Robinson Sophie 6PS014 Dissertation(Single)

Sophie Laura Robinson 0908128 - 1 -

Do Personality and Attribution Style affect Belief in

Good Luck?

Student Name: Sophie Robinson

Student Number: 0908128

Project Supervisor: Dr. Niall Galbraith

Degree: BSc Single Honours Psychology

Date: April 2012

Word Count: 9,216


TABLE OF CONTENTS

Project title and Abstract Page 1 - 4

Introduction Page 5 - 18

Method

Design Page 19

Participants Page 19-20

Materials 0-22

Procedure Page 22-23

Results Page 24-26

Discussion Page 27-38

References Page 39-43

Appendices:

Appendix 1

Information sheet Page 44

Informed consent sheet Page 45

Copies of questionnaires Page 46-50

Debriefing sheet Page 51-52

RES20A form Page 53-55

Project management forms Page 56-58

Appendix 2

SPSS Output Page 59


ABSTRACT

The current study is investigating various individual difference factors that may predict

someone’s belief in good luck. More specifically, the relationships between the Five

Factor personality traits, attribution style, and belief in good luck will be measured;

with hope that if any trends emerge, these can be applied to adaptive treatments and

coping strategies for certain people who show particular traits. The research will also

be exploring the self-efficacy bias as one positive benefit for activating good luck to

improve performance. Existing research showing positive benefits of the use of good

luck is dominated by sport, business and gambling psychology areas with few studies

into positive uses in the general populations. Similar research can be found from

Damisch et al., (2010) who was also interested in the effect positive superstition could

have upon performance in various cognitive tasks. They found that various different

activations of superstition served to enhance performance in subsequent tasks. This

study was conducted with 103 participants from the University of Wolverhampton and

adult residents in the area who completed three questionnaires and a throwing task

which used a between groups design. Contrary to hypothesis a significant model

emerged using a backwards multiple regression analysis, which indicated 4.7% of the

variance in good luck belief, could be accounted for by low imagination. No further

significant effects were found yet some trends within data are consistent with previous

research and hypotheses. Limitations of this research and its implications are discussed

for theory, application, and future research.


Declaration

I hereby declare that the work submitted in this dissertation is the result of my own

investigation, except where otherwise stated.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to my supervisor Dr. Niall Galbraith for his help and support during this

project. I would also like to express my sincere thanks to the technicians for their role

in this study. To all others who gave encouragement, thank you very much.


INTRODUCTION

Superstition

As the participants in this research are from the UK, superstition will be defined from

the Oxford Dictionaries (2011) ‘a widely held but irrational belief in supernatural

influence, especially as leading to good or bad luck, or a practice based on such a

belief.’ As can be seen by this definition and that of an American dictionary as

reported in Kramer & Block (2008), the consensus is that superstitions relate to luck as

the primary phenomenon of the ‘supernatural’. However, it can also be seen that

superstitions are defined as irrational despite evidence that some of the most successful

people in society believe in such superstitions (see Jahoda, 1969, for reviews).

Superstitions can be divided into cultural (lucky number 7 in the West) or personal

(adding lucky charms to a bracelet) or even rituals (a footballer touching the grass with

his left hand as he runs on the pitch), and all revolve around the basic idea of either

attracting good luck or warding away bad luck (Block & Kramer, 2009).

Superstitions have been created all over the world, yet these beliefs typically are

culturally anchored, and differ according to countries (Vyse, 1997). To illustrate, in

China and Taiwan the number four is considered unlucky (Lip, 1992), whereas in the

USA and UK the number thirteen is said to be generally an unlucky number.

Superstitions are learnt in the same way as stereotypes – through cultural socialisation

– and are similarly activated by environmental cues (Devine, 1989).

Tracing the origin of specific superstitions is difficult in some cases; however we now

know that certain observable phenomena became superstition because our ancestors

did not know the true cause and meaning of certain events (Benitez, 2000). Take for

example crows being an omen of death, yet science now shows crows were often

found on roofs of deceased peoples’ houses because they can smell decaying flesh, or

walking under a ladder bringing bad luck, as something could fall on you that was

balanced on a rung or you might knock the ladder over (Delacroix & Guillard, 2008).

Skinner (1948) demonstrated that idiosyncratic superstitions can be learnt through

conditioning with his intriguing pigeon experiment. Pigeons were presented at random

with food (reward), yet Skinner observed that whatever the pigeon was doing when

food was given (stimulus), it would keep repeating. The pigeons could have been

doing anything – standing on their left leg, tilting their head to the right, walking

backwards – whatever it was the pigeon repeated the action in hope of more food.

Although based upon observations from animals, similar behaviours have been

illustrated with humans too (discussed below), lending support for this explanation of

origin. Skinners’ findings led other researchers to suppose that humans can develop

personal superstitions in the same way through operant conditioning – that some

behaviour becomes related to the outcome of an event, which in reality is not a causal

link to the outcome. However, to the person displaying the behaviour, both cause and

effect are very real and related, which encompasses the definition of an irrational belief

in superstitions (Rotter, 1966; Darke & Freedman, 1997).

Belief in luck – good or bad – is widespread in Western and in Eastern cultures.

Perhaps two of the most prominent examples of this when Palazzolo (2005) reported


that the United States of America looses between $800 and $900 million in business

each Friday the thirteenth; and in China people are willing to pay and bid up to seven

times the country’s average annual income for a licence plate considered lucky:

APY888 (Yardley, 2006). Both examples highlight the extreme effects belief in luck

can have upon otherwise rational people and the lengths they are willing to go to in

order to either avoid bad luck or attract good luck (Malinowski, 1954; Darke &

Freedman, 1997). Literature in the area of luck upon marketing and business has

boomed in the past decade because of the economic implications of the research. Many

more interesting examples of the influence of believing in luck can be found in Tsang

(2004), Gunn (1997), and Simmons & Schindler (2003).

A philosophical theory as to why people believe in luck is the just-world hypothesis

(Lerner, 1965) which speculates that humans have a need to believe the world is fair

and just, meaning that people get what they deserve. This logic allows individuals to

act as though chance is a fallacy and all behaviour is direct causes and effects, in other

words, people deserve the luck they have. Lerner & Simmons’ (1966) early experiment

supports the notion that people behave consistently to this belief, though their

participants were only female. Since then however, research has begun to show that

certain types of people are more likely to hold this belief than others, such as those

who are more authoritarian and have an internal locus of control (see Rubin & Peplau,

1975 for reviews). This belief has also been demonstrated across cultures with few sex

differences (Furnham, 1993).

Illusory Control

Research is in agreement that generally the conditions under which people endorse

superstition are during times of uncertainty, and/or when experiencing psychological

stress (Keinan, 2002; Padgett & Jorgenson, 1982). Malinowski (1954) posited that

superstitions are used to counter the psychological anxiety caused by uncertainty. The

vast existing amount of cognitive research on luck has shown that belief in good luck

serves as a positive adaptation, for example, allowing the individual to feel that they

have a sense of control and are not merely passive in an otherwise ambiguous or

chance situation (e.g. Langer, 1975, 1977; Schippers & Van Lange, 2006; Damisch,

Stoberock & Mussweiler, 2010; Xu, Zwick & Schwartz, 2011). Langer & Roth

(1975), note that this effect, known as locus of control, is markedly true in situations

where chance can combine with skill; which can be seen of course in the sporting

world.

It has also already been established by Keinan (1994, 2002), and others, that people

turn to superstitions when they experience low levels of perceived control, perhaps

because reliance on superstition allows them to reassert their influence over the

outcome of an event (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). Case, Fitness, Cairns & Stevenson

(2004) demonstrated that as an individual’s perceived likelihood of their failure

increased, so did their use of superstitious behaviours.

Consistent with the generally accepted finding, that low perceived control leads to

more superstitious behaviour, is work by Schippers & Van Lange (2006), who also

found the control effect to be true of top sportspersons. Whereby, if the competitor

they were against is as strong as they are (as likely to win) or stronger (more likely to

win) their superstitious behaviour would increase and also become more important to

the sportsperson. Schippers & Van Lange (2006) extended their research further by


investigating whether the superstitions observed by the sportspersons provided more

benefits than just allowing for a greater sense of control. Their research confirmed this

idea by illustrating that the superstitions served to minimise anxiety and promote the

focus necessary to perform well in competitive sports, in other words, the superstition

encouraged psychological well-being.

Their research was limited to team sportspersons which confines their findings to this

population, however as the types of superstitions reported by their participants did not

involve other teammates, it can be reasonably inferred that superstitions in

performance settings are largely individualised and idiosyncratic (Gmelch, 1971;

Albas & Albas, 1989; Rudski & Edwards, 2007; Delacroix & Guillard, 2008). In other

words, superstitions are likely to be personal whether performing in a team or as an

individual, as within football or snooker. These findings are in line with and support

the early theories of superstition development (Skinner, 1948, 1953; Malinowski,

1954) and also demonstrate the scope of superstitions people can hold.

Because of the obvious advantages to the use of good luck for people in competitive

spheres, the notion of luck on performance has been especially researched in the field

of sport and consequently has been a primary area of application for superstition

research. This is not surprising given that the reasons for which people are most likely

to engage in superstitions are found in such performance-related areas – sport and

business (Sarason, 1984). Moreover, the success of the influence of belief in good luck

on performance situations to date, demonstrates why students are a worthy population

of study, as they regularly encounter performance situations such as exams (Womack,

1992).


Darke & Freedman (1997) have shown that associating luck to one performance can

create expectations about luck that broaden from this isolated incident to subsequent

events that are unconnected. This finding is consistent with the notions that

superstitious behaviours are related in one’s mind to positive outcomes (Skinner, 1948;

1953), or at least to neutral ones if warding off bad luck, and hence people expect to

perform well again if the superstition is observed next time. Reinforcement and

associations explain this type of behaviour which allows people to continue to adhere

to such beliefs as luck because they can assign a cause to an event. This permits

organisation of the world into seemingly meaningful orders, which then allows for

predictions to be made based upon these orders (Lindeman & Aarino, 2007).

Dark & Freedman (1997) discovered an important finding when developing their

Belief in Good Luck questionnaire, which is consistent with the notion that people use

phenomenon such as luck to organise what is more rationally random chance

outcomes. They found that those people who had low belief scores did not all

necessarily disbelieve in good luck but rather, they thought that luck had a balance

where if they had been lucky one time, they would be unlucky the next. On the other

hand, those who scored highly tended to believe they could influence luck to be

positive more often than not. The former was governed the rational view of luck as

random, external and unreliable, and the latter was termed the irrational view as

influential, personal and stable.

Increased Self-Efficacy

Theoretically, good luck belief works to increase perceived locus of control by

boosting self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977). Research has demonstrated that carrying a

lucky charm or observing positive superstitions, serves to increase optimistic traits and

to reduce irrational beliefs of individuals who are depressed or anxious (Day &

Maltby, 2003; 2005; Damisch et al., 2010). Belief in good luck is thus related to, yet

distinct from, concepts that are allied with self-efficacy – hope and confidence (Darke

& Freedman, 1997).

Such findings are relevant to the proposed research as we are interested in establishing

whether those participants who believe most in good luck will perform better in the

experimental task. The experimental task element to this research aims to establish

whether those who show a stronger belief in good luck are more influenced by the

experimenter describing a ball as “lucky”, and hence perform better in a throwing

exercise. Research suggests that activating the good luck superstition often leads to

improved performance because this serves to boost self-efficacy (e.g. Damisch et al.,

2010), and sport psychology studies have demonstrated such research findings in real

life settings (Buhrmann & Zaugg, 1981).

It has been suggested from observations of different cultures, as with the Hua people

of New Guinea (Meigs, 1984), that there is a common belief that everything is

interconnected in the cosmos and one can influence seemingly unrelated things within

the universe to cause change in the future (Werner, 1948). This belief is the core

principal behind why and how lucky charms and luck-rituals are thought to work, by

influencing the cosmos to attract good luck to the beholder of the charm of ritual.


Personal Determinants of Superstition:

Attribution style

Those who have an internal attribution style tend to view events as consequences of

their own actions, while people with an external attribution see outcomes as

consequences of phenomena such as luck, fate, chance, divinity, or as simply

unpredictable (Rotter, 1966; Scheidt, 1973).

Research is slightly inconsistent however, when it comes to answering who is more

likely to engage in superstition. Tobacyk & Milford (1983), Vyse (1997), Dag, (1999),

Schippers & Van Lange (2006), and Maltby et al., (2008) provide evidence to suggest

it is people with external, because they seem to engage more in superstitious

behaviours and believe life events depend on external determinants. Maltby et al.,

(2008) supports this as they actually found that it was those who had an internal

attribution style who rejected a belief in luck. Van Raalte, Brewer, Nemeroff & Linder

(1991) argues it is individuals who have an internal attribution. One might argue that

people with internal assign more personal control over external factors, and hence they

may feel a greater urge to adhere to superstition to influence their good luck;

heightening their illusion of control.

Complementary to internal versus external, Lindeman & Aarnio (2007) demonstrated

that people who relied more on intuition, as opposed to analytical thinking and

reasoning, held more superstitious beliefs and hence were more likely to attribute

events to external phenomena such as luck.

Personality Traits

This need for control is of course one of the main reasons neuroticism has been

suggested to have a relationship with superstition, because neurotic individuals feel

great anxiety when they are uncertain. Neuroticism is a trait of the well-accepted Big

Five Personality Factors (McCrae & Costa, 1981) which is associated with negative

emotions, for instance depression and anxiety (Matthews & Deary, 1998).

Malinowski’s (1954) theory that superstitions serve to reduce anxiety caused by

uncertainty, can explain why those who show high trait neuroticism also demonstrate

stronger belief in luck than non-neurotics (those who are highly emotionally stable)

(Wiseman & Watt, 2004; Day & Maltby, 2003). In other words, superstition has

symbolic value – it helps the individual reaffirm a degree of power in a situation and is

consequently adaptive. Until recently, Malinowski’s theory was supported by

anecdotal evidence alone, but now has support from Tsang (2004) and many other

researchers in this area (e.g. Irwin, 2000; Schippers & Van Lange, 2006; Kramer &

Block, 2008). Latest research has found that certain good luck beliefs such as the

practice of feng shui are slightly associated with neuroticism (Lindeman & Aarnio,

2007).

Research from Maltby et al., (2008) found that belief in being lucky had a significant

positive relationship with imagination, as well as optimism, hope, external attribution

style, and other factors which impact positively upon psychological well-being. They

also found that lack of or low belief in being lucky was associated with neuroticism,

anxiety and irrational beliefs. Similar findings were uncovered by Wiseman (2003)

who found that self-professed lucky people scored higher in imagination and

extraversion, and unlucky individuals scored significantly higher in neuroticism.


Interestingly, Mowen & Carlson (2003) and others (Darke & Freedman, 1997; Chotai

& Wiseman, 2005) found that the demographics of age and education level, which

might be presumed to have a correlation with general superstitious belief, did not.

Accordingly, age is not a demographic the current research is going to request from

participants.

Psychological Benefits of Belief in Good Luck & Research Hypotheses

The positive inferences of good luck belief and finding out if there are particular

personality types of whom this may be of particular benefit to, is why this research is

focusing on good luck. Bad luck belief has been demonstrated to hinder psychological

well-being (i.e. Tobacyk & Shrader, 1991; Wolfradt, 1997, Maltby et al., 2008). Yet

good luck superstitions are not only adaptive (Wiseman, 2003; Chotai & Wiseman,

2005) but have also been shown to be much more prevalent than negative ones, despite

the bias in previous literature towards bad luck superstition (Albas & Albas, 1989;

Wiseman & Watt, 2004). Therefore, this is where the present researches focus rests.

The majority of the studies mentioned above with the exception of a few more recent

studies (e.g. Wiseman & Watt, 2004; Maltby et al., 2008), have used the Paranormal

Belief Scale (Tobacyk & Milford, 1983). The relevant sub-measure to this

questionnaire only measures negative superstition. In their studies, Wiseman & Watt

(2004) demonstrated how there is need to measure both positive and negative

superstition before insinuating that someone is superstitious per se. It is not logically

accurate to suggest someone is superstitious by observing their behaviour towards bad

luck alone and it has also been shown that believing one is lucky or unlucky are two

different constructs that attract different personalities (Wiseman, 2003; Maltby et al.,

2008). Thus, the current research is interested in only positive superstitions as an

extension to Wiseman & Watt’s (2004) observations of the bias in past literature in this

domain.

Further to this decision is the reasoning that the present research is influenced by the

Positive Psychology (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000) movement. In line with this

and other research aforementioned, if the individual uses superstition to enhance

psychological well-being a positive use of superstition is assumed because of its ability

to regulate psychological tension, and therefore, must be granted more credit for

rationality (e.g. Miller & Taylor, 1995; Keinan, 2002; Chotai & Wiseman, 2005;

Schippers & Van Lange, 2006). However, the current study will not be using Wiseman

& Watt’s (2004) scale as it restrictively measures popular superstitious sayings alone

which are not representative of the range of idiosyncratic superstitions available as

evidenced above (Delacroix & Guillard, 2008). Darke & Freedman’s (1997) Belief in

Good Luck scale will be used for these reasons instead because it accounts for the need

to accommodate the personalisation aspect of good luck belief.

The present study was limited to defining superstition as “beliefs and/or practices that

have no religious nor scientific foundations and which lead people to think that certain

facts (external events or one’s own actions), or objects can bring good or bad luck, or

be signs announcing positive or negative consequences” (Delacroix & Guillard, 2008,

p. 1). Consistent with Delacroix & Guillard (2008) who sought to better define the

superstition construct, the present author also acknowledges that religion, astrology

and para-normality (supernatural beings, extra-terrestrials and spiritualism) are


separate to superstition because they have nothing to with luck, as are chance

(Wagenaar & Keren, 1988), fate and fortune (Darke & Freedman, 1997). However,

Delacroix & Guillard’s (2008) questionnaire will not be used either as they

acknowledge that it is still in its developmental infancy regards validity.

These decisions influence the areas this research will have implications in. The

domains any findings may have relevance to are counselling and clinical psychology,

because a model may emerge which suggests it could be beneficial for people of

certain personality or attribution types over others to encourage within themselves a

belief in good luck during certain situations, or to generally maximise their

psychological well-being.

Damisch et al.’s first experiment in 2010 has had the most influence on the design of

the current research. They demonstrated that activating good luck improves

performance. The current research would like to incorporate this effect to see whether

belief in good luck influences performance on a ball throwing task, either in a ‘good

luck’ or control condition, by linking the good luck concept to the ball used (Van

Raalet et al., 1991; Damisch et al., 2010). As a note of caution, according to Damisch

et al., (2010), activating superstition before performance has not been studied prior to

their research but the samples they used included less than 50 university students each

time, who were mostly female. No further details about the students were reported in

any of their four studies, whether participants knew they were partaking in a putting

task and had practice at this or not, or if they were in sporting majors. Hence there may

be possible confounding variables towards their small samples’ findings.

Literature suggests that females are more prone to believe in supernatural phenomena

than males (Emme, 1940; Vyse, 1997; Wolfradt, 1997; Randall & Desrosiers, 1980;

Dag, 1999), and are more inclined to endorse superstition. Therefore, it is hypothesised

that females will score higher than males in the experimental throwing task as they will

be more responsive to the ball when it is described as ‘lucky’.

So as not to provoke suspicion of the experimenter in the experimental condition (good

luck) when saying “…this ball has been said to be lucky by previous participants,” the

current research was titled as ‘An Investigation into the Relationship between

Personality and Attribution Style’. As with Damisch et al.’s (2010) study there was no

mention of luck specifically in the information sheet given to participants and good

luck belief was classed as an aspect of personality and not drawn attention to. The

throwing task was said to be a measure of hand-eye-coordination in relation to the

individual difference variables measured, so as not to reveal the true purpose of the

study, for then the throwing task would loose validity.

Most of past research in the area of superstition and personality has focused on the

neurotic trait and attribution style. The present study hopes to add to research which

helps correct this bias. Accordingly, the hypotheses are two-tailed for agreeableness

and conscientiousness because the author was unaware of existing literature which

might indicate a direction for these variables.

However, it is expected that belief in good luck will affect throwing-task score

positively, that is, as belief in good luck is activated within the good luck condition,

ball score will be higher for this group. It is predicted from existing research that


neuroticism, imagination, extroversion, being female and external attribution style will

be the strongest predictors of a participant’s belief in good luck because these factors

are more often connected to good luck belief and positive superstitions.


METHOD

Design

The first part to this study is a laboratory experiment which uses a between groups

design. The experimental group is condition 1 (luck), and condition 2 acts at the

control group (no luck). The dependent variable here is score on the ball throwing task

which is derived from the amount of times the participant manages to throw the ball

into the paper bin. Gender and luck condition will be included as factors, with belief

in good luck as a covariate, in a one-way analysis of covariance.

The second part of the study will employ a design consistent with a multiple linear

regression analysis. The predictor variables being attribution style: internal-personal,

external-other person, external-situational; personality factors: extroversion,

agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism and imagination and belief in good luck

will be the dependent variable. Only complete sets of responses will be included. The

analyses will be performed with the statistical software SPSS for Windows Version 19

with significance set at 0.05.

Participants

An opportunity sample of 17 males and 86 females took part in the study. No age data

was collected however those under 17 years of age were not eligible to participate due

to the content of the scenarios in the ARAT questionnaire. It was decided that not all

the scenarios would have been applicable to young teenagers as the authors of the

ARAT only used university level participants themselves during its development.

The majority of participants were students from the University of Wolverhampton, and

of those that were not students, all lived in Wolverhampton.

Participants were randomly assigned to each group. Those who arrived as an odd

number were in the luck condition (1) and those who arrived as an even number were

in the no luck condition (2).

There was a reward offered for students of 0.5 course credits, as is part of a system in

place at the university, other participants acted as volunteers.

Materials

Participants were asked to complete three questionnaires. The first was the

Achievement and Relationships Attribution Task (ARAT) by Fornells-Ambrojo &

Garety (2009), a measure of attribution style using everyday life situations (see

Appendix p. 46). Attribution is measured by scoring responses to why the participant

thinks something happened as either internal-personal (oneself), external-personal

(another person), or external-situational (chance or circumstances).

For example, in question a1 the participant is asked at the end of the scenario, “What is

the reason for the success of your business?” An internal attribution of causality would

be ‘because of my hard work’. Other-person attribution would be indicated with an

answer similar to ‘because of my partners’ successful advertising’. For an external-


situational attribution the participant might give a response of ‘because it is the only

store for miles around’.

The generality of the scenarios asserts the tasks external validity. Construct validity

has been demonstrated by the questionnaires ability to complement existing knowledge

of the relationship between depression and attribution of events, as well as literature on

paranoia biases. Reliability assessment tests found this measure to be very good, with

an average for the scenarios of .83 Cohen’s kappa value (Fornells-Ambrojo & Garety,

2009, p. 97).

The second questionnaire was the Mini-International Personality Item Pool (Mini-

IPIP) by Donnellan, Oswald, Baird & Lucas (2006), which asked participants to rate

how much they agreed with twenty statements along a five-point likert scale, to assess

the Big Five personality factors (see Appendix p. 49). Validity of the scale has been

proven against other Big Five measures and its parent scale (International Personality

Item Pool – Five Factor Model by Goldberg, 1999) which uses fifty statements. Test-

retest studies reveal reliability which resembles the coefficients of the IPIP-FFM,

demonstrating alternate-form reliability.

Lastly, a sixteen-item, six-point likert scale questionnaire to measure beliefs about the

causal properties and stability of personal good luck is the original Belief in Good

Luck scale (BIGL) by Darke & Freedman (1997) (see Appendix p. 50). The scale

indicates that those who score low hold a more rational view of luck – in which luck is

random and unreliable or do not believe in it at all; whereas those who score highly

tend to hold a view of luck as personal, stable and controllable.

Belief in good luck using the questionnaire has been demonstrated to be distinct from

possible related constructs such as self-esteem, optimism and life-satisfaction, thus

showing discriminant validity. The questions have been shown by the authors to be

reliable measures of belief in good luck for at least two months after first taking the

questionnaire, indicating that belief in good luck is relatively stable over time.

The latter two questionnaires (Mini-IPIP, BIGL) were ideally short so as to improve

quality of responses from participants because the first questionnaire (ARAT) is fairly

lengthy. It has been warned that having too many long questionnaires may produce

transient measurement errors due to participant’s boredom and frustration with

answering so many questions in a limited time frame (Schmidt, Le & Ilies, 2003).

Other equipment used to supplement this study was a small, soft ball and a waste-

paper bin in which to throw the ball. A two metre marker was used to gauge where the

participant was to stand from in order to throw the ball into the bin.

Two rooms were required, one in which to give the standardised instructions and to

complete the questionnaires, and another room in which to privately conduct the ball-

task as well as issue the debriefing after active participation had finished.

Procedure

Participants are firstly given both the information sheet and informed consent form to

grant them the necessary knowledge so that they know what they would be required to

do and whether they would like take part (see Appendix p. 44, 45). In the event that


participants felt uncomfortable answering any questions, they were given the right to

withdraw without consequence at any time. If consented, one at a time, a participant

will be led into a private room with only the experimenter in which to complete the

ball-throwing task.

The participant will be assigned to a condition dependent upon which number they are.

This is determined as follows: the first participant will be in the luck condition, and so

will each odd numbered participant after that. The second participant will be in the no

luck condition and so will each even numbered participant after them.

The experimenter will direct the participant to stand on the marker and face the bin. In

the luck condition, the experimenter will tell the participant, “All I would like you to

do is to try to throw the ball in the bin 10 times. Other people have said this ball’s

lucky so see how you do. You have as much time as you like.”

For the no luck condition the experimenter will say to the participant, “All I would like

you to do is to try to throw the ball in the bin 10 times. You have as much time as you

like.”

The experimenter stands back to allow the participant to proceed with the task. Once

ten throws have been made, the participant is led back into the main room to fill out

the questionnaires in the order they are presented in the materials section. The

participant is also reminded to write their ball score at the end of the last questionnaire.

Once completed, the participant is thanked and asked to give their participant-pool

number if they wished to receive 0.5 course credits for taking part. A debriefing is

issued to the participant in private, so as not to collude other participants, and a sheet

given for them to read in order to fully explain and clarify to them what they have

done in this study (see Appendix p. 51).


RESULTS

Belief in Good Luck

An enter method, multiple linear regression analysis was computed to determine the

extent to which condition, gender and the six personality factors: Extroversion (E),

Agreeableness (A), Conscientiousness (C), Neuroticism (N), Imagination (I), and

Attribution Style (AS), could predict a person’s belief in good luck score. The alpha

level of 0.5 was used for all statistical tests. There were 103 participants in total, 51 in

the luck condition, and 52 in the no luck condition. As can be seen by the summary

statistics in Table 1, the sample presented a mostly internal attribution style which past

research suggests is less likely to be related to superstitious belief in comparison to

external attribution. The sample was also highly agreeable and relatively low in

neuroticism. Implications of the sample’s characteristics will be discussed.

Table 1: Participants’ descriptive statistics showing means and standard deviations

rounded to two decimal places.

Variable Mean Standard Deviation

Good Luck Belief 48.52 11.06

AS: Internal Attribution 5.61 2.09

AS: External Other Person 3.48 1.66

AS: External Situational 2.89 1.53

E 13.11 3.48

A 17.00 2.25

C 13.92 3.51

N 12.19 3.27

I 14.90 2.85

Using the enter method, a non-significant model emerged (F(10,92)=0.741; p =.684)

accounting for -2.6% of the variance. These variables were not collectively significant

predictors in this model. Data to illustrate each variable is shown in Table 2.


Table 2: Participants’ β, t and p values showing whether the ten variables predict belief

in good luck.

Predictor β t p

AS: Internal Personal -.185 -.116 .452

AS: External Other-person -.163 -.130 .908

AS: External Situational -.132 -.113 .897

E .068 .650 .517

A .044 .429 .669

C -.010 -.095 .925

N -.093 -.844 .401

I -.261 -2.434 .017*

Gender -.015 -.139 .890

Condition -.004 -.041 .967

Because all variables but Imagination *(p = < 0.05) were non-significant in this model,

a backward method, multiple linear regression analysis was conducted to see if a

significant model would emerge after the weaker predictor variables were removed.

The backward method produced a significant model (F(1,101)=6.058; p = .016)

accounting for 4.7% of the variance. This model contained only the imagination

variable: Beta = -.238, t = -2.461, p = .016. The inferential statistics here suggest that

as imagination decreases, belief in good luck increases, presenting a negative

regression slope. Such effects were not expected or predicted within the hypotheses.

Ball Task Score

A two-way between-subjects design analysis of covariance was calculated with the

factors of gender and luck condition (luck or non luck group) upon the dependent

variable of ball task score, to establish if performance differed between the two luck

conditions. Belief in good luck was included as a covariate.

There was no significant main effect revealed for the gender factor upon ball task score

(F(1,98)= 0.406, p = 0.525). There was also non-significance for the luck condition

factor upon ball task score (F(1,98)= 0.233, p = 0.631). Good luck belief also

produced a non-significant result (F(1,98)= 0.000, p = 0.982).

The interaction between luck condition and gender upon ball task score is non-

significant (F(1,98)= 2.335, p = 0.130). Data constituting to the breakdown of gender

differences can be seen in Table 3. The table shows that females who were in the luck

condition did score averagely higher on the ball task than no luck females and males in

both conditions. However the low numbers of males in the sample do not allow for

strong or reliable mean differences in order to reach significance.

Table 3: The numbers (N), means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of the ball task

score from each luck condition with further gender breakdown.

Gender

Condition Female Male

Luck: N = 51, M = 5.80, N = 46, M = 5.91, SD = N = 5, M = 4.80, SD =


SD = 1.63 1.66 0.84

No Luck: N = 52, M =

5.48, SD = 1.92

N = 40, M = 5.38, SD =

1.93

N = 12, M = 5.83, SD =

1.95

Results suggest that in this study, ball task score was not significantly affected by

belief in good luck, gender or by which of the luck conditions the participants were in,

therefore the null hypotheses are retained for these factors.


DISCUSSION

The present research examined whether personality and attribution style could predict

a person’s belief in good luck (BIGL); as well as whether belief in good luck could

indicate performance on a throwing task once good luck superstition had been

activated. The results provide some support for the hypotheses towards gender and

activating good luck superstition upon performance.

Imagination

All of the predictor variables together as a model failed to predict belief in good luck

within this sample. However, when the backwards method of regression analysis was

employed in order to find if any of the variables accounted for belief in good luck,

negative significance emerged from one variable - the imagination factor. The analysis

showed that as a persons Imagination trait lessened (that is according to McCrae &

Costa, 1987, people who are less open to experiences and show preference for

convention, traditional interests and straightforwardness), the greater their BIGL score

was. It seems to go against common sense to say that as a person’s imagination

increases, their belief in good luck declines. Research which might be able to explain

this unexpected finding was not available to the author. It would be unsafe to assume

upon this research alone that this is a truly significant finding and it is suggested

instead that this result is anomalous.

Reasoning for why this finding is considered to be anomalous is explainable by (a) its

contrast between existing research, which is inconsistent with the result that lower

imagination scores result in higher BIGL, (b) the bias observed within the sample, and

(c) cognitive explanations.


Maltby et al., (2008) whose sample consisted of over 200 UK participants with an

average age of 30.35 years, found significance between belief in being personally

lucky and imagination, and significance between belief in being unlucky and low

imagination. Given their seemingly representative and unbiased sample and given that

Wiseman (2003) also found such a relationship, it seems that the present researches

finding is an anomaly.

Supposing the finding of low imagination is a factor which can predict BIGL, the trait

would need to be examined alongside the concrete traits associated with strong belief

in luck like neuroticism and external attribution with different populations and cultures

(e.g. Day & Maltby, 2003; Wiseman & Watt, 2004; Schippers & Van Lange, 2006).

Doing so would help to ensure that what has been found in the present research is not a

result of the sample alone and is instead, a legitimate result that can be inferred across

other populations. Realistically, however, the imagination model only accounted for

4.7% of the variance in BIGL, which is minimal, and so the author is inclined to

assume this is one of those findings that are of anomalous significance.

If the significance of imagination is indeed an anomalous finding due to this sample’s

participants, the following would be worthy of note. The data were collected mostly

with psychology students from the University of Wolverhampton. One would expect

psychologists, or at least those interested in the analytical line of thought which

psychology lends its self to, to show high trait agreeableness (Tokar, Fischer & Subich,

1998; Osipow, Ashby & Wall, 2011). This is what was found as Table 1 shows.

Perhaps the analytical mind of the sample and the fact that they presented a mostly

internal attribution style biased the results, as these are two traits shown relatively

consistently to be opposed to superstition, whether positive or negative (Maltby, 2008).

Such a suggestion would be supported by research by Lindeman & Aarnio (2007).

An alternative explanation to why significance was not found between BIGL and the

predictor factors is partly explainable by cognitive research from Kramer & Block

(2008). A critical affect of belief in luck is that when a negative superstition is made

salient, a person is more likely to make risk-averse choices (Kramer & Block, 2008).

This effect has been demonstrated to be highly salient in non-conscious processing, up

to three times more so than conscious processing, which suggests that the influence of

superstition is largely unnoticed unless a conscious effort is made to adhere to a

superstition (e.g. choosing a lucky pen to take to a test). Of course this finding of is not

directly related to the current research as it is exploring only good luck, yet it is still of

some importance because it should be held in mind that participants might not be

consciously aware that they do in fact hold a belief in good luck, and they might not

realise when that belief influences decisions or actions that they make.

Neuroticism

Neuroticism was the 10th

factor to be removed from the regression analysis model. The

lowest displayed trait by the sample was neuroticism which, as the introduction shows,

is the one personality trait that has been linked the most consistently to the area of

superstitious belief in general. Yet this highly reported personality trait was not found

to predict belief in good luck in this sample and thus retains the null hypothesis.


Wiseman & Watt (2004) did not consistently find significance with this variable across

all studies and said that this seemed due to whether the beliefs measured were of

positive or negative luck. They found that highly neurotic individuals endorsed more

bad luck beliefs than those lower in the trait (Wiseman, 2003). Support comes from

Day & Maltby (2003) who also found correlations between depression and beliefs in

bad luck. This in turn complements Wiseman & Watt’s (2004) finding that people low

in life satisfaction endorsed more highly negative superstitions, compared to those with

high life satisfaction. Wiseman & Watt (2004) theorised that high trait neuroticism is

linked to belief in bad luck and since we were measuring good luck belief it may not

be out of the ordinary to find no significance in this context with neuroticism. A later

study by Maltby et al., (2008) also found this trend, with bad luck endorsement by

highly neurotic individuals being significantly associated to poor psychological well-

being (e.g. pessimism).

Attribution Style

The sample also had a much stronger bias towards an internal attribution style than

either of the external loci and significance was not found for this variable; again

retaining the null hypothesis. As highlighted in the introduction, research is relatively

consistent in reporting the significant relationship an external attribution style has upon

superstitious and luck belief, most likely because externals show more tension

compared to internals (e.g. Schippers & Van Lange, 2006). Yet internal attribution

style was also shown to be significantly related to absence of a belief in any luck

(Maltby et al., 2008).

Peltzer (2002) was interested in replicating existing paranormal belief and personality

research, among black South African students. His study examined the sub-scales

within the Paranormal Belief Scale (PDI) Tobacyk & Milford, 1983), big five

personality factors, attribution style, and religiosity. He found significance between

both external and internal attribution styles for the superstition sub-scale, although

heed that this only measures negative superstition (Wiseman & Watt, 2004). This

suggests that in some populations attribution style may not be as significant a predictor

to superstitious belief as Western-based research abovementioned leads us to believe.

Perhaps attribution style is not as relevant to good luck belief specifically as it can be

in superstition in general. Instead, an individual’s BIGL may be more influenced by

environmental factors, such as exposure to superstitious practice and parental beliefs

towards positive superstition (Emme, 1940).

Extroversion

The extraversion factor was the 9th

predictor variable removed from the regression

analysis, no significance was found for its ability to predict BIGL and so this does not

allow rejection of the null hypothesis for this trait. Maltby et al., (2008) discovered that

individuals low in extraversion had significant belief that they were unlucky, which is

complemented by the findings from Wiseman (2003). Peltzer (2002) though, found no

correlation between the PDI measure of superstition and extraversion but did with the

Psi sub-scale. This is logical given an extravert’s tendency to interact more with their

environment and hence believe they can directly affect things around them (McCrae &

Costa, 1987).


The present sample was quite highly extroverted and taking into account Peltzer’s

(2002), Wiseman (2003), and Maltby et al’s (2008) findings, this may suggest that

extroverts are likely to benefit from strategies that use good luck superstition to

improve performance and psychological well-being. Future research might expand

upon this speculation as in contrast; perhaps more introverted individuals would

benefit more from encouragement to utilise good luck rather than bad.

The discussion of the predictor variables above suggests that the nature of the

characteristics of the sample may be biased towards the opposite of any strong belief in

good luck, let alone superstition. The null hypotheses could not be rejected for the

variables of conscientiousness and agreeableness as no significance was found for

these traits. In spite of this, previous research which also included these personality

factors by Maltby et al., (2008) found non-significant correlations between them and

general belief in luck. This and the present researches findings might indicate these

two variables carry no bearing upon someone’s belief in good luck.

Ball-Throwing Task

The ball task experiment did not produce significant results with any of the variables;

however, the emerging trends within the data are in conformity with research which

explores self-efficacy (e.g. Tobacyk & Shrader, 1991) and gender (e.g. Wiseman &

Watt, 2004) with good luck. This lends some strength to the validity of the present

research. BIGL did not significantly affect a person’s ball task performance, that is, as

BIGL score increased task performance did not significantly improve. Interestingly

though, those in the luck condition (superstition activation) did perform slightly better

than those in the no-luck condition (no superstition activation). Support is thus

provided to theories and research which propose that activating good luck superstitious

belief triggers the self-efficacy bias, which serves to enhance performance (e.g.

Bandura, 1977; Damisch et al., 2010).

A theoretical explanation as to why this aspect did not reach significance could be due

to the way in which individual participants view the luck concept, bearing in mind it

has been shown to be distinct to chance (Wagenaar & Keren, 1998). If a participant

held the bias prior to entering the study that they were unlucky, the activation of the

positive superstition might have been void. That is, their belief that they are unlucky

might have been more powerful than the suggestion that they would perform well with

the ‘lucky ball’. Research has shown that those who believe themselves to be unlucky

have cognitive biases which lead them to be anxious and unconfident (Wolfradt, 1997;

Maltby et al., 2008). They also have been found to believe that luck is uncontrollable

and more like chance which is said to be uncontrollable, in comparison to those who

believe they are lucky and that they can influence luck favourably (Darke & Freedman,

1997; André, 2009).

Regards gender differences, no significance was found, yet trends within results are

also in-line with previous literature which suggests females would be more likely to

endorse superstition (e.g. Vyse, 1997). Females appeared to be more responsive in the

luck condition because they scored averagely higher than the males, suggesting that

females are more receptive to the benefits of good luck activation. Oddly, males

performed slightly better when in the no luck condition yet this was most likely an

unintentional bias due to the fact that the large majority of males were in the control


condition. A factor which may have contributed to this pattern of results and for why

these gender differences did not reach significance, was most likely because of the

very unequal gender split. There were far fewer males to females in both conditions

and so the trends were there, but there were probably not enough males to afford

significance to the results.

Limitations, Implications & Future Research

The sample was relatively small, due to the time constraints upon collecting data,

compared to prominent previous research in the area which has used samples much

larger than the present research (e.g. Darke & Freedman, 1997; Wiseman & Watt,

2004; Schippers & Van lange, 2006; Delacroix & Guillard, 2008). If this research were

to be conducted again with a different population it may be more beneficial to only

include the data of those participants who scored in say, the top 10 or 20 percent (as

Wiseman & Watt did in 2004 with one of their experiments) of the BIGL scale. This

would allow findings to be clearer in that they are the effects of people who believe

strongly in good luck. When time is not so constrained, it would also benefit to gather

data from a larger sample to conduct a more sound linear regression analysis with

(Brace, Kemp & Snelgar, 2003).

An obvious limitation of this research is that the findings cannot be generalised to the

overall population since the sample was dominated by psychology students, however,

the outcome can be used to inform and broaden future research in the area of good

luck.

Intriguing and unusual research from Chotai & Wiseman (2005), demonstrates

significance of factors which are unlikely to immediately spring to mind when thinking

what could influence someone’s belief in luck. Through their research into the

relationship between feeling lucky and month of birth, they showed that summer-born

individuals considered themselves to be significantly luckier than the winter-born. As

previously mentioned, they also demonstrated that belief in good luck had many

positive implications on psychological well-being; particularly for the summer-born,

such as being more imaginative, less neurotic and more extraverted compared to the

winter-born participants. They discuss why this may be in terms of brain biochemistry.

Thus, such research illustrates that there are numerous possible factors which

contribute to belief in good luck and to how strongly that person might believe in luck

in general. Maybe birth month would be a more universal predictor of belief in good

luck than the individual differences explored in the current research, because

collectively they failed to significantly predict BIGL within this sample.

Research was presented in the introduction which discussed the importance to

recognise that good luck is not restricted to popular sayings and that it can instead be

personalised to lucky charms and rituals. The method of activating positive

superstition in this research was externally, by the experimenter referring to a ball as

lucky. Perhaps BIGL would have had a stronger affect on the participants’ task

performance (lead to significance being reached in the luck condition), had they

actually seen the ball behaving in what could be called a lucky manner, rather than

solely taking the experimenters’ word.


For example, if participants had observed a few participants (or stooges) before them

perform really well on the throwing task they may have self inferred that the ball was

lucky and could have had this reaffirmed by a stooge when handing the ball to the

experimenter. The stooge might say something such as, “This seems to be a lucky ball

you know!” A design like this may be sounder for future research when attempting to

activate good luck beliefs, for if priming is obvious the positive effects of the

superstition activation have been shown to be reversed (Kramer & Block, 2008).

Perhaps the more an apparently lucky object seems personal, the better it would work

to act as a ‘lucky charm’, and hence activate the self-efficacy bias (Werner, 1948;

Damisch et al., 2010). Of course, in real life, superstitions are frequently activated

personally by the individual so that they become idiosyncratic (Schippers & Van

Lange, 2006), which can present a problem to research in the area demonstrating

external validity.

It is however, worth mentioning in defence of the throwing task used in this study, that

some participants in the luck condition did hand the ball back to the experimenter

exclaiming such things as “I think that really is a lucky ball!” when they performed

better than they thought, or “I think I’ve ran out of luck with it [the ball] now,” when

they did well and then lost their streak of consecutive successful throws. Such

statements demonstrate internal validity of the study but as discussed above, the design

could be improved for future research.

There were other observations made of participants which could have influenced

results. During the design of the study, care was taken to ensure that participants would

feel as comfortable and relaxed as possible, by such measures as only having the

experimenter and the participant present in the throwing task and allowing them as

much time as possible. Despite this and extra reassurance from the experimenter, some

first year university students appeared anxious. It is quite likely that their emotions had

an effect on their performance during the throwing task in a negative manner

(Rajkumar, Anilkumar & Pasodi, 2011).

As a matter of interest, if this study were to be replicated in a place known for

superstition, such as China or the Philippines (Simmons & Schindler, 2003; Tsang,

2004), perhaps a model would emerge which would successfully predict BIGL within

that culture. On the other hand, superstition is a very integral part of that culture so

perhaps a clear model would not emerge there due to the diversity between the people

who would endorse luck.

Findings from this study, and those which have informed this research, have lead to

speculation that it would be beneficial for future research to explore good and bad luck

within clinical samples, such as those who are depressed or suffering with an anxiety

disorder (Kring, Johnson, Davidson & Neale, 2010). This is because of research and

theories which suggest that those who are highly neurotic tend to endorse superstition

more, particularly negative superstition (e.g. Wiseman & Watt, 2004). As it is

therefore likely that such individuals already endorse negative superstition which may

add to poor psychological well-being (e.g. Wolfradt, 1997; Maltby et al., 2008),

perhaps development of strategies in which such people can use their beliefs positively

will aid in the development of coping strategies which can help to lessen the anxiety

and depression they may experience.


The findings from this sample did not suggest a strong model to explain the variance

of belief in good luck. The suggested association between the imagination trait and

belief in good luck appears anomalous because this finding conflicts with previous

research and is not found elsewhere in current literature. The findings do suggest that

females may be more likely to respond to and benefit from using positive superstition

to enhance psychological well-being and supports the theories and research which

demonstrates this positive effect (e.g. Malinowski, 1954, Bandura, 1977; Schippers &

Van Lange, 2006). Furthermore, this study does add to support for theories which

explain why we still have positive superstitions today via biases of self-efficacy and

illusory control as those in the luck condition did perform better than those who did

not have superstition activated (e.g. Langer & Roth, 1975; Damisch et al., 2010).

This study suggests that there is not necessarily one universal model which predicts

BIGL across populations and whom might benefit from using superstition to maximise

psychological well-being (e.g. Miller & Taylor, 1995; Day & Maltby 2003). Taking

into account previous literature, it appears that endorsing good luck can potentially be

beneficial to anyone, so long as they do believe in luck (Maltby et al., 2008). Practical

implications are that using good luck does have benefits and should be given credit

(i.e. not always viewed as an irrational belief) if use serves to improve performance

and well-being (Wiseman, 2003).

It does appear from the regression analysis that good luck is something people either

endorse or do not endorse and personality is not necessarily a concrete factor upon

which this endorsement is dependent upon. Overall, this study helps to fill gaps in the

literature and hopes to provide more footing towards the use of positive superstition

and good luck to improve psychological well-being in clinical and counselling

domains. Individual differences in good luck belief still need further investigation and

present findings ought to be confirmed across different populations.


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APPENDICES

Information Sheet

An Investigation into the Relationship between Personality and Attribution Style

You are invited to participate in a study of personality and attribution style. The

purpose of the study is to examine whether these two factors are in any way an

indicator to hand-eye coordination. Gender differences will also be explored.

The study is being conducted by Sophie Robinson, under the supervision of Dr.

Niall Galbraith ([email protected]). Completion of this research is a

requirement for the degree BSc Hons. Psychology.

If you decide to participate you will be asked to firstly take part in a simple ball-

throwing exercise (there will be only yourself and the experimenter in the room

for this task) which will realistically take less than 5 minutes. Secondly, you will

be asked to complete three questionnaires, two relating to personality and one

exploring attribution style. All in all this should take no longer than 25 minutes.

Participants will be required to indicate their sex.

Any information or personal details gathered in the course of the study are

anonymous. No individual will be identified in any publication of the results. Only

the investigator and their supervisor will have access to data.

If you decide to participate, you may withdraw from further participation at any

time without having to give a reason and without consequence. If you would like

to request an abstract once the study has been completed, which will be after

April 2012, you may email your request to [email protected].

If you are prepared to participate please sign the Consent Form and return it to

the investigator.

Thank you for your time.

The ethical aspects of this study have been approved by the University of

Wolverhampton Behavioural Sciences Ethics Committee.

mailto:[email protected]


Informed Consent form

An investigation into the relationship between Personality and Attribution Style

I have read (or, where appropriate, have had read to me) and understand the information provided in the Information Sheet.

I understand that I will be asked to complete three questionnaires: two exploring personality and one to assess attribution style, which should take no longer than 20 minutes; and that I will provide information to the best accuracy of my knowledge. I understand that in the experimental task I am in no pressure to perform perfectly and that I can take my time. I understand that my identity will not be linked with my data, and that all information I provide will remain anonymous. Any questions I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. I agree to participate in this research, knowing that I can withdraw from further participation in the research at any time without consequence. Participant’s Name: ____________________________________________________ (block letters) Participant’s Signature: _______________________ Date: ______________________


Achievement & Relationships Attribution Task (ARAT) Fornells-Ambrojo & Garety (2009)

INSTRUCTIONS: The stories below describe some everyday situations. Each of them is followed by a question. Please read the scenarios and answer the questions. Try to decide what the main cause

of the event described in each scenario was. Please write down your answers on the space provided. In some cases, it might be difficult to decide what the main explanation for the event is.

In those cases, please write down the causes in order of importance. Thank you for your co-operation

Story a1 You decide to open your own dry cleaning shop in a small but growing town. Your store will be the only one of its kind for miles around. In the first year of business, the town’s population doubles and your business prospers. Your business partner’s ad campaign is a big success and customers praise the quality of your work. Your sales exceed expectations. What is the reason for the success of your business?

Answer: …………………………………………………………………………………………………………..

Story b1 You have trouble finding work. Unemployment has risen lately. You’ve had difficulties with the management in the past because of tardiness and poor performance record. You have not applied for all the jobs in your field advertised because your neighbour is redecorating the flat and has been asking your help quite often this week. Why do you have trouble finding work?

Answer: …………………………………………………………………………………………………………..

Story b6 Recently, you haven’t done all the work that your boss expects from you. The boss begins to complain about your performance. The job is sometimes difficult for you because it’s quite technical and the hours are long. Also, you recently discover through the office grapevine that the boss’ nephew is very interested in your position. Why does your boss complain about your work performance?

Answer: …………………………………………………………………………………………………………..

Story a2 You take pride in your appearance, and make an effort to look your best for a dinner party. You notice that an old friend is sitting next to an argumentative couple and is pleased to move seats to talk. Your friend compliments you on your appearance. Later on the evening, this person annoys you by asking for a ride home. This is a great inconvenience because this person lives far away. Why do you receive a compliment from your old friend?

Answer: …………………………………………………………………………………………………………..

Story a6 You just got into the college you wanted to do your A levels. The competition to get into this college is usually very high because is the best in the area. However, this year there were fewer applicants because a new college just opened in the centre of town. You had very good grades in your GCSEs. During the admission interview you learnt that your previous tutor worked quite closely with one of the interviewers and recommended you personally.


Why do you get in the college?

Answer: …………………………………………………………………………………………………………..

Story b2 A neighbour mentions to you that their teenager has a drinking problem. You wonder if the neighbour is going to ask you for advice. This neighbour is an independent and headstrong person who rarely seeks advice from others. You do not ask the neighbour any specific questions about this matter because you are not very good at counselling people. This neighbour mentions that he is late for work and leaves without asking for your advice. Why doesn’t the neighbour ask you for advice?

Answer: …………………………………………………………………………………………………………..

Story b5 You take part in a debate at college. A student with a view opposite to yours starts presenting. As you listen to the speech, you notice that this individual is a very fluent and persuasive speaker. You have not had much time to prepare your own speech so your presentation turns out to be quite disorganised. You also have some problems making yourself heard because your microphone is making disturbing high pitch noises during your talk. After counting the votes it becomes clear the audience does not support your views. Why does the audience not support your views?

Answer: …………………………………………………………………………………………………………..

Story a3 You decide to throw a party at short notice. There has not been a party in your college for months and you know that a lot of your friends are dying to have one before the exam period starts. You book the top floor of a famous club. A friend of yours who is a well-known DJ agrees to play for the evening. Everybody seems to enjoy themselves. The dance floor is full until the end of the evening. Why is the party a success?

Answer: …………………………………………………………………………………………………………..

Story a5 You have recently received a salary increase at work. While you are a bit surprised by this since you had no prior notice about such a raise, you do feel that you have been a reliable worker. Indeed, other colleagues have received the annual rise. The day after your receive this news, a memo is sent from the boss to all workers indicating that in the last few months a number of employees have left the company. The company’s boss offers to be open to suggestions for improving job satisfaction. Why do you get a rise?

Answer: …………………………………………………………………………………………………………..

Story b3 You and a friend from college decide to go out to dinner. The evening starts out badly because you forget to make dinner reservations as arranged. You and your friend meet at the


restaurant. After an hour’s wait, there is still no table so you both decide to go elsewhere for a meal. The food and service turn out to be disappointing there, especially for your friend. During the dinner, your friend hassles you about how you were able to get such a high mark in your essay. The questioning indicates a hostile tone.

Why does your friend act hostilely toward you?

Answer: …………………………………………………………………………………………………………..

Story b4 You arrange to go to the cinema with someone you just met last week. You let the other person choose the film that turns out to be quite boring. After the cinema you go for a coffee. You don’t talk much because you are feeling tired. When the evening is over, this person tells you that she/he didn’t have a good time. Why does the date go badly?

Answer: …………………………………………………………………………………………………………..

Story a4 You take a course in English Literature because you like to write. Your first assignment involves writing a paper on a contemporary English author. You happen to have a newly published book discussing the style of this particular author in detail. You work hard on the paper and are quite pleased with the result. You hear from another student that the person doing the marking in this course is very generous. When the paper is returned you are happy to see that you have an excellent mark. Why do you receive an excellent grade?

Answer: …………………………………………………………………………………………………………..

GENDER (PLEASE CIRCLE): MALE / FEMALE


20-Item Mini-IPIP DONNELLAN, OSWALD, BAIRD, AND LUCAS (2006)

Below are some short statements. Please indicate the extent of your agreement with the statements by ticking one of the five responses to each question.

Thank you for your time.

(1)

Strongly

Disagree

(2)

Slightly

Disagree

(3)

Neutral

(4)

Slightly

Agree

(5)

Strongly

Agree

1) I am the life of the party

2) I sympathise with others’ feelings

3) I get chores done right away

4) I have frequent mood swings

5) I have a vivid imagination

6) I don’t talk a lot

7) I am not interested in other people’s problems

8) I often forget to put things back in their proper place

9) I am relaxed most of the time

10) I am not interested in abstract ideas

11) I talk to a lot of different people at parties

12) I feel others’ emotions

13) I like order

14) I get upset easily

15) I have difficulty understanding abstract ideas

16) I keep in the background

17) I am not really interested in others

18) I make a mess of things

19) I seldom feel blue

20) I do not have a good imagination


Belief in Good Luck DARKE AND FREEDMAN (1997)

Below are statements relating to luck. Please indicate the extent of your agreement with the statements by ticking one of the six responses to each question.

Thank you for your participation. (1)

Strongly Disagree

(2) Somewhat Disagree

(3) Slightly

Disagree

(4) Slightly Agree

(5) Somewhat

Agree

(6) Strongly Agree

a) Luck plays an important part in everyone’s life

b) Some people are consistently lucky, and others are unlucky

c) I consider myself to be a lucky person

d) I believe in luck

e) I often feel like it’s my lucky day

f) Nobody can win at games of chance in the long-run

g) I consistently have good luck

h) I tend to win games of chance

i) It’s a mistake to base any decisions on how lucky you feel

j) Luck works in my favour

k) I don’t mind leaving things to chance because I’m a lucky person

l) Even the things in life I can’t control tend to go my way because I’m lucky

m) I consider myself to be an unlucky person

n) There is such a thing as luck that favours some people, but not others

o) Luck is nothing more than random chance

p) Luck played a part in the ball-throwing exercise

Please Indicate your score in the Ball-throwing exercise:


Debriefing Sheet

An investigation into the relationship between Personality and Attribution Style

Thank you for your participation in this study. A main aim of the study was to examine whether personality and/or attribution style is related to belief in good luck, and the extent to which this belief affects performance.

We used a simple experiment in which to assess good luck belief on performance by either describing the ball as lucky or not. Participants will have been in one of these conditions for the ball-throwing task which was considered relatively easy and not reliant upon much external skill or knowledge. That is, that the task was more easily influenced by chance than sheer skill.

One of the reasons for studying belief in good luck is to find out whether there are any indicative traits for this belief, as this would then have benefits to the construction of coping mechanisms for people who express certain personality characteristics. Applications of this would be in a clinical and counselling setting.

We already know that people who demonstrate neuroticism on a Big Five measure, find the endorsement of good luck is helpful in making them more optimistic, but little to nothing is known about whether this would also be beneficial to any other personality traits. This knowledge could also help to explain why certain superstitious behaviours have persisted over time, such as the expression ‘knock-on-wood’.

Because external attributors have been found to have a higher belief in concepts such as luck, it may be the case that this is the dominant factor in determining whether someone would benefit from using good luck strategies in their daily life and it is not solely reliant upon personality characteristics.

So, in this study, after reading the information sheet and consent form, you were asked to try to throw the ball into the receptacle 10 times. Half of participants were told the ball is lucky in some way, and the other half receives no description of the ball. The study also wanted to find out if the people who express a strong belief in good luck are more likely to perform better when the ball is described as lucky. The reason for including the control condition of no description was to assess whether describing the ball as lucky made any difference to performance aside of factors such as personality.

It is expected that those who show traits of agreeableness and imagination will be more susceptible to the balls description as lucky. It may be the case that even if such people did not show direct belief in good luck, they are influenced by its mention in context-relevant situations. If this is so, then these people should perform better in the experimental task.

Your contributions to this study are hence very valuable and greatly appreciated. Your responses will be used to help answer the question of whether certain personality traits and attribution styles can be predictors of belief in good luck. This is a question that could greatly benefit those in therapeutic/rehabilitation settings.

If you would like to read a journal article on this general topic, please see:

Day, L., & Maltby, J. (2003) Belief in good luck and psychological well-being: the mediating role of optimism and irrational beliefs. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 36, 99-110.

To remind you that your responses to all elements of this study are anonymous and confidential – no single responses will be identified in any publication of the results, and only averaged results will be reported.


Thank you for participating in this study, however, please do not show this debriefing sheet or discuss any aspect of the study with other students. For the study to work it is important that future participants do not have this information or any particular expectations.

If you would like more information, or have further questions about this study, then please feel free to contact Sophie Robinson at, [email protected], or Dr. Niall Galbraith ([email protected]).

mailto:[email protected]


RES 20A (October 2003)

Division of Psychology Ethics Committee: submission of project for approval

This form must be word processed – no handwritten forms can be considered

ALL sections of this form must be completed

No project may commence without authorisation from the Divisional and School

Ethics Committees

CATEGORY A PROJECTS:

There is no significant interference with participants’ physical or psychological

wellbeing. In detail:

• The research procedure is not likely to be stressful or distressing.

• The research materials are not of a sensitive, discriminatory or otherwise

inappropriate nature.

• The participants are not members of a vulnerable group, such as those with a

recognised clinical or psychological or similar condition.

• The research design is sufficiently well-grounded so that the participant’s time is not

wasted.

Projects involving access to confidential records may be considered Category A

provided that the investigator’s access to these is part of his/her normal professional

duties.

Category A projects will be approved by the Psychology Ethics Committee and

monitored by the School Ethics Committee. The School Ethics Committee will not

normally examine individual Category A projects but receives a record of projects that

have been approved at Divisional level.

Title of Project:

Personality and Attribution Style on Belief in Good Luck

Name of Supervisor:

(for all student projects)

Dr. Niall Galbraith

Name of Investigator(s): Sophie Laura Robinson

Location of Research:

(Module code, MPhil/PhD, Staff)

University of Wolverhampton, 6PS004

Qualifications/Expertise of the

investigator relevant to the

submission:

Level 6 psychology student

Participants: Please indicate the

population and number of

participants, the nature of the

participant group and how they

will be recruited.

128 participants is the aim for this research, according to the

highest result of a sample size calculation made using G*Power.

They will be of undergraduate nature in Wolverhampton

University, and recruited using a random opportunity sample.

Continued overleaf

Please attach the following and tick the box* provided to confirm that each has been included:

To be completed by SEC:

Date Received:

Project No:


*in the case of undergraduate projects, this should be done by supervisors to confirm that each part is properly

constituted Rationale for and expected outcomes of the study: The current study is investigating

various factors that affect or indicate someone’s belief in good luck. More specifically, the

relationships between personality, attribution style, and belief in good luck will be measured;

with hope that if any trends emerge, these can be applied to adaptive treatments and coping

strategies for certain ‘types’ of people. The vast existing amount of cognitive research regards

luck has shown that belief in good luck serves as a positive adaptation, for example, allowing

the individual to feel that they have a sense of control in an otherwise ambiguous situation

(Langer, 1977). This relates to our measure of attribution style by way of locus of control. It

has also already been established by Keinan (1994), and others, that people turn to

superstitions when they experience low levels of perceived control. An aim of this research is

to investigate whether certain people would benefit from use of good luck, as it may be that

more analytical people would not be affected by the use or notion of good luck, such as those

who are low on the openness/imagination trait.

Research has also demonstrated that carrying a lucky charm serves to increase the confidence,

optimism and hope of the individual in a performance related situation (Day & Maltby,

2003). This finding is also relevant to the proposed research as we are interested in

establishing whether those participants who believe most in good luck will perform better in

the experimental task. The experimental task element to this research aims to establish

whether those who show a stronger belief in good luck are more influenced by the

experimenter describing the ball as “lucky”, and hence perform better in the throwing

exercise as research suggests that activating the good luck superstition often leads to

improved performance because this serves to boost self-efficacy. The notion of luck on

performance has been especially researched in the area of sport, for example by Schippers &

Lange (2006).

Moreover, the success of the influence of belief in good luck on sport, demonstrates why

students are a worthy population of study, as they regularly encounter performance situations

such as exams (Womack, 1992).

Regards the personality element to the proposed research, past researchers have focused on

the neurotic trait (Wiseman & Watt, 2004; Day & Maltby, 2003) and established that high

neurotics endorse a stronger belief in luck than non-neurotics.

The positive inferences of good luck belief is why this research is not considering measuring

bad luck alongside, as it has been demonstrated to have no psychological benefits by a great

deal of research (Tobacyk & Shrader, 1991; Dag, 1999), and this study would like to find

those who might best benefit from endorsing the use of good luck.

This study aims to establish if personality variables or attribution style can indicate a belief in

good luck within the general population. The personality variables of particular interest in

this research are imagination, agreeableness and neuroticism. This research will have

implications in the areas of counselling and clinical psychology because it may be beneficial

for people of certain personality or attribution types to encourage within themselves a belief

in good luck during certain situations, or to generally maximise their psychological well-

being. It is predicted that those who highly show the trait of neuroticism, agreeableness,

imagination and/or attribute externally will show a higher belief in good luck. It is also

predicted that those who indicate a higher belief in good luck will perform better in the

experimental task when the ball is described as lucky.

Details of method: Materials: To conduct the study an Achievement and Relationships

Attribution Task, Mini International Personality Item Pool, and Belief in Good Luck

questionnaires will be used.

The validity of the BIGL Scale by Peter R. Drake and Jonathan L. Freedman is shown by the

fact that belief in good luck using the scale has been demonstrated to be distinct from possible

related constructs such as self-esteem, optimism and life-satisfaction. The questions have

been shown to be reliable measures of belief in luck for at least two months after first taking

the questionnaire, indicating that belief in good luck is relatively stable over time. To assess

how much participants believe luck played a role during the ball-throwing exercise, a

question to measure this has been added onto the questionnaire as question ‘p’. We also ask

them to write their score from the experimental exercise here.

The ARAT questionnaire essentially measures attribution style and was created by Miriam

Fornells-Ambrojo and Philippa A. Garety of University College London (2009). The


questions asked are of every-day situations which are likely to be encountered by most

people; this asserts the tasks face validity. The tasks have also been shown to complement

existing knowledge of the relationship between depression and attribution of events, as well

as literature on paranoia biases; which demonstrates internal validity. Previous tests to assess

reliability found this to be good to very good, with an average Cohen’s kappa value of .83.

The Mini-IPIP is a 20 item short version of the 50-item, 5 factor measure (IPIP-FFM).

Developed by Donnellan et. al. (2006), the scale has had validity proven against other Big

Five measures and its parent scale. Test-retest studies reveal that the IPIP’s reliability

resembles that of the coefficients of the IPIP-FFM.

The experimental task will require a soft, coloured ball and a receptacle in which to throw the

ball.

Design: The laboratory experiment is a between groups design, consisting of throwing a ball

into a receptacle 10 times. The experimental group is condition 1, and condition 2 is the

control group. Results from this task are analysed with the questionnaires using a multiple

linear regression design. In this design, belief in good luck is the dependent variable, and

agreeableness, imagination, neuroticism and external attribution are the predictor variables.

Procedure: From the random opportunity sample, participants will be given the information

sheet to read, then to sign the consent form if they wish to participate. Once this is done they

will be led to a private room. In condition 1; where the experimenter will tell them that they

are to attempt to throw “this lucky yellow ball, because other participants do well with this

ball” into he jar 10 times and remind them that they are under no time pressure to do so. The

control condition will be exactly the same, only the ball will not be described as lucky,

“please throw this ball”. After the experimental task, the participant will be led back into the

first room to complete the three questionnaires: Mini IPIP, BIGL, and ARAT. Answer sheets

to the questionnaires will be marked with a number starting from 1 for means of organisation,

but kept separately from the consent forms in order to preserve participant’s anonymity.

Determination of experimental condition will be as follows: those participants who are even

numbered will be in condition 1 - lucky, and those who are odd numbered will be in condition

2 - the control.

The standard demographic of gender will be asked so as to compare data to other research

and establish any trends. Participants have the right to withdraw up until their data is handed

in as the anonymity of it prevents participants from being identified.

Information sheet* and informed consent form for participants *to include appropriate safeguards for confidentiality and anonymity

Details of how information will be held and disposed of: Held for five years in the

supervisors sealed filing cabinet, to be shredded after these five years.

Details of if/how results will be fed back to participants: The information sheet holds an

email address that participants can request an abstract from if they wish.

Letters requesting, or granting, consent from any collaborating institutions NA

Letters requesting, or granting, consent from head teacher or parents or equivalent, if

participants are under the age of 16

NA

Is ethical approval required from any external body? NO

If yes, which committee?


REGRESSION

/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N

/MISSING LISTWISE

/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN TOL

/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)

/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT GoodLuckBelief

/METHOD=ENTER InternalAttribution OtherPersonAttribution ExternalAttribution Extroversion Agreeableness

Conscientiousness Neuroticism Imagination Gender Condition.

Regression

[DataSet1] C:\Users\Sophie\Documents\SPSSInc\GoodLuckResults1.sav

Descriptive Statistics

Mean Std. Deviation N

GoodLuckBelief 48.5243 11.05587 103

InternalAttribution 5.6117 2.09216 103

OtherPersonAttribution 3.4757 1.65591 103

ExternalAttribution 2.8932 1.52696 103

Extroversion 13.1068 3.47516 103

Agreeableness 17.0000 2.24918 103

Conscientiousness 13.9223 3.51102 103

Neuroticism 12.1942 3.26916 103

Imagination 14.9029 2.85092 103

Gender 1.1650 .37304 103

Condition 1.5049 .50242 103


Correlations

GoodLuck

Belief

InternalAttri

bution

OtherPerso

nAttribution

ExternalAtt

ribution

Extrovers

ion

Agreeabl

eness

Conscien

tiousnes

s

Neurotici

sm

Imaginati

on Gender

Conditio

n

Pearson

Correlati

on

GoodLuckBelief 1.000 .020 -.035 .005 .079 .000 .006 -.063 -.238 .010 .019

InternalAttribution .020 1.000 -.690 -.621 .011 -.058 .027 -.028 -.038 -.005 .114

OtherPersonAttribution -.035 -.690 1.000 -.135 -.046 .039 -.009 .124 .010 .094 -.103

ExternalAttribution .005 -.621 -.135 1.000 .039 .046 -.022 -.098 .061 -.089 -.031

Extroversion .079 .011 -.046 .039 1.000 -.019 .037 -.254 .045 .017 -.121

Agreeableness .000 -.058 .039 .046 -.019 1.000 .016 .049 .139 -.023 -.069

Conscientiousness .006 .027 -.009 -.022 .037 .016 1.000 -.109 -.001 -.267 .134

Neuroticism -.063 -.028 .124 -.098 -.254 .049 -.109 1.000 -.166 -.139 .023

Imagination -.238 -.038 .010 .061 .045 .139 -.001 -.166 1.000 -.049 -.157

Gender .010 -.005 .094 -.089 .017 -.023 -.267 -.139 -.049 1.000 .179

Condition .019 .114 -.103 -.031 -.121 -.069 .134 .023 -.157 .179 1.000

Sig. (1-

tailed)

GoodLuckBelief . .421 .364 .482 .213 .498 .476 .263 .008 .461 .425

InternalAttribution .421 . .000 .000 .455 .279 .395 .391 .353 .480 .126

OtherPersonAttribution .364 .000 . .087 .321 .346 .465 .106 .461 .173 .150

ExternalAttribution .482 .000 .087 . .347 .323 .414 .163 .271 .185 .377

Extroversion .213 .455 .321 .347 . .425 .356 .005 .327 .434 .112

Agreeableness .498 .279 .346 .323 .425 . .436 .310 .081 .407 .243

Conscientiousness .476 .395 .465 .414 .356 .436 . .137 .497 .003 .089

Neuroticism .263 .391 .106 .163 .005 .310 .137 . .047 .081 .408


Imagination .008 .353 .461 .271 .327 .081 .497 .047 . .310 .057

Gender .461 .480 .173 .185 .434 .407 .003 .081 .310 . .035

Condition .425 .126 .150 .377 .112 .243 .089 .408 .057 .035 .

N GoodLuckBelief 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103

InternalAttribution 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103

OtherPersonAttribution 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103

ExternalAttribution 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103

Extroversion 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103

Agreeableness 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103

Conscientiousness 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103

Neuroticism 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103

Imagination 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103

Gender 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103

Condition 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103


Variables Entered/Removedb

Model Variables Entered

Variables

Removed Method

1 Condition, Neuroticism,

Agreeableness,

ExternalAttribution,

Conscientiousness,

OtherPersonAttribution,

Imagination,

Extroversion, Gender,

InternalAttribution

. Enter

a. All requested variables entered.

b. Dependent Variable: GoodLuckBelief

Model Summary

Model R R Square

Adjusted R

Square

Std. Error of the

Estimate

1 .273a .075 -.026 11.19913

a. Predictors: (Constant), Condition, Neuroticism, Agreeableness,

ExternalAttribution, Conscientiousness, OtherPersonAttribution,

Imagination, Extroversion, Gender, InternalAttribution

ANOVAb

Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.

1 Regression 929.004 10 92.900 .741 .684a

Residual 11538.685 92 125.420

Total 12467.689 102

a. Predictors: (Constant), Condition, Neuroticism, Agreeableness, ExternalAttribution,

Conscientiousness, OtherPersonAttribution, Imagination, Extroversion, Gender,

InternalAttribution



Coefficientsa

Model

Unstandardized Coefficients

Standardized

Coefficients

t Sig.

Collinearity Statistics

B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF

1 (Constant) 74.095 98.133 .755 .452

InternalAttribution -.976 8.420 -.185 -.116 .908 .004 252.363

OtherPersonAttribution -1.092 8.412 -.163 -.130 .897 .006 157.809

ExternalAttribution -.954 8.422 -.132 -.113 .910 .007 134.498

Extroversion .217 .333 .068 .650 .517 .916 1.092

Agreeableness .215 .502 .044 .429 .669 .964 1.037

Conscientiousness -.032 .341 -.010 -.095 .925 .859 1.164

Neuroticism -.313 .370 -.093 -.844 .401 .838 1.193

Imagination -1.013 .416 -.261 -2.434 .017 .874 1.145

Gender -.457 3.287 -.015 -.139 .890 .818 1.223

Condition -.098 2.396 -.004 -.041 .967 .848 1.179

a. Dependent Variable: GoodLuckBelief


Collinearity Diagnosticsa

M

od

el

Dim

ensi

on

Eigenval

ue

Conditio

n Index

Variance Proportions

(Constan

t)

InternalA

ttribution

OtherPerso

nAttribution

External

Attributio

n

Extrover

sion

Agreeablen

ess

Conscientio

usness

Neuroticis

m

Imaginati

on Gender

Conditio

n

1 1 10.080 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00

2 .294 5.851 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00

3 .230 6.618 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00

4 .107 9.713 .00 .00 .00 .00 .03 .00 .04 .01 .01 .31 .25

5 .096 10.244 .00 .00 .00 .00 .14 .00 .03 .09 .01 .18 .26

6 .077 11.441 .00 .00 .00 .00 .08 .00 .16 .33 .00 .04 .14

7 .049 14.382 .00 .00 .00 .00 .61 .01 .15 .10 .09 .07 .11

8 .037 16.437 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .43 .07 .34 .24 .17

9 .019 23.251 .00 .00 .00 .00 .05 .44 .10 .24 .42 .08 .00

10 .011 30.910 .00 .01 .01 .01 .10 .54 .08 .14 .10 .08 .03

11 8.762E-5 339.185 1.00 .99 .98 .99 .00 .00 .00 .00 .04 .00 .02



REGRESSION

/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N

/MISSING LISTWISE

/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN TOL CHANGE

/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)

/NOORIGIN

/DEPENDENT GoodLuckBelief

/METHOD=BACKWARD InternalAttribution OtherPersonAttribution ExternalAttribution Extroversion Agreeableness

Conscientiousness Neuroticism Imagination Gender Condition.

Regression [DataSet1] C:\Users\Sophie\Documents\SPSSInc\GoodLuckResults1.sav


Mean Std. Deviation N

GoodLuckBelief 48.5243 11.05587 103

InternalAttribution 5.6117 2.09216 103

OtherPersonAttribution 3.4757 1.65591 103

ExternalAttribution 2.8932 1.52696 103

Extroversion 13.1068 3.47516 103

Agreeableness 17.0000 2.24918 103

Conscientiousness 13.9223 3.51102 103

Neuroticism 12.1942 3.26916 103

Imagination 14.9029 2.85092 103

Gender 1.1650 .37304 103

Condition 1.5049 .50242 103


Correlations

GoodLuck

Belief

InternalA

ttribution

OtherPer

sonAttrib

ution

External

Attributio

n

Extrover

sion

Agreeabl

eness

Conscien

tiousnes

s

Neurotici

sm Imagination Gender

Conditio

n

Pearson

Correlati

on

GoodLuckBelief 1.000 .020 -.035 .005 .079 .000 .006 -.063 -.238 .010 .019

InternalAttribution .020 1.000 -.690 -.621 .011 -.058 .027 -.028 -.038 -.005 .114

OtherPersonAttribution -.035 -.690 1.000 -.135 -.046 .039 -.009 .124 .010 .094 -.103

ExternalAttribution .005 -.621 -.135 1.000 .039 .046 -.022 -.098 .061 -.089 -.031

Extroversion .079 .011 -.046 .039 1.000 -.019 .037 -.254 .045 .017 -.121

Agreeableness .000 -.058 .039 .046 -.019 1.000 .016 .049 .139 -.023 -.069

Conscientiousness .006 .027 -.009 -.022 .037 .016 1.000 -.109 -.001 -.267 .134

Neuroticism -.063 -.028 .124 -.098 -.254 .049 -.109 1.000 -.166 -.139 .023

Imagination -.238 -.038 .010 .061 .045 .139 -.001 -.166 1.000 -.049 -.157

Gender .010 -.005 .094 -.089 .017 -.023 -.267 -.139 -.049 1.000 .179

Condition .019 .114 -.103 -.031 -.121 -.069 .134 .023 -.157 .179 1.000

Sig. (1-

tailed)

GoodLuckBelief . .421 .364 .482 .213 .498 .476 .263 .008 .461 .425

InternalAttribution .421 . .000 .000 .455 .279 .395 .391 .353 .480 .126

OtherPersonAttribution .364 .000 . .087 .321 .346 .465 .106 .461 .173 .150

ExternalAttribution .482 .000 .087 . .347 .323 .414 .163 .271 .185 .377

Extroversion .213 .455 .321 .347 . .425 .356 .005 .327 .434 .112

Agreeableness .498 .279 .346 .323 .425 . .436 .310 .081 .407 .243

Conscientiousness .476 .395 .465 .414 .356 .436 . .137 .497 .003 .089

Neuroticism .263 .391 .106 .163 .005 .310 .137 . .047 .081 .408


Imagination .008 .353 .461 .271 .327 .081 .497 .047 . .310 .057

Gender .461 .480 .173 .185 .434 .407 .003 .081 .310 . .035

Condition .425 .126 .150 .377 .112 .243 .089 .408 .057 .035 .

N GoodLuckBelief 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103

InternalAttribution 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103

OtherPersonAttribution 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103

ExternalAttribution 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103

Extroversion 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103

Agreeableness 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103

Conscientiousness 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103

Neuroticism 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103

Imagination 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103

Gender 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103

Condition 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103


Variables Entered/Removedb

Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method

1 Condition, Neuroticism,

Agreeableness,

ExternalAttribution,

Conscientiousness,

OtherPersonAttribution,

Imagination, Extroversion,

Gender, InternalAttribution

. Enter

2 . Condition Backward (criterion: Probability of F-

to-remove >= .100).

3 . Conscientiousness Backward (criterion: Probability of F-

to-remove >= .100).

4 . Gender Backward (criterion: Probability of F-

to-remove >= .100).

5 . ExternalAttribution Backward (criterion: Probability of F-

to-remove >= .100).

6 . InternalAttribution Backward (criterion: Probability of F-

to-remove >= .100).

7 . OtherPersonAttribution Backward (criterion: Probability of F-

to-remove >= .100).

8 . Agreeableness Backward (criterion: Probability of F-

to-remove >= .100).

9 . Extroversion Backward (criterion: Probability of F-

to-remove >= .100).

10 . Neuroticism Backward (criterion: Probability of F-

to-remove >= .100).

a. All requested variables entered.



Model Summary

Model R R

Square

Adjusted R

Square

Std. Error of

the Estimate

Change Statistics

R Square Change

F Change df1 df2

Sig. F Change

1 .273 .075 -.026 11.19913 .075 .741 10 92 .684

2 .273 .074 -.015 11.13886 .000 .002 1 92 .967

3 .273 .074 -.004 11.08011 .000 .011 1 93 .916

4 .272 .074 .006 11.02260 .000 .016 1 94 .899

5 .272 .074 .016 10.96622 .000 .021 1 95 .886

6 .272 .074 .026 10.90974 .000 .003 1 96 .954

7 .271 .074 .036 10.85614 .000 .039 1 97 .843

8 .268 .072 .044 10.81151 -.002 .188 1 98 .666

9 .260 .067 .049 10.78263 -.004 .466 1 99 .496

10 .238 .057 .047 10.79155 -.011 1.167 1 100 .283

a. Predictors: (Constant), Condition, Neuroticism, Agreeableness, ExternalAttribution, Conscientiousness, OtherPersonAttribution, Imagination, Extroversion, Gender,

InternalAttribution

b. Predictors: (Constant), Neuroticism, Agreeableness, ExternalAttribution, Conscientiousness, OtherPersonAttribution, Imagination, Extroversion, Gender, InternalAttribution

c. Predictors: (Constant), Neuroticism, Agreeableness, ExternalAttribution, OtherPersonAttribution, Imagination, Extroversion, Gender, InternalAttribution

d. Predictors: (Constant), Neuroticism, Agreeableness, ExternalAttribution, OtherPersonAttribution, Imagination, Extroversion, InternalAttribution

e. Predictors: (Constant), Neuroticism, Agreeableness, OtherPersonAttribution, Imagination, Extroversion, InternalAttribution

f. Predictors: (Constant), Neuroticism, Agreeableness, OtherPersonAttribution, Imagination, Extroversion

g. Predictors: (Constant), Neuroticism, Agreeableness, Imagination, Extroversion

h. Predictors: (Constant), Neuroticism, Imagination, Extroversion

i. Predictors: (Constant), Neuroticism, Imagination

j. Predictors: (Constant), Imagination


ANOVAk

Model Sum of Squares df

Mean Square F Sig.

1 Regression 929.004 10 92.900 .741 .684

Residual 11538.685 92 125.420

Total 12467.689 102

2 Regression 928.793 9 103.199 .832 .589

Residual 11538.896 93 124.074

Total 12467.689 102

3 Regression 927.410 8 115.926 .944 .484

Residual 11540.279 94 122.769

Total 12467.689 102

4 Regression 925.406 7 132.201 1.088 .377

Residual 11542.283 95 121.498

Total 12467.689 102

5 Regression 922.914 6 153.819 1.279 .274

Residual 11544.775 96 120.258

Total 12467.689 102

6 Regression 922.507 5 184.501 1.550 .182

Residual 11545.182 97 119.022

Total 12467.689 102

7 Regression 917.833 4 229.458 1.947 .109

Residual 11549.856 98 117.856

Total 12467.689 102

8 Regression 895.695 3 298.565 2.554 .060

Residual 11571.994 99 116.889

Total 12467.689 102

9 Regression 841.188 2 420.594 3.618 .030

Residual 11626.501 100 116.265

Total 12467.689 102

10 Regression 705.468 1 705.468 6.058 .016

Residual 11762.221 101 116.458

Total 12467.689 102

a. Predictors: (Constant), Condition, Neuroticism, Agreeableness, ExternalAttribution,

Conscientiousness, OtherPersonAttribution, Imagination, Extroversion, Gender, InternalAttribution

b. Predictors: (Constant), Neuroticism, Agreeableness, ExternalAttribution, Conscientiousness,

OtherPersonAttribution, Imagination, Extroversion, Gender, InternalAttribution

c. Predictors: (Constant), Neuroticism, Agreeableness, ExternalAttribution, OtherPersonAttribution,


d. Predictors: (Constant), Neuroticism, Agreeableness, ExternalAttribution, OtherPersonAttribution,

Imagination, Extroversion, InternalAttribution

e. Predictors: (Constant), Neuroticism, Agreeableness, OtherPersonAttribution, Imagination,

Extroversion, InternalAttribution

f. Predictors: (Constant), Neuroticism, Agreeableness, OtherPersonAttribution, Imagination,

Extroversion


Coefficientsa

Model

Unstandardized

Coefficients

Standardized

Coefficients

t Sig.

Collinearity

Statistics

B

Std.

Error Beta Tolerance VIF

1 (Constant) 74.095 98.133 .755 .452

InternalAttribution -.976 8.420 -.185 -.116 .908 .004 252.363


ExternalAttribution -.954 8.422 -.132 -.113 .910 .007 134.498

Extroversion .217 .333 .068 .650 .517 .916 1.092

Agreeableness .215 .502 .044 .429 .669 .964 1.037


Neuroticism -.313 .370 -.093 -.844 .401 .838 1.193

Imagination -1.013 .416 -.261 -2.434 .017 .874 1.145

Gender -.457 3.287 -.015 -.139 .890 .818 1.223

Condition -.098 2.396 -.004 -.041 .967 .848 1.179

2 (Constant) 74.648 96.680 .772 .442

InternalAttribution -1.036 8.246 -.196 -.126 .900 .004 244.652


ExternalAttribution -1.014 8.249 -.140 -.123 .902 .008 130.435

Extroversion .219 .329 .069 .665 .508 .933 1.072

Agreeableness .216 .498 .044 .434 .665 .968 1.033


Neuroticism -.313 .368 -.093 -.851 .397 .840 1.191

Imagination -1.010 .408 -.260 -2.473 .015 .897 1.114

Gender -.487 3.185 -.016 -.153 .879 .862 1.160

3 (Constant) 74.861 96.150 .779 .438




Extroversion .219 .327 .069 .669 .505 .933 1.072

Agreeableness .215 .496 .044 .435 .665 .968 1.033

Neuroticism -.307 .361 -.091 -.850 .398 .863 1.158

Imagination -1.007 .405 -.260 -2.485 .015 .901 1.110

Gender -.386 3.020 -.013 -.128 .899 .948 1.055

4 (Constant) 75.238 95.606 .787 .433




Extroversion .219 .325 .069 .675 .501 .933 1.071


Agreeableness .216 .493 .044 .438 .662 .968 1.033

Neuroticism -.299 .354 -.088 -.845 .400 .889 1.124

Imagination -1.003 .402 -.259 -2.496 .014 .908 1.101

5 (Constant) 61.685 13.500 4.569 .000

InternalAttribution -.042 .721 -.008 -.058 .954 .518 1.929

OtherPersonAttribution -.167 .916 -.025 -.183 .856 .512 1.953

Extroversion .217 .323 .068 .673 .503 .935 1.069

Agreeableness .211 .490 .043 .432 .667 .973 1.028

Neuroticism -.300 .352 -.089 -.852 .396 .890 1.124

Imagination -1.015 .391 -.262 -2.596 .011 .949 1.053

6 (Constant) 61.309 11.791 5.199 .000

OtherPersonAttribution -.130 .658 -.020 -.198 .843 .983 1.018

Extroversion .217 .321 .068 .677 .500 .935 1.069

Agreeableness .213 .487 .043 .437 .663 .974 1.026

Neuroticism -.302 .349 -.089 -.863 .390 .895 1.118

Imagination -1.014 .389 -.262 -2.609 .011 .950 1.053

7 (Constant) 61.020 11.644 5.241 .000

Extroversion .218 .320 .069 .683 .496 .936 1.069

Agreeableness .210 .484 .043 .433 .666 .975 1.025

Neuroticism -.310 .345 -.092 -.897 .372 .907 1.102

Imagination -1.016 .387 -.262 -2.628 .010 .951 1.052

8 (Constant) 64.097 9.191 6.974 .000

Extroversion .217 .318 .068 .683 .496 .936 1.069

Neuroticism -.299 .343 -.088 -.872 .385 .912 1.097

Imagination -.991 .381 -.256 -2.603 .011 .972 1.028

9 (Constant) 67.652 7.555 8.955 .000

Neuroticism -.358 .331 -.106 -1.080 .283 .972 1.028

Imagination -.991 .380 -.255 -2.609 .010 .972 1.028

10 (Constant) 62.272 5.686 10.952 .000

Imagination -.922 .375 -.238 -2.461 .016 1.000 1.000



Collinearity Diagnosticsa

Model

Dimensio

n

Eigenval

ue

Condition

Index

Variance Proportions

(Constan

t)

InternalAt

tribution

OtherPer

sonAttrib

ution

ExternalAttr

ibution

Extrovers

ion

Agreeable

ness

Conscien

tiousness

Neuroticis

m

Imaginat

ion Gender

Conditio

n

1 1 10.080 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00

2 .294 5.851 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00

3 .230 6.618 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00

4 .107 9.713 .00 .00 .00 .00 .03 .00 .04 .01 .01 .31 .25

5 .096 10.244 .00 .00 .00 .00 .14 .00 .03 .09 .01 .18 .26

6 .077 11.441 .00 .00 .00 .00 .08 .00 .16 .33 .00 .04 .14

7 .049 14.382 .00 .00 .00 .00 .61 .01 .15 .10 .09 .07 .11

8 .037 16.437 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .43 .07 .34 .24 .17

9 .019 23.251 .00 .00 .00 .00 .05 .44 .10 .24 .42 .08 .00

10 .011 30.910 .00 .01 .01 .01 .10 .54 .08 .14 .10 .08 .03

11 8.762E-5 339.185 1.00 .99 .98 .99 .00 .00 .00 .00 .04 .00 .02

2 1 9.173 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00

2 .291 5.616 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00

3 .229 6.323 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00

4 .102 9.503 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .08 .06 .00 .55

5 .081 10.614 .00 .00 .00 .00 .25 .00 .07 .34 .00 .03

6 .053 13.110 .00 .00 .00 .00 .52 .00 .37 .11 .00 .09

7 .041 14.983 .00 .00 .00 .00 .10 .01 .23 .09 .46 .09


8 .019 22.157 .00 .00 .00 .00 .05 .43 .12 .26 .42 .11

9 .011 29.071 .00 .01 .01 .01 .08 .55 .12 .15 .08 .12

10 8.959E-5 319.971 1.00 .99 .98 .99 .00 .00 .00 .00 .03 .00

3 1 8.234 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00

2 .290 5.329 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00

3 .229 5.993 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00

4 .094 9.351 .00 .00 .00 .00 .02 .00 .22 .00 .53

5 .075 10.471 .00 .00 .00 .00 .40 .00 .15 .01 .31

6 .045 13.582 .00 .00 .00 .00 .41 .01 .25 .31 .03

7 .021 19.952 .00 .00 .00 .00 .09 .24 .30 .60 .07

8 .012 26.394 .00 .01 .01 .01 .07 .74 .08 .05 .05

9 8.975E-5 302.893 1.00 .99 .99 .99 .00 .00 .00 .03 .00

4 1 7.322 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00

2 .289 5.036 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00

3 .228 5.668 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00

4 .081 9.496 .00 .00 .00 .00 .33 .00 .38 .01

5 .045 12.694 .00 .00 .00 .00 .50 .01 .27 .25

6 .022 18.234 .00 .00 .00 .00 .11 .16 .29 .68

7 .012 24.377 .00 .01 .01 .01 .06 .83 .05 .02

8 8.994E-5 285.323 1.00 .99 .99 .99 .00 .00 .00 .03

5 1 6.547 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00

2 .259 5.028 .00 .10 .22 .00 .00 .00 .00

3 .084 8.845 .00 .02 .00 .34 .00 .34 .01

4 .046 11.937 .00 .10 .09 .47 .00 .36 .17


5 .040 12.834 .00 .54 .51 .01 .02 .06 .28

6 .019 18.523 .01 .04 .03 .05 .56 .13 .42

7 .005 35.381 .99 .20 .14 .13 .41 .11 .13

6 1 5.689 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00

2 .159 5.976 .00 .93 .03 .00 .00 .01

3 .081 8.367 .00 .05 .27 .00 .43 .00

4 .045 11.264 .00 .00 .46 .02 .20 .33

5 .020 17.002 .02 .00 .07 .47 .20 .52

6 .006 29.940 .98 .01 .16 .51 .16 .14

7 1 4.846 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00

2 .084 7.617 .00 .31 .00 .40 .01

3 .045 10.392 .00 .46 .02 .21 .33

4 .020 15.679 .02 .07 .46 .21 .52

5 .006 27.543 .98 .15 .52 .17 .14

8 1 3.863 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .00

2 .083 6.804 .00 .30 .42 .01

3 .043 9.447 .00 .42 .16 .45

4 .010 19.797 1.00 .28 .42 .54

9 1 2.927 1.000 .00 .01 .00

2 .061 6.943 .01 .64 .21

3 .013 15.170 .99 .35 .79

10 1 1.982 1.000 .01 .01

2 .018 10.600 .99 .99



Excluded Variablesj

Model Beta In t Sig.

Partial

Correlation

Collinearity Statistics

Tolerance VIF

Minimum

Tolerance

2 Condition -.004a -.041 .967 -.004 .848 1.179 .004

3 Condition -.006b -.061 .951 -.006 .882 1.134 .004

Conscientiousness -.011b -.106 .916 -.011 .893 1.120 .004

4 Condition -.009c -.083 .934 -.009 .910 1.099 .004

Conscientiousness -.006c -.063 .950 -.006 .982 1.018 .004

Gender -.013c -.128 .899 -.013 .948 1.055 .004

5 Condition -.011d -.110 .913 -.011 .946 1.057 .511

Conscientiousness -.007d -.071 .943 -.007 .986 1.015 .512

Gender -.014d -.138 .890 -.014 .953 1.049 .501

ExternalAttribution -.160d -.143 .886 -.015 .008 128.857 .004

6 Condition -.011e -.113 .910 -.012 .948 1.054 .894

Conscientiousness -.007e -.074 .941 -.008 .987 1.013 .884

Gender -.014e -.144 .886 -.015 .962 1.040 .871

ExternalAttribution .004e .045 .964 .005 .970 1.031 .890

InternalAttribution -.008e -.058 .954 -.006 .518 1.929 .512

7 Condition -.009f -.092 .927 -.009 .959 1.043 .906

Conscientiousness -.007f -.075 .940 -.008 .987 1.013 .897


Gender -.016f -.167 .868 -.017 .975 1.026 .887

ExternalAttribution .007f .070 .944 .007 .986 1.014 .900

InternalAttribution .009f .095 .925 .010 .995 1.005 .906

OtherPersonAttribution -.020f -.198 .843 -.020 .983 1.018 .895

8 Condition -.011g -.114 .910 -.012 .961 1.040 .911

Conscientiousness -.006g -.064 .949 -.007 .988 1.012 .902

Gender -.017g -.170 .865 -.017 .975 1.026 .891

ExternalAttribution .009g .090 .929 .009 .988 1.012 .905

InternalAttribution .007g .073 .942 .007 .997 1.003 .911

OtherPersonAttribution -.018g -.186 .853 -.019 .983 1.017 .898

Agreeableness .043g .433 .666 .044 .975 1.025 .907

9 Condition -.019h -.195 .846 -.020 .975 1.025 .949

Conscientiousness -.006h -.058 .954 -.006 .988 1.012 .960

Gender -.018h -.184 .855 -.018 .975 1.025 .951

ExternalAttribution .010h .100 .921 .010 .988 1.012 .965

InternalAttribution .007h .076 .939 .008 .997 1.003 .971

OtherPersonAttribution -.019h -.197 .844 -.020 .984 1.017 .957

Agreeableness .042h .430 .668 .043 .975 1.025 .951

Extroversion .068h .683 .496 .068 .936 1.069 .912

10 Condition -.019i -.192 .848 -.019 .975 1.025 .975

Conscientiousness .006i .061 .951 .006 1.000 1.000 1.000

Gender -.002i -.021 .983 -.002 .998 1.002 .998

ExternalAttribution .019i .195 .845 .020 .996 1.004 .996

InternalAttribution .011i .113 .910 .011 .999 1.001 .999


OtherPersonAttribution -.032i -.333 .740 -.033 1.000 1.000 1.000

Agreeableness .034i .348 .728 .035 .981 1.020 .981

Extroversion .090i .932 .354 .093 .998 1.002 .998

Neuroticism -.106i -1.080 .283 -.107 .972 1.028 .972

a. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Neuroticism, Agreeableness, ExternalAttribution, Conscientiousness, OtherPersonAttribution,


b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Neuroticism, Agreeableness, ExternalAttribution, OtherPersonAttribution, Imagination,

Extroversion, Gender, InternalAttribution

c. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Neuroticism, Agreeableness, ExternalAttribution, OtherPersonAttribution, Imagination,

Extroversion, InternalAttribution

d. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Neuroticism, Agreeableness, OtherPersonAttribution, Imagination, Extroversion,

InternalAttribution

e. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Neuroticism, Agreeableness, OtherPersonAttribution, Imagination, Extroversion

f. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Neuroticism, Agreeableness, Imagination, Extroversion

g. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Neuroticism, Imagination, Extroversion

h. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Neuroticism, Imagination

i. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Imagination

j. Dependent Variable: GoodLuckBelief


UNIANOVA BallTaskScore BY Condition Gender WITH GoodLuckBelief

/METHOD=SSTYPE(3)

/INTERCEPT=INCLUDE

/EMMEANS=TABLES(Condition) WITH(GoodLuckBelief=MEAN)

/EMMEANS=TABLES(OVERALL) WITH(GoodLuckBelief=MEAN)

/EMMEANS=TABLES(Gender) WITH(GoodLuckBelief=MEAN)

/EMMEANS=TABLES(Condition*Gender) WITH(GoodLuckBelief=MEAN)

/PRINT=ETASQ HOMOGENEITY

/CRITERIA=ALPHA(.05)

/DESIGN=GoodLuckBelief Condition Gender Condition*Gender.

Univariate Analysis of Variance

[DataSet1] E:\Uni\GoodLuckResults1.sav

Between-Subjects Factors

Value Label N

Condition 1.00 Luck 51

2.00 No Luck 52

Gender 1.00 Female 86

2.00 Male 17

Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa

Dependent Variable:BallTaskScore

F df1 df2 Sig.

1.471 3 99 .227

Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups.

a. Design: Intercept + GoodLuckBelief + Condition + Gender + Condition * Gender



Gender Condition Mean Std. Deviation N

Female Luck 5.9130 1.65766 46

No Luck 5.3750 1.93069 40

Total 5.6628 1.79941 86

Male Luck 4.8000 .83666 5

No Luck 5.8333 1.94625 12

Total 5.5294 1.73629 17

Total Luck 5.8039 1.62505 51

No Luck 5.4808 1.92497 52

Total 5.6408 1.78146 103


Tests of Between-Subjects Effects


Source

Type III Sum of

Squares df Mean Square F Sig. Partial Eta Squared

Corrected Model 10.216a 4 2.554 .798 .529 .032

Intercept 145.182 1 145.182 45.385 .000 .317

GoodLuckBelief .002 1 .002 .000 .982 .000

Condition .745 1 .745 .233 .631 .002

Gender 1.300 1 1.300 .406 .525 .004

Condition * Gender 7.471 1 7.471 2.335 .130 .023

Error 313.492 98 3.199

Total 3601.000 103

Corrected Total 323.709 102

a. R Squared = .032 (Adjusted R Squared = -.008)

*Nonparametric Tests: One Sample.

NPTESTS

/ONESAMPLE TEST (Condition InternalAttribution

OtherPersonAttribution ExternalAttribution Extroversion Agreeableness

Conscientiousness Neuroticism Imagination GoodLuckBelief

BallTaskScore Gender)

/MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE

/CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.

Nonparametric Tests

[DataSet1] E:\Uni\GoodLuckResults1.sav

Robinson Sophie 6PS014 Dissertation(Single)

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