character”’ (Davis 2004, p.823). One certainly suspects that when Vidy@ra>yarefers to Y@jnavalkya and Aj@tasatru, the king of K@sa, as jewels among knowers ofbrahman (JMV 1.2.2, 2.4.66), he also considers them as ‘knowers of the tradition’(sa:prad@yavid- at JMV 3.8.10) whose teachings and lives are soteriologicallyinstructive.

69 On the latter issue, Vidy@ra>ya holds that his contemporaries do not sufficiently prac-tice preliminary, contemplative training (up@sana, up@sti) and therefore do not ad-equately establish manon@sa and v@san@k

_saya before the recognition of the non-dual

nature of reality. Under such conditions, tattvajn@na becomes obscured because it is notadequately supported bymanon@sa and v@san@k

_saya, which ‘quickly blowout like a lamp

in awindyplace’ (JMV2.4.2–3, cf.Madaio 2018, p.17). Aswith anumber of sections of theJMV, Madhus+dana Sarasvata, in his commentary on Bhagavadgat@ 6.32, reproducesportions of JMV 2.4.2–3 verbatim.

70 Raghavan (1938–9) has shown in a ‘convincing manner’ (Slaje 1998, p.104) thatVidy@ra>ya draws from the LYV. Divanji (1939a) rightly noted that the LYV, attributedto the editorship of anAbhinanda fromKashmir, was not an abridgement of the vulgateYogav@si

_sbha, published by the Nirnaya Sagar Press in 1911 (although earlier versions

appeared), but of a different recension. In confirmation of Divanji’s assessment, it waslater argued (Hanneder and Slaje 2005; Hanneder 2006; Steiner 2014) that the LYV, asubstantial-sized ‘laghu’ at c. five thousand stanzas, is an abridgement of an earlierrecension known under the titleMok

_sop@ya. In the printed edition, the LYV consists of

six ‘books’ (prakara>a) with forty-six chapters (sarga) of varying sizes across theprakara>as. Except for the last three short chapters of the sixth book, which are a lateraddition (e.g., Thomi 1983, p.108) that are partially or completely missing from a

James Madaio 365

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number of extant manuscripts (cf. Thomi 2019), the LYV attests to verses nearly iden-tical to those found in the Mok

_sop@ya, albeit with some rearrangement of the lines of

stanzas. Certainty, a critical edition of the LYV remains a desideratum. Yet irrespectiveof whether one draws on the printed edition (which includes the last three additionalsargas), it is hardly convincing to characterise the LYVas a ‘Ved@nticized’ version of theMok

_sop@ya given the sheer quantity of identical (or near identical) verses. Vidy@ra>ya,

who cites c. 250 verses from the LYV, never quotes the last three sargas of the sixthprakara>a, which were likely unknown in the fourteenth century and played no role inthe Mok

_sop@ya gaining prominence within Advaita Ved@nta. In other words, it was an

abridgment of theMok_sop@ya that made transit into Advaita Ved@nta in the (mid-thir-

teenth to) fourteenth century and not a text that can be characterised as having under-gone a Ved@ntic reworking. The LYV, in fact, preserves certain verses from the‘original’ Mok

_sop@ya that appear to have been later lost in the Mok

_sop@ya manuscript

tradition (see infra 117). Throughout this article, when citing the LYV, I also includereference to the corresponding verses in theMok

_sop@ya (MU) (Slaje 2011–18). It should

be noted that Thomi has edited, and translated into German, an edition of the LYVprimarily basedona c. fifteenth centurymanuscript held at theBodleianLibrary,whichis titled Mok

_sop@ya.

71 nanu pram@>otpannasya tattvajn@nasya ko n@ma b@dhaprasango yena rak_s@pek

_syate [. . .].

JMV 4.1.2.72 cittavisr@ntyabh@ve sa:sayaviparyayau prasajyey@t@m. JMV 4.1.3.73 ‘Sa:saya and viparyaya, which are of the nature of the impossibility of understanding

(asa:bh@van@) and contrary understanding (viparatabh@van@), obstruct the fruit of therecognition of reality’. sa:sayaviparyay@bhy@m asa:bh@van@viparatabh@van@r+p@bhy@:tattvajn@nasya phala: pratibadhyate. JMV 4.1.21.

74 ajn@naviparyayau mok_sam@travirodhinau, sa:sayas tu bhogamok

_sayor ubhayor api virodha

tasya paraspara-viruddhakobidvay@valambitv@t. yad@ sa:s@rasukh@ya pravPttis tad@mok

_sam@rge buddhis t@: niru>addhi. yad@ ca mok

_sam@rge pravPttis tad@ sa:s@rabuddhis

t@: pratibadhn@ti. tasm@t sa:say@tmano na ki:cit sukham astati mumuk_su>@ sarvath@

sa:sayas chettavya$. JMV 4.1.19. On sa:saya, also see JMV 1.2.42.75 It has been demonstrated (e.g., Hanneder 2006) that the well-known Yogav@si

_sbha or

Yogav@si_sbhamah@r@m@ya>a (Pa>asakara 2008 [1911]), of nearly thirty thousand verses,

presupposes the similar, but earlier, tenth-century Mok_sop@ya(s@stra), as well as the

‘Laghuyogav@si_sbha’, which is an abridgement of the Mok

_sop@ya. Early research focused

on the later Yogav@si_sbha, a work that internally refers to itself as the Mok

_sop@ya, and

was printed with the V@si_sbhat@tparyaprak@sa, the 1710 CE commentary by the Advaita

Ved@ntin ?nandabodhendra Sarasvata (Gode 1952), a pupil of Gangadh@rendraSarasvata, author of Sv@r@jyasiddhi. Scholars who worked on the vulgate Yogav@si

_sbha

noted how the text evidences a kind of rationalism (Divanji 1939b, p.295), which fea-tures an epistemology that falls outside the scripturally centred pram@>a system ofVed@nta (Atreya 1936b, p.15) and that it holds pratyak

_sa as a ‘principal source of know-

ledge’ (Divanji 1939b, p.285). It was also pointed out that the Yogav@si_sbha derives from

tenth-century Kashmir, and that it references the historical king Yasaskaradeva (d.948) and Pradyumna hill, while demonstrating familiarity ‘. . .with every small detailabout the places and buildings in and also the folklore of K@smar’ (Divanji 1935, p.29).The ‘Buddhistic’ (Bhattacharyya 1925; Divanji 1935) elements of the work were also


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evident, particularly in relation to the Yog@c@ra stream (Dasgupta 1952 [1932]), as wasthe work’s familiarity with Trika Saivism (e.g., Bhattacharyya 1951). Other sources ofinfluence were identified, such as Upani

_sadic advaita, the Bhagavadgat@, BhartPhari,

Gaunap@da, and textual reuse of a number of k@vyas, including those from Kalid@saand Asvagosa (e.g., Mainkar 1977 [1955]). The Yogav@si

_sbha is not, however, philosoph-

ically reducible to a Mah@y@na Buddhist school or Trika Saivism, for example, butrather draws on other sources in the service of its own non-dual position (Slaje1992). Despite accruing important alterations and additions over time, it is obviousto the careful reader that the later, vulgate Yogav@si

_sbha, as constituted in the printed

edition, does ‘not readily conform to the Sa:kara Ved@nta pattern’ (Bhattacharyya1951, p.131; cf. Divanji 1939b, p.293, etc.). Given the prominence of Advaita Ved@ntaamong pa>nita communities from the early modern period onward, and among popu-larisers during the colonial period, it was difficult, however, for some interpreters toconceive of the advaita of the Yogav@si

_sbha as independent of Sa:kara (cf. Hanneder

2006, p.x). It is, though, worth keeping in mind that Advaita Ved@nta is not an ahistor-ical, monolithic entity reducible to the viv@rtav@da of the eighth-century Sa:kara butan internally diverse tradition, which does not easily lend itself to simple comparisons.The ‘Yogav@si

_sbha’, which garnered a broad and theologically diverse pan-Indian popu-

larity, also attracted, among other groups, the interest of adherents of Trika Saivism,evinced, for example, in the commentary by Bh@skaraka>bha (seventeenth century),who is better known for his Bh@skara on Abhinavagupta’s ` [email protected] lamented that the bak@ of Bh@skaraka>bha, which was ‘based on olderpresentations’ (Bhattacharyya 1951, p.131) of the ‘Yogav@si

_sbha’, had beenoverlooked. It

was, however, only in the wake of the text-critical work of Slaje (1994) that the oldestrecension (i.e., the Mok

_sop@ya), and Bh@skaraka>bha’s commentary, was critically

edited and published. Certainly, the greatest philological achievement related to theMok

_sop@ya/Yogav@si

_sbha texts is the critical edition of the Mok

_sop@ya (Slaje 2011–18),

which ‘. . .reconstructs a text that is arguably the closest possible version to what theKashmirianMok

_sop@yawas in the tenth century’ (Torzsok 2017, p.94). German language

users will no doubt benefit from the on-going translation of the Mok_sop@ya by Roland

Steiner.76 Slaje (1998, p.104) holds that Vidy@ra>ya knows the work by the title

Vasi_sbhar@masa:v@da. However, in the instance cited (i.e., JMV 1.4.7, to which could

be added JMV 1.3.14), Vidy@ra>ya appears to be referring to the dialogue betweenVasi

_sbha and R@ma and not the title of the work as such. Vidy@ra>ya, for example,

cites other conversations in a similar way, such as between Bali and Sukra (JMV 2.11.5),Arjuna and KP

_s>a (JMV 4.2.1), and Janaka and Y@jnavalkya (P@M 67 [Olivelle 1986,

p.121]). Vidy@ra>ya clearly refers to the title of the work as V@sisbhar@m@ya>a at JMV2.1.3 and JMV 2.4.56. As Divanji noted, the ‘original title [of the so-calledLaghuyogav@si

_sbha] however appears fromthe oldMss. thereof andof the commentaries

thereon to beV@si_sbhaR@m@ya>a. The third alternative title bywhich it is referred to in

itself is Mok_sop@ya-s@ra, that of the original work itself being Mok

_sop@ya’ (Divanji

1939a, p.699). It is perhaps worth noting that Madhus+dana Sarasvata also refers tothe ‘V@sisbhar@m@ya>a’ in his G+n@rthadapik@ (cf. the commentary on Bhagavadgat@ 6.32).Although there are other titles that were known to have been used for the ‘LYV’, e.g.,Mok

_sop@ya or V@si

_sbha, I have opted here to refer to the work as the V@sisbhar@m@ya>a

following Vidy@ra>ya. With regard to Vidy@ra>ya’s reading of the ‘LYV’, Slaje (1998)

James Madaio 367

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has forcefully argued that Vidy@ra>ya’s ‘intention’ was to deliberately conceal the‘original meaning’ of the work, which is his most frequently cited source text. Whileit is certainly useful to point out differences between a text and a later interpretation, Iwould agree with Goodding that Slaje’s condemnation of Vidy@ra>ya ‘misses the point’(Goodding 2002, p.45) of theological exegesis, which is precisely the concern of thisarticle. Indeed, this kind of criticism could be equally levelled at Sa:kara’s interpret-ation of the Bhagavadgat@, or, essentially, any theological reading of a text that does not,by historical–philological standards, aim at uncovering the authorial intention of awork. My own approach does not frame the intervention of the JMV as carrying out akind of domestication, or ‘tendentious text revision’ (Slaje 2000, p.171), of apparentlywholly-othernon-brahmanical sources. Rather, I positionVidy@ra>ya’s JMVas a text indialogue with multiple (con)texts, which draws soteriological value from a variety ofworks that were likely in vogue in the ascetical milieu at Vijayanagara. AlthoughVidy@ra>ya creatively positions source texts, some of which were not of ‘ved@ntic’origin, within the overarching aim of his inherited tradition, he also significantlyexpands the theological horizon of his successors. Indeed, we might ask how theLYV changed Vidy@ra>ya’s ideas rather than the other way around. There are, ofcourse, important differences and similarities between Vidy@ra>ya’s articulation ofAdvaita Ved@nta and the advaita of the MU/LYV, just as there are with other advaita-inflected works that Vidy@ra>ya selectively cites, such as the Vi

_s>upur@>a,

Bh@gavatapur@>a, S+tasa:hit@, Param@rthas@ra, etc. Likewise, when the Saiva commen-tator Bh@skaraka>bha ignores, or is unable to convincingly comment on, the MU’sfrequent assertion that brahman is ultimately quiescent (s@nta) (Lo Turco 2011, p.13),it is not indicative of a conspiratorial project of deceit; rather, it is simply that thisaspect of the MU does not align with that commentator’s theological commitments. Ingeneral, in the MU/LYV, consciousness, when known asmanas, etc., entails the spandaof imaginative conceptualisation from which the oneiric appearances of an unrealworld derive. This characterisation of the world, as absolute non-existence(atyant@bh@va), is a radical position that is not unlike the aj@tiv@da of Gaunap@da, afigure whom Vidy@ra>ya cites and considers an @c@rya of his parampar@. Although theMU/LYV inventively straddles the quiescent-dynamic debate concerning the nature ofthe supreme reality, brahman is ultimately considered s@nta (e.g., Madaio 2019, p.120).Among a variety of other positions in the LYV, which should be evident from theexegesis detailed in this article, Vidy@ra>yawould no doubt find theological resonancebetween this view of brahman and his own commitment to a quiescent substratum. TheKabha Upani

_sad, for example, famously sets forth three different ‘selves’, and the final

self, as it were, is glossed with s@nta: the self that is peace (s@nt@tman). In his exegesis ofthe yogic model of the Kabha Upani

_sad, Vidy@ra>ya holds that ‘the self that is peace,

which is within everything, is the homogeneity [or ‘one taste’] of consciousness’ (s@nta@tm@ sarv@ntaras cidekarasa$, JMV 3.8.1), which is beyond any particularised egoity orsense of ‘I am’.

77 The MU/LYV frequently hooks the reader into storyworlds—or what might be called‘participatory examples’ (Madaio 2019, p.107)—by introducing a well-known characterfrom sacred literature but then repositioning that figure’s life-story by revealing anunknown period in that character’s life. As we will see later in this article, just as theMU/LYV tells of R@ma’s existential inquiry, despair, discipleship, and liberation before


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the well-known ordeals attested to in the R@m@ya>a, it also fills in the gap, as it were, inthe life story of the famed Bhagaratha, revealing events in the life of that king before hehad secured his famed boons.

78 tattvavido r@ghavasya visr@nte$ p+rva: sa:saya: visv@mitra ud@jah@ra . . .. JMV 4.1.3.79 Elsewhere (Madaio 2019), I have pointed out parallels between the condition of R@ma,

who is described early on in theMU/LYVas having ascertained the unreality of objects,and similarly awakened, but still troubled characters in stories that are told to theprince (and, by extension, to the qualified reader). While there is a certain pedagogic-ally driven mirroring method evident in this regard, the provocative depiction ofawakened sages,whoare not yet javanmuktas, played, I believe, a particularly importantrole in shapingVidy@ra>ya’s position regarding the status of a ‘knowerof brahman’ (anda javanmukta). Although impossible to prove definitively, I believeVidy@ra>ya’s readingof canonical life narratives is generative of doctrinal, orthopraxic positions and notmerely an exercise in justifying a priori views.

80 That is, the descendants of Ik_sv@ku, who is the son of the sun-born Manu.

81 The MU refers to effort (pauru_sa) cultivated through ‘the s@stras in which the re-

gional dharmas are augmented by the conduct of exemplars’ (s@straissad@caritajP:bhitadesadharmai$, MU 2.6.37) and ‘through attendance to scholars,good people, and authentic sacred texts’ (sacch@stras@dhujanapa>nitasevanena, MU2.6.38).

82 ‘This confusion of R@ma has not arisen from misfortune, nor is it due to attachment(r@ga). This knowledge is a great fortune that arises from dispassion that is caused bydiscernment (viveka)’. e

_sa moho raghupater n@padbhyo n@pi r@gata$ | vivekavair@gyakPto

bodha e_sa mahodaya$ k LYV 1.1.93 [MU 1.10.2]. On this verse, and the role of reasoning

(vic@ra, viveka, yukti) in the Mok_sop@ya/Yogav@si

_sbha, see Slaje (2000).

83 na r@ghava tav@sty anyaj jneya: jn@navat@: vara | svayaiva s+k_smay@ buddhy@ sarva:

vijn@tav@n asi kbhagavadvy@saputrasya sukasyeva matis tava | visr@ntim@tram ev@trajn@tajney@py apek

_sate k LYV 1.3.17–18 (MU 2.1.2, 4) at JMV 4.1.3–4. In the LYV, there is

a clear emphasis thatR@maand Suka came to a correct understandingof reality on theirown through reasoning or inquiry but that they required further reassurance—indeed,a calming or settling of the mind—that is facilitated through an instructive consult-ation with a liberated teacher.

84 When Visv@mitra tells R@ma about Suka, it cues R@ma’s interest: ‘Oh venerable one,howwas the thought of Suka, sonof the venerableVy@sa, not at first quiescent and [howwas his] thought later quiescent?’ bhagavadvy@saputrasya sukasya bhagavan katham |dhiy@py @dau na visr@nta: visr@nta: ca dhiy@ puna$ k LYV 1.3.19 (MU 2.1.5). In response,Visv@mitra elaborates the story of Suka, which serves as a kind of ‘maieutic mirror’ (cf.Madaio 2016) that instructively reflects R@ma’s condition back to him while also indi-cating ways toward the resolution of his problem.

85 It is worth noting that the second chapter of the Mah@ Upani_sad tells the story of Suka

reusing verses from the Mok_sop@ya. Indeed, the Mok

_sop@ya, or some version of it, was a

source for numerous later Upani_sads, with textual reuse in not only theMah@ Upani

_sad but

also the Annap+r>a, Ak_si, Muktik@, V@r@ha, BPhatsa:ny@sa, S@>nilya, Y@jnavalkya, among

others. On these parallels, see the extensive treatment in Atreya (1936a, pp.41–56).

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86 sa:s@r@nambaram ida: katham abhyutthita:mune | katha: ca prasama: y@ti kiyat kasyakadeti ca k LYV 1.3.26 (MU 2.1.14). ?tmasukha glosses sa:s@r@nambaramam withsa:s@rasa:rambha$ in the nearly identical verse at LYV 1.3.41 (MU 2.1.29). See infra 88.

87 See LYV 1.3.38–39 (MU 2.1.26–27). The sense ofmudita here seems indicative of a joy orsatisfaction that is not dependent on objects.Within the context of the story, it is worthnoting that R@ma lacks this inner joy at the start of the work. This is perhaps anindication of how the ‘mirroring’ stories (cf. Madaio 2019) help R@ma (and the reader)not only understand his (and one’s) own condition but also to advance on the path.

88 sa:s@r@nambaram ida: katham abhyutthita: guro | katha: prasamam @y@ti yath@vatkathay@su me k LYV 1.3.41 (MU 2.1.29).

89 yath@ya: svavikalpotthas svavikalpaparik_say@t | k

_sayate dagdhasa:s@ro ni$s@ra iti niscaya$

k LYV 1.3.45 (MU 2.1.33) at JMV 4.1.8.90 sukas tu svayam ev@dau tattva: viditv@ tatra sa:say@na$ pitara: pP

_sbv@ pitr@pi

tathaiv@nusi_sbas tatr@pi sa:say@no janakam upasadya. . .. JMV 4.1.5.

91 avyucchinnas cid@tmaika$ pum@n astaha netara$ | svasa:kalpavas@d baddho ni$sa:kalpas tumucyate k LYV 1.3.48 (MU 2.1.36) at JMV 4.1.11.

92 na dPsye patasi brahmanmuktas tva: bhr@ntim utsPja k LYV 1.3.50cd (MU 2.1.41cd) at JMV4.1.13–14. I have amended ‘yatasi’ from the LYV to ‘patasi’ following the MU.

93 That Suka is depicted as spending ten thousand years in nirvikalpasam@dhi after hisencounter with Janaka aligns with Vidy@ra>ya’s positioning of nirvikalpasam@dhi as thehighest stage (bh+mi) of javanmukti. See JMV 4.1.50–57.

94 anusi_sba$ sa ity eva: janakenamah@tman@ | visasr@ma sukas t+

_s>a: svasthe paramavastuni k

vatasokabhay@y@so nirahas chinnasa:saya$ | jag@ma sikhara: mero$ sam@dhyartham anin-ditam k tatra var

_sasahasr@>i nirvikalpasam@dhin@ | dasa sthitv@ sas@m@s@v @tmany asne-

hadapavat k LYV 1.3.51–53 (MU 2.1.42-44) at JMV 4.1.14–16.95 tasm@d vidite ’pi tattve visr@ntirahitasya sukar@ghavayor iva sa:saya utpadyate. sa c@jn@nam

iva mok_sasya pratibandhaka$. JMV 4.1.17.

96 In other words, it signals the importance of the role of ‘. . .?ptas i.e. of those on whomwe can rely for our guidance’ (Divanji 1939b, p.289). For example, see MU 2.17.8c.

97 Vidy@ra>ya cites the Vi_s>upur@>a as his source by name at JMV 2.4.56. The Vi

_s>upur@>a

is viewed authoritatively by Advaita Ved@ntins, attracting commentaries by Citsukha(c. 1220 CE) and Sradhara (c. 1400 CE). It should go without saying, however, that thework is a key theological text within Vai

_s>ava devotional contexts. Sravai

_s>avas, for

example, regard it as the most important of the Pur@>as (Adluri 2015) and it was acritical source in the Gaunaya tradition’s understanding of the saktis of Vi

_s>u (cf.

Haberman 1988, p.59). For a recent translation of the Vi_s>upur@>a, see Taylor (2021).

98 See supra 73.99 ‘“The onewho is ignorant and lacks trust, whose nature is to be uncertain, is lost. There

is no happiness for the one whose nature is to be uncertain – neither in this world norbeyond.” Lack of trust is error’. ajnas c@sraddadh@nas ca sa:@y@tm@ vinasyati | n@ya: loko’sti na paro na sukha: sa:say@tmana$ k [Bhagavadgat@ 4.40] iti. asraddh@ viparyaya$. JMV4.1.18–19.

100 The Obhu and Nid@gha story also appears at 2.49.34–94 of the N@radapur@>a/N@radayamah@pur@>a (C@rudeva 1984 [1923/24]) and chapter 379 on advaitabrahmajn@nain the Agnipur@>a (Mitra 1873–9).


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101 Among other sages, Obhu and Nid@gha are mentioned in the J@b@la Upani_sad as para-

maha:sas ‘. . .whohaveno visible emblem,whokeep their conduct concealed, andwho,although they are sane, behave like madman’ (J@b@la Upani

_sad 6.69 in Olivelle [1992,

pp.145–6]). At the very start of the JMV (1.0.3), Vidy@ra>ya cites the J@b@la Upani_sad as

the basis for the view that the cause of renunciation is vairagya. In the Bh@gavata Pur@>a(KP

_s>asankara 1965), another work Vidy@ra>ya cites, Obhu is mentioned as a wander-

ing celibate (Bh@gavata Pur@>a 4.8.1) and a siddha in the guise of a madman (Bh@gavataPur@>a 6.15.12–15).

102 The two sages are depicted in dialogue on gnostic matters in numerous late Upani_sads,

see Tejobindu Upani_sad (Ayyang@r 1938, pp.78–105), Var@ha Upani

_sad (pp.220–42),

Annap+r>a Upani_sad (Ayyang@r 1941, pp.28–87), and Mah@ Upani

_sad (pp.252–357). An

extended dialogue between Obhu and Nid@gha also features in the sixth book of theSivarahasya (?treya 1983), a Saiva advaitic work that fashions itself as an itih@sa anddetails, among other issues, the sacred geography of South India (Raghavan 1972,p.100). The part of the Sivarahasya that includes Obhu and Nid@gha is popularly knownas the Obhugat@, which has been published as a separate text in numerous languages inIndia for over a century, and is particularly popular in Tamil. Ramana Maharshi, whotells a version of the Obhu and Nid@gha story (cf. Ramanasramam 2002, pp.47–9)detailed here, highly commended the Obhugat@, as did ‘the sage of K@nci’Candrasekharendra Sarasvata Sv@ma. Helena Petrovna Blavatsky (1888), in her well-known occult work The Secret Doctrine, quotes Horace Hayman Wilson’s translation ofthe Vi

_s>upur@>a frequently. Blavatsky’s associate, Bhagavan Das (1909), would later

publish a translation of the Vi_s>upur@>a’s story of Obhu and Nid@gha in The Theosophist.

On the need to disambiguate non-ved@ntic, advaita-inflected works, such as theObhugat@, from the umbrella of ‘Advaita Ved@nta’, and on the considerable importanceof these Sanskritic and vernacular works in shaping colonial period accounts of advaita,see Madaio (2017).

103 The story of Obhu and Nid@gha is embedded within a narrative about a king namedBharata, a devotee ofV@sudeva,whobecomes attached to a deer and undergoes a seriesof rebirths. Having become a brahmin, who is depicted as a knower ofmok

_sadharma, he

is queried about the highest good (param@rtha, VP 2.14.8c) or supreme aim (sreyas, VP2.14.11c) by the king of Saurava. In this framing story, the goal of ritual action, amongother aims, is critiqued (VP 2.14.22–28), alongwith ‘dualists who see unreality’ (dvaitinoatattvadarsina$, VP 2.14.31d).

104 av@ptajn@natattvasya na tasy@dvaitav@san@m | sa Pbhus tarkay@m@sa nid@ghasya . . . k VP2.15.5.

105 In the framing story, atVP 2.13.4–5, kingBharata is portrayed as being absorbed in yoga,which is characterised as having the mind always fixed on V@sudeva. It is not entirelyclear what ‘knower of yoga’ signifies in relation to Nid@gha but the characterisation ofBharata is useful to keep in mind.

106 On the vaisvadeva ritual in the oldest dharma literature, see Kane (1941, pp.741–8).107 ‘The self (@tman) is one, all pervasive, impartial, pure, without qualities, beyond prakPti,

bereft of birth, aging, etc., omnipresent, [and] immutable’. eko vy@pa sama$ suddhonirgu>a$ prakPte$ para$ | janmavPddhy@dirahita @tm@ sarvagato ’vyaya$ k VP 2.14.29.Also in the story of Bharata, at VP 2.13.66, the @tman is described as pure (suddha),imperishable (ak

_sara), quiescent (s@nta), and without qualities (nirgu>a).

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108 pum@n sarvagato vy@pa @k@savad aya: yata$ | kuta$ kutra kva gant@saty etad apy arthavatkatham k so ’ha: gant@ na c@gant@ naikadesaniketana$ | tva: c@nye ca na ca tva: ca n@nyenaiv@hamapy ahamkVP2.15.24–25.Obhu further explains that one’smind should attainimpartiality (samat@) and that impartiality, or equality (s@mya), is the way to liberation(VP 2.15.31).

109 evam ekam ida: viddhi na bhedi sakala: jagat | v@sudev@bhidheyasya svar+pa: para-m@tmana$ k VP 2.15.35.

110 On the perhaps not unrelated notion of advaitav@san@, see Duquette’s (2021, pp.101–4)discussion of the concept in Srahar

_sa’s Kha>danakha>dakh@dya (twelfth century),

Vidy@ra>ya’s Anubh+tiprak@sa, and Appaya Dak_sita’s Siv@rkama>idapik@ (sixteenth century).

111 viparyayasy@pi nid@gha ud@hara>am. JMV 4.1.21.112 As noted elsewhere (Madaio 2018, p.19), Vidy@ra>ya distinguishes between a stable

(sthita) realisation and one that is unstable (asthita). In the case of the former, if thepractitioner has established the proper preliminary disposition, ‘when the recognitionof reality arises. . .he continuously meditates on [i.e., is aware of] reality’ (utpannetattvajn@ne . . . nairantarye>a tattva: dhy@yati at JMV 1.6.3). On the other hand, if thereis a lack of the requisite attitudinal and attentional qualities, the recognition of realityis unstable and, eventually, ‘the reality is forgotten’ (tattva: vismaryate at JMV 1.6.3).

113 Pbhu$ paramakaru>ay@ nid@ghasya gPham etya bahudh@ ta: bodhayitv@ nirjag@ma. buddhe‘pi tadupadi

_sbavastuny asraddadh@no nid@gha$ karm@>y eva paramapuru

_s@rthahetur iti

viparyaya: pr@pya karm@nu_sbh@ne yath@p+rva: pravavPte. so ’pi si

_syasya paramapuru

_s@r-

thabhra:so m@ bh+d iti kPpay@ guru$ punar @gatya bodhay@m@sa. tad@pi viparyaya: najahau. tPtayena tu bodhanena viparyaya: parityajya visr@ntim alabhata. JMV 4.1.21

114 ‘There is a tripartite categorisation of tendencies pertaining to tradition: addiction tostudy, addiction to many scriptures, and addiction to ritual performance’. s@strav@san@trividh@, p@bhavyasana: bahus@stravyasanam anu

_sbh@navyasana: ceti. JMV 2.4.40.

Madhus+dana Sarasvata, in his commentary on Bhagavadgat@ 6.32, reproduces verbatimVidy@ra>ya’s account of the different types of v@san@s. He also cites Nid@gha as anexample of a sage who suffered from addiction to ritual performance.

115 Vidy@ra>ya had previously cited R@ma as a gnostic who, lacking mental quiescence, suf-fered from uncertainty. R@ma, however, could have also served as an example of a gnosticafflicted by impure v@san@s. Vidy@ra>ya, indeed, draws attention to this aspect elsewhere,quoting R@ma as follows: ‘What will a feeble one such as I do? As the prior net of latenttendencies compels me, oh sage, so I remain’. pr@ktana: v@san@j@la: niyojayati m@m yath@ |mune tathaiva ti

_sbh@mi kPpa>a$ ki: karomyahamk LYV2.1.4 (MU2.9.23) at JMV1.3.18. This is

useful to keep in mind since it intimates the deep interrelationship between mind andv@san@. In fact, on the LYV account, mind is nothing other than v@san@: ‘the nature of themind is always just latent tendency (v@san@). Theword “mind” is regarded as a synonymoflatent tendency’.v@sanaiva sad@ r@jan svar+pa: viddhi cetasa$ | cittasabdas tupary@yov@san@y@ud@hPta$ k LYV 6.9.363 (MU 6.98.5).

116 It is principally in chapter three of the JMV,wherein Vidy@ra>ya explicates themostlyyogicmethods ofmanon@sa, that pr@>a is discussed. In particular, Vidy@ra>ya considersthe cessation of the pulsation of pr@>a as the fourth step in a series of four methods,which are the cause of the dissolution (vi

pla) of themind. The key verses from the LYV

that Vidy@ra>ya cites in relation to these methods, which are distinguished from in-effective, forceful approaches, are as follows:


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Realizing the knowledge of the supreme self, association with good people,giving up latent tendencies, and the cessation of the pulsation of pr@>a areindeed the effective methods for conquering the mind. By these [methods,the mind] is quickly conquered like the dust of the earth [that is washedaway] through rain. When there are these methods, those who are [tryingto] restrain the mind through force (habha) [are like those] who, havingdiscarded the lamp, [try to] allay the darkness with lamp-black. Thosefoolish [methods] that try to conquer the mind through force are [as itwere] binding a large, frantic elephant by lotus-fibres. adhy@tmavidy@dhiga-mas s@dhusa:gama eva ca | v@san@sa:parity@ga$ pr@>aspandanirodhanam ket@s tu yuktaya$ pu

_sb@$ santi cittajaye kila | @bhis taj jayate k

_sipra: dh@r@bhir

iva bh+raja$ k sata_su yukti

_sv et@su habh@n niyamayanti ye | cetas te dapam

utsPjya vinighnanti tamo ’njanai$ k vim+nh@$ kartum udyukt@ ye habh@c cetasojayam | te nibadhnanti n@gendram unmatta: bisatantubhi$ k 5.10.128–31 [MU5.93.34–37] at JMV 3.2.3–6.3

It is worth noting that thismaterial, including significant text pieces from the JMV, arereproduced by Madhus+dana Sarasvata in his commentary on Bhagavadgat@ 6.35 in hisG+nh@rthadapik@. With regard to the above quotation, although the MU/LYV distancesitself from forceful methods, a position Vidy@ra>ya reiterates (cf. ‘habhayoga’ at JMV3.1.16), it is worth noting that Atreya (1936a, p.250 ff.), long ago, had linked certainelements of the ‘Yogav@si

_sbha’, particularly those related to pr@>a, n@na , and ku>nalina , to

the broad stream of habhayoga. In addition to the so-called yogic and sa:ny@sicUpani

_sads, theMU/LYVwas one ofmany sources drawn on by later habhayogic works,

such Sv@tm@r@ma’s fifteenth-century compilation, the Habhapradapika (Bouy 1994).Yogic aspects of the JMV, which cite the LYV, as well as Gaunap@da, etc., likewisedemonstrate a certain degree of overlap with some notions evident in the habhayogiccorpus (broadly construed). In light of the interest of Advaita Ved@ntins in habhayogicmaterial during the early modern period (Bouy 1994), it is interesting to note somelater entanglements in this regard. For example, the South Indian householderMummanideva’s Sa:s@ratari>i (cf. Divanji 1939a), an ostensibly Advaita Ved@ntic com-mentary extant on prakara>as four to six of the LYV, cites the Habhapradapika whenexplicating certain verses of the LYV. In addition, Brahm@nanda’s commentary on theHabhapradapik@, the Jyotsn@, quotes JMV 1.3.11, citing Vidy@ra>ya by name, when com-menting on Habhapradapik@ 3.82.

117 y@vad vilana: na mano na t@vad v@san@k_saya$ | na k

_sa>@ v@san@ y@vac citta: t@van na

s@myati k LYV 5.10.110 at JMV 2.2.2. Finding it peculiar that there is only a hemstitchfor this corresponding stanza in the Mok

_sop@ya (i.e., LYV 5.10.110ab ¼ MU 5.93.11), I

noticed that the two subsequent stanzas in the LYV are also absent in the Mok_sop@ya

(MU) critical edition (in addition to other verses). Steiner (2015, f. 3, p.593–4), in hismeticulous notes, points out that the logic of the MU here suggests that the ten afore-mentioned missing p@das, which are present in the LYV (and, indeed, the laterYogav@si

_sbha), originated from the MU but were later lost in the MU manuscript trad-

ition. This, of course, underscores the view already mentioned that the LYV is anabridgement of the MU (i.e., assuming the LYV is not the earliest ‘core’). It is also a

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reminder of the rather complicated textual history of theMok_sop@ya, particularly since

‘. . .none of the Mok_sop@ya manuscripts is free of contamination from the Yogav@si

_sbha

recension’ (Torzsok 2017, p.85).118 v@san@vasata$ pr@>aspandas tena ca v@san@ | LYV 5.10.65ab (MU 5.92.53ab) at JMV 3.2.17.119 ya$ pr@>apavanaspandas cittaspanda$ sa eva hi | pr@>aspandak

_saye yatna$ kartavyo

dhamatoccakai$ k LYV 5.10.125 (MU 5.93.30ab, 31ab) at JMV 3.4.3.120 pr@>@y@madPnh@bhy@sair yukty@ ca gurudattay@ | @san@sanayogena pr@>aspando nirudhyatek LYV 5.10.122 (MU 5.93.25) at JMV 3.2.19.

121 v@san@sa:parity@g@c citta: gacchaty acittat@m | pr@>aspandanirodh@c ca yathecchasi tath@kuru k LYV 5.10.121 (MU 5.93.24) at JMV 3.2.21. Compare this section of the JMV,including the cited LYV quotations, to Madhus+dana Sarasvata’s commentary onBhagavadgat@ 6.35 in his G+nh@rthadapik@.

122 See supra 32 and 115.123 tasm@d avisr@ntacittasya samsayaviparyayaprasangena tattvajn@nasya phalapratibandhalak

_s

a>@d b@dh@d rak_s@pek

_syate. visr@ntacittasya tu manon@sena yad@ jagad eva pralayate tad@

sa:sayaviparyayayo$ ka$ prasanga$. JMV 4.1.25.124 Indeed, during nirvikalpasam@dhi there is no triad of the knower, the object known, and

the resulting knowledge,which is the condition of possibility for dualistic disturbances.On the abeyance of the tripuba structure during sam@dhi, see, e.g., Pancadasa 11.16(N@r@ya>a R@ma, 1987).

125 The final stage of javanmukti is indistinguishable from videhamukti (i.e., when that termis understood as liberation after the fall of the body).

126 ‘Although the three [categories of] latent tendencies pertaining to society, tradition,and the body appear acceptable to one who lacks discernment, they are to be aban-doned by thosewith discernment because they obstruct the arising of knowing in thosedesirous [of gnosis] and obstruct the stability of knowing in the gnostic’. tad etallokas@stradehav@san@trayam avivekin@m up@deyatvena pratibh@sam@nam api vividisorvedanotpattivirodhitv@d vidu

_so jn@naprati

_sbh@virodhitv@c ca vivekibhir heyam. JMV 2.4.85.

127 ‘In the same way that one who is afflicted by son, friend, wife, etc., and then getsdetached, accepts renunciation for the removal of those [afflictions], one who isafflicted by impure latent tendencies, such as pride of knowledge, pride of wealth,pride about the customary practice of [one’s] family, etc., ought to practise discern-ment (viveka), which is antithetical to those [impure tendencies]’. yath@putramitrakalatr@dibhi$ panyam@nastato viraktas tannivartaka: p@rivr@jya: gPh>@titath@vidy@madadhanamadakul@c@ramad@dimalinav@san@bhi$panyam@nas tadvirodhina: vive-kam abhyasyet. JMV 2.8.1.

128 adya yemahat@:m+rdhni te dinair nipatanty adha$ | hanta cittamahatt@y@$ kai_s@ visvastat@

tava k LYV 5.1.39 [MU 5.9.15] kva dhan@ni mahap@n@: brahma>a$ kva jaganti v@ |pr@ktan@ni pray@t@ni keya: visvastat@ tava k LYV 5.1.41 [MU 5.9.22] kobayo brahma>@:y@t@ gat@s svargaparampar@$ | pray@t@$ p@:suvad bh+p@$ k@ dhPtir mama javite k LYV5.1.42 [MU 5.9.24] ye

_s@: nime

_sa>onme

_sau jagat@: pralayodayau | t@dPs@$ puru

_s@ na

_sb@

m@dPs@: ga>anaiva k@ k LYV 5.1.49 [MU 5.9.44]. These verses are cited in succession atJMV 2.8.2–5.


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129 The well-known preliminary qualities that mark a student as eligible for inquiryinto brahman include: (i) discernment between that which is eternal and ephemeral;(ii) dispassion towards enjoyment of results of actions here and in the hereafter;(iii) attainment of the means, such as tranquillity and sense-control; and (iv) striv-ing for liberation.

130 n@ya: do_sa$. s@dhanacatu

_sbayasa:pannasya pasc@d brahmajn@nam ity e

_sa sarvapuru

_sa

s@dh@ra>ak_su>>a$ praunho r@jam@rga$. janakasya tu p+rvapu>yapunja

parip@ke>@k@saphalap@tavad akasm@t siddhagat@srava>am@tre>a tattvajn@nam utpannam.tatas ca cittivisr@ntaye viveko ’ya: kriyata iti k@>na evedam ucita: t@>navam. JMV 2.8.7.

131 Indeed, Vidy@ra>ya does not deny that viveka is a prerequisite for tattvajn@na; rather, heholds that the application of viveka after awakening is also a method of counteractingimpure v@san@s that may obstruct non-dual knowing.

132 At LYV 5.1.13–16 [MU 5.7.2–5], Vasi_sbha explains that in the pandemonium of sa:s@ra,

there are two excellent ways to liberation (apavarga). The first occurs gradually overone ormany lives by carrying out the instruction of a teacher (guruprokt@d anu

_sbh@n@t).

The second, pertaining to one whose mind is somewhat refined(kincidvyutpannacetasa$), occurs quickly only through oneself, and this attainment ofgnosis is like a fallen fruit from the sky (@k@saphalap@tavat). With regard to the latter,Vasi

_sbha tells the story of Janaka, the hearing ofwhich induces an expedient realisation

(not unlike how Janaka’s hearing of the siddhas set in motion his own awakening). Thephrase ‘like a fallen fruit from the sky’ is suggestive of how this is a direct or quickawakening, which is different from the well-known maxim of the crow and the palm(k@kat@laya, e.g., MU 5.9.49a), which is employed in this story in reference to the ultim-ate non-existence of causality.

133 prabuddho ‘smi prabuddho ’smi dP_sbas cauro may@tmana$ | manon@meha hanmy ena:man-

as@smi cira: hata$ k LYV 5.1.55 [MU 5.9.60].134 nanu vidvatsa:ny@sino vedanas@dhanasrava>@dyanu

_sbh@navaiphaly@d vedanasya ca

svar+pe>a kartum akartum anyath@ v@ kartum asakyasy@nanu_sbheyatv@d upasarjanatven@py

uttarak@lino ’bhy@sa$ kadPsa$. JMV 2.3.3–4.135 na, janakasya tadanuvPttyabh@ve ’pi y@jnavalkyabhagarath@des tadanuvPttidarsan@t. asti hi

y@jnavalkyasya tatprativ@din@m u_sastakahol@dan@: ca bh+y@n vidy@mada$, tai$ sarvair api

vijiga_sukath@y@: pravPttatv@t. JMV 2.9.2.

136 y@jnavalkyas tu vijiga_sudas@y@: na t@dPsa$, cittavisr@ntaye vidvatsa:ny@sasya tena

kari_syam@>atv@t. na kevalam asya vijiga

_s@ ki: tu dhanatP

_s>@pi mahata , yato bah+n@:

brahmavid@: purata$ sth@pita: s@la:k@ra: gosahasram apahPtya svayam evedam @ha:namo vayam brahmi

_sbh@ya kurmo gok@m@ eva vaya: sma iti. [B@U 3.1.2] . . . itare ca

brahmavida$ svakaya: dhanam anen@pahPtam iti matv@ cukrudhu$. aya: cakrodhaparavasa$ s@kalya: s@pena m@ray@m@sa. JMV 2.9.22, 25.

137 ‘“I ask you about that person providing the hidden connection (upani_sad) – the onewho

carries off these other persons, brings them back, and rises above them? If you will nottell me that, your head will shatter apart.” S@kalya did not know him, and his head did,indeed, shatter apart. Robbers, moreover, stole his bones, mistaking them for some-thing else’ (B@U 3.9.26 in Olivelle 1998, p.101). sa yas t@n puru

_s@n niruhya pratyu-

hy@tyakr@mat ta: tvaupani_sada: puru

_sa: pPcch@mi | ta: cen me na vivak

_syasi m+rdh@ te

vipati_syatati | ta: ha na mene s@kalyas | tasya ha m+rdh@ vipap@ta | api h@sya parimo

_si>o

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’sthany apajahrur anyanmanyam@n@[email protected]. A similar versionof the incident is alsotold at Satapatha Br@hma>a 11.6.3.11 and Jaiminaya Br@hma>a 2.77, see Fiser (1984, p.76)and Witzel (1987, pp.377–80).

138 A close reading of BPhad@ra>yaka Upani_sad 3 attests to the increasing sense of disturb-

ance in Y@jnavalkya, who calls S@kalya an idiot (ahallika, B@U 3.9.25) and quips at him:‘. . .have the br@hma>as made you their tool, to pull coals from the fire for them?’ ([email protected] in Roebuck2003 [2000], p.56). Roebuck comments on Y@jnavalkya’s sharp query:‘Y@jnavalkya is trying to warn S@kalya not to overreach himself. S@kalya’s name,Vidagdha, means both “clever” and “burnt-up”. A lengthened vowel at the end ofthe question suggests that Y@jnavalkya has raised his voice, perhaps in exasperation’(Roebuck2003 [2000], p.402, f. 14).

139 On the head shattering or bursting (vippad) trope, see Witzel (1987), Insler (1989–90),

Black (2007), and Lindquist (2011). One of the earlier instances of the threat (B@U 3.6)causes an interlocutor to desist or become quiet (uparar@ma) but it is certainly fatal inthe case of S@kalya. The rather troubling fact that a celebrated knower of brahman haskilled someone, and, in particular, a brahmin, is certainly evident to Vidy@ra>ya.Indeed, at JMV 2.9.25, without prodding from the p+rvapak

_sin, Vidy@ra>ya cites the

Kau_sataki Upani

_sad and the ?ry@pancasati (¼Param@rthas@ra) in support of the view that

liberation (mok_sa) is still possible for a knower of brahman even if he kills. The thrust of

the quotations is reminiscent of Bhagavadgat@ 18.17, which is cited at JMV 1.2.43.140 ki: bahun@, brahmavid@: y@jnakalky@dan@m asty eva malinav@san@nuvPtti$ . . .. JMV 2.9.28.141 Not unlike the ethos of the Bhagavadgat@, the sages depicted in the LYV, many of whom

arekings, provide ample examples of realised sageswhodidnot renounce the dharmaoftheir @srama and var>a in a formal sense. For an interpretation of the literary (ratherthan literal) function of the prince/king in the LYV—as exemplified by R@ma—seeMadaio (2019, p.111). Unlike the JMV, theMU/LYV critiques ascetical or formal renun-ciation; however, aswewill see shortly, a drastic renunciation andwithdrawal from theworld is indeed portrayed as a necessary step in the case of Bhagaratha, who, unlike aformal renouncer, returns to a kingship as a javanmukta. It is worth recalling, however,that Vidy@ra>ya does not position the Advaita Ved@ntic teaching as exclusively forrenouncers (see supra 48 and 50).

142 This short summary of the Bhagaratha story follows R@m@ya>a 1.41–43. CompareMah@bh@rata 3.106–109.

143 See LYV 6.8.5–15 [MU 6.78.2–21].144 cinm@tra: sarvaga: s@ntam asti nirmalam acyutam | deh@di netarat ki:cid iti vedmi muna s-

vara k ki: tv atra pratipattir me sphubat@m eti na prabho | et@vanm@trasa:vitti$ sy@m aha:sarvad@ katham k LYV 6.8.19–20 (MU 6.78.25).

145 sarare ’smi:s cir@r+nho girau tarur iva svake | aha:bh@vo mah@bh@ga vada me tyajyatekatham k LYV 6.8.26 (MU 6.78.32). The term aha:bh@va appears synonymous withaha:k@ra given the use of the latter term in the directly preceding verse by Tritula:‘Oh King, when there is the quiescence of the I-sense, that knowledge, which causes theelimination of desire and aversion [and] is the medicine of the sickness of sa:s@ra, isobtained’. r@gadve

_sak

_sayakara: sa:s@ravy@dhibhe

_sajam | aha:k@ropas@ntau tad r@jan

jn@nam av@pyate k LYV 6.8.25 (MU 6.78.31).


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146 s@nt@se_savise

_sa>o vigatabha$ sa:tyaktasarvai

_sa>o gatv@ n+nam aki:canatvam ari

_su tyaktv@

samagr@: sriyam | s@nt@ha:kPtir astadehakalanas te_sv eva bhik

_s@mabanm@mapy ujjhitav@n

ala: yadi bhavasy uccais tad uccair asi k LYV 6.8.30 (MU 6.78.36).147 bahu

_su janmasu dPnhabh@vitatven@smin janmani vinaiva paropadesamaha:k@

ramamak@rak@makrodh@dayo malinav@san@ utpadyante. . .. JMV 2.4.41.148 . . . bhagarathas tu tattva: viditv@pi r@gjya: p@layan malinav@san@bhis cittavisr@ntyabh@ve

sati sarva: parityajya pasc@d visr@ntav@n. JMV 2.9.28. On the critical role of the ‘renun-ciation of everything’ (sarvaty@ga) in the LYV, as articulated in the story of Sikhidhvajaand C+n@l@, a narrative known to Vidy@ra>ya (cf. JMV 3.1.31-34), see Madaio (2019).

149 See supra 23.

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