Semiotic Analysis of Perception

WORKING COPY # 1330

“Semiotic Analysis of Perception: The USST Approach toUnderstanding Perception”

By Charls Pearson, Ph.D.

American Semiotics Research Institute

[email protected]

I. INTRODUCTION:

Barry Maund, in his new work (2003) on perception, sets up a broadframework for thinking about the philosophy of perception andidentifies various theories of perception that fit within hisframework. However, he does not mention one of the most important,and in many ways the most successful, theories of perception, CharlesPeirce’s semiotic theory of perception.

Perhaps Maund may be forgiven for this oversight since Peirce’stheory of perception is not published in a single, unified work, butscattered diffusely over a lifetime of writing. Here, C.F. Delaney,in his recent book, Science, Knowledge, and Mind (1993), has provided agreat aid by gathering some of Peirce’s writings on perceptiontogether as section III.3.c., “The Epistemic Role of Perception”.

Yet Peirce’s theory still lacks a unity and focus that neitherPeirce, Maund, nor Delaney might have given it if either one of themhad concentrated their attention on developing and presenting it as asingle, unified theory of perception.

In this paper, I attempt to provide that unity and focus byanalyzing Peirce’s theory of perception from within the Semiotic

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Pearson: “Semiotic Analysis of Perception” of 35

Paradigm with an application of the Universal Sign Structure Theory(USST) to explain the semiotics of his theory. Thus analyzed, it isnot surprising that Peirce’s theory satisfies all of the requirementsset forth by Maund as well as fitting consistently within Peirce’sCritical Common Sense philosophy (Pragmaticism) of Practical Realismand Concrete Idealism.

II. BACKGROUND:

II.A. Philosophy vs. Psychology of Perception:

Discussion about the nature of perceptual knowledge and thecategories of the objects of perception forms one of the oldestcontinuous threads of philosophic debate. This thread winds itselfin and out of many of the classical philosophic pigeon holes, such asepistemology, metaphysics, logic, philosophy of mind, philosophy oflanguage, and philosophy of science. Given that many topics in manyof these areas of philosophy have become the exclusive domain ofscience (viz. natural philosophy is now professional physics) andgiven that psychology is now attempting to do the same forperception, how do we distinguish between the philosophy ofperception and the psychology of perception?

Peirce, himself, attempted to answer this question in 1890 bysaying that, “The object of a theory is to render somethingintelligible. The object of philosophy is to render everythingintelligible” (W8: 23). This paper will attempt to make this ideamore precise.

In those areas of the older philosophy that have become theexclusive domain of the professional sciences, the characteristicquestions of philosophy have mostly been answered, at least to acertain degree of general acceptance. For instance, naturalphilosophy decided long ago what constitutes physical phenomena,data, goals, objectives, questions, methodology, etc. and etc.However, in the case of perception, no generally accepted answersexist for most of these questions. So, for instance, we see


psychologists measuring the latency between the onset of a specificperceptual stimulus and the reported registration of a perceptualimage to the nearest millisecond, but philosophers have not evenagreed yet on whether the objects of perception are mental ormaterial, whether these objects exist independently of the act ofperceiving, or are they constructed? What is the nature and role ofperceptual experience; what role does thought play, what is the roleof concepts? What are perceptual sensations and what role do theyplay in perception? What is the role of signs, and how does thestructure of signs determine the structure of our perceptions? Etc.and etc.

Given that philosophic discussion of such questions has continuedfor almost 2,500 years now, it may be understood why the difficultyand complexity of such philosophical problems has prevented a morerapid development of the psychological science of perception.

This paper presents an attempt to make some progress in thedevelopment of a generally accepted philosophical theory ofperception. This theory would provide the generally accepted answersto the above mentioned questions by combining the little known theoryof perception by Charles S. Peirce with both the semiotic methodologyof the Semiotic Paradigm and the theoretical power of the UniversalSign Structure Theory (USST).

There is no direct attempt to address the perceptual theories orthe methodologies of professional psychology except insofar as thehoped for impact of an agreed upon philosophy on the overall progressand maturity of the entire field of perceptual psychology. Inreturn, it is hoped that such advances in perceptual psychology willenable very subtle and very powerful advances in the ability ofsemioticists to design and develop experiments to probe and explorethe structure of signs and sign processes. This is a directcorollary of my Principle of Paradigm Inversion from theexperimental/observational subparadigm of the Semiotic Paradigm(i.e., experimental semiotics).


II.B Maund’s Requirements for a Philosophy of Perception:

Maund claims that the study of perception falls within what iscalled “naturalistic epistemology” by followers of the Aristotelian-Stoic approach. It is implicit in this approach that skepticism isnot treated as a problem. Maund says that “According to Aristotle,we can safely leave the sceptic (sic – sp) “like a bump, sitting on alog”.” (2003:3). According to Maund, this should be interpreted asdescribing a philosophical study for which the natural sciences arerelevant, not as one attempting to completely reduce epistemology topsychology (2003: 3). This distinction has been further discussed byKornblith (1985: 3-13).

Maund describes the goals of naturalistic epistemology as theexplanation of the conditions under which knowledge is acquired, andthe means whereby it is acquired, etc. (2003: 4). This approach doesnot deny a role for the phenomenology of perception or for describingperceptual experience from the first person point of view, but itstarts with the view that perception is a natural process in theworld. Our first task is to describe the role that perception plays,and as a result, to try to solve the problems that arise fromattempting to perform that task.

Maund says that it is only at a later stage,that it becomes important to give an account of perceptual experiences, andhere describing the experience from the first person point of view is crucial.But that stage comes after we have set up a framework for describing perceptionas a natural process. It will still be necessary, following this approach, toprovide an account of perceptual experience, for perceptual experience is partof the means whereby the perceiver acquires his or her knowledge of theenvironment. On either approach then, it will be necessary not only to spellout the epistemological role of perceptual experiences, but to provide theright characterization of them, that is, of their character, their content, andtheir objects. (2003: 5).

Maund claims that the naturalistic approach is the most likely todeliver a theory of perception that will provide an integration ofthe first person and third person points of view. Such integration


is a crucial requirement (my emphasis) for any adequate theory ofperception (2003: 5). Maund fails to note, however, that anintegration of the first person and third person points of view isalso an integration of the phenomenological and scientific approachesand therefore requires the integrative methodology of semiotics.

Maund gives his second and third requirements after a discussionof various kinds of historical theories of perception. He says, “weneed to distinguish between various forms of representationalism:indirect representationalism (the representative theory ofperception) and direct representationalism where the letter may bethought of as cognitive direct realism (or at least one importantform of it)” (2003: 8).

He continues with his third requirement for a philosophical theoryof perception, “With respect to the representative theory, moreover,we need to distinguish between the “classical” theory and non-inferential forms of the theory.”

After a more extensive discussion of the natural view Maundarrives at his next requirement: “If I wish to reject the naturalview, I need to explain why it seems so instinctively true.” (2003:12).

The next requirement comes immediately in the next section, “ThePhilsophy and psychology of perception: (2003: 13). “Someone engagedin a philosophical approach to perception needs to say, at least inoutline, how we should conceive the relationship between thephilosophy of perception and the psychology of perception” (2003:13). And again, “the philosopher needs to provide an account thatallows a role for empirical research…” (2003: 16).

In the section, “Natural realism in philosophy and psychology”,Maund arrives at another requirement for the philosophy ofperception: “… it is an important philosophical task to spell outwhat is involved in these perceptual activities and processes. Thecrucial matter is to understand how perception works; for example, to


find out how knowledge is acquired and whether or not it is throughsense impressions or representations or ideas or cognitions, orwhatever, to find out whether there are assumptions built into theview that are open to criticism or revision.” (2003: 20).

We may summarize these requirements for a philosophical theory ofperception in Table 1: Maund’s Requirements for a PhilosophicalTheory of Perception.

Table 1: Maund’s Requirements on any PhilosophicalTheory of Perception

1.

We must start with the view that perception is a natural process in theworld. Our first task is to describe the role that perception plays, andas a result, to try to solve the problems that arise from attempting toperform that task. We must set up a framework for describing perception asa natural process.

2.

…It will still be necessary to provide an account of perceptual experience,for perceptual experience is part of the means whereby the perceiveracquires his or her knowledge of the environment. It is thus necessary notonly to spell out the epistemological role of perceptual experiences, butto provide the right characterization of them, that is, of their character,their content, and their objects.

3.Any adequate theory of perception must provide an integration of the firstperson and third person points of view, thereby also integrating thephenomenological and the scientific approaches to theory building

4.

We need to distinguish between various forms of representationalism:indirect representationalism (the representative theory of perception), anddirect representationalism, where the latter may be thought of as cognitivedirect realism (or at least, one important form of it).

5. With respect to the representative theory, moreover, we need to distinguishbetween the “classical” theory and non-inferential forms of the theory.

6. If the natural view is to be rejected, we need to explain why it seems sointuitively true.

7.We need to say, at least in outline, how we should conceive therelationship between the philosophy of perception and the psychology ofperception. This relationship must allow a role for empirical research.


8.

We must spell out what is involved in perceptual activities and processes.The crucial matter is to understand how perception works; for example, tofind out how knowledge is acquired and whether or not it is thru senseimpressions, representations, ideas, cognitions, or whatever; to find outwhether there are assumptions built into the view that are open tocriticism or revision.

III. SOME IMPORTANT PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF PERCEPTION:

III.A. Naïve Realism:

Myles Burnyeat (1979) characterized one version of Naïve Realismas the “window model” of perception. The act of perceiving revealsthe thing as it really is, like opening a window and looking out. Heattributes this theory to a number of ancient Greek philosophers.

Landesman claims that one principle central to Naïve Realism isthe following:

The Principle of Direct Acquaintance: Perception of an object is the directapprehension of that neumenal object. Landesman claims “… you don’tneed evidence when you have the very thing itself” (1993: 3).

The Naïve Ontological Realism theory of perception has severalcharacteristics that will be important in this analysis. They are:

1. The natural view is ontologically realistic. I am presented with aparticular that exists independently of the perceiver or the act ofperception.

2. The relation of perceptual acquaintance is epistemic, altho of aspecial sort. It is an occurrent state of perceptual awareness: Iam aware of (conscious of) the particular.

3. The theory is a direct realist one. It is a certain particular, aphysical object that is presented to me, and of which I am aware.There is no intermediary between the physical object and theperceiving subject, which is either presented or that I am aware of.


4. The theory is transparent. When we introspect our perceptualexperiences, we are aware of an instance of a quality that isinstantiated in the very object perceived.

On any specific occasion, we see a particular object against apatterned background. It is a physical object that the perceiverdirectly perceives, is acquainted with, and interacts with.

III.B. Idealism/Phenomenalism:

The phenomenology of perception attempts to describe theexperiencing of perception from a first person, subjective, point ofview; while phenomenology itself is the philosophical theory thatattempts to account for and explain the phenomenology of experience.Idealism/phenomenalism is the phenomenological theory of perception.This theory attempts to account for and explain the phenomenology ofperception involving perceptual experiencing described from the firstperson, subjective, point of view.

“According to the idealist/phenomenalist theory, we are aware of asensory particular, but it is not a physical thing that existsindependently of our act of perceiving (nor do we perceive indirectlysuch a physical thing)” (Maund 2003: 11). On the other hand, othersclaim that according to idealism/phenomenalism, it is the physicalobject that is normally perceived, but physical objects areintermediaries between the perceiver and the neumenal object. Thiscan be interpreted, however, as a mere terminological difference.

Some idealist/phenomenalist philosophers observe the PhenomenalPrinciple:

The Phenomenal Principle: If there sensibly appears to me to besomething which possesses a particular sensible quality, then thereis something of which I am aware, which does possess that quality(Maund 2003: 120F, 146).

Idealism/phenomenalism also attempts to explain the transparencyand double awareness aspect of perceptual experience.


Transparency and the Double Awareness Aspect of Perceptual Experience: Since I amnot directly aware of any qualities of my inner experiences, myexperience is transparent to me. But when I introspect, I amcertainly aware of the phenomenal character of my visual experience.By being aware of the phenomenal character of the perceptualexperience, I am aware of what it is like for me.

These sensations during introspection are also sensoryexperiences. These states, while conscious, are ones that I need notbe aware that I am having, while I am having them. Allphilsosophical theories of perception must account for this dualaspect of perceptual experience.

According to this theory, perceptual experiences have three morephenomenological features:

1) their rich, sensuous, phenomenal character;

2) their intentional content; they are intentional in representingthe world as being a certain way; and

3) the subjective feeling of the experience.

These features are first person, subjective features that belongnot to the physical objects, but to the process of experiencingitself. The phenomenal character of perception is revealed when Iintrospect my experiences. However, these three features are notwithout controversy.

From a first person point of view, a perceptual experience.

1) involves the discrimination of a three-dimensional physicalobject with contours and hard edges in the foreground, from abackground.

2) provides the basis for actions vis-à-vis that object;

3) provides the basis for explicit judgment;

4) involves thoughts/beliefs;


5) provides the basis for having thoughts about the perceivedobjects;

6) provides the basis for making judgments about my own perceptualcapacities.

Maund does not make clear whether he regards theidealism/phenomenalism theory as either representational ornonrepresentational, or as either inferential or noninferential.

III.C. Natural Realism:

III.D. Cognitive Direct Realism:

III.E. Representational Theories of Direct Perception:

III.F. Representative Theory of Perception (classical indirecttheory of perception):

III.G. Representative Theory of Perception (non-inferentialform):

III.H. Ecological Theory of Perception:

III.I. Modified Natural Realism:

III.J. Semiotic Theory of Perception:

Figure 1: Network of Naturalistic Philosophical Theories of Perception


Table 2: Properties of Naturalistic Philosophical Theories ofPerception

# Philosophical Theory Proponents

Philosophical

Assumptions

Rep/

Nonrep

Direct/

Indirect

Infer/Non

DirectlyAware of:

1. Naïve Realism (“window model ofperception”)

Many earlyGreekPhilosophers

TransparentDirectRealism

Non D Non

Theneumenalobjectitself

2. Idealism/PhenomenalismBerkeley,Price,Robinson

Idealism orPhenomenalism

? Neither ?

Sensoryparticularthat is nottheneumenalobjectitself

3. Natural RealismReidAustinStrawson

DirectRealism

Non D NonPhysicalObjects

4. Cognitive Direct RealismDirectRealism

Rep D

5. Representational Theories of Colin McGinn Direct Rep D


Direct Perception Realism

6.Representative Theory ofPerception (classical indirecttheory of perception)

DescartesLocke

IndirectRealism

Rep I I

7.Representative Theory ofPerception (non-inferentialform).

BroadIndirectRealism

Rep I Non

8. Ecological Theory of PerceptionJamesGibsonJohnHaugelandEvan Thompson

DirectRealism

Non D

9. Modified Natural Realism MaundIndirectRealism

Rep I

10. Semiotic Theory of Perception

PeirceDelaneyPearson

PracticalRealism &ConcreteIdealism*

Rep I I Signs

*Also requires Semiotic Paradigm and the USST.


Table 3: Pros & Cons1. Naïve Realism

ProsExtremely simpleIntuitively appealing

ConsLacks explanatory powerViolates the Kantian Veil

2. Idealism/Phenomenalism

ProsDoes not violate the Kantian VeilIncorporates first personphenomenological viewpoints into thirdperson objective theoryAccounts for the double awarenessphenomenaAccounts for the intentional content ofperception

Cons

3. Natural Realism

ProsExplains practical conceptsExplains discursive conceptsJustifies knowledge claimsExplains ostensive nature of practicalconceptsExplains link between practical conceptsand discursive conceptsIncorporates first personphenomenological viewpoints into thirdperson objective theory

ConsDoes not account for theintentional content ofperceptionDoes not distinguishbetween sensations andperceptionsDoes not explain thelinkage between sensationand perceptionViolates the Kantian VeilDoes not account for thedouble awareness phenomenaof perception

4. Cognitive Direct Realism

Pros Cons


5.

Pros Cons6.

Pros Cons

7.

8.

9.

10.

IV. SEMIOTIC PARADIGM AND THE USST:

IV.A. General:

The Semiotic Paradigm is a full scientific paradigm in the Kuhniansense (Pearson Paradigms). It includes the six subparadigms shown in Table 4.

Table 4: The Semiotic Paradigm and itsSubparadigms

#. Subparadigm Name Function

1. LinguisticandPhilosophical

LanguageofMenetics

Sets the language, terminology, philosophy,metaphysics, logic, questions, methodology,and complete Weltanschauung

2. Observation andExperimental

ObservationalSemiotics

Sets the methodology for observing semioticphenomena and controlling experiments

3. Generalization andRegularities

DescriptiveSemiotics

Sets the methodology for finding andstating semiotic regularities and invariants


4. Theoretical andExplanatory

ExplanatorySemiotics

Sets the methodology for explaining thegeneral laws of semiotics and how to developthe theories

5. Mathematical

MathematicalSemiotics

Sets the mathematical methodology forstating, solving, and calculating problemsin semiotics

6. Applications

AppliedSemiotics

Applies the methodology of the semioticparadigm to problems in all areas ofsemiotics

The theoretical subparadigm contains two complementary semiotictheories. The Universal Sign Structure Theory (USST) explains lawsinvolving static sign structure, and the Theory of OperationalSemiotics (TOS) explains laws involving dynamic sign processes(Pearson TOS). In Section V., I will be using the USST to explainCharles Peirce’s theory of perception. Therefore a short descriptionof the USST would be useful at this point (Pearson Diss).

The USST contains a Universal Sign Structure Diagram (USSD) andthree principles for applying it to problems involving signstructure. The USSD is shown in Figure 2: Universal Sign StructureDiagram. The three principles are as follows:

The Triadic Principle: A sign is a trinary relation. It thereforehas three independent dimensions structured as shown in Figure 2.

Principle of Minimum Structure: A sign must have at least onelevel of structure in each dimension and all additional structuregrows from the center out to the extreme, independently for eachdimension.

Principle of Internal-External Balance: Each level of structure ineach dimension is balanced with exactly one internal and one externalcomponent except for the Pragmatic, or mediating, dimension, whichhas exactly one internal and two external components for each level.


The internal components are called components of meaning and theexternal components are called information/abstraction generators.

Figure 2: Universal Sign Structure Diagram for USST-2000

IV.B Semantic Structure:

A complete philosophical theory of perception, in all its details,would require the entire USST. However, perceptual theory is soheavily burdened on the semantic dimension that for the purposes ofthis outline, I will neglect both the syntactic and pragmaticdimensions, and concentrate only on the semantic dimension. Thesemantic dimension of the USSD is shown in Figure 3: SemanticDimension of the USSD.


Figure 3: Semantic Dimension of the USSD

IV.C. Semiotic Foundation for a Philosophy of Perceptions andUniversals:

To be written

V. PEIRCE’S PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION:

V.A. Overview:

In developing his philosophy of perception, Peirce presents aneven balance of phenomenology, idealism, semiotics, realism, logicalanalysis, and scientific analysis in a more natural way than any ofthe classical phenomenologists, philosophers, or scientiststhemselves. This provides a perfect solution to Maund’s requirementssome hundred years before Maund even stated them. If only Maund hadread his Peirce!

Delaney says that “Peirce’s principle criticism of the idealisttradition is that it does not appropriately acknowledge thephenomenological fact that perceptual experience presents itself asthe experience of a world that is independent of the perceiver andwith which the perceiver is confronted.” (1993:119).

Peirce’s notion of perception is a holistic notion that requires adetailed analysis into its logical components if we are going to getany satisfactory answers to the epistemological questions with whichwe are concerned. It is theoretically decomposable into simpler


elements, but Delaney reminds us that, “the analysis should not blindus to the holistic character of the experience itself.” (1993: 120).

Altho it is not inappropriate to talk of this particular perceptualprocess and these components of perception, our actual process ofperception is not a series of discrete units made up of isolatedparts but rather a continuous whole. The actual process, no matterhow direct or how short, involves dimensions of confrontation andmeaning as well as elements of memory and anticipation. However,this having been said, Peirce acknowledges the legitimacy of analysisand the significance of abstractly characterizing the variousstructural elements of the perceptual process.

The easiest way of understanding Peirce’s analysis of thisholistic process of perception is to start with Figure 4. It is anadaptation of Figure 3 with the components relabeled in order tofollow more easily Peirce’s discussion of his theory.

Figure 4: Peirce’s Theory of Perception

In order to follow Figure 4 better, we will use Peirce’s ownmethod, which he calls “precision”. It is an act of mentalabstraction which “arises from attention to one element and neglect ofthe other” (CP 1.549). Delaney says that, “When this analytic


intention is focused on the flow of perceptual experience, Peirce isable to distinguish as elements the percept, the percipuum, and theindividual perceptual judgment.”(1993: 120). These three componentsare shown in Figure 4 as the three internal components of perception.

Delaney says that, “As one prescinds the elements from theconcrete flow of perceptual experience, the order is from theperceptual judgment, through the percipuum, to the percept as one movesaway from the complex phenomenon of meaningful perceptual experiencetoward what simply confronts one in perception.”(1993: 121).Thisfollows the sequence shown in Figure 4 from the perceptual judgment,a universal, down to the percept, a concrete singular.

In interpreting the cognitive side of Peirce’s Theory ofPerception, Delaney says, “We come to know facts about our world bymeans of the perceptual judgment which, through the percipuum,indicates the percept which indicates the physical object.”(1993:123)

We will now proceed to discuss Peirce’s Theory of Perception interms of

V.B. Outline in Terms of USST Semantic Structure:

V.B.1. The Raw Information Input

V.B.2. The Compulsive Sensation

V.B.3. The Latent Property

V.B.4. The Perceptual Process

V.B.5. The Perceptual Judgment

Peirce claims that a perceptual judgment is initially defined as“a judgment assorting in propositional form what a character of apercept directly presents to the mind is” (CP 5.54). It is the actof forming a mental proposition about some characteristic of theperceptually given, together with an assent to that proposition. Theperceptually given stems from the compulsive sensation, an external


first, an information generator, or what Peirce calls an informationinput, or II; the selected characteristic stems from the latentproperties, an external second, another information generator, or II;while the proposition stems from the perceptual process, and externalthird, and also an II. The assent to the proposition is theassertive force of the proposition, the illocutionary force ofassertion,1 and is inserted into the perceptual sign by a linkbetween the perceptual process and the pragmatic structure, whichdoes not show in Figure 42.

However, Peirce is quite specific about the precise logical formof perceptual judgments, namely, they are to be regarded as limitcases of abductions: “The perceptive judgment is the result of aprocess …[and] if we were to subject this subconscious process tological analysis, we should find that it terminated in what thatanalysis would represent as an abductive inference” (CP 5.181).

In the more precise language of the Semiotic Paradigm, this wouldread something like, “a perceptual judgment can be represented as acombination of inductive inference from a first (a compulsivesensation) to a second (the latent properties), followed by anabductive inference from the second to a third that pulls the secondand first together (the perceptual process), all of which areexternal information inputs to the perception, followed by theperceptual judgment (a process, one which carries the informationinputs to the cognition), yielding finally, a perceptual judgment(the result) which is an internal component of the sign and thusavailable to the cognition3.

Peirce’s perceptual judgment is the internal half of thecognotative level of a symbol.

Delaney says that:1

See Perceptual Process in Figure 4.2

See TOS for description of the process that inserts the illocutionary force into the proposition.3 See Figure 4.


Perceptual judgments are to be thought of on the model of the ascription of ageneral predicate to individuals, which would reduce them to some kind of unityand thereby render them intelligible. They have the form of hypotheticalinterpretations of given elements and are general in nature” (1993: 125).

Figure (4? 9?) shows us that the “general predicate” stems fromthe latent properties while the “individuals” stem from thecompulsive sensations, both of which are information inputs andexternal components of the perceptual sign structure. The“hypothetical interpretations” are due to the abduction from thelatent properties to the perceptual process (process – an externalthird) and the “general nature” of Peirce’s perceptual judgment(result – an internal third) is due to the secondness of the latentproperties which forms the external connotative structure of an icon.

Delaney continues,“It is important to note, however, that when we are speaking of perceptualjudgments as abductions we are speaking analogously, because these instances ofabductions are both subconscious and uncontrolled, characteristics contrary tostandard abductions. Strictly speaking, perceptual judgments are not reallyjudgments that we make but rather ones that are forced upon us” (1993: 125).

These are not real abductions because they do not proceed from onesign to another but only mimic abductions (pseudo inferences, if youplease) by availing themselves of the abductive machinery inconnecting two external components of the analysis of perceptiontogether.4

Perceptual judgments are not available to our control. Delaneysays, “In the appropriate concrete circumstances these perceptualjudgments are things that happen to us, not things we do”(1993: 126).

Peirce says:You may adopt any theory that seems to you acceptable as to the psychologicaloperations by which perceptual judgments are formed. … All that I insist uponis that these operations, whatever they may be, are utterly beyond our controland will go on whether we are pleased with them or not. (CP 5.55).

4 See Latent Properties and Perceptual Process in Figure (4 or 9?).


The USST shows that since perceptual judgments are the result ofpseudo inferences, we do not have initial signs (called “premises”)available to control, while the final signs (called “conclusions”)are completely determined for us subconsciously by the perceptualprocess, they are part of the semiosis of perception.

V.B.6. The Percipuum

The stark differences between the percept and the perceptualjudgment pose a problem: how is the percept absorbed into theperceptual judgment; and how does the percept function in theperceptual judgment? To answer this, Peirce introduces the“percipuum”, an intermediary cognitive unit from which our concept ofthe pure percept is prescinded. The basic unit of which we arecognitively aware is not the percept itself, but the percept asimmediately interpreted in the perceptual judgment. This is what hecalls the “percipuum”.

Peirce says, “I propose to consider the percept as it isimmediately interpreted in the perceptual judgment, under the name ofthe “percipuum” (CP 7.643).

Delaney says that, “The percipuum is the percept as immediatelyinterpreted, and the operative notion here is immediately.”(1993: 123)5

By this he can mean either that there is no other complete signbetween the perception and the interpretation of the perception orthat there is no other sign component between the percipuum and thepercept, for both are true.

The percipuum is an icon, or more precisely a pseudo icon, theinternal half of the connotative level of an icon6. If we try toabstract away the index we would be left with a pure connotation andthus lose not only the index and the percept, but also the denotationand the object.

5 Delaney’s emphasis.

6 See Percipuum in Figure 4.


While it is clear that Peirce analyzes the subconscious processleading from the latent properties IU to the perceptual process IU asabductive – a pseudo abduction – it is not so clear that he makes asimilar analysis from the perceptual judgment CU to the percipuum.However, a glance at Figure 4 will show that this subconsciousprocess is a pseudo subduction.7

V.B.7. The Percept

Peirce says that “every percept is the product of a mentalprocess” (CP 7.624). This, too, is easy to see by looking at Figure4. He also claims that the percept

… “makes no professions of any kind, essentially embodies no intensions of anykind, does not stand for anything. It obtrudes itself upon my gaze; but not asa deputy for anything else, not “as” anything. It simply knocks at the portalof my soul and stands there in the doorway (CP 7.619).

Figure 4 makes it clear, once again, that what Pierce is sayinghere is that the percept has no intension, connotation, or ground;that it possesses no generality. It is not a complete sign orrepresentation, merely a sign component, a cognitive unit, as he saysin CP 5.54.

Delaney concludes that, “The percept, then, is the bare compulsiveexperience composed of qualities of feeling independent of relationsand interpretation. It is something that happens to me, notsomething I construct…” (1993:121). He also says that:

The percept is the most primitive sensory presentation of the objectcharacterized by the relevant sensory qualities and by the feeling ofopposition or otherness. In itself it is a determinant particular. Peirce iswilling to characterize it as an image which “obtrudes itself upon me in itsentirety,” as long as we do not build into the notion of an image the role ofrepresentation (1993:121).

Its character as a “determinant particular” follows from itsposition on the denotative level of concrete individuals of Figure 4.

*Contrast percept with perceptual judgment.7See (Pearson 1990/91) for definition, description, and analysis of subduction.


Delaney claims that, “while percepts are our most primitiveconscious informational input,8 it is perceptual judgments that areour most primitive cognitive units”.9 (1993: 122). However, in sayingthis, he does not recognize a bilateral structure. That is, he doesnot distinguish between immediate and dynamic structure as doesPeirce or between internal and external structure as I do10.

Peirce notes several important differences between the percept andthe perceptual judgment. First, taking as an example the perceptionof a yellow chair, the percept present the chair as a unity involvingno analytical elements whatever, whereas the perceptual judgmentseparates the chair from the color, making one the predicate of theother (CP 7.631). The perceptual judgment abstracts the color fromthe chair making it the predicate.

Secondly, the ‘singularity’ of the percept is definite with regardto this individual and this shade of yellow while the generality ofthe predicate in the perceptual judgment allows it vaguely to rangeover all yellow things and all shades of yellow (CP 7.632f) (and Imay add, the abstractness of the judgment allows us to focus on thisparticular individual, and the property of its particular yellowness,by precision as it were.)

Thirdly, the perceptual judgment no more resembles the perceptthan a description of a painting resembles the painting itself (CP5.54), but is related to its percept as an index that arises from itdyadically (CP 7.628). That is, the percept is indexical incharacter, while the judgment is symbolic.

Fourthly, a percept is non-propositional in form and this canstand in no logical relation to anything else; only the perceptualjudgment is capable of sustaining logical relations (CP 7.628).Hence, altho the percept might have a more primitive claim to the

8 See Figure 4.

9 See Figure 4.

10 See information inputs and cognitive units in Figure 4.


title ‘evidence’ of the senses, it is only the perceptual facts –“the intellect’s fallible record of the percepts” – which functioncognitively in reasoning both as starting points and as controls.

Our judgments about the sensory characteristics of things thatpresent themselves in our perceptual field, while direct (i.e., notan inference from judgments about percepts), is not unmediated. Infact, our judgments and the things that present themselves in ourperceptual field are part of the same sign process. The ground ofour full-blown perceptual judgment is a more primitive judgment abouthow things appear to us. In fact, the ground is part of thepercipuum.

Delaney says “We come to know facts about our world by means ofthe perceptual judgment which, through the percipuum, indicates thepercept which indicates the physical object.” He adds, “Thepercipuum, then, is the percept as immediately interpreted, and theoperative notion here is immediately” (1993: 123). The term“immediately” here can be interpreted as “adjacent component” or“connected component” as in Figure 4. But it can also be interpretedas no other sign standing between the percipuum and the percept.

The percept is an index, or the internal half of an index:We know nothing about the precept otherwise than by testimony of the perceptualjudgment, excepting that we feel the blow if it, the reaction of it against us,and we see the contents of it arranged into an object in its totality. … Butthe moment we fix our minds upon it and think the least thing about the percept,it is the perceptual judgment that tells us what we so “perceive.” For thisand other reasons, I propose to consider the percept as it is immediatelyinterpreted in the perceptual judgment, under the name of the “percipuum.” (sic– punc.) (CP 7.643).

Since perception purports to be about objects in the real world,reference is secured by the indexical component of the perception,i.e., by the Denotation, which consists of the Percept pointing tothe Compulsive Sensations.


V.B.8. Perceptual Experience:

Peirce calls attention to the dyadic character of perceptualexperience:

“It involves the sense of action and reaction, resistance,externality, otherness, pairedness. It is the sense that somethinghas hit me or that I am hitting something; it might be called thesense of collision or clash…” (CP 8.41).

This sense of external action enters into the sign via what Peircecalled the “dynamic object”, or what in the USST is called simply the“object”.

Peirce defines ‘perceptual experience’ as “It is more particularlyto changes and contrasts of perception that we apply the word‘experience’. (CP 1.336).

Delaney says that “Perceptual experience includes as one of itsfeatures the otherness of the objects perceived. To perceive is toencounter a world not of our own making, a world forced upon us towhich we must make an accommodation”, (1993:119) and that Peirce wasaware of this. No matter how immersed in either feeling or theory,“we are continually bumping up against hard fact; we expected onething or possibly took it for granted and had the image of it in ourminds, but experience forces that idea into the background andcompels us to think quite differently” (CP 1.324).

This feeling of forced otherness continues at all levels of theperceptual experience: singular; general; and universal alike. Thisis because the secondness of compulsive experience is not due to thesecondness of connotative semantic structure nor to the secondness ofthe dynamic object, but to the secondness of bilateral semanticstructure. That feeling of certainty about an external world is dueto all of the information inputs of perception rather than to asingle information input such as the dynamic object or to all of thecognitive units of perception, and is explained purely by the


bilateral semantic structure of the USST. When the perceptualjudgment finally enters the cognition, it enters from outside of thecognition. It might as well be coming from the “real” externalworld.

Our perceptual experience is direct because there is no other signsbetween that which presents itself in our perceptual field and eitherthe percept or our perceptual judgments. In fact, they are all partof the same perceptual sign. While our perceptual experience ismediated because the ground of the perceptual judgment is the latentproperties (the second) component of the information input. Theground and the percipuum of the perceptual sign share the sameconnotative structural level. The ground of our full-blownperceptual judgment is a more primitive judgment about how thingsappear to us. But as Delaney says, “we don’t infer the former fromthe latter … in most cases we infer the latter from the former”(1993: 124).

In cases of hallucination, the percipuum is exactly the same as incases of veridical perception; it is just that the correspondinghigher order perceptual judgments are called into question by theirfailure to cohere with other relevant perceptual judgments.

V.C. Pros:

Maund’s Requirements:

V.D. Cons:

VI. PERCEPTION OF UNIVERSALS:

NOTES:

Definitions:

A concrete singular is to be called an Individual or Object,depending on the context of usage.


A concrete general is to be called a General, Property, Attribute,or Aspect, depending on the context of usage.

An abstract singular is to be called a Universal, Abstraction, orConcept, depending on the context of usage.

A concrete singular may be reanalyzed as an abstract singular atany time for purposes of entering, or creating, a new recursive levelof ontological explanation. See figure 1.a.

An abstract singular may be reanalyzed as a concrete singular atany time for purposes of entering, or creating, a new recursive levelof mathematical modeling. See figure 1.b.

Any level of semantic structure may be recursively iterated ineither direction without limit, subject only to the condition thatthe purpose of analysis and direction of recursion always remainconsistent.

An object is nothing but the simultaneous presence of an infiniteand complete collection (I deliberately do not use the technical word“set”) of generals, i.e., properties and aspects, with possibly alittle bit of hecceity thrown in for good measure to serve as a kindof glue. Possibly the Vienna Circle’s concept of ‘infinite porosität. Mostgenerals do not even have names, unless they are important for humanpurposes.

A general is nothing but an infinite collection (“association”might be a better word?, but certainly no “set”) of universals, i.e.,abstractions or concepts with maybe some other kind of glue to holdthem together. Again, an explication of porosität. As conceptualists,members of the Vienna Circle did not distinguish between generals anduniversals. Only the universals mankind has found useful have eithernames or general (i.e., semantic) markers, so we are never fullyaware of their presence until they make themselves known in some way.

This gives us a semiotic foundation for developing not only atheory of perception, but the same foundation also simultaneously


explains the nature of individuals, generals, and universals, awonderful integration and consolidation of theory.

VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS:

Observations:

All of the relations under discussion are between, or within,signs or sign components and neither between anything in externalreality nor between anything beyond the Kantian veil. Hence they aresemiotic relations and are semiotically relative in the sense ofCarnap’s lingisitc relativity.

But relations between signs or sign components are internal in theUSST sense and hence involve only phenomena. But phenomena involvethe first person point of view. Hence semiotics must involve boththe first and third person points of view. Hence semiotics isbroader than either traditional science or traditional phenomenology.Semiotics is the science of triadic relations, but the distinctionbetween classical science and classical phenomenology disappears inthe requirements of the new science of semiotics. There is a uniformcontinuity between the first person point of view and the thirdperson point of view.

It is like drawing a rectangular coordinate system on a two-dimensional plane. Before drawing the x-y coordinates, one could onlyconceive of traveling back and forth in one direction along the x-axis (thinking scientifically), or traveling back and forth in theother direction along the y-axis (thinking phenomenologically).Classical science was like the x-axis and classical phenomenology waslike the y-axis, but they were distinct domains. After drawing thex-y axes as a two dimensional coordinate system, we can wander aroundin the whole plane, and view the problem from any angle as it reallyis.

The Ding an Sich may or may not have something that looks likeindividuality, generality, and/or universality. It doesn’t make any


difference because we could never know it, or even talk about it, ifit did. We could never prove or disprove it, so we might as wellsimplify our analysis by using the simplest language possible, ourordinary language of intuition.

In the process of perception, our perceptual apparatus causes asign to be created in the observer and this sign has denotative,connotative, and cognotative structure, causing the perception tohave individual, general, and universal characteristics. But thesecharacteristics are in the representations, not in some hypotheticalneumenal object. They may or may not also be in the ding an sichitself, but this we can never know.

Note: Bilateral semantic structure enables an explanation of thedouble awareness aspect of perception.

Figure 5: The semiotic plane allows arbitrary viewpoints, from anyangle, to suit the problem.


Figure 6: Perception, and Semantic Structure of the Perceptual Sign

Interduction – a new form of semantic reasoning. Reasoning byreinterpretation – reinterpretive inference.

*Note the similarity between perception and the role that logicalstructure plays in scientific reasoning. Perceptual judgmentattaches a characteristic to a percept to make a proposition,abduction changes only the subject of the proposition and leaves thepredicate unchanged.

Figure 7: The Three Recursive Levels of Perception

VIII. BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Burnyeat, M.


1979 “Conflicting Appearances”, Proceedings of the British Academy.65(1979): 69-111.

Dancy, J.1985 Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell.

Delaney, C.F.1993 Science, Knowledge, and Mind: a Study in the Philosophy of C.S. Peirce.

(London: U. of Notre Dame P.).

Gordon, I.1997 Theories of Visual Perception. (New York: Wiley).

Kornblith, H. (ed.)1985 Naturalizing Epistemology. (Cambridge: MIT Press).

Landesman, C.1993 The Eye and Mind. (Dordrecht: Kluwer).

Maund, Barry2003 Perception. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s U.P.).

Moreland, J.P.2001 Universals. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s U.P.).

Pearson, Charls1990 “Selfhood Sign Structure”1990/91 “Modes of Reasoning”2002 “USST-2000”19xx “Paradigms”19xx “TOS”1976 Dissertation.

Peirce, C.S.CPW

Robinson, H.1994 Perception. (London: Routledge).

Rock, I.


1995 Perception. (New York: Scientific American Books).


“Semiotic Analysis of Perception:

The USST Approach to Understanding Perception”

by Charls Pearson, Ph.D.

American Semiotics Research Institute

ABSTRACT

Barry Maund, in his new work (2003) on perception, sets up a broadframework for thinking about the philosophy of perception andidentifies various theories of perception that fit within hisframework. However, he does not mention one of the most important,and in many ways the most successful, theories of perception, CharlesPeirce’s semiotic theory of perception.

Perhaps Maund may be forgiven for this oversight since Peirce’stheory of perception is not published in a single, unified work, butscattered diffusely over a lifetime of writing. Here, C.F. Delaney,in his recent book, Science, Knowledge, and Mind, (1993), has provided agreat aid by gathering some of Peirce’s writings on perceptiontogether as section III.3.c. “The Epistemic Role of Perception”.

Yet, Peirce’s theory still lacks a unity and focus that Peirce,Maund, or Delaney might have given it if either one of them hadconcentrated their attention on developing and presenting it as asingle, unified theory of perception.

In this paper, I attempt to provide that unity and focus byanalyzing Peirce’s theory of perception from within the SemioticParadigm by applying the Universal Sign Structure Theory (USST) toexplain the semiotics of his theory. Thus analyzed, it is not


surprising that Peirce’s theory satisfies all of the requirements setforth by Maund as well as fitting consistently within Peirce’sCritical Common Sense philosophy (Pragmaticism) of Practical Realismand Concrete Idealism.

Semiotic Analysis of Perception

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