Soviet Perceptions of Global Ecological Problems: An Analysis of Three Patterns

Soviet Perceptions of Global Ecological Problems: An Analysis of Three PatternsAuthor(s): Barbara Welling HallReviewed work(s):Source: Political Psychology, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Dec., 1990), pp. 653-680Published by: International Society of Political PsychologyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3791477 .Accessed: 07/11/2011 13:30

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Political Psychology, Vol. 11, No. 4, 1990

Soviet Perceptions of Global Ecological Problems: An Analysis of Three Patterns

Barbara Welling Hall'

This research builds on existing cross-national research on environmental attitudes to analyze Soviet perceptions of global ecological problems between 1972 and 1986. Three perceptual patterns are hypothesized: cold war, ecological, and technocratic. Simple descriptive statistics appropriately used with nominal data are employed to discover the prevalence of these patterns as revealed through the content analysis technique of simulated interviewing. Results indicate that the Cold War pattern is least prevalent. Comparing this research with data presented by Cotgrove (1982) and Milbrath (1984) suggests that there is considerable room for common discourse in discussing issues of global concern.

KEY WORDS: Soviet; perceptions; ecological; environmental; interdependence; cooperation.

INTRODUCTION

According to Mikhail Gorbachev, the recognition of global ecological interdependence is an important element in "new political thinking." Mean- while strip-mining in Estonia, air pollution in Siberia, and the shrink- ing of the Aral Sea fuel nationalist sentiments in the U.S.S.R. In evaluating these statements, it is helpful to remember that the facts they report have not emerged suddenly. How are Gorbachev's words on ecological interdependence and new political thinking to be interpreted? What are the roots of Soviet perceptions of global ecological problems? Is there any reason to believe that these Soviet perceptions are analogous to Western perceptions?

'Department of Political Science, Earlham College, Richmond, Indiana 47374.

653 0162-895X/90/1200-0653$06.00/1 ? International Society of Political Psychology

Although there have been several studies of domestic environmental problems in the Soviet Union (DeBardeleben, 1985; Goldman, 1970, 1972; Kramer, 1973; Pryde, 1972; Ziegler, 1987), cross-national studies of environmental attitudes (Cotgrove, 1982; Milbrath, 1984), and studies of the U.S.S.R. and ecological interdependence (Clemens, 1978), these works are not well integrated. The purpose of the research reported here is to pull together these disparate strands of inquiry. There is clearly no single Soviet view of global ecological problems, just as there is no single Western view. On the other hand, to jump to the other extreme and say that there are as many views as individuals defies the rationale underlying social science that there are patterns in human behavior.

This article outlines three hypothesized Soviet perceptual patterns focusing on global ecological problems, as summarized in Table I. Following a brief review of data-collection procedures, it describes the actual prevalence of those perceptual patterns between 1972 and 1986, in the decade and a half prior to perestroika and glasnost. Finally, the article compares existing Soviet ecological perceptions with Western ecological perceptions as captured in cross-national research.

THE HYPOTHESIZED COLD WAR PATTERN

Culture, when it progresses spontaneously and is not consciously controlled. . . leaves deserts behind it. (Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence)

In the 1980s Western analysts argued that Soviet interest in global ecological problems was best understood as a new weapon in the social, class struggle between Marxism-Leninism and imperialism (Wettig, 1988). In other words, Soviet environmental writings have been designed to shore up Soviet positions in the Cold War. In keeping with this plausible explanation, it is hypothesized here that Soviet propagandists will argue publicly that there are no environmental problems inherent in socialism (as per McIntyre and Thornton, 1978); that existing socialism provides the solutions to all global problems (including ecological problems); and in an inversion of Fry (1976) and Komarov (1980), that capitalism (rather than socialism) is the implaca- ble foe of ecology. Any suggestion that the causes of global ecological problems are similar under socialism and capitalism will be vigorously denied. Therefore any success in resolving these problems will be wholly the result of Soviet initiative.

This hypothesized Cold War pattern, as illustrated in Table I, is related to a response set labeled "cornucopian" by Cotgrove (1982, p. 25) and "rearguard" by Milbrath (1984, p. 55). The "cornucopians" and members of the "rearguard" are individuals who strongly support what Pirages (1978,

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Soviet Perceptions of Global Ecological Problems

Table I. Global Ecological Problems: Three Soviet Patterns

Nature Solution International of Problem to Problem cooperation

Cold War Capitalism, Existing Result of imperialism socialism Soviet

initiative

Technocratic Diminishing Technology, Peaceful resources rational use coexistence,

acquisitive

Ecological Limits to New manner Information growth of thinking exchange,

coordination

p. 7) calls the Dominant Social Paradigm as opposed to the New Environ- mental Paradigm (Dunlap and Van Liere, 1978, p. 10). According to the Dominant Social Paradigm, there is no real environmental problem; any problem that might potentially exist can be resolved through newer and more powerful technology; and the idea of limits to growth is ludicrous, if not immoral. For Cotgrove (1982, p. 92) and Milbrath (1984, p. 21) defense of the Dominant Social Paradigm also involves defense of market control of the economy and economic individualism. Given obvious differences in the dominant social paradigm of the Soviet Union, the Cold War pattern hypothesized in this research is drawn for a worldview based on Marxism-Leninism rather than on capitalism and free enterprise.

THE HYPOTHESIZED TECHNOCRATIC PAIITERN

Mankind. . . inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve, since closer examination will always show that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the course of formation. (Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, 1977)

The assertion of a prevailing Soviet belief that there is a technological fix for every problem (DeBardeleben, 1984; Pryde, 1972) makes another perceptual pattern seem equally plausible. Respondents of a second anticipated type believe that there are large environmental problems, that these can be solved by better technology, and that there are not inflexible limits to growth. This pattern is here labeled "technocratic" in reference to a worldview in which technology "rules" as well as to the presumption that this would be a plausible worldview for political and managerial elites since it acknowledges the existence of a problem while denying any trade-offs in solution.

Parrott (1985, p. 3) argues that technological progress is always important to the political elite. This observation is in keeping with Cotgrove

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(1982) and Milbrath (1984) who list faith in technology as a central element in the Dominant Social Paradigm. Respondents falling into the technocratic type are likely to be what Parrott calls "nontraditionalists." According to Parrott the "traditional" Soviet siege mentality regarding technology is domi- nated by concerns of imperialist aggressiveness; the belief that military technology must be given top priority; and preference for economic autarky as an imperative for survival. Conversely, adherents to the hypothesized technocratic pattern should share characteristics of Parrott's "nontraditionalists." That is, they should believe that placing undue stress on military technology hampers other spheres of economic and technological development; they should be less certain that the Soviet Union can surpass the West; and they should attach "considerable value to technological ties with the West as a means of meeting Soviet economic shortcomings" (Parrott, 1985, pp. 5-6). Although Parrott does not discuss global ecological problems, each of these beliefs would be consistent with recognizing environmental difficulties (particularly domestically) and valuing technological exchange with the West as a key to their solution.

Given the emphasis on economic growth within such a technocratic perceptual pattern, it is anticipated that diminishing natural resources will be considered the most serious environmental problem. Solutions should focus on the rational use of these resources as well as technological development.

THE HYPOTHESIZED ECOLOGICAL PATTERN

We should not flatter overselves overmuch on account of our human victories over nature. For each such victory nature takes its revenge on us. Each victory it is true, in the first place brings about the results we expected, but in the second and third places it has quite different, unforeseen effects which only too often cancel out the first. (Engels, The Dialectics of Nature, 1974)

The hypothesized ecological pattern is closely related to a response type labeled "the vanguard" by Milbrath (1984, p. 59) and "catastrophist" by Cot- grove (1982, pp. 25-26) in previous surveys of environmental opinion. In keeping with the New Environmental Paradigm, this perceptual pattern is based on assumptions that environmental problems are quite serious; that there are definite limits to economic growth; and that necessary changes require a new manner of thinking rather than new technology. Like DeBardeleben's (1984, p. 138) pessimists, these respondents are likely to believe that time is short and ecological caution is in order. Like Inglehart's (1977, p. 290) postmaterialists, these respondents are predicted to be change-oriented and to indicate that some basic social reorganization is necessary.

This hypothesized pattern draws on the holistic ecological concept that "the whole is greater than the sum of its parts" (Worster, 1977). It is there-

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fore anticipated that interrelatedness (both natural and political) will be a pervasive theme in an ecological pattern. In political terms this may trans- late into a cosmopolitan rather than a nationalist identity. Although Milbrath (1984) links environmental concern to sympathy with peace movements, it is anticipated that because adherents to a hypothesized ecological pattern should consider environmental problems urgent in their own right, they will not necessarily rank the prevention of nuclear was as the number-one global problem. However, given a cosmopolitan worldview, detente and peaceful coexistence should be considered conducive to the resolution of global ecological problems to the extent that they allow for information exchange and the coordination of global solutions.

DATA COLLECTION

Students of Soviet politics and foreign policy frequently write about the special difficulties of data collection and analysis that befall them in their pursuit of knowledge (Breslauer, 1982; Kramer, 1973). Some of these special obstacles stem from the general impracticability of applying methods, or more precisely, methodological assumptions (such as random sampling), useful for studying Western political behavior to the Soviet case. These un- glamorous problems of data collection are hard to ignore when the time comes to plunge into the cold waters of empirical research. Some of these have been clearly related to the pre-glasnost Soviet penchant for secrecy. The existence of censorship during the period encompassed by this research (1972-1986) suggests systematic differences in retained and rejected primary sources.2 However, it is not only censorship that makes collection of Soviet data difficult. There are numerous mundane deterrents, like the inconsistent and sparing use of footnotes, indexes, and bibliographies in even scholarly works, that hinder double-checking and the snowballing accumulation of data that enriches scholarly research in other areas. When bibliographies do appear, as in the 1972 article in Voprosy Filosofii [Problems of Philosophy] that in- troduced the Club of Rome and The Limits to Growth to Soviet readers (Shi- lin, 1972), they are noteworthy.

The data-collection technique used in this research marries the advantages of content analysis as an unobtrusive measure with the issue-specific focus of survey research in a method called simulated interviewing. The term "simulated interviewing" is from Krippendorff (1980), who provides an ex-

2See Webb and Campbell (1966) which discusses content analysis in terms of the problems of selective deposit and retention of archives.

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ample of a study conducted of the history of the views of child-rearing over a 300-year period, using this technique of data collection. In Krippendorffs case, simulated interviews were used because the majority of authors whose views were sought were deceased. The method of simulated interviewing is similarly appropriate when, as in this case study, respondents have been in- accessible for political reasons.

Other content-analysis techniques are widely used in research in political psychology. One used frequently in the study of Soviet perceptions is based on the operational-code construct first developed by Leites in his Operational Code of the Politburo (1951). In order to focus my research on Soviet perceptions of global ecological problems in particular, I have had to develop my own "operational code," which is a compendium of attitudes about different aspects of the problem, recorded via a method that resembles traditional survey or interview research, in that a survey questionnaire was constructed and responses were coded for individuals. However, as suggested above, simulated interviewing differs substantially from traditional survey research because "respondents"' answers are inferred from work that was not written with the questionnaire in mind. This research method explicitly exchanges the numerous obstacles of direct interviewing (for Soviet opinion held in years past) for the more limited rewards of a feasible, yet systematic, study.

The total population of works focusing on Soviet perceptions of global ecological problems that should be sampled (if the study were in keeping with the requirements of traditional survey research) is extremely difficult to identify. Because the selected works cannot be considered a scientific, random sample, I refer throughout to the articles and books included in the survey as a "pool" rather than a "sample." Western scholars have obtained searches of Soviet bibliographic holdings from INION, but these include book titles rather than journal contributions, rather more Western than Soviet titles, and, in any case, the titles are frequently printed in such short supply that they are not available on demand to the researcher. [It must be noted that such biases would be far more likely to distort the research of the scholar who does not read Russian. In searching through indices of Soviet publications compiled by the Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) of the For- eign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), articles in the Soviet press that fit my decision rules for incorporation into the study were likely to be among those indexed, but not translated. Similarly, when working in the private For- eign Science Library of the Battelle Memorial Institute in Columbus, which regularly produces partial in-house translations of Priroda [Nature] and other natural science publications, those articles incorporated in my interview pool according to my decision rules were given the notation "Omit." This means that researchers who do not read Russian are probably missing a substantial portion of the Soviet ecological perspective.]

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It was my intention to become familiar with several different categories of sources: those published primarily for a Soviet domestic elite audience, for Soviet domestic mass audiences, and for foreign audiences. The primary sources of raw data for the simulated interviews included journal articles, books, and chapters written by Soviet scholars and selected for inclusion in this research because they dealt with:

1. the present and/or future state of the natural environment, 2. the social interaction of humanity and nature, and 3. global problems. Works were identified through exhaustive, computerized interlibrary

loan searches conducted with the assistance of the Library of Congress and OCLC. Available sources that met the three decision rules listed above yielded 87 interviews. These included 20 articles in Voprosy Filosofii [Problems of Philosophy], published by the Institute of Philosophy of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences; 19 articles published in Priroda [Nature], the Soviet analog to Scientific American, a "popular" science journal with articles written by scientists for highly educated readers outside of their own discipline; 17 books and articles translated by Soviets for foreign consumption; 7 articles from Kommunist, the theoretical journal of the CPSU; 11 articles from specialized academic journals, including global modeling monographs, geography journals, and journals of international research institutes; and 9 mis- cellaneous books and articles addressed to a mass Soviet domestic audience. All works were published between 1972 (the year that the United States and the Soviet Union entered into their first environmental protection agreement) and Gorbachev's first Party Congress as general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1986.

The few opportunities for cross-referencing which do present themselves in the Soviet press suggest that no major works were omitted. The extent to which this research is drawn from several different types of sources and describes variation in Soviet perceptions is one indication that the work does not suffer unduly from systematic bias: systematic distortion would have been more likely to thrust findings in one general direction than in several com- peting directions.

THE SURVEY

The survey, reproduced in Appendix A, posed questions designed to tap perceptions of the following aspects of global ecological problems:

1. The nature of global ecological problems. 2. The solution to global ecological problems. 3. The value of international cooperation.

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Many of the questions were derived from existing surveys (Dunlap and Van Liere, 1978; Hunter, 1984; Milbrath, 1984) with adjustments made for the Soviet case. Adjustments have been fairly drastic in some cases; the development and justification for each survey item are presented in Hall (1987). As a single example of adaptation, one of Dunlap and Van Liere's items states:

There are limits to growth beyond which our industrialized societies cannot expand.

This item recalls Marshall Goldman's (1970, 1972) investigation of the propo- sition that socialism provides the solution to environmental deterioration. In providing numerous examples of fish kills, air pollution in resort cities, soil erosion, and the degradation of natural beauty (among other problems) in the U.S.S.R., Goldman (1970, p. 42) argues that the prime cause of ecological problems is not private enterprise, nor for that matter socialist government -although he does state that public greed is no more conserving of the environment than private greed. While both phenomena have their disadvantages in creating and coping with ecological difficulties, the primary cause of environmental disturbances is industrialization.

Goldman's conclusion of convergence was roundly denounced by Soviet social scientists in the 1970s (Khozin, 1972). In anticipation of Soviet respondents' recoiling at the connotation of our industrialized societies, I have divid- ed Dunlap and Van Liere's item in two:

Item No. 8: There are limits to growth beyond which capitalist societies cannot expand. Item No. 9: There are limits to growth beyond which industrialized societies cannot expand.

This specification allows for the identification of authors who argue that there are limits to growth, but only in the capitalist world, and those who believe that limits are a more generalizable phenomenon. I have matched the first question about the potential failings of capitalist societies with an unquali- fied statement that could include socialist societies, but does not require the respondent to agree with a politically volatile suggestion of convergence.

Respondents were coded as agreeing that a given item was TRUE, arguing that an item was FALSE, having a BALANCED opinion, making NO COMMENT, or making a RELATED statement. In addition, illustrative responses pertinent to individual items were recorded longhand and carefully footnoted. Examples of coded responses are provided in following sec- tions of this article as well as in Hall (1987). The process of analyzing the co-occurrence of statements within and among interviews was made possible by a commercial software program that catalogs and conducts Boolean searches within research notes.3

3The software program used was Squarenote,T a product of UnionSquareware.

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DATA ANALYSIS

There are not many statistics that are appropriately applied to nominal data. The variation ratio is an exception. According to Blalock (1979, pp. 76-77), the variation ratio, which is defined as V.R. = 1 - fmoda/N, "is a measure of the degree to which cases are concentrated in the modal category, rather than being distributed more evenly throughout all categories." In other words, it is an extremely simple measure that may be appropriately used with nominal data, e.g., responses coded as TRUE, FALSE, or BALANCED. In an analysis of Soviet perceptions, the measure has an added intuitive appeal: the lower the variation ratio (i.e., the closer to - 1.0), the greater the evidence of a rigorously defended standard "line"; the higher the variation ratio (i.e., the closer to 0.0), the greater the evidence of some leeway in permitted discussion. The computed variation ratios for the 24 items in the survey do tend to be quite low. The average (mean) variation ratio is - 0.67 with almost one third between - 1.0 and - 0.80. This simultaneously suggests that those questions for which there is an unusually high variation ratio may be worthy of examination in some detail and that the survey items, as they were word- ed, may not have tapped the most differentiating aspects of Soviet perceptions of global ecological problems. This is where the advantages of the technique of simulated interviewing come into play. It is possible to examine the recorded qualitative responses to given questions in order to play out unanticipated nuances.

Another descriptive statistic, a Polemical Quotient (P.Q.), was designed and calculated to serve as an indicator of the extent of ideological hostility directed toward the West in a given source. The denominator in the quotient is the total number of paragraphs in the article (or pertinent chapter of a book). The numerator is the number of paragraphs containing one of the following themes:

1. Global ecological problems are best understood within the frame- work of class struggle.

2. Socialists are inherently better at resolving these problems than capitalists.

3. Bourgeois ideology is bankrupt; bourgeois scholars cannot proper- ly understand environmental problems. An examination of the frequency distribution of the percentage of these polemical themes in the interview pool revealed distinct breaks at 10%, 20%, and 40%o. Therefore, qualitatively speaking, those ranked at less than 10% are said to have a low Polemical Quotient, those between 10 and 19, a moderate Polemical Quotient; between 20 and 39, a high Polemical Quotient; and above 40, an extremely high Polemical Quotient.

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THE COLD WAR CORE GROUP

As a first step in testing for the existence of an actual Cold War pattern in Soviet perceptions of global ecological problems, all interviews with an extremely high P.Q. and those with a high P.Q. in combination with assertions that capitalism faces unique limits to growth were carefully analyzed. This core group of eight interviews turns out to be intuitively coherent since it includes at least two Marxist-Leninist philosophers (I.T. Frolov and I.P. Laptev) in addition to the unnamed editors of Voprosyfilosofii; the editor- in-chief of the World Marxist Review (K. I. Zarodov); the director of the Academy's Institute of the International Working Class Movement (T. T. Timofeyev); and V. V. Zagladin (deputy director of the CC CPSU's international section).

Reading through these authors' works indicates that there are prominent characteristics of this pattern beyond a high Polemical Quotient (as described above). According to the decision rules for incorporating these interviews into the group all these respondents agree with Item No. 8:

There are limits to growth beyond which capitalist society cannot expand.

and disagree with Item No. 9:

There are limits to growth beyond which industrialized society cannot expand.

That is, these respondents who see limits to capitalist growth do not acknowledge limits to industrialized growth which may include socialist societies. This implicit rejection of convergence may be made with great hostility in emphasis. In fact, no holds are barred in the attack against capitalism (Item No. 5): the profit lust of out-of-control capitalists who care not a whit for the future saps the earth of its wealth. The real danger of raw material shortages (Item No. 3) is that they will inspire imperialists to engage in rapa- cious plundering of other countries to make up for their own profligate use of natural resources. Some international-relations analysts go so far as to state that "within 10 to 15 years environmental aggression will become the root source of political conflict between states" (Krugly stol, 1973, p. 109).

While some take the finding of DDT in penguin livers as a jumping- off point to argue that "everyone in the world suffers because of pollution in capitalist countries," others list air, water, and noise pollution, depletion of raw materials, desertification, energy shortages, species extinction, and the greenhouse effect as serious environmental problems. Given the history of antipathy between Marxists and Malthusians it is not surprising that these authors vigorously deny the validity of concerns about population growth raised by "pundits of the reactionary bourgeoisie" (Zarodov, 1972, pp. 17-18).

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Even so, the seriousness of population growth is not wholly denied: the editors of Voprosy filosofii (Society and Nature, 1973, p. 162) state that "the demographic explosion represents contradictions and is a topic of fierce debate."

The members of this core group pay far more attention to technology than the hypothesized Cold War pattern would suggest. The most polemical, arguing that Item No. 6 is FALSE, state that the emphasis on technology as the cause of environmental evils is part of a "campaign of obscurantism" and that "technicism, whatever its garb, acts as the refined ideological protection of modern capitalism" (Laptev, 1975, pp. 65-66). At the same time, Cold War respondents indicate great faith in technology in response to Item No. 14. Anger at the suggestion that technological progress should be halted just as society is on the verge of transition to communism is expressed in the strong denunciation of any "back to nature" [nazad k prirode] movement or Rousseauist romanticism. As Ryabchikov and Saushkin (1973, p. 8) put it, agreeing that Item No. 17 is TRUE:

. .not back to nature, but forward to nature, leaning on social and scientific and technological progress -such is the path of resolving the problem of the "ecological crisis" [quotes in original].

It is explicitly stated in response to Item No. 16 that unless this movement "forward to nature" is accompanied by socialist revolution, ecological balance will remain hopelessly out of reach (Laptev, 1975, p. 64; Ryabchikov, 1973, p. 4; Timofeyev, 1976, p. 46; Zagladin and Frolov, 1979, p. 37; Zarodov, 1972, p. 49). Not only socialist politics, but Marxist-Leninist philosophy are a prerequisite for overcoming environmental problems (Item No. 20).

Virtually all of the respondents in the pool who write about international cooperation say that it is important (88), and this core group of cold warriors is not an exception. However, unlike the core group of Soviet ecologists, most members of the Cold War core group quote Brezhnev directly to support this claim rather than using their own arguments. An interpreta- tion that these authors are not particularly in favor of international cooperation, but publicly support what Parrott (1985) calls Brezhnev's "nontraditional" stance in the interests of political livelihood, would be consistent with this finding.

As evidence of Soviet "success" in efforts to resolve global ecological problems, Cold War respondents point to the number of decrees that have been passed or the number of rubles that have been allotted in the plan. Ques- tions about how effectively new legislation has been implemented or how efficiently rubles have been spent and whether they have been spent as intended are simply ignored. Significantly, the international agreements that are mentioned in response to Item No. 22 tend to be within the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance.

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THE TECHNOCRATIC CORE GROUP

Given Cotgrove's (1982) and Milbrath's (1984) assertion that faith in technology is a central element in the Dominant Social Paradigm, and the hypothesis that within the technocratic pattern diminishing natural resources will be considered the most serious environmental problem, the core group of technocrats was identified as those respondents who state that Items No. 17 and No. 3 are both TRUE. That is, they argue that the major environmental problem today is effective management of natural resources and that environmental problems will find their solution in the scientific and technological revolution. No attempt was made to classify this group of respondents according to their party or professional affiliations. It is thus striking that this group includes most, but not all of the leading Communist Party figures who were surveyed. It happens, unexpectedly, that this group may also be identified as those respondents who are moderately polemical, including 7 out of the 8 interviews in the entire pool of 87 that have a moderate Polemical Quotient (i.e., between 0.10 and 0.20).

The respondents classified as having technocratic patterns are Acade- mician Pyotr Nikolayevich Fedoseyev, member of the CC-CPSU Central Committee, elected vice-president of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences in November 1975, previously director of the Central Committee's Institute of Marxism-Leninism, earlier Director of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences's Philosophy Institute; the late Academician Yevgeny Konstantinovich Fyo- dorov, a climatologist, former director of the Chief Hydrometeorological Service's Institute of Applied Geophysics, chairman of the Soviet Peace Com- mittee, member of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet, and candidate member of the CC CPSU; Dzhermen Gvishiani, corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences, former deputy director of the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT), former director of the All- Union Institute for the Study of Systems Analysis (VNIISI), transferred in 1986 to a position in Gosplan; Yuri Izrael, Director of the State Committee on Hydrometerology and Control of the Environment (formerly the Hydrometeorological Service); the late Academician Innokenty Petrovich Gerasimov, director of the Academy of Science's Institute of Geography; Mikhail Ivanovich Budyko, a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences, of the Voyeikov Main Geophysical Observatory in Leningrad; and V. A. Los, candidate in philosophy and scientific secretary of the section on global problems of the Scientific Council of the Presidium of the Acade- my of Sciences on philosophical and social problems of science and technology.

The authors in this technocratic core group are inclined to state that some ecological problems are simply bourgeois myths, but there is not a firm

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consensus on this argument. Individual respondents express concern about the demographic boom as "a complicating factor," water pollution, open- pit mining, eutrophication, urbanization, the greenhouse effect, species extinction, the mastery of space as a global commons, and desertification. Like the core group of ecologists, they believe that overpopulation has serious consequences. Unlike the Cold War respondents, these Soviet technocrats do link nuclear war specifically to environmental concerns (Fyodorov, 1972, p. 70; Los, 1982).

While not believing in generalized limits to growth (Item No. 9), the technocrats indicate a fairly solid respect for the methodology that first predicted those limits (Item No. 13). It is under the auspices of Dzherman Gvishiani, one of the core group of technocrats, that Dennis Meadows (The Limits to Growth) has traveled to the Soviet Union to train ecological managers and groups of Soviet researchers have traveled to the United States to study with prominent systems analysts.

In arguing the "we can't get away from the evils of technology by re- jecting it," the technocrats' emphasis is on a technical revolution in environmental problem-solving rather than on an ecologically based revolution in science. These are respondents who believe that Item No. 19 (Society should emphasize utilizing and/or transforming nature to meet human needs) is TRUE. Some of the proposals made by technocrats for transforming the man- nature relationship are along lines that ecologists would reject as nature-hating or life-endangering. It is not surprising that Fyodorov, who invented a method for controlling hail formation, reminds readers that "humanity has mastered the earth, its resources, and outer space for its own use" (Fyodorov, 1972, p. 70) and makes various suggestions for artificially regulating the planet's cloud cover (which would, as he acknowledges, require the cooperation of a number of states). Gerasimov (1983, p. 44), the founder of the Soviet discipline of constructive geography, is explicit that "modern geography is a science concerned with transformation" (emphasis in original). In addition to proposing large-scale irrigation projects, constructive geographers endorsed the now abandoned massive project to redirect the flow of Siberian rivers to Central Asia.

Finally, as hypothesized, these respondents are vocal supporters of both peaceful coexistence (Item No. 23) and learning from the West (Item No. 24). Unlike most Soviets, the technocrats are well-traveled. They recognize both success and failure in international efforts to resolve global ecological problems. They combine their Cold Warrior compatriots' emphasis on socialist cooperation within the CMEA with the cosmopolitan interest (inherent in the ecological pattern) in the cooperation of scientists, mentioning the International Council of Scientific Unions, UNESCO, and UN conferences on the biosphere.

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THE ECOLOGICAL CORE GROUP

Establishing a core group to test the hypothesized ecological pattern was more difficult in some respects. Intuitively this makes sense: the further one moves from hard-line positions, the more variation is likely. Because previous studies have revealed that supporters of a New Environmental Paradigm are highly educated, the primary selection criteria for this core group of interviews was that the respondents be highly educated individuals. In the context of simulated interviewing, I operationalized "highly educated" as having an advanced degree in the natural sciences, because this information is available in Soviet bylines. In addition, members of the ecological core group had to agree that industrialized societies in general face limits to growth (Item No. 9), thus admitting a possibility of convergence.

The resulting group contains 13 interviews and 17 individuals (Fedorenko and Reimers, 1974, 1981; Fedorenko et al., 1980; Gilyarov and Naumov, 1978; Girusov and Lappo, 1974; Kamshilov, 1974; Kapitsa, 1973; Moiseyev, 1978, 1984; Neronov and Goncharov, 1979; Parshenkov, 1972; Piruzyan et al., 1980). While Soviet publications are far from exhaustive in providing biographical information about their authors, enough information is available to suggest that these respondents are not peripheral scientists. At least five are members or corresponding members of the prestigious Academy of Sciences: Fedorenko, Gilyarov, Kapitsa, Moiseyev, and Piruzyan. In this pool, the ecologists include biologists, biophysicists, and zoologists (Gilyarov, Kamshilov, Malenkov, Naumov, Piruzyan, and Reim- ers); physicists and mathematicians (Kapitsa, Barenboim, and Moiseyev); economists (Fedorenko and Lemeshev)4; as well as one geographer (Neronov), one oceanographer (Lappo), and one philosopher of the natural sciences (Girusov). The heavy representation of biology and related disciplines is not surprising given ecology's historical roots as a subfield of biology. It is more surprising that there is not strong disciplinary identification among these respondents. The biologists do not aspire to make biology the "king of disciplines" in ecological research as some geographers associated with the existing technocratic pattern do. The interdisciplinary orientation of the economists might be explained by the fact that historically ecology and economics have been at cross-purposes (Oldak, 1973, p. 33). Thus, for an economist to address environmental issues seriously requires some substantial reevaluation of his or her own discipline.

In addition to perceiving limits to growth and seeing the solutions to global ecological problems lying beyond simple technological innovation,

4Economics were not identified as natural scientists. Fedorenko and Lemeshev are drawn into the group of ecologists as the result of co-authoring articles with Reimers, a biologist.

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these authors share responses on other items. Some Soviet ecologists turn the traditional Marxist critique of bourgeois population concerns on its head, stating that some bourgeois economists (Julian Simon?) falsely believe that reducing population size will lead to economic deterioration.

Agreeing that Item No. 3 is TRUE, these respondents believe that raw material and natural-resources shortages are far more imminent than the average Soviet understands. "Our naivete regarding natural resources is some- times absolutely staggering. . .people think that the earth is a limitless warehouse" (Fedorenko and Reimers, 1974, p. 2). This naivete must be addressed by courses in ecoliteracy, paralleling an earlier massive Soviet literacy campaign, in adult schools, by journalists, in elementary schools, for everyone. While the bulk of attention is paid to the need for rationally using and conserving the raw materials that are needed for production, this core group counters Marxist "anti-Rousseauism" by stating that natural landscapes are worth preserving for their spiritual [dukhovny], aesthetic, recreational, and patriotic value (Astanin and Blagosklonov, 1983, p. 133; Girusov and Lappo, 1974, p. 6; Kamshilov, 1974, p. 250).

Although the use of the word "convergence" is assiduously avoided (no doubt to avoid Sakharov's former fate), the concept is clearly present. In an intriguing article emphasizing the community of humanity in the evolution of the biosphere, Moiseyev (1984) expands the metaphor of "spaceship earth" with references to "the ship of Planet earth," "Columbus' ship," and "Noah's ark." His last paragraph reads like a decoy for censors:

The evolution of life on our planet results in divergence- new species, new branches of irreversible fortunes, etc. are always arising, and we must examine the contemporary ecological process from exactly this position. [Emphasis added] (Moiseyev, 1984, p. 67)

As hypothesized, and in contrast to the core groups of Cold Warriors and technocrats, the Soviet ecologists firmly believe that the scientific and technological revolution has contributed to environmental deterioration. "In the future," writes Parshenkov (1972, p. 51) agreeing that Item No. 6 is TRUE, "our technology will be looked at as if we intended to burn down the house in order to roast the pig." Thus, the majority of ecologists disagree that nuclear power is either safe or indispensable (Item No. 15). Both the paucity of responses to this item as well as its high V.R. (variation ratio), as indicated below in Table III, suggest that the discussion of nuclear power in the Soviet Union was remarkably controversial even prior to Chernobyl.

The emphasis on technology as a primary cause of contemporary environmental problems is consistent with less finger-pointing at capitalism. This is the only group of respondents that engages in substantial self-criticism about the extent of Soviet failure in dealing with domestic environmental

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problems. The standard defensive line is explicitly rejected by Fedorenko, Lemeshev, and Reimers (1980, p. 3), who state that the Soviet Union has severe and contemporary environmental problems that cannot be attributed solely to the trials and tribulations of the Civil War and World War II. These ecologists point out that Soviet planning is not all that it is cracked up to be. Advocacy for centralized planning in the USSR is an important theme for these respondents. While the cold war respondents state that lack of planning is a problem in the capitalist world, in their responses to Item No. 7 this group of respondents argues that Soviet "departmentalism" [vedomst- vennost] is a primary organizational obstacle to successfully resolving global environmental problems (Piruzyan et al., 1980, p. 7).

This group of respondents sees interrelatedness between man and nature and between disciplines (Item No. 11). They believe some kind of new economic thinking is required to resolve environmental problems in the Soviet Union (Item No. 17). The seriousness of considering natural resources both limitless and free in the Soviet Union was popularized in the West by Komarov (1980), but even during the Brezhnev era this concern was not confined to the pages of samizdat published outside of the Soviet Union. According to Lemeshev (1975, pp. 44-45), the general conception that because land is free it can be used carelessly means that the most dangerous environmental vio- lators are not "poachers," but factory managers. Factory managers destroy the environment because the development of ecologically efficient technology is unprofitable when natural resources cost nothing, because ecological inventiveness is not rewarded, and because an environmental inspector's job is not respected or prestigious (Piruzyan et al., 1980, p. 8). Soviet ecologists thus consider "environmental protection" and "economic growth" synony- mous rather than antonymous (Item No. 18); they are advocates of conservation and of preserving nature for its own sake (Item No. 20); they are eager supporters of international exchanges (Item No. 22) and believe that they can learn from their Western counterparts (Item No. 24). Finally, in distinc- tion from many of their compatriots, the ecologists provide examples of Soviet failure in resolving environmental problems (Item No. 21).

Despite a vividly expressed interest in international cooperation to resolve global ecological problems and contrary to the hypothesized ecological pattern, these respondents tend to avoid discussion of detente or peaceful coexistence. In fact, the core group of technocrats pays more attention to peaceful coexistence than do the ecologists. Several interpretations present themselves. It may well be that references to peaceful coexistence in the 1970s and early 1980s raised "complicated" political questions. Coexistence was one of the key words and themes in Sakharov's famous essay of 1968. Writing in detail about their own specific fields of expertise, several Soviet ecologists go considerably further than did Sakharov to stress the imperative of cooper- ative efforts. Their choice of language, both in omission and com-

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Table II. Distribution of Polemical Quotient Within Interview Pool

Rank Raw Numbers Percentage Low 51 58.6 Moderate 14 16 High 15 17.2 Extremely High 7 8

Totala 87 99.8

aTotal does not equal 100, due to rounding.

mission, is probably quite deliberate (see Moiseyev above). Another plausible explanation for the ecologists' tendency to avoid discussion of detente or peaceful coexistence is that these authors do not think about international relations primarily in bilateral East-West terms. This explanation receives some support from the intensive attention these authors devote to multilateral forms of cooperation.

PREVALENCE OF EXISTING PATTERNS WITHIN THE SOVIET POOL

The existence of the hypothesized Cold War pattern was illustrated by those respondents who stated that global ecological problems are best understood in the context of class struggle, that socialists are inherently better at problem-solving than capitalists, and that bourgeois ideology is bankrupt. As described above, these three defining beliefs are associated with a richer pattern in the Cold War core group. Is this ideological distortion of ecological issues, initially measured by P.Q., a recurring theme throughout the pool as a whole? Are other perceptual patterns more or less prevalent? In this section, a discussion of the Polemical Quotient in the pool as a whole will be followed by a discussion of the modal responses given to all survey items as summarized in Table III.

As indicated in Table II, even if the two most polemical ranks are com- bined, the number of interviews encompassed is only half as large as the number that have a low P.Q. (22 as opposed to 51). Within this pool, highly charged Cold War responses that gloat about the superiority of the socialist system as compared to the weaknesses of capitalism are not the norm. While it is common to attribute environmental problems to the inadequacies of capitalism (including the lack of centralized planning), only a small percentage of Soviet authors in this pool actually assert that there are unique capitalist limits to growth or that Marxist dialectics provides a necessary and sufficient font of answers to global problems. Moreover, as indicated in Ta- ble III, most of the claims for basic changes in the nature of society refer

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O

Table III. Responses to Interview Items by Core Group

Item Cold War Technocratic Ecological V.R. Modal Percentagea

Item No. 1 Nuclear War No comment True Varied -0.54 True (T)b 32

Item No. 2 Overpopulation False True True -0.52 True (T/E)b 51

Item No. 3 Shortages Varied True True -0.64 True (T/E) 54

Item No. 4 Survival at stake Varied True True -0.84 True (T/E) 57

Item No. 5 Cause = capitalism True Varied Varied -0.66 True (CW)b 54

Item No. 6 Cause = technology False False True -0.58 True (E)b 74

Item No. 7 Cause = lack of planning Truec True Trued -0.77 True (CW) 61

Item No. 8 Capitalist limits True True No comment -0.83 True (CW/T) 28

Item No. 9 General limits to growth False False True -0.37 Variedd 53

Item No. 10 No Third-World limits True Varied False -0.31 False (E) 37

Item No. 11 "Unbounded" problem Varied Varied True -0.93 True (E) 63

Item No. 12 Use Marxist dialectics True True No comment -0.75 True (CW/T) 28

Item No. 13 Use systems analysis False True True -0.71 True (T/E) 47

Item No. 14 Technological solution True True Varied -0.56 True (CW/T) 67

Item No. 15 Nuclear power safe No comment

Item No. 16 Need global social beform True'

Item No. 17 Need Soviet economic reform Varied

Item No. 18 Growth over protection Varied

Item No. 19 Nature for human needs True

Item No. 20 Nature for aesthetics False

Item No. 21 Soviet failure No

Item No. 22 International success No

Item No. 23 Need peaceful coexistence Varied

Item No. 24 Non-Soviet contributions Varied

True

True'

False

True

True

Varied

No

Yes

True

Trueg

False

Truef

True

Otherf

False

True

Yes

Yes

Varied

True

- 0.35 No comment

-0.81 True (E)

- 0.42 True (E)

- 0.65 Other (E)

-0.81 True (CW/T)

- 0.54 True (E)

-0.71 No (CW/T)

-0.93 Yes (T/E)

- 0.94 True (T)

- 0.52 True (T/E)

32

61

40

43

41

40

100

100

38

100

0 4.

1D 0 0

MI,

CD n

C P* S'3

0

&M

0 cn

0

0 . IV

5? m

"Percentage refers to the percentage of respondents in the total pool who addressed this item. bLetters in parentheses refer to the perceptual pattern that the modal response "fits." CW, Cold War; T, Technocratic; E, Ecological. Some responses fit more than one pattern, e.g., CW/T, Cold War and Technological and T/E, Technocratic and Ecological.

CCold Warriors argue that centralization is required in capitalist countries. Ecologists argue that centralization is lacking for ecological problem-solving in the U.S.S.R.

dThe distribution of responses for this item is True -39, False -39, and Neutral- 10 with the Neutral leaning more toward True than False. 'Cold Warriors and Technocrats define "basic change in the nature of society" as "socialist revolution." Ecologists define "basic change" as massive increases in ecological literacy and new priorities for the natural environment.

fEcologists claim that the question of economic growth OR environmental protection sets up a false and misleading dichotomy. SAccording to the Technocrats, these contributions have been specifically in the area of global modeling and systems analysis.

3

to a new and healthy ecological respect for the earth rather than socialist revolution.

In addition to providing information about the responses to individual survey items made by members of core groups, Table III indicates the extent to which consensus is present or lacking on a given question (summarized by the V.R.) This table also highlights the prevalence of perceptual patterns existing in the U.S.S.R. by indicating modal responses to given survey items. Finally, Table III provides data regarding the percentage of respondents in the total pool who addressed each item.

The majority of modal responses in the pool that fit the Soviet Cold War perceptual pattern also fit the Soviet technocratic pattern. This is most notably true of faith in technology as a cure for global ecological problems (Item No. 14), the assessment that nature exists for human use (Item No. 19), and the lack of acknowledgment of Soviet failure in resolving environmental problems (Item No. 21). The fascination with technology is also present in a generalized admiration of "high-tech academia," i.e., systems analysis and/or global modeling, by close to half of all respondents. Although vituperative denials of limits to growth are most clearly associated with the Cold War pattern, technocrats also do not acknowledge limits.

While the discussion above may seem to indicate that the technocratic pattern is a subtype of the Cold War pattern, Table III indicates that most modal responses that fit the technocratic pattern also fit the ecological pattern. This is true for the modal assertions that overpopulation represents a serious problem (Item No. 2), that human survival is threatened by the severity of ecological problems (Item No. 4), that systems analysis is a useful tool (Item No. 13), that success in resolving global ecological problems has oc- curred on the international scene (Item No. 22), and that world scientists have made valuable contributions to understanding (Item No. 24).

According to Table III, the only uniquely technocratic modal responses in the interview pool are concern with nuclear war as Global Problem Num- ber One and the need for peaceful coexistence. This linkage suggests that global ecological problems may not be easily separable from other East-West issues. It is significant in this regard that Parrott (1985, p. 256) found an upswing in the prevalence of the "nontraditionalist" approach to technological progress during the 1970s: Brezhnev wanted to rely on cooperation with the West to guarantee technological innovation in the U.S.S.R.

As suggested by the overall low P.Q. of the interview pool, some of the key themes that are central to both the hypothesized and the existing Soviet ecological pattern show up relatively frequently. Given the general support for science and technology described above, the belief that the scientific and technological revolution has been responsible for a great number of ecological woes (Item No. 6) appears as a slightly incongruous modal

672 Hall


response. In keeping with this ambivalent attitude towards technology, 39 out of 87 respondents state that industrialized societies in general face limits to growth. Only half as many state that the third world must also observe environmental constraints in the process of economic development (Item No. 10), but this too is a modal response.

In terms of solutions, the development of a new economics that recog- nizes ecological limitations (Item No. 17) is frequently mentioned, although the moderately high V.R. of - 0.42 suggests that this question remains controversial. As suggested above, respect for the biosphere is advocated more frequently than socialist revolution in the total pool. Finally, although fewer than half of the interviews address the appreciation of nature for its own sake (Item No. 20), the ecological response is surprisingly a modal response.

The picture that emerges in Tables I, II, and III is of a tripartite consensus. As hypothesized, it is possible to identify coherent Soviet Cold War, technocratic, and ecological perceptual patterns within the pool. However, no one of these predominates. Cold War responses are modal responses slightly less frequently than technocratic and ecological responses. Items for which ecological responses are prevalent tend to be addressed in fewer interviews and have a higher variation ratio. A noteworthy exception is Item No. 11 (Global ecological problems transcend interdisciplinary boundaries). A majority of respondents address the question of interdisciplinary approaches to ecological problem-solving, and there is a high degree of consensus that such approaches are necessary.

COMPARISON WITH WESTERN SURVEY DATA

The reader will be aware that there are inherent difficulties present in such a comparison. Most importantly, while existing surveys of environmental opinion in the West are based on representative samples, it is difficult to substantiate such a claim for this research. For reasons outlined above, I have assiduously avoided the use of the word "sample." This study does provide a systematic overview of at least elite Soviet opinion on global ecological problems. Some comparisons, while remaining conscious of limitations, are therefore in order.

Whereas data from the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom presented by Milbrath (1984, p. 62) indicate that "[m]ost business leaders and substantial portions of labor leaders, public officials, and media gatekeepers are adherents of the rearguard," the Soviet interviews suggest that political elites in the U.S.S.R. pool tend to be technocrats rather than Cold War respondents. Soviet technocrats, in their belief that there are large environmental problems which can be solved

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Hall

by better technology and which do not pose inflexible limits to growth, resem- ble Milbrath's (1984, p. 57) "nature conservationist establishment followers." Milbrath is "reluctant to take this group very seriously" because they represent less than 5% of the U.S., German, and English publics and they have what he perceives to be an incongruous set of attitudes. In the Soviet case, this type must be taken very seriously. The Soviet fascination with the scientific and technological revolution as the second great revolution of the 20th cen- tury colors perceptions of a number of problems. It may also be argued that environmental problems are perceived as so serious that they pose considerable challenges to the economic growth that must occur (for philosophical reasons). If Communism is "state power plus electrification," raw material shortages are a grim problem for the Soviet state.

This does not mean that all environmental concerns in the pool are con- sumerist. Most Soviet respondents who are concerned by raw-material shortages are also concerned about maintaining ecological balance so that the biosphere can regenerate itself; they are further worried by the appearance of global warming trends. Moreover, concern for the conservation of raw materials as an ecological problem is not uniquely Soviet. British and Ameri- can respondents have also identified shortages of essential raw materials as a primary problem (Cotgrove, 1982, p. 125; Milbrath, 1984, p. 119).

In his demographic analysis, Milbrath indicates that nearly half the U.S. business leaders surveyed fall into the "rearguard." The rearguard is "domi- nated by people active in the production section of the economy that is oriented toward using market mechanisms for choosing societal direction" (Milbrath, 1984, p. 62). The Soviet equivalent of the rearguard may also be identified as individuals who are responsible for "choosing societal direction," but Zaradov, Laptev, Timofeyev, Zagladin, and Frolov are not producers- they have been propagandists and their expressed interests can and do change. Moreover, the core group of Cold Warriors, closely related to the rearguard, has fewer members than either of the other two core groups. A glance at the bibliography indicates that the most vitriolic Cold War responses fade from view in the 1980s.

The vanguard, on the opposite side of the environmentalism spectrum, has been identified demographically as a group that "has less economic stake [than the rearguard] in the preservation of the old Dominant Social Paradigm" (Milbrath, 1984, p. 62). Members of the Soviet ecological core group are by definition natural scientists and are, therefore, not primarily involved in the production sector of the economy. They do have views very similar to Milbrath's vanguard and Cotgrove's catastrophists: they see a large problem, and believe that basic change rather than technology alone is needed to effect a cure. Some of their concerns, such as preventing soil loss and dealing with the pollution problems of urbanization, may be considered domestic

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rather than global problems; however, Soviet scientists who work on these problems professionally have been among the strongest advocates of international cooperation for the purposes of monitoring and information exchange. In terms of explicitly global change, this pool of respondents envisions maintaining ecological balance in a biosphere that does not observe jurisdic- tional boundaries; overcoming global warming trends; preventing both trop- ical deforestation and species extinction; and somehow countering the negative consequences of population growth. It is difficult to imagine achiev- ing this preferred future without engaging in well-funded and well-staffed international efforts. When Soviet ecologists and Western catastrophists meet in Nairobi, Geneva, or Paris they undoubtedly have quite a lot that is mutually understandable to say to one another. Unfortunately, as these individuals have noted themselves, the tasks and solutions that are worked out in committee depend in large measure on political will for implementation.

Discussions of political will are frequently linked to concepts of social change. What is meant by "change in the basic nature of society" with respect to global ecological problems? Some Soviet respondents explicitly equate socialist revolution with the necessary social change, but this is not a modal response. More frequently noted aspects of change are centralizing environmental decision-making and enhancing coordination between ministries, the development of bioeconomics, and the teaching of ecological literacy. While bioeconomics and ecological literacy definitely fit the New Environmental Paradigm in the West, political centralization, the antithesis of nonhierar- chical, participatory decision-making, probably does not. Differences in decision-making styles in international endeavors may be bones of contention as much as issues of substance. At the same time, the proliferation of new unofficial ecology groups demanding some decentralized control over local environmental problems (as well as freedom of expression) is sugges- tive of a trend toward postmaterialism that is not as apparent in the Soviet literature published between 1972 and 1986.

CONCLUSIONS

It is apparent that Soviet opinion-makers have not been above using environmental issues for propaganda purposes. These data, although some- what speculative, also support the contention that Soviet interest in global ecological problems has not been primarily hostile. While the environment has clearly been politicized (demands for new political thinking in the ecological realm have been published since the early 1970s), it has not been com- pletely polemicized. The data presented in Table II demonstrate that more than half the interviews barely mention the themes that determined the Po-

675

lemical Quotient. The perceived need for international success and the value of non-Soviet contributions in resolving global ecological problems are expressed more often than the assertion that capitalism or "the West" is the primary cause of these problems. Implicit statements of convergence are common in this pool.

An assessment of these statements must be moderated by the familiar pronouncements of social scientists that attitude does not always correlate well with behavior (Dunlap and Van Liere, 1978, p. 17). As demonstrated by numerous authors (Goldman, 1972; Pryde, 1972; Kramer, 1973; De- Bardeleben, 1985; Zeigler, 1987), a poor Soviet record on environmental protection was obvious years prior to the accident at Chernobyl. At the same time, it is not unreasonable to suppose, as Ananichev (1976) has argued, that successful Soviet participation in efforts to resolve global ecological problems should be predicated on serious efforts at the domestic level.

In the Gorbachev era, practical decisions indicate the extent to which the necessity of ecologically sustainable development is taken seriously. Eco- logically disastrous plans to divert the flow of Siberian rivers to Soviet Cen- tral Asia have been retracted; managers who have not protected Lake Baikal and who allowed negligence at Chernobyl have been fired; despite official word that nuclear energy is essential, several plants have been canceled; and, meeting the long-stated request of Soviet ecologists, a new centralized state committee wholly devoted to environmental planning and protection has been created. At the same time, the tensions between economic acceleration and environmental protection are made both more visible and more profound by glasnost and perestroika.

In global arenas, the Soviets have stepped up collaborative efforts with the International Atomic Energy Agency on nuclear safety; the Montreal Pro- tocol to cooperate in protecting the ozone layer has been signed; and although the USSR is not a member of the UN Food and Agriculture Organiza- tion, meetings have been held with FAO officials on addressing problems of desertification. There are almost daily announcements of new bilateral agreements or exchanges in environmental protection. In 1989 the U.S. and Soviet academies of science formed a joint Interacademy Committee on Global Ecology. At the same time, Soviet leaders (like their U.S. and Japanese counterparts) have been unwilling to curb production of chemicals that nega- tively affect the global climate.

The millennium has not arrived. It is not a foregone conclusion that successful cooperation in resolving global ecological problems will occur because it must occur. One of the underemphasized, yet dramatic, consequences of perestroika and glasnost is that it is now possible to talk explicitly about differences. This study of perceptual patterns and controversial topics simply suggests that Soviet understanding of ecological problems has been com-

676 Hall


mensurable with Western variation in environmental opinion for almost two decades. There is considerable room indeed for mutually understandable discourse in discussing issues of global concern.

APPENDIX A: THE SIMULATED INTERVIEW SURVEY5 1. Preventing nuclear war is the most pressing global problem. 2. We are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can support; there are

negative consequences of population growth. 3. There are likely to be serious and disruptive shortages of essential raw materials if things

go on as they are; the resource base of modern society is inadequate to sustain its future. 4. Human survival depends on the protection of the biosphere, our home-the planet earth. 5. Pollution of the environment is primarily a consequence of the profit motive in capitalist

countries. 6. The scientific and technological revolution has led to serious disruption in ecological

processes. 7. Ecological problems are intensified by the lack of needed systems of centralized planning. 8. There are limits to growth beyond which capitalist society cannot expand. 9. There are limits to growth beyond which industrialized society cannot expand.

10. Environmental protection and the economic development of the third world are incom- patible goals.

11. Global ecological problems are "unbounded" problems that transcend interdisciplinary boundaries and inherently demand many forms of intellectual cross-breeding to resolve.

12. Marxist dialectics prevent the kind of reductionism that hampers solutions to global ecological problems.

13. The large-scale, comprehensive and multidisciplinary nature of global problems necessi- tates a wide application of systems analysis, including global modeling.

14. The solution to global ecological problems will be found in greater scientific and technological development.

15. The peaceful development of nuclear power is a safe and/or indispensable response to the global energy problem.

16. The solution to global ecological problems will be found in basic changes in the nature of society.

17. The solution to man-nature problems in the U.S.S.R. wifl be found in greater scientific and technological progress.

18. Economic growth is more important than environmental protection. 19. Society should emphasize utilizing and/or transforming nature to meet human needs. 20. Society should emphasize preserving nature for its own sake, for aesthetic and/or moral

reasons. 21. Author provides examples of Soviet failure in dealing with ecological problems. 22. Author provides examples of international success in dealing with any global ecological

problems. 23. Peaceful coexistence is a prerequisite to the successful resolution of global ecological

problems. 24. Non-Soviet, Western, and/or bourgeois authors have contributed to understanding global

ecological problems.

5As noted in the text, relevant statements on each of these items were recorded and respondents were coded as agreeing that the given item was TRUE, arguing that the item was FALSE, having a BALANCED opinion, making NO COMMENT, or making a related OTHER statement.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Chadwick Alger, John Dryzek, James Harf, Mar- garet Hermann, Richard Herrmann, Philip Stewart, and anonymous review- ers for their assistance. A Graduate School Alumni Research Award from The Ohio State University, a Title VI National Resource Fellowship, and a Ford Foundation Dual Competence Fellowship in Soviet Studies and In- ternational Security made this research possible.

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Soviet Perceptions of Global Ecological Problems: An Analysis of Three Patterns

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