Social Policy, Legitimation and Diverging Regional Paths in Belgium.

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10. Social policy, legitimation and diverging regional paths in BelgiumClaire Dupuy and Virginie Van Ingelgom

Do regional governments gain legitimation from their social policy? Does regional social policy exert an effect that feeds citizens’ preferences for the regional level of government? The issue of the feedback effect of regional social policy arises in a context where, over the last three decades, regional governments across Europe were entrusted with core social policy respon-sibilities in health care, education, labour policy and social assistance (e.g. McEwen and Moreno, 2005). Examining such feedback effects contributes to the analysis of democracy at the regional level (e.g. Loughlin et al., 2010).

The chapter addresses the legitimation effects of regional social policy by investigating the case of Belgium, more specifically, the two regional cases of Flanders and Wallonia. These cases provide something akin to a natural experiment, as the federalization of the country occurred concurrently to the development of diverging regional paths from what were once close starting points, that is, long- term convergence between Flanders and Wallonia existed until 1993. After this date, however, citizens in Flanders have increasingly shown both a preference for the regional level of government and a stronger identification with the region. Wallonia experienced opposite patterns: From 1993 on, citizens have expressed less support for the regional level and a decreased regional identification. The overall picture emerging from our analyses is one of long- run convergence between Flanders and Wallonia up to 1993, and divergence thereafter.

To account for these contrasting evolutionary patterns, we contend that legitimation effects through regional social policy- making cannot be taken for granted. Specifically, this chapter argues that legitimation effects are dependent on three requirements that may or may not be met: First, regional social policy design must be distinct, standing out from previous policies; second, regional policies need to be supported by a public dis-course; and, third, policies need to perform well and build performance satisfaction among citizens. In fact, there are strong differences regarding the three proposed requirements in Flanders and Wallonia. While each is

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Social policy, legitimation and diverging regional paths in Belgium 199

fulfilled in the Flemish side of the country, none of them is in the French- speaking part. Simultaneously, we find contrasted systems of citizen evalu-ation and perception of regional governments in the two regions.

The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The first section provides historical insights into government use of social policy as a legitimation instrument and elaborates on the theoretical argument we make. The second section presents the chapter’s methodology and data, and explains the choice of Belgium as a natural- like case study. The third section is dedicated to the empirical analysis. Following the presentation of the dependent variable, we report on whether the three requirements are fulfilled in the two Belgian regions. The fourth concluding section dis-cusses the results and the possibility and difficulties to infer the operation of policy feedbacks from the empirics in the present cases.

DEVELOPING SOCIAL POLICY AS A LEGITIMATION TOOL

National and Regional Governments’ use of Social Policy for Legitimation Purposes

At the national level, seminal works on social policy and welfare state origins emphasize that social policy was introduced as an answer to legiti-mation needs of the political elite in the late nineteenth century, with much of the development occurring after World War II (Alber, 1981; Heclo, 1974). In fact, it is widely believed that national social policy generated massive feedbacks. Not only did social policy arguably feed sustained support of welfare states (Borre, 1998; Pettersen, 1998), but it also spurred an increasing citizen preference for the national level to address social issues. Data presented in The Scope of Government show that a vast major-ity of European citizens (over 84 per cent) think that the national govern-ment should be in charge of social policy (Huseby, 1998). The feedback effects of national social policy has impacted the legitimation of national governments, as social policy conveys messages about the relevance of this level of government for dealing with social issues and contributes to community- and identity- building. Overall, welfare and education systems are widely acknowledged as key factors in building national governments’ legitimacy (Bartolini, 2005).

The regionalization of social policy across Europe since the late 1970s has led to the reiteration of this historical process by which nation- states strived to gain legitimacy from national social policy. Most European countries have experienced regionalization or (quasi- ) federalization

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200 How welfare states shape the democratic public


processes, with the partial exception of Northern Europe. Overall, regional political authority has markedly increased (Marks et al., 2008). Following these institutional and constitutional reforms, regional governments across Europe have intervened in many policy fields, in particular in the social realm.1 In this context the search for legitimation has been a primary concern for regional governments and a driver of regional policy- making. Michael Keating (1998) argues that regional governments have addressed problems through policy- making as a tool to gain legitimacy. Regional social policy- making in Spain (Moreno and Trelles, 2005), in France or in Germany (Dupuy, 2012) underscore this point. Scholars working on substate nationalism have also convincingly demonstrated how substate nationalist parties have used social policy as a tool to gain political support through identity- building, as in Scotland or in Flanders (e.g. Béland and Lecours, 2008). The question that arises then is whether, when and how regional social policy- making generates the anticipated legitimation effects, that is, how it feeds back into citizens’ preference for the regional level.

Legitimation Effects of Regional Social Policy: Several Requirements

A first look at the data sustains our investigation of the relationships between regional social policy- making and potential legitimation effects. We see that the development of regional social policy is concurrent to increasing levels of citizens’ preferences for the regional level in European countries. Empirically, the legitimacy of a given level of decision- making is assessed by citizens’ evaluations of whether a certain level of government is appropriate for dealing with the issue at stake. The 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009 European Elections Studies (EES) surveys include a question asking respondents about the most appropriate level of government to deal with the ‘most important’ problem.2 Table 10.1 presents the results over time for the 11 countries that participated in the survey. To put these percentages in perspective with the previous sub- section, the last columns show the evolu-tion of the regional authority index from 1970 to 2006,3 the last available year of the index.

When it comes to regional governments as the most appropriate level of decision- making to deal with the most important issue, there is a clear upward trend: 12.4 points between 1994 and 2009, and 110 points between 1994 and 2004. Collected during the middle of the economic and financial crisis, the 2009 data reveal a distinct pattern: There was a growing support for the European level as the appropriate level of decision- making to deal with the most important issue (EU11, 1 13.3). Excluding 2009, regionalization of social policy in Western Europe thereby coincides with an increased citizen preference for the regional level to tackle the most

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important issue. Interestingly, this upward trend is noticeable in countries where subnational identities have been a political issue, as in Spain or the United Kingdom, as well as in countries where regional identities have not been salient in the period, as in France or Germany (Fitjar, 2010).

This observation, however, says little about the actual relationships, if at all present, between regional social policy- making and legitimation effects, nor do they tell us much about explanatory factors. Going beyond more simplistic explanations, the argument in this chapter is that legitimation effects are not necessarily derived from regional social policy- making; rather, such policy- making may exert a positive, negative or nonexistent impact on the legitimation of the regional level of government. Specifically, we argue that legitimation is contingent on several requirements that may or may not be met. Drawing on the existing literature, we emphasize three requirements.

The first requirement is that regional social policy design needs to be distinct and stand out from previous policies. Policy design is widely acknowledged as a main vehicle for policies to trigger feedback effects on citizens’ political attitudes and behaviours. Research has considered the size of benefits, their duration and the program administration (Campbell, 2003; Kumlin, 2004; Soss, 1999). Other policy characteristics are also

Table 10.1 Percentage of respondents indicating the region as the most appropriate level of decision- making for most important issue in 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009 (11 countries) and regional authority index (RAI)

1994 1999 2004 2009 1994–2004 RAI 1970–2006

RAI 2006

Belgium 9.8 11.3 19.3 15.9 1 9.5 15.1 28.1Denmark 9.5 10.3 26.5 16.0 1 17.0 13.1 10.2France 20.5 23.3 30.2 20.2 1 9.7 19.0 16.0Germany 13.9 23.2 25.4 14.9 1 11.5 10.1 29.3Greece 6.2 19.0 14.9 13.5 1 8.7 19.0 10.0Ireland 12.0 30.0 25.1 14.1 1 13.1 16.0 6.0Italy 15.5 17.3 – 14.6 – 114.0 22.7Portugal 9.4 29.7 17.4 15.4 1 8.0 11.1 3.6Spain 9.3 41.7 19.2 10.3 1 9.9 112.1 22.1The Netherlands 10.5 15.5 11.5 17.1 1 1.0 11.0 14.5United Kingdom 23.4 29.7 34.8 17.3 1 11.4 0.0 9.5EU11 13.0 21.7 23.0 15.4 1 10.0 – –

Sources: EES 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009; Hooghe et al., 2010.

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important, such as the definition of beneficiary groups and target popula-tions (Schneider and Ingram, 1993; Soss and Schram, 2007). In terms of regional social policy, whether citizens consider the policy to be a regional policy, devised and implemented by a regional government, is of utmost importance This consideration depends, first, on the distinctiveness of regional social policy compared to former central state policy and/or to other regional governments’ policy in the same field; and second, on the possibility for citizens to trace the regional policy back to the regional gov-ernment, that is, the clarity of policy origin between levels of government. We expect both dimensions of policy design to impact the presence of a legitimation effect of regional social policy: If citizens do not consider the policy to be regional, this policy will not matter for citizens’ attitudes about the legitimacy of the regional government, and, as a result, the legitimation effect will be nonexistent. On the contrary, if citizens consider the policy as a regional policy, it may trigger a legitimation effect of the regional gov-ernment, either positive (legitimation) or negative (delegitimation).

The second requirement is that regional social policy needs to be sur-rounded by a public discourse in order to exert a legitimation effect. A reoccurring finding in the research on policy feedback is that mediating actors are key for the operation of such policy feedback effects because they frame the information about the policy in certain ways and thereby may shape citizens’ attitudes about it (Campbell, 2012). Interest groups (Anderson and Lynch, 2007) and political elites (Soss and Schram, 2007), for example, can play the role of mediating actors. In the case of regional social policy, public discourse by regional political elites is central for the operation of regional social policy legitimation effects. A surrounding public discourse is characterized first by the connection drawn by the political elite between the policy and the regional government. That is, the public discourse must attribute the policy to the regional government. If however the public discourse does not link a regional policy to the regional government, the regional policy is not considered to be surrounded by a public discourse. Second, surrounding public discourses are also charac-terized by a relative consensus in the overall appreciation of the policy attribution to regional governments: the policy’s origins may be valued on cultural or identity grounds, in terms of efficiency or it may be con-tested on the basis of another understanding of the policy rationale. We expect the surrounding public discourse to trigger a legitimation effect for regional government. Conversely, we expect the absence of a supporting public discourse to be detrimental to the emergence of such a legitimation effect. Moreover, depending on the overall tone of the public discourse, which either tends to value or contest the policy attribution to regional government, we expect the legitimation effect to be either positive or nega-

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tive. One should note that the distinctiveness of the policy design and the surrounding public discourse by regional political elites are not necessarily related. A political discourse emphasizing the regional dimension of the policy may be developed in absence of an objective differentiation of the policy (McEwen, 2005). Conversely, a policy may be distinctive without a surrounding public discourse.

Lastly, for regional social policy to have legitimation effects it needs to perform well and build performance satisfaction among citizens. From a theoretical perspective, policy performance, that is, ‘effectiveness in the attainment of the agreed ends or purposes of government’ (Beetham and Lord, 1998, p. 25), is a main component of a government’s legitimation. It refers to the principle of governing for the people, as Fritz Scharpf (1999) coined it. From an empirical point of view, however, we know rela-tively little about the impact of policy performance on citizens’ attitudes. Research in this area nevertheless points to the importance of citizens’ evaluation in mediating the impact of policy performance on their atti-tudes (van Oorschot and Meuleman, 2012). Moreover, existing research underscores a significant relationship between policy performance and both citizens’ perception thereof and their attitudes (see Chapters 9, 13, and 14 in this volume). Drawing on these works, we expect regional policy performance to impact citizens’ evaluation of regional social policy and also on their views of the regional government. Specifically, we expect regional policies that are mostly well- received to have a positive legitima-tion effect for the regional government. Conversely, we expect performance dissatisfaction with regional policies to lead to a negative legitimation effect, that is, delegitimation.

These three requirements aim to account for the presence of a legitima-tion effect for regional governments by regional social policy (if policy distinctiveness and a surrounding public discourse exist) and for the posi-tive or negative nature of this legitimation effect (depending on the tone of the public discourse and on perceived policy performance). These require-ments should thereby contribute to the explanation of cases where regional social policy leads to an increased legitimation of regional governments, as well as cases where regional social policy undermines the legitimation of regional governments. Furthermore, the requirements should also con-tribute to explaining situations where regional social policy fails to trigger legitimation effects of any sort.

Theoretically, the proposed requirements for a regional social policy legitimation effect are not unrelated to Paul Pierson’s notion of interpre-tive effects (1993). Such effects refer to ‘how policies convey meanings and information to citizens’ (Mettler and Welch, 2004, p. 500). In Pierson’s analysis, interpretive effects depends on two conditions: visibility, that

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is, ‘voters must experience some discernable outcome that leads them to inquire about the cause of this outcome’; and traceability: ‘the electorate must be able to link that outcome to some governmental action’ (Pierson, 1993, p. 622). We suggest that our proposed requirements contribute to the analysis of how policies convey meaning and information to citizens by specifying the operations at play.

THE CASE OF BELGIUM: A QUASI- NATURAL EXPERIMENT

We use the Belgian case to illustrate our argument. The chapter is designed as a single case study of regional social policy in Belgium or, put differently, as two regional case studies. There are three reasons for this methodological choice. The first reason is that Belgium approximates an interesting natural experiment that allows a particular test of policy feed-back. Since the 1993 constitutional reform that transformed the unitary Belgian state into a federal state, two (or three) autonomously devised regional social policies replaced one single state policy. This setting allows us to carefully examine the development of our three proposed require-ments in the two main regional territories. Furthermore, since 1988, the communities4 have been in charge of education policy and, since 1993 of ‘person- related matters’, in particular certain dimensions of health care policy, family and welfare policy (Deschouwer, 2009). Social security remains largely national (Baudewyns and Dandoy, 2005). The Belgian setting therefore allows us to investigate the potential feedback effects of the set of social policies developed by subnational governments. Indeed, regional governments’ legitimation gains, if any, arguably do not originate from a single policy, but from the set of policies they are in charge of. We place a particular focus on secondary education policy in unravelling the processes behind policy feedback effects. There are several advantages of secondary education policy: Secondary education is compulsory in Belgium and therefore benefits everyone. Furthermore, there are small generational conflicts, as everyone was either a beneficiary of regional education policy or is a close relative of a beneficiary of the policy (parents, grandparents). Due to the nature of secondary education policy analyses we are therefore able to run our analyses for the entire sample without dividing it. The federal organization of Belgium is composed of two layers of meso- level government: the communities and the regions.5 As a matter of clarity in the remainder of this chapter we refer to commu-nity policies as regional policies in order to emphasize the level of power and not the institution in charge.

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The second reason for choosing the Belgian case is that following this single case over time allows us to combine both qualitative and quantitative observations to illuminate the plausibility of our argument. Furthermore, this combination of a variety of data and the historical case study design is useful in identifying the mechanisms underlying policy feedbacks, an issue that the policy feedback literature still needs to tackle, as Andrea Campbell argues (2012, p. 345). In this respect, the type of analysis we conduct in this chapter is different from most chapters, as we strive to trace changes in regional governments’ legitimation back to regional social policies in the two main Belgian regions over time.

A third reason for choosing the case of Belgium is the availability of data on citizens’ attitudes at the regional level. Most surveys either do not allow for a disaggregation of data at the regional level or the N is too small to permit statistical analysis. Because the number of Belgian regions is small, data can be disaggregated at the regional level even when the original survey was not designed for this purpose (e.g. EES, ESS). In the few cases where surveys include data on policies and level of government preferences by region (e.g. EES), hardly any region- specific items are included (De Winter et al., 2008, p. 131). Potentially crucial explanatory variables regard-ing citizens’ support attitudes towards the regional level are simply absent. This issue exemplifies the methodological nationalism pointed out in other fields (Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002), which puts severe constraints on cross- national quantitative analysis of political phenomena that take place at the regional level6 (Snyder, 2001; Fitjar, 2010). The Belgian post- election surveys conducted by the Institute of Social and Political Research (PIOP/IPSO)7 are not subject to this difficulty, as they have included questions on citizens’ perception of the evolution of federalism since 1991.

Our research design is not without its limitations. On the one hand, the federalization of Belgium only dates back to 20 years, meaning that we are only able to observe medium- term patterns. We lack the data that would allow a comparative analysis of the attitudes of groups socialized under different policy regimes (for an excellent instance of a study taking generational differences into account, see Svallfors, 2010). Yet, the tem-porality of the operation of policy feedback is shorter than socialization processes, and 20 years is still a decent amount of time to see whether and how regional social policy contributed to the legitimation of regional governments. On the other hand, we also have to face data limitations. We do not always have the measures that we need to make our points. That is why we will sometimes rely on several indirect measures. Furthermore, the most recent data available were published in 2010. Therefore, we do not cover the period of time after the 2010 institutional crisis, wherein it took 18 months to form a federal government.

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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

To test the plausibility of our argument in the Belgian case, we will proceed as follows: We first present the dependent variable in our analysis and the state of the three proposed requirements in the two Belgian regions. The section ends with a presentation of measures of Belgians’ systems of evalu-ation and perception of their regional government.

Diverging Paths of Preference for the Regional Level

We operationalize regional governments’ legitimation by focusing on citi-zens’ evaluation, as they are vital for the legitimacy of a polity (De Winter et al., 2008). Our dependent variable measures citizens’ preference for the federal level. Specifically, in the ISPO/PIOP surveys we use the question on respondents’ preferences for the level of decision making.8 On a scale of 0 to 10, citizens are asked to indicate the level of government in Belgium that should be in charge; 0 refers to a situation where all political powers are given to Flanders or Wallonia; 10 describes a situation where the federal government takes care of everything.

As shown in Figure 10.1, respondents in Wallonia very clearly prefer the

4

4.5

5

5.5

6

7

6.5

1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2010

WalloniaFlanders

Sources: PIOP/ISPO 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007 & 2010 (Wallonia only) (Samples weighted by age, gender, education and vote choice).

Figure 10.1 Preference for the federal state by region – means

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federal level. The Walloon mean stabilizes around 6.5 since the beginning of the 1990s. While a slight upward trend can be seen beginning in 1999, the mean was otherwise stable between 1991 and 2010 (10.04).9 In Flanders, on the contrary, there was a shift since 1991 towards an increased preference for more regionalization, as the Flemish mean decreases from 5.78 in 1991 to 5.15 in 2007. Thus, the gap between Walloons’ and Flemings’ preferences has also increased over time, increasing from a difference of 0.6 in 1991 to 1.44 in 2007; the F- Test shows that the Flemish score is significantly differ-ent from the mean score in Wallonia for every PIOP/ISPO wave (p ,.0001).

From the federalization of Belgium in 1993, a second diverging path can be observed regarding regional identification patterns.10 Until the early 1990s and despite the differences in level, Flemish and Walloon patterns displayed a number of commonalities. As Figure 10.2 illustrates, from 1979 to 1995 regional identification trends were decreasing in both regions (Flanders, –19.3; Wallonia, –14.9), while feelings of belonging to Belgium were increasing (Flanders, 119.07; Wallonia, 117.1).

0

10

20

30

40

60

50

1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007

Feeling of belonging to theFlemish community/RegionFeeling of belonging to theFrancophone community/Walloon Region

Sources: ISPO/PIOP, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007 (samples weighted by age, gender, education and vote); Regioscopes I, to VI (Delruelle and Frognier 1983).

Figure 10.2 Feelings of belonging in the 1979–2007 period (percentage opting for the regional level as first choice)

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In 1995, directly after federalization, the difference in regional identifica-tion in Flanders and Wallonia was at a low point (–6.4), though Flemings were slightly more inclined to express a feeling of belonging to the Flemish Community/Region (25.6 per cent) than the Walloons did to the French Speaking Community and/or to the Walloon Region (19.2 per cent). But from this date on, as Figure 10.2 illustrates, one can see an increase in the feeling of belonging to the regional level in the Flemish case, from 25.6 per cent in 1993 to 33.3 per cent in 2007. In that same year, only 12.2 per cent of Walloons expressed a feeling of belonging to the Francophone Community and/or the Walloon Region. There is a 21.1 points difference in 2007 in terms of regional identification between both groups. In the Walloon case, 1995 is not a turning point in the pattern of regional identifi-cation: The feeling of belonging to the French Community or the Walloon Region has steadily decreased between 1979 and 2007.

The Flemish and the Walloon cases are therefore strongly contrasting cases. While the regionalization of social policy is concurrent to increasing preference for the regional level and regional identification in Flanders, in Wallonia we find a stable level of preference for the national level and a steady decline of regional identification. To a certain extent, the Walloon case is the most puzzling, as the regionalization process seems to have had no discernible impact.

With regard to the Flemish case, one could think that a regional identification- based explanation would suffice to account for the change in Flemings’ preference for the regional level. One could assume that different preferences regarding regionalization led to differing policies that conse-quently led to greater satisfaction with the new policies and regional organi-zation. However, there are three observations that weaken the plausibility of this regional identification- based explanation as a self- contained account of the Flemish/ Belgian case and thereby pave the way for an analysis of policy feedback. First, since 1979, the development of territorial identities shows that a majority of both Flemings and Walloons have identified first and foremost with Belgium, and that these majorities have steadily become larger over the years (see also Billiet et al., 2006). In 2007, they represented 53.5 per cent of Flemish respondents and 76.5 per cent of Walloon respondents.

Second, regional and national identities are conflicting neither for Flemings nor for Walloons. In the PIOP/ISPO surveys, the ‘Moreno ques-tion’11 (Moreno, 1986) demonstrates that most Flemings consider Belgian and Flemish identities as complementary (see also Billiet et al., 2006, p. 917; De Winter, 2007). In 2007, 35.3 per cent of Flemings felt just as much as Flemish as Belgian; 37.6 per cent of Walloons felt equally Walloon as Belgian. This same year, whereas only 7.3 per cent of Flemings felt only Flemish, 12.7 per cent said they felt only Belgian.

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Third, the percentages of regional identification in 2007 are still much lower than the values recorded in the early 1980s (45.0 per cent in Flanders and 34.1 per cent in Wallonia in 1979). Moreover, in the Flemish case, the correlates of levels of power and identification items show that the preference for the regional level is strongly related to regional identity, as measured by the feelings of belonging (in 2007, 0.337 (p ,.000)) and by the Moreno question (in 2007, 0.488 (p ,.000)). Interestingly, this rela-tionship does not grow over time. While among Flemings the preference for the regional level has increased over time, the correlations between the preference for the regional level and regional identity have remained stable: from 0.333 (p ,.000) in 1991 to 0.337 (p ,.000) in 2007 for the feelings of belonging item, and from 0.504 (p ,.000) in 1995 to 0.488 (p ,.000) for the Moreno question. As the preference for the national level has increased over the years in Wallonia, the strength of the relation-ship between national feeling of belonging and preference for the national level has slightly decreased over time: from 0.209 (p ,.000) in 1991 to 0.145 (p ,.000) in 2007 for the feelings of belonging item, and from 0.196 (p ,.000) in 1995 to 0.181 (p ,.000) in 2007 for the Moreno question. This means that if the Walloons who identify as Belgian showed a more federal-ist stance in the past, this relationship is currently weaker. In both cases, if regional identity was the sole explanatory factor, a stronger correlation over time would have been observed.

The Distinctiveness of Regional Policy Design in Flanders and Wallonia

In order to shed light on the diverging paths in regional policy preferences, let us examine our first requirement in the case under scrutiny, Belgium. The first component of policy distinctiveness relates to the distinctiveness of regional policy compared to former state policy and/or the policy of other regions. The difference between Flanders and Wallonia is marked: Flemish social policy displays a strong policy divergence both from the former state- led policy and from the French community policy. As educa-tion policy stands at the core of the policy responsibilities of the commu-nities, we focus our attention on it. The communities were entrusted with the responsibility of education in 1988. From this date on the delivery of education in Flanders has dramatically changed: ‘A unified state school system directly delivered by central bureaucrats was turned into a network of schools in which professionals have a greater role in their governance’ (de Rynck, 2005, pp. 492‒493). Moreover, the regulation of quality was also reshaped to a system regulating results- achievements, with the min-istry of education regulating quality in public and private schools. On the contrary, ‘in the French community, changes consolidated the national

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policy legacy, and attempts at moving away from that legacy have failed’ (de Rynck, 2005, p. 491). Moreover, governments of the French commu-nity emphasized the notion of public service, just as the former state policy did. On the French- speaking side, education policy is thereby strongly path- dependent vis- à- vis the former state- led policy. Given their respective designs, the distinctiveness of the Flemish policy is arguably greater than the distinctiveness of the French- Speaking Community policy.

The second component of policy distinctiveness relates to the clarity of the policy attribution between levels of government. The asymmetry of Belgian federalism illuminates the role of the Flemish region in devising social policy, while it obscures the role of the Francophone institution. While in Flanders the Flemish region and the Flemish community merged in one single institution (Deschouwer, 2009), there are still two institutions on the Francophone side, namely the Walloon region and the French com-munity. There is only one institution that develops policies in Flanders. On the Francophone side, however, there are two institutions that may potentially be held responsible for a policy. There is therefore a great com-plexity of the division of policy responsibility. In addition, institutions in the Francophone part of the country are not systematically considered to be part of the same set of French- speaking institutions. For instance, the Brussels- capital region stands apart in the views of its inhabitants, thus making it quite difficult to identify which institution did what. The complexity of implementing certain policy responsibilities only serves to magnify this difficulty. Education policy provides an illustrative example of these challenges. The French community delegated its power over edu-cation policy to the Walloon Region and to the Commission of the French Community of Brussels- Capital Region (Erk, 2003). One should also note that the French community renamed itself in April 2011 and is now called ‘Fédération Wallonie- Bruxelles’. This new name likely created even more confusion, for in French the term ‘federation’ does not connote a subna-tional level of government, but rather the national government.

Overall, it seems that Flemish social policy is distinctive from former state policy and to the other region’s policy. On the contrary, it is not as clear that Walloon social policy is less different from former state policy. The likelihood that citizens accredit Walloon social policy to the French- speaking community is low given the institutional complexity on the Francophone side.

Public Discourse and Support to the Regional Level

Our second requirement covers whether public discourse establishes an explicit link between the policy and the regional level of government

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and how positively this relationship is presented. The difference between Flanders and Wallonia is striking. Flemish governments, backed by the Flemish nationalist movement, have framed social policy as a matter of solidarity among Flemings, resulting in the exclusion of Walloons. In addition, Flemish governments have repeatedly emphasized that ‘Wat we zelf doen, doen we beter’ (what we do ourselves, we do better) (Erk, 2003). This framing started in the 1980s, when the Flemish Movement became interested in social policy, elaborating a discourse linking Flemish regional identity and cultural features to distinctive social policy. The Flemish move-ment has made two arguments in favour of the further federalization of the Belgian insurance system. The first one draws on the idea of subsidiarity, that is, the idea that social policies in Flanders should reflect the needs, values and policy preferences of Flemings and therefore should be devised and implemented by the Flemish government. The second argument refers to the results of studies commissioned by the Movement on the financial flux between the two regions. The argument states that ‘Walloons willingly overuse countrywide social insurance benefits or, alternatively, that their culture encourages them to do so’ (Béland and Lecours, 2008, p. 166). The political discourse in Flanders thereby offers a positive image of Flemings in complete opposition to their Francophone counterparts. The main claim is that the boundaries of redistribution and solidarity should shift from Belgian- wide boundaries to the boundaries of the Flemish nation.

On the French- speaking side, the political discourse of the elite on social policy is defensive, and is merely a reaction to the Flemish framing of social policy as a cultural and identity- related matter. The studies commissioned by the Flemish Movement were successful in shaping the Belgian political agenda during the 1990s and in informing ‘many of the arguments used on both sides of the linguistic border for justifying claims and counter- claims about the federalization of the Belgian social insurance system’ (Béland and Lecours, 2008, p. 165). Contrary to the Flemish discourses, Walloon elites have emphasized a national definition of social solidarity, rather than a regional one. They echo a representation widely shared among Francophones who believe that the welfare ‘system represents (. . .) one of the last meaningful ties holding the country together’ (Béland and Lecours, 2008, p. 170). The Walloon elites have engaged in the discussion about national vs. regional boundaries of welfare by picking apart the Flemings’ arguments one by one. They have reminded Flemings that Flanders was the poorest half of the country for more than one hundred years, and ben-efited the most from the national social insurance system. Francophone experts also dispute the financial analyses conducted by the Flemish side, and argue that the financial transfers in favour of Walloons are not as large as the Flemish analyses presented them.

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While the Walloon elite discourse refers to social policy, it does not connect social policy to the regional level of government; rather it strongly emphasizes the relationship between social policy and the national level. In fact, social policy is valued as a matter of Belgium- wide solidarity. The Flemish political elite, however, talks about social policy in a way that establishes a clear and explicit link between Flemish cultural features and needs, and social policy. The public discourse on the Flemish side of the country thereby values the administration of social policy in favour of regional governments. Therefore, there seems to be a supporting discourse of regional social policy- making in Flanders, whereas no such public dis-course surrounding regional social policy in the French- speaking side of the country exists.

Regional Policy Performance and its Evaluation

Let us now turn to our third requirement. We focus on education policy to describe policy performance and citizens’ evaluation thereof. Indeed, the advantage is that all citizens benefit from secondary education policy, either directly as (former) pupils or indirectly as parents or grandparents of pupils. There are important differences between Flemings and Walloons in terms of their evaluation of education. In the ESS surveys between 2002 and 2010, Flemings were systematically more positive and satisfied with the state of education than Walloons. When asked to evaluate the state of education, the first recorded mean scores were around 7.0 on a 10- point scale for Flemings; Walloons had mean scores of approximately 5.5.

These evaluations are congruent with the performance of the Flemish and Walloon education systems. Indeed, the Flemings, who perform quite well according to the PISA studies (Programme for International Student Assessment) assessing 15- year olds’ school performance, evaluate education policy very positively. Since 2001, the surveys have shown that Flemish pupils perform very well in reading, mathematics and science, and are among the best pupils in the OECD countries (OECD, 2010). Walloon student performance, on the other hand, is around the OECD average. Put bluntly, the Flemish education system performs better than the Walloon system, and Flemings’ and Walloons’ respective evaluations of the state of education in their regions echo these different levels of educational performance.

Systems of Evaluation and Perception

We have described the state and development of our three requirements in both Belgian regions. The next step is to now investigate whether and

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how Flemings’ and Walloons’ systems of evaluation and perception may have been affected by policy distinctiveness, public discourse and perceived policy performance of Flemish and Walloon respective social policy. We see these systems to hint at the dimensions through which citizens grasp public policies and evaluate them. We therefore consider these systems of evaluation and perception to provide insights into the processes, if any, which connect changes in the environment (changes in the policy design, in policy discourse and policy performance) and citizens’ reactions to them. In the EES, respondents were also asked about the level of govern-ment dealing with the most important problem (see endnote 2 for the exact wording of the question). Both in Flanders and in Wallonia unem-ployment and pensions were indicated as the most important problems.12 In Flanders, there is an upward trend: 15.5 per cent of the respondents thought that the regional government was in charge in 1994; in 2009 it was 27 per cent. In Wallonia, on the other hand, the trend is a downward one: in 1994 18.8 per cent of Walloon respondents thought the region dealt with the most important problem; in 2009 that figure dropped to 14.9 per cent.

These results are supplemented by a factor analysis using additional data in terms of source, scope and time. This type of analysis measures the degree to which items are tapping the same concept. When respondents answer in similar ways to questions related to different policy sectors, it means that respondents do not consider these concepts, here public poli-cies, to be distinct. We used questions related to the suitable level of gov-ernment for eight public policies, including social policy.13 These questions were only asked in the 1999 PIOP/ ISPO survey.

The factor analysis presented in Table 10.2 shows that the eight policies correspond to two separate attitudinal dimensions in Flanders, and to only one in Wallonia. In general, the items that weigh the most determine a fac-tor’s meaning. We thus chose to retain the items linked to unemployment, education, health insurance and retirement to construct the first factor in Flanders. The factor’s meaning is not ambiguous, as these policies are all social policies. In 1999 in Flanders, the first factor clearly expresses the specificity of social policy in terms of the level of decision making: more than one- third of Flemish respondents chose the regional level as the suit-able level of decision- making for unemployment (30 per cent), education (44 per cent), health insurance (33 per cent) and retirement policy (30 per cent). The second factor, referring to policy areas to be handled by the federal state, relates to security, the judicial system, scientific research and the environment. In Wallonia, on the contrary, respondents did not distinguish social policy from other policies when answering the question regarding the suitable level of government to be in charge. This is consist-ent with our theory: Given the low distinctiveness of regional social policy

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design and the absence of a surrounding discourse in the Francophone part of the country, we did not expect Walloons to distinguish regional social policy from federal policy.

A further step is to examine how Flemings and Walloons evaluate regional policies. Such evaluations tell us about respondents’ abilities to evaluate these policies as regional policies and their level of (dis- )satisfac-tion with these policies. The issue is whether they use a specific system to evaluate regional policies or if they rely on a broader system that is not sensitive to levels of government. In order to complete the previous analysis, we used 2010 ESS data that include evaluation items on educa-tion and health services. We ran a factor analysis to see whether Flemings’ and Walloons’ evaluations can be reduced to one or several dimensions. In the analysis we included the satisfaction with the state of the economy, the national government and the state of democracy as proxies for evaluating the national level.

As shown in Table 10.3, in 2010 Flemings distinguished themselves from their Walloon counterparts, as the latter evaluated all five items along one single dimension. On the contrary, Flemings clearly differentiated their evaluations of education and health services from their evaluation of the economy, the national government and democracy. Flemings seem to be

Table 10.2 The most suitable level of government – factor analysis – by region, ISPO/PIOP 1999

Suitable level of government for solving problems relating to . . .

Flanders Wallonia

Component Component

1 2 1

Unemployment 0.481 0.476Education 0.501 0.556Retirement 0.892 0.561Health insurance 0.856 0.588The judicial system 0.649The environment 0.505 0.377Security and maintenance 0.671 0.319Scientific research 0.478

Explained variances (R2 after rotation) 43.6% 13.4% 41.4%

Note: Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Source: ISPO/PIOP, 1999 (samples weighted by age, gender, education and vote).

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able to distinguish regional policies from what is dealt with at the federal level, whereas Walloons assess regional policies and the proxies used for the federal level in a one- dimensional fashion. Ten years later and using another battery of questions, this result confirms the previous factor analysis’ conclusion.

Regarding the mean evaluation scores, the levels of satisfaction with the national government and with democracy do not differ significantly between Flanders and Wallonia (NS). This result reconfirms the Flemings’ and the Walloons’ common patterns of evaluation when they evaluate the national government and democracy at the national level, as highlighted in both factor analyses. In terms of the evaluation of the state of the economy, education and health services, the two groups display significant differences. Focusing on the evaluation of education, the F- Test shows that the Flemish score is significantly different from the mean score in

Table 10.3 Systems of evaluations – factor analysis and mean composite scores and standard deviations of citizens’ attitudes – Flanders and Wallonia samples ESS round 5 (mean scores on 10- point scales) – 2010

Variables Factor analysis Mean scores and SD

Flanders Wallonia Flanders Wallonia F- Test

Components Mean Score

SD Mean Score

SD Sig.

1 2 1

State of the economy

0.702 0.755 5.26 1.739 4.54 1.920 .000

National government

0.859 0.695 3.64 2.279 3.55 2.347 Ns

Democracy 0.760 0.751 5.06 1.739 5.35 2.293 NsState of education

0.851 0.470 7.20 1.405 5.73 2.102 .000

State of health services

0.823 0.622 7.60 1.320 7.13 1.650 .000

Explained variances (R2

after rotation)

44.74% 22.21% 44.50%

Note: Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Source: ESS 2010.

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Wallonia (t531.389; p ,.0001). In Flanders, the means for education and health services (7.20 and 7.60) are much higher those for the national level items (5.26 for satisfaction with the state of the economy, 3.64 for satisfac-tion with the national government and 5.06 the satisfaction with democ-racy). Social policy is thus evaluated very positively. In Wallonia, however, the state of education is evaluated similarly to the state of democracy (5.35 and 5.73, respectively), whereas health servicers are evaluated more positively (7.13). This last result may show that Walloons’ level of (dis- )satisfaction with regional policies is very close to their evaluation of federal policies. But the fact that they use the same system of evaluation for national and regional social policy lends support to the idea that the regional government cannot be held accountable for a poorly evaluated education system.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Patterns of legitimation for Flemish and Walloon governments have been diverging since the federalization of Belgium in 1993. Over time, Flemings’ preference for the Flemish government has increased, while Francophone Belgians’ preference for the French- speaking and/or Walloon governments has remained stable. In order to explain this puzzle, we argued that regional social policy- making does not necessarily entail legitimation effects for regional governments per se, but that such legitimation effects are contin-gent on three requirements. Specifically, we expected that when regional social policy has a distinct design and stands out in some important ways, when it is surrounded by a supporting public discourse and when citizens are fairly satisfied with the policy performance, the regional government is likely to gain legitimation.

Data collected on the Flemish case fit with these theoretical expecta-tions. The two characteristics of policy design, namely the distinctive-ness of the Flemish regional policy in comparison to the previous state policy and to the policy of the other region, on the one hand, and clarity a policy’s origins, on the other hand, enable legitimation to take place at the regional level. Furthermore, we showed that the Flemish elite political discourses may be a key mediator between the policy and the mass public. The connection established by the Flemish elite between regional social policy and Flemish features may have allowed respondents to correctly identify regional social policies. Finally, we demonstrated that education policy performs better in Flanders than in French- speaking Belgium, and that Flemings’ positive evaluations of the education system echo this high level of performance. Using factor analyses, we showed that Flemings

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make a distinction for social policy when asked about the suitable level of government for addressing an issue. They also evaluate social policy more positively than proxies for the national level.

Furthermore, we expected that when there is no policy design distinc-tiveness and when regional policy is not surrounded by a public discourse, then it is likely that the regional government does not gain legitimation through its social policy- making. The French- speaking Walloon case but-tresses these expectations. Indeed, the federalization of Belgium has not been conducive to changes in the pattern of Walloons’ preference for the regional level of government. Francophone Belgium is a case where none of the three requirements is met. Overall, there is relative congruence of our arguments with data for the Belgian case. One should note that the two regional cases are not different enough for us to be able to discern whether the three requirements are additive or whether all three need to occur in order to legitimation effects. In Flanders, each requirement is met; none are met in Wallonia.

Is this body of converging evidence sufficient to make our point? The crucial issue here is that of causality, that is, whether the different attitudes towards the regional level of government in the two main Belgian regions are indeed feedback from the differing policies introduced after federali-zation. A counter argument could be made, pointing to a reverse causal arrow: One could posit that different preferences regarding regionalization led to differing policies that, once implemented, have led to increased satis-faction with the new policies and regional organization. The key elements here are regional identification patterns and their different states when federalization occurred. The patterns’ evolution (see Figure 10.2) shows that this counter- explanation is not as convincing as it might first seem. Indeed, one observes a clear change in the trend from 1993 on in Flanders, but it is not accompanied by strengthened correlations between the level of power and the identities items. On the contrary, in Wallonia the feder-alization process has not brought about a halt to the previous trend, that is, to the waning feelings of regional belonging. Moreover, the correlations between the appropriate level of power and the identification items are declining over the long run. This is not to say that regional identification does not play a role in explaining regional governments’ legitimation; but rather that it is not sufficient to look at regional identification patterns in accounting for the legitimation of regional governments in Belgium. If there was a disparity in the patterns of identification between the two main regions before the federalization process, it is however worth noting that the overall picture emerging from our analyses is one of long- term convergence between Flanders and Wallonia up until 1993, then followed by divergence. The data we analysed in this chapter demonstrate that there

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is some policy feedback at play in these diverging legitimation paths. We could see regional identification as amplifying or lessening the impacts of the three requirements we proposed. In Flanders regional identification plays a role in reinforcing the connection between social policy and the regional level of government established in elite discourses. The strong correlates between the feeling of belonging and the level of power in Flanders could lend some support to the idea that the regional govern-ment legitimation in Flanders relies both on regional policies that build a preference for the regional level in addressing social issues and on a process of regional identity- building. As Lipset reminds us, the legitimacy of a political system primarily refers to its capacity ‘to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for a society’ (1958, p. 86). To some extent, one could say that while Flemish and Walloon elites have both succeeded, they have different socie-ties in mind.

Overall, the results are consistent with the main proposition of this volume: Citizens’ attitudes may be the outcome of public policies. The chapter investigated the conditions under which citizens’ preferences for the regional level of government may be a feedback effect of regional social policy- making. Examining policy feedback among citizens in European welfare states is an important research area because it engages questions of great normative significance for democratic governance (Campbell, 2012). This chapter focused on one major challenge for the study of contempo-rary democracies, namely, the democratic outcomes of regionalization processes across Western Europe. To continue on this path, however, more opinion surveys and qualitative studies are needed. This would be a neces-sary condition for avoiding the pitfalls of methodological nationalism and for better understanding how the regionalization of social policy across Europe impacts citizens’ attitudes and behaviours.

NOTES

1. For example, the development of the Spanish welfare state is inseparable from regional governments’ policy- making. They have responsibilities in the field of education, social assistance and services, housing policy, minimum wage policy and, for some autono-mous communities, health care. In the United Kingdom the devolution process initiated under Blair’s first government resulted in the regionalization of (certain dimensions of) health care policy, education, housing and personal social services to the Scottish and the Welsh Parliaments. In Italy regional governments are in charge of social assistance, social care, and health care. The French regions deal with parts of education policy, and are increasingly involved in hospital policy.

2. ‘As of today, is ,the most important issue. mainly dealt with by regional, national, or European political authorities? And who do you think would be most appropriate

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to deal with ,the most important issue.: regional, national, or European political authorities?’

3. The Regional Authority Index (RAI) is a measure of the authority of regional gov-ernments in 42 democracies or quasi- democracies on an annual basis over the period 1950–2006 (Hooghe et al., 2010). As regionalization across Europe took place in the last three decades, we calculated the evolution from 1970 to 2006. For Portugal and Spain the data begin in 1976 and 1978, respectively.

4. The three communities are defined on a linguistic and cultural basis (Flemish, French and German communities). The division of Belgium into four linguistic regions is based upon the 1962‒63 language laws.

5. Regions are mainly in charge of economic issues. There are three territorially defined regions: Flanders, Wallonia, and the Brussels- capital region. They are political subdivi-sions that are different from the linguistic communities mentioned earlier.

6. In a cross- national perspective, the soon- to- be published “Citizenship after the nation state” survey is a rare exception (Jeffery et al., 2013).

7. PIOP and ISPO are the respective Institutes for Social and Political Opinion Research in the Dutch- speaking and the French- speaking parts of Belgium. The data used in this publication were made available by the ISPO and PIOP – Interuniversity Centres for Political Opinion Research, sponsored by the Federal Services for Technical, Cultural and Scientific Affairs. The data were originally collected by Marc Swyngedouw (ISPO) for the Flemish voters and André- Paul Frognier and Pierre Baudewyns (PIOP) for the French- speaking voters. Neither the original collectors of the data nor the Centre bear any responsibility for the analysis or interpretations presented here.

8. ‘The form of government that the country should have is still a matter of discussion. Some think that “Flanders and Wallonia must each be able to decide over everything by themselves”. Others think that “Belgium, Flemish and Walloons together, must be able to decide about everything”. Where would you place yourself on the scale?’

9. At the time of writing, the 2010 PIOP/ISPO dataset is only available for Wallonia.10. ‘Which group do you consider yourself to be a member of in the first place? 1. Belgium

2. French- speaking community 3. Flemish Community/Region 4. German- speaking community 5. Walloon Region 6. Brussels Region 7. Province 8. Commune or city’.

11. ‘Which one of the following statements applies most to you? 1. I consider myself to be only a Fleming/Walloon 2. I feel more Fleming/Walloon than Belgian 3. I feel myself to be equally Fleming/Walloon and Belgian 4. I feel more Belgian than Fleming/Walloon 5. I consider myself to be only a Belgian’.

12. Note that in 1999, when the dioxin crisis in Belgium occurred, food safety was also cited as the most important problem.

13. ‘In our country there are five levels of government: municipal (local), provinces, regions and communities, Belgium (federal) and Europe. Below you will find a list of policy issues. In your opinion, which of the five levels of government is most suitable for the next problems?’

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Social Policy, Legitimation and Diverging Regional Paths in Belgium.

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