S P E C I A L F E AT U From Legal Transplants to Sustainable Transition Extended Producer...

S P E C I A L F E AT U R E O N E X T E N D E D P R O D U C E R R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y

From Legal Transplants to SustainableTransitionExtended Producer Responsibility in Chinese Waste Electricaland Electronic Equipment Management

Xin Tong and Lin Yan

Summary

Extended producer responsibility (EPR), which assigns significant responsibility to produc-ers to take back their end-of-life products to create incentives for redesign of productswith lower life cycle environmental impacts, has come to a crossroad facing a trade-offbetween the original innovation-oriented regime design and the cost-efficiency challengesin practice. This is particularly true in its implementation in non-Organization for EconomicCo-operation and Development (OECD) countries as they are trying to transplant the“best practices” from OECD countries, for there is increasing skepticism as to whether EPRis suitable for developing countries at all. As an important producer of electronic productsand destination of electronic waste (e-waste) flows in the world, China has been expectedto play a vital role in the evolution of global governance based on the idea of EPR, eitherto create new ways for producers to perform their end-of-life strategies, or to reshape themode of production and consumption with its fast-growing market. However, the estab-lishment of EPR in China has been long and full of difficulties. This article reviews the statusand trends in the establishment of an EPR system for waste electrical and electronic equip-ment (WEEE) management in China. We use the framework of a multilevel perspectiveof transition theory in our analysis to characterize the complex interactions among variousagents in the evolution of the Chinese system from initial innovation-oriented design to thecurrent efficiency-oriented version. An ongoing research framework for evaluation of theEPR program in China is outlined as the research agenda in coming years.

Keywords:

Chinaelectronic scrapextended producer responsibility (EPR)industrial ecologysustainable transitionwaste electrical and electronic

equipment (WEEE)

Introduction

Extended producer responsibility (EPR) is an environmentalpolicy approach in which a producer’s responsibility, physicaland/or financial, for a product is extended to its postconsumerstage (OECD 2001). The principle of EPR has been includedin the Circular Economy Promotion Law of the People’s Re-public of China (Standing Committee of the National People’sCongress 2008), and is stated as one of the key institutional ap-proaches to promote the circular economy throughout the pro-

Address correspondence to: Xin Tong, College of Urban and Environmental Sciences, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China. Email: [email protected]: www.urban-environ.pku.edu.cn/english/renwu/Tong%20Xin.html

© 2013 by Yale UniversityDOI: 10.1111/jiec.12013

Volume 17, Number 2

duction and consumption chains in China’s Twelfth Five-YearPlan (2011–2015) (Xinhua News Agency 2011). Increasing im-plementation can be found in efforts to develop legislation andpilot projects in such sectors as automobiles, electronics, andpackaging based on various elements of EPR principles (Fanget al. 2009; Kai et al. 2001; Tong et al. 2004; Wang and Chen2011; Wang and Peiry 2009). Among all the efforts, the leg-islation of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE)management is moving forward. Nearly 3 years after the promul-gation of the Ordinance on the Administration of the Recovery

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R E S E A R C H A N D A N A LYS I S

and Disposal of Waste Electrical and Electronic Products, alsoknown as “China WEEE” (2009), the Ministry of Finance an-nounced the Measures for the Collection and Administrationof the Funds for the Recovery and Disposal of Waste Elec-tronic and Electrical Products (hereafter referred to as the FundManagement Measures) in Beijing on 21 May 2012, which wasfinally implemented in July 2012 (MOF 2012). However, com-pared to the early draft for discussion, the current version ofthe Chinese system eliminated most of the legal obligations ofbrand owners to take back end-of-life products, leaving only thetaxlike financial obligations of manufacturers to a governmentfund. The only incentive for producers to be involved in end-of-life management in this system is that the producers can havethe priority to build certified facilities for WEEE recycling andto enjoy the government subsidy for recycling activity. Com-pared to the ambitious target attached on EPR in the CircularEconomy Promotion Law and the national Twelfth Five-YearPlan, the real practice was actually a moderate gesture to sup-port the infant formal recycling industry. How does it get here,and where to go next? The implementation of China WEEEcould bring even more disputes and reflections.

The transplant of EPR in China reveals a growing con-vergence around a few principal approaches to environmentalregulation worldwide led by the practices of the Organizationfor Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) coun-tries. Such transplants of regulatory policy measures have tomeet with very different legal and cultural traditions from theoriginal development context of those regulatory approaches.This article reviews the trends and status of EPR in WEEEmanagement in China based on our participant observationfrom 2003 onward. We found that many disputes on the detailsin regulatory measures in practice reflect the dilemma in EPRworldwide: disagreement between EPR idealism, which insistson an innovation-oriented regime design, and EPR pragmatism,which emphasizes cost-effectiveness in practice. Although it iseasy to come to an accord that both parts are indispensable inany successful EPR program, the small difference in focus atthe beginning creates different ways in practice. Furthermore,when we try to evaluate the effects of certain EPR programs,the difference in focus leads to different methods for evaluation,and thus brings us quite different implications for improvement(Lifset and Lindhqvist 2008).

This disagreement is influential for EPR implementation innon-OECD countries, who are trying to transplant the “bestpractices” from OECD countries. Different successful elementsgeneralized from different experiences are learned and promotedby different agents in quite different contexts. The lessons aremultiple, conflicting, and sometimes confusing. This is espe-cially the case when multiple stakeholders try to interpret theexperiences for their own interests, as it creates conflicts, ratherthan alignment, in actions among the local players.

As to the case of WEEE management in China, the entireidea of WEEE management based on EPR principles came fromoverseas. The problem of WEEE attracted the public attentioninitially with the publication of embarrassing pictures of pollu-tion caused by recycling imported electronic waste (e-waste) in

southern rural areas of China (BAN 2002). And then, the Eu-ropean Union (EU) WEEE directives stirred up tension amongChinese producers. As a response, China borrowed the idea ofEPR to build its own WEEE management system, mainly relyingon a top-down approach by the central government. However,China has its own challenges—the new regulation should notreduce the competitiveness of the Chinese electronics indus-try, which is one of the largest export sectors of the country,while building a new recycling sector from the vast numberof family-based urban junk-buyer networks and rural recyclingclusters (Tong and Wang 2004). Without fundamental regimechange, these two challenges can hardly be tackled together,because, under the EPR principle, the cost of the formalizationof the recycling sector will inevitably increase the burden toproducers.

In this article we review the progress of EPR in WEEEmanagement in China to see how the tension between theinnovation-oriented and efficiency-oriented perspectives haveaffected the evolution of the system of regulation of WEEE. Thenext section provides a literature review of debates within EPRscholarship in light of the broad theoretical concerns about sus-tainable transition. We then present the experiences of EPRin WEEE management in China based on our participant ob-servations in the making of legislation. A research frameworkis then outlined for our ongoing project on China’s WEEE incoming years.

Sustainable Transition: Is ExtendedProducer Responsibility “A Drop in theOcean” or “A Drop That Erodes theStone”1

Idealism versus Pragmatism: Divergent PolicyOrientations on Extended Producer Responsibility

How to induce environment-friendly technological innova-tion has become a core question in relation to environmentalgovernance, since socioecological transitions toward a sustain-able world depend heavily on the paths of technological changein the long run (Geels 2010; Gerlagh and Lise 2005; Jaffe etal. 2002). As a strategy designed to promote the integration ofenvironmental costs associated with products throughout theirlife cycles into the market price, EPR has been viewed by itsinventors as an important driver for green innovation, whichcan range from simply making recycling work better, to leadingregime change at both the sectoral and social level (Bennettand Graedel 2000; Kibert 2004; Lindhqvist 2000; OECD 2001;Tojo 2004). As Lindhqvist (2000) stated:

EPR is a vehicle for innovation in the design of productsand product systems . . . [it] will encourage a shift towardsproviding the functions of the products in a more efficientway . . . a shift towards product-service systems. It will def-initely enhance the interest for re-manufacturing activitiesin the industry that is manufacturing and providing complexproducts.

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As an element of EU waste policy, the WEEE Directive basedon the principle of EPR has sought to create incentives for prod-uct innovation with lower environmental impacts throughoutthe life cycle, addressing not only the physical properties of aproduct, but also the mode of consumption and production (EC2008).

However, increasing doubts have arisen about the real effectsof EPR on innovation (Calcott and Walls 2000; Hanisch 2000;Røine and Lee 2006; Smith 2005; Walls 2005). On the onehand, advocates of the EPR principle, who were not satisfiedwith the compromise in the way of collective responsibilities inpractice giving little incentives for innovation and design im-provements, suggested deliberate redesign of regulations basedon the notion of individual responsibility (Atasu et al. 2010;Clift and France 2006; Mayers et al. 2011; Rossem et al. 2006).On the other hand, critics emerged regarding the high transac-tion costs and unintended direction of technological change inpractice due to complexity in management and regulations inthe name of EPR (Krikke 2010; Lauridsen and Jorgensen 2010;Sachs 2006).

As Lauridsen and Jorgensen (2010) pointed out, the EU’sWEEE directive provided a challenging case that could beanalyzed with the multilevel perspective of transition theory(MLP). The simplified causal relations between regulations andthe activities of producers supposed by the policy makers canhardly address the complex interactions among various agentsat different levels, and previously independent regimes of elec-tronics production and consumption and e-waste management(Lauridsen and Jorgensen 2010).

The MLP takes a broad view of technological and insti-tutional dynamics with a systematic framework that links mi-crolevel, disaggregated innovation with socioeconomic land-scape change at large (Geels 2002). The wide range of changesanticipated by the EPR idealists can be categorized into dif-ferent levels of transition, from technological choices at thefirm/product level, to regime change in the waste managementsector, as well as the modes of production and consumption ofour modern society. However, few studies on EPR in the ex-isting literature have taken such an inclusive and systematicview.

The MLP distinguishes three analytical levels to depict theheterogeneous configurations for technology systems with in-creasing stability: (1) the “micro” level of technological niches,which are “protected” spaces in which actors search and learnin various ways about new technologies and their use; nichesare precarious and require work by protagonists to be main-tained; (2) the “meso” level of sociotechnical regimes, whichare rule sets or “common sense” that are built up around a dom-inant technology and grant it stability; (3) the “macro” level ofsociotechnical landscapes, consisting of a range of contextualfactors that influence technological development but cannotbe changed directly by actors (Geels 2002). The MLP proposesthat transitions, which are defined as regime shifts, come aboutthrough interacting processes within and between these lev-els (Geels 2010). From the perspective of MLP, technologicaltransition not only involves changes in technology, but also

changes in user practices, regulations, industrial networks, in-frastructure, and symbolic meaning or culture (Geels 2004).

From the perspective of MLP, the regime change is the fo-cus in the competition between the old and new technology,especially for radical technological innovation. It’s ironic thatalthough most of EPR researchers agree that the waste problemof modern industrial society is the result of the current modeof mass production, and that providing incentives to environ-mentally friendly design should be one of the key targets of EPRprinciples, they have a divergence of views on whether it isnecessary for radical regime change as the aim of policy.

We identify two strands of research based on their view ofEPR’s role in sustainable transition: (1) innovation-orientedanalysis, embraced by EPR idealism, which insists on regimeredesign based on the individual responsibility of producers;and (2) efficiency-oriented analysis, embraced by EPR pragma-tists, which emphasizes cost-effectiveness in practice.2 The twostrands focus on different aspects in each level within the MLPframework of technological transition, as shown in figure 1.

The elements of analysis in both the innovation- andefficiency-oriented strands could address all three levels ofthe technology system; however, the focus of analysis di-verges. Efficiency-oriented analysis mainly examines physi-cal/quantifiable characters of the system, while innovation-oriented analysis tries to reveal the intangible/qualitativechange of the structure.

Innovation NichesThe fundamental premise of EPR is that adding the end-of-

life fees into the producer’s cost calculation can trigger designchanges upstream of the production that are decisive to the lifecycle environmental impacts of a product. Innovation-orientedanalysis includes intensive studies on the innovation niches thatcould be established in EPR programs, from changes in productattributes, such as designing for dismantling, ease of repair,and recyclability, to changes in the daily routines of firms andconsumers. Positive impacts were documented in many nationalEPR programs in different sectors (Ogushi and Kandlikar 2007;Rossem et al. 2006; Tojo 2004). One of the most importantpolicy implications of this research is the need to increase thedegree of producer involvement in EPR programs based onindividual producer responsibility (Rossem et al. 2006).

Efficiency-oriented analysis suggests that the anecdotalevidence for EPR’s impacts on redesign was not convincing todraw the conclusion of general innovation inducibility by EPR(Gottberg et al. 2006; Mayers 2007; Mayers et al. 2005; Røineand Lee 2006; Walls 2005). In this perspective, other policytools targeting specific technological change would be moreuseful, such as the EU’s Restriction of Hazardous Substances(RoHS) directive, which restricts the use of certain hazardoussubstances in electronics products, and France’s WEEE EPRscheme where fees paid by producers vary according toenvironmental criteria. The growth of recycling rates could bemuch easier to observe. Given the target of increased recyclingrates, reducing the administrative cost would be the centralissue for policy design.

Tong and Yan, EPR in Chinese WEEE Management 201


Innovaon

Niches

Socio-technical

regimes

Socio-technical

landscape

Recycling rate

Social welfare

Market structure

Product aributes

Business rounes

Market transacons

Culture symbol

Infrastructure Instuons

Administrave cost

Mode of produconand consumpon

Code of conduct

Efficiency oriented Innovaon orientedEPR

Figure 1 Comparison of innovation-oriented versus efficiency-oriented analysis of EPR. The figure shows two strands of EPR studies: (1)innovation-oriented analysis and (2) efficiency-oriented analysis. The two strands focus on different perspectives in each level within themultilevel perspective of transition theory (MLP) framework on technological transition. The arrows show the interactions betweenelements of multilevels within each strand, while the dashed lines compare the different perspectives at each level in the two strands.

Sociotechnical RegimesAt the meso level, efficiency-oriented analysis tends to take

the current mode of mass production and consumption forgranted and tries to calculate the benefit and cost facing dif-ferent players in the market transactions. For example, howdoes the distribution of responsibility between producers andconsumers change the input of resources and the output ofpollution (Gallego and Lenzen 2005)? And how can the deci-sions of producers, either to organize the management of theirend-of-life products individually or to cooperate by setting upa producer responsibility organization (PRO), affect their deci-sions on product durability, the market structure of recycling,and social welfare as collective results (Fleckinger and Glachant2010)?

In contrast, innovation-oriented analysis anticipates someregime changes, which could lead to new norms for the industryand transform the mode of production and consumption in amore sustainable way. For example, Brouillat and Oltra tried tosimulate the impacts of a set of EPR policy instruments on firms’innovation strategies in an evolutionary manner, by which aclosed-loop recycling system could endogenously develop fromthe linear economic system (Brouillat 2009; Brouillat and Oltra2011).

Sociotechnical LandscapeEfficiency-oriented analysis generally seeks improvement of

infrastructure for recycling with lower cost and complexity for

administration (Calcott and Walls 2000; Walls 2005). Such aviewpoint influenced the recent assessment of the implemen-tation of the EU’s WEEE revision (EC 2008; Huisman et al.2008). The policy recommendations were mainly focused onadministrative details, collection targets, logistics, and levies.

In contrast, innovation-oriented analysis suggests that trans-formation of the industry in the long run greatly dependson institution building (Hafkesbrink 2007), and even onour understanding of waste and recycling as cultural symbols(McDonough and Braungart 2002).

In general, efficiency-oriented quantitative analysis canhardly capture the qualitative change in system transition thatthe EPR idealists anticipated. Further, policy evaluation heavilydepends on quantifiable measurements for comparison amongalternative instruments. The flexible combination of policy in-struments and the different settings for implementation in EPRworldwide makes learning about and transplanting of regulatoryapproaches even more difficult.

Extended Producer Responsibility in DevelopingCountries

Debates on the effects of EPR systems in OECD countrieshave been influential to the development of policy in develop-ing countries, which are searching for “best practices” to follow(Lin et al. 2002; Manomaivibool 2009; Osibanjo and Nnorom2007; Tong et al. 2004; Toxics Link 2011; Widmer et al. 2005).



Despite suspicion regarding the relevance of OECD countries’EPR experiences to the practice in developing countries (Ko-jima et al. 2009; Williams et al. 2008), it is now difficult to findany discussion of WEEE management throughout the worldthat excludes the principle of EPR.

Yu and colleagues (2010a) estimated that the volume ofobsolete personal computers (PCs) generated from developingregions will exceed that of developed regions by 2016–2018 andwill be double that from the developed world by 2030. Thus Yuand colleagues urge developing countries to develop efficientsystems to handle the rapidly increasing amount of WEEE notonly imported from overseas, but also generated locally.

The growth of WEEE in developing countries has occurredalong with the global shift of production related to the over-all trend of vertical specialization in the electronics industry.Increasingly manufacturers in developing countries have beenintegrated into the global production network, mainly con-centrating in the material-intensive processing stage in globalproduct chains (Luthje 2006). Such spatial shifts of industrieshave not only changed the location of industrial activities,but also the power relations along the product chains. Theo-retically EPR supposes a producer-driven governance structurein commodity chains in which producers have the most con-trol over the whole life cycle of the product. As Lindhqvist(2000, vi) put it, “an EPR system with full responsibilities al-located to the original manufacturers will make the businessopportunities connected to such re-manufacturing and product-service approaches more visual and comprehensible for the in-dustrial entrepreneurs.” However, in the current global com-modity chains driven mainly by buyers, the brand owner produc-ers and retailers in developed countries increasingly outsourcethe production stage to manufacturers in developing countries,who have little control over the properties of the products theyare making. This characteristic makes it difficult to induce au-tonomous redesign by manufacturers in developing countries ofproducts and processes because of concerns about the environ-mental performance through the EPR policies in the developedworld (Tong et al. 2012).

With the globalization of the e-waste problem, an increas-ing number of studies on EPR programs in developing countrieshave appeared recently. On the one hand, the cross-border ef-fects of EPR policy in OECD countries have led to calls for moremonitoring and control on transborder movement of hazardouswaste in the international trade of recyclable goods (EC 2008;Nordbrand 2009; Widmer et al. 2005; Zoeteman et al. 2010).On the other hand, policy being transplanted to non-OECDcountries calls for assessment of implementation in the differentsettings of developing countries (Akenji et al. 2011; Bandyopad-hyay 2008; Manomaivibool 2009). Based on a thorough eval-uation of the EPR program in Thailand, Manomaivibool andVassanadumrongdee (2011) find that EPR mechanisms in thedeveloping countries focus too much on the financial aspects,which mainly take the form of mandatory fees and governmen-tal funds, and provide no incentives for producers to redesign.This viewpoint successfully captures the possible failure of pub-lic intervention by government in the implementation of EPR

in developing countries. However, it misses the larger picturethat could have shown the actions of other agents during EPR’sevolution and which thus calls for rethinking the creation ofvalue in global commodity chains (Lepawsky and Billah 2011).

The ongoing studies on e-waste management in develop-ing countries need to deal with complex interactions amongmultiple agents in a context-sensitive manner (Lepawsky andMather 2011), linking the change of sector-specific technolo-gies and daily routines with the transformation of sociotechnicalregimes at large. Systemic analysis of the practical experiencesof different policy instruments that include various elementsof EPR principles in developing countries can provide valuableinformation about their performance and provide useful infor-mation for other countries. In conclusion, constant reflection isrequired along with institutional evolution at different scales.

Experiences of Extended ProducerResponsibility in Chinese Waste Electricaland Electronic Equipment Management

The experiences of EPR in Chinese WEEE managementprovide a challenging case for analysis from the perspective ofMLP. The entire idea of EPR came from overseas and was ac-cepted as a creative principle for waste management by the Chi-nese central government. However, the legislation, as a meansof disseminating EPR, has to deal with complex interactionsamong heterogeneous agents at various levels. The pursuit ofregime change as a key goal validates the legal transplant effortswhen strong economic incentives still exist for informal recy-cling activities in this country; however, the efficiency-orientedsolution won out due to its practicability in the current admin-istrative configuration. If EPR should play a role for sustainabletransition, as claimed by the government, active involvement ofproducers is needed beyond the compulsory obligations requiredby the legislation.

Paths of Legal Transplant

The global flows of WEEE have stimulated the growth andconcentration of related recycling activities in coastal Chinasince the mid-1980s. Such growth of WEEE recycling occurredin tandem with the dramatic increase in electronics production,which reflected the localization of different segments of globalelectronics product chains evolving toward a technical regimefor quicker innovation and shorter life cycles. Tong and Wang(2004) discussed the significant role of the recycling sectors inrural industrialization and local economic development in theseareas. Before the conspicuous exposure of environmental pollu-tion related to WEEE recycling activities in one of these areasby international environmental organizations (BAN 2002; Linet al. 2002), China had already increased the import controlson recyclable goods due to environmental protection concernsby the mid-1990s (Tong and Wang 2004). Furthermore, theactions of the Basel Action Network (BAN) and Silicon Val-ley Toxic Coalition (SVTC) created an event that attractedextensive public attention to e-waste management.



The EPR principle was first proposed to be implemented ine-waste management in 2002, in an effort to learn from the“best practices” from OECD experiences (Tong et al. 2004).Several government departments were involved in the pro-cess of drafting legislation due to the complexity and broadnessof the EPR regulations, which crossed two separate regimesonce governed by different government departments: pollu-tion control by the State Environmental Protection Agency(SEPA) and industrial production by the Ministry of Informa-tion Industry (MII) (now restructured into the Ministry of In-dustry and Information Technology [MIIT]). In order to alignactions among different departments, the National Develop-ment and Reform Commission (NDRC) led the development oflegislation.

In 2003 the SEPA promulgated the Declaration on Strength-ening the Management of Waste Electrical and ElectronicsEquipment (SEPA 2003), which recommended that local envi-ronmental protection agencies pay attention to pollution con-trol in e-waste disposal and recycling activities, and suggested(but did not mandate) that electronics firms adopt environmen-tally friendly and recycling-friendly features in their products(Tong et al. 2004). Since then, the SEPA has narrowed thefocus to pollution control of e-waste management with promul-gation of two regulatory policies—the Technical Policy on thePollution Control of End-of-Life Electronic Household Appli-ance and Electronic Products (SEPA 2006) and Measures forPrevention of Pollution from Waste Electronic Products (no.40) (SEPA 2007).

At the same time, the MIIT developed Measures for Admin-istration of the Pollution Control of Electronic InformationProducts (no. 39) (often referred to as China RoHS [2006]),in correspondence to the EU’s RoHS Directive, addressingrestrictions on materials at the design and production stage(MIIT 2007). The MIIT also supported the establishment ofthe China E-waste Comprehensive Utilization Work Commit-tee (CECUWC), a nongovernment organization that is tryingto build a third-party producer organization to help electronicsproducers manage their e-waste collectively.

The divergence of focus between the SEPA and MIITwas quite influential in the evolution of EPR regulations inChina and also reflects the regime conflicts between the re-cycling and production/consumption of electronic products.On the one hand, the SEPA preferred a simplified regula-tory framework focusing on the certification and monitoringof formal recycling companies as well as the planning andconstruction of recycling infrastructure at the provincial level.On the other hand, the MIIT argued for more involvementof producers, as well as flexibility in fund-raising and subsi-dies to include some elements of individual responsibility forproducers.

After several years of debate and practice in pilot programs,in 2008 the EPR principle was formally stated in the CircularEconomy Promotion Law of the People’s Republic of China asa principle in the national legal framework for waste manage-ment. Based on this principle, the Regulation on the Admin-istration of the Recovery and Disposal of Waste Electrical and

Electronic Products, also known as China WEEE, was promul-gated in 2009. It was planned to be put in force on 1 January2011.

The ordinance proposed to establish a governmental fundwhere money will be collected from producers to subsidize certi-fied recyclers. However, the implementation was postponed dueto disputes over administrative details. The rigidity of the ad-ministration of the government funds shifts the balance to theefficiency-oriented approach. On 21 May 2012, the Ministry ofFinance finally announced the Measures for the Collection andAdministration of the Funds for the Recovery and Disposal ofWaste Electronic and Electrical Products (Fund ManagementMeasures), which was implemented in July (MOF 2012). How-ever, most of the measures that were intended to increase theinvolvement of producers were eliminated in the final version,such as different fees for producers according to their product’senvironmental criteria, and a reduction of fees for producers ifthey have their own take-back program. Only one measure toencourage producers to participate in recycling was left: “Theproducer has the priority for approval while applying to build acertified recycling plant” (MOF 2012).

Separated Niches in Production and Recycling

The introduction of EPR in China was inevitably influencedby the dynamics of global linkages in both the productionand recycling of electronic products. However, the attitudestoward these two linkages were totally opposite. The produc-tion linkage was actively promoted under the export-led de-velopmental state, while the recycling linkage was strictly pro-hibited under the common response of “not in my backyard”(O’Hare et al. 1983). This divergence created the differentspaces in which innovation niches could form at the microlevel.

Diffusion of Green Technology Within ProducersThe diffusion of design change for recycling in products

spread quickly with the promulgation of two EU directiveson e-waste in 2003. In particular, the Directive on Restric-tion of the Use of Certain Hazardous Substances in Electricand Electronic Equipment (RoHS) launched a global campaignto eliminate several environmentally sensitive substances, in-cluding lead (Pb), mercury (Hg), cadmium (Cd), hexavalentchromium (Cr6+), polybrominated biphenyls (PBBs), and poly-brominated diphenyl ether (PBDE), from electronic products.It brought a shock to electronics producers in China from 2003to 2006. Most domestic companies cared nothing about theenvironmental issues related to their end-of-life products be-fore 2003. However, green manufacturing suddenly became ahot issue within the industry as the requirement of the twoEU directives quickly spread through the global supply chain(Tong et al. 2012). However, the quick switch in productionleft producers in China little time for independent evaluationof the environmental and technological merits of the “greensubstitutes.” The green wave moved quickly. Although the ma-jority of producers in China claimed that they were RoHS



ready before 2006, the seeds of suspicion about the real envi-ronmental benefits also spread within the industry, along withcomplaints regarding the unequal distribution of the costs of“being green” within the value chain. Given the continueddebate on the real environmental benefits of current choicesfor substitutes, the mere adoption of cleaner technology at theproduction stage is far from sufficient. RoHS could have littleimpact on the general trends in the sociotechnical regime ofelectronics that is highly dependent on “planned obsolescence”in product design to promote increased consumption on a globalscale.

Fragile Niches at the End-of-Life StagePolicy diffusion accompanied the cross-border effects of the

EU WEEE and RoHS directives. EPR was constructed as partof an ambitious policy framework toward a sustainable mode ofproduction and consumption. Unlike in the EU, where localgovernments found economic benefits from EPR in divertingtheir financial burden of public waste management to producers,in China, the central government validated the efforts of legaltransplant mainly based on the supposed role of EPR in regimechange toward a circular economy.

The pilot projects supported by the government createdsome niches for environmentally sound recycling practices tocompete with economically driven informal recycling activi-ties. The existence of informal sectors in WEEE recycling indeveloping countries as a challenge to legal transplant of EPRhas been widely discussed (Kojima et al. 2009; Widmer et al.2005; Yu et al. 2010b). The import by e-waste dealers in coastalareas had reached a comparatively large scale, generating a sta-ble supply of materials in the early 2000s. However, the dealerswere initially excluded from the establishment of formal recy-cling facilities, as the policy orientation was to cut the importsof “foreign trash.”

For many years, domestic discards had not created any realmarket demand for formal recycling services in China. Eventhe demonstration projects established with government sup-port could hardly get a significant amount of WEEE to sustaintheir operations (Yu et al. 2010b). Yang and colleagues (2008)compared the cost and revenue between informal and formal re-cycling activities based on samples in Beijing. They found thatthe informal recyclers could make a good profit from recycling,while the formal recyclers suffered a deficit when recycling mostappliances. The informal recyclers have various ways to reducecosts in their transactions through their network of junk buyersand increase their revenues by refurbishment for the second-hand market instead of disassembly and shredding for materialrecovery. It seems that the informal collection system was muchmore efficient if the externality of environmental pollution wasignored.

Given the existence of a vast and economically efficientinformal collection and recycling network, both the local gov-ernment authorities and the enterprises who had been involvedin the pilot projects were aware of the necessity to include theinformal sector when designing a take-back program. Figure 2shows a city-based EPR system we proposed to the MII in 2006

for their cooperative pilot projects in Beijing and Shanghai. It isdesigned to incorporate the junk-buyer network of the informalsystem into the reverse logistics of the WEEE recycling systemat the municipal level.

There are three parts in this system (see figure 2). The darkbox on the lower left was the collection network in practice,then mainly composed of informal recyclers and urban junkbuyers. The two dashed boxes outside are the reverse logisticsystem to be built: the left upper one is the individual pro-ducer’s take-back service for large-organization users; the rightone is the publicly sponsored advanced recycling platform. Dif-ferent players, including producers, distributors, organizationusers, and residential communities, could all take their ownactions voluntarily. We anticipated this public platform for ad-vanced recycling would evolve gradually, instead of being builtas a new full-fledged project by the government at the begin-ning.

The key step in the plan was to cooperate with the indepen-dent service providers3 and distributors of electronic productsto restructure the junk-buyer network into the reverse logisticservices. We contacted different distributors and large junk buy-ers in Beijing. The reality was different from our imagination.The links between the sales of new products and the collectionof discarded products already existed. The distributors grantedthe right of collection through certain informal auctions toseveral leaders of the junk buyers, who enjoyed the exclusiveright to buy old products from the customers who bought newproducts from the distributor. It was a service for the customerto conveniently deal with the discarded product, but no onecared where the collected discarded products went or how theirdisposal occurred. This business was even more profitable thanselling new products at that time, as one of our intervieweessaid, because more than half of the discarded products were re-furbished for the local second-hand market. Only those productsthat could not be repaired were disassembled and sold outside ofBeijing.

The next step of the plan was to establish a public plat-form with a third-party information system provided by theCECUWC. The CECUWC planned to collect data on salesfrom the industry and the demand for take-back services fromconsumers through a mobile phone message system. We alsodesigned a remanufacturing center for test and evaluation ofthe WEEE collected by different channels to function as aresearch and development (R&D) and demonstration cen-ter for the development and diffusion of advanced recyclingtechnology, serving both the formal and informal recyclers. ASino-American joint-venture company was established in Bei-jing in 2006 to act as the remanufacturing center. But thisenterprise failed due to the similar difficulties that frustratedmost formal recyclers: an inability to acquire enough discardedproducts.

Common Sense for Regime Change

Before 2009, all pilot programs suffered from a lack of inputs.The progress of legislation was stagnant as well. However, the



Reverse

logistics

Second-hand market

Storage &

sorting

Organizational Users

Consumer

education

Remanufacturing

Center

Testing and evaluation

Recycling Technology

development

Distributors

Parts recoveryDisposal

Material recovery

ProducersOld for new with

discounts in sales

Public advan

ced recycling platform

Personal Users

Independent

Service Provider

Take back

items in

contract

Individual take back by producers

Junk-buyers

Spare parts for repair

Informal recyclers

Community collection

Current collection

system

Disassembly

Information

system

Take back

by mail

Promotion

in public

media

Hazadous waste management

Material flows that already exist Linkages to be built

Figure 2 A proposed take-back system of WEEE at the city level. The dark box in the lower left is the current collection network mainlycomposed of the informal recyclers and urban junk buyers. The dashed box on the upper left is the individual producer’s take-back servicefor large organizational users; they can either sell equipment directly to the organizational users or sell through independent serviceproviders who provide information technology services to big companies, including hardware and software. The dashed box on the right isthe publicly sponsored recycling platform to be built, including an information platform open to the public, a logistics warehouse for storageand sorting, and a remanufacturing center for the development and demonstration of advanced recycling technologies.

attitudes of producers toward their responsibilities at the end-of-life stage changed gradually during this process. In 2002, fewdomestic producers had heard about the idea of EPR and tookfor granted that the end-of-life stage had nothing to do withthem. However, within less than 5 years, most of the large pro-ducers, both foreign and domestic, had the view that producersshould take certain kinds of responsibility for their discardedproducts. Although disputes still exist about the operationaldetails, few people question the validity of the idea of EPR.The challenge from the overseas market became the stimulusfor producers in China, especially the big companies, such asChanghong, Haier, and TCL, who had ambitions of increasingbrand awareness on the global market, to participate actively inthe design of the Chinese e-waste management regime. Theyestablished cooperation with the newly founded formal recy-clers in various ways with the support of both central and localgovernments in many pilot projects along with the develop-ment of legislation. The degree of involvement in the recyclingbusiness varies from company to company. For example, TCLbuilt two recycling plants, while Haier established a strategicalliance with Xintiandi, one of the pioneering formal recyclingcompanies in Shandong Province.

Unexpected Opportunities for Systematic ChangeThe situation changed dramatically in 2009 due to the

national old-for-new Home Appliances Replacement Scheme(HARS) (). Announced by the NationalDevelopment and Reform Commission in 2009, the HARSwas one of the national economy stimulus measures adopted toconfront the 2008 global financial crisis by stimulating domes-tic consumption. According to this scheme, consumers couldreceive a subsidy worth 10% of the price of five kinds of newappliances—televisions, air conditioners, refrigerators, washingmachines, and computers (the same five categories covered inthe China WEEE)—from 1 June 2009 to 31 May 2010 in ninepilot areas, including five cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin,Fuzhou, and Changsha) and four provinces (Jiangsu, Zhejiang,Shandong, and Guangdong). Consumers were required to selltheir old appliances to certified recycling companies to get acertificate, which they could give to retailers in exchange for a10% discount. The Ministry of Commerce (MOC) chose thequalified producers, retailers, and recyclers and administeredthe entire process. The scheme was extended to 31 December2011 and was expanded to 28 cities and provinces from the 9existing pilot areas, including the provinces of Hebei, Shanxi,



Table 1 Comparing the collected units of the Home Appliances Replacement Scheme (HARS) with estimated discards, October 2009–August 2010 (per 1,000 units)

Washing machines Refrigerators Air conditioners Computers Television sets

Location Collected* Estimated** Collected Estimated Collected Estimated Collected Estimated Collected Estimated

Beijing 203 163 130 165 22 6 96 485 780 661Tianjin 73 85 43 88 5 5 29 155 385 555Shanghai 108 166 71 209 11 28 76 526 2,336 1,398Jiangsu 299 291 135 200 19 15 77 692 3,211 3,339Zhejiang 92 122 70 137 7 10 169 346 1,759 1,313Shandong 177 233 118 193 8 4 86 629 1,807 2,172Guangdong 264 296 146 222 65 85 54 794 1,252 2,028

Notes: *The collection units announced by the Ministry of Commerce.**The estimated volume of discards calculated with the China Household Electric Appliance Research Institute (CHEARI) model.

Liaoning, Jilin, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Henan, and Hubei andthe cities of Dalian, Xiamen, and Chongqing (MOF 2009).

The HARS provided a great incentive for consumers tobring their old appliances to certified recyclers, which diverteda considerable amount of the WEEE flow from informal recy-clers to the formal pilot recycling facilities. We calculated thediscarded units of the five products in seven of the first ninepilot areas with the estimation model provided by the ChinaHousehold Electric Appliance Research Institute (CHEARI).This model uses the historical penetration rate of each kindof product from the statistical yearbooks to estimate the fu-ture generation of e-waste in China (CHEARI 2012; He et al.2010).4 We compared the results with the collected units ofthe HARS from October 2009 to August 20105 (see table 1).The estimated volume calculated from the CHEARI model wasgenerally less than the volume estimated in some early researchusing historical sales data (e.g., Yang et al. 2008). However, forwashing machines, refrigerators, air conditioners, and comput-ers, the collection volume was even less than the estimationby the CHEARI model. Only for televisions did the collectiondata surpass the estimation in some regions because of the massreplacement of cathode ray tubes by liquid crystal displays thathas occurred within the last several years. Since the market forsome home appliances, such as washing machines, refrigerators,and televisions had reached saturation in these developed areasin the late 1990s, the collection volume of the HARS can beseen as the maximum for next few years because the incentivesprovided by the HARS will be much higher than the recyclingfunds for China WEEE.

The key part of our design shown in figure 2 was realizedduring the HARS, in that the retailers of electronic appliances(“distributors” in the figure), who had collaborated with cus-tomers and the informal collection network of urban junk buyersto take back end-of-life equipment, had to send the returned oldproduct to certified retailers to get the subsidy from the MOC.Under this system, the retailer played the central role in thetake-back process. The agreements between the retailers andjunk buyers were formalized to some extent, as the collectionperson going to homes to take back the old product would bedressed in the uniform of the retailer who sold new product

to the consumer. However, the price of the old product to bediscarded was bargained between the owner and the collectionperson, just as junk buyers usually did. It proved later that suchan arrangement set a bad precedent, because the real cost of thediscarded products grew out of control.

The main objective of the HARS was to stimulate consump-tion, and both the government and the producers found it a goodopportunity to boost the formal recycling sector. This actuallyruns opposite from the sustainable transition at which the EPRprinciple aims. Although it has increased the business for cer-tified recyclers at present, it also brings uncertainties for futureimplementation of e-waste management based on the ChinaWEEE regulations. The HARS ceased at the end of 2011, but itset a high value for those end-of-life products. Without the sub-sidy, most of certified recyclers have fallen into difficulty again.And the subsidy to be provided by WEEE recycling funds raisedfrom producers can hardly reach the level set by the HARS.The HARS exhausted the purchasing power of the market forelectronic products. Most of the producers had very gloomyexpectations for sales in 2012, which will inevitably affect thefunds to be collected.

Alternative Pathways Toward Cross-Regime InteractionsThe growth of the e-waste recycling business stimulated by

the HARS did attract new investment into this field, providingopportunities for different business models to evolve. Since thebeginning of 2012, many certified recyclers that benefitted fromthe subsidy from the HARS have been trying to find new waysto survive in the post-HARS era. Three strategies have proveneffective:

First, the large certified recyclers have tried to build theirown urban reverse logistic networks. The HARS enabled cer-tified recyclers to build business relations with the informaljunk buyers. Some of these relations have been formalized withlong-term contracts. The junk buyers get formal approval tocollect discards in residential communities, and the certifiedrecyclers send trucks to collect the goods from junk buyers onsite. Since the bargaining on price between the junk buyers andthe owners of discards increases the cost and uncertainty in thereverse flow of goods, the recyclers are trying to invent new



types of transactions to increase the transparency of the en-tire process. For example, Jinqiao, one of the certified recyclersin Shanghai, created an attractive way for consumers to givediscards to the formal collection site. They built their own on-line platform to collect information about discards of productsand give customers an Ala-card, a bonus card invented by Jin-qiao. Customers gets bonus points when they bring discardedproducts to the formal collection site in their own neighbor-hood. The Ala-card can then be used for shopping in Shang-hai. Enterprises that are concerned about the environment cansupport this program by providing discounts to users of theAla-card.

Second, some certified recyclers have tried to develop moreprofitable ways to use the recycled material. For example, thedevelopment of wood-plastic composites (WPCs) has increasedthe value of waste plastics. The new technology quickly diffusedamong the certified recycling companies throughout the coun-try. Some specialized companies are emerging as they developtheir own patented recycling technologies for specific materi-als. For example, GEM, an e-waste recycling company startedin Shenzhen, has several patents for recycling waste batteries toobtain secondary cobalt powder, which is so profitable that thecompany does not have to rely as much on subsidies from thegovernment as do other recyclers.

Third, some certified recyclers try to build close relationswith big companies to provide integrated waste managementfor the whole company, from waste generated on the productionlines to the end-of-life equipment abandoned from their offices,even including e-waste from their employees’ households.

However, according to most of the certified recyclers, thebuilding and operation of the take-back system to cover allthe products addressed by China WEEE, still needs subsidies,especially for the reverse logistic cost. All the certified recyclersare anxiously waiting for the Funds Management Measures tobe implemented.

Targeting Sustainable Transition With a Vision for theFuture

As the MLP framework suggests, the actors can hardlychange the sociotechnical landscape solely by their own efforts.New technologies, new business routines, and new sociotech-nical regimes are all embedded in the current sociotechnicalstructure. The landscape is changing in gradual and, in manycases, unexpected ways.

The current version of the Chinese EPR system in its actualimplementation discourages most of the EPR idealists who in-sist on the original design of EPR for innovation inducement.The producers only have an obligation to contribute to thegovernment recycling funds based on their production volume.There is no incentive for design change or take-back actionsby the producers. All the administrative details focused on sim-plification of the process as the priority. This seems reasonablein order to accelerate enforcement of the law instead of deal-ing with endless disputes and discussions. However, the systemleaves as much as it settled for change in the future.

An increasing number of producers in China have becomeinvolved in the end-of-life stages in various ways during the de-velopment of legislation for China WEEE, including buildingtheir own recycling facilities, taking back their end-of-life prod-ucts through their after-sale services network, and so on. Thecurrent design of the Chinese system could reverse this trend ifthere are no further actions to encourage the industry to takemore responsibility voluntarily. Additional efforts for alignmentare needed to promote the positive interactions between the tworegimes of recycling and production/consumption. We expecttwo developments with the potential for transition within theframework of the current system:

1. Producers can cooperate with recyclers to build a moreefficient recycling system than the one subsidized withthe government funding. Thus the government-fundedsystem could transform into alternative EPR platformsbased on voluntary agreements within the industry. Thecurrent system is based on the use of a government fundinstead of taxes. This makes modifications of the systemeasier and open to new types of systems if they are better.

2. We also expect that local governments will play a moreimportant role in the system. The recycling system shouldbe highly localized to fit the conditions of the local en-vironment. In the top-down solution promoted mainlyby the central government, the local governments havelittle autonomy in designing their own recycling systems.According to China WEEE, the provincial governmenthas the obligation to plan the infrastructure of WEEErecycling, which could increase the involvement of localgovernment in the design of local systems based on EPRprinciples.

Just as previous research discovered (Rossem et al. 2006), theinvolvement of producers was greatest in many other countriesduring the legislative process, even more than after the law wasimplemented. If the Chinese system set a moderate objective toonly improve the efficiency of the recycling, increasing the in-volvement of producers could have little significance. However,if EPR plays a more important role in the Chinese transitiontowards a sustainable circular economy, the involvement ofproducers should go beyond the legal requirement.

Research Agenda: A Proposal Frameworkfor Future Observation

Given the importance of innovation in the sustainable tran-sitions that come from the aggregated results of interactionsamong heterogeneous agents, we believe it is essential to builda framework to incorporate both technological and institutionaldynamics in the analysis of the EPR program in China’s WEEEmanagement.

Figure 3 shows an analysis framework for our follow-up studyon the evolution of EPR in China. We would like to build ourexplanations of the systemic transition of the EPR system inWEEE with a multilevel perspective:



Social-technical landscape: Recycling-based circular economy

Innovaon Niche: Technological choices at firm level

EPR programs

Workshop with producers

Cross-sectordialogue

Levels of observaon Acons

Social-technical regime: Supply chain governance

Figure 3 A multilevel framework for follow-up evaluation of China’s WEEE program.

First, by focusing on specific technological choices at thefirm level, the disaggregated choice model could be used tostudy the factors that impact a firm’s R&D strategy (Tong et al.2012), including material choices, product durability, design forrecycling, and so on. Various studies have shown the effective-ness of policy tools targeting specific technological niches, suchas RoHS. But it is still not clear whether firms will invest inR&D for environmental design when there are no compulsoryrestrictions.

Second, key actors and emerging linkages could be identi-fied with social network analysis of firms’ supply chain strategieswith social and environmental concerns. Besides the legal re-sponsibility to pay the fees, we expect some of the producersto include recycling services for end-of-life products into theirsubcontracting system, which would probably be more efficientthan the current mode of subsidies with government funds.

Third, EPR has been stated as one of the key institutionalapproaches to promote the circular economy throughout theproduction and consumption chains in China’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan. This position goes beyond the moderate intention ofmany of EPR’s supporters to provide incentives for the redesignof products for recycling, and seeks to advance one of the keyprinciples targeting a sustainable transition toward a circulareconomy, in which producers might change from a product-oriented economy into a service economy in which they wouldprovide the function of their products in a more efficient way.According to this position, the current version of China WEEEcan hardly take this role. As an action-oriented research, thisstudy itself would be part of the effort to build new linkages andvisions for the future.

Acknowledgments

This research was supported by the grants “TechnologicalTransition Through Extended Producer Responsibility in theElectronics Industry” (41271548), “The Organization of Pro-ducer Responsibility for E-waste Management” (41040010),and “Regional Comparison on the Impacts of Extended Pro-ducer Responsibility on the Electronics Industry in China”(40401014) from the National Natural Science Foundationof China. Thanks to the China E-waste Comprehensive Uti-

lization Work Committee (www.e-waste.org.cn/) for their helpduring our investigation. The authors appreciate the construc-tive comments and advice of the editor and all anonymousreviewers.

Notes

1. We borrow this phrase from Gerlagh and Lise (2005), which showsvividly the difference in policy effects between the makeshift atpresent and the substantial change on technological change in thelong run.

2. Such a dichotomous characterization is not meant to create a stereo-typed view on all the studies, but helps indicate the key differencesthat could lead to divergence in policy evolution, especially withrespect to EPR in China.

3. Independent service providers are the sales companies for informa-tion technology (IT) products. For organization users, the purchaseof IT equipment often includes services, such as installation, main-tenance, software integration, and so on. The independent serviceproviders provide integrated solutions including hardware, software,and technical services.

4. We have another paper comparing different estimation methodsfor the e-waste generation in China with the collection data of theHARS (Tong et al. Forthcoming). The estimation of the CHEARImodel is closest to the collection data. It also has advantages in dataavailability in China.

5. The MOC only announced the collected volume for the first ninepilot areas from October 2009 to August 2010.

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About the Authors

Xin Tong is an associate professor and Lin Yan is a mastersstudent in the Department of Urban and Economic Geographyin the College of Urban and Environmental Sciences at PekingUniversity, Beijing, China.


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