Space as time: temporalization and other special functions of locational-setting adverbials

Space as time: temporalization and otherspecial functions of locational-setting

adverbials*

TUOMAS HUUMO

Abstract

The basic semantic function of locational elements with the syntactic statusof clause modifier is typically assumed to be the establishing of a (spatial,temporal, or other) setting, within which entities interact and processesunfold. Less attention has been paid to structures where several settingsare connected to the same predicate, and to the mutual semantic relationof the settings in these structures. In this article evidence is produced forthe argument that these constructions (called multiple locational specifica-tions) reveal a scope relation between the settings such that a semanticallyhigher domain dominates a lower one. For instance, in the sentence OnMonday nights, Ollie played chess with Arthur in London, time dominatesspace by confining the spatial relation between Ollie and London to Mondaynights only. The opposite scope relation can be achieved by creating aspecial interpretation of the lower domain. For instance, space can dominatetime only if it acquires a temporal sense itself. Such a reading foregroundsthe duration of the presence of an entity in the space. Syntactically, thiseffect is created by word order; e.g. In London, Ollie played chess withArthur on Monday nights evokes a temporal reading for in London (‘whenin London’), enabling it to include on Monday nights within its scope. Itis argued in this paper that temporal and other special interpretations arequite productive and possible for many different kinds of domain.

1. Introduction

‘‘Setting adverbials’’ are typically regarded as peripheral elements obvi-ously not of great grammatical importance. In standard syntax textbooksthey are passed over with only a few remarks, saying for instance thatthey occur in the clausal periphery (the absolute beginning or end of thesentence); that their syntactic position is unstable (no constraints prohibit

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their ‘‘movement’’ to the initial position); that they are optional; thatthey are not criterial for verb subclassification; and that in semantic termsthey introduce a (spatiotemporal ) ‘‘setting,’’ within which entities aresituated and processes unfold.

Yet the assumption that setting adverbials merely introduce settings ofpreexisting events or processes and have no effect on how we understandthe process or event designated by the clause nucleus is certainly anoversimplification. Equally oversimplified is the assumption that thesemantic relation of an adverbial to the nucleus is directly predictablefrom its ‘‘basic’’ meaning, that is, that for instance ‘‘adverbials of place’’always indicate only a spatial setting of an event. Consider the differencebetween (1) and (2).

(1) In Britain, the president hunts hares.(2) In France, the president hunts hares.

It is important to note that in syntactic terms, examples (1) and (2) areidentical: both consist of an ‘‘adverbial of place’’ (In Britain, In France),and the predication the president hunts hares. Yet there is an importantdifference in the information we get from these examples. In (1), theclause-initial locative indeed carries its basic sense and indicates a spatialsetting of hunting hares. Example (2), on the other hand, can be under-stood as saying that the person performing the activity is the president France. Such a reading is excluded in (1), which, in a world whereBritain is a kingdom, can only be a predication about the president ofanother country. In (2) the setting adverbial in France can thus becharacterized as a possessivized expression, in the sense of Huumo(1996b).

In the following discussion the view is adopted that locatives such asthose in (1) and (2), as well as other locationals (i.e. elements morphologi-cally and syntactically reminiscent of spatial expressions; cf. Clark 1978),function as space-builders in the sense of Fauconnier (1985: 16–18). Theirmain function is to introduce mental spaces, which are, according toFauconnier, ‘‘constructs distinct from linguistic structures but built upin any discourse according to guidelines provided by the linguistic expres-sions.’’ In the mental-space framework, the difference between (1) and(2) is seen as a consequence of the different role structures of theirrespective mental spaces (Britain, France). In (2), the mental space Francecontains a role for the president, but in (1) the Britain space has no suchrole. The difference in reading is a result of different cognitive mappingstrategies: in (1), the president is mapped into the Britain space fromanother space (where it is defined), whereas in (2) the president is defineddirectly within the France space (cf. Fauconnier 1985: 30). Note that


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exactly the opposite implications would arise if the king were substitutedfor the president in these examples, assuming of course again that thesentences are interpreted against the background of the world as wepresently know it. Such implications are thus directly dependent on thelinguistic and extralinguistic context available to the interlocutors. Ingeneral, the unmarked interpretation of a mental space and its contentis the one best compatible with the discourse context and backgroundknowledge, in particular with previous space-building that has been goingon in the discourse (see Fauconnier 1997). In this respect (2) is moreautonomous than (1), which requires additional knowledge (as to whichpresident we are talking about).

Now the objection might be made that the observed difference between(1) and (2) is part of ‘‘pragmatics’’ and is irrelevant from a grammaticalpoint of view; that in spite of their obvious inequality, the crucial thingis that (1) and (2) are identical. However, if the differenceis ignored, then it becomes very difficult to explain why (3) is less naturalthan (4).

(3) *In Britain, the president hunts hares in France.(4) In France, the president hunts hares in Britain.

Even though (3) is syntactically well formed, it is semantically unaccept-able (again, in a world where Britain is a kingdom), whereas (4), marginalas it may be, certainly has a possible interpretation with the ‘presidentof France’ reading. In semantic terms, the unacceptability of (3) is dueto the between ‘Britain’ and ‘France’: these locationsare geographically separate, and thus their connection (as purely spatialmodifiers) to the same predicate results in a contradiction where one andthe same individual is in two different places at the same time (compareIn Britain, the president hunts hares in Sussex, which is natural becausethere is a geographical relation of containment between the two places;see also section 2.1). In (4) such a contradiction is avoided, because inFrance has the possessivized reading. The example shows that a possessiv-ized locative can give up its function as an indicator of a spatial settingand introduce a mental space with a more abstract relation to the nucleus.

Normally, of course, a possessivized locative has a double function, asan indicator of both a possessive and a locative relationship. Unlessconflicting information is provided in the context, (2) is thus understoodas saying that the president France hunts hares France. But as(4) shows, we can sometimes cancel one of these functions, as long aswe do not cancel both (cf. the impossibility of [4∞]).

(4∞) *In France, the president of the United States hunts hares in Britain.


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So far we have seen that the simplistic assumption that setting adverbi-als are peripheral elements, with only a loose semantic and syntacticconnection to the nucleus, does not tell the whole story. Now considerthe claim that the clausal position of setting adverbials is unstable, thatis, that they can be freely ‘‘moved’’ from the end of the sentence to thebeginning without causing a change in their function. This claim is anoversimplification in both semantic and syntactic terms, since the functionof the ‘‘same’’ adverbial can be essentially different in different positions.We need only compare (2) with (5) to see the difference:

(2) In France, the president hunts hares.(5) The president hunts hares in France.

The president of France reading is immediately obtained in (2) but hardlyin (5).1 Thus the clausal position of the locative element seems to affectits ability to acquire a particular semantic relation with the nucleus. Thisis due to the general tendency that a preceding element can affect thesemantic interpretation of subsequent elements but not vice versa (seeVerhagen 1986: 217). Note also that if a conflicting locative were intro-duced to these examples, then, again, only (2) but not (5) would sustainits (marginal ) acceptability (In France, the president hunts hares in Britain;*The president hunts hares in France in Britain).

Leaving now these possessivized examples aside for a while (to discussthem thoroughly in section 3), we can conclude that word-order variantsthat differ only in the positioning of a locational element (initial versusfinal position) reveal interesting semantic differences. Possessivization isby no means the only kind of special interpretation there is for a locationalelement. Another type shows up in our examples if we remove thepossessive implication (by changing the subject NP) and add a temporalmodifier. Compare (2∞) and (5∞), with special attention to the scoperelations between space and time.

(2∞) In France, Bill hunted hares at weekends.(5∞) Bill hunted hares in France at weekends.

Observe first that neither of these two examples allows the possessivizedreading of the initial locative. This is because the subject is a propername, and proper names are incapable of fulfilling a role set up by theinitial space-builder (i.e. there is no Bill of France; see, however,Fauconnier 1985: 63–81, who demonstrates that even proper names mayset up a role in special contexts). But there is another kind of specialreading that distinguishes these examples from each other, as regards thescope relation between time and place. In (5∞), the spatial relation(between Bill and France) is subordinated to the temporal relation (the



weekends), and what the sentence says is that Bill was in France onweekends only, hunting hares. Time takes place within its scope, as ifthe temporal setting were a more extensive container that includes thespatial container as part of it. The discontinuous nature of the temporalsetting (consisting of successive weekends, which are of course separatedby the intervening days) results in an interpretation where all otherrelationships are discontinuous as well. It is important to note that thesentence does not say anything about the time intervals between theweekends, that is, it neither confirms nor denies the possibility that Billwent to France, or hunted hares, on some workdays as well.

Example (2∞), where the spatial element occupies the initial position,suggests a very different interpretation. Comparing (2∞) with (5∞), we getthe impression that the semantic scope between space and time has beenoverturned — space dominates time in (2∞), and this results in a readingwhere Bill’s presence in France is continuous and covers both the week-ends and the time intervals between the weekends. The clause-initialadverbial in France is not understood as an indicator of pure place anymore; rather, it gets a special interpretation where the duration of Bill’spresence in France is foregrounded.

The requirement for such a special interpretation follows from the factthat time is a conceptually higher domain than space, and the unmarkeddominance relation between the two has time dominating space by settingup temporal limits of the spatial relation. The opposite scope relationwhere space dominates time can only be achieved if a special interpreta-tion is assigned to the spatial element that promotes it onto the temporallevel. This is the interpretation of the spatial element: wehighlight the duration of the spatial relation, and this duration becomesa temporal space that may ‘‘contain’’ less extensive time periods desig-nated by proper temporal elements.

It is important to note that irrespective of the dominance relationbetween time and space, both (2∞) and (5∞) subordinate the activity itselfto both domains. In both examples Bill’s hare-hunting takes place atweekends, in the temporal dimension, and in France, in the spatialdimension. The important thing in setting up the scope relations seemsto be the subject (Bill ) and its relation to the two domains in each case.In (2∞), it is only in his role as the agent of the particular activity (huntinghares) that Bill is within the scope of at weekends. At the same time,however, he has a continuous relation to the France space that exceedsthe weekends and establishes the temporal frame of ‘Bill’s presence inFrance’. Temporalization of a locative is thus not a property of thelocative alone but of the combination of the locative with another entity(normally the subject), whose presence in the location is the temporal


394 T. Huumo

period. This effect would be exactly the same if we replaced the temporal-ized locative with a proper temporal expression designating a more extens-ive time period. Thus, even though Last year, Bill hunted hares at weekendssubordinates the activity (of hare-hunting) to the weekends, Bill still hasa continuous relationship with last year as well (at least in the trivialsense that his existence continued throughout the last year, even betweenthe weekends).

The possessivized and temporalized examples have shown that thesemantic functions of locationals can be complicated: they do not merelyprovide spatiotemporal backgrounds for preexisting events but in factaffect the interpretation of the events and the entities that participate inthe events. In the following sections, scope relations between locationalelements will be discussed in detail. Section 2 is an overview on multiplelocational specifications with respect to one dimension and on the scoperelations between locationals in these constructions. We will return topossessivized and temporalized setting adverbials in sections 3 and 4 anddiscuss in more detail the mechanisms that lie behind these interpretationsand enable us to construe them. Finally, section 5 is a short examinationof the semantic functions of setting adverbials with respect to categoriesassociated with the verb (tense, modality, and negation).

2. Multiple locational specifications in a single domain

Scope relations between two locationals are of course most straightfor-ward if both belong to the same semantic domain, since such a contain-ment relation is based directly on inclusion within one and the samedimension. In this section, examples with multiple spatial (section 2.1)and temporal (section 2.2) specifications are discussed from thisperspective.

2.1. Space

The most prototypical containment relation is of course the spatial one.Multiple spatial specifications describe a situation where one containeris located within another one, which in turn may be located in an evenmore extensive container, and so on. Linguistically, multiple containmentrelations are represented by a structure where several locative elementsare connected to the same predicate. These structures have been studied,among others, by Langacker (1991a), who calls them ‘‘nested locativeconstructions’’ and argues that their most natural word order reflects the



containment relation in placing the most extensive container first insequence. Example (6) is derived from Langacker (1991a: 177, 1991b:8–9):

(6) Your camera is downstairs in the bedroom in the dresser in thebottom drawer under the pile of socks.

As observed by Langacker (1991a: 177), in examples like (6) ‘‘eachlocative expression in the sequence narrows down the possible locationof the subject, confining it to just a portion of the region specified by thepreceding locative.’’ Semantically, the linear order of the locative elementsin nested locative constructions has the effect of bringing the addresseeinto the locational configuration ‘‘from outside.’’ In this particular exam-ple the whole sequence of locative expressions is placed toward the endof the sentence; however, if the sequence were to be split by placing oneof the elements at the absolute beginning, then it could only be theelement indicating the most extensive setting. This phenomenon has beenobserved by many scholars, and the conclusion has often been drawnthat a division is to be assumed between and locatives,where inner locatives belong to the nucleus (verb phrase), while outerlocatives modify the whole clause and indicate a setting. This assumptionis supported for instance by Fillmore (1968), Anderson (1977), Halliday(1985) (who uses the term circumstantials for setting expressions), andGivon (1984: 82), who speaks of the ‘‘distributional freedom’’ of adverbswith ‘‘wider scope.’’

The most detailed discussion of multiple spatial specifications that Iam aware of is Quirk et al. (1985: 519; see also Quirk and Greenbaum1985), who also point out that only the element indicating the mostextensive setting can be preposed. In their examples, In London manypeople eat in restaurants is acceptable but *In restaurants, many peopleeat in London is not. Like the other writers mentioned above, Quirk et al.(1985: 519) are inclined to draw a syntactic distinction between theelements: ‘‘[. .. ] both adjuncts are of the same semantic class but ofdifferent grammatical functions (the one being a sentence adjunct, theother a predicate adjunct).’’ However, as we have seen in section 1, inthe discussion of examples (2∞) and (5∞), a similar dominance relationis possible if the elements belong to different semantic domains.Furthermore, the assumed systematic syntactic difference between (wide-scoped) clause-initial and (narrow-scoped) clause-final elements is highlydubious, especially given the possibility of a clause-final adjunct standingoutside the verb phrase (as assumed by Quirk et al. [1985] themselves).Consider the following set of examples.


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(7) Elmer played chess with Albert at the chess club.(8) At the chess club, Elmer played chess with Albert.(9) In London, Elmer played chess with Albert at the chess club.

Following the description of Quirk et al. (1985), in both (7) and (8) thelocative at the chess club is a ‘‘sentence adjunct,’’ it is syntacticallyoptional, it introduces a setting of the whole relation, and its positioncan be changed. However, it is hard to see how its relation to the nucleusis any different in (9); yet, if its relation to the other locative (in London)were to be described in purely syntactic terms, it would here have to beclassified as a ‘‘predicate adjunct.’’ But this explanation would be totallyad hoc, since the only difference between (9) and the two other examplesis the presence of the additional spatial element in London, introducinga more extensive setting than at the chess club. In other words, theintroduction of another clause modifier into the sentence would have theeffect of supplanting the more narrow-scoped locative from its clause-modifying function and forcing upon it the function of a verb modifier.In my view, a much more natural approach would be to assume that in(9) we have in fact two clause-level modifiers, which both cover semanti-cally the entire process ‘Elmer played chess with Albert’, and which inaddition reveal a mutual scope relation where the more extensive settingsubsumes both the less extensive setting and the process under its scope.

In the examples discussed above, the containment relation between thetwo locations has always been unambiguous: it is self-evident that‘London’ is a more extensive setting than ‘the chess club’ or ‘restaurants’.If, however, the containment relation can be understood either way, thenword order starts to (instead of passively ‘‘reflecting’’) it. Suchis the case in the following examples (cf. Huumo 1995: 318–319).

(10) On the little table, Elmer’s disgusting rat was eating cheese inits cage.

(11) In its cage, Elmer’s disgusting rat was eating cheese on the littletable.

In these examples the initial setting is always the most extensive containerand includes the subsequent setting within its scope. Thus the primaryoption in examples like these is to interpret the two locatives in such asense that their containment relation is reflected in the word order; ifsuch an interpretation is impossible (*In restaurants, many people eat inLondon) the sentence becomes unacceptable.

2.2. Time

Although space is the basic domain type where relations of containmentare concerned, other domains sometimes reveal similar behavior. In



multiple temporal specifications, a similar scoping tendency existswhereby the indicator of the most extensive period takes the indicatorsof less extensive periods under its scope. It has been observed by Quirket al. (1985: 533, 544–545) that a scope relation is possible between twotemporal adjuncts, at least if they belong to the same semantic subtypeof temporal expressions. In (12) we have an example with two expressionsof ‘‘time points,’’ and in (13) one with two ‘‘frequency’’ expressions:

(12) I’ll see you at nine on Monday.(13) She felt his pulse hourly each day.

In (12) the time space on Monday contains the time space at nine. In(13), each subpart of every day (which is itself frequentative) is furtherdivided into subperiods by hourly. It is, however, important to see thatsuch a variation (and the concept of scope itself ) only applies to certainsubclasses of time adjuncts, including the two types exemplified above,but not systematically.

As with expressions of space, the scope relation between the temporalelements again affects their ability to occupy the sentence-initial position(see [14]–[16]).

(14) On Monday, I’ll see you at nine.(15) *At nine, I’ll see you on Monday.(16) Each day she felt his pulse hourly.(17) *Hourly, she felt his pulse each day.

A variation where the scope between two temporal expressions can beunderstood either way (and is thus determined by word order) appearsto be rare, since the mutual scope of ‘‘time-point’’ expressions is usuallyself-evident: a shorter period cannot possibly contain a longer period.There are, however, certain temporal expressions that are vague as tothe exact duration of the period they indicate, and these sometimes allowscope variation to arise with respect to other temporal modifiers of thesentence ([18] vs. [19]).

(18) In the afternoon, the boys played football for a long time.(19) For a long time, the boys played football in the afternoon.

In (18), the initial temporal adjunct in the afternoon (indicating a ‘‘timepoint’’) dominates the subsequent for a long time (indicating ‘‘duration’’):the long time is part of the afternoon. In (19), on the other hand, a longtime establishes a time space, within the limits of which the boys had thehabit of playing football in the afternoon. The time expression in theafternoon has to be understood in a repetitive sense for the intendedscope relation to arise. This obviously has to do with perfectivity and


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the different semantic functions of the two elements: expressions of dura-tion typically transform a (temporally) ‘‘unbounded’’ event into a‘‘bounded’’ one, but expressions of a time point (such as in the afternoon)do not (see Talmy 1988). A consequence of this is that the limits of aprocess embedded within a durative period coincide with the limits ofthat period. With an expression of a time frame this is not necessary,and in (19) it is not assumed that the boys played football the wholeafternoon. Therefore, in (19) the expression for a long time cannot findan unbounded process to bound, unless the event is understood in therepetitive sense; this again makes the process unbounded and enables theexpression of duration to bound it.

3. Multiple locational specifications belonging to different domains

The multiple locational specifications discussed in the previous sectionhave been semantically straightforward in that both elements have estab-lished a domain belonging to one and the same dimension (space, time),and their mutual dominance relation has been a direct consequence oftheir extension within that dimension. Other kinds of problem arise inexamples where a multiple locational specification consists of locationalsbelonging to different domains, as in the examples discussed in section 1.

A dominance relation between different domains cannot be based onconcrete coverage but on a more abstract relationship, where one of thedimensions has the ability to dominate the other one. In the followingdiscussion it will be shown that such relations are quite natural and thatdifferent domains can be arranged in a scoping hierarchy (cf. Huumo1996b) that reflects their ability to take one another under their scope.It is further argued that a space lower in the hierarchy can govern ahigher space only if it is given a special interpretation that promotes itto (at least) the level of that higher space. Attention will be paid inparticular to possessivized and temporalized interpretations of nontempo-ral domains.

It has been argued in Huumo (1996b), mostly on the basis of Finnishdata, that locational expressions of space, possession, and time constitutea scoping hierarchy time>possession>space, reflecting their ability todominate one another in a sentence. According to this hierarchy, inprototypical instances where all elements carry their basic meaning, pos-session takes space under its scope, while time takes under its scope bothpossession and space.

Before moving on to details, it is worth emphasizing that the scopinghierarchy, as it stands, draws a parallel between possession and the other



domains included. Possession is thus seen as metaphorical containment,and the possessive domain as analogical to the spatial domain. Thisassumption concerning the relatedness of possession to location is ofcourse most natural in the case of languages such as Finnish, whichindicate possession morphologically with a locative element and syntacti-cally with a locative construction (see examples below). However, asimilar assumption has been adopted in descriptions of languages suchas English, which represent possession with a transitive structure (for atypological study of possessive constructions, see Heine 1997). Theassumption is perhaps strongest in a framework of localist case grammar(Anderson 1971), but many other writers, among them Lyons (1967,1968), Fillmore (1968), Clark (1973), Kimball (1973), Bickerton (1981),Jackendoff (1983), and Langacker (1991a: 167–180), see possession assemantically related to location. Clark (1978) has shown, in a typologicalstudy, that the possessive constructions of different languages often beara resemblance to the locative/existential constructions. In cognitive gram-mar (Langacker 1991a), possession is seen as a ‘‘reference-point system’’where the possessor is coded as a reference point that gives the conceptual-izer access to the possessee; this relation resembles spatial relations inmany respects and is general enough to handle atypical instances ofpossessive structures that express less prototypical possessive relations.

As regards Finnish, the uniformity of the linguistic coding of spatial,possessive, and temporal relations can be illustrated with the followingset of examples, which share the same syntactic structure but differ withrespect to the domain expressed by the sentence-initial element: (20) hasa spatial, (21) a temporal, and (22) a possessive meaning.

(20) Piha+ lla oli kaarme+ i+ta.yard+ADE be.PST.3SG snake+PL+PAR2‘There were snakes in the yard.’

(21) Kesa+ lla oli kaarme+ i+ta.summer+ADE be.PST.3SG snake+PL+PAR‘In the summer there were snakes.’

(22) Liisa+ lla oli kaarme+ i+ta.Lisa+ADE be.PST.3SG snake+PL+PAR‘Lisa kept snakes.’

It would certainly be an oversimplification to claim that time, space, andpossession always behave identically in Finnish syntax; yet the fact thatminimal pairs can be found is illustrative of a deep analogy between thedomains. In a study devoted to setting adverbials, (20)–(22) are of coursenot representative examples, because the locational elements here are not


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sentence modifiers but parts of the nucleus (and syntactically obligatory);all types, however, do have uses as clause modifiers, as shown by thefollowing examples:

(23) Piha+ lla kissa so+ i hamsteri+n.yard+ADE cat eat+PST.3SG hamster+ACC‘In the yard, the cat ate the hamster.’

(24) Kesa+ lla kissa so+i hamsteri+n.summer+ADE cat eat+PST.3SG hamster+ACC‘In the summer, the cat ate the hamster.’

(25) Liisa+ lla kissa so+ i hamsteri+n.Lisa+ADE cat eat+PST.3SG hamster+ACC‘Lisa’s cat ate her hamster.’

In (23)–(25), the spatial, temporal, and possessive domains establish asetting for the event the cat ate the hamster. In (23), the yard is the placewhere the action occurred. In (24), in the summer is the temporal framefor the action. In (25) (which is stylistically colloquial but represents avery common usage of possessives in spoken Finnish), the initial elementLiisalla establishes what might be called a possessive setting, and thesentence indicates that both participants in the relation (the cat and thehamster) belonged to Lisa. It must be emphasized, however, that, com-pared to the spatial and temporal elements, the possessive element ismuch less typical in this kind of function. This is because possession istypically a relation between two (in the cognitive-grammar sense),not between a thing and a whole relation. Furthermore, place in (23)and time in (24) are primarily the settings of the (eating), whilethe possessive domain in (25) pertains primarily to the participants (thecat and the hamster), and only secondarily to the interaction betweenthe participants. Yet, from a syntactic point of view, the importance ofexample (25) lies in its ability to show that Finnish possessives canfunction as clause modifiers. An analogy for structures such as (25) canbe found in topic-prominent languages, where they would be akin totopic structures (‘As for Lisa, the cat ate the hamster’; see e.g. Chafe1976; Li and Thompson 1976; Kuno 1978).

Now, to return to the scoping hierarchy temporal>possessive>spatial,and to see how it works, consider the following examples of multiplelocational specifications. The scope relations between the domains arethe same in the English translations (assuming a willingness to see posses-sion via the locative analogy).

(26) Liisa+ lla oli moottorisaha tyomaa+ lla.Lisa+ADE be.PST.3SG chain-saw worksite+ADE‘Lisa had [=kept] her chain saw at the worksite.’



(27) Iltapaiva+ lla Liisa+lla oli moottorisaha.afternoon+ADE Lisa+ADE be.PST.3SG chain-saw‘In the afternoon, Lisa had a chain saw.’

(28) Iltapaiva+lla Liisa pelas+ i shakki+a kerho+ lla.afternoon+ADE Lisa play+PST.3SG chess+PAR club+ADE‘In the afternoon, Lisa played chess at the club.’

In (26) the possessive element Liisalla has the whole spatial relation thechain saw was at the worksite within its scope, and Lisa is understood tobe responsible for the spatial relation (=she is keeping the chain saw atthe worksite; see Huumo 1995). In (27), time takes possession under itsscope in setting up a temporal frame for the possessive relation.Analogically, in (28), time subsumes space under its scope: the spatialrelation between Lisa and the club is subordinated to the period of theafternoon. The spatial expression in (28) cannot govern the temporalexpression in a similar sense: Lisa’s relation to the afternoon is notconstrained by her relation to the club. This is probably a consequenceof the fact that an entity cannot move in time in the same way as it canin space; or, as Givon (1979: 330) puts it, ‘‘we can be at the same placeat two different times [but] we cannot be at two different places at thesame time.’’ He draws the conclusion that ‘‘the use we make of [the fourdimensions] in construing our universe is skewed, with time occupying acertain privileged position that space could never occupy.’’

4. The mechanisms of possessivization

As we saw in section 1, an otherwise nonpossessive mental space maybecome possessivized if a particular kind of implication exists betweenthe space and one of its occupants, where the occupant fills a role set upby the space. We argued that a clause-initial setting adverbial that wouldotherwise designate a spatial location may take on a twofold function,as an indicator of both a spatial and a possessive or both a spatial anda temporal relationship.

We also argued in section 1 that the example with a possessivizedsetting adverbial can be seen as a more autonomous predication aboutthe setting than its nonpossessivized counterpart. Since the occupant ofa role is defined directly within the mental space being constructed, thepossessivized example does not require additional information about thespace-building that has been going on in the previous discourse. In thisrespect, possessivized examples in fact resemble examples with an indefi-nite subject. According to Fauconnier (1985: 20), an indefinite NP (an N )


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sets up a new element w in some space, whereas a definite NP (the N)normally points to an element already introduced in another space. Thismeans that referents of definite expressions are mapped into a spacecurrently in focus from a previous space. Indefinite expressions, on theother hand, are first encountered in the space being constructed. Aparticularly clear example is the existential construction that specializesin introducing new referents into mental spaces. In some existentialconstructions, the spaces may be set up by a ‘‘dummy’’ element (as inEnglish, cf. Lakoff 1987: case study 3), in others by a proper locational(as in Finnish; see [29]).

(29) Pysakointialuee+ lla on auto+ j+a.parking-lot+ADE be.PRES.3SG car+PL+PAR‘There are cars in the parking lot.’

From this perspective, consider now the following triplet of examples,where (30) and (32) have a definite subject but (31) an indefinite subject.On the other hand, only (30) has the possessivized reading.

(30) In Bulgaria, the president had a car accident.(31) In Bulgaria, a man had a car accident.(32) In Bulgaria, the man had a car accident.

According to Fauconnier’s rules of definite and indefinite interpretations,the indefinite a man sets up a new element in the Bulgaria space in (31).The indefinite article tells the addressee that s/he is not supposed tosupplement the interpretation with information from previously intro-duced spaces. In (32), the definite subject has the opposite effect, inspecifically informing the addressee that s/he should be able to identifythe man as an element already introduced in a previous mental space.

Now consider (30), which also has a definite subject and hence isexpected to behave identically with (32). However, the possessivizedpresident of Bulgaria reading has a similar effect as indefiniteness in (31):the identity of the president is directly defined in the present space, andunless context implies otherwise, we will assume that the subject is definitespecifically because it is the filler of a role set up in the present space.Note that the function of the definite article itself is the same in (32) and(30): in both it tells us that we are supposed to identify the referent ofthe NP. It is only the way of performing the identification that differs inthe two examples. In (30), unlike (32), the identification does not extendoutside the present space.

From a discourse-level point of view, (30) thus resembles (31) morethan (32). In a sense, (30) and (31) are both autonomous predicationsabout the space (the space is a fixed point for all information that



follows), while (32) is a ‘‘predication about the man.’’ Such characteriza-tions are of course only intended to describe the containment relationbetween the space and the subject — I would not like to argue that theverb phrase itself is any less a predication about the subject in (30) and(31) than in (32). Each example gives the same predication about ahuman subject, whose semantic role is the same (‘‘experiencer’’). It isimportant to see that examples (30)–(32) are complex and comprise (atleast) two different relationships: first the containment relation betweenthe space and its content, and second the event or action that takes placewithin the space. The differences between the three examples can becharacterized more precisely by saying that in (32) both the containmentrelation and the event (of having the car accident) are approached fromthe viewpoint of the subject, whereas in (30) and (31) the subject hasthat status only with respect to the event — the containment relation isviewed from the perspective of the space itself.

A more fine-grained descriptive system applicable to the problemhas been developed by Langacker (1987, 1991a, 1991b) in his cognitivegrammar. That system is based on the concept of natural paths. A naturalpath is ‘‘any cognitively natural ordering of the elements of a complexstructure’’ (Langacker 1991a: 550) and can be used in the analysis of awide range of linguistic ordering phenomena, subsuming several differentfactors that contribute to the ordering of participants either in concreteword order or in the construction of more abstract semantic relations.These factors include energy flow (and causal relations between theparticipants), prominence, the temporal order of words at the phonologi-cal pole, conceptual autonomy, and temporal sequencing of componentevents (Langacker 1991a: 291–293). According to Langacker, a complexstructure has numerous levels or dimensions of organization, for each ofwhich a particular ordering of elements may have a valid claim to beingcognitively natural. These orderings are called natural paths, and theorigin of any natural path is called the starting point of that path.

From the present point of view, two particularly important types ofnatural paths are the event-participant path (henceforth EP), and thelocational path (LP; Langacker 1996). In constructing the EP, the concep-tualizer selects one participant of the process as the starting point andproceeds mentally from that participant toward other participants andrelations designated in the predication. The EP conventionally associateswith a wide range of syntactic structures, including typical transitive andintransitive clauses. The LP, on the other hand, has direct associationswith certain less widespread syntactic structures. It selects a mental spaceas the starting point and proceeds into the space, representing its contentas new information. In general, the LP is constructed in examples desig-


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nating spatial and metaphorical relations of containment from the view-point of the container. A good example of the canonical implementationof the LP is the Finnish existential construction in (29).

As Langacker emphasizes, complex structures usually include a numberof natural paths, which pertain to different levels of the construction ofsemantic and phonological (ordering) relations. Different natural pathsmay be in competition, in particular if the choice is not directly deter-mined by independent semantic criteria such as agentivity. For instance,a static containment relation between a space and its occupant involvesno independent causal or temporal order and can therefore be naturallyapproached from the viewpoint of either participant. Thus the containerand its occupant are both good candidates for a starting point. Langacker(1996) gives the following pair of contrasting examples.

(33) The motorcycle is beside the shed.(34) Beside the shed is the motorcycle.

Both examples represent the ‘‘same’’ locative relationship. Both code theentity to be located with the syntactic subject, and its location with themodifier. The relevant difference is the word order, which reflects theselection of the starting point. In (33), the subject constitutes the startingpoint for the locational configuration, and the situation is representedvia the EP, whereas (34) represents the relationship in the opposite way,setting up an LP; we first access the space and only then ‘‘find’’ itsoccupant there. Roughly speaking, then, the EP relates to the kind ofmental access that arises from conceiving of individuals acting with eachother, whereas the LP is connected to the everyday experience of findingthings in space.

I would now like to propose that one important factor behind thepossessivized vs. nonpossessivized readings of examples (30)–(32) is thedifferent strategies they use in combining two separate natural paths. Ineach example, the first path consists of the containment relation betweenthe setting and its content, while the second path consists of the processdesignated by the verb and its complements. From our point of view, thelast-mentioned path is relatively unimportant and remains the same inall examples: it is an EP with the subject as the starting point. Whatconcerns us more is the relation of containment, in particular the selectionof a natural path to assemble that relation. Example (32) maps thesubject into the present space from a previous space; thus the subject isthe starting point for this relation of containment, as well as for the eventitself. On the other hand, (30) and (31) introduce the subject as a newelement in the space, which thus becomes the starting point. In otherwords, (30) and (31) use the LP in the construction of the relation of



containment, whereas (32) uses the EP; nevertheless, all three use the EPin the construction of the event itself.

In more general terms, our argument suggests that a complex predica-tion combines several semantic layers and several natural paths, and thatthe conceptualizer who processes the linguistic expression pays attentionto different paths at different points in processing time (for this term, seeLangacker 1987: 167). In building up the semantic representation, s/heproceeds from one relation to another, using the preceding informationas a foundation for the interpretation of subsequent information. VanHoek (1997: 57) has characterized this strategy in the following way:

The conceptualizer makes mental contact with each distinct element within therelation ... rather than construing the integrated relation as an undifferentiatedconceptual unity, but each distinct instance of mental contact is made within thedominions established by the preceding elements rather than within a conceptualvacuum. The element with which one first makes contact becomes subjective,relative to the next element — as if, in a sense, one adopted the first element asa vantage point from which to view the second.

The mutual order of the two natural paths can also explain ourobservation that the possessivized reading is favored if the locationalelement starts the sentence but suppressed if it occupies a late position.Recall the difference between examples (2), which had a locative in theinitial position (In France, the president hunts hares), and (5), which hada late locative (The president hunts hares in France). Even though (5) hasexactly the same possessive implication between the locative and thesubject as (2), the possessivized reading is not constructed. I assume thisto be the result of assembling the two natural paths (containment andevent) in the opposite order in the two examples. Example (5) constructsthe event first and only then pays attention to the relation of containment.By then the subject has already been established as the starting point ofthe event. If the possessive president of France interpretation were nowto be constructed, the interlocutors would have to cancel assumptionsthey have already made.

5. The mechanisms of temporalization

Temporalization is an operation that assigns a locational element thestatus of a temporal modifier and enables it to dominate spaces belowtime in the scoping hierarchy. We argued in section 1 that temporalizationforegrounds the duration of an otherwise nontemporal relation and thussets up a secondary temporal space that may subsume less extensive time


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periods within its scope. Temporalization is based on the fact that contain-ment relations have a duration and, if the duration is limited, existbetween two points of time: they start when the entity enters the spaceand last up to the moment it leaves the space. In constructing the temporalinterpretation, we thus need to consider the relation of containment as acomplete, uninterrupted whole.

This requirement also affects the selection of the natural path used inassembling the temporalized locational relation. In general, only the EPallows the temporal reading to be constructed. For the temporal readingto arise, it is a necessary assumption that the occupant has an existenceoutside the space before it enters the space, and its previous existenceoutside the space has to be included in the scope of predication. Thismeans that we cannot use the LP and access the occupant only aftershifting our viewpoint into the space. Such a strategy would prohibit usfrom including the whole duration of the containment relation withinthe scope of predication and, ultimately, prohibit the construction of thetemporal reading.

5.1. Temporalization of spatial relations

The few examples we discussed in section 1 invariably temporalized therelation of containment between the setting and the referent of thesyntactic subject of the sentence. In canonical transitive and intransitiveconstructions this is a natural choice, because the subject is conceived ofas the most prominent occupant of the setting; it is also the starting pointwe assume in interpreting events that take place within the setting (cf.Chafe 1994: 82–83). Other constructions, however, may select other kindsof elements as starting points, and when combined with an outer settingthese nonsubject starting points may maintain their status and becomestarting points for the temporalized relation of containment as well. Asan example, consider a nested locative construction where one settingcontains another. Assume, further, that the innermost setting (with itscontent) remains within the outermost setting for only a restricted periodof time. This situation meets the conditions for a temporal interpretationof the outermost setting. Only this time both the innermost setting itselfand its occupant are in principle capable of associating with the outermostsetting to give rise to the temporal reading. The natural path we use inconstructing the innermost relationship affects the starting-point selectionfor the outermost relation as well. Consider (35) and (36).



(35) Siperia+ssa lapse+t oli+vat iltapaivisinSiberia+INE child+PL.NOM be+PST.3PL afternoonravintolavaunu+ssa.dining-car+INE‘In Siberia, the children were in the dining car in the afternoons.’

(36) Siperia+ssa ravintolavaunu+ssa oli iltapaivisinSiberia+INE dining-car+INE be.PST.3SG afternoonslaps+ i+a.child+PL+PAR‘In Siberia, there were children in the dining car in the afternoons.’

Both examples are nested locative constructions where three settings (onetemporal and two spatial ones) are used to express the spatiotemporalposition of the children. The important difference is that in (35) theinnermost relation of containment is represented by an intransitive loca-tive predication (the children were in the dining car), whereas (36) has anexistential predication as its nucleus (there were children in the diningcar). Both examples result in a temporal reading for the initial Siberiaspace, which enables the Siberia space to subsume the proper temporalspace (in the afternoons) within its scope. The difference is that in (35)the temporal reading reflects the experience of the children (when thechildren were in Siberia .. .), whereas in (36) the dining car is the prominentexperiencer of the temporalized relation of containment (when the diningcar was in Siberia . ..). In (36), the occupant of the innermost settingdoes not contribute to the construction of the temporal reading at all;its identity may even change during the process (i.e. there may be differentchildren in the dining car on different afternoons).

This difference is a consequence of the way we assemble the innermostrelation of containment in each example. The intransitive locative con-struction in (35) sets up an EP, while the existential construction in (36)sets up an LP and selects the container as the starting point for thisinnermost relation. In both cases, the starting point of the innermostrelation then associates with the outermost setting and temporalizes it.

5.2. Temporalization and possession

Now consider possession and its relation to temporalization. The scopinghierarchy says that possession is a lower domain than time, and thereforetemporalized locatives are capable of including a whole possessive relationwithin their scope, as in (37).


408 T. Huumo

(37) Tyomaa+ lla Liisa+ lla oli moottorisaha.worksite+ADE Lisa+ADE be.PST.3SG chain-saw‘At the worksite, Lisa had a chain saw.’

The temporalized reading of (37) is the one where Lisa had the chainsaw when she was at the worksite herself. Note that when setting up thetemporal reading, the outermost setting interacts with the possessor, notwith the possessee. The important factor is thus the duration of Lisa’spresence at the worksite, but the chain saw and its relation to the worksiteare less important.

As we saw in examples (20)–(22), the Finnish possessive constructioncarries a strong resemblance with the spatial existential construction. Itselects the possessive space as the starting point and introduces its content,the possessee, as a new element. Structurally, the possessive constructionresembles the existential construction (29) in all important aspects (wordorder, lack of subject–verb agreement in the plural, partitive marking ofthe possessee if it is a mass noun or a plural form).

If seeing possession as analogous to spatial containment is indeed ajustifiable metaphor, then it follows that a possessor is not conceived ofas a participant but rather as a metaphorical location of the possessee.Of course, such an assumption is the more natural the more locativecharacteristics a given possessive construction incorporates (cf. Heine1997). In Heine’s (1997) typology of possessive constructions, the Finnishconstruction would correspond to the ‘‘location schema,’’ but it alsoincorporates properties of the ‘‘existential schema’’ in introducing thepossessee as a new element in the possessive space.

It is thus a reasonable assumption that the Finnish possessive construc-tion sets up an LP where the possessive space is the starting point.Because of its starting-point status, the possessive space also becomesthe prominent element interacting with the outer settings of the relation.The possessee, which is embedded within the possessive space, does notparticipate directly in such interaction. For instance, (37) says nothingabout the permanence of the relation between the chain saw and theworksite: perhaps Lisa brings the saw with her every time she comes towork, or perhaps it is there all the time. In this respect, (37) resemblesthe existential example (36): the content of the innermost space remainsblocked within that space and is incapable of interacting with outersettings.

However, Finnish also has a possessive construction that follows theEP in assembling the possessive relation. An example is (38), formallyreminiscent of a simple intransitive locative construction.



(38) Tyomaa+ lla moottorisaha oli Liisa+ lla.worksite+ADE chain-saw be.PST.3SG Lisa+ADE‘At the worksite, the chain saw was in Lisa’s use.’

This construction indicates temporary possession, selects the possesseeas the subject, and places the locative-case possessor toward the end ofthe sentence. In addition, (38) has a clause-initial setting adverbial. Inthe possessive nucleus of (38) (moottorisaha oli Liisalla) the possessee isthe starting point, and being owned by the particular possessor is newinformation given about the possessee. The example utilizes the EP, andthe possessee, as the starting point, is the only participant with a directsemantic link to the outermost setting. The temporalized reading of theinitial adverbial is thus the amount of time the possessee spends in thatlocation.

The scoping hierarchy also suggests that a possessive space can itselfbe temporalized. However, this operation cannot be applied to simplepossessive constructions where the possessive space only contains thepossessee. Example (39) shows an attempt to temporalize a simple posses-sive construction. It has the candidate temporalized space (the possessor)in the initial position, followed by the subject (the possessee) and a propertime adverbial. Nevertheless, no temporal reading arises. What we getis an emphatic word-order variant, where time nevertheless dominatespossession.

(39) Liisa+ lla moottorisaha oli iltapaiva+ lla.Lisa-ADE chain-saw be.PST.3SG afternoon+ADE‘It was in the afternoon that Lisa had the chain saw.’or‘It was Lisa who had the chain saw in the afternoon.’

However, this failure is not evidence for a general incapability ofpossessive domains to acquire a temporal sense. Rather, it is a directconsequence of the semantic nature of the simple possessive construction.Since the possessive domain in (39) is not a setting but has only thepossessee within it, temporalization would result in a situation whereonly the possessee (but no predication) remained within the propertemporal domain. This would yield a nonsense predication, *‘When Lisahad it, the chain saw was in the afternoon.’

This is in fact what we find when we look at simple examples,that is, simple existential ([40]) or locative ([41]) constructions, where asole relation of containment is indicated. They share with simple posses-sive constructions the inability to become temporalized ([42]).


410 T. Huumo

(40) Piha+ lla oli iltaisin auto.yard+ADE be.PST.3SG evenings car‘In the evenings there was a car in the yard.’

(41) Auto oli piha+ lla iltaisin.car be.PST.3SG yard+ADE evenings‘The car was in the yard in the evenings.’

(42) Piha+ lla auto oli iltaisin.yard+ADE car be.PST.3SG evenings‘It was in the evenings that the car was in the yard.’

Finnish, which has a discourse-pragmatically constrained word order (fordetails, see Vikuna 1989), allows almost any linear combination of theelements in this example. However, any attempt to temporalize the spatialelement fails, for the same reasons that the possessive structure in (39)failed to temporalize. In these simple constructions, the temporalizationof the spatial element would leave only a single entity (the car) withinthe scope of the temporal expression in the evening, and this would createa nonsense predication akin to the one rejected above (*‘When it was inthe yard, the car was in the evenings’). The unnaturalness of this predica-tion is due to the typical (though not exceptionless; see example [21])function of temporal spaces: they contain predications, not single entities.

Within the spatial domain, a temporal interpretation becomes possibleonly if an entire predication (instead of just an entity) is embedded inthe locative domain. The temporalization of the locative space still leavesthe predication within the scope of the proper time expression, whichnow functions as the innermost setting in the multiple locational specifi-cation. As (43) shows, a slight modification is enough.

(43) Piha+ lla auto oli iltaisin kylma.yard+ADE car be.PST.3SG evenings cold‘[ When] in the yard, the car was cold in the evenings.’

In (43), the extra predication of being cold is added. This allows thespatial element to be promoted into the temporal function: now it is notthe mere occupant of the space (the car) but a whole predication givenabout that occupant (the car being cold ) that gets embedded within thetemporal setting (in the evenings). This temporal setting (with its content)is then embedded within the temporalized locative setting.

The situation is just the same in possessive constructions. As soon asa further predication is given about the possessee, temporalization of thepossessive relation becomes possible. This is because the possessive spacenow functions as a setting (see [44] vs. [45]).



(44) Iltapaivisin Liisa+lla oli moottorisaha repu+ssa.afternoons Lisa+ADE be.PST.3SG chain-saw rucksack+INE‘In the afternoons, Lisa had [a/the] chain saw in [her] rucksack.’

(45) Liisa+lla moottorisaha oli iltapaivisin repu+ssa.Lisa+ADE chain-saw be.PST.3SG afternoons rucksack+INE‘[ When] Lisa [had it], the chain saw was in the rucksack in theafternoons.’

In both examples the additional locative predication of being in therucksack is given about Lisa’s chain saw. This makes the possessivedomain a setting for the spatial relationship as a whole. Example (45)temporalizes the possessive space and makes it a container for the propertemporal space. In (44), on the other hand, the possessive space is onlythe setting for the spatial relation (but not for the temporal one); thiscomplex possessive construction is embedded in the time space in theafternoons.

The tripartite relation of containment in (44) and (45) consists of acomplex combination of natural paths. In (44), the locative predicationas a whole is embedded in the possessive space. Since it is always thestarting point of an embedded relation that interacts with outer settings,we can assume that the selection of either the rucksack or the saw as thestarting point of the innermost relation of containment will also determinewhich one is understood as being a property of Lisa’s. What makes thisexample problematic is that its syntactic structure does not tell us unam-biguously whether it is the chain saw or the rucksack (or perhaps both)that primarily belongs to Lisa (cf. Huumo 1995: 328–329). Since Finnishhas no articles to indicate definiteness, the example allows at least threereadings: (i) Lisa has her chain saw in some rucksack; (ii) Lisa has somechain saw in her rucksack; (iii) Lisa has her chain saw in her rucksack.This ambiguity is also reflected in the syntactic structure of (44): on theone hand, the possessee is in the canonical position of a new element(after the verb), but on the other hand, the spatial element follows thepossessee in the linear order, and linear precedence usually correlateswith conceptual autonomy. Note that if the possessee were placed at theabsolute end (yielding Iltapaivisin Liisalla oli repussa moottorisaha[afternoons Lisa+ADE be.PST.3SG rucksack+INE chain-saw]), itwould make the rucksack the primary property of Lisa’s (reading ii).The situation is more straightforward on the outermost levels of theexample. In the holistic interpretation of the complex possessive relation-ship, it is the possessor (Lisa) who is selected as the starting point,and who maintains that function with respect to the temporal setting(temporal settings rarely, if ever, set up an LP).


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The situation is different in (45). The promotion of the possessivespace to a temporal status requires the possessee to be the starting pointat all levels; otherwise no temporal period of possession can be con-structed. The sentence thus sets up EPs at all levels of containment andconsists of mutually embedded locational predications where the chainsaw is the starting point. Note that temporalization is possible in (45)because not only the possessee but the whole locative predication thechain saw was in the rucksack remains within the scope of the actualtemporal element.

Now the question might arise whether the mutual relation betweenpossession and time is not actually the same in (44) and in (45). Evenin (44) (at least with readings i and iii) the possessive relation is easilyunderstood in a permanent sense and continues even between theafternoons. According to this view, the only difference between the twoexamples is that (44) represents the possessive period as temporallyunbounded, whereas (45), as argued, highlights its duration and makesit temporally bounded.

However, there are certain important semantic differences between(44) and (45). In (44), unlike (45), the LP construction of the possessiverelationship has the consequence that the continuity of that relationshipoutside the afternoons is merely an implication, an open possibility, notpart of the meaning of the sentence. The implication follows from thefact that the possessive relation between a person and a chain saw isusually long-lasting. However, since the discontinuous time period is infact the outermost setting of the predication, the sentence does not reallytell us anything about relations between the participants outside the limitsof that setting. The difference between the two examples becomes clearerif we replace the possessee with another noun that does not support theimplication of long-lasting possession. In that case the construction repre-sented by (44) allows the identity of the possessee to change in differentparts of the discontinuous temporal space; see the structurally identicalexample (46), where the prominent reading is the one where the possessee(beer bottle) is a different individual each afternoon.

(46) Iltapaivisin Liisa+ lla oli olutpullo repu+ssa.afternoons Lisa+ADE be.PST.3SG beer-bottle rucksack+INE‘In the afternoons, Lisa had [a] bottle of beer in her rucksack.’

Temporalized possession, on the other hand, is only possible if the pos-sessee keeps its identity throughout the possessive period, and thus alsothroughout the discontinuous time space. This is the case even if theimplication of a long-lasting possessive relation is missing ([47]).



(47) Liisa+ lla olutpullo oli repu+ssa iltapaivisin.Lisa+ADE beer-bottle be.PST.3SG rucksack+INE afternoons‘[ When] Lisa [had it], the bottle of beer was in the rucksack inthe afternoons.’

The difference between (46) and (47) is that (46) allows a reading witha different beer bottle in the rucksack each afternoon, whereas (47)requires the bottle to be the same individual. This is because the outermostframe in (46) is the discontinuous time space, but in (47) it is thetemporalized possessive period (which in turn includes the discontinuoustime period within its scope). For the duration of the possessive periodto exceed the afternoons, the possessee must of course maintain itsidentity.3

6. Other domains and their relation to the hierarchy

The two major domain types that were not included in the scopinghierarchy in its original formulation are abstract spaces (e.g. In thenovel .. .), and ‘‘bound’’ spaces, which indicate the internal state of anentity by metaphorically representing the state as a container (e.g. Theprofessor is in a coma; see also Huumo 1996a).

Abstract spaces have a special status compared with the other typesand deviate from them in being autonomous with respect to the ‘‘realworld.’’ Unlike the other types, abstract spaces do not establish parts ofthe real world but hypothetical, imaginary worlds with their own struc-tures. These abstract worlds typically include their own counterparts forall other types of spaces (time, place, and other real-world domains).Abstract spaces are in fact the most prototypical instance of mentalspaces, including books, stories, movies, games, etc. (see Fauconnier1985). In scope relations of multiple locational specifications, abstractspaces take precedence over all other domain types, and when connectedto the same predication include the other types within their scope;see (48).

(48) In Elmer’s novel, a French farmer has noblemen hiding in hiscellar during the French revolution.

Here the space Elmer’s novel is superordinate with respect to the otherspaces: possession (a French farmer has . ..), location (in his cellar), andeven time (during the French revolution), since the French revolution hereis part of the story, that is, the story counterpart of the ‘‘real’’ Frenchrevolution. The scope relations between the spaces in this example cannotbe altered for instance by manipulating word order, since a change in


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scope would require the abstract space to be dominated by a space thatis part of the ‘‘real world.’’

There are, however, other instances of abstract spaces, which areindeterminate as to whether they achieve autonomous or nonautonomousreadings with respect to other spaces. These spaces in fact bear a resem-blance to bound spaces, since they are characterized by a dependencerelation to a real-world entity such that both their existence and theircontent depends on the spatiotemporal position of that entity. We seethis as variation in scope in the following examples.

(49) In Lisa’s story, it was a wealthy banker who was beat up on thestreet last night.

(50) Last night, it was a wealthy banker who was beat up on the streetin Lisa’s story.

In (49), the temporal space last night is included within the scope ofLisa’s story (it is part of the story), but in (50) the reverse may be true:Lisa’s story, as she told it last night, had a wealthy banker (but now shesays it was a shopkeeper). The crucial factor that makes the scopevariation possible is that the mental space of Lisa’s story can change itscontent depending on Lisa’s spatiotemporal position, if it is assumed thatshe tells different versions of the story at different times and places.Strictly speaking, of course, the different versions of the story are ‘‘the same’’ mental space but several counterparts of a space that existin different (‘‘real-world’’) temporal spaces. Fauconnier’s (1985: 39–63)distinction between roles and individuals can be applied here, and it canbe said that the general role of Lisa’s story is filled by individual versions(of the story) in different temporal spaces; these individual stories differfrom one another with respect to their content (whether it was a bankerwho was beat up or not).

It is also worth noting that the space-builder in Lisa’s story itselfmanifests a different semantic behavior in (49) and (50). In (49) itbehaves like a typical abstract space (compare it with Elmer’s novel in[48]), but in (50) it loses its autonomous status, becomes spatiotemporallydependent on Lisa with respect to its content, and resembles what arecalled ‘‘externally bound abstract spaces’’ in Huumo (1996a: 308–314).These are abstract domains that are at the same time conceptually depen-dent on another (conscious) entity, of whose mental world or imaginationthey are part. These include, as their most prototypical instances, dreamsand thoughts. In the scope relations indicated in multiple locationalspecifications, these domains can end up in a position where they standwithin the scope of a lower space, if the entity on which they are



dependent is present in that space; observe the contrast between (51)vs. (52):

(51) In my dreams, Ollie runs a marathon at night.(52) At night, Ollie runs a marathon in my dreams.

The mental space of the dreams is dependent on the person who has thedreams (the speaker), and therefore it can be embedded within anotherspace if the speaker is within that space himself. In (51), the space ofthe dreams is the dominant space and contains the temporal space atnight within it (the nights are part of the dreams), whereas in (52) theopposite is true: here the nights are the nights experienced by the speaker,and the information is that during those nights he has dreams of Ollierunning a marathon.

Bound spaces are discussed in Huumo (1996a), where it is argued thatthey meet certain semantic and syntactic constraints that do not applyto autonomous spaces. In that discussion, bound spaces are divided intoan externally bound type, represented by the examples above, and aninternally bound type, characterized by a conceptual dependence of thespace on its content (rather than on an external entity). An internallybound space only exists with respect to the entity that occupies it. Aprototypical example is The professor was in a coma, where a coma is aninternal state of the professor, linguistically represented as a containerwith the professor situated in it. The linguistic usage of internally boundspaces is restricted; for instance, they are not allowed in existentialstructures, as is shown by the unacceptability of *In the coma there wasa professor. The unacceptability of this example is due to the fact that‘‘the professor’s coma exists only with respect to the professor, and theprofessor cannot be introduced as a new entity into a domain that alreadypresupposes his existence’’ (Huumo 1996a: 295). In other words, boundspaces systematically set up an EP but never an LP.

From the point of view of their scope relations to other spaces, exter-nally bound spaces (dreams, thoughts, and perhaps stories, as in examples[48] and [49]) resemble autonomous abstract spaces. The matter is verydifferent with internally bound spaces, which are always dependent ontheir content and unable to contain other entities within them (e.g. *Johnwas in the professor’s coma/*In the professor’s coma there was John).Therefore they are also unable to contain other spaces, and in multiplelocational specifications they seem always to fall under the scope of theother spaces. Consider the following examples, where a bound spacerelation exists between a person and an illness, the illness linguisticallyrepresented as a container; in the examples, this predication is connected


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to a multiple locational specification, with a temporal element in (53)and a spatial one in (54).

(53) Maanantai+na Elmeri oli flunssa+ssa.Monday+ESS Elmer be.PST.3SG flu+INE‘On Monday, Elmer had the flu.’( lit. ‘On Monday, Elmer was in flu.’)

(54) Elmeri makas+ i flunssa+ssa sangy+ssa.Elmer lie+PST.3SG flu+INE bed+INE‘Elmer was lying in bed, down with the flu.’( lit. ‘Elmer lay in the flu in the bed.’)

In (53), the temporal expression on Monday sets up a frame for therelationship between Elmer and the flu; as expected, the bound spacefalls within the scope of the temporal space. In (54), the scope relationis less obvious, and the sentence can be seen as a more equal characteriza-tion of Elmer’s position with respect to two dimensions: a location (thebed), and an internal state (the flu). If a scope relation is assumedbetween the two, then it is in my view most natural to see the spatialexpression as the dominating one. This is because the bed is autonomouswith respect to Elmer but the flu only exists as bound to Elmer; hence itcan be argued that the domain of Elmer’s flu is automatically situatedin all spaces where Elmer is himself. On the other hand, Elmer’s relationto the bed is not of course a condition of having the flu, in the sense thattime is in (53).

The following examples demonstrate that even bound spaces can betemporalized and thereby promoted above other spaces in the semanticrelations of a multiple locational specification (cf. also Huumo 1998). Asis the case with other temporalized nontemporal domains, the temporalreading is created by highlighting the duration of the internal state. Theduration then assumes the role of a temporal frame containing otherrelationships in which the entity participates; see (55) and (56).

(55) Humala+ssa Liisa riitel+ i pomo+nsaintoxication+INE Lisa argue+PST.3SG boss+GEN.3PXkanssa.with‘When she was drunk [ lit. ‘in intoxication’], Lisa argued withher boss.’

(56) Flunssa+ssa tytto luk+ i kauhutarino+ i+taflu+INE girl read+PST.3SG horror-story+PL+PARsangy+ssa+ an.bed+INE+3PX‘When she had the flu [ lit. ‘in the flu’], the girl read horror-storiesin bed.’



In (55) and (56), the bound spaces of Lisa’s intoxication and the girl’sflu set up a temporal frame for the rest of the predication. In (55), theargument between Lisa and the boss is subordinated to Lisa’s intoxication(Lisa argued with the boss when she was drunk). Correspondingly, in(56) the girl read horror-stories when she had the flu (without implicationsas to her activities under other circumstances). It is worth noting, how-ever, that in spite of their temporalization, which promotes them to thefunction of an all-embracing setting, the bound spaces of these examplesstill carry their basic meaning in relation to the subject of the sentence:in (55) it is only Lisa (and not the boss) who is drunk, and in (56) onlythe girl has the flu, but the horror-stories and the bed are obviouslyoutside that domain. It can therefore be argued that the space-buildershere have the double function of establishing both a bound space and atemporal space simultaneously, and that the subject in (55) and (56) isembedded in both spaces while the other participants in the relationship(e.g. the boss in [55]) are only embedded in the temporalized space.

The following example shows, finally, that a temporalized bound spacecan dominate even temporal spaces proper, as well as other types ofspaces that typically fall within the scope of temporals in the scopinghierarchy.

(57) Flunssa+ssa tyto+ lla oli oisin kuumemittariflu+INE girl+ADE be.PST.3SG nights thermometeryopoyda+ lla.night-table+ADE‘When she had the flu [ lit. ‘in the flu’], the girl had a thermometeron her night table at night.’

Here the bound space builder flunssassa ‘in the flu’, in its basic sense, isconnected to the possessor (the girl ); as a temporalized space, however,it governs time (at night), possession (the girl had .. .), and location (onthe night table).

7. Provisional conclusion: the revised scoping hierarchy

In this paper the original scoping hierarchy temporal>possessive>spatial, proposed in Huumo (1996b), has been discussed, with specialattention to the possessivization and temporalization of nontemporalspaces. The relationship of two additional domain types (abstract andbound spaces) to the original hierarchy has also been examined. Theresults show that in sentences where all locationals carry their basicmeaning (and do not undergo operations such as temporalization or


418 T. Huumo

possessivization), prototypical abstract spaces dominate all other types,and prototypical (internally) bound spaces are subordinated to all othertypes. As a result, a revised version of the scoping hierarchy canbe proposed, with these two types included: abstract>temporal>possessive>spatial>bound.

The semantic basis for this hierarchy is quite complicated, and acomplete analysis of all relevant aspects somehow involved in the scopingbehavior of the domains would require additional in-depth studies.However, I would like to propose that the following account reveals atleast some of the most important semantic principles that are at workwhen we make interpretations regarding scope relations betweendifferent spaces.

First, the fact that abstract spaces are above all other types followsfrom their autonomous status: they establish independent ‘‘differentworlds,’’ which are not parts of reality as we know it. All entities (andembedded spaces) within the abstract space either are all-new or else arerole counterparts of entities in other spaces, including ‘‘reality.’’ Noindividual mappings are allowed, because no individual can actually entera novel or a story in the same way it enters a house; it can only have acounterpart in the novel or story. Therefore abstract spaces do not ingeneral allow temporalized readings, which are specifically based on atemporary containment relation between an entity and a space, wherethe entity first enters and then leaves the space. Examples with abstractspaces always set up LPs and select the abstract space as the semanticstarting point. On the other hand, all other domain types of the scopinghierarchy have uses as (concrete or metaphorical ) containers for real-world entities and can be entered and left by those entities.

At the lower end of the hierarchy, we find bound spaces, which arespecial in being conceptually dependent on their content. As arguedabove, a bound space is automatically embedded within all other spaces(temporal, spatial, etc.) that contain its occupant but cannot dominatethose other spaces unless a special (temporal ) interpretation is created.Because of their conceptual dependence, bound spaces can never set upan LP, either in existential sentences or in other constructions. These aregood reasons for the special scoping behavior of bound spaces as thelowest type.

It may be more difficult to find independent justification for the posi-tions of the three remaining types (time, possession, place) in the hier-archy. However, the ideas of Givon (1979: 330), briefly discussed insection 1, reveal something important about the special nature of timeas opposed to the other domains. Basically, Givon argues that our abilityto interact with time is more constrained than our ability to interact with



space. We can move about freely in space, change our position if wewant to, return to places we have visited before, and so on. But time isdynamic, autonomous, linear, and unidirectional. We cannot control our‘‘motion’’ in time. We cannot consciously avoid entering a time space,or ‘‘leaving’’ it, and we cannot return to a time space we have alreadyleft. A period of time is always absolute, in the sense that it necessarilysubsumes every entity and relation in the world within its scope. This isprobably also the basis for the use of time in setting up limits for spatialor possessive relations rather than vice versa.

The mutual scope relations of possession and place (with possessiondominating place) may be a result of their different conceptual nature.Possession, at least in the prototypical sense, is independent of place; apossessive relation does not normally start or cease when the possessor(or the possessee) enters or leaves a particular location. On the otherhand, possessors can keep their properties at different places, thus con-trolling the spatial position of the possessees. Note that possession is alsothe more abstract domain of the two: it is not physical but social.

8. Other factors affecting the interpretation of locationals:tense, modality, and negation

Temporalization of a nontemporal space is a semantic operation that ishighly dependent on other semantic facets of the sentence. In the previoussections the focus has been on direct semantic dominance relationsbetween different mental spaces, and the factor behind temporalizationhas been the strong tendency to assign the clause-initial element a statusthat enables it to dominate subsequently introduced spaces. However,other factors exist that are important in determining the interpretationof locationals; these include especially factors connected to the predicate(verb). In this section, three such factors are briefly discussed: (1) tense,(2) modality, and (3) negation. It goes without saying that this discussiondoes not purport to be a detailed study of these categories as such, butmerely a brief overview of their effect on the interpretation of locationals.

8.1. Tense

A clear correlation can be observed between the tense of the predicateverb and the naturalness of a temporal reading of a nontemporal domain:the temporal reading is most natural if the verb is in the past tense butless natural with the present tense (cf. Huumo 1996b: 289–292). The


420 T. Huumo

present tense allows a temporalized interpretation only if the predicateis understood in a generic or a habitual sense; in general, nontemporalsettings combined with a present-tense verb tend to maintain their basic(nontemporal ) readings. As an example, compare (58) and (59), withspecial attention to the scope between possession and space.

(58) In Buffalo, Elmer has a supermarket.(59) In Buffalo, Elmer had a supermarket.

In spite of its locative-initial word order, (58) says that Buffalo is thelocation of Elmer’s supermarket and not the setting of the possessiverelationship between Elmer and the supermarket. A temporal interpre-tation would be possible if the sentence were understood as generic(Whenever Elmer is in Buffalo, he has a supermarket), but pragmaticfactors make this reading highly unlikely. However, the structurally sim-ilar sentence In Buffalo, Elmer has an umbrella, where the possessiverelation is easily understood in a nonpermanent sense, makes the genericinterpretation quite natural. Example (59), on the other hand, has theverb in the past tense and allows the temporal interpretation of space(When Elmer lived in Buffalo, he had a supermarket); hence it also has ascope relation where temporalized space dominates possession; on theother hand, it can of course be read like (58).

The difference also manifests itself in examples of sentence coordina-tion, where successive vs. simultaneous interpretation of locational rela-tions are in competition. The interpretation may be determined by tense;this is shown in the following pair of examples. Sentence (60), with thepast tense, favors a successive reading of the possessive relations; (61),with the present tense, foregrounds a simultaneous reading (Huumo1996b: 291).

(60) In London Elmer had a one-family house but in New York hehad an apartment.

(61) In London Elmer has a one-family house but in New York he hasan apartment.

At the same time, of course, the mutual scope of possession and locationvaries: in (60) the temporalized locatives dominate the possessive relation-ships, but in (61) possession dominates space and only the dwellings arelocated in the cities.

8.2. Modality

Modality is another factor that affects the interpretation of locationals.In fact, modal expressions of irrealis situations, that is, hypothetical and



counterfactual ones, require a special reading for any space-builder thatis connected to the predication. According to Fauconnier (1985: 109),counterfactuality is a case of forced incompatibility between mentalspaces: ‘‘a space M

1is incompatible with another space M

2if some

relation explicitly specified in M1

is not satisfied for the correspondingelements in M

2.’’ Most prototypically, hypothetical mental spaces are

established by overtly conditional expressions (If .. ., then ... clauses; inthe above classification these would be a subtype of abstract spaces).However, since modal expressions explicitly evoke a counterfactual read-ing even if a conditional clause is not present, the function of indicatingthe hypothetical space can be shifted to any space-builder that happensto occur in the sentence. Consider Fauconnier’s (1990: 155) example (62):

(62) In France, Watergate would not have done any harm to Nixon.

According to Fauconnier (1990: 155), this (and other similar examples)show that other grammatical elements than the if .. ., then ... constructioncan also set up counterfactual spaces.4 According to Fauconnier (1990:155), in this example ‘‘a counterfactual space is set up for ‘France’ inwhich Nixon and Watergate have counterparts.’’ This structure allows avast number of different interpretations with roles and counterparts,which ‘‘do not share a common truth-conditional core’’ (Fauconnier1990: 155).

To see how modal expressions may affect locationals and their scoperelations, let us return to example (58) (In Buffalo, Elmer has a super-market) and the scope relation between possession and space. Asobserved, the example with the present tense does not naturally allow atemporalized reading, with space dominating possession and Buffalobeing the frame of the possessive relation. However, if an irrealis auxiliaryis added to the example the scope relation changes easily, very much asin (59), where the same example was transformed into the past tense:

(63) In Buffalo, Elmer would have a supermarket.

In (63), the locative in Buffalo dominates the whole (hypothetical ) posses-sive relationship. It sets up a hypothetical mental space where Elmer livesin Buffalo, and it is within this hypothetical space that the possessiverelation between Elmer and the supermarket exists.5 We can say that thehypothetical interpretation of the space-builder is the result of combiningit with the irrealis predication, in very much the same sense as thetemporalized reading of (59) is the result of combining it with the pasttense. Other analogies also exist. As argued in section 3, the temporalinterpretation of a nontemporal space is a consequence of the fact thatthe relationship between the space and the entity occupying the space


422 T. Huumo

has a duration; the temporal extension is not a property of the spacealone. For instance, in (59) we were not talking about the period ofexistence of the city of Buffalo but about the period of Elmer’s presencein that city.6 Analogically, in (63) Buffalo as such is not hypothetical(which would produce the reading If Buffalo existed, Elmer would have asupermarket). What is hypothetical here is only Elmer’s presence inBuffalo. Thus what was said of temporalized locatives in section 3 alsoholds, mutatis mutandis, for locatives acquiring the hypothetical sense.

The following examples show that all types of domain discussed in thispaper are able to yield a hypothetical reading when combined with anirrealis predication, and that they enjoy a status in the scope relations ofthe sentence similar to that of their temporalized counterparts, that is,they are able to dominate other types of spaces. The following areexamples with a bound space,

(64) Flunssa+ssa mina pysy+ isi+n sangy+ssa kokoflu+INE I stay+COND+1SG bed+INE wholepaiva+n.day+ACC‘If I had the flu [‘in the flu’], I would stay in bed all day.’

(65) Liisa+lla tama auto ol+ isi joka viikonloppu rikki.Lisa+ADE this car be+COND.3SG every weekend broken‘If Lisa had it [‘in Lisa’s possession’], this car would be brokenevery weekend.’

(66) Kesa+ lla nuo saappaa+t ol+ isi+vat liiansummer+ADE those boot+PL be+COND+3PL tookuuma+t sinu+lle.hot+PL you+ALL‘In summer, those boots would be too hot for you.’

From the present point of view, the interesting thing in these examplesis that when used as a hypothetical space the locational is at the sametime promoted in the scoping hierarchy, in very much the same sense aswhen it is temporalized. This can be readily observed in (64) where thehypothetical bound space (the flu) takes the temporal space (the wholeday) under its scope; the latter in turn dominates the spatial relation ofbeing in bed. Note further that the nonautonomous nature of the boundspace again shows up in the example: here the space of the flu is itselfhypothetical and does not exist ‘‘in reality,’’ unlike places, possessors,and time periods. The hypotheticality can thus be connected directly tothe bound space (If my flu existed .. .), unlike (63), where the locativespace was autonomous (recall the impossibility of the If Buffalo existed .. .reading, discussed above).



The scope relations are similar in (65), where the possessive relationis hypothetical (if Lisa had the car) and sets up a frame for the rest ofthe predication, the car would be broken every weekend. Note, again, thatthe hypothetical function cannot be shifted to the possessor (If Lisaexisted .. .) but to the possessive relation (If Lisa’s possession of thecar existed .. .). In (66), the autonomous, all-embracing nature ofthe temporal space shifts the hypothetical function to the predicationalone, excluding even the subject’s relation to the space from the hypo-thetical domain. Thus the hypothetical relation is not the one betweensummer and the boots (cf. If the boots existed in summer .. . , as in [63]:If Elmer existed [=were] in Buffalo . .. ) but the one between summer andthe implicit using the boots.

Now consider the scope relations in the following examples, wherescope and the assignment of the hypothetical function vary with wordorder.

(67) Tavallise+ssa sairaala+ssa ol+ isi+n kooma+ssa.ordinary+INE hospital+INE be+COND+1SG coma+INE‘In an ordinary hospital, I would be in a coma.’

(68) Kooma+ssa ol+ isi+n tavallise+ssa sairaala+ssa.coma+INE be+COND+1SG ordinary+INE hospital+INE‘[If I were] in a coma, I would be in an ordinary hospital.’

In both examples, the initial space-builder acquires the function of estab-lishing the hypothetical space, and the subsequent space is subordinatedto the hypothetical space and is hence itself hypothetical.

To make a final point of the hypothetical functions of locationals, letus return to their possessivized interpretations (e.g. In France, thepresident hunts hares). Hypothetical predications seem to have a specialeffect on possessivized locatives in reversing the condition for the posses-sivized interpretation. As argued in section 1, a possessivized interpreta-tion requires the presence of an implicative possessive relation betweenthe space and the element in the space. Therefore, it was observed,predications such as In Britain, the president is an old man (in a worldwhere Britain is a kingdom) do not have the possessive reading of InFrance, the president is an old man, and it was concluded that the existenceof the role (the president) in the space is a precondition for the possessiveinterpretation. However, with hypotheticals (which describe irrealis situa-tions) the opposite of this condition seems to be true; consider (69)and (70):

(69) In France, the president would be an old man.(70) In Britain, the president would be an old man.


424 T. Huumo

Since the space relationships here are hypothetical, the conditions for the‘‘possessive’’ reading are reversed. The possessive reading is now availableonly if the possessive implication between the space and the element inthe space is missing. In a context where France is a republic, example(69) cannot impose the hypotheticality into the relation between thespace-builder and the subject (If France had a president .. .). The onlyway to make the hypotheticality successful is to waive the possessivizedreading and to replace it with a spatial (or temporalized spatial ) readingwhere the president is the president of another country (If the presidentof the U.S. were in France . .. ). But in this particular example the predica-tion causes difficulties, because ‘‘being old’’ is a property that is typicallynot dependent on spatial factors.7 A more natural example of this wouldbe In France, the president would hunt hares. In (70), on the other hand,we know that in the ‘‘real world’’ Britain is a kingdom, and thereforethe hypothetical-possessivized reading with the president of Britain isnatural; here the hypothetical part of the example would include therelation between the space-builder and the subject (If Britain had apresident, he would be an old man).

8.3. Negation

Negation is another operator that affects the interpretation of locationals.It has often been observed that the scope of negation may be differentin sentences that represent only a bare nuclear predication and in senten-ces with optional elements; see, for example, Givon (1984: 329), whogives the following examples:

(71) John didn’t kick the ball.(72) John didn’t kick the ball on purpose.(73) John didn’t kick the ball that time.

According to Givon, only (71) denies the action indicated by the verb;in (72) and (73) the negation has only the optional element (on purpose,that time) under its scope, producing the interpretations John kicked theball but not on purpose for (72) and John kicked the ball but not that timefor (73). However, in practice a change in accentuation can cause anyelement to come under the scope of negation. Horn (1978: 136) arguesthat, although different structural and accentual patterns can cause anyconstituent to come under the ‘‘scope’’ of negation, the negation is still sentential, because ‘‘the apparent difference in readings (asto the truth conditions for the corresponding affirmation fail to bemet) is attributable to the factor of what is pragmatically presupposed



[.. .].’’ In other words, what is common to all variants is that the particularprocess, event, or action under the particular circumstances is denied.Thus, for instance, John did not kiss Mary in London denies its affirmativecounterpart John kissed Mary in London, no matter what else it mayimplicate with different accentuations.

Now consider the following examples with locationals from this pointof view.

(74) The president was not sitting in his office.(75) Elmer did not eat fish in John’s restaurant.(76) Elmer did not eat fish on Monday.

These examples all negate their respective affirmative counterparts; inaddition, they reveal differences in what they implicate. In (74) the mostlikely interpretation negates the whole assertion (except the presupposedexistence of the president; cf. Givon 1984: 324–325) and strongly impli-cates that the president was not in his office at all (though literally it isonly in his office that is denied). In (75), the ‘‘scope of negation’’may include either one constituent or the whole predicate, that is, animplication may arise that Elmer ate fish elsewhere, or that he did eatsomething in John’s restaurant but not fish, etc. In (76), again, it iseating fish on Monday that is denied, with the possible implication thatfish was eaten at another time, or perhaps that something else was eatenon Monday. Note, again, that the existence of Elmer (which is presup-posed information) is not denied in either (75) or (76).

Note further that there is one slight but important difference betweenthe spatial examples (74) and (75), on the one hand, and the temporal(76) on the other hand. As observed above, (74) strongly implicates thatthe president was not in his office at all. In (75), correspondingly, it maybe the case that Elmer never went to John’s restaurant. In other words,the relation between the space and the subject is not part of the presuppo-sition, nor is it a necessary implication in the spatial examples. In (76),with a temporal space-builder, the situation is different: the relationbetween Elmer and Monday cannot be denied in any reading, becausethis would mean that Elmer did not exist on Monday. In (76) we canonly deny the activity of eating fish within the time frame of Monday,but we cannot deny the presence of the subject in the time space ofMonday.

The situation is strikingly different if the nontemporal locationals aretemporalized by placing them in sentence-initial position, as in (77)–(79).All the space-builders now acquire the behavior of a true temporalelement and remain outside the scope of negation. On the contrary, thenegation is itself embedded within the frame set up by the space-builder,


426 T. Huumo

and the sentence denies the performing of the activity by the subject(when in the space).

(77) In his office, the president was not sitting.(78) In John’s restaurant Elmer did not eat fish.(79) On Monday Elmer did not eat fish.

A comparison of (77)–(79) with (74)–(76) quickly shows that only (79)has maintained the interpretation of its counterpart (76): Elmer existedon Monday but did not eat fish at that time. Examples (77) and (78)differ clearly from (74) and (75) in this respect: they negate the particularactivity indicated by the predicate, but they cannot negate the locationalrelationship established by the initial space-builder. Example (77) pro-duces a reading where the president was in fact in his office but did notsit, and (78) a reading where Elmer was in John’s restaurant but did noteat fish there. Thus it is not merely the existence of the subject thatescapes negation here; even the ambiguity of the negation with respectto the locationals that was observed in (74) and (75) has vanished, andthe locationals in fact set up a frame within which the negation holds.In this sense they strongly resemble temporal expressions, such as thosein (76) and (79).

From this perspective, consider now the negation of our by nowfamiliar example, with a multiple locational specification of time andtemporalized space, (80).

(80) In France, Bill did not hunt hares at weekends.

In (80), again, the temporalized relation between Bill and France is aframe for the rest of the predication, and the sentence cannot possiblyhave a reading where Bill’s presence in France is denied. Furthermore,Bill’s relationship to the weekends cannot be denied either (as he existedat weekends). What is denied is only the hare-hunting-at-weekends-in-France, and implications may remain that Bill did hunt hares in Franceon weekdays, or that he did hunt hares on weekends before going toFrance or after leaving it.

9. Conclusions

It has been shown in this paper, first of all, that different domain types(space, possession, internal state) have special functions in certain seman-tic and syntactic environments. It has also been shown that the mutualscope of domains depends on the one hand on their basic meaning, onthe other on the semantic operations they are subject to, such as tempo-



ralization. Domains carrying their basic meaning can be arranged into ascoping hierarchy that reflects their ability to dominate one another inthe sentence. Word order has been shown to play a crucial role indetermining the mutual scope relations and semantic function of thelocationals. Sentence-initial position in particular requires the locationalelement to carry a meaning that enables it to dominate other mentalspaces in the sentence. The same phenomenon was observed as concretecontainment in section 2, where several locational specifications of thesame type were connected to the same predication: the initially introduceddomain is conceived of as being the outermost frame of the predication,within which subframes are embedded. In more general terms, this reflectsthe principle that ‘‘more specific, narrowing, restrictive information tendsto come later, while more general, non-restrictive, non-narrowing infor-mation tends to come earlier’’ (Givon 1984: 225).

Received 16 April 1998 University of TurkuRevised version received17 March 1999

Notes

* Correspondence address: Department of Finnish, University of Turku, Henrikinkatu 3,FIN-20014 Turku, Finland. E-mail: [email protected].

1. Here it can be objected that in sentence-final position the locative element is part of theverb phrase and thus syntactically different from its sentence-initial counterpart.However, their syntactic difference is far from self-evident; for instance, Brown andMiller (1991: 91) analyze the last locative expression of S[NP[John] VP[V [stood] PP[on thetable] ] PP[in the bathroom]] as a modifier of the whole sentence. In semantic terms, thefinal element has the function of indicating the setting of the whole process John stoodon the table. In the semantically based framework of cognitive grammar, the classifica-tion of locational elements as indicators of a setting is not dependent on their positionbut on their semantic coverage; Langacker (1991a: 300, 343) argues that the expressionsIn Louisiana and in the garage are both settings in In Louisiana, a hurricane destroyedseveral small towns and Sean fixed his bicycle in the garage, despite their differentposition.

2. The following abbreviations are used in the glosses: ACC=accusative, ADE=adessive,ALL=allative, COND=conditional, ESS=essive, GEN=genitive, ILL= illative,INE= inessive, PAR=partitive, PASS=passive (impersonal ), PL=plural, PRTC=participle, PST=past tense, PX=possessive suffix (with person number), REL=rela-tive pronoun, SG=singular.

3. Compare also Elmerilla oli iltaisin rakko kadessa [Elmer+ADE be.PST.3SG eveningsblister hand+INE] ‘In the evenings Elmer had a blister on his hand’ (obviously adifferent blister every evening) with the awkward ?Elmerilla rakko oli iltaisin kadessa[Elmer+ADE blister be.PST.3SG nights hand+INE] ‘When Elmer had it, the blisterwas on his hand in the evenings’. The awkwardness of the latter is due to two implica-


428 T. Huumo

tions: first, the implication that (one and the same) blister was located somewhere elseoutside the time of the evenings, and second, that a temporal possessive relationshipexisted between Elmer and the blister, which would result in a reading whereby theblister was possessed by someone else before and after Elmer had it. However, at leastone context can be devised where this interpretation makes sense: Elmer is an actorplaying the role of a character with a blister on his hand, and an artificial blister isattached to his hand in the evenings when he plays the role.

4. In fact, even the expression in reality can paradoxically take on a counterfactual func-tion. Consider for instance In reality, you would be dead by now when uttered by a flightinstructor to a pilot in a flight simulator. The paradox is that the pilot (who part of‘‘reality’’), is dead. This is possible because ‘‘reality’’ here is the counterpart of thesimulated flight in a hypothetical space, where it is a real flight with an actual plane. Forfurther discussion of the problems connected with the concept of ‘‘reality’’ in mentalspace theory, see Fauconnier (1985: 14–15).

5. Gilles Fauconnier (personal communication) has pointed out to me that in fact thisexample has several competing counterfactual readings, including the analogical onewhere Elmer has a sports outlet in Denver, and in Buffalo, the equivalent of that wouldbe having a supermarket; the temporal one that makes the prediction that if Elmer(actually) moves to Buffalo, he will indeed have a supermarket; and also a readingcombining the functions of a counterfactual and a temporal setting (in time periodswhen Elmer is in Buffalo, he owns a supermarket), etc.

6. Consider, however, an example such as In Communist Hungary, Istvan was a wealthyofficial where the location (Hungary) is represented via a temporary feature (being acommunist country). Now the most likely interpretation is indeed the one where theperiod of existence of communist Hungary is being talked about; Istvan may still beliving in Hungary (which is no longer a communist country). Contrast this with the barelocative in In Hungary, Istvan was a wealthy official (When he was in Hungary .. .), whichimplicates that Istvan has actually left the country.

7. A possible reading would be one where ‘‘being old’’ is understood in a relative sense;thus the president, when in France, would be old compared to the average age of theFrench, or in relation to their concept of the appropriate age of a president.

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Space as time: temporalization and other special functions of locational-setting adverbials

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