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Somaliland's best kept secret: shrewdpolitics and war projects as means ofstate-makingDominik Balthasar aa The Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) ,London , UKPublished online: 17 Apr 2013.

To cite this article: Dominik Balthasar (2013): Somaliland's best kept secret: shrewd politics andwar projects as means of state-making, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 7:2, 218-238

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Somaliland’s best kept secret: shrewd politics and war projects as meansof state-making

Dominik Balthasar*

The Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), London, UK

(Received 22 February 2012; final version received 1 February 2013)

The de facto state of Somaliland has featured prominently as constituting anallegedly exceptional case of state-making, especially because peaceful anddemocratic elements of its trajectory have frequently been emphasized. Yet,evidence suggests that the polity’s state-making project not only showedconsiderable traits of authoritarian leadership, but also that it was significantlyperpetuated by the civil wars encouraged by President Egal during his first termin office. Hence, this article proposes that Somaliland’s ‘best kept secret’ lies lesswith the commonly emphasized processes of reconciliation and consensus-basedgovernance driven by ‘traditional authorities’ than with the shrewd politics andwar projects that underpinned its state-making endeavour. While clarifying thatwar was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for state-making, thisarticle counters the neo-liberal proposition that war invariably constitutes‘development in reverse’ and contributes to the argument that we need todisaggregate the ‘black box’ of war in order to enhance our understanding ofunder what condition war, or certain elements thereof, can be constitutive of state-making in the contemporary world.

Keywords: state-building; conflict; civil war; reconstruction; Somalia

Introduction

Having apparently undergone a process of ‘autonomous recovery’1 and enjoying

relative peace and stability since it unilaterally declared independence in 1991,

Somaliland’s state-making project has been accorded the status of ‘Africa’s best kept

secret’.2 Past attempts to disclose this secret have referenced processes of ‘traditional’

reconciliation,3 ‘grassroots’ democracy,4 its combination of ‘traditional’ and

‘modern’ forms of governance into ‘hybrid political orders’,5 and overall peaceful

nature.6 These narratives of Somaliland’s state-making have culminated not only in

the assertion that Somaliland’s state development was unique7 and characterized by

a ‘vivid democracy’,8 but also in the erroneous contention that throughout its

process of state-making ‘[n]o civil war occurred’.9

Yet, Somaliland’s state-making process was not as benign as has frequently been

claimed. Not only was its state-making project marked by serious traits of

authoritarian governance, but also it saw episodes of large-scale violence. While it

has been recognized that the decade-long war of the Somali National Movement

(SNM) against Somali dictator Siyad Barre was foundational for Somaliland’s

*Email: dbalthasar@chathamhouse.org

Journal of Eastern African Studies, 2013

Vol. 7, No. 2, 218�238, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2013.777217

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state-making trajectory,10 the civil wars that occurred within this polity during the

course of the 1990s have generally been perceived as having derailed state

development. However, this article suggests not only that Somaliland’s ongoing

state-making project has been characterized by shrewd politics, but also that the ‘warprojects’ carried out under President Egal were constitutive of the polity’s state-

making endeavour.

Besides challenging the prevailing reading of Somaliland’s state-making history,

the argument put forth in this article also fuels a wider theoretical debate. Tilly’s

dictum that ‘war makes states and states make war’11 is well established in the

literature on state-making, yet it is not uncontested. First, it is postulated that whilst

true for the historic process of state-making in Europe, the argument no longer holds

in today’s world.12 Second, proponents of the ‘new wars’ thesis have qualified theproposition, suggesting that the nexus between war-making and state-making only

proved true for inter-state but not intra-state wars.13 This article exemplifies how

Somaliland defies these critiques, supporting the proposition that war may remain an

important component for state-making in contemporary Africa.14

The article provides an overview of Somaliland’s state trajectory during the

transitional two-year period following its declaration of independence in 1991, and

then takes a closer look at particular elements and processes of state-making during

President Egal’s first term. In postulating that Egal’s reign was characterized more byshrewd elite politics than benign ‘grassroots’ statecraft and democratic processes, the

ground is prepared for the argument that the civil wars of the mid-1990s were

constitutive of the polity’s state-making endeavour.15 A conclusion sums up the

article’s findings.

From secession to cessation: the interim period (1991�1993)

Shortly after Siyad Barre was driven out of Mogadishu on 27 January 1991, in north-western Somalia the militarily dominant, Isaaq-based SNM expanded its control

from the rural to urban areas. As a result, the largely antagonistic Gadabursi,

Dhulbahante and Warsangeli clans, who had generally sided with Barre, had little

alternative but to enter into peace negotiations. Bilateral truce and reconciliation

meetings were followed by a ‘national’ conference in Burco, which culminated in the

announcement of an independent Republic of Somaliland on 18 May 1991.

Although the declaration of independence was accompanied by a wave of enthusiasm

and optimism, by 1992 government support had declined drastically. Tensionsbetween the Isaaq and other clan families had been addressed in numerous

reconciliation meetings, yet rivalries within the guerrilla movement remained rife.16

These tensions came to a head once the SNM emerged victorious from the war and

the question of power distribution arose.

As the SNM leadership had no ready-made plans for post-war administration,17

it largely replicated its existing governance structure in establishing a transitional

national government. The executive committee became the government, its chairman

and vice-chairman president and vice-president, respectively, and the SNM centralcommittee functioned as a national council or preliminary parliament.18 Simulta-

neously, the cabinet presented by interim president Abdirahman Ahmed Ali ‘Tuur’

on 4 June 199119 reflected his attempt to forge an all-inclusive elite bargain.20

However, the two factions that had formed within the SNM during the course of the

struggle increasingly vied for power. While ‘Tuur’ enjoyed the backing of the ‘civilian

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wing’, comprised mainly of intellectuals who had proclaimed the formation of the

SNM in London and Jeddah in 1981, he was viewed with suspicion by the Calan Cas,

the movement’s more hardline, military elements that had started the armed

resistance on the ground.21 Although ‘Tuur’ initially accommodated some Calan

Cas in his government � mainly because of their military strength � he incrementally

sidelined them politically. The ensuing power struggles between the two factions

determined politics throughout the transitional period, inhibiting the formation of a

viable state.

One consequence of this internal power struggle was that the interim government

was unable to establish control over roaming militias and expand state authority. The

plan to unify the diverse clan militias and transform them into national security

forces under central state command22 provoked tensions within and outside of thetransitional administration � particularly with the militarily powerful Calan Cas,

who despised ‘Tuur’. Thus, military power remained fragmented and regionally

dispersed, effectively confining the government’s authority to the capital of

Hargeysa.23 Economic asset allocation was also negatively affected. As the different

clan militias in general, and the Calan Cas in particular, incrementally tightened their

control over revenue-generating facilities, the government was drained of resources.

In a desperate attempt to stave off financial collapse, the interim administration tried

militarily to secure the port of Berbera, the polity’s greatest economic asset.24 Thiswas fiercely resisted by one of the resident clans and their Calan Cas commander, Col

Ibrahim Abdillahi ‘Degaweyne’.25 Although ‘Tuur’ narrowly avoided military defeat,

his government continued to crumble in the face of growing opposition.

The political brawl over power and resources quickly translated into a clan

confrontation, as the elites of both sides resorted to clan mobilization to strengthen

their positions politically.26 ‘Tuur’ largely relied on the support of the Garhajis, the

Calan Cas mainly on the Habar Jalo and Habar Awal,27 in whose territory the most

profitable economic assets fell. The continuously deteriorating security situation ledthe polity to the brink of all-out civil war.28 Although a peace was eventually

brokered, it was evident that the young polity had hit rock bottom. As Somaliland

had principally come full circle by 1993, the transitional period is generally regarded

as ‘two wasted years’.29

Cornerstones of state-making: Egal’s shrewd politics (1993�1994)

As in 1991, conferences were held to cease hostilities and discuss the future of thestate. The 1992 conflicts in Burco and Berbera over the allocation of political,

military and economic power were addressed at the Tawfiq (‘understanding’,

‘consensus’) conference in the town of Sheikh in October�November 1992. Although

it led to important agreements on essential aspects of internal security provision and

resource allocation,30 leading Brons to argue that it was ‘a first step toward the

formulation of a Somaliland state’,31 it did little to resolve the underlying political

contestation. The latter was addressed in Boroma, where the second major ‘national’

conference was held.The Shirweynaha Guurtida Beelaha Soomaaliland (‘Conference of Elders of the

Communities of Somaliland’) took place in parallel with the seventh SNM Congress.

Between late January and mid-May 1993, members of the warring factions,

‘traditional authorities’, and hundreds of official observers, advisors and others

attempted to find a consensus on security, resource mobilization and the political

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future of Somaliland.32 The conference largely manifested the status quo with regard

to the patchwork of different ‘clanistans’ Somaliland had evolved into, as the

traditional authorities asserted their rights and reaffirmed the polity’s decentralized

character. Ultimately, every clan would have its own local administration.33

With hatchets officially buried, wide allegiance to Somaliland reaffirmed, and a

new (form of) government installed, by mid-1993 the situation once again looked

promising. Nonetheless, this phase was ‘difficult and not without violence’,34 partly

because the new president embarked on shrewd politics to carry through processes of

state-making. Consequently, the political consensus crafted at this 1993 conference

came to be overtly rejected by some constituencies, leading to two more years of civil

strife. Despite being on the brink of collapse for a second time, the government

somehow emerged in a position of strength, consolidating the young state. How andwhy did this state trajectory differ from the previous one?

Starting over: ousting ‘Tuur’, retrieving Egal

The transition of power that occurred during the 1993 Boroma conference evolved

into a political thriller, which kept Somaliland on its toes in the years to come. It

started with the selection of ‘Tuur’s’ successor � a process largely neglected by most

accounts,35 even though it set the stage for numerous political manoeuvresthroughout the 1990s. While received wisdom has it that the new political leadership

was chosen in a swift, uncontested and largely harmonious process by the traditional

authorities,36 the underlying dynamics were much more conflictual. This was not

surprising, given that Somaliland no longer exhibited a reasonably coherent and

uncontested player as in 1991, but rather constituted a land of decentralized power

centres with claims to power made by several equipollent factions. Although the

‘elders’ in general and the Gadabursi guurti more particularly have, time and again,

been credited for this ‘watershed event in Somaliland’,37 the conference’s politicaloutcome was largely the result of a tug-of-war amongst the political elites.38

The fight over political power mainly pitched two protagonists against each other �‘Tuur’ and the ‘civilian wing’ versus the Calan Cas, who backed enigmatic politician

Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal. While Egal had held numerous positions during the

civilian era in the 1960s, he had also dismantled the Somali National League (SNL) in

1962, stripping the former British Protectorate of Somaliland of its only significant

political party.39 Despite being twice imprisoned by Barre, Egal supported his

government and ‘heavily criticised the [SNM] movement, actively denouncing it,and even supported Barre’s repressive policies in the Northwest’.40 When the SNM

declared independence in May 1991, Egal deplored this as well,41 and accepted an

invitation from the Djiboutian government to take part in talks aimed at restoring a

national government in Somalia in July 1991.42

Against this background, the choice of Egal by the Calan Cas as political

racehorse appears surprising. The SNM hardliners had a number of reasons. First,

his critical stance on the SNM and the fact that he had never been involved in the

rebel organization gave him an aura of neutrality, which made him acceptable tocommunities unaligned with the SNM. Second, Egal was from the Isaaq clan of

Habar Awal, a clan prominent amongst not only the Calan Cas, but also the Isaaq

business community. Third, and most important, he appeared to be, despite his

political weight, one of the weakest candidates as he was not supported by a specific

group within Somaliland. Thus, Egal was selected by the guurti not because of his

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political acumen and international connections, but because the Calan Cas thought

that they could easily manipulate and rule through him.43

Besides being propped up militarily, Egal’s presidential campaign was also

buttressed economically. His candidacy was largely financed by money collected at

the Calan Cas controlled port of Berbera and the financial support of numerous

Habar Awal businessmen.44 Egal was proclaimed president on 5 May 1993,45 with a

member of the Calan Cas faction, Abdirahman Aw Ali, vice-president.46 Besides

a change in power � which saw with the ascendance of the Calan Cas not a

‘civilization’, but rather a ‘militarization’ of power47 � the Boroma conference also

witnessed a structural change, which was to have important repercussions on the

state-making trajectory.

In essence, the governance structure of the 1991�1993 period morphed into a

proper presidential system. This was championed by the Calan Cas, who wanted a

strong executive, which they could manipulate, and its separation from the

legislature.48 The ‘traditional authorities’ also emerged from the conference

considerably strengthened.49 Having evolved into key protagonists on the sub-

national level with regard to political and military aspects, they were institutionalized

in the form of a national guurti, which came to be the highest organ of the new state

and the most prominent and formalized element of the ‘hybrid political order’.50 Yet

the guurti’s transformation from the ad-hoc council it had constituted during the

interim period of 1991�199251 into an institutional organ of the state also

foreshadowed the beginning of the traditional authorities’ political displacement

as independent actors within Somaliland.52

Apart from creating a House of Elders and an independent judiciary,53 the

National Charter agreed upon in Boroma also established a House of Representatives

as the second component of a bicameral legislative body. Acknowledging the clan as

the basic organizing principle of society, a beel-system of governance was chosen for

the allocation of seats in the House of Representatives. Having been described as a

‘dynamic hybrid of Western form and traditional substance’,54 the beel-system

established a power-sharing coalition of Somaliland’s main clans. Seat allocation was

based on principles of proportional representation, which also gave smaller and

minority clans better representation.55 Originally intended as a transitional arrange-

ment, it lasted a decade, generating new challenges, as factionalism along clan lines

took on the age-old character of clan competition.56

The politics behind state-making under Egal

Once the Boroma conference had ended, the newly agreed upon institutions needed

to be implemented. The tasks facing Egal were no less daunting than those that had

confronted ‘Tuur’ two years earlier, partly because of the still prevailing fragmenta-

tion of power. While Egal had the benefit of siding with, rather than fighting against,

the militarily and economically important Calan Cas, this was a two-edged sword.

Not only did the Calan Cas’ predominance in the new government evoke the

formation of a strong opposition, but also the politically victorious hardliners

restricted Egal’s scope of action, leading him to complain of being ‘held hostage’ by

them.57 Despite this, Egal made some headway in subsequent years, particularly with

regard to security, resource mobilization and administration,58 central state-making

features to which the article now turns.

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Increasing resource mobilization

Upon taking power, one of Egal’s priorities lay in the mobilization of revenues to

finance the state-making project. Until he could establish a steady revenue stream, he

drew on alternative sources in order to finance the government’s day-to-day

operations and initiate first policies. Having already secured the support of

important Isaaq businessmen at the Boroma conference, Egal called on them for

loans to be repaid through tax exemptions. The businessmen also gained in that they

practically monopolized the trade between Berbera, Hargeysa, Ethiopia and

Djibouti,59 and created a tool of long-term market control.60 Egal thus attracted

investment in Somaliland.

A second major resource stream originated from the introduction of a proper

currency, the Somaliland shilling, in October 1994, again with the support of potent

Habar Awal traders.61 This not only allowed the government to manage the country’s

economy and fiscal household better, but also produced a considerable financial

windfall.62 However, it came to cost numerous businessmen dearly, bringing about

the bankruptcy of thousands of small and middle-class businesses. Moreover, the

inequality it produced due to the fact that its introduction of the new legal tender

was largely confined to Hargeysa and Berbera was a key reason for the outbreak of

civil strife shortly thereafter.63

Thirdly, Egal reverted to his sub-clan network to access further resources. As the

main revenue-generating assets were under the control of the Habar Awal and/or key

Calan Cas militiamen, Egal found it much easier than his predecessor to access the

state’s most profitable revenue streams.64 At the same time, regional developments

favoured Egal. First, as the southern ports of Kismayo and Mogadishu closed due to

conflict, Berbera increased in importance,65 becoming probably the most important

Somali port.66 Second, Egal was lucky in that Somaliland’s economy benefited from

the revival of the livestock export trade when the Saudi Arabian market reopened to

Somali meat. In order to draw on the port’s resources, Egal established the Berbera

Port Authority in 1993, creating it in such a way that part of the revenues went

directly into the president’s office.67 While this provided Egal with an immediate

revenue stream of approximately US$10�15 million per year, it led to accusations of

corruption and impeachment hearings in the late 1990s.68

Egal also preyed on the khat trade.69 Customs generated from khat constituted

not only the second most profitable source of revenue, but also were easy to levy, as

most of the trade passes through Kalabydh, a town largely under the control of the

Egal-supporting Habar Awal militias. Despite the levy put on the narcotic leaf by the

government, it became cheaper as the Egal administration had managed to do away

with militia extortion that had kept the prices relatively high during ‘Tuur’s’ reign.70

In the early 1990s khat revenue provided roughly 10% of government income,

estimated at US$250 million.71

However, Egal abhorred the fact that his revenue streams were dependent on

clans and their militiamen, thus trying to establish more direct control. In order to

do so, he started to reshuffle the individuals in charge. After having left the customs

checkpoint in Kalabeydh under the control of the militia of Habib Diriye Noor, an

SNM Calan Cas of the Habar Awal sub-clan of Jibril Abokor, for about six months,

he transferred Habib’s friendly head of customs to become head of customs at the

port of Berbera. In return, Egal relocated the director of customs in Berbera to

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Kalabeydh.72 While not depriving them of their positions, this reshuffling under-

mined the control each sub-clan had over the revenues generated.

Egal’s endeavours to bring these revenues under his control was also facilitated by

the fact that the Garhajis, who had largely supported ‘Tuur’, were hostile towards thenew government and refused to cede their control over Hargeysa airport and its

customs to Egal. This was very much a tit-for-tat response to the Calan Cas’ 1992/

1993 denial to allow ‘Tuur’ access to the resources in Berbera and beyond.

Consequently, the Habar Awal clan in general, and the Calan Cas more particularly,

responded by granting Egal full support for his policies � thus allowing him to also

draw on the resources of the Kalabeydh checkpoint in order to defeat the Garhajis.73

Consequently, Bryden and Farah judge that ‘tax collection is carried out effectively

in areas that come under the sway of ‘‘Igal’s administration’’’.74 For September 1996it was estimated that government revenue amounted to US$10 million, rising

towards US$15 million, a considerable improvement on previous years.75

Usurping the means of violence

The Boroma conference deliberations on security had culminated in the Axdiga

Nabadgalayada ee Beelaha Soomaaliland (‘Somaliland Communities Peace Charter’),

which laid down provisions for peace agreements to be mediated by a national multi-clan guurti.76 Having identified the traditional authorities as those actors who were

ultimately responsible for controlling the clan militias,77 they were tasked with

removing them from major towns, dissolving existing roadblocks, forming local

police forces and settling outstanding disputes.78 Egal put particular emphasis on

removing the roadblocks between Kalabeydh, Hargeysa and Berbera, the country’s

main economic corridor. Although some of the militias initially objected to

government authority, they finally acceded.79

As the Boroma conference had led to provisions for a localized approach toestablishing peace and security, and because Egal did not want to upset either the

traditional authorities or the Calan Cas at an early stage, he announced that he had

no intentions to centralize control over security forces or to form a national army.

However, once established in office and with revenues secured, he launched efforts to

take control over them. To this effect, he engaged in a major programme of

disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). He paid off technical80

owners,81 and bargained to assemble clan militias in cantonment sites for retraining

and absorption into Somaliland’s new security forces, or for acquisition of skills forcivilian life.82 Most of the young polity’s first revenue was thus largely used to finance

the DDR effort,83 and Egal, once again, looked to businessmen for financial

support.84

Acknowledging the highly political nature of demobilization, Egal used politics

rather than blunt pressure to woo the diverse clans and their militias to the project.

For instance, having declared that DDR should be voluntary,85 Egal approached the

Isaaq clan of the Arap to demobilize first.86 The Arap entertained great interest in

shifting control over coercive means from the diverse clans to the state, as they werein no position to defy other clan militias and inhabited a particularly resource poor

area. Thus, Arap Sultan Mohamed Farah agreed to lead the process of demobiliza-

tion.87 The Arap’s surge ahead created pressure on other clans to follow suit, and, in

early 1994, a well-staged ceremony was held in the Hargeysa football stadium, in

which some clans started to publicly hand over their weapons to the government.

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This constituted an ‘important symbolic event in the process of consolidating the

Somaliland state’.88

Egal also oversaw the establishment of the National Demobilisation Commission

(NDC) in 1993,89 chaired by Somaliland’s vice-president, ‘Tool Laawi’, with thegovernment-appointed SNM veteran Ali Mohamed Yusuf ‘Gurey’ of the Habar

Awal as executive director.90 Although it has been claimed that Somaliland

constituted a case of ‘autonomous recovery’,91 it did receive important support

from the international community: the DDR programme benefited from some

Zimbabwean advisors,92 and the salaries of the NDC, for example, were paid by the

United Nations through the Ministry of Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reinte-

gration at least until 2008.93 The NDC soon claimed that it had acquired three-

quarters of the heavy weapons from five brigades in Hargeysa and westernSomaliland, and that as many as 5000 militia members had been demobilized within

the framework of the programme.94 Although DDR and the formation of a national

military force had proceeded apace, the process was not uncontested.

Soon those opposed to the new government in general, and the Calan Cas in

particular, accused Egal of having gone against the spirit of the Peace Charter, which

had laid out decentralized security provisions. Those opposed to the new adminis-

tration (mainly the Garhajis sub-clans who had supported ‘Tuur’) rejected

demobilization, and the NDC was unacceptable in the areas they controlled.95

Demobilization had little success around Somaliland’s second biggest city of Burco,

and did not take place at all in the regions of Sool and eastern Sanaag.96 Ultimately,

two Garhajis units tightened their military control over Hargeysa airport, mirroring

the earlier behaviour of certain Habar Awal militias under ‘Tuur’.97 Just as the latter

had claimed to exert control over the port of Berbera, the former stressed that the

airport fell into territory traditionally inhabited by the Eidagalle.

By March 1994, the 1st Brigade of the new National Army (principally made up

of Habar Awal and Habar Jalo militias) was operative, and 18 months later, estimatesput the number of uniformed soldiers as high as 15,000.98 While the military forces

had been centralized, the police forces that were established in early 1994 remained

decentralized for several years, however, and the 300 member-strong police force

under the command of Col Jirif of the Habar Awal sub-clan of Jibril Abokor was

confined to Hargeysa.99 In Gabiley, Berbera and Burco, separate police forces of

roughly 70, 100 and 200 policemen, respectively, were also established.100 Whereas

the army quickly saw a certain degree of mixing of different clans,101 the police units

remained largely homogeneous with regard to clan composition for a long time.102

Thus, DDR fell short of being a total success. In early 1995, an informed estimate

suggested that some 10,000 militia members remained to be demobilized,103 and

efforts to do so were hampered by the outbreak of war in 1994, which led to a

remobilization along clan lines.104

Centralizing administration

Rapid progress was not confined to revenue generation and security provision, butalso concerned the establishment of the state’s administrative architecture. Egal used

civil service positions as bait for demobilization � both security personnel and civil

servants were largely drafted from the ranks of the SNM militias. Although this

inflated the administrative apparatus (with generally untrained and unskilled

individuals) it contributed significantly to the provision of security. In the words

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of a member of staff of the Civil Service Institute (CSI), ‘[c]ivil service recruitment

was part of the process of peace building, of rehabilitation and demobilisation of

militias.’105 As civil servant positions were awarded to those who disarmed first, the

civil service was quickly captured by the Isaaq.106

Despite Egal’s progress107 the government’s writ was still largely confined to

western Somaliland and so the government started to develop functional local

government structures, with responsibilities for revenue collection and municipal

administration.108 In order to establish a legal basis for a stronger relationship

between the centre and the regions, the government attempted to redraft Article 21 of

the National Charter in early 1995. This, however, was blocked by parliament, as the

parties could not agree on political representation and financial responsibilities.109

While local councils were happy to receive financial support from central

government for services including police and education, they also wanted to retain

their right to make autonomous local government appointments. Yet, backed by

much financial and military capacity, Egal eventually made appointments cen-

trally.110

In his endeavour to bring administration under the aegis of central government,

Egal also attempted to remove elders’ initiatives, which had locally taken care of

matters regarding administration and governance (see above).111 While traditional

authorities in Boroma, for example, had set up social services in co-operation with

non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and negotiated development projects with

international agents, Egal wanted this done via the state administration. Subse-

quently, international NGOs had to move their headquarters to the capital of

Somaliland or lose their permit to work within the borders of that polity.112

Egal also started building a competitive administrative apparatus at the central

state level. In 1993, he oversaw the establishment of the Civil Service Commission

(CSC), which employed some 800 civil servants.113 Bradbury assesses developments

in the sphere of administration:

During the first two years of Egal’s premiership, government ministries were revitalised,offices were refurbished, morning and afternoon work hours were instituted, and a CivilService Commission was created. Ministerial and civil service staff (which numberedabout 2,500 in 1995) received regular salaries, as did MPs, the police and the army. [. . .]A judicial system of regional and district courts was put in place, utilising the 1960 penalcode.114

Thus, it was judged that ‘Egal’s achievements in creating a functioning administra-

tion were considerable’.115 In a similar vein, others argue that while the period of the

interim government was chaotic, law and order were established during Egal’s reign �at least in the areas under his control.116

Yet, the conflicts that were to erupt in subsequent months inhibited the further

development of an administrative apparatus, particularly for the country’s eastern

regions. This was particularly important in light of the fact that the inhabitants of

Sool and Sanaag largely felt marginalized, particularly after ‘Tuur’ had been ousted.

As a result, many Habar Yonis politicians ‘opted out’ of the central government, and

the Habar Yonis militia clashed with government-aligned Habar Jalo troops in the

neighbouring Togdheer region, blocking government access to the eastern regions for

years.117

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State-making is not all roses, but also guns: the ‘War Projects’ (1995�1996)

While euphoria had followed the successful conclusion of the Boroma conference,118

and Egal managed to bolster his position and advance the state-making project by

securing revenues, improving security and building a nascent administration, the new

polity remained fragile.119 The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM),

for example, did not recognize the legitimacy of the Boroma conference. Instead, it

sponsored alternative leaderships which exacerbated internal struggles and, arguably,

contributed directly to the destructive round of civil strife in 1994�1996.120 Of more

immediate significance was, however, that the Egal government ‘nationally’ stood on

shaky ground.

A key challenge for the government arose from the decentralized character

Somaliland had taken during the 1991�1993 period, which was corroborated at the

Boroma conference. While Egal managed to consolidate state authority in Somali-

land’s ‘heartland’,121 he struggled in the ‘hinterland’. When the government tried to

establish control over Zeyla to set up tax checkpoints, for example, sporadic clashes

with the Iisa militia occurred. It was only in August 1995 that Egal asserted his

power in the west.122 Similar problems arose in the east, as the Harti clans remained

critical of political developments. Even though one of their members had been

appointed speaker of parliament, they felt politically alienated.123 Although

problematic, this structural challenge was overshadowed by political challenges

from within the Isaaq clan family.

In the wake of the Boroma conference, the supporters of the previous

administration formed a vehement opposition. The Garhajis claimed that the

process that had propelled Egal into power had been unfair and were additionally

aggrieved that Egal’s choice of ministers not only lacked Garhaji representatives, but

included individuals that had violently challenged the ‘Tuur’ government in 1992.124

They also claimed that the process of centralizing control over financial and military

capacity violated the National Charter.125 Consequently, only one month into Egal’s

government, the political consensus reached in Boroma was in tatters, and the scuffle

between different Isaaq and SNM factions continued, manifesting in the Habar

Yonis and friendly Warsangeli leaders refusing the two ministerial posts offered to

them.

In July 1993, the fragile political situation grew more acute, when a number of

Habar Yonis leaders gathered in Burco. At the meeting known as the ‘Liiban

Congress I’ they also decided not to take up their seats in parliament, and announced

that they were not bound by the laws of Somaliland.126 They withdrew their support

for and cooperation with the Egal administration and, one year later, even declared

Somaliland’s government illegitimate,127 Gen. Jama Mohamed Ghalib ‘Yare’ and

‘Tuur’ announcing their preference for a renewed federation with Somalia.128 They

also rekindled their relationship with the southern faction leader Mohamed Farah

Aideed, initially formed during the struggle against Barre.129

The ‘War Projects’

In order to emphasize their opposition to the Egal-led government, two Garhajis

militias under the leadership of ‘Yare’ tightened their military control over Hargeysa

airport in the summer of 1994.130 They justified their claim by arguing that the

airport fell into their clan territory, citing the National Charter, which stipulated

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local security arrangements. In defiance of the government, they demanded

extortionate landing fees and other charges from Somali and international travellers

alike. Bryden and Farah note that ‘even the efforts of ‘Iidagale elders to persuade the

militia to surrender the airport to government control failed to elicit co-operation,

confirming allegations that they received support and encouragement from members

of the federalist group.’131

Although political issues lay at the heart of the contestation, it also carried

economic connotations. Historically, the Habar Awal produced prominent business-

men, who resided in urban areas, maintained well-established links with Djibouti and

engaged in commodity trade. The Habar Yonis have usually been more prominent in

government and, together with the Eidagalle and Habar Jalo, generally dominated

the livestock trade. Hence, by taxing and harassing commercial and aid flights, the

Garhajis militia interfered in the business of the Habar Awal entrepreneurs living in

Hargeysa, who were crucial to Egal’s ability to establish and maintain government

capacity.132 Thus, the ensuing stand-off between the government and its opposition

carried not only political and clan, but also economic connotations, and resembled in

many ways the conflict ‘Tuur’ had fought in Berbera two years earlier.

What ultimately sparked the conflict is open to debate. While some cite the

introduction of the Somaliland currency as the last straw,133 others argue that it was

ignited by the recruitment of Gadabursi militias into the ‘national army’,134 or their

resistance to the government’s disarmament efforts.135 Most accounts suggest that

the fighting that erupted in November 1994 was solely aimed at breaking the

Garhajis opposition and advancing the government’s authority in the name of its

state-making project. However, this narrative fails to take into account that the war

also served to sack certain members of the government, and to realize that the

subsequent civil wars were willingly entertained by Egal in order to bolster his

power.136 Thereby, the argument that Egal deliberately picked the war against the

Garhajis is corroborated by the fact that he repeatedly rejected calls for another

national conference to resolve outstanding issues that provoked tensions.137

The Garhajis were the second political thorn in the flesh of Egal, the first being

the Calan Cas (see above). As mentioned previously, the president perceived himself

being held hostage by the Calan Cas; in fact, ‘[i]n 1993, Egal was not a leader, [but] he

was a guest.’138 Having been sponsored by this SNM faction during the Boroma

conference, Egal felt that, initially at least, he had to accommodate them, despite

their historical tensions with the Garhajis, which caused additional tensions.139

However, once Egal felt more secure in his control of the military and economic

spheres, and confident in the support of the guurti, he began to dispose of the militia

commanders. Thereby, the undiplomatic actions of the Garhajis in general and

‘Yare’’s militias’ occupation of Hargeysa airport more particularly gave Egal a

legitimate excuse to confront them and, thus, kill two birds with one stone by fuelling

the war in order to weaken both the Garhajis and the Calan Cas.140

In November 1994, government troops moved to take the airport by force.

Having secured this objective, the government forces led by Minister of Interior

Muse Behi Abdi, and Vice-President and Minister of Defense Abdirahman Aw Ali141

proceeded to attack Toon, an Eidagalle village on the capital’s outskirts. Although

this rallied the Garhajis even more against the government,142 it was functional for

Egal in that it politically delegitimized the Calan Cas, who were well on the way to

digging their own political grave.

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After their defeat in Hargeysa, the Habar Yonis largely retreated to Burco, their

historical stronghold. As Egal was related to the Habar Yonis through his mother,

military action there was a much more delicate matter. However, in order to

politically eliminate the opposition around ‘Tuur’ and assert his authority in easternSomaliland, Egal needed to push on. Giving the military leaders plenty of rope and

portraying the war effort as a ‘Calan Cas project’, the president managed to wash his

hands of responsibility.143 When Egal sent his troops to take control of checkpoints

in the vicinity of Burco in March 1995, violence erupted144 and the resulting fighting

was the heaviest since the struggle against Siyad Barre. Up to 180,000 people again

took refuge in Ethiopia, and as many as 4000 are estimated to have lost their lives in

Burco alone.145 Although government military supremacy played an important part

in deciding the conflict’s outcome, Egal covered all possible bases. Having acquiredthe financial backing of a number of tycoons to finance the war effort, he bribed

several Garhaji leaders into abandoning their opposition, thus undermining the

group’s solidarity.146 This led to accusations of encouraging a culture of corruption �just as during his prime ministership in the late 1960s.147

Second, Egal successfully labelled the warring parties in order to (de-)legitimize

them. While portraying the opposition as struggling for reunification with the south,

he placed himself firmly in the independence camp, thereby claiming the moral high

ground.148 Depicting the war as one that pitched ‘nationalists’ against ‘federalists’,he rejected calls for an inter-clan dialogue to resolve the conflict,149 fearing loss of

control to other actors, such as the guurti. Fighting such an ideological war, Egal

managed to defeat his opponents politically ‘without resorting to undue amounts of

force’.150 Last, but not least, Aideed’s death on 2 August 1996 led to diminishing

external support for the ‘federalists’.151

Somaliland was in tatters, but Egal was victorious, having managed both to

eliminate the Garhajis opposition and to rid himself of the Calan Cas by blaming

them for the wars.152 As the Calan Cas became a political liability, Egal incrementallysacked them from their ministerial positions. During the course of the civil wars,

Egal had started replacing the Calan Cas ministers either with ministers from smaller

clans, ‘traditional leaders’, and/or with members of the Garhajis, and given that their

protest was only minor, he continued with this practice.153 At the same time, he

assured himself of the support of the guurti, whom he convinced that the Calan Cas

constituted a threat to peace in Somaliland.154 In order to deprive the Calan Cas of

their military ability, Egal assimilated their rank and file into the presidential guard;

this not only deprived the Calan Cas elite of their support base, but also showedother militias that it paid to belong to the state.155

While disposing of the Calan Cas, Egal simultaneously accommodated the

aggrieved and defeated Garhajis.156 ‘Although the war had threatened to foreshorten

Somaliland’s existence,’ Bradbury argues, ‘in the end it served to consolidate public

support for the territory’s independence and to strengthen central government.’157 For

Egal, the wars had constituted a ‘project’ and central tool for state-making. In this line

of argument one interviewee expressed his believe that ‘Egal intentionally ignited the

conflict � it was really obvious’,158 an allegation also supported by others.159

Establishing and consolidating state authority

Comparing the 1991�1993 and 1993�1996 periods, both parallels and differences

emerge. Whereas the ‘Tuur’ administration was largely characterized by a fragmentation

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of military, political and economic power, and its respective institutions, Egal’s reign was

marked by a slow but steady resurrection of state authority. That such a shift would

occur was anything but obvious at the 1993 Boroma conference. While the change from

a parliamentary to a presidential system suggested that the state regime would grow

stronger, most other developments pointed in the opposite direction. The Boroma

summit principally cemented the decentralized character that the new polity had taken

under ‘Tuur’, thereby making the establishment of a centralized state inherently

difficult. Even though the new political arrangements reaffirmed the legitimacy of

Somaliland and were judged to have ‘signalled the birth of something like a Somaliland

consciousness, some national identity with a sense of statehood’,160 Somaliland

constituted de facto little more than the sum of its parts.

The subsequent years under Egal were characterized by a return to state-making.

On the one hand, as Renders and Terlinden observe, ‘President Egal masterfully

nurtured and instrumentalized the embryonic popular sense of nationhood and

statehood initiated at Borama.’161 On the other hand, even though he was unable to

outright enforce the state’s institutions, i.e. ‘rules of the game’,162 he managed

incrementally to establish a basis for it. Unlike ‘Tuur’, Egal succeeded in asserting

state power beyond his own clan base, thus laying the seeds for broadcasting state

authority throughout the territory. Two factors are mainly responsible for this.

First, Egal incorporated those actors who had significant economic, military and/

or administrative leverage. Being well aware of the economic and military capacities

of the Calan Cas and acknowledging the de facto � and since the Boroma conference

also de jure � powers the traditional authorities exercised, Egal integrated them into

the state architecture. This not only confined their own powers to the state’s

framework, but also allowed Egal to draw on their leverage to advance state-making.

Thus, ‘[w]hile claiming superiority, the state effectively outsourced much of the

security and judicial affairs to the elders’163 � a state-making approach that is far

from unique to Somaliland. The president went on to enhance the position of the

traditional authorities164 and the Calan Cas, thereby creating ample opportunities to

manipulate and instrumentalize them.165

Second, once Egal had incorporated alternative power centres, deprived them of

much of their military, political and/or economic capacity, and transferred the latter

to the state, he embarked on a process of alienating and eliminating them. Egal drew

the traditional authorities so close to the power centre that they ultimately lost their

neutrality and became partisan to the state.166 He increasingly sidelined the Calan

Cas representatives in the government, replaced them and used their own weapons to

delegitimize them within society. The opposition was crushed in political, military

and financial terms, leading some of its most significant members to turn their backs

on Somaliland and search for a political future in Mogadishu.

Conclusions

Although Somaliland had, by 1996, still not broken the back of its state-making

endeavour as numerous further challenges remained in the years to come, it is

indisputable that it had come a long way during Egal’s reign. Considering the similar

state-making challenges that both ‘Tuur’ and Egal faced, the difference in

performance is astonishing. While both leaders and their respective administrations

had to come to terms with poor resource bases, abundant military fragmentation and

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staunch political opposition, the state trajectories could hardly have been more

different, from state-breaking (1991�1993) to state-making (1993�1996).

In light of the narrative on Somaliland’s state trajectory provided above, it is clear

that the self-styled republic was not solely established on ‘bottom-up’ processes and

‘grassroots’ democracy. Rather, a closer look at the history of this state-making

project shows that it has at least as much been shaped by ‘top-down’ policies and

elitist power politics. As a ‘master manipulator’ of clans,167 President Egal resorted

to shrewd rather than benign politics in order to advance the young polity’s state-

making endeavour. He not only reverted to autocratic and dictatorial traits of

governance,168 but also even instigated civil wars to consolidate the state. After all,

‘civil war is not a stupid thing’,169 and the civil wars that occurred under President

Egal’s aegis are far from having constituted ‘development in reverse’.170 Indisputably

violent and brutish and not without potential non-violent alternatives, still the civil

wars fought in the mid-1990s were clearly constitutive of Somaliland’s state-making.

Hence, wars can continue to make states171 in the contemporary world. Conse-

quently, we have to recognize that although not being angels of order, civil wars are

also not the demons of decay they are commonly believed to be. More research is

needed to disaggregate the ‘black box’ of warfare172 and the need to understand

under what conditions and how what kinds of warfare may be constitutive to state-

making.A final conclusion that may be drawn from this reinterpretation of Somaliland’s

state-making trajectory is that it must be acknowledged that not even in the case of

‘Africa’s best kept secret’173 have all good things gone together. State-making is

inherently a complicated and conflictual process, unlikely to be characterized only by

incarnations of Western notions of liberal peace and democracy. While sobering, it

needs to be acknowledged that Somaliland’s early years of statehood were at least as

much characterized by autocratic leadership, violent conflict and human rights

violations as they were marked by an adherence to human rights, peaceful

negotiations of power and democratic forms of governance. Consequently, one

central lesson that Somaliland forcefully teaches us concerns the fact that what is

required to sustain a state should not be confused with what is required to initiate

it.174

Notes

1. Weinstein, ‘‘Autonomous Recovery and International Intervention’’.2. Jhazbhay, ‘‘Somaliland � Africa’s Best Kept Secret.’’3. Bryden, Somaliland and Peace; Jhazbhay, ‘‘Somaliland’s Post-War Reconstruction’’;

Walls, ‘‘Emergence of a Somali State.’’4. Adam, ‘‘Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born?’’; Forti, ‘‘Pocket of Stability,’’ 5.5. Boege et al., On Hybrid Political Orders; Renders and Terlinden, ‘‘Negotiating Statehood

in a Hybrid Political Order,’’ 723.6. See e.g. Othieno, ‘‘New Donor Approach to Fragile Societies.’’7. Hoyle, ‘‘Somaliland: Passing the Statehood Test?,’’ 85; Kaplan, Fixing Fragile States,

148; Jhazbhay, ‘‘Somaliland: Journey of Resistance, Reconciliation and Peace,’’ 50.8. Kaplan, ‘‘Remarkable Story of Somaliland,’’ 248; Forti, ‘‘Pocket of Stability,’’ 5.9. Sufi, ‘‘Future Political Order,’’ 285.

10. Huliaras, ‘‘Viability of Somaliland’’; Spears, ‘‘Reflections on Somaliland’’; Bakonyi,‘‘Moral Economies of Mass Violence’’; Helling, ‘‘Tillyan Footprints Beyond Europe.’’

11. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, 67.12. Leander, ‘‘Wars and the Un-Making of States,’’ 69; Taylor and Botea, ‘‘Tilly Tally.’’

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13. For example, Kaldor, New and Old Wars.14. Herbst, ‘‘War and the State in Africa’’; Herbst, States and Power in Africa; Deflem,

‘‘Warfare, Political Leadership, and State Formation’’; Niemann, ‘‘War Making andState-making.’’

15. It should be noted that, first, war is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition forstate-making; second, that state-making is a complex process, which cannot simply bebroken down into a ‘war makes states and vice versa’ equation; and, third, that theanalysis provided here focuses only on pertinent processes of state-building, refrainingfrom broadening the discussion to include nation-building.

16. Academy for Peace and Development (APD), Self-Portrait of Somaliland, 20.17. Compagnon, ‘‘Somali Armed Movements,’’ 77; Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 85.18. Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty, 247; Renders, ‘‘‘Traditional’ Leaders and Institu-

tions,’’ 202; Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 85.19. Wartorn Societies Project (WSP), Rebuilding Somaliland, 61; Bradbury, Becoming

Somaliland, 85.20. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 85; personal communication with an ex-official of the

Presidency, Hargeysa, July 4, 2011.21. Interview with an ex-SNM officer and politician, Hargeysa, July 8, 2011. While it is

commonly argued that the Calan Cas (‘Red Flag’) had a socialist inclination (e.g.Renders, ‘‘‘Traditional’ Leaders and Institutions,’’ 202f.), most of its members were nomore leftist than the ‘civilian wing’. The name Calan Cas originates in the founding ofthe Somali Democratic Union (SDU) in 1962, which had a socialist inclination, and wasused to label the SNM’s ‘military wing’ as the founder of the SDU and the leader of the‘military wing’ were one and the same � Saleebaan ‘Gaal’; interview with a Member ofParliament (MP), Hargeysa, July 21, 2011.

22. Renders, ‘‘‘Traditional’ Leaders and Institutions,’’ 202f.; cf. International Cooperationfor Development (ICD), Conflict Transformation and Peace Building, 12.

23. Gilkes, Two Wasted Years; Spears, Civil War in African States, 155.24. Personal communication with a policy analyst, Hargeysa, July 5, 2011.25. Personal communication with an ex-official of the Presidency, Hargeysa, July 4, 2011.26. Bryden and Farah, Peace Committee for Somaliland, 13; interview with an SNM veteran,

Hargeysa, February 10, 2009; personal communication with a local employee of aninternational non-governmental organization (NGO), Hargeysa, February 25, 2009;interview with an SNM veteran, Hargeysa, July 19, 2011; interview with an ex-deputyspeaker of parliament, Hargeysa, March 13, 2009.

27. Personal communication with an ex-official of the Presidency, Hargeysa, July 4, 2011.28. Flint, ‘‘Somaliland: Struggling to Survive,’’ 37; Renders, ‘‘‘Traditional’ Leaders and

Institutions,’’ 195f.; interview with a government official, Erigavo, April 8, 2009.29. Gilkes, Two Wasted Years.30. Cf. Farah and Lewis, Roots of Reconciliation, 57.31. Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty, 250.32. Ibid.; Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 98.33. Interview with an SNM veteran, Hargeysa, July 19, 2011; interview with a government

official, Erigavo, April 8, 2009.34. Wartorn Societies Project (WSP), Rebuilding Somaliland, 49.35. Cf. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland.36. Ibid., 100.37. Ibid., 98; Renders, ‘‘‘Traditional’ Leaders and Institutions,’’ 196.38. Interview with an SNM veteran, Hargeysa, March 30, 2009; interview with an ex-

minister, Hargeysa, August 7, 2008; interview with an ex-SNM officer and politician,Hargeysa, July 8, 2011.

39. Interview with a policy analyst and entrepreneur, Hargeysa, August 2, 2011.40. Renders, ‘‘‘Traditional’ Leaders and Institutions,’’ 216.41. Bryden, ‘‘Banana Test.’’42. Renders, ‘‘‘Traditional’ Leaders and Institutions,’’ 216; see also Spears, Civil War in

African States, 157, who refers to the International Crisis Group (ICG), Somaliland:Democratisation and Its Discontents, 10.

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43. Interview with an MP, Hargeysa, July 21, 2011; interview with a local researcher andpolicy analyst, Hargeysa, July 28, 2008.

44. Interview with a policy analyst and entrepreneur, Hargeysa, August 2, 2011; personalcommunication with a Somaliland entrepreneur, Hargeysa, June 11, 2011.

45. Legum, Africa Contemporary Record, B391.46. Bradbury, Somaliland Country Report, 22.47. Against this background, it is questionable how far the conflicts of the early 1990s did, in

fact, drastically alter the balance of power against the SNM, as Renders and Terlindenhave it; Renders and Terlinden, ‘‘Negotiating Statehood in a Hybrid Political Order,’’730. It appears that the hardline members of the SNM emerged from the conflict aswinners; interview with a policy analyst and entrepreneur, Hargeysa, August 2, 2011.

48. Interview with an ex-SNM officer and politician, Hargeysa, July 8, 2011; interview withan ex-deputy speaker of parliament, Hargeysa, March 13, 2009.

49. Interview with a policy analyst and entrepreneur, Hargeysa, August 2, 2011.50. Interview with an ex-deputy speaker of parliament, Hargeysa, March 13, 2009; Jimcaale,

‘‘Consolidation and Decentralization,’’ 74; see also Renders, ‘‘‘Traditional’ Leaders andInstitutions,’’ 213; cf. Farah and Lewis, Roots of Reconciliation, 7.

51. Personal communication with an MP, Hargeysa, July 3, 2011.52. Hoehne, ‘‘Traditional Authorities in Northern Somalia,’’ 16ff.; Renders and Terlinden,

‘‘Negotiating Statehood in a Hybrid Political Order,’’ 731.53. Academy for Peace and Development (APD), Consolidation and Decentralization of

Government Institutions, 23.54. Jimcaale, ‘‘Consolidation and Decentralization.’’55. Academy for Peace and Development (APD), Consolidation and Decentralization of

Government Institutions, 23.56. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 100.57. Personal communication with an MP, Hargeysa, July 21, 2011.58. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 109.59. Ibid., 112.60. Renders and Terlinden, ‘‘Negotiating Statehood in a Hybrid Political Order,’’ 732.61. Ibid., 731.62. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 112.63. Interview with an ex-deputy speaker of parliament, Hargeysa, March 13, 2009.64. Personal communication with an ex-official of the Presidency, Hargeysa, July 1, 2011.

Zierau depicts how the Somaliland state was largely captured by a small Habar Awalelite; Zierau, ‘‘State Building without Sovereignty,’’ 60.

65. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 112.66. Personal communication with an ex-guurti advisor, Hargeysa, July 5, 2011.67. While custom duties levied on imported/exported goods fell to the Ministry of Finance,

the revenues generated from service charges came under the presidency. Thus, Egal notonly controlled important revenues, but could also assure his Habar Awal/Iisa Museclansmen that ‘their’ revenue remained under their control; personal communication withan ex-official of the Presidency, Hargeysa, July 11, 2011.

68. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 111.69. Khat (also qaat) is a mild amphetamine-like stimulant consumed by most male Somalis.70. Flint, ‘‘Somaliland: Struggling to Survive,’’ 38; interview with a khat trader, Hargeysa,

July 5, 2011.71. Gilkes, Acceptance Not Recognition; cf. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 112.72. Also the Iisa Muse militia that controlled the port of Berbera was given an extra six

months (June�December 1993) to take revenue from the port before it became a nationalasset; personal communication with a policy analyst, Hargeysa, July 18, 2011.

73. Personal communication with an ex-official of the Presidency, Hargeysa, July 11, 2011.74. Bryden and Farah, Peace Committee for Somaliland, 8.75. Bradbury, Somaliland Country Report, 24.76. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 98; Renders, ‘‘‘Traditional’ Leaders and Institutions,’’

213, referring to the Academy for Peace and Development (APD), Self-Portrait ofSomaliland, 23.

77. Interview with a member of the Council of Elders, Burco, August 2, 2008.

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78. Renders, ‘‘‘Traditional’ Leaders and Institutions,’’ 213; Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland,99.

79. Personal communication with a policy analyst, Hargeysa, July 18, 2011.80. Toyota pick-up trucks with weapon-mounting capabilities.81. Interview with an ex-minister, Hargeysa, July 28, 2008; see also the interview with an ex-

director of the National Demobilization Commission (NDC), Hargeysa, July 25, 2008.82. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 113.83. Warsame and Brons, ‘‘Somaliland: State in Pursuit of Peace and Stability,’’ 25.84. Bradbury, Somaliland Country Report, 23. The Gesellschaft fuer Technische Zusamme-

narbeit (GTZ) started supporting Somaliland’s DDR efforts in September 1994; GTZ,All What You Need to Know About Gtz, 4.

85. Interview with a Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) veteran, Hargeysa, July 4,2011.

86. Interview with an SNM veteran, Hargeysa, July 21, 2011; personal communication withan ex-official of the Presidency, Hargeysa, July 11, 2011.

87. Interview with an SSDF veteran, Hargeysa, July 4, 2011; personal communication withan ex-guurti advisor, Hargeysa, July 5, 2011.

88. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 114.89. Brickhill, Disarmament and Demobilisation in Somaliland, 2.90. Ibid., 3; interview with an ex-director of NDC, Hargeysa, July 25, 2008.91. Weinstein, ‘‘Autonomous Recovery and International Intervention.’’92. Cf. interview with an SNM veteran and journalist, Hargeysa, July 25, 2008.93. Personal communication with an SNM veteran and policy analyst, Hargeysa, July 20,

2008; interview with an ex-member of NDC, Hargeysa, July 24, 2008.94. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 114; referring to Nyathi, ‘‘Somaliland, Zimbabwe:

Demobilisation and Development,’’ 27.95. Interview with judicial advisors to the Somaliland Police Force, Hargeysa, March 17,

2009.96. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 114.97. Cf. interview with an SNM veteran and journalist, Hargeysa, July 25, 2008.98. Bradbury, Somaliland Country Report, 23. The establishment of the military and police

forces was a true demobilization process. ‘‘The soldiers were hired if they had a big gun.[. . .] Anyone with no gun wasn’t registered’’; interview with an SNM veteran, Burco,April 21, 2009.

99. Personal communication with an ex-official of the Presidency, Hargeysa, July 11, 2011.100. Interview with an SNM veteran, Hargeysa, July 21, 2011.101. Yet, it remains questionable to what extent the Habar Yonis and Eidagalle formed part of

the ‘national’ army.102. Interview with an SNM veteran, Hargeysa, July 21, 2011.103. Gilkes, Acceptance Not Recognition; cf. Bradbury, Somaliland Country Report, 23.104. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 115.105. Interview with a CSI official, Hargeysa, July 18, 2011.106. Ibid., July 20, 2011.107. Bradbury, Somaliland Country Report, 23.108. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 111.109. Ibid., 120.110. Ibid.111. It was, for example, not until 1997 that the central government established some nascent

control over Erigavo, which remained, however, largely under the control of the localadministration; interview with a policy analyst, Hargeysa, August 4, 2011.

112. Renders and Terlinden, ‘‘Negotiating Statehood in a Hybrid Political Order,’’ 733.113. Personal communication with an ex-CSC official, Hargeysa, March 21, 2009; personal

communication with a CSI official, Hargeysa, July 20, 2011.114. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 111.115. Bradbury, Somaliland Country Report, 22.116. Interview with an SNM veteran, Burco, April 21, 2009.117. Gilkes, Acceptance Not Recognition, 11f., 22; The Peace Committee for Somaliland, A

Peace Proposal, 6.

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118. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 109.119. Ibid., 115.120. Academy for Peace and Development (APD), Self-Portrait of Somaliland, 21.121. The ‘heartland’ is conceived of comprising the Kalabeydh�Hargeysa�Berbera corridor.122. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 116.123. Ibid., 100. The Harti were the second most important clan confederation after the Isaaq

until 1993, when they were overtaken by the Gadabursi � partly signified by the vice-presidential appointment; interview with an MP, Hargeysa, July 3, 2011; personalconversation with an ex-official of the Presidency, Hargeysa, July 4, 2011.

124. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 101; Spears, Civil War in African States, 156; interviewwith a policy analyst and entrepreneur, Hargeysa, July 30, 2011. Amongst the centralCalan Cas figures Egal accommodated were militia leader Muse Behi Abdi, DayibMohamed Gurey, and ex-Minister of Interior ‘Gaal’, whom ‘Tuur’ had sacked for havingwithheld Berbera port revenues.

125. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 116.126. Ibid.127. Garowe Online, ‘‘Somalia,’’ November 22, 2007; Spears, Civil War in African States, 156.128. Personal communication with an MP, Hargeysa, July 21, 2011.129. Spears, Civil War in African States, 156.130. Interview with a policy analyst and entrepreneur, Hargeysa, July 30, 2011.131. Bryden and Farah, Peace Committee for Somaliland, 9.132. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 119.133. Interview with an ex-deputy speaker of parliament, Hargeysa, March 13, 2009.134. Bradbury, Somaliland Country Report, 25.135. Interview with an ex-SNM and NDC official, Hargeysa, July 25, 2011.136. Personal communication with an MP, Hargeysa, July 21, 2011.137. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 117.138. Personal conversation with an MP, Hargeysa, July 21, 2011.139. In the imminent civil war, the Garhajis were, indeed, fighting at least as much against the

Calan Cas as against Egal, as most of them perceived the former as their main opponentwho had pushed them out of government; cf. Spears, Civil War in African States, 157.

140. Interview with a local researcher and policy analyst, Hargeysa, July 28, 2008.141. Personal conversation with an ex-official of the Presidency, Hargeysa, July 4, 2011.142. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 117.143. Interview with a local researcher and policy analyst, Hargeysa, July 28, 2008.144. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 117.145. Ibid., 116.146. Personal conversation with an ex-official of the Presidency, Hargeysa, July 4, 2011;

interview with an SSDF veteran, Hargeysa, July 4, 2011.147. Interview with an SNM veteran, Hargeysa, July 19, 2011; personal communication with

a policy analyst, Hargeysa, July 18, 2011.148. For historical, geographical and political reasons the Garhajis were, indeed, largely in

favour of unification; interview with a local researcher and policy analyst, Hargeysa, July28, 2008. The portrayal of the opposition as pro-unionists gained credence when ‘Tuur’,his former Finance Minister ‘Buba’ and General ‘Yare’ all accepted positions in Aideed’sgovernment in Mogadishu. Given that they also took with them all senior politicians ofthe Garhajis, this Isaaq clan lost any influence in Somaliland politics; personalcommunication with an MP, Hargeysa, July 21, 2011. Similarly, also Dr Ali KhalifGalayd, who had been part of the Dhulbahante delegation in Burco, abandonedSomaliland and became the first Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal Governmentin Somalia in 2000; Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 82.

149. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 118; Spears, Civil War in African States, 157.150. Spears, Civil War in African States, 158; referring to Bryden, Somaliland and Peace, 2.151. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 123.152. Personal communication with a local researcher and policy analyst, Hargeysa, July 28,

2008, and July 10, 2011.153. Personal communication with a policy analyst, Hargeysa, June 29, 2011; interview with a

local researcher and policy analyst, Hargeysa, July 28, 2008.

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154. Interview with a Somaliland intellectual, Hargeysa, July 6, 2011.155. Personal conversation with an ex-official of the Presidency, Hargeysa, July 4, 2011.156. Ibid.157. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 123.158. Personal communication with an MP, Hargeysa, July 21, 2011.159. Interview with a local researcher and policy analyst, Hargeysa, July 28, 2008; interview

with a policy analyst and entrepreneur, Hargeysa, July 30, 2011.160. Renders and Terlinden, ‘‘Negotiating Statehood in a Hybrid Political Order,’’ 731.161. Ibid.162. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance.163. Renders and Terlinden, ‘‘Negotiating Statehood in a Hybrid Political Order,’’ 734.164. Personal communication with an MP, Hargeysa, July 3, 2011.165. Cf. personal communication with an ex-official of the Presidency, Hargeysa, July 4, 2011.166. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, 121.167. Interview with a Somaliland intellectual, Hargeysa, August 1, 2011.168. Interview with a Somaliland intellectual, Hargeysa, July 6, 2011; personal conversation

with an APD researcher, Hargeysa, July 22, 2011.169. Cramer, Civil War Is Not a Stupid Thing.170. World Bank, Breaking the Conflict Trap; Collier and Hoeffler, ‘‘Greed and Grievance in

Civil War’’; see also Leander, ‘‘Wars and the Un-Making of States.’’171. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, 67.172. Rasler and Thompson, War and Statemaking; Kestnbaum and Skocpol, ‘‘War and

Development of Modern National States,’’ 667.173. Jhazbhay, ‘‘Somaliland � Africa’s Best Kept Secret.’’174. Borrowing from Rodrik, One Economics, 6, who makes a similar point with regards to

economic growth.

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