1

SOCIO-POLITICAL IMPACT OF AMNESTY PROGRAMME ON

THE NIGER DELTA AREAIN NIGERIAN STATE.

A RESEARCH PROJECT PRESENTED TO THE DEPARTMENT

OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA.

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR

THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF SCIENCE IN

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND EDUCATION (B.SC. (ED))

BY

AWOLU JOSE BABATUNDE.

2009/2126

NOVEMBER, 2013

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APPROVAL

THIS PROJECT HAS BEEN APPROVED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF

POLITICAL SCIENCE EDUCATION, UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA,

NSUKKA.

BY

_____________________ __________________

Supervisor Internal Examiner

____________________ __________________

External Examiner Head of Department

__________________________

Dean of Faculty

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CERTIFICATION

AWOLU JOSE BABATUNDE, an undergraduate student in the

Department of Political Science and with Reg. No: 2009/2126 has satisfactorily

completed the requirements for course and research work for the degree of

Bachelor of Science B.SC (ED). The work embodied in this project is original

and has not been submitted in part or full for any other Diploma or Degree of

this or any other University.

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DEDICATION

This research is dedicated to the Lord almighty without whom the

builders build in vain, my indefatigable grand-father Chief Samuel A. Awolu

(Late), Rev’d. & Mrs. S.E Awolu the financial pillar of my academic pursuit.

All who labourer and encounter difficulties in their desire to acquire knowledge

(Greek word EPIGNOSIS) as a tool for self-actualization and to every of my

well-wishers.

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TABLE OF CONTENT

Title Page--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- i

Certification------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ii

Dedication-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- iii

Acknowledgement----------------------------------------------------------------------- iv

Table of Content------------------------------------------------------------------------- vi

List of Tables--------------------------------------------------------------------------- viii

Abstract------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ix

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION-------------------------------------------------1

1.1 Background of the Study------------------------------------------------------------1

1.2 Statement of Problem-----------------------------------------------------------------3

1.3 Objective of the Study---------------------------------------------------------------4

1.4 Research Hypothesis------------------------------------------------------------------4

1.5 Significance of the Study------------------------------------------------------------4

1.6 Basic Assumption -------------------------------------------------------------------5

1.7 Research Methodology---------------------------------------------------------------5

1.7.1 Sources of Data-----------------------------------------------------------------------6

1.7.2 Method Of Data Collection-------------------------------------------------------------6

1.73 Techniques of Data collections-------------------------------------------------------6

1.74 Data Analysis---------------------------------------------------------------------------6

1.8 Scope/Limitations of the Study--------------------------------------------------------6

1.9 Operationalization of Term ------------------------------------------------------------7

1.10 Organisation of Chapter -------------------------------------------------------------10

References-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------11

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW----------------------------------------12

2.1 The nature of the Nigeria Fiscal Federalism----------------------------------------17

2.2 Theory of Fiscal Federalism----------------------------------------------------------19

2.3 The synopsis of revenue commissions and allocation formula in Nigeria: 1946-88----22

2.4 Revenue Mobilisation Allocation And Fiscal Commission And The Politics Of

Revenue Allocation------------------------------------------------------------------------25

2.5 Oil Revenue formula-------------------------------------------------------------------34

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2.6 Remote and Immediate Causes of Niger Delta Crisis-----------------------------35

2.7 Socio-Political And Economic Impact Of Niger Delta On The Nigerian Economy--------41

2.7.1 Economic Impact --------------------------------------------------------------------41

2.7.2 Security implication of the Crisis -------------------------------------------------42

2.8 Theoretical Framework----------------------------------------------------------------44

CHAPTER THREE

3.1 Historical overview of the Niger Delta Conflict---------------------------------------46

3.2 Federal government intervention and crisis resolution in the Niger Delta------------48

3.2.0Niger Delta Master Plan-------------------------------------------------------------51

3.2.1 The Niger Delta Development board (NDDB) ----------------------------------51

3.2.2 Presidential Task Force (PTF)-----------------------------------------------------52

3.2.3 Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC)-----------52

3.2.4 Niger Delta Environmental Survey (NDES)-------------------------------------55

3.2.5 The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC)--------------------------56

3.3 Recent and Current Programmes and Projects in the Niger Delta -------------59

3.3.1 National, State and Local Government ------------------------------------------60

3.3.2 International Agencies and Non – Governmental Organisation (Ngos)-----------61

3.3.3 Other Organisations ----------------------------------------------------------------63

3.3.4 Oil, Gas and Servicing Companies-----------------------------------------------64

CHAPTER FOUR:

4.1 The concept of Amnesty and its imperative----------------------------------------69

4.2 Amnesty Initiatives in the Niger Delta----------------------------------------------70

4.3 The Presidential Amnesty Programme and Niger Delta Militancy------------- 72

4.4 Niger Delta Amnesty Programme Under Goodluck Jonathan Administration---78

4.5 The impact of Amnesty programme on national development ----------------80

4.6 The Federal government Amnesty programme; the success so far-------------83

4.7 Failure and Criticisms of the Federal government Amnesty programme -----84

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1 Summary--------------------------------------------------------------------------------86

5.2 Conclusion------------------------------------------------------------------------------88

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5.3 Recommendations----------------------------------------------------------------------90

Bibliography---------------------------------------------------------------------------------92

Abbreviations-------------------------------------------------------------------------------98

LIST OF TABLES.

Table 1 History Of Revenue Allocation In Nigeria------------------------------------27

Table 2.The report of the revenue sharing formula------------------------------------33

Table 3 Oil revenue Formula--------------------------------------------------------------34

Table 4 Potential Financial Resources---------------------------------------------------68

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Abstract

The Niger delta region of Nigeria, reputed to be one of the most richly endowed

delta’s inthe world, contributes about 80% of Nigeria’s national wealth. Years of

political andeconomic marginalization, environmental degradation, bad governance

and policyinconsistency by the government, and the divide and rule policy of the oil

companies ledto emergence of militancy in the Niger delta in the early 2006. The

various activities ofmilitants have created a state of general insecurity in the region.

The persistent neglect was to result in unrests by thepeople of the area, which

eventually almost got out of hand. Long years of neglect and conflict have

promoted,especially among youths a feeling of a bleak future, and thus see conflict as

a stratagem to escape deprivation. The paper argues that themethods of operation of

the militants, which includes kidnapping and hostage taking, blowing/shutting down of

oil installationsand facilities, setting off of car bombs, and illegal oil bunkering has

negatively impacted Nigeria’s economic development.

The government not able to bear the embarrassment and the drop in daily oil

production, coupled with the substantial loss of revenues devised the amnesty

programme in 2009 as solution to the quagmire. The paper is aimed at examining the

circumstances causing the crisis situation in the area, and the attendant consequences

to the people of the areas and to the global community, the various effort and

programmes of the government in curbing the situation, it attempt the critical analysis

of the amnesty programme initiated by the Federal government, its impact at ensuring

and restoring durable peace back to the region, it discusses some of the challenges to

amnesty programme, it drives out appropriate recommendations as to how the crisis

will be given a permanent rest and peace be fully restored to the region of Niger Delta.

The study adopted the Marxian political economy approach as its theoretical construct,

and used it, in the content analysis of the secondary data on the subject matter.

Materials for this paper has been drawn mainly from secondary sources found in

libraries and archives in Nigeria, in general and in the Niger Delta in particular;

academic and other resources available in the internet, local and international

publications.

Keywords: amnesty, Niger delta, Oil exploration, pollution, Multinational

Corporation, Derivation, Militancy, impact, insecurity, Nigeria.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Background of the Study

Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa, is indisputably one of the most

richly endowed countries on the continent. It boasts of immense resources (human and

material) which provides opportunity for national development (Oyakorotu, 2008:1). A

disconnection between the economic advantage of the Niger Delta and the quantum of

resources disbursed for the development of the region has given rise to structural

imbalances in Nigeria. Consequently, the Niger Delta of Nigeria is increasingly famous

due to massive oil deposits and constant violence in the region. Estimates show that the

Nigerian government generates over 90% of its revenue from the region, which is

characterized by crisis of underdevelopment (Ikein, 2009). The region remains

underdeveloped despite the huge revenue it provides for the privileged social class

including the public figures, public servants and beneficiaries from multinational oil

corporations. The Nigerian government and multinational corporations are principal

beneficiaries of the massive oil deposits in the region, while the majority of the people

there battle against squalor occasioned by exploitative oil exploration, environmental

degradation, climate change, inadequate infrastructure, unemployment and poverty.

This has precipitated various forms of incessant and/or sporadic ethno-religious

conflicts or what the Freedom House calls “simmering tensions” among the country’s

about 350 ethnic groups, as well as between religious communities. Augustine Ikelegbe

rightly observes that, “these conflicts do not only constitute the main threat to the

nation’s fledgling democracy, national stability and security but also consistently and

stubbornly throw up the issue of the national question.” The challenge of peaceful and

effective management of violent communal, ethno-religious and political conflicts in

Nigeria contributes to the country’s classification as a collapsing, if not fragile state. In

fragile and collapsing states there are indications of poor governance and the citizens are

bound to retreat into ethnic shelters for succour and their solidarity and sense of

patriotism deplete. In illuminating the instability of the Niger-Delta, an oil-rich region

enmeshed in various forms of communal and resource conflicts, a number of descriptions

have ensued. The history of oil in the Niger-Delta is often traced to 1956, when the

Anglo-Dutch oil giant, Shell discovered oil, the high grade ‘Bonny Light’ crude in

Oloibiri in present day Bayelsa State. This culminated in Nigeria’s first export of crude

cargo in 1958. Media reports succinctly describe the growth of Nigeria’s oil industry,

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with a current potential of producing three million barrels of crude oil daily, in spite of

the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) limit on production of crude

oil.

The Niger-Delta is noted for its biodiversity because of the region’s high content

of diverse plant and animal species, including many exotic and unique flowers and birds,

but the region has probably turned out to be the most polluted in the world. Current

literature points out the magnitude of these ecological disasters.

On assumption of office in May 2007, former Nigeria’s President Umaru Musa

Yar’Adua included the Niger-Delta as part of his administration’s seven-point agenda.

The government scheduled a meeting with the stakeholders in the region, which Reuben

Abati described as “an insincere attempt to keep the people talking.” The Yar’Adua’s

administration also proposed a Niger-Delta summit that died on the ground of

controversy, and created the Niger-Delta Ministry to focus mainly on the needs of

populations in the region. To address the worrisome situation in the Niger-Delta, and

considering the failure of previous efforts at resolving the conflict, the government set up

the Niger-Delta Technical Committee, which was mandated to collate and review all

previous reports and recommendations on ways of resolving the conflict. Thereafter, the

Presidential Committee on Amnesty and Disarmament of Militants in the Niger-Delta

was mandated to design a framework of disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation

or reintegration of the militants. This culminated in the presidential proclamation of

amnesty on 25 June 2009, to encourage non-state combatants in the Delta to abandon

violence, which lapsed on 4 October 2009, pursuant to section 175 of the Constitution of

the Federal Republic of Nigeria. In the amnesty document government acknowledges the

inadequacies of previous state interventions at meeting the population’s needs.

Government also noted the threat to peace, security, order and good governance and the

Nigerian economy by militant agitation of certain elements of the region.

The amnesty proclamation also acknowledged the need to harness the energies of

able-bodied youths for development in the region. Consequently, “all persons who have

directly or indirectly participated in the commission of offences associated with militant

activities in the Niger- Delta” were to surrender and hand over “all equipment, weapons,

arms and ammunition” including “execution of the renunciation of Militancy Forms

specified in the schedule.” The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process

was followed by a monthly stipend for the ex-militants. If anything, the Niger-Delta

amnesty draws attention to the ‘no victor, no vanquished’ rhetoric that ended the

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Nigeria/Biafra civil war in which the discovery of crude oil and ethnic and regional

tensions were major factors. The amnesty that followed the civil war can be categorized

as an ‘unfinished business’, to use the words of Ade Ajayi. Against this backdrop, the

core thrust of this study is to examine the socio-political effect of the amnesty

programme on the Niger Delta Area of the Nigerian state.

Statement of the problems Many political researchers have identified the Nigeria delta crisis as having a

serious effect on the peace of the nation, the political system and the economic situation

of the nation.

This Niger delta crisis arises as a result of their suffering from environmental

degradation and pollution thought oil spillage, and gas flaring. Also the government

impact and various attempts to make the people happy serves as fuel that fire more

heavily the strength of the crisis as it may be associated with unfair judgment pose on the

allocation of the nation revenue and resource. This among other causes of Niger Delta

Crisis “greed and selfishness, deprivation, poverty and social injustice” has stood as a

key infringe on the peacelesness in the region. What a paradox!

Reports note that they lack basic infrastructure- good network of roads, health

care facilities, good schools and portable water. The recent sad image of the poor quality

of life in the creek shown to the world on CNN (and in the newspaper) show that the oil

wealth is not used to develop the area. The successive governments have collected

billions of dollars from the land over the decades, but little (if any) has been invested in

the area to improve the people’s living conditions. As a result of the affair mentioned

causes, it is very clear so to say that the region which is home to Nigerian oil wealth

remains the most impoverished community in the nation.

Therefore, the Niger delta crisis is a serious matter that requires serious policy,

courageous and committed to resolve.

Purpose of the study

The objectives of this research work are:

(i) To critically assess the origin, nature and the extent of the Niger Delta Crisis

(ii) To focus on the amnesty programme initiated by the Late president Yar’adua in

2009.

(iii) To examine the significance of amnesty programme in the area.

(iv) To determine the extent to which the Amnesty programme has been achieved?

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(v) To suggest the ways of finding lasting peace in Niger Delta area of the Nigerian

State.

Significance of the study The Niger-Delta is noted for its biodiversity because of the region’s high content

of diverse plant and animal species, including many exotic and unique flowers and birds,

but the region has probably turned out to be the most polluted in the world. It is not

surprising, therefore, that the Niger-Delta people have complained for decades regarding

the issues of environmental pollution, poverty and under-development in the region.

They believe they have not got a fair treatment from the Nigerian state.

However, Agitation by youths in the region precipitated a regime of restiveness,

which resulted in the formation of several militia groups, some based on ethnicity, and

frequently target oil corporations and their employees for hostage taking, vandalism,

kidnapping, and sometimes, outright murder.

In illuminating the instability of the Niger-Delta, an oil-rich region enmeshed in

various forms of communal and resource conflicts, a number of descriptions have

ensued.

In the amnesty document government acknowledges the inadequacies of previous

state interventions at meeting the population’s needs. Government also noted the threat

to peace, security, order and good governance and the Nigerian economy by militant

agitation of certain elements of the region. The amnesty proclamation also acknowledged

the need to harness the energies of able-bodied youths for development in the region.

In attempt to put these crisis to a permanent rest in the region and Nigeria state at

large, everyone who have directly or indirectly participated in the commission of

offences associated with militant activities in the Niger- Delta area” were made to

surrender and hand over “all equipment, weapons, arms and ammunition” including

“execution of the renunciation of Militancy Forms specified in the schedule.”

This research fills the gap in literature, regarding the application of a peaceful

mechanism to address the Niger-Delta conflict. Points of relevance can also be extracted

to other societies facing similar governance challenges.

Delimitations of the study Ideally, the first pre-requisite of a successful research in any science is a definite

understanding of what size of a unit one is going to observe. In line with the above

premise and considering the fact that the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme will be too

large for such vigorous study in a short time-span, the study therefore was limited to the

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core Niger Delta (Bayelsa, Delta, Ondo and Rivers State). The study thus investigated on

the origin and extent of the Niger Delta Crisis. It covers all the period that pervade the

struggle and agitations of the Niger Delta people on resource control.

Also, focusing on the introduction of the Amnesty programme and how effective

or otherwise it has been in resolving the Niger Delta Crisis.

This project work shall cover the period when the Niger Delta Crisis started (Dec 2005)

and when the Amnesty programme started.

Research hypothesis

Several attempt has been made to resolve the Niger Delta Crisis, the latest in the series of

these attempts is the granting of Amnesty to the militants in the Niger Delta. The

questions that this research intends to answer are:

(a) What differentiate this method from the other previous ones

(b) Can this method guarantee everlasting peace in the crisis ridden area of the

Niger Delta?

(c) Is there any clear purpose of action between the Federal Government and the

militant boys of the Niger Delta in the implementing of the Amnesty?

(d) Can this reprieve in the name of Amnesty guarantee peace?

Assumptions

The basic assumption of this research is listed below:

(i) The Nigerian state had short changed the Niger Delta thus resulting in Crises.

(ii) State intervention is incapable of resolving the Niger delta Crisis.

(iii) The weak or failed governmental institution of the State has giving room for the

crisis of the Niger Delta.

(iv) Political restruction is the only viable solution to the Niger Delta Crisis.

Research methodology The methodology of the study shall be categorized into 3 stages:

Sources of data

The data needed for this research will mainly be secondary. This secondary data

will be collected from both library and research institutions, notably the library of

College of Education Ikere-Ekiti, Adekunle Ajasin university Akungba – Akoko and the

Internet service.

Method of data collection Majority of the techniques of data collection for this research will include the following;

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Library research whereby fact will be drawn from relevant text in the various

libraries.

Also, writing of different scholars on the concept of conflict in Nigeria,

Particularly in Niger Delta region of Nigeria State will also be helpful in this research.

OPERATIONALISATION OF TERM

The terms used in this project work shall be defined for proper understanding of the

concepts.

The concept of conflicts:

Conflicts as a major phenomenon in any organization, society and organization or

society is seen as a collection of independent and interacting individuals who work

towards common goals and whose relationships are determined to a certain structure.

Coser (1956) defined conflict as a struggle over values and claims to scare resources in

which the aim of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate the rivals conflict

exist whenever incompatible activities exist with one another (Otite 1999).

Chaplin, (1979:109) defines conflicts as “the simultaneous of two or more mutually

antagonistic impulses or motives” while Wilson and Hanna, (1990:255) describe it as ‘ a

struggle involve ideas and or limited resources”.

The concept of Conflict resolution:

Conflict resolution is also referred to as conflict management. It is the process

through which hiter-personal communication is used to gather parties to a conflict with

the aim to reduce the difference in their ideas and views so as to arrive at amicable and

satisfaction, consensual ideas and view through arbitration, bargaining and negotiations

(Omoluabi, 2001)

Fundamentally, two main approaches to conflict resolution are discernable namely

peaceful negotiation or arbitration and use of force e.g. War.

The concept Fiscal federalism:

Federal systems by their nature are complex administrative designs because they

involve multiple levels of government.

Federalism means is a political concept in which a group of members are bound

together by covenant with a governing representative head. The term is also used to

describe a system of the government in which sovereignty is constitutionally divided

between a central governing authority and constitutional political units (like states or

provinces).

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Federalism is a system in which the power to govern is shared between national

state governments, creating what is often called a federation (Akindele and Olaopa,

2002). It is a political theory that is divergent in concept, varied in ecology and dynamic

in practice. It has to do with how power is distributed or shared territorially and

functionally among the various units in a federation.

Acording to (Ayakeme, 2005), Prof. K.C. Wheare defined federalism as a

constitutional arrangement in which law making powers and functions are divided

between Central and State governments in such a way that each, within its respective

sphere of jurisdiction and competence is equal, independent and coordinate, to the

extent of the federating states voluntarily surrendering some functions exigent on

perceived capacity and desire to a central government for their collective good.

Fiscal federalism refers to the allocation of tax-raising powers and expenditure

Responsibilities between levels of governments (Akindele S.T and Olaopa, 2002).

Fiscal federalism concerns the division of public sector functions and finances among

different tiers of government (Ozo-Eson, 2005:1). In undertaking this division, the

emphasis is on the need to focus on the necessity for improving the performance of the

public sector and the provision of their services by ensuring a proper alignment of

responsibilities and fiscal instruments.

Adejare (1997, 39) affirms that fiscal matters transcend the purview of economics.

They have done this in most cases, especially in pluralistic societies with assumed

political, religious and social dimensions and their inherent conflicting situations. The

issue of fiscal federalism is an intrinsic element in a federation, which is dependent on,

but not synonymous with fiscal decentralisation. While bringing out the differences

between the two complimentary but different concepts of fiscal federalism and fiscal

decentralisation, Sharma (1995) opines that ‘fiscal federalism constitutes a set of

guiding principles, a guiding concept that helps in designing financial relations between

the national and subnational levels of government; fiscal decentralisation, on the other

hand, is a process of applying such principles.

The concept of Revenue Allocation: Revenue allocation can be taken to mean the sharing of federally collected

revenue among the tiers of government (i.e) the federal, state, and Local Government. It

is the sharing of government’s revenue (revenue in the Federation Account) among the

various level of government (Federal, State, and Local) using a constitutionally or

legally defined formula.

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Resource allocation arises as an issue because the resources of a society are in

limited supply, whereas human wants are usually unlimited, and because any given

resource can have many alternative uses. Revenue allocation has been a major issue in

the Nigerian political system even from the pre-independence era. Between 1946 and

1960, four fiscal review commissions were appointed to recommend a satisfactory

revenue allocation formula for the country.

The concept of Amnesty: Amnesty is granted usually for political crimes against the state, such as treason,

sedition, or rebellion. It is addressed generally to classes or communities and takes the

form of a legislative act or other constitutional or statutory act of the supreme power of

the state. However, an amnesty differs from a general pardon in that the latter simply

relieves from punishment whereas the former declares innocence or abolishes the crime.

According to Oxford Leaner’s dictionary (1995) is “an official act of forgiving

people who have committed offenses against the state and allowing them go free”. It

also means “a period of time during which people can admit to do something wrong

without fear of punishment. In case of the presidential Amnesty granted to militants in

Niger Delta, it was in form of an olive branch extended by Yar’Adua’s led Nigerian

state to the Niger Delta militants who had held the region and the country indeed to

ransom, destroying pipelines, kidnapping, doing all kinds of oil bunkering and the like.

Amnesty can be referred to as pardon. It is a programme that is introduced to bring

about peace. It can be seen as an instrument of conflict resolution.

Organization of the Chapter The chapter one would be focusing and addressing the background to the study,

statement of the problem, justification for the study, objectives of the study, basic

Assumption, methodology, scope of the study, Expected contribution to knowledge,

limitations to the study, organization of chapters and references.

While chapter two shall examine the literature review, the nature of Nigeria’s fiscal

federalism, revenue allocation since independence, Remote and immediate causes of the

Niger Delta Crisis, Socio- Political and Economic implication of the Niger Delta crisis

and the theoretical framework.

The chapter three shall be focusing on conflict Resolution previous method in

resolving the Niger Delta master plan, issues on OMPADEC, NDDC.

17

Chapter four will examine the imperative of Amnesty: amnesty in Nigeria, Amnesty

initiative programme, Presidential Amnesty for the Militant in Nigeria under Yar’Adua

administration, Amnesty under Jonathan and the success of amnesty so far.

Chapter five examines the summary, conclusion, Recommendation and

bibliography.

REFERENCES

Adejare, B. (1997). Contradictions in Nigerian Federalism. University of Ibadan, Department of History.

Akindele, S.T. and Olaopa (2002). “Fiscal federalism and local Government Finance in Nigeria: An Examination of Revenue, Rights and Fiscal Jurisdiction” in Contemporary Issues in Public Administration. Omotoso, F. ed. Lagos: Bolabay Publications, pp.46-64.

Sharma, C.K. (2005). “The Federal Approach to Fiscal Decentralisation: Conceptual Contours for Policy Makers”. Loyola Journal of Social Sciences, XIX (2): 169-88.

Sharma, C. k. .(1995). “When Does decentralization Deliver? The Dilemma of Design”, South Asian Journal of Socio-Political Studies, 6(1):38-45.

Otite, O., & Albert, I. O. (1999): Community conflicts in Nigeria. Ibadan: Spectrum Books: Conflict resolution (2008). Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia Available:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/conflict resolution.htm Oshiomhole, A. (2009). Labour and the Challenge of Nation Building. Being the 3rd

Convocation Lecture of the Niger Delta University, Wilberforce Island, Bayelsa State. 27th March, 2009.

Saro-wiwa, K. (1991). Similia: Essays on anomic Nigeria. Port Harcourt: Sans International Publishers: 168-170

Saro-wiwa, K. (1995). A month and a day: A detention diary. Ibadan, Spectrum Books Ltd; 52-54.

Nweke, K. (2012), the role of traditional institution of government in managing social conflicts in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta communities: imperatives of peace- Building process in the post- amnesty Era. EEE. British journal of Arts and social science ISSN 2046-9578, Vol. 5 No.2.

Nweke, K. & Nyewusira, V. (2011). Nigerian state and the politics of Amnesty programme: implications for Niger Delta Region. A paper presented during an international conference, University of Nigeria Nsukka, June 20-23, 2011.

Nwoguugwu, Ngozi, Alao Olatunji, E. and Egwuonwu, Clara (2012). Militancy and insecurity in the Niger Delta. Impact on the inflow of foreign direct investment to Niger, Kuwait chapter of Arabian journal of Business and management Review Vol.2, No.1 September, 2012.

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CHAPTER TWO

LITIRATURE REVIEW A cursory look at Nigeria and the writing of other political and social

commentators reveals that all is not well with the country. Nigeria today is engulfed in

ethnic rivalry, religious crisis, and massive corruptions of varied types, favoritism,

nepotism and the struggle in the sharing of the national cake. To add to that, the country

is said to be a federation in theory, but the actual practice of true fiscal federalism is very

much elusive.

Regarding the Nigerian federalism, school of thoughts are of the view that

Nigeria federalism is more of a unitary system in practice than what is in black and

white, for instance, the 1999 constitution clearly stated that Nigerian shall be a

federation. It is rather unfortunate that when one takes a critical assessment of the

country’s federal arrangement, actually and out rightly negates the basic and primary

tenets of a true federalism as put down by the father of federalism and even

contemporary writers (Adebayo 1982, Olukoshi and Agbu 1996, Anuwo and Hercult

1998, where 1953)

The agitation for the first just and equitable fiscal system by the people of the

South-South first started in the year 1957 when testimonies were made before the Wilink

commission of inquiry into minority fears subsequently, several protests and clamours

for Justice have been registered to no avail. Characteristically, both military and civilian

governments have ignored clamours for equitable remedy and forcibly smothered

protests through the use of over whelming military might and other documented acts of

state sanctions.

The present agitation for better treatment and resource control by the Niger Delta

started with the Ogonis in Rivers state in the 1970s. that year there was a major blowout

at the Bornu oil field in Ogoni Land which caused wide spread pollution and outrage. By

the 80’s, other communities were beginning to protest, the Iko people, the Etches at

umuechem, the Omudigbo, Oggia, Igbeide, Izon, Irri, Uzure and Ijaw.

In the early 90’s, the agitation increases with the formation of MOSOP, which

revealed succinctly and concisely the injustice suffered by the people of the South- South

with particular attention on oil bearing areas of Rivers state. The movement’s primary

objectives was to inform Nigerian and the international community on the carnage and

the endangering of lives and Environment in these areas perpetuated by shell in a

network of patrimonial corruption supported by the Nigeria state. Second, to force shell

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and the Nigeria state to pay a good compensation to the Ogonis and such other oil

bearing areas for the many years of oil exploration by shell.

The Late Ken Saro- Wiwa who was the activist of this movement had touched the

world, brought the case to the awareness of the united Nations and also written memos to

the federal government all to no avail, rather than hearken to these plead or come to the

negotiation table, the federal government sponsored or motivated by shell and the few

elites who benefited from this exploitation resorted to information, arrest and sometimes

killing of demonstrators or supporter, all is an effort to equal or kill the agitation.

Owugah (1999) in a local resistant and the state’s showed that agitation in the

Niger Delta started in phases in the early 1990s and graduated to a full-fledge violent

resistance movements that culminated in the closing down of oil wells kidnapping and

holding foreign expatriates, hostile and general killing.

The struggle and agitation for resource control has its roots in the clientele

patrimonial culture of Nigeria that tends to favour those set of individuals, groups and

even some states that are highly and well connected to this network of corruption.

Scholars and activities who are well informed on the sociology and political

economy of the Nigeria states more often that in tend to condemn the operators of the

Nigerian states who sit at the home with this unjustifiable or justified systematic

eradication of one group in favour of another.

As earlier espoused federalism as propounded and maintained world wide

posturizes a political arrangement whereby justificational power exist between two or

more constituent units with each exercising jurisdiction in their geographical areas.

Unfortunately, this has not been the case with Nigeria, (Davidson 1992) in the

Black man’s Burden of Africa and the curse of the Nation – state, opines that Nigeria is

practicing an apparent defective and fallible federation (Davidson 1992). This to him is

because Nigeria federal system has consistently undermined the cardinal philosophy of

federalism. He observes that this particular principle says: Beyond size, territorially and

constitutionally, the plurality and heterogeneity of the federal constituents must be

recognized’ by implication, the relative autonomy,, independence and self determination

of these units must be appreciated and guaranteed in clean terms (Davidson 1992).

In the line above, Awa (1976) also explains that in a federation, the general

welfare of the constituent members in general must always be assured. He noted further

that is by such assurances that one could be able to evaluate the relevance of a federal

arrangement on the constituent citizens, communities, states and nationalities.

20

These theoretical expositions state in clear term what a federation stands for a

situation whereby all the tribes and ethnic groups are given a sense of belonging such

that irrespective of their peculiar diversities and pluralities, they can co-exist together for

the betterment of the generality of the citizenry. However, since the annulment of the

June 12 1993 general elections, it has never been well with the political, economic and

socio-cultural situation of the nation. By this singular act, the southern minorities and

their leaders begin to question the essence of the Nigeria federation when some of the

nationalities are not given a free hand to attain the political leadership of their country,

not of recent that Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, the Nigeria formal vice-President (now the

President) was compensated politically to subdue and kindle the insurrections of the

people of the Niger Delta.

Udegbe (1998) in the constitutional conference, political restructuring and

women’s access to power brought to force the fact that “ the need for political

restructuring and national integration of all people in Nigeria became even more

pronounced with the threat of national unity created by the annulment of June 12 General

election by Gen. Ibrahim Babangida” Drawing our own inspiration from Udegbes

assertion, it would not be on isolated argument to put forward that although these has

been bickering at different time on the issue of fiscal federation in Nigeria, the current

agitation for economic survival of the people of the Niger Delta on the platform of the

resource control has its root in the infamous and inglorious cancellation of the 1993

elections.

Akpan Ekpo (2001) in “Revenue control: contextual imperatives and implications

for Nigeria” observes that the struggle and agitation for economic empowerment and a

justifiable fiscal administrative system is a struggle is being favoured by the corrupt

political, economic and dialectical network operated in Nigeria, here he notes: the

dialectics of resource control is critical to the under-standing of the dilemma of minority

oil producing area in the Nigeria federalism (Akpan Epo (2001).

It is plausible to ague in line with the above that the various struggles in the Niger

came to lime light with the Ogoni struggle in River state in the early 90’s and Kaima

declaration of 1998. in their lexicon, these groups and activist really mentioned the word

resource control, however, a critical assessment and understanding of their condition

reveals nothing other than a demanded for resource control for instance, Obi (1995) notes

that oil minority social movement in some of their conditions demanded for radical

destruction of the nation’s federations in such a way that it would give more autonomy to

21

other interest of self determination, to the minorities, a return to the principle of

derivation and also make available adequate compensation for oil pollution in the

different oil bearing areas. The movement for the survival Ogoni people (Mosop), was

the most outspoken of the group, however, with the unfortunate death of Saro-Wiwa

master –minded by the state in collacuration with shell petroleum relegated the

movement to the background while another nationality, the Ijaws took the mantle of

agitation for the economic mancipation of the Niger Delta upon their shoulders.

In the famous declaration that shook the nation in 1998 famously addressed as the

Kalma declaration by the Ijaw Youth council, they called for self determination within

the Nigerian state and the control of resources. In addition, it also called for the

summoning of a sovereign national conference (Owugah 2000). With these various cells

and decorations, the fight for resource control has continued unabated and come to stay,

which is a reality within the Nigeria state.

The call for self determination and resource control brings us to another important

issue aside the welfare of the constituent units- The centralization of the Nigeria

federalism. As a matter of fact, this is another aspect that has fuelled the call for the

restructuring of the nation. It is worthy of noted that the federal (central) government is

more powerful than all other unit put together. Various scholars in Nigeria have come to

the conclusion that between the states, local and federal governments, it’s a lopsided

political management that makes the centre over-whelm the other constituent units

politically, economically and otherwise.

For instance, Obi (1998) in the impact of oil in Nigeria’s Revenue Allocation

system: problems and Prospect for national reconstruction” shows trace of how the

federal government through its obnoxious law reduced the economic earnings of states

and local government, such decrees include decree 57n of 1969 and 38 of 1971. These

gave the federal government complete overwhelming ownership and total control of all

petroleum produce in Nigeria. While decrees 9 of 1971 gave it over the collection of off-

shore oil receipts. This singular act by the federal government has been the major

catalyst of the Niger Delta crisis to control their endowed resources.

Also in early work of Nwabueze (1983) in federalism in Nigeria under the

presidential constitution, pointed out that basking in the Euphoria of military neurosis,

the federal government still controlled most of the revenues such that the states were

90% dependent on the centre; Owugbe 2000, Akinsanya 1986, Akinyemi et al 1979,

Suberu 1998, Olukoshi and Agbu 1996.

22

For fair and justice play, the Niger Delta areas are not even asking for

compensation for the billions of derivation revenue denied them in the past under the

pretext of onshore/offshore dichotomy. The overt neglect by the government and oil

prospecting firms endangers agitations for change.

According to Suberu (1996) the basic demand and grievances of Nigeria’s oil

bearing area as articulated by their intermediaries or spoken persons can be identified

under five broad themes. These relate respectively to the disposition of mineral land

rents, the application of the derivation principle to the allocation of the oil producing

states. Basically, the Niger Delta crisis is hinge on depletion values.

Various methods had been adopted by the people of Niger Delta to seek redress,

they use force and violence but all never yielded positive result because the government

was unable to find a final solution to the problems. Many Nigerians, international non-

governmental organizations and government have condemned the federal government for

this. These condemnations made the government to finally arrived at profounding a

solution to the problem.

The amnesty programmes represents a policy attempt to seek an alternatives route

to peace and is anchored on the tried of anti-violence, pro-dialogue and welfarism. The

programme seeks to decriminalize the activities of the activities of the militants and

unconditionally exonerate them of culpability in the myriad felonies with which they

have been associated – namely illegal oil bunkering, arson, hostage-taking, kidnapping

and ransom receipts, killing and maiming, pipeline and oil installation destruction and

high treason.

The unconditional Amnesty programme of the presidency to provide militants

with a needed window for peace has resulted in a general cessation of hostilities, despite

the continued presence of the JTF in the region. Although inconsistencies in the steps

taken so far by the former president and ambiguities in the implementation of amnesty to

militants cast doubts on the successful execution of the amnesty package.

THE NATURE OF NIGERIA’S FISCAL FEDERALISM Understanding federalism as a larger concept will help facilitate the understanding

of fiscal federalism. This is because federalism is the operational context within which

fiscal federalism is situated. Thus, it is an in tegral aspect of federalism. Federalism refers

to a political system where there are at least two levels of government. In such cases,

there is the juxtaposition of two levels of power of a central government otherwise called

23

the federal government and other states labelled variously as states, regions, republics,

cantons or unions (Ajayi, 1997:150)).

Federalism is derived from the Latin word “foedus” meaning covenant. It is a

political concept in which a group of members are bound together by covenant with a

governing representative head. The term is also used to describe a system of the

government in which sovereignty is constitutionally divided between a central governing

authority and constitutional political units (like states or provinces). Federalism is a

system in which the power to govern is shared between national state governments,

creating what is often called a federation (Akindele and Olaopa, 2002). It is a political

theory that is divergent in concept, varied in ecology and dynamic in practice. It has to

do with how power is distributed or shared territorially and functionally among the

various units in a federation.

Also, Itse Sagay (2008, A11) conceptualized federalism as: an arrangement

whereby powers within a multi-national country are shared between a federal

government and component units in such a way that each unit, including the central

authority exists as a government separately and independently from others, operating

directly on persons and properties with its territorial area and with a will of its own

apparatus for the conduct of affairs and with an authority in some matters exclusive of

others.

Fiscal federalism is concerned with “understanding which functions and

instruments are best centralized and which are best placed in the sphere of decentralized

levels of government” (Oates, 1999:1120). In other words, it is the study of how

competencies (expenditure side) and fiscal instruments (revenue side) are allocated

across different (vertical) layers of the administration. An important part of its subject

matter is the system of transfer payments or grants by which a central government shares

its revenues with lower levels of government.

Fiscal Federalism is characterized by the fiscal relations between central and

lower levels of government. That is, it is manifest by the financial aspects of the

devolvement of authority from the national to the regional and local levels. Fiscal

federalism covers two interconnected areas. The first is the division of competence in

decision making about public expenditures and public revenue between the different

levels of government (national, regional and local). The second is the degree of freedom

of decision making enjoyed by regional and local authorities in the assessment of local

taxes as well as in the determination of their expenditures (Kesner-Skreb, 2009:235).

24

In fact, fiscal federalism is a general normative framework for the assignment of

functions to the different levels of government and appropriate fiscal instruments for

carrying out these functions. Sharma (2005:38) perceives fiscal federalism as a set of

guiding principles, a guiding concept that helps in designing financial relations between

the national and sub-national levels of the government, fiscal decentralization on the

other hand as a process of applying such principles.

Fiscal federalism refers to the allocation of tax-raising powers and expenditure

responsibilities between levels of governments (Akindele S.T and Olaopa, 2002). Fiscal

federalism concerns the division of public sector functions and finances among different

tiers of government (Ozo-Eson, 2005:1). In undertaking this division, the emphasis is on

the need to focus on the necessity for improving the performance of the public sector and

the provision of their services by ensuring a proper alignment of responsibilities and

fiscal instruments.

Adejare (1997, 39) affirms that fiscal matters transcend the purview of economics.

They have done this in most cases, especially in pluralistic societies with assumed

political, religious and social dimensions and their inherent conflicting situations. The

issue of fiscal federalism is an intrinsic element in a federation, which is dependent on,

but not synonymous with fiscal decentralization. While bringing out the differences

between the two complimentary but different concepts of fiscal federalism and fiscal

decentralization, Sharma (1995) opines that ‘fiscal federalism constitutes a set of guiding

principles, a guiding concept that helps in designing financial relations between the

national and subnational levels of government; fiscal decentralization, on the other hand,

is a process of applying such principles.

In summary, the trend of the principles of fiscal federalism presupposes the fundamental

importance of improved public sector performance geared towards accountability and

responsibility with the deliberate intention of improving governance at all strata of

government.

THEORY OF FISCAL FEDERALISM The basic foundations for the initial theory of Fiscal Federalism were laid by

Kenneth Arrow, Richard Musgrave and Paul Sadweh Samuelson's two important papers

(1954, 1955) on the theory of public goods. Musgrave's book (1959) on public finance

provided the framework for what became accepted as the proper role of the state in the

economy.

25

The theory was later to be known as “Decentralization Theorem” (Ozo-Eson,

2005:1).

Within this framework, three roles were identified for the government sector. These were

the roles of government in correcting various forms of market failure, ensuring an

equitable distribution of income and seeking to maintain stability in the macro-economy

at full employment and stable prices (Musgrave, 1959). Thus the government was

expected to step in where the market mechanism failed due to various types of public

goods characteristics. Governments and their officials were seen as the custodians of

public interest who would seek to maximize social welfare based on their benevolence or

the need to ensure electoral success in democracies (Ozo-Eson, 2005:1).

Each tier of government is seen as seeking to maximize the social welfare of the

citizens within its jurisdiction. This multi-layered quest becomes very important where

public goods exist, the consumption of which is not national in character, but localized.

In such circumstances, local outputs targeted at local demands by respective local

jurisdictions clearly provide higher social welfare than the central provision. This

principle, which Oats (1999) has formalized into the "Decentralization Theorem"

constitutes the basic foundation for what may be referred to as the first generation theory

of fiscal decentralization (Bird, 2009). The theory focused on situations where different

levels of government provided efficient levels of output of public goods “for those goods

whose special patterns of benefits were encompassed by the geographical scope of their

jurisdictions” (Oates, 1999: 5). Such situations came to be known as “perfect mapping”

or “fiscal equivalence” (Olson 1996).

Nevertheless, it was also recognized that, given the multiplicity of local public

goods with varying geographical patterns of consumption, there was hardly any level of

government that could produce a perfect mapping for all public goods. Thus, it was

recognized that there would be local public goods with inter-jurisdictional spill-overs.

For example, a road may confer public goods characteristics, the benefits of which are

enjoyed beyond the local jurisdiction. The local authority may then under-provide for

such a good. To avoid this, the theory then resorts to situation whereby the central

government is required to provide matching grants to the lower level government so that

it can internalize the full benefits.

Based on the preceding, the role of government in maximizing social welfare

through public goods provision came to be assigned to the lower tiers of government.

26

The other two roles of income distribution and stabilization were, however, regarded as

suitable for the central government.

From the foregoing, we can summarize the role assignment which flows from the basic

theory of fiscal federalism. The central government is expected to ensure equitable

distribution of income, maintain macroeconomic stability and provide public goods that

are national in character. Decentralized levels of government on the other hand are

expected to concentrate on the provision of local public goods with the central

government providing targeted grants in cases where there are jurisdictional spill-overs

associated with local public goods.

Once the assignment of roles had been carried out, the next step in the theoretical

framework was to determine the appropriate taxing framework. In addressing this tax

assignment problem, attention was paid to the need to avoid distortions resulting from

decentralized taxation of mobile tax bases. Gordon (1983) emphasised that the extensive

application of non-benefit taxes on mobile factors at Decentralized levels of government

could result in distortions in the location of economic activity.

Following from the assignment of functions, taxes that matched more effectively the

assigned functions were also assigned to the relevant tier or level of government. For

example, progressive income tax is suited to the functions of income redistribution and

macro-economic stabilization and is therefore assigned to the central government. On the

other hand, property taxes and user fees were deemed more appropriate for the local

governments. Benefit taxes are also prescribed for decentralized governments based on

the conclusion that such taxes promote economic efficiency when dealing with mobile

economic units, be they individuals or firms (Ozo-Eson, 2005:1).

The final element of this basic theory that is worthy of note is the need for fiscal

equalization. This is in the form of lump sum transfers from the central government to

Decentralized governments. The arguments for equalization were mainly two. The first

which is on efficiency grounds saw equalization as a way of correcting for distorted

migration patterns. The second is to provide assistance to poorer regions or jurisdictions.

Equalization has been important in a number of federations. For example, Canada

has an elaborate equalization scheme built into her inter-governmental fiscal

arrangements (Weingast, 1995).

It should be pointed out however, that recent literature emphasizes the importance of

reliance on local revenues for financing local budgets. A number of authors (Weingast,

1995; McKinnon, 1997) have drawn attention to the dangers of Decentralized levels of

27

government which rely too heavily on intergovernmental transfers for financing their

budgets.

THE SYNOPSIS OF REVENUE COMMISSIONS AND ALLOCATION

FORMULA IN NIGERIA: 1946-88 The issue of fiscal federalism is a unique one in Nigeria. This is because it is

characterized by constant struggle, clamour for change and, very recently, violence in the

form of agitation for resource control in the Niger-Delta region. It is fiscal centralism

instead of fiscal federalism. Calls and exhortations by lower tiers of government for a

more Decentralized fiscal arrangement have continued to fall on deaf ears. The issue has,

over the years, engaged the attention of various commissions and committees. They

include:

1. Phillipson Commission (1946): This commission recommended the use of derivation

and even development as criteria for distribution of revenue. By derivation, the

commission means each unit of government would receive from the central purse the

same portion it has.

The history of revenue allocation began with the appointment of Sir Sydney

Phillipson, then financial secretary to the Nigerian government as the sole financial

commissioner, by the new financial arrangement to be adopted under the new

constitution. The policy statement identified two types of regional revenue. Declared

revenue and non declared revenue.

The Hick Phillipson commission recommendations were made on the belief that

Nigeria was a federation and the reality of the 1951 constitution made the

recommendations unworkable. Hence, many criticisms were levead against it.

Nevertheless, some of the Regions were not better off.

2. Hicks-Phillipson Commission (1951): This commission recommended need,

derivation, independent revenue or fiscal autonomy and national interests as the criteria

for revenue sharing.

3. Chicks Commission (1953): The commission recommended derivation principle and

infact, went futher to warn that the principles of need and national interest should in

future play no futher role on the issues of revenue allocation in Nigeria. To all intents

and purposes, the implication of the chicks recommendations started the unending

chorus of political dingdong over revenue allocation in Nigeria. The North

and West enjoyed this as they gained much from it, but the three regions became

disenchanted with this derivation principle: the north with the way it was applied, the

28

west, with its method of application, and the East felt it should not be applied at all.

There were also an increasing subordination of the financial autonomy or superiority of

the central government to the regional Governments.

4. Raisman Commission (1957): was set up under three backgrounds, disenchantment

with the derivative principle self-government at regional levels and moves towards

independence; as well as the control of the Regions by distinct political parties, fear of

domination of the center by one ethnic group and the prospect of Nigeria becoming a

petroleum country.

The terms of revence of the commission were very broad, which to all intents and

purposes shared the dissatisfaction with the derivatives principle and system of allocation

before 1957, in its recommendations, the commission de-emphasized derivation and

recommended less controversial principle such as need, population, basic responsibilities

of each region and much importance on the other principles, one expected that the

revenue allocation formula it recommendation would be politically acceptable to all the

tiers of government. It recommended need, balanced development and minimum

responsibility. Percentage division o f 40% to the north, 31% to the east, 24% to the west

and 5% to Southern Cameroon.

5. The Binns Commission (1964): This commission established the following

backgrounds; loss of southern Cameroon by Eastern Nigeria in 1901, the creation of mid-

western region in 1964 and the desire of the federal government to acquire more revenue

from the proceeds of mining rents and royalties. The recommendation of the commission

came into effect on 1st April 1966 under a new military government headed by major

General Aguyi Ironsi. However, the National council in 1965 had accepted its reports

and even given it constitutional backing by the amendment of the appropriation section

of the 1963 constitution. It is important to point out that because of the oil in large

commercial quantity, the East which had hitherto condemned the derivative principle

now called for its fullest implementation.

Moreover, the Binns Commission constituted the basis for the working of financial

arrangement. This commission rejected the principles of need and derivation. In its place,

it proposed regional financial comparability and percentage division of 42% to the north,

30% to the east, 20% to the west and 8% to the mid-west. The recommendations to these

committee were rejected not because of their economic and financial inadequacies, but

principally because of their political implication. This led to the establishments of the

Dina committee.

29

6. Dina Commission (1969): This commission was set up under these new

developments; suspension of the constitution, particularly those provisions that provided

for the periodic financial adjustment and creation of twelve states out of the existing

region. The committee unlike the past once, was made up of eight Nigerians-four

university lecturers and four civil servants. The committee’s terms of reference were

made restrictive by the federal government with the belief that the exercise was for a

while pending a comprehensive change of fiscal system. It recommended national

minimum standards, balanced development in the allocation of the state’s joint account

and basic need. Although, the recommendations were rejected, the report later became

the only material that the federal government could resort to, especially after the 1966

civil war.

7. Aboyade Technical Committee (1977): These committee was made up of six

member- all Nigerians with a term of reference made very extensive and significant in

the development of a viable federal finance in Nigeria. It was the first time that a panel

was asked to allocate revenue on th basis of constitutional responsibilities. It also marked

the first time a specific autonomy was being sought for Local government as the third of

government. It recommended a national minimum standard for national integration

(22%), equality of access to development opportunities (25%), absorptive capacity

(20%), fiscal efficiency (15%) and independent revenue effort (18%). Other criteria are:

57% to Federal Government, 30% to State Governments, 10% to Local Governments and

3% to a special fund. The federal government accepted the technical committees report

with minority modifications and sent same and its white paper on it to the constituent

assembly where it was rejected not because of any technical inadequacies or inaccuracies

of its data but principally because it was too technical and difficult to operationalise.

8. Okigbo Committee (1980): It recommended percentages on principles: Population

(4%), equality (4%), social development (15%) and internal revenue effort (5%).

Percentages for governments: Federal (53%), States (30%), Local Governments (10%),

Special Fund (7%).

9. Danjuma Commission (1988) It recommended percentages: Federal (50%, States

(30%), Local Governments (15%), Special Fund (5%). Other laws and decrees on

revenue allocation:

• Decree 15 of 1967

• Decree 13 of 1970

• Decree 9 of 1971

30

• Decree 6 of 1975

• Decree 7 of 1975 (Oyeneye, et al, 1988).

REVENUE MOBILISATION ALLOCATION AND FISCAL COMMISSION AND THE POLITICS OF REVENUE ALLOCATION.

The establishment in 1999 of Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal

Commission (RMAFC) was a response by the Federal Government to provide for all

embracing and permanent revenue body in Nigeria. RMAFC is a body that reflects the

Federal Character Principle in its membership composition and has enabling laws which

empower the commission to act as follows:

1) Monitor the accruals into and disbursement of revenue from the federation

account;

2) Review from time to time, the revenue allocation formula and principles in

operation to ensure conformity with changing realities;

3) Advise the federal, state and local governments on fiscal efficiency and methods

by which their revenue is to be increased;

4) Determine the remuneration appropriate to political office holders; and,

5) Discharge such other functions as may be conferred on the commission through

the constitution or any act of the National Assembly (Shuaibu, 2002).

In principle, it is assumed that the tax sharing powers between the various tiers of

government are designed to guarantee the equitable distribution of the nation’s wealth in

the spirit of true fiscal federalism. Analysing the roles of RMAFC vis-à-vis the politics of

revenue allocation in Nigeria, RMAFC has sustained the notion of fiscal imbalance in the

country.

In 2001, the fiscal body made a draft proposal with this sharing formula, the Federal

Government got 41.3%, state governments 31%, local governments 16% and special

fund 11.7%. However, this particular proposal was nipped in the bud following the

Supreme Court pronouncement on resource control in April 2002. By the year 2008, the

fiscal body had a new proposal for revenue sharing table before the National Assembly.

It had proposed 53.69% for the federal government. Ultimately, it is obviously based on

the new proposal that Nigerian fiscal federalism will continue to skew in favour of the

Federal Government. Inevitably, the new revenue formula proposal is testy and

controversial in nature. Thus, ‘the formula is weighted to favour the Federal

Government.

31

The Federal Government has no business having more than 35% of the revenue

because it has no work; that is why it spends money anyhow’ (Sagay, 2008:42).

In analysing the approximate net allocation to the thirty states between May 29, 1999 and

November 2003 in Nigeria, over two trillion naira has been allocated to the states.

However, it is pertinent to note that the increment in allocation to states has not provided

the needed impetus that will usher in development and growth at the state level. The

revenue increment over the years has only further created an avenue for most of the state

governors to loot their treasury. While the revenue allocation has not led to any

meaningful development, it is also discernible that the Federal Government is taking

more than it can chew.

Various criteria used for allocating resources were not based on a rational

consideration but on the basis of other primordial considerations. It is argued that this

formula only crippled the revenue generation capacity of each state, as states rely wholly

on the monthly allocation. The effect of this monthly routine is that it has merely become

a tradition to receive money, pay salary and appropriate the remaining part of the money

for personal aggrandizement.

The revenue allocation formula in Nigeria inevitably encourages parasitic

governance where states become relaxed and endlessly expectant of the monthly ritual of

allocation from the federal government. The implication of this is that while it limits the

capacity of states to provide public goods needed to promote and sustain governance, it

simultaneously and inextricably the Internally Generated Revenue (IGR) of each state,

thus making the states perpetually dependent on the federal government.

This arrangement of allocation sharing in Nigeria threatens initiatives, innovation and

modern ideas of generating resources, especially money, for sustainable development.

The federal government, on the other hand, cannot also be divested of this

revenue allocation ‘pathology’ since it appropriates and concentrates too much money at

the Centre leading to waste and corruption. The federal government lacks a basic plan for

the transformation of resources into concrete developments. This also explains the

reasons for the characterization of politics in Nigeria as a ‘do or die’ phenomenon.

The federal politics is soaked in the miry clay of violence and accumulation of

weaponry to propagate election victory. Election victory is not determined by the

electorate but by the amount of thugs and weapon of violence. Since federal government

becomes distribution point, it becomes attractive to political jobbers who are bereft of

idea of politics of development and development of politics. Politicians become

32

interested in the looting of national treasury thereby playing politics of decline and

decline of politics.

Little wonder that despite enormous resources in Nigeria, the country is still rated

as one of poorest countries in the world; country with little or no opportunities for

capacity building and empowerment of youths and women.

HISTORY OF REVENUE ALLOCATION IN NIGERIA

Table 1 S/N ITEMS DATE FEDERAL STATE LOCAL

GOVT SPECIAL FOUND

TOTAL

1 Phillipson 1964 - Largely By Derivation Resulting In Nortern Region 46%, Western region 3%, Eastern region 24%.

- - -

2 Hicks phillipson

1951 -- By derivation (from taxes that can be originally identified need (e.g Population and national interest)

- - -

3 Chicls commission

1953 5% of general import and excise duty on tobacco 50% of export duty on hide and skin

Regions 50% on general import duty on derivation basis region 50% import and exercise duty on motor tobacco basis based on derivation basis. Region 60% of import of excise duty on tobacco based on derivation. Region 100% of import duty on motor spirit, 100% of the mining rent royalty should go to the region 50% -50% share bases on export duty hide and skin

- - -

4 Raisman 1958 Introduced Sales produce - - -

33

commission distributable pool account (DPA) under federal control from DPA 30% of mining rate and loyalty DPA – according to principles of continuity minimum responsibility, population and balance development of federation.

and motor vehincle tax 10% from DPA, 50% of mining royalty return to the region of derivation from DPA 20% of mining rate and royalty DPA to all other region from DPA

5. Bonn’s commission

1964 No fundamental change

Proceeds of the execise duty imposed on locally produces motor spirit and diesel oil, the federation shall pay to the region duty based on their consumption

- - -

6 Dina commission

1968 DPA renamed states joint Account (SJA) and that a special grant Account (SGA) allocation of fund based on tax effort balance, development and national interest.

Off shore operations revenue share: federal government 60% SJA- 30% and SGA -10% onshore royalty shared: FG 15%, State of derivation 10% SJA 70%, SGA 5% from revenue and excise duty shared: FG 60%, SJA- 30% and 10% revenue from export duty shared: FG 15% State of derivation 10% SJA 70%, SGA 5%.

- - -

7 Federal military decree

1975 80% mining rent and royalty, 35% import duty, 100% on motor spirit, tobacco

DPA re-divided among the state on the following bases – 50%

- - -

34

and hide and skin 50% of excise duty.

based on equality of State, 25% based on population

8. Aboyede commission

1977 57.00% 30% 10% 3% 100%

9. Okigbo commission

1980 53% 30% 10% 7% 100%

10 Revenue allocation Act

1981 55% 30.50% 10% 4.5% 100%

11. Pre supreme court legal law

April 2001 48% 24% 20% 7.5% 100%

12 Supreme court RFMAC Proposal

August 2001

41.23% 31% 16% 11.70% 100%

13 Supreme court rulling

April 2002 -- - - Unconstitutional -

14 Post supreme court executive order no 1

May 2002 56% 24% 20% 0.00% 100%

15 Post supreme court executive order no 2

July 2002 54.68% 24.72% 20.60% 0.00 100%

16 Post supreme court RFMAC proposal

Jan 2003 46.63% 33% 20.37% 0.00% 100%

17 Latest RFMAC

Sept 20, 2004

47.19% 31.10% 15.21% National priority service fund Ecology 1.50 mineral development 1.75 Agricultural development 1.75, Reserve fund -1.50. total = 6.50, joint FG/SG/LG management.

-

18 Presidential proposal

Submitted to NASS Jan 25,2005

47.19% 31.10% 15.21% Ditto horizontal formula state derivation fund broad to manage general ecological find 1.56% solid mineral development fund 1.75% national fund development 1.50%

100%

19 Yar’ Adua/ Jonathan revenue formula

2010 52.68% 26.72% 20.60% - 100%

35

20 Current revenue formula

- 50% 24% 20% 6.5% 100%

Sources: European journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative science – issue 51 (2012)

CURRENT REVENUE ALLOCATION FORMULA

Table 2.

The report of the revenue sharing formula

(a) Federal Government = 50%

(b) State Government = 24%

(c) Local Government = 20%

(d) Special Fund = 6.5%

Total = 100%

The Value added Tax (VAT) is also currently distributed as follows:

(i) Federal Government = 15%

(ii) State Government = 50%

(iii) Local Government =35%

Source: Federal Office of Statistics, Benin City.

OIL REVENUE FORMULA Oil revenue allocation has been the subject of much contention well before

Nigeria gained its independence. Allocations have varied from as much as 50%, owing to

the First Republic's high degree of regional autonomy, and as low as 10% during the

military dictatorships. This is the table below.

Table 3

Oil revenue sharing formula

Year Federal govt State govt Local govt Special

Projects Derivation Formula

1958 40% 60% 0% 0% 50% 1968 80% 20% 0% 0% 10% 1977 75% 22% 3% 0% 10% 1982 55% 32.5% 10% 2.5% 10% 1989 50% 24% 15% 11% 10% 1995 48.5% 24% 20% 7.5% 13% 2001 48.5% 24% 20% 7.5% 13% 2002 54.68% 24.72% 20.60% 0% 13% 2004 47.19% 31.10% 15.21% 6.5% 13% 2013 52.68% 26.72%. 20.60% 0% 13%

36

* State allocations are based on 5 criteria: equality (equal shares per state), population,

social development, land mass, and revenue generation.

*The derivation formula refers to the percentage of the revenue oil producing states

retain from taxes on oil and other natural resources produced in the state. World Bank

Report, 2013.

REMOTE AND IMIIDIATE CAUSES OF NIGER DELTA CRISIS The discovery of oil in Nigeria’s Niger Delta Region in 1957 triggered a chain of

events that has led to the political and economic marginalization of the inhabitants.

Indeed, it has been argued that oil has been more of curse than blessing to the people of

who have been at the receiving end of horrendous government oppression and brutality,

often resulting in fatalities. Despite 41 years of oil production and hundreds of billions of

dollars of oil revenue, the local people remain in abject poverty without even the most

basic amenities such as water and electricity.

Although the Niger Delta has a long history of violence over the years, just that

the situation has grown from bad to worse to disastrous recently to the emergence of

armed militant groups who are willing to kill as part of their campaigns for a greater

share of the region oil wealth. This can be attributable to several historical and societal

underpinning of the growing insurgency factors, among which we have; the

marginalization of the peoples of the Niger delta, environmental degradation, bad

governance and inconsistent policy framework, and the divide and rule policy of the oil

companies etc.

MARGINALIZATION AND ABJECT POVERTY The Niger Delta communities have remained grossly socio-economically

underdeveloped and pauperized amidst the immense oil wealth owing to systematic dis-

equilibrium in the production exchange relationship between the state, the Trans-national

companies and the people. Enormous money had been derived from oil export but the

area has been subjected to severe land degradation, socio-economic disorganization,

increasing poverty, misery, military occupation and bloody violence.

Oil extraction has impacted most disastrously on the socio-physical environment

of the Niger Delta oil bearing communities massively threatening the fragile subsistent

peasant economy and bio-diversity and hence their entire social livelihood and very

survival. The oil producing communities have basically remained dependent and

underdeveloped, persistently dis-empowered, socio-culturally marginalized and

psychologically alienated.

37

The wealth derived from oil resource exploitation and exports benefit directly only the

operators of the oil industry and the bureaucrats in government (Owabukeruyele, 2000).

Ejibunu (2007) posits that ‘the discovery of oil in the Niger Delta region in 1957

triggered a chain of events that has led to the political and economic marginalization of

the inhabitants.” Despite over forty years of oil production in Nigeria and hundreds of

billions of dollars of oil revenue (Oronto, et al 2003), the inhabitants of the Niger delta

region especially the riverine (creeks) remain in abject poverty. Poverty level is about

80% while unemployment level is about 70%. They live without even the most basic

amenities such as pipe-borne water and electricity (Ibaba, 2005). Mukagbo (2004) opines

that “in the Niger Delta, scenes of abject poverty pervade the area, very similar to what

you find in a refugee camp”.

The distribution of resources from the federation account has been another source

of marginalization for the Niger delta. Prior to 1999, the allocation to the Niger delta

from the federation account of revenues from oil, decreased progressively as Nigeria

became more dependent on oil. In 1960, the allocation was 50%, then down to 45% in

1970, declining to 20% in 1982, down to 3% in 1992. It was raised to 13% following

persistent agitations from the Niger Deltans (Ikelegbe, 2006).

MASSIVE UNEMPLOYMENT

Unemployment is very high among the people of the Niger delta. The youth from

the Niger delta do not benefit from the presence of the transnational corporations

especially the oil companies operating in their communities. Less than 5% of the people

from the Niger delta work in the companies, while women from the region working with

the oil companies are less than 1%. Those who benefit through employment by the oil

companies are from the non-oil producing parts of Nigeria (Ejibunu, 2007; Brisibie,

2001).

ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION According to the World Bank, there are five great plagues of mankind: war,

famine, pestilence, environmental pollution, and death. The Niger Delta is in the throes

of becoming an environmental wastebasket. From the oil spills to the round-the-clock

gas flares and effluents from industrial wastes, the fragile ecosystem of the Niger Delta is

under constant assault. However, it is still a mystery that no comprehensive study of oil

exploration in Niger Delta and its effect on the environment exists (Ile & Akukwe,

2001).

38

“The unbridled exploitation of crude oil and natural gas beneath the lands of the

Niger Delta has caused indescribable and irredeemable ecological devastation of the

Niger delta land” (Azaiki, 2003). Okaba (2005: 18 – 20) sums up the environmental

impact of the oil industry in the Niger Delta of Nigeria as land deprivation, soil quality

alteration, destruction of aquatic ecosystem and air pollution.

DESTRUCTION OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEM A major environmental tragedy in the Niger Delta is the waste of aquatic

ecosystem. This aspect is quite significant to the people, being that it constitutes a grave

threat to a hitherto economic hub of their lives—fishing. It is a common sight that in the

process of oil exploration and production materials such as drill cuttings, drill mud and

other fluids that are used to stimulate production are discharged into the environment and

most end up in the streams and rivers (Nwaomah, 2009a). These chemicals are not easily

degradable and the skimming of oil on the water surface hardly solve the problem since

most of the oil might have sunk to the bottom of the water surface leaving grave

consequences such as: (a) surface and ground water quality deterioration in terms of

portability, aesthetic and recreation, (b) destruction and reduction of fish life and

fisheries production of the waters, (c) destruction by acute and sublehal toxicity of

aquatic flora and fauna of spills on water and benthic macro (Okaba, 2005: 19-20.).

SOIL QUALITY ALTERATION Soil quality alteration is another environmental problem that the Niger Deltans

contend with as a result of the oil industry. It is an environmental condition that is caused

by a collection of oil exploration and exploitation activities such as construction of flow

lines and trunk line networks, terminals, digging of location waste pits and barrow pits,

oil spillage either from equipment failure, human error, corrosion of pipes due to age and

sabotage (Nwaomah, 2009b). It is estimated that as at 2002 about 8581 oil spills,

involving nearly 28 million barrels of oil have occurred in the Niger Delta. (Okaba,

2005: 15).

Other factors responsible for the soil quality alteration are the unceasing gas

flares; drill cuttings, drill mud and refinery waste. The harmful effects of these elements

on the soil are unquestionable (Nwaomah, 2009a). Owabukeruyele argued that the

compounds from the numerous petroleum wastes contain organic chemicals such as

phenol cyanide, sulpheide-suspended solids, chromium and biological oxygen that leave

destructive effects on the land and water (Owabukeruyele, 2000).

39

AIR POLLUTION Gas flaring is a primary source of air pollution in the Niger delta. The oil

companies are wrecking the ecosystem of the Niger delta through uncontrollable gas

flaring. Gases flaring takes place twenty four hours and some are believed to been

burning for over thirty years, thereby resulting in the release of hydrogen sulphide. The

oil companies are not only destroying the Niger delta, but they are also contributing to

global warming (Comet Newspapers, 2001).

The pollutions released and the noises from the vibration are injurious to human

health….

It is also argued that the chemical emissions from the flaring contribute to acid rain,

trigger skin diseases (Okaba, 2005) and the quick corrosion of roofing sheets in the Niger

Delta area, a common sight in this region. A secondary source of air pollution in the

Niger Delta is the incidents of fire resulting from leakages from the exposed and

corroded oil pipes that are scattered all over the region (Nwaomah, 2009a).

The environmental degradation being carried out by the oil companies in the Niger

delta as a result of their non-compliance with internationally recognized environmental

standards are damages that their consequences cannot be limited by time. Unfortunately,

available evidence shows that the trend is worsening as the government lack the political

will to ensure compliance to rules by the oil companies (Doran, 1995; Ojomu, 2002;

Susa, 1999).

DIVIDE AND RULE POLICY Over the years the oil producing companies operating in the Niger delta have

adopted a divide and rule method in which they identify for compensation, people in the

host communities they believe have the capability to influence the indigenes to ensure

that they have a peaceful environment to operate in, at minimal cost. A minute part of the

money that should have been spent on corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the

development of the host communities are paid to such individuals and groups. As such in

some communities, traditional rulers and local community leaders have become corrupt

as they have become recipients of various contract awards and cash payments at the

detriment of the communities they represent. (Kemedi, 2003).

Where there has been crisis of leadership in the host communities, the oil

producing companies have tended to support whichever faction they believe had the

capability of disrupting its operations “as opposed to which groups or factions were

properly constituted and traditionally legitimate” (Ikelegbe, 2006). In furtherance of this

40

policy, the Shell petroleum development company (SPDC) ignored the traditional rulers

and elders and accorded recognition, partnered and related with the youths, simply

because the youths had more disruptive power on oil production. Therefore the youths

emerged as community leaders. These youths became the power brokers, the liaison with

the MNCs, and the object of MNCs patronage (Kemedi, 2003; Ile & Akukwe, 2001).

The realization by the youths that violent protests and disruptive actions elicited

immediate actions and payments by the oil companies led to emergence of several youth

groups or militias. These youth groups became more daring in their tactics, from minor

threats of disruption of activities emerged full blown militancy activities. “Some youths

began to hijack ships and helicopters, kidnap MNCs staff, and vandalize facilities in

order to obtain pay offs, ransoms and payments from the oil companies.” (Ikelegbe,

2006).

DEPRIVATION The Niger Delta is a prime example of deprivation, directly traceable to the absence

of true federalism. The Niger Deltans, whose crude oil and gas reserve are the substratum

of the oil licenses and leases are not extended to them. Graduates of the Niger Delta that

have good certificates are denied employment opportunities.

The crude oil and gas reserves without which there is no oil economy, oil company,

oil revenues and foreign exchange for Nigeria, were pretended to be not important. Thus,

this unfair government led to genuine fears of the Niger Deltans. They hope to benefit

groom the oil economy, but they became highly deprived by the state governments in the

Niger Delta, in the present civilian dispensation starting from 1999.

Thus, this frustration led to aggression that arose from unrealized genuine

expectations of the Niger Deltans, from their God-given crude oil.

BAD GOVERNANCE AND CORRUPTION One of the causes of the Niger Delta crisis is unbridled corruption, lack of

accountability and management, and official kleptomania and consummate dishonesty,

both at the national and local levels.

The Niger Delta region is riddled with bad governance/corruption on the part of

government officials, both at the state and local government levels. It has been argued

that, if government officials in the region have utilized judiciously their monthly

allocations, to better the lot of ordinary people, through the creation of jobs, and embark

on infrastructural development of the region, the situation would have been better than

41

this current sorry state. Rather, the jumbo monthly allocations are spent on frivolous

things that have no corresponding bearings on the life of the people.

INSINCERITY OF THE FEDERALGOVERNMENT The alleged insincerity of the federal government of Nigeria to fully develop the

region in partnership with the state governments. Commission like oil minerals

producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC), created by the region of

General Ibrahim Babangida, for the development of the area did not achieve its due to

poor funding on the part of the federal Government, in spite of the development of area

from crude oil. This gradually led to some leaders in the region agitation for resource

control.

The government of Obasanjo equally set up another agency, the Niger Delta

Development Commission (NNDC), to bring development to the doorsteps of the people,

but the operation of the commission is being hampered by lack of money to carry out its

mandates, and it became a serious obstacle in pursuing the goal of developing the region.

According to Akanna Campbell, Executive Secretary, South-South Community

Development Union (SSCDU), a Niger Delta research group, the insincerity of the

Federal government made the people want to confront the issue in a militant way. In his

words, “the situation forced many indigenes to begin feel frustrated that another hope

and promise has gone down the drain. It marked the beginning of hydra-headed issue of

kidnapping of oil workers. The people, particularly the youth, in their own judgment,

now felt that the best way to react was by disturbing the flow of oil.

SOCIO-POLITICAL AND ECONOMC IMPACT OF NIGER DELTA CRISIS ON

THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY The crisis in the Niger delta region arising from the activities of the different

militant groups operating in the region has brought about some negative implications, not

only on oil production and other economic activities, but also on governance in general

(Ejibunu, 2007). The activities of the militants have impacted the Nigerian economy in

various ways.

ECONOMIC IMPACT

Government The government of Nigeria relies solely on the earrings derived from the sales of

oil to beable to carry its obligations. The crisis which began since December 2005 has at

times forced oil production shutdowns of up to 800,000 barrels per days 46, threatening

Nigerian government plans to plans to nearly double production to four million barrels a

42

day 2010. The crisis is said to have cost the country an annual loss of 4.4 billion dollars

(3.2 billion euros). The campaign of the foremost militants group, MND, has heightened

tension in the area and is threatening to cripple Nigeria’s crude oil export.

International supply of Crude oil The Niger Delta crisis since it began has rippled across energy markets,

contributing to higher prices and tighter supplies. Attacks on oil platforms in the region

usually push oil prices up. According to a report by international Herald tribune, an

attack by gunmen on a boat carrying oil workers to an offshore rig in the Delta on Friday,

8th June, 2007, pushed up oil prices by more than $1.50, to $63.38 a barrel.

Lull in Business Activities Since the start of the crisis, particularly hostage taking and attack on oil

instillations in the Niger Delta, there has been dearth of business activities. Restiveness

has reduced growth in the business sector in the past three years. In Rivers State alone,

the situation has assumed a worrisome dimension to the extents that about 80 percent of

companies in the state have stopped operations as expatriates have either gone their

countries or have taken cover in other areas.

Downsizing of oil companies employees and disruption of business activities As a result of the activities of militants in the Niger delta region, “SPDC retrenched

3, 500 workers in September 2007” (Punch Newspapers, 2007a: 14). Indoroma

Petrochemical Company shut down its operations thereby rendering over 3, 000 youths

jobless and aggravating the unemployment situation (Sunday Trust Newspaper, 2007).

Restiveness has reduced growth in the business sector. As a consequence of militant

activity Royal Dutch Shell has seen its production dropping from one million bpd to

about 380,000 bpd at its Bonny terminal in the South of the Delta. Exxon has also

experienced increased insurgent activity in its Nigerian operations. ….. Nigeria is already

suffering from production slow down due to militancy, currently the Niger Delta is only

exporting 1.8 million bpd, compared with a targeted 2.2 million bpd (Harper, 2009).

In Rivers state, over 80% of the companies have stopped operations, as expatriates have

either gone to their home countries or relocated to safer environments (Ejibunu, 2007).

The MTN had 43 base stations shut down as militant activities made them inaccessible

(Punch Newspapers, 2007b).

43

SECURITY IMPLICATION OF THE CRISIS

Confrontations with Military Under the aegis of the joint military Task force (JTF), have been fighting with the

militants since 2006 when movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)

started its violent activates. MEND and other militia groups have been able to withstand

the military in several clashes they have had. They have been to do this because of their

access to sophisticated weapons which they use in attacking oil platforms and facilities.

To make matters worse, the militant’s tactics and weaponry are increasingly sophiscated.

Kidnapping and hostage taking Kidnapping and hostage taking has been a major tactic of the militant groups with

foreign nationals working with oil companies as primary targets. In January 2006,

Hostage taking of oil workers started in Bayelsa after the declaration of ‘operation orido

danger’ by MEND with the kidnapping of four set of hostages…. Over two hundred

expatriates had been kidnapped …. Although most have been

released within weeks in exchange for ransoms, typically hundreds of thousands of

dollars (Amaize, 2006).

Though casualty figures from kidnapping by militants operating in the Niger delta

has been low, reportedly put at about fifteen. However, the implication of the

kidnappings which involved mainly foreign workers and development partners on

Nigeria’s economic development has been enormous. It succeeded in scaring away

potential development partners and robbed the Nigerian state of the benefit of such

development alliances and opportunities. The state of insecurity has led to a reduced

volume of investments and capital flow to the region (Akpan, 2010; Saturday Punch,

2007).

Illegal Oil Bunkering The operations of militants in the Niger delta and the insecurity it has made it

impossible for security agencies to adequately cover locations of various oil facilities.

This has created a veritable ground for illegal oil bunkering to thrive in the region. Illegal

Oil Bunkering, an euphemism for oil theft, has assumed considerable dimensions in the

Niger Delta. Estimates range from 30,000 to 200,000 bbl/day (Oudeman, 2006).

Several of the militant groups are also believed to be involved in illegal oil

bunkering. It is believed that illegal oil bunkering has become a major source of funding

for the operations of the militants in the Niger delta. Militant warlords who engage in

illegal oil bunkering justify their actions by claiming that it is a means of providing

44

income for the impoverished residents of the oil producing communities. It is reported

that one days’ worth of illegal oil bunkering in the Niger delta (at 100, 000 bbl at $15bbl)

will buy quality weapons for and sustain a group of 1, 500 youths for two months (ICG,

2006).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The Marxist Political Economy approach is deemed fit to be adopted as the

analytical construct in this study. The reason has been that, the approach scientifically

studies the society in its totality and takes into consideration the interconnection of social

relations, class conflict and the organic relationship between the sub-structure (economy)

and the super structure (politics).

Political economy is concerned with the social laws of production and distribution

(Lange, 1974:7). The Marxist political economy approach is a holistic, historical

orientation, which is used for the analysis of social formations and their contradicting

relationships. It mainly focuses on the economic laws which govern the production and

distribution of material benefits among individuals and groups at different stages of

development of society (Iwarimie, 1991:50). Put differently, the approach is seen as the

window to understand the laws that govern the economic life of the society. It explains

the relationship between what man produce and how he benefits from the surplus he

produce. The approach show how the various parts of the superstructure are used as

instruments of the ruling class domination, and as mechanism of oppression of the

subject class.

According to Ake (1981), a major advantage of this approach is that, it emphasizes

the relatedness of social phenomena. This links exist between the economic structure and

social structure. More so, the approach helps to penetrate deep into the processes and

policies, lay bare their essence and then explain concrete forms of their manifestation.

In essence the political economy approach will unravel the oil production and lack

of development paradox in the Niger Delta, which is attributed to the obnoxious laws

that governs the oil industry, the lopsided federalism and revenue allocation mechanism

in the country, neglect and marginalization of the ethnic minorities that bear the burden

of oil exploration and exploitation, etc. It will also explain the lack of political will on the

part of the federal government to develop the region.

On the other hand, the history of all hitherto existed society is the history of class

struggle (Marx, 1977). Thus, the class analysis framework of the approach best explains

the endemic class struggle between the exploiters (Federal Government and Oil

45

Multinationals) and the exploited Niger Deltans. According to Marxist thought,

consciousness means man’s ability to ideally reproduce in his mind the surrounding

reality existing beyond and independent of him, the production of which is engendered

by contradictions (domination, exploitation and marginalization in society. It posits that

the dominated, exploited and marginalized groups, which paradoxically generated or

bears the burden of creating resources, seeks to change the status quo when it becomes

conscious (Libman and Borisox, 1985:125; Marx and Engels, 1977; Luckac, 1968).

It is imperative to note that the consciousness of exploitation is enhanced by the

movement of a class from a class-in-itself (an unconscious class category), to a class-for-

itself (which is a conscious class category). The above explanation also captures the

transition from Ethnic group-in-itself to Ethnic group-for-itself in the Niger Delta (Ibaba,

2005:25). Therefore, the agitations (now very violent) in the Niger Delta by the ethnic

minorities are attributed to the consciousness of exploitation and the struggle to change

the status quo. Ken Saro-wiwa buttresses this point when he opined that:

There is tremendous awareness in Ogoni now… there is no woman or child who

does not know… that the Nigerian government is cheating them and that the ethnic

majorities in Nigeria are cheating them… They also know that … something has to be

done to stop it… (Cited in, Ibaba, 2002:83).

More importantly, it is the frustration of the initial peaceful agitations inability to

realize set goals that necessitated the violent militant agitations in vogue. The argument

is that, psychology teaches that frustration creates worry which in turn leads to anger and

ultimately violence (Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis) and that captures reality in the

Niger Delta.

46

CHAPTER THREE

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE NIGER DELTA CONFLICT The struggles over oil, particularly the quest to correct the perceived injustices

embedded in the separation of those that profit from the oil production and

commoditization (MNCs and the Nigerian ruling elites), from the others (dispossessed

local inhabitants) whose land and waters the oil is extracted, has led to the violent

agitation in the Niger Delta region (Obi, 2010). The publicity and tempo of the agitation

for environmental justice increased in the region with the formation of the Movement for

the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) in August, 1990; the November, 1995 hanging

of Saro-Wiwa and eight Ogoni compatriots; the punitive expedition against the

inhabitants of Odi in February, 2000; the formation of the Ijaw Youth Council in

December 11, 1998 and the famous Kaiama Declaration on 11 December 1998. Others

groups that were formed during these periods include the Movement for the Survival of

Ijaw Ethnic Nationality (MOSIEN), Community Rights Initiative (CORI), Niger Delta

Women for Justice (NDWJ), Chiccoco Movement, Ijaw National Congress and Egbema

National Congress. These groups have continued to criticize the government and the oil

MNCs for the environmental damage caused due to the oil exploration activities by the

Multinational corporations (MNCs). This situation in the Niger Delta is well captured by

Ken Saro-Wiwa in his presentation on why he championed Ogoni cause, in this way: ‘I

looked at Ogoni [Niger Delta] and found that the entire place was now a wasteland; and

that we are victims of an ecological war, an ecological war that is very serious and

unconventional. It is unconventional because no bones are broken, no one is maimed.

People are not alarmed because they can’t see what is happening. But human beings are

at risk, plants and animals are at risk. The air and water are poisoned. Finally, the land

itself dies. Oil has brought nothing but disaster to our people [Niger Delta] (Saro-Wiwa,

1998). What can be inferred from this is that the failure of the Nigerian government to

address the development needs of the region and to address the environmental damage

caused by the oil exploration activities of the MNCs created a feeling of injustice in the

Niger Delta people and led to the conflicts and insecurity in the Niger Delta region. It

then becomes clear that the struggle is for an end to injustice, discrimination, exclusion,

oppression, domination and exploitation, systematic destruction of the ecosystem,

corporate and environmental bad governance, a call for equitable federation of Nigeria’s

economic policy. It is sad to note that since around 2005, the pattern of unarmed peaceful

protests and demonstrations used by these groups against the unwholesome activities of

47

the MNCs operating in the Niger Delta region has been shifted to a violent one by the

armed militant groups, like the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

(MEND), Egbesu Boys, Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), and others to

the extent that the whole region had become highly militarized. The rise of groups like

the MEND is said to be traceable to the lack of space for peaceful opposition movements

and the failure of the government and the MNCs in ensuring that the Niger Delta people

enjoy the benefits of oil production (Bassey, 2008).

The response of the government to the claims of the oil producing areas has been

classified by Suberu (Suberu, 1996) (Note 1) into three forms: redistributive,

reorganizational and regulatory state responses. According to Suberu, ‘redistributive

policies are state decisions that consciously dispense valued resources to one group at the

expense of other claimants to state resources. Reorganizational policies refer to state

efforts to restructure or reconfigure political or administrative institutions and

relationships in order to accommodate group demands or strengthen the efficacy of

centralized state power. Regulatory policies entail the mandatory imposition of sanctions

or restrictions on individuals or groups that are perceived to pose a threat to state

cohesion and order.’ These included the creation of separate federal States in the Niger

Delta, viz Akwa Ibom, Delta, and Bayelsa States in 1987, 1991 and 1996, respectively

(reorganizational policies) (Omotola, 2007), the increase in the percentage of revenue

allocation based on derivation from 1.5% to 3% in 1992 and 13% in 1999 (Osaghae,

2008), the installation of His Excellency, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, the former Governor of

Bayelsa State, an Ijaw man, as Vice-President of Nigeria in 2007 under the People’s

Democratic Party (PDP) (now President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in May 2010

following the death of President Umaru Yar’Adua on the 5th of May, 2010) and his

subsequent election in May 2011 for another four year term and the establishment of

development agencies, such as NDDB, OMPADEC, NDDC, etc. (redistributive

policies). The repressive response of the State include the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa

and eight other Ogoni leaders in 1995 by the Military government of late Gen. Sani

Abacha, the Umuechem massacre of 1990 (African Concord, 1990; Suberu, 1996) (Note

2), the Ogoni genocide (The News May, 1993; Suberu, 1996) (Note 3), the Odi Massacre

of 1999 (Aghalino, 2009) (Note 4), the Odioma killings in 2005 (Aghalino, 2009) (Note

5) and Gbaramatu Massacre of 2009 (Adebayo, 2009) (Note 6) among several

communities in the Niger Delta. The protesters in these communities not only have their

properties destroyed but were also killed, maimed, raped, displaced or forced into exile

48

(Oshionebo, 2009; Ekine, 2008). The local inhabitants see these as a form of repression

to keep them (minorities) from voicing even the most moderate claims.

These responses from the government and the oil MNCs elicited violence from the Niger

Delta people in the form of kidnapping, hostage taking, bunkering and oil theft, pipeline

vandalisation, bombings, oil-facility sabotage, destructions of properties and even

killings of people in pursuance of the struggle.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION AND CRISIS RESOLUTION IN THE NIGER DELTA.

The federal Government of Nigeria has used both the state instrument of coercion

or violence and peaceful negotiations so as to put to rest these twin cankerworms that

have more than ever before threatened the very existence of the Nigerian State. Better

still, one would say that the Nigerian government has used both the “stick (force) and

carrot (peace)” approaches in handling these two land mine issues.

Using the “stick” approach, the Nigerian Mobile Police Force (MOPOL) brutally

quelled a peaceful youth protest against Shell at Umuechem in Rivers State, and the

community was virtually destroyed on 31st October 1990. Eighty people were killed and

about 500 houses were destroyed, thus triggering an unprecedented number of internally

displaced people in the history of that community (International Crisis Group 2006).

Again, in 2003, an army of occupation known as the Joint Task Force (JTF) code

– named Operation Restore Hope was formed for the consistent, persistent and

aggressive suppression of oil-related protests in the Niger Delta.

Note however that the government has also used the “carrot” approach too. In the

area of fiscal allocation, apart from the huge sums of amount allocated from the

federation account to oil producing states, there is the constitutional 13 percent derivative

principle set aside for the Niger Delta region. The federal government has also responded

to the issue of the Niger Delta by establishing the following;

1. The Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) established in 1961 by the Niger

Delta Development Act (1961) based on the recommendations of the Willink’s

Commission.

2. The Oil and Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC)

created by Decree 23 of 1995.

3. The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) established in 2000.

4. The Niger Delta Regional Master Plan launched on 27 March 2007.

5. The Ministry of Niger Delta created in 2008.

49

6. The Unconditional Amnesty to the Militants 2009 – 2010 with post amnesty

conditionalities given due attention.

However, Given the major negative implication of the crisis for all interest

involved, it is not surprising to find that a number of initiatives have been adopted by the

Nigerian State and the all companies to assuage the anger of the communities in the

Niger Delta. Among the initiatives, the following have been popular:

- The project Approach (undertaking such projects as building hospitals, school etc.

- The Agency approach (establishing development agencies such as NDE, OPADEC

and NDDC).

- The political Empowerment Approach (creation of Local government, states and

geo-political zones, appointment of prominent individuals from the Niger Delta to

positions of national leadership).

- Providing Development Frameworks (establishing plans for development such as

master plans, national state Economic Empowerment Development Strategies –

NEEDs, SEEDs, LEEDs, or enunciating national policy on poverty Eradication

which are then passed on to other state institutions and agencies to implement.

- The financial Empowerment Approach (giving cash or block grants to states, and

communities providing micro credits to community members through third parties,

etc).

- The Rule making Approach (as in the revenues derivation formula, making laws

and regulations for the ‘development’ of the Niger Delta or as part of some general

legislation, on property rights, environmental, etc.).

- The talk-shop Approach (Convening National Submits on the Niger Delta; inviting

leaders recognized by the state and the oil companies for discussions/consultations

etc.)

- Constitution of the presidential committee on peace and conflict resolution on the

Niger Delta region by the president, with similar committee set up in the nine states

in the region to facilitate and catalyze the resolution set up in the conflict.

- The unsuccessful attempt by the Federal Government to host a Niger Delta

stakeholder’s summit.

Unfortunately, these initiatives have not and cannot work because they share

individually and collectively some common weaknesses.

50

First and the most fundamental weakness is that they are based upon a wrong

understanding of the essence of the crisis and hence challenge of development in the

Niger Delta.

A second weakness which which they oil share is the adopted solution are at best

not sincere and at worst, constructed to maintain the statuesque. This explains the

deliberate subventions of the development programmes by the very state officials who

approve them.

Thirdly, it is also clear that there is no clear pattern to the process of development in

the adopted programmes. What activities occur are disjointed and usually have an

emergency character. More often than not, they are varied responses to intense agitations

by the people of the Niger Delta. The response is thus abandoned as soon as the

agitations die or are put down.

Fourthly, they are usually commandist in nature. They are the ideas of those who

are responsible for the En-crisis in the Niger Delta, while attempts are often made to

incorporate and co-opt certain sections and levels of the elite of the Niger Delta into the

decision making process, these attempts and their results in terms of the nature of the

elements and their results in terms of the nature of the elements co-opted usually further

undermine in a fundamental sense the past and current achievement of those that

genuinely committed to the resolution of the problems in the Niger Delta.

Finally and every importantly, the initiatives are pursed within the framework of an

invigorated garrisoning agenda.

NIGER DELTA MASTER PLAN The Niger Delta Region has witnessed a number of attempts to influence the pace

and nature of development in the area and improve the standard of life for its people. For

the most part the legacy of these schemes translates into a picture of missed

opportunities, low value for money and, not least, enormous disappointment for

communities of the Niger Delta whose hopes and aspirations have been raised and then

repeatedly shattered. This part of the Master Plan document puts into focus the efforts

that have been made so far to put the NDR on the path of sustainable development.

The Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) The unique characteristics of the Niger Delta Region lay behind Sir Henry

Willink's Commission (1958) recommendation that the area deserved special

developmental attention by the Federal Government of Nigeria. This was even before

crude oil became a critical factor in Nigeria's development. In response, the Federal

51

Government established the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) in 1960 to

manage the developmental needs and challenges of the region. The special area was

defined as Yenagoa Province, Degema Province, the Ogoni Division of Port Harcourt

and the Western Ijaw Division of Delta Province.

In its seven years of existence, however, the NDDB achieved little before it faded

away following the military coup in 1966 and the outbreak of civil war in 1967. After the

civil war, the NDDB was not revived and the Government showed no interest in

addressing the developmental needs of the region. Rather, it decided to use the

substantial revenue accruing from oil production in the region to fund a massive

rehabilitation and reconstruction program in various parts of the country. Even with the

quadrupling of oil prices in 1973 and the subsequent oil windfall, there was no deliberate

attempt to use part of the oil wealth to address the issue of poverty and the

developmental needs of the region.

Presidential Task Force (the 1.5% Committee) Following growing agitation for a renewed focus on the development of the region,

the 1979/83 Administration set up a Presidential Task Force (popularly known as the

1.5% Committee) in 1980 and 1.5% of the Federation Account was allocated to the

Committee to tackle the developmental problems of the region. Although the Committee

existed until early years of the 1985/93 regime, it was largely ineffective.

There were only a few projects to show for the funding received from the

Federation Account and very little visible beneficial impacts on the welfare of the people

of the oil producing communities.

Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) Further growing discontent and restiveness in the oil producing areas, caused the

Babangida regime to set up the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Commission (OMPADEC)

in 1992. Three percent of federal oil revenue was allocated to the Commission to address

the developmental needs of the areas.

Although OMPADEC initially raised the spirit and hopes of the people,

inefficiency and corruption in the organisation resulted in yet more disappointment.

Between 1992 and 1999 when it was wound up, OMPADEC completed several

projects but bequeathed numerous abandoned or unfinished projects and huge debts.

There is no reliable information on the total amount the Commission received from the

Federation Account, but what is clear is that OMPADEC suffered from lack of focus,

inadequate and irregular funding, official profligacy, corruption, excessive political

52

interference, lack of transparency and accountability, and high overhead expenditure.

Most of its projects had little to do with poverty reduction and the vast majority of the

people did not benefit from its activities. In brief, OMPADEC failed abjectly to abate

discontent and restiveness in the Region. Majority of the people did not benefit from its

activities. In brief, OMPADEC failed abjectly to abate discontent and restiveness in the

Region.

Given this background it is hardly surprising that one of the first actions of

President Obasanjo, soon after his inauguration in May 1999, was to submit a Bill to the

National Assembly for the establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission

(NDDC) to replace OMPADEC.

One of the challenges facing the Nigeria Nation today is how to ensure that

communities in the area in which upstream petroleum activities takes place receive an

equitable share of the nation’s revenues from such activities. The struggle by the oil

producing areas has continue to grow and this day the activities of the oil companies in

the Niger Delta region in Joint venture with NNPC, the national oil company are

frequently destructed by activist from these communities seeking redress from a host of

grievances against the Nigerian State.

This situation has been aggravated since the 1995 execution of the activist and

writer, Ken Saro Wiwa and other Ogoni activist. The root was due to the collision

between Saro-Wiwa’s movement for the survival of ogoni people (MOSPO) and the

federal government policies on the right of oil producing areas. So deep are these

grievances that some activist now argued that the only permanent solution is a re-

configuration of constitutional arrangement in the Nigeria state to give oil producing

areas greater control over their (political and economic ) affairs.

Over the years, the Nigerian government and its upstream venture partners, has

provided development assistance such as Schools, scholarship, hospitals, jetties etc. to

the oil producing areas but representatives of this areas have often contended that these

projects do not match the wealth extracted from their and. It was not until agitation in the

Niger Delta begin to threaten oil production that it became clear that those areas were not

as powers as they appeared to be. This forced the Nigerian leadership to take another

look at the weight to be accorded derivation in revenue allocation and developmental

efforts in the Niger Delta region.

In a direct response to the agitation in the oil producing area, the Nigerian

government through a federal military decree in 1992 established the oil Mineral

53

producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC) with a primary mandate of

undertaking development project in the oil producing area alongside the increase in the

special allocation to oil producing state to 3%.

OMPADEC KEY MAIN FUNCTIONS WERE:

(a) To receive and administer the monthly sums from the allocation of the federal

account in accordance with confirmed ratio of oil production in each state;

(i) For the rehabilitation and development of oil producing area, (ii) For tacking ecological problem that have arisen from the exploitation of oil

mineral. (b) To determine and identify through the commission and there spective oil

mineral producing state, the actual mineral producing area and embark on the

development of projects properly agreed upon with the local communities at

the oil mineral producing area.

(c) OMPADEC of each state and local government to the nation’s oil production

and to use the basis for the equitable distribution of projects and services and

as a basis for the employment of personnel’s. This development mark a turning point as its acknowledge in many years of how

unjustly the oil minerals producing areas has been treaded in revenue allocation and

development efforts. Prior to its establishment, special allocation to oil producing areas

were channeled through the state government with jurisdiction over these areas. In many

state, oil production takes place only in certain communities and there had been

complains from such communities that state government does not spend these allocations

in developing the oil producing communities.

Therefore, by requiring the commission ascertain the level of oil produced by each

community and distribute projects accordingly, the commission’s decree sought to

address this situation.

However, it soon began apparently that the 3% of revenue allocation was viewed

grossly inadequate compensation for the years of neglection in that there was an almost

complete absence of basic infrastructure in the area where the nation makes its wealth.

Immediately OMPADEC was established, it was overwhelmed with demand for roads,

bridges, jetties, water supply etc. these demands were obviously greater than the

expected allocation for the commission.

The clamour for development project was so great that OMPADEC’S other major

function of baffling ecological problem was all but forgotten. Other issues that sabotage

54

the success of OMPADEC initiatives includes the location of the commission’s

headquarter at the Nation’s capital which is far from the Niger Delta region, this

president to appoint the members of the commission from each state without the

approval of the people of the oil producing communities created the perception of the

commission as an alien body which militate against its acceptance by the people of the

oil producing region.

Also, issues such as ethic struggle among the people of the oil producing region,

corruption, bureaucracy and struggle for contracts and appointment greatly hampered the

success of OMPADEC. Mered from birth in controversy, regularly accused of corruption

and in competency, OMPADEC has if anything increased the level of frustration and

anger in the oil producing region. These inherent lapses of OMPADEC later led to its

disbandment and subsequent establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission

(NDDC) on June 5, 2000 under the democratic government handed by president

Olusegun Obasanjo (GCFR).

Niger Delta Environmental Survey (NDES)

The Niger Delta Environmental Survey (NDES) was set up to reconcile industry,

environment and community interest in the Niger Delta. The initiative was prompted by

increasing pressure from rapid deteriorating ecological and economic conditions, social

dislocation and tension in communities, which were not being addressed by policies and

action. A study of the region by the World Bank (1995) warned that: ''An urgent need

exists to implement mechanism to protect the life and health of the region's inhabitants

and its ecological system from further deterioration'' It was against this backdrop that the

Niger Delta environmental Survey (NDES) was initiated in February 1995, by Shell

Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) on behalf of its joint partners (NNPC, ELF

and AGIP) to undertake an environmental study of the region and to provide the required

database.

The Survey is now almost entirely funded by Oil Companies in Nigeria under the

umbrella of the Oil Producers Trade Section (OPTS) of the Lagos Chamber of

Commerce.

NDES therefore created a steering committee in 1996 and engaged Euro Consult, a

Dutch firm as the managing consultants for the execution of:

ü A cartographic definition of the Niger Delta

ü A preliminary description of the features of the region

ü An overview and evaluation of existing information and data on the region

55

ü The identification of major issues to be addressed

ü The identification of additional data requirements and

ü The preparation of a detailed tor and scope of work to be carried out in phases

The NDES objective has been:

To describe and quantify the renewable and non- renewable resources of the Niger

Delta, identify and assess the positive and negative Factors of resources use in the area

and the manner in which they serve and affect local, regional and national interest;

ü To stimulate pro-actively and encourage relevant stakeholders to address and solve

specific current social and environmental problems identified in the course of the

survey and propose an indicative plan for future management of the region;

ü To appraise how the present state of the region has evolved over time and assess the

present conditions of social and economic under - development; and

ü Generate data and information on the Niger Delta, including the formulating

strategies and plans for effective natural management towards the sustainable use of

resources in order to protect the environment and the livelihood of the people in the

region.

The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) The NDDC was officially inaugurated on December 21, 2000 with a vision "to offer

a lasting solution to the socio-economic difficulties of the Niger Delta Region" and a

mission "to facilitate the rapid, even and sustainable development of the Niger Delta into

a region that is economically prosperous, socially stable, ecologically regenerative and

politically peaceful".

The NDDC Act provided for generous funding sources, including:

ü Federal Government contribution, which was to be equivalent to 15% of the

monthly statutory allocation due to member States of the Commission from the

Federation Account.

ü Oil and gas processing companies' contribution of 3% of their total budget.

ü 50% of the Ecological Fund Allocations due to the member States.

ü Proceeds from NDDC Assets and miscellaneous sources, including grants-in-aid,

gifts, loans and donations.

The Act also provides for a Governing Board of twenty members. Ten of the

members are appointed by the Federal Government (The Presidency) including the

Chairman, the MD/CEO, the two Executive Directors, three Representatives of non-oil

producing states, one representative each from the Federal Ministry of Finance and the

56

Federal Ministry of Environment and one representative of the oil companies. Each of

the nine oil producing states appoints one member each while the oil companies appoint

one member to represent them.

The Commission's initial task was to review a n d complete some of the

abandoned/unfinished projects of the defunct OMPADEC and embark on some new ones

whilst preparing a comprehensive Master Plan for the development of the Niger Delta

region.

With offices in each of the nine oil-producing states, during the first three years of

its existence (January 2001 to January 2003), the NDDC:

ü Received N47 billion from all its funding sources.

ü Awarded about 700 contracts of which 358 had been completed by June 2003.

ü Undertook the construction of 40 road projects, 90 water projects, 129

electrification projects, 47 shore protection/jetty projects, 50 health centres, 205

new blocks of six classrooms each. In the relatively short time since its creation the

NDDC is therefore beginning to deliver some of the benefits to the people that its

clear and demanding agenda requires.

The NDDC, was established with a vision of offering a lasting solution to the socio-

economic difficulties of the Niger Delta region and a mission of facilitating the even

sustainable development of the Niger Delta region into a region that is economically

prosperous, socially stable, ecologically regenerative and politically peaceful. The

mandate of the commission includes:

(i) The formation of polices and guidelines for the development of the region.

(ii) Conception, planning and implementation in accordance with set rules and

regulations of projects and programmes for sustainable development of the

Niger Delta region in the field of transportation, health, employment,

industrialization, agriculture, housing and urban development, water supply

electricity and telecommunication.

(iii) Surveying the Niger Delta in order to ascertain measures necessary to

promote its physical and socio-economic development.

(iv) Preparation of master plan scheme designed to promote the physical

development of the Niger Delta region and the estimation of the member state

of the commission for the development of the Niger Delta region by the

federal government and the state commission.

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(v) Identify factors inhibiting the development of the Niger Delta region and

assists the member state in the formulation and development of policies to

ensure efficient management of the resources of the Niger Delta region.

(vi) Accessing and reporting on any project being founded or carried out in the

region by oil and gas companies and any other company including non-

governmental organization as well as ensuring that funds releases for such

project are properly utilize.

(vii) Tacking an ecological and environmental problem which arises from the

exploration of oil minerals in the Niger Delta region the advising the federal

government and the member state on the prevention and control of oil spillage

gas flaring and environmental pollution.

(viii) Liaising with the various oil minerals and gas producing companies on all

matters of pollution prevention and control.

(ix) Executing such other works and performing such other functions which in the

opinion of the commission are required for the sustainable development of the

Niger Delta region and its people.

The NDDC’S more excusive mandate couple with other features such as the

compilation of a master plan to serve as a guiding framework for its actions and the more

encompassing nature of a law establishing it, it appeared to be more equipped to tackle

the challenges of the Niger Delta region than OMPADEC.

Other basic advantage of NDDC over OMPADEC includes:

1. E unlike the remote citing of The location of its headquarter in Port Harcourt

river State, a major oil producing state unlike the remote citing of

OMPADEC’S headquarter in the nation’s capital.

2. Legal provision that allows the member state government rather than the federal

government as in the case of OMPADEC to nominate the members of

management of the commission.

3. Subjects to ratification of the national assembly and the rotation of the

commission’s Chairman among the nine member state in alphabetical order

(i.e), Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Balyesa, Cross rivers, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and

Rivers state.

4. Increased statutory funding of NDDC coupled with the increase in the revenue

allocation to oil producing state to 13% as oppose to the 3% obtainable during

the OMPADEC’S era.

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The establishment of the ministry of Niger Delta on September 8, 2008 by President

Umaru Musa Yar’Adua (GCFR) with NDDC to function as a parastatal under it as been

described as a commendable effort of strengthening the NDDC and largely the

development of the Niger Delta region.

Although, since inception, NDDC has embarked on various developmental project which

include: roads construction, waste management, environmental protection, wealth and

educational project, development of basic infrastructure and likewise serving as an

essential organ in the implementation of the federal government Amnesty programme to

mention but few. NDDC is not without its inherent challenges and lapses which only

time will tell on how satisfactory it will facilitate the development of the Niger Delta

region in the face of these inherent challenges.

RECENT AND CURRENT PROGRAMMES AND PROJECTS IN THE NIGER

DELTA The challenges and opportunities in the Region cannot be tackled effectively by the

NDDC alone in the absence of cooperation and collaboration across the public, private

and non-governmental sectors. The delivery of sustainable development stands a chance

of success but only if the lessons of the past are taken on board and used to formulate

realistic programmes and projects in partnership with organisations that already have or

can inspire the confidence and meaningful involvement of the local people. The

ingredients for fruitful partnerships are evident in various programmes focusing on or

likely to impact on the Region as highlighted in the ensuing paragraphs.

National, State and Local Government The Federal Government has put in place the National Economic, Empowerment

and Development Strategy (NEEDS). NEEDS is the instrument for poverty reduction in

the country.

The State and Local Government counterparts of NEEDS are State and Local

Government Economic, Empowerment and Development Strategy (SEEDS / LEEDS).

NEEDS, the Federal Government's poverty reduction strategy will have a

significant bearing on the future development in the Niger Delta Region. It is a medium

term strategy (2003-2007) for a nationally coordinated framework of action in close

collaboration with the States and Local Governments. It derives from the country's long-

term goals of poverty reduction, wealth creation, employment generation and value re-

orientation.

59

The strategy lays particular stress on four key actions: reforming the way

government works and its institutions; growing the private sector; implementing a social

charter for the people; and re-orientation of the people with an enduring African value

system.

NEEDS, in collaboration with State SEEDS, constitutes a response to the

challenges of underdevelopment. The aim is to mobilise people around the core values,

principles and programmes of both strategies. A coordinated implementation of both

programmes is expected to create at least seven million new jobs over the period, reduce

poverty, and lay the foundations for sustainable development.

The States in the Niger Delta Region have their own projects. They are responsible

for basic infrastructure, schools and medical facilities. Many also have training

programmes and job creation schemes.

Similarly, local governments have supervision of the roads, waterways, schools and

medical facilities in their areas.

INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES AND NON – GOVERNMENTAL

ORGANISATION (NGOs) United Nations The United Nations has a long association with the Region and its agencies have been

involved in a number of projects affecting the Niger Delta. A number of UNDP

projects have included work with non-governmental organizations and the public

sector:

ü In its first country cooperation framework (CCF) -1998-2002- UNDP supported a

minimum of eight communities per state in the improvement of their access to

health and basic social services through support to health Centre’s, provision of

boreholes and qualitative education. In the same programme, many skill

development Centre’s were facilitated and capacity built to sustain them with

backing from micro-financing, etc..

ü Another priority has been on unemployed youths, with skills development centres

in each state being given equipment and training of trainers. These programmes

were underpinned by micro-credit, which was made available to those involved in

these projects! a capacity building of local government staff.

ü Assistance to Bayelsa and Cross River States to prepare their State blueprints for

economic development. The current UNDP projects focus on governance, energy

60

and the environment, HIV/AIDS, information and communication technology

with crosscutting issues, such as gender.

World Bank Community-Based Natural Resource Management Programme in Niger Delta. The

project with a total estimated cost of US$ 82.2 m, which includes a loan of US$15m, is

planned to commence in year 2005.

The initiative aims to improve the standard of living and quality of life of the rural

poor with emphasis on women and youth. It sets out to strengthen rural communities and

service provider capacity for community development and by establishing a community

development fund. The latter includes support for village Infrastructure, livelihood

development and natural resource management. T h e l i v e l i h o o d development

component comprises fisheries (aquaculture), agriculture and agro-forestry development

with a particular focus on soil fertility management and conservation.

A prominent feature of the planned effort is that it will be community based and

primarily demand-driven and will, if successful, provide valuable lessons for future

activities to be supported by the NDDC

ü Community - Based Poverty Reduction Project The project, with a competition date

of 2006, aims to improve access by the

ü Poor to social and economic infrastructure and increase the availability and

management of development resources at the community level. It is a country-wide

development effort that also covers the NDR. The World Bank loan amounts to US-

$ 60 million.

The project will assist the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) to move from a

town, supply-driven and non-participatory mode of delivering services to communities to

a demand-driven approach to poverty reduction covering multiple sectors depending on

specific community determined needs. The project will assist in implementing the

government's strategy through building government capacity, related to policy -making

and dissemination, analytical work, monitoring and evaluation of programmes. The

project will also assist States by building the capacity of state governments and LGA's to

work with communities in designing and implementing community- based projects, as

well as, through investments in such projects. The major project components include

institutional development at Federal, State, and Local Government level, and financial

support to community –based activities through social funds and social assistance

(micro-projects).

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ü Fadama II The objective of the World Bank financed project is to sustainably

increase the incomes of Fadama u s e r s by enabling the communities to take

charge of their own development agenda, and by r e d u c i n g conflict between

Fadama users.

The project will take a demand-driven approach where by all users of Fadama

resources will be encouraged to develop participatory and socially- inclusive Local

Development Plans (LDPs).

The project, based on a US$ 100m loan, will help to increase the supply of rural

infrastructure by financing small-scale irrigation systems, feeder roads, other community

infrastructure, and m a r k e t i n g infrastructure that Fadama resource users consider as

priorities, and which they agree to implement, operate and maintain. By empower i n g

producers' associations to purchase their own agricultural research and advisory services,

the project will support demand - driven research and extension, and provide better

access to inputs and product markets.

A separate project -- to be funded by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) -will

contribute to the development objective of the proposed project by focusing on the

conservation of critical ecosystems within the Fadama areas as well as enhance the

conservation of biodiversity and environmental services of global significance.

ü Local Empowerment and Environmental Management Programme Areas The

project, which was approved July in 2003, is planned to be executed between 2004

and 2009. In the NDR, the participating states will be Bayelsa and Imo. The total

loan amount is US-$ 70 million. The project will address the direct and indirect

causes of degradation of Protected Areas. These will include:

(a) clarifying the policy and legislative environment governing management of

Protected Areas and biodiversity conservation; (b) establishing effective mechanisms of

institutional coordination among public agencies from the national to the state and local

levels of government; (c) building capacity to monitor and enforce regulations; ( d )

stakeholder s ' participating in determining the management plans of Protected Areas;

and (e) promoting ecologically sustainable livelihoods in the support zone to reduce

poverty and the dependence on resources in the protected areas.

62

OTHER ORGANISATIONS Other prominent initiatives in the region include:

ü MacArthur Foundation. In addition to its original work on population and

reproductive health, MacArthur has funded some governance work in the Niger

Delta through several NGOs, mainly focusing on human rights and legal systems. It

has also f u n d e d some environmental projects in the Region. In addition, some

individuals have received grants under the Fund for Leadership. The Foundation's

Niger Delta Initiative programme includes a partnership working arrangement with

the Local and State Governments and the NDDC.

ü Friedrich Naumann Foundation. The Friedrich Naumann Foundation working on

human rights promotion and legal systems. It collaborates with the Centre for

Advanced Social Studies (CASS) in Port Harcourt.

ü Heinrich Boll Foundation. The Foundation is working in the area of gender issues

and human rights, socio and economic rights, minority rights including ethnic and

religious issues.

ü Africare receives funding f r o m USAID a n d CEDPA for work with AIDS

orphans in 5 local government areas in Rivers State. In 2003, Africare signed a

$4.5million partnership with SPDC for a Malaria Rollback , shrimp culture and

business development initiative focused on the Niger Delta region over the next

three years.

Oil, Gas and Servicing Companies The oil and gas industry is the most important private sector group in the economy

of Nigeria and the region. Operating oil and gas companies also play an important role in

the social life of the region. Many oil and gas companies have well-established

community development programmes through which they have provided support to their

host communities. Here one example, SPDC, is described in greater detail, being the

oldest and largest of the oil and gas companies' initiatives.

The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd (SPDC)'s initial

community assistance programme, which began in the 1960s, started with agricultural

extension services to improve the livelihood of agrarian communities. The programme

gradually extended to education, infrastructure and water and sanitation programmes. In

the 1990s, assistance with health care provision, hospitals and youth programmes was

added. During that decade SPDC began a transition from community assistance to

community development. However, under the community assistance model there was a

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low level of community participation and ownership of the welfare schemes and

infrastructure projects provided as part of the company's programme.

A comprehensive review of all community interface activities within Shell

Companies in Nigeria (SCiN), in April 2002 highlighted the inadequate capacity within

SCiN to fully deliver the social dimension of development; the company began the

process of developing new strategies to address current and emerging social issues.

The objectives of this shift were to:

ü Promote sustainable social and economic development of the communities;

ü Support government in building capacity to enhance delivery on it's role in

sustainable community development;

ü Form partner ships with other corporate bodies and civil society organizations in

developing communities; Secure SCiN's License to Operate and ultimately,

maximize oil and gas development revenues for the benefit of all.

This new approach, termed Sustainable Community Development (SCD) strategy,

is aimed at improving the management of all community interfaces within Shell Nigeria,

and has become the next phase of social uptake in SPDC's journey from community

assistance to sustainable social development. It involves managing community interface

as a core line responsibility and through the Area teams who interact daily with the

communities, complemented by strong central guidance and monitoring from the SCD

organization, thus enabling faster attention to community issues and concerns.

The SCD strategy places greater emphasis on partnerships, not just with the

communities themselves, but also with government and strategic local and international

development organizations to complement SPDC's efforts and develop solutions SPDC

cannot achieve on their own, thereby accelerating developmental and employment-

generating opportunities across the region. Two of such partnerships were entered in

2003, the first one with USAID a five-year $20 million agreement that will develop

Nigerian capacity in agriculture, health and business enterprise and the second with

Africa are a three-year $4.5 million partnership that will focus on reducing deaths from

malaria. A third partnership, with UNDP, was signed in 2004.

Apart from leveraging expertise and additional development funding into the Niger

Delta, these partnerships are intended to offer excellent opportunities for improved

cultivation for farmers, increased access to domes t i c and overseas markets,

development of local industry and agro-allied enterprise. They will also increase

opportunities for local employment and capacity building, and help to improve the local

64

economy. Implementation of the programmes under these partnerships will begin in

2004, whilst discussions are ongoing to develop new partnerships (including with

NDDC).

Through partnerships with government agencies such as the NDDC, SCD hopes to

build a closer and more supportive relationship with government in their primary role of

providing basic infrastructure and services for the Niger Delta citizens.

The new strategy also aims to abolish corrosive practices that currently impede

sustainable development in communities, chiefly the pressure for cash payments for

unjustifiable reasons, such as the payment for "ghost workers" (or standby labour). The

demand for, and payment of, cash to community youths for access fees, standby labour,

and so on, have sometimes led to disputes within communities and often distort genuine

community needs. Accordingly, SPDC's interaction with communities will henceforth be

governed by a set of SCD 'big rules', which amongst other things outlaws unjustifiable

payments.

The primary goal of the big rules and SCD as a whole is to ensure that SPDC's

community interventions are sustainable and deliver real and measurable benefits to

intended beneficiaries’ right across communities, and not just concentrated in the hands

of a few influential individuals.

To ensure sustainability, benefiting communities need to take the lead in the

decisions and planning for their own development, and ownership of the resulting

projects and programmes. To provide them the skill and confidence to do so, SCD places

emphasis on capacity building helping communities (other development partners) to

build their capacity.

The SCD strategy also recognizes the' symbiotic relationship ' between

development and peace. An integral part of the new SCD strategy is the development of

a Peace and Security Strategy (PaSS) for the Niger Delta. Preliminary work has been

done with the help of internationally recognized experts on conflict reduction and peace

building. So far, a synthesis and a baseline report of the conflict situation in the region

have been produced following wide consultation across the region. Going forward, a

peace and security working group comprising public and private stakeholders in the

Niger Delta will be set up to collectively develop the PaSS. On completion, it is expected

that PaSS will become an essential component of the strategy for fostering sustained

peace and development in the Niger Delta. The success of this new strategy will depend

on all stakeholders working together and each one playing their part. This, of course,

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includes the necessity of SPDC delivering on promises. The SCD vision of the Niger

Delta is of a region "that is characterised by safe, healthy, thriving and self-reliant

communities capable of sustaining their own development, and wherein Shell is a

welcome and valued stakeholder".

The essential approach of SPDC to development intervention in communities

before the SCD era has been quite representative of the practices amongst other

companies in the oil and gas industry. They also failed to deliver lasting benefits or

sustainable development for various reasons, including:

ü An excessively community-pressure driven or crisis management approach, which

reduced development efforts to meeting a set of demands expressed in Memoranda

of Understanding (MOUs) with the communities.

ü A high rate of default on the MOUs, which have usually been explained as due to

budgetary constraints.

ü A high cash-payment and placatory tendency to dealing with community agitations.

ü The absence of any long-term or integrated view to development challenges.

ü The limited arrangements if any for maintenance of infrastructure provided, leading

to very short-lived benefits from the rapid collapse of structures erected.

ü The poor networking and synergy with other agencies and governments, leading to

duplication of infrastructure and poor resource use. But SCD as envisaged is a

marked departure from the approach to relationships with the communities in times

past and raises hopes of improved oil industry contributions.

The funds for the implementation of the Niger Delta master plan is derive from the

following sources and in the following amount. Statutory grants and aids $74m or 0.2%

and private investment inflow $356 or 73%.

Below is the summary of the potentials financial resources.

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POTENTIAL FINANCIAL RESOURCES

Table 4 S/N SOURCES

($)

YEAR 1-5 ($) YEAR 5-1 ($) YEAR 10-15 ($)

1. Statutory NDDC’s Sources 2,603,947 2,745,602 3,144,635

2 Indirect federal/ State/Local government

sources

7,136,416 9,210,222 13,069,189

3 Discretionary development sources 76,652 80,550 81,038

4 Discretionary private invest 3,812,537 3,812,537 3,812,537

5 Total 13,629,553 15,848,911 20,107,400

The completion of the drafting of the Niger Delta Master plan is the comprehensive

consultation exercise on the plan including stakeholder work shop in each state. The

views express by stakeholder s stipulated that the implementation of the master plan will

be reviewed annually so as to evaluate the performance of the policies, proposals,

programmes and projects of the master plan.

Sources: The Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs 2009

CHAPTER FOUR

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THE CONCEPT OF AMNESTY AND ITS IMPERATIVES Amnesty is derived from a Greek word amnestia meaning forgetfulness. It is

therefore defined as a grant of general pardon or as a general pardon granted by a

government especially for political offences (free dictionary, 2011). In international law,

amnesty is defined as the act of effacing and forgetting past offences granted by the

government to persons who have been guilty of neglect or crime (Encarta, 2009).

In this context, amnesty is a pardon granted to members of all militant groups who

have been involved in different nefarious activities that made the nation looked insecure

and unconducive for foreign investment which impinged on the growth and development

of the nation’s economy and which also dragged the nation’s international reputation to

the mud. It is an unconditional pardon granted to all persons who directly or indirectly

participated in committing offences associated with militant activities in the Niger Delta

as well as all persons presently being prosecuted for offences associated with militant

activities (Compass News Paper, 2009).

Amnesty is a legislative or executive act by which a state restores those who may

have been guilty of an offence against it to the positions of innocent people. It is more

usually associated with the forgiveness of a political crime. It is more inclusive than

pardon or leniency. While leniency only seek to lessen the reprimand or sentence to an

admission of guilt, pardon just seek to strike out offence from the record of an individual

in order to pronounce them innocent but Amnesty in addition to this, obliterates all legal

remembrance of the offence.

Amnesty is granted for a variety of reasons; it may be extended when the

authority decides that bringing citizens into compliance with a law is more important

than punishing them for past offences. It can also be used to get people to turn in control

bound.

The advantage of using Amnesty may include avoiding expensive prosecution

(especially when massive numbers of violators are involved), promoting violators to

come forward who might otherwise have eluded authorities and promoting

reconciliations between offenders and society.

It is also use as a useful initiative in encouraging individuals to turn in illicit items to

the authorities. Even with the perceived advantage of amnesty, it can at time raise

questions of justice in lieu of the impunity that it implies. It can encourage the

commitments of atrocities by individual with an expectation of amnesty as away out of

the crimes.

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AMNESTY INITIATIVES IN THE NIGER DELTA Following his inauguration in May 2007, President Umaru Yar’Adua promised to

address the Niger Delta conflicts, and so recognized it in his seven-point agenda. In

fulfillment of his promise, the late President Yar’Adua in line with the suggestion of the

Niger Delta elders (Obi & Rustad, 2011) inaugurated the Technical Committee on the

Niger Delta. This 45-member Committee was inaugurated on 8th September, 2008 to

collate and review all past reports on Niger Delta, appraise their recommendations and

make other proposals that will help the Federal Government to achieve sustainable

development, peace, human and environmental security in the Niger Delta Region. The

Committee under the Chairmanship of Ledum Mitee, Movement for the survival of

Ogoni People (MOSOP) President had submitted its report (Report of the Technical

Committee on the Niger Delta, 2008) to the Federal Government since 1st of December

2008 (Mitee, 2009). The Committee’s recommendations include appointing a mediator to

facilitate discussions between government and militants; granting of amnesty to some

militant leaders; launching a disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation campaign,

and increase in the percentage of oil revenue to the Delta to 25 percent from the current

13 percent; establishing regulations that compel oil companies to have insurance bonds;

making the enforcement of critical environmental laws a national priority; exposing

fraudulent environmental cleanups of oil spills and prosecuting operators, ending gas

flaring by 31st December 2008 as previously ordered by the Federal Government (Report

of the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta, 2008).

The amnesty office has successfully placed a total of 17,500 out of the 26,358 ex-

militants who accepted amnesty and have been enrolled for degree and vocational skills

acquisition training programmes in Nigeria and abroad (Pointer, 2011). The vocational

and technical training programmes include: seaman training, welding, aviation, computer

technology, leadership training, marine technology, entrepreneurial skills, information

technology, employment/placement opportunities development activities and so on.

The recommendations of the Technical Committee on Niger Delta for effective

realization of the content of amnesty programme according to MOSOP (2008) are to:

a. establish a credible and authoritative Disarmament, Demobilization and

Reintegration (DDR) institutions and processes including international

negotiators to plan, implement and oversee the DDR programme at regional,

state and local government levels;

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b. provide for open trial and release on bail with a view for eventual release of

Henry Okah and others involved in struggles relating to the region;

c. grant amnesty to all Niger Delta militants willing and ready to participate in the

DDR programme;

d. address short term issues arising from amnesty to militants by promoting

security for ex-militants and rebuilding of communities destroyed by military

invasions;

e. work out long term strategies for human capacity development and reintegration

of ex-militants;

f. reflect on a time-line with adequate fund for the DDR programme to take place;

g. stop the illegal demands put on youths from the region by prosecuting the

suppliers of small arms and light weapons and also those involved in oil

bunkering by identifying highly placed sponsors of violence for economic and

political reasons;

h. exclude from amnesty and criminalize the activities of those militants not

committed to the DDR process and unwilling to surrender their arms;

i. Ensure that signatories to the DDR programme show clear commitment to the

entire process.

The amnesty which was unveiled on 25th June, 2009 was scheduled to run between

6th August to 4th October, 2009, that is, a 60 day period; and was ‘predicated on the

willingness and readiness of the militants to give up all illegal arms in their possession,

completely renounce militancy in all its ramifications unconditionally, and depose to an

undertaking to this effect’ (Federal Government of Nigeria, Niger Delta Amnesty

Programme). During the declaration, the President acknowledged the fact that the

challenges in the Niger Delta arose as a result of the inadequacies of the previous

attempts at meeting the yearnings of the people of the region, which thus led to the

restiveness witnessed in the Niger Delta. The high incidence of violence in the Delta led

to the amnesty initiatives.

As a matter of fact, in the first nine months of the year 2008, about 1,000 people

lost their lives, 300 were taken hostage and the government lost $23.7 billion to attacks,

oil bunkering and sabotage (Report of the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta,

2008). Apart from the inability of Nigerian government to meet up with its OPEC quota

and other negative economic effects, the oil Multinational corporations (MNCs) on their

part reportedly lost billions of dollars to the conflicts. For instance, between 2003 and

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2007, Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) estimated that it lost US$10.6

billion, with a total loss of not less than US $21.5 billion by the oil MNCs as a whole

since 2003 (Nwozor, 2010).

It can be seen that a major drive for the use of amnesty in the management of oil-

related conflicts in Nigeria is the belief that it is only through peace that sustainable

development can be guaranteed in the Niger Delta.

THE PRESIDENTIAL AMNESTY PROGRAMME AND NIGER DELTA

MILITANCY. A Niger Delta Militant accepting “amnesty” wept while submitting his best friend,

a rocket launcher, and disgustedly contrasted the opulence of oil-money built Abuja with

the underdevelopment of the Niger Delta. The airport in Abuja is fed by a 10-Lane

highway costing 54 billion naira and a planned local railway. Are we on the same planet,

he asked? Will the amnesty reverse lost development, jobs and wellbeing? (Marinho,

2009:19).

More so, despite the suppression and repression tactics of the Federal Government

which culminate in the militarization of the region, militant activities continued unabated

geometrically. The interpretation been that, military onslaught in the region was only

increasing the strength and capability of the militants. From the foregoing, it became

imperative that, something drastic ought to be done to save the vulnerable economy from

imminent collapse, actualizing the zero crude oil export threat by the militants. We wish

to categorically assert that, it was the multi-dimensional impact of militancy in the Niger

Delta which instigated the federal government to come up with the amnesty programme,

hoping that it would pacify the militants and afford the multinational oil companies the

opportunity to resume uninterrupted exploration, production and exportation of oil and

gas. Put differently, the amnesty programme was initiated to perhaps get a breather for

the Nigerian economy which was heading for crisis.

The declaration of the Presidential Amnesty offer was succeeded by a 60-Day

window period, requesting all militants who choose to embrace the amnesty programme

to surrender their arms and ammunitions on or before 4th October, 2009. To achieve the

policy objectives, a Presidential Amnesty Committee was set up, headed by the then

Minister of Defense Godwin Abbe. Arms collections and mobilization centers were also

set up in strategic locations across the region and the initial sum of 50 billion naira was

released to execute the programme.

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The leadership of the militants initially rejected the amnesty offer outright,

claiming that it was simply one of the insincere and deceptive policies of the federal

government to perpetuate the unbridled exploitation of the region. Some militant leaders,

such as, Government Ekpemopulo (Tompolo), Asari Dokubo, Commander Ajugbe

(Shoot-at-Sight), Ogumboss etc. equally argued that they are freedom fighters, fighting

for the development of the over exploited oil rich region, and since they are not

convicted criminals, the amnesty offer cannot be accepted.

Again in tandem with the fact that he who makes peaceful change impossible,

makes violent change inevitable, the militants argued that, it is the insensitive and

exploitative Nigerian State that instigated them to assume their present position, hence

the struggle must continue until victory is won for the region. Reacting to their bunkering

activities, the militants opined that, there is absolutely nothing wrong in taking what

belongs to them. That is, the oil deposits in the region belong to the people of the region

and they have the right to use it for their development.

However, after serious persuasions and politicking, all the known militants except

Asari Dokubo and the faceless members of MEND embraced the Amnesty Programme.

The position of MEND was that, it allowed its commanders to accept the amnesty

because their identities have been known, but promise to replace them with a new set of

dedicated faceless commanders to continue with the struggle. The general acceptance of

the amnesty offer was followed with the massive surrendering of different typologies of

arms and ammunitions, including sophisticated Anti-Aircraft guns, Rocket Propelled

Grenades and Multi-Purpose Gun-Boats.

A visit to the Arms Collection Centers and the number of arms and ammunitions

submitted by the repentant militants was reminiscent of countries plagued by years of

civil war. From Okitipupa to Warri, Yenagoa to Port Harcourt and Benin to Eket, the

story was the same.

While surrendering his weapons at the Isaac Boro Peace Park, Yenagoa, amidst

fanfare, one the repentant militants, Commander Lagos Jackson, spoke the mind of many

of the militants when he assert that, the decision to surrender his arms and disband his

camp in the creeks was based on the proclamation of an unconditional amnesty to all

militants by President Yar’Adua, which will allow them the opportunity to return to

normal life in the cities unmolested (The Nation, March 21, 2010). This is attributed to

the fact that, becoming a militant in the Niger Delta was seen as signing your death

sentence, with a high propensity to be killed by military forces, especially the Joint Task

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Force (JTF) saddled with the responsibility of keeping the peace in the region. The

movement of militants publicly was therefore highly restricted simply because they were

seen as enemies of the State, social deviants and criminal elements in the society, which

explains the highly secret camp locations and lifestyles.

The second vital reason why the amnesty programme was embraced by the

militants was to give peace a chance and watch keenly what the Federal Government has

up his sleeves. To demonstrate to the world that the ethnic minorities were peace loving

people, but only became violent as a result of decades of victimization, suppression and

brutalization, the militants decided to lay down their arms and give government the

opportunity it has been yawing for to reverse the development deficit in the region. This

was against the lame excuses often advanced by government that militant activities

frustrate the development agenda of the region.

However, it is important to state that with due regard to the backward and

deplorable condition of the Niger Delta amidst the wealth that the region produce to

sustain the nation; the arbitrary use of State power to suppress peaceful agitations for

decades, to mention but few, the Federal Government has no moral justification to brand

freedom fighters as criminals and granting them amnesty.

Amnesty is granted to convicted criminal, and since the militants were not

prosecuted and convicted by any court of law in the land, it is a misnomer to grant them

amnesty. Indeed it is irrational and there is no justification of telling indigenes of Odi,

Oporoza, Gbaramatu, Umuechem, Kaiama, Ezetu, Choba, Agee, Okerenkoko, Ogoni

land etc. that the Federal Government has pardoned them. The government is guilty of

gross human right abuses in the region. In an ideal situation, all things been equal, it is

the Niger Deltan that should be thinking of forgiving and writing off the sins of the

government for the uncountable atrocities committed against them.

As a panacea of achieving peace, amnesty for militants in the Niger Delta is a good

idea. However, the Federal Government must demonstrate the political will to muster

resources for the development of the region. The reason has been that, Government so

easily finds funds for peripheral matters on the Niger Delta, and not for core issues

begging for attention. The above kind of sentiment completely betrays a deep

misunderstanding, or covering up, of the working of capitalism in general and the

especially short sighted kleptomaniac characteristic of the Nigerian State.

A significant point to note is that, the popularized amnesty programme was not

adequately planned, but highly monetized and politicized. To achieve sustainable and

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dependable outcome, the pioneer step on the part of Nigerian government basically ought

to have been a comprehensive militants and arms audit in the region. The argument is

that, carrying out a comprehensive audit of the rank and file of the militant population in

the region would have afforded the government the opportunity to ascertain the strength

of the various militant camps and arms capacity in the region. But since that was not

done before the hasty amnesty proclamation, it is difficult to ascertain whether the arms

surrendered by the militants at the various arms collection centers across the region

actually represent the genuine arms and ammunition capacities of such groups. The grim

reality is that, due to the thick fog of insincerity that cloud the relationship between the

people of the Niger Delta and the Government, most militants especially the Resource

Agitators-Militancy category, surrendered only part of their armory. In other instances, it

was alleged that even the arms and ammunitions submitted by the militants were bought

for them for submission by some top government officials simply to demonstrate the

acceptance of amnesty in those States. Bayelsa and Delta State are reference points

where such allegations held sway.

Furthermore, there was no concrete post-amnesty plan, and the government’s

amorphous amnesty menu, which offers tripartite rehabilitation jobs, skills acquisition

(including education), and private business- does not suit all the targeted beneficiaries

(Agbo, 2009). More so, most registration and mobilization centers for the repentant

militants were Secondary School Buildings without windows and other facilities

conducive for habitation. The amnesty programme was designed to pay monthly

allowances to the repentant militants. But it was observed that, due to the monthly

meager allowances paid to the repentant militants for their up keep, some militants were

even excluded from the registration process. Some militant leaders claim that the

Amnesty Co-ordination Committee members told them to bring in only a specified

numbers of repentant militants for registration from a particular camp. The fundamental

question that begs for an answer is that, where will the rest militants go to and what

would become of them? That is, after earning about three hundred to six hundred

thousand naira per month as militants, and being discriminated or segregated in a process

where they are to earn an insignificant amount of twenty five thousand naira, actually

leave them with no option than to go back to the trade they have mastered.

More so, the amnesty package was heavily monetized and corruption was a major

bottle neck for the efficient and effective implementation of the programme. Evidently,

there have been persistent cases of non-payment of allowances to militants, coupled with

74

the inflation of payment vouchers with ghost names. This means, non-militants are

receiving the allowances of ex-militants, which clearly pictures the massive corruption

that engulfed the amnesty programme. The demonstration by ex-militants at Benin,

Warri, Yenagoa and Port-Harcourt were reactions against the high degree of corruption

in the programme.

The politicization of the amnesty programme also play out in the tense rivalry

between the State representatives of the presidential amnesty committee and some

Governors, battling for the soul of militants in the region. That is, there was serious

political interest protection, centered on influencing militants, especially the political

thugs–militancy category to surrender their weapons through the initiative of either the

Governors of the State or Presidential Amnesty Committee members. The implication is

that, militants that surrendered their weapons through each party will be loyal to them

and politically useful during the conduct of elections. In Bayelsa State for instance, the

militants loyal to Governor Timipre Sylva surrender their weapons amidst funfair at the

Adaka Boro Peace Park in Yenagoa. While the militants loyal to a political big wig in the

State, Timi Alaibe, the Honourary Adviser to the President on the Niger Delta, and

former gubernatorial aspirant and Managing Director of the NDDC, were not part of the

Peace Park ceremony, but surrendered their weapons at Azuzuama, in the remote creeks.

More so, where as the pro-Sylva militants were given red carpet reception and presently

accommodated in Government House, Yenagoa, their counterparts do not enjoy this

privilege, which creates bad blood in the militant community.

Again, several months after the inception of the amnesty programme, the

repentant militants are yet to be rehabilitated and trained in trades that will sustain them.

Therefore the absence of an effective and acceptable post-amnesty plan, coupled with the

ill health of President Yar’Adua is gradually eroding the halcyon days in the Niger Delta,

with the recent resumption of attacks by the militants. Though militant agitations seized

in October 2009 and led to increase in the oil production output, Nigerians were taken

aback when militants blew up an oil pipeline at the Abonemma area of Rivers State, late

in December 2009. This has been followed with similar attacks in 2010 at the Shell

Petroleum Development Company oil pipeline in Kokori, Delta State, Shell Trunk Line

in Obunoma, Rivers State and the most recent Car bomb attacks in Warri, Delta State.

The fact is that, the absence of a workable post-amnesty programme has led to a

vicious circle of conferences without tangible results. Angered by the above scenario, the

militant community called for ending of empty talks been recycled and demands the

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implementation of a sustainable development blue print for the region. And to

demonstrate their opposition to unproductive talk shops, MEND, planted and detonated

two car bombs on the 15th of March, 2010 to disorganize one of such conferences in

Warri, Delta State. The conference which was tagged “Post Amnesty Dialogue” was

organized by Vanguard to discuss the post-amnesty road map for the region and was

attended by Governors, Activists, Traditional Rulers and top Government functionaries.

Though the action of MEND is highly condemned because it led to the death of two

persons and several others wounded, it demonstrate the more pertinent issues of the

failure of the government to latch on to a window of opportunity to effectively restore

stability and progress to the volatile region. From another perspective, the cavalier

attitude some political leaders have for the Niger Delta crisis is also detrimental to

maintaining peace in the region. As claimed by MEND, the bomb blasts were carried out

to prove wrong Governor Uduaghan of Delta State assertion that, “MEND is not real but

a media creation”. The reality is that, youths in the region are ever ready to relocate to

the creeks due to the elongated famine of the supposed amnesty dividends in the region.

The argument in essence is, the present existential condition authenticate and

corroborate the perception that, the amnesty policy was formulated and implemented to

safeguard the uninterrupted flow of oil and gas production in the region. The amnesty

programme is failing gradually simply because, with the ever increasing consciousness

of exploitation in the region, peace will be elusive if the agitations of the people are not

adequately addressed.

NIGER DELTA AMNESTY PROGRAMME UNDER GOODLUCK JONATHAN ADMINISTRATION

President Goodluck Jonathan ascension to presidency as controversial as it was

ended 78daysof power vacuum occasioned by president Yar’ Adua’s failure to properly

handed over power to the vice president as stipulated. While the Nigerian policy drifted

as it were, a lot of burning national issues did not get the required attention. One of

burning national issues was the post Amnesty programme of the federal government for

the repentant Niger Delta militants.

In the period in which the power vacuum lasted, there were signs that the gains of

the Amnesty were going to be lost to the uncertainties of the post Amnesty period. For

example, there were signs of renewed militancy in the region and speculation about the

against shell relocating from the region, owing to treat by a faction of MEND

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(Movement for the emancipation of Niger Delta) the major umbrella body militants in

the Niger Delta to renew hostilities in other to show their frustration about the failure on

the part of the leadership of the country to resolve the power struggle in the federal

government which was indirectly having adverse effect on the post Amnesty Era.

Upon the resolution of the country’s leadership which resulted in the proclamation

of Goodluck Jonathan as an acting prosident by the national assembly, the post amnesty

programme which seems to be heading for the rock gradually regained buoyancy. The

emergence of Goodluck Jonathan as president of country has brighten the hope of a

successful conclusion of the Amnesty programme owing to the fact that the president is

from the Niger Delta region, he is therefore seen by many as a round peg in a round hole.

In his first broadcast to the nation after assuming power as acting president (and

specifically in relation to the post Amnesty programme) Goodluck Jonathan declares.

“The federal government will take every step to consolidate the gains of Amnesty

in the Niger Delta and execute the post Amnesty programme, I therefore appeals to all

concern to be patient as there can be no meaningful development without peace and

stability”.

In actualizing his policies, he directed all the relevant ministries and committees

involves in the post Amnesty programme of the federal government to fast tract all issues

involving the programme, particularly those involving infrastructural development is

sleeping. Other major development the amnesty programme under the leadership of

President Goodluck jonathan include the scrapping of the presidential committee on the

disarmament and Amnesty for militants in the Niger Delta led by the minister of defense,

major general Godwin Abbe (rtd) which coordinated the disarmament phase of the

Amnesty programme and in its place are few committees which will handle the post

Amnesty programme in the region. The new committees are presidential monitoring

committee headed by the presidential adviser on the Niger Delta, Mr. Timi Alaibe,

infrastructural development committee chaired by the minister of Niger Delta affairs and

disarmament and re-integration committee headed by the minister of defense. The other

two committees are oil and gas asset protection committee and environment remediation

committee.

The post Amnesty programme under the new president is not without its own

challenges notable among which include: the allegation of corruption and insincerity on

the part of government official coupled with political issues, the pressures to enroll new

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repentant militants numbering about 1000 who surrendered their arms after the

exploration of the Amnesty programme.

Other challenges witnessed by the post Amnesty era also include the shortage of

rehabilitation camps for the repentance militants. The total capacity of the camp used

presently is estimated to be able to only accommodate 1000 repentant at once. Therefore,

with a total number of about over 20,000 repentant militants, the rehabilitation and re-

integration phase of the post Amnesty programme are executed in batches.

THE IMPACT OF AMNESTY PROGRAMME ON NATIONAL

DEVELOPMENT. This section does not attempt to discuss development in details with reference to

all associating arguments from different scholars in development studies. It attempts to

bring to the fore the generally conceived meaning of development in order to understand

the extent to which militant activities affected the development of the Niger Delta region

in particular and the nation in general.

Development, according to Indabawa and Mpofu (2006) is defined both

quantitatively and qualitatively. Quantitatively, development is seen as growth in Gross

National Product, Gross Domestic Product and Per Capita Income of any nation. This

Growth is expected to quantitatively lead to the provision of infrastructure and utilities

such as potable water, electricity, schools, primary health clinics, roads, bridges and

recreational facilities (Rogers in Indabawa & Mpofu, 2006). In defining development

qualitatively, Akinpelu (2002:80) focuses on human beings whom he referred to as the

target of development processes rather than material accumulations surrounding him nor

of the economic progress and growth of any nation state. He conceived development as:

A process of changing the personality, equipping it with the necessary skills,

knowledge and attitudes to conceive, design, and carry out his/her own self-development.

It involves liberating him/her from all inhibitions (social, economic, political and

cultural) that prevent him/her from realizing the best potentialities in him/her; enhancing

his/her knowledge, skills and attitudes; boosting his/her self-confidence, self-reliance,

self-pride, and poise to face the world, and of his/her creative potentials and sense of

freedom and readiness to participate in any matters involving self and/or the

environment.

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The ultimate of this type of development is “transformation” or “fundamental

change of consciousness” – a change that goes to the very root of the personality

(Freire&Nyerere in Akinpelu, 2002).

Development conceived only from one perspective stands on one limb. That is, it

is incompletely, unholistically and erroneously conceived because qualitative paradigm

of development should lead to quantitative paradigm of development and vice-versa.

This implies that economic prosperity of any nation should be able to improve the quality

of lives of the citizens of that nation in terms of provision of human needs such as food,

shelter, quality health delivery system, potable water, safety and security, quality

education and so on. It is on this note that Indabawa and Mpofu (2006) defined

development as “transformation both socially and materially”.

From the glimpse understanding of what development is, one will not be wrong to

say that what is called development is lacking in the Niger Delta region and by

extension, most states of the federation.

This region lacked federal attention in terms of provision of potable water, good

roads, electricity, hospitals and clinics, good schools and so on. In this region, people

live in a dehumanized state with their environment gruesomely degraded. Abject poverty

is still showing on the faces of the inhabitants of the creek areas of this region. This

scenario made the youths of the region to embark on arms struggle and agitations in

search of the ideal solution to their problem. This arms struggle affected negatively the

economy of the nation as well as the negligible seeming aspects of development that

were trickling down to the region as many companies deserted the region and rate of

production of crude oil per day drastically dropped. The environment of the region was

also dastardly degraded through the illegal bunkering activities of the militants as well as

their conscious vandalization of oil drilling platforms of many oil companies in order to

provoke the Federal Government of Nigeria. It was in the bid to stop the activities of the

militants in order to attract investors to boost the nation’s economy that the idea of

amnesty was conceived and granted.

The Pointer (2011) articulated specific benefits of the amnesty programme to

include the following:

a. Oil companies and associated companies reopened shut-in wells. Thus, Nigeria’s

combined crude oil and condensate production increased from less than 2 million

barrel per day to currently 2.4 million barrels per day (ibtimes.com, 2011);

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b. The construction of the popular East-West road abandoned due to militant activities

had resumed and work is currently ongoing;

c. Kidnapping activities in the core Niger Delta states has drastically reduced to the

barest minimum;

d. Oil bunkering and pipeline destruction has also reduced considerably;

e. Crime rate also has declined to a manageable degree in the region;

f. The LNG company’s reputation as a reliable supplier of LNG was restored;

g. Contractors handling development projects in the region were given adequate

security to fast track their efforts so as to assure sustainable development in the

Niger Delta;

h. The amnesty office has successfully placed a total of 17,500 persons in degree and

vocational skill programmes in Nigeria and abroad (Pointer, 2011); and

i. Federal presence is gradually been felt in the region. For instance, the citing of a

branch of central bank of Nigeria in Bayelsa, Delta and other states, the Naval

Logistic Command in Bayelsa and Delta states, Federal University Otueke and

Nigeria Law School etc. in Bayelsa state.

Negotiations are on between the presidency, state governors and foreign investors to

invest in Nigeria.

There is definite hope that when all these negotiations are concluded, investors come in

to invest, job opportunities will be created for teaming unemployed youths. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AMNESTY PROGRAMME; SOCCESS SO FAR

Between 6th August 2009 when the disarmament (the first phase of the amnesty

programme) commenced and October 4, 2009 when it ended, 20,192 militants

comprising 20,049 males and 133 females respectively across the nine states of the Niger

Delta denounced militancy and registered for the amnesty programme. Those that

accepted the amnesty offer surrendered their weapons of war to security forces at

different designated collection centers. The conditional amnesty offer gave the militants

the opportunity to renounce violent agitations. It is worthy to note without equivocation

that the amnesty initiative successfully but temporarily put an end to militancy and

insecurity in the region thereby paving way for uninterrupted exploration and

exploitation by the multinational oil companies.

The remarkable achievement of peace and security has generated considerable goodwill

for Nigeria among many international partners and friends. Hostage taking and general

insecurity not only affect the nation internally but also a threat to diplomatic relationship

80

between Nigeria and other countries especially home countries of the expatriates that

work in the oil companies. Thus, the amnesty programme rebranded and gave Nigeria a

positive image among the comity of nations but for the spate of kidnapping for ransom

that became pervasive in the south-east geo-political zone of Nigeria.

It is no doubt that the violent agitations of the militants had a negative effect on the economy of Nigeria. The face-off between the militants and the Military Joint Task Force (JTF) and the sacking of the Camp 5 in Gbaramatu, Delta State worsened the economic situation of the country. Although, it was a victory for the Nigerian state, the militants blew up every pipe line on their way as they retreated and faded into the interior creeks. Consequently, oil production plummeted to less than 1 million barrels per day. The state lost more oil production in victory than when the militants held sway in the region (Agbo, 2009). With the conditional amnesty granted by the late Yar’Adua’s administration, the economic forecast that looked depressed prior to the amnesty offer, began to witness a near instant turn around. The export figures improved from 800,000 barrels per day that it was during the hostilities between 2006 to 2008 to 2.3 million barrels per day in 2010. This increment of 1.5 million barrels per day means that the revenue to national coffers increased by a whopping 120.45 million dollars every day. This enormous wealth was gained as a result of the amnesty programme that brought relative peace into the region. CRITICISMS/FAILURE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AMNESTY PROGRAMME In spite of the remarkable gains of the amnesty, there are some challenges that the programme has not been able to address.

• The amnesty programme does not incorporate in its packages credible and comprehensive stakeholders’ consultation. The opinion of the inhabitants that suffered the brunt of the environmental degradation were ignored. Whatever consultation and endorsement they got were from governors and few traditional rulers who only did not feel the negative impact of oil exploration but also connived with the managers of the Nigerian state to undermine the devastating impact suffered by the people.

• The amnesty initiative is nothing but a militant centered programme aimed at persuasively retrieving firearms from the militants and relocating them to rehabilitation camps where they are placed on monthly allowances. Whatever amount that is paid to the militants will not adequately make up for the life of luxury derivable from illegal oil bunkering activities and ransoms from those taken hostage.

81

• The actualization of peace in line with the amnesty package is on the negative side. The Nigerian state conceived peace as merely the absence of turmoil, tension, conflict and war. Peace on the positive side is conceived as a condition of good management, orderly resolution of conflict, harmony associated with mature relationships, gentleness and love (UNDP 2008). The peace ushered in by the amnesty is devoid of its positive components. For instance, there are cases of protests by repentant militants over the delay and non-payment of allowances. The mere fact that the militants carry the label and are addressed as ex-militant negates the principle of amnesty and depicts stigmatization. This has a traumatizing impact on the youths. It accounts for the growing skeptism and fear that the programme is ill motivated (NDCBP 2009).

• The 45 man technical committee on the amnesty was not only on comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation. It also had as its term of reference, the harmonization of various reports on the Niger Delta. The resulting report recommended an increased allocation of oil revenue to the producing communities, urgent improvement of infrastructure and human welfare and new institutions for the region’s long-term development. The amnesty as it stands, is only concerned about the symptoms persuading the youths to surrender their arms while the cause which incorporates unemployment, poverty, infrastructural decay and general underdevelopment that affect the generality of people in the Niger Delta are unattended to. This has grave implications for the renewed violent agitations in the Niger Delta.

• The amnesty initiative did not incorporate in its package revenue allocation that is based on derivation as was the case in pre oil economic epoch. If the area that the revenue is derived is not given special consideration by way of fair share, it has great potentials for agitations.

But beyond amnesty, what is the hope of the thousands of youths that took part in the struggle? What do they become after the programme? What hope does the future hold of them? How does the country ensure that the people do not go back to their former way of life? Many of them were school drop outs, many of them have no skill that they can deploy to work in the society. And something has to be done to safe the situation.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

SUMMARY

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The Niger delta crisis which started as a mere peaceful reactions to perceived

marginalization of the region by the federal government and the environmental

degradation associated with the exploration of crude oil in the region has gradually

metamorphose into a major conflict in the country.

Before the adoption of the Amnesty option by the late President Umaru Musa

Yar’Adua in 2009, previous administrations have made various concerted attempt at

solving this problem in the past. Some of which included, the various allocation of

special funds dedicated to the development of the region, institutional interventions such

as the creation of Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB), Oil Mineral Producing Area

Commission (OMPADEC), the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC),

Ministry of the Niger Deltas, the drawing up of the Niger Delta Development master

plan etc. Other past interventions in this regard include military interventions against the

various militant groups operating in the region. It was the apparent ineffectiveness of

these past government attempts at resolving the crisis which was then having that

prompted the late President to adopt the Amnesty option as a political solution to the

problem which has defiled various solutions in the past.

The pronouncement of Amnesty on June 25, 2009 ushered in a new phase in the

Niger Delta crisis. Form the date the Amnesty was announced by the President, militants

were given a 60-day –grace period to surrender their arms and embrace the federal

government Amnesty deal which include among other things a state pardon for crimes

committed by the repentant militants against the Nigeria state, Post Amnesty

rehabilitation and re-integration of the repentant militants into the society during which

the non-educated ones were expected to have acquired the knowledge of a basic

vocational skills while the educated ones were to be provided with scholarship

opportunities to further their academic pursuit where necessary which will automatically

in either case result to gainful employment for the repentant militants. The repentant

militants were also to be paid the sum of $450 per month while the rehabilitation and

reintegration phase of the Amnesty programme lasted.

Although, the Amnesty deal of the federal government was greeted with most

feelings at its inception due to fears of insincerity of purpose on the part of the federal

government but the Niger Delta militants later came out in large number to accept the

Amnesty deal after accusation and leaders of the various militants groups and the Niger

Delta people.

83

At the end of the Amnesty period over 20,000 repentant militant have embraced

the Amnesty deal leading to the return of relative peace in the region. This is

accompanied with the increase in oil exploration activities in the region thereby

drastically improving the government revenue. The country was able to once again,

produce petroleum product at her full capacity thereby meeting OPEC allocations and

regaining her position as the living exporter of petroleum product in Africa.

At the expiration of the Amnesty period and the inception of the post Amnesty

era, the programme was faced with various challenges paramount among which include.

Inadequate camp facilities for the rehabilitation and reintegration of the repentant

militants thereby causing the execution of this phase of the Amnesty programmes in

batches. This resulted in the inability to project a realistic time frame for the post

Amnesty period. This, many has described as unhealthy for the Amnesty programme.

Another major setback to the post Amnesty era was the constitutional crisis

occasioned by the failure of the late President Yar’Adua to properly hand over power to

the Vice-president, Goodluck Jonathan when he travelled out of the country in

November to seek medical attention in Saudi Arabia. The power vacuum that occur

almost led to the collapse of the Amnesty programme but the later pronouncement of the

National Assembly making Vice President Yar’Adua helps in no small measure in

repositioning the Amnesty programme which was once heading for the rock on the part

to success.

The eventual emergence of President Goodluck Jonathan greatly rekindled the

hope of the repentant militant in the Amnesty deal because the President is also from the

region and he is therefore seen by many as the right man for the Job.

This view is supported by the declaration of the President commitment to the

consolidation of the gains of the Amnesty Programme upon his consolidation of the

power. The president has since; match his words with actions by effecting various

changes in the Amnesty initiatives with the aim of better reposting it for greater success.

These changes in the view of many are in line with the aspirations of the people of the

Niger Delta.

Although, the Amnesty programme has not being without its own problems,

criticisms and challenges. It has been described as been successful in view of the relative

peace experience in the Niger Delta region vis-à-vis the associated increase in oil

exploration activities.

CONCLUSION

84

With the large number of assorted arms and ammunition surrendered by the

militants through the amnesty initiative of the late president Yar ‘Adua’s administration,

relative peace and improved security situation is now evident. The programme has been

able to pave way for the cessation of arm conflict and wanton destruction of lives and

properties and other forms of criminality in the Niger Delta region. Emanating from the

peaceful and stable environment is the boost in Nigerian economy through undisrupted

and increased oil production. However the gain of the Amnesty is lopsided. They are

negatively skewed in disfavour of millions of the inhabitants of the host communities in

the Niger delta. The amnesty initiative is nothing but a militant-centered programme that

undermines the plight of the entire Niger Delta people.

Whatever benefits that accrue to the people only go to the few youths who

accepted the amnesty offer, abnegated militancy and surrendered their arms. However it

should be noted that those who renounced militancy constitute a very infinitesimal

percentage of the Niger Delta population so taking them to the camp and re-integrating

them does not in anyway address the problem of underdevelopment in the Niger Delta.

The amnesty is silent about the plight of Niger Delta people that cause and reinforced

violent agitation in the region. In other words, the amnesty programme has not been able

to remove the people from what Sachs (2005) refers to as poverty trap-a situation in

which degraded environment, poor health, poor education, poor infrastructure and poor

standard of living reinforce one another.

The neglect of the salient issues that border on the plight of the people, the

inconsistency and ambiguities that characterized the implementation of the amnesty

programme not only cast doubt on the successful implementation of the amnesty package

but it also protends fresh threats to peace in the Niger Delta in a post amnesty era.

In view of the strategic role the region plays in economic scheme of the country,

the Niger Delta crisis has always been the major challenges of successful government in

the country. This is why different government has devise various policies targeted at a

meliorating the situation. The adoption of the amnesty programme in solving the

problems of the Niger Delta crisis by late Yar’Adua has proved have proved to be the

best of all the past efforts of government at solving the Niger Delta crisis. Although, the

amnesty programme like any other human endavour is not without its own lapses,

challenges and inherent imperfection’s.

In the view of many, the amnesty programme has given the Niger Delta in

particular and the country in general a bad peace and only a proper and prompt address

85

of the various issues that occasioned the Niger Delta crisis can consolidate the gain of the

amnesty programme and the failure of which might lead to the re-emergence of more

divesting crisis in the region. This view is image on the fact that lasting peace cannot be

dictated but be born since true peace is not actually about the absence of conflict but the

presence of justice.

It is in the light of this that it is very imperative for the federal government to

judiciously consider and grant the request of the Niger Delta within the purviews of

fairness to other region of the federation rather than making alien peace to faster peace in

the region if the federal government is keen on engendering lasting peace in the Niger

Delta region.

IMPLICATION OF THE STUDY

It has been make clear from the result of the research carried the effect of the

various government programmes put in place in bid to quench the fire of peacelessness

and crisis of the Niger Delta Militant which hails from an agitation for just treatment on

the allocation of the resources of the state Nigeria. The emergence of the crisis that lasted

for several years which at the same time caused a very serious harm to both the economy

of the country in comparing with other country of the World and the state security as

well. This calls for various attempt of the Nigerian government to tackled the rise of the

Militancy; this has led to the establishment of various commissions under the Military

regimes to the era of democratically elected Government. The study indicates the list of

Table that shown the various formulas that have been encoded to help solve the problem

of the allocation of the state resources as against what the God endowed natural

resources has cause to the country as it servitude it peace and unity. All this was put in

place to solve the problem of crisis face on the Niger Delta region of the state which has

claim degree and numbers of the innocent lives in the region, kidnapping in a great sense

among the host of others down to the emergence of the government Amnesty programme

in the year 2009 from under the leadership of the Late President Yar’ Adua to Jonathan

Goodluck. The success of the Amnesty programme was also enhancing by the promise

of the federal government to commence on aggressive implementation of the Niger Delta

master plan immediately peace return to the region. This among others has been

identified as factors that encourage the militants to embrace the Amnesty deal though at

the later days of the Amnesty period. The study as well help to generated varies degree

of recommendation for the further encroachment for absolute restoration of peace for the

sustainable development of the region and the Nigeria State at large.

86

RECOMMENDATION In other to avert devastating agitations by the Niger Delta youths, I hereby

recommend the following as urgent steps to resolve the problems in the Niger Delta

region of Nigerian state.

(a). The amnesty initiative, through a different and viable approach to the Niger Delta

crisis, is not different from other measures in the sense that it has not been able to

provide satisfactory solution to the problem of under-development in the Niger

Delta. The amnesty initiative addressed only the symptom and not the cause of the

Niger Delta problem sustainable solutions to the Niger Delta problem must be

based on credible stakeholder’s consultations and endorsement at all phases and

levels. The initiators of the amnesty consulted state governors and few influential

traditional rulers. Those who suffer the brunt of environment degradation must

also be consulted. This will enable the Nigerian state appreciate the sustained

trauma suffered by the Niger Delta people.

(b). There must be credible reliabitation of the youths that surrendered their fire arms.

The monthly allowance be complemented with alternative and viable youth

empowerment that can generate their means of livelihood. This could come in

form of employment, and grants for small scale business. This will enable proper

integration into mainstream society and discourage their relapse into militancy.

(c). The amnesty package should incorporate a holistic framework for sustainable

development. This framework should go beyond peace building and pay special

attention to sustainable development. The Nigerian state and the multinational oil

companies must address issues that border on the environment, infrastructure and

the people.

(d). The Nigerian state must adopt a fair revenue allocation formular. Those

communities have abundant oil and gas deposits as natural endowment to be

compensated with increased derivation allocation of 25 percent as against the

current 13 percent. A credible revenue allocation formular as rightly noted

represents a viable way of lessening tension, agitations, perception of unfairness

and total disillusionment on the inhabitants in total Niger Delta.

(e). There should be sufficient capacity building and the creation of new jobs through

the establishment of labour intensive small scale industries that have high

employment elasticity for the age structure of the region’s population. If the

monumental level of youth unemployment is not taken into consideration, the

87

unemployed youths could be easily persuaded and recruited to use the unleash a

more devastating round of violence in the region.

(f). The Nigeria state must desist from compromising its statutory role of ensuring the

well-being of it citizenry. Striving to create a favourable climate for the

multinational companies to operate at the expense of the inhabitants can trigger

off disaffection and agitatious.

Finally, the effective implementation of the recommendations is anchored on governance

that is based on genuine democratic principles of participation accountability and

transparency. This will give the Niger Delta the opportunity to choose representatives at

all levels of government that will genuinely address the plight of the Niger Delta people

and take pragmatic steps that will usher in sustainable development in the region. It is

only through this approach that the perennial Niger Delta problem and its attendant

violent agitations can be sufficiently addressed. Anything short of this is nothing but a

temporary measure aimed at addressing the symptom and ignoring the cause. This could

leads to a relapse into more violent agitations in the Niger Delta.

LIMITATION OF THE STUDY The study suffered some limitations. The first is financial. Due to the difficult

terrain of the Niger Delta, the cost of transportation was very high and it limited the

ability of the researcher to conduct a more elaborate work. Again, accessibility to

principal actors as well as their willingness to volunteer relevant and valid information

was not always easy.

Illiteracy on the part of many citizens of the Niger Delta areas as many of they

were afraid of given a response to the question asked from them based on the cause of

the research study. This is so as many will be conscious of not allowing their voice to be

recorded for security purpose. The distance involves also serves as one among other

limitations of the study which lead to the use of secondary data for the collection of

information.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY Following the opposition by the Niger Delta Leaders to the government bid to

hosting the Niger Delta peace committee in 2008; the Niger Delta Leaders suggested that

what the federal government should do is to set up a body to appraise the various reports

that have been submitted that on the forward for the Niger Delta, from the Willink

Commission of 1958 to 2007 and let the body come out with the things to be done or not

88

done from the different report, and then, the Leader house like the stakeholders gathered,

could be called to fine-tune and ratify the final report.

Reading further; AllAfrica, 1 July, 2009, quoted in Obi, C and Rustad, S.A

(2011). Amnesty and Post-amnesty peace, is the window of opportunity closing for the

Niger Delta?

Nigeria in search of Sustainable peace in the Niger Delta through the Amnesty

Programme; Journal of Sustainable Development; Vol 5, No. 7; 2012.

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Abbreviations

93

MNCs - Multinational Corporations

MOSOP - Movement for Survival of Ogoni people

MOSIEN - Movement for the survival of Ijaw Ethnic Nationality

CORI - Niger Delta Women for Justice

MEND - Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

NDPVF - Niger Delta people’s volunteer Force

NDDB - Niger Delta Development Borad

OMPADEC - Oil and mineral Producing Area Development Commission

NDDC - Niger Delta Development Commission

PDP - People’s Democratic Party

SPDC - Shell petroleum Development Company

DDP - Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

HDI - Nigeria’s Human Development Index

NDBDA - Niger Delta Basin Development Authority

IPIECA - International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation

Association

PRA - participatory Rural Appraisal

OGIF - Oil and Gas Industry Foundation

JTF - Joint Task Force

MOPOL - Nigerian Mobile Police Force

SEEDs - State Economic Empowerment Development Strategies

NDES - Niger Delta Environment Survey

OPTS - Oil Producers Trade Section

SCD - Sustainable Community Development

NDPVF - Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force

NDWJ - Niger Delta Women for Justice

OPEC - Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries