Right-wing Political Violence Or Terrorism? An Exemplary Analysis of the National Socialist...

University of St. Andrews

School of International Relations

Module IR3008 - International Terrorism

Coordinator: Dr. Peter Lehr

RIGHT-WING POLITICAL VIOLENCE OR TERRORISM? AN

EXEMPLARY ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST

UNDERGROUND (NSU) IN GERMANY.

Essay handed in by:

Hanna Spanhel (Erasmus)

[email protected]

Student-Matriculation No: 130022823

Due Date: 11/11/2013

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Table of Contents

1) The National Socialist Underground in Germany: Far-right terrorism? ................................ 2

2) Key concepts and definitions: Far-right political violence and terrorism .............................. 3

Far-right political violence and right-wing extremism .................................................................. 3

Definitions and core characteristics of terrorism .......................................................................... 4

Right-wing terrorism and the German context ............................................................................. 6

Conceptual thresholds, differentiation and frameworks for analysis ........................................ 8

3) Exemplary case analysis: The National Socialist Underground in Germany ...................... 9

Political aims and motives of the actions ...................................................................................... 9

The use or threat of violence .......................................................................................................... 9

Psychological impact of the actions and creation of a climate of fear .................................... 10

Deliberate targeting of civilians and symbolic character of the acts ....................................... 10

Communication of a message to a broader audience - or clandestine acting? .................... 11

Specifics of right-wing terror: Ideological basis and cell structure .......................................... 12

4) Conclusions and Prospects ....................................................................................................... 12

5) References................................................................................................................................... 15

6) Appendix

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1) The National Socialist Underground in Germany: Far-right terrorism?

"It seems as if what we are dealing with here is a new kind of right-wing extremist terrorism."1 (Hans-Peter Friedrich, German Minister of the Interior, CSU)

When in 2011, the right-wing group National Socialist Underground (NSU) and their decade-

long series of murders were undiscovered in Germany, the talk has quickly been of terrorism.

The fact that the acts committed by the group - the murder of eight Turkish men, one Greek

and one policewoman throughout Germany, as well as a bombing with more than 20 mostly

Turkish injured - were not attributed to the hidden group for years, but instead to the Turkish

mafia, had raised criticism on the blindness of German institutions. Headlines on the

seemingly unprecedented phenomena of a new form of far-right terrorism have dominated

newspapers 2 , and in political and media discourse, the phenomena was concordantly

described as terrorism.

However, some authors mainly from a political-scientific background have questioned this

conceptualization of the NSU in public discourses. In a 2013 contribution, Peter Lehr points

out that the criteria of conventional definitions of terrorism might not be not met by the NSU

and their series of violent acts - regardless of their brutality3. Following this line of argument,

Lehr as well as Christoph Busch, Armin Pfahl-Traughber and Alexander Ritzmann all argue

that terrorism can generally be understood as a communication strategy aiming to spread a

political claim to a wider public. However, so the argument, this has not happened in the

case of the NSU, as for years, there were no public confessions of responsibility for the

killings.4 With reference to the broader discourse on terrorism, Lehr highlights that

"in a particular German context, terrorism is when terrorists attack highly symbolic and

instrumental targets in a very public and widely reported manner as the RAF did - unspectacular attacks targeting minorities do not seem to meet this criterion, and seem to remain below the radar screen of public attention."5

With even the families of the victims not knowing who murdered their relatives, it was unlikely

that the acts were able to create a climate of fear to influence a broader audience in a

political sense. Considering these arguments, one can ask whether the actions of the NSU

were firstly purposely committed to communicate a political message, and secondly, aimed

at creating a broader climate of fear beyond the immediate victims of the acts.

However, even though a wide impact of shock or the creation of a broader, diffuse sense of

fear within the population was not reached, it must also be considered that certain

communities or social groups - namely those minority groups targeted by the NSU - might

1 Zeit-Online 2013

2 Baumgärtner et al. 2011

3 Lehr 2013:15

4 Lehr 2013:15; Busch 2012; Pfahl-Traughber 2011; Ritzmann 2011

5 Lehr 2013:15f.

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well have felt terrorized by the acts committed6. Additionally, some have argued that the NSU

communicated their message even without a confession, just by conducting the act as such,

which - as goes the argument - is rather typical for right-wing terrorism in Europe7.

In the end, the question whether NSU-acts can be considered terrorism, or rather just some

form of political violence, is controversial. This paper wants to assess this case with clear-cut

defining criteria at hand. By doing this, it shall be assessed where, in this specific case, far-

right extremist violence ends and terrorism begins, and to thereby add in on the general

question of differentiation between far-right political violence and terrorism. However, this can

not only be considered relevant as conceptualization influences the practical means taken up

when handling violent groups, but might also add in to a broader theoretical debate on the

conceptualization of unprecedented, new or different forms of political violence or terrorism.

Therefore, the concepts of political violence and far-right political violence shall be outlined in

a first step, as well as those definitions of terrorism prevailing in the literature. From these

concepts, analytical criteria for the differentiation of right-wing political violence and terrorism

shall be derived. In a second step, the case of the German NSU will be analyzed

exemplarily, as to see whether a clear-cut differentiation between far-right political violence

and terrorism can be drawn here. Even though the scope of this undertaking remains

exemplary and limited, the paper might be able to point out some conceptual limits, or even

through up questions concerning the so far prevailing definitions and conceptual thresholds

between far-right political violence and terrorism.

2) Key concepts and definitions: Far-right political violence and terrorism

Far-right political violence and right-wing extremism

Political violence, generally speaking, always encompasses deliberate acting for political

motives aimed at political change.8 However, the concept as such is hardly agreed on or

outlines clearly in the literature, but rather seems to broadly encompass many forms of

violence, such as terrorism, political assassination, material destruction or insurgency9.

When looking at the specific field of right-wing activism, one comes over a multiplicity of

different forms of extremism and violence. The right-wing extremist milieu is not an entity,

actors do act in groups or alone, openly or covertly, according to clear ideologies or not:

"As a broad generalization, we might say that extreme right-wing political violence and terrorism constitutes an umbrella term that is applied to cluster together extremist and violent

6 Lehr 2013:16 7 Gensing 2011; Staud/Radke 2013; Busch 2012 8 Enzmann 2013:45; Nieburg 1969:13 9 Schmidt/Jongman 2005:60

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political activity that targets specific communities and actors who are blamed for the failed

aspirations and grievances of belligerents."10

Wilhelm Heitmeyer considers the basic elements of a right-wing extremist orientation an

ideology wherein inequality between people is considered as natural, pre-given principle as

well as the consideration of violence as a legitimate way of acting.11 Explicitly and openly

violent forms of far-right extremism then are "individuals, groups or networks that are (i)

inspired by right-wing extremist ideology and (ii) employ violence and/or terrorism as a tactic

through which they pursue various goals"12, as Matthew Goodwing and Vidhya Ramalingam

propose. Crucial elements of far-right extremism are the rejection or undermining of values,

procedures and institutions of the democratic constitutional state, and the rejection of the

principle of fundamental human rights. In contrast to right-wing political parties, violent

groups not only reject the latter principle (as do parties) but also take 'direct action methods'

targeted against minority groups or those deemed responsible for encouraging

multiculturalism and rising ethnic diversity13.

One conception of political violence that has become more established in the literature on

right-wing political violence is that of hate crime14. The term hate crime is defined by the

OECD as "a crime that is motivated by intolerance towards a certain group within society"15,

a so-called bias motivation against characteristics such as religion or race. Thus, hate crimes

are not necessarily conducted out of a wider ideological worldview, but rather just motivated

by this bias.16 This concept thus does provide some analytical applicability for case analysis,

and might be a good way of conceptualising certain far-right violent acts. However, Tore

Bjørgo criticises that the label of hate crime "tends to isolate the criminal aspect of the

phenomenon from its possible wider political context and non-criminal activities" 17 . In

addition, the concept does not enable a clear-cut differentiation from other forms of political

violence, as far-right terrorist acts would probably also fit in with the criteria of “crime” and

“bias motivation”. Where political violence - for example in the form of hate crimes - ends

might thus only become apparent when it is clear where terrorism begins.

Definitions and core characteristics of terrorism

"Terrorism, simply put, means deliberately and violently targeting civilians for political purpose." 18

10 Taylor/Holbrook 2013: 2 11 Heitmeyer (1992):13-16 12 Goodwing/Ramalingam 2012:43f 13 Goodwing/Ramalingam 2012:44 14 see Bjørgo 1995:2 15 OSCE 2013 16 Goodwing/Ramalingam 2012:44f. 17 Bjørgo 1995:2 18

Richardson 2007:20

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However simple and plausible this definition by Louise Richardson might seem, in academia

there seems to be agreement not to agree on the definition of the term. Yet, even though no

single, clear-cut definition of terrorism has emerged as a generally accepted one, it is

nonetheless necessary to develop a clear-cut (working) concept of terrorism when

undertaking an analysis. In what follows, several concepts of terrorism will be discussed, to

then derive solid criteria to be used for the analytical framework of this work.

Terrorism, as extensively defined by Bruce Hoffman, can be conceptualized as being

"the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. All terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of violence.

Terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack. It is meant to instill fear within, and thereby intimidate, a wider `target audience' that might include a rival ethnic or religious group, an entire country, a national government or political party, or public opinion in general. Terrorism is designed to create power where there is none or to consolidate power where

there is very little. Through the publicity generated by their violence, terrorists seek to obtain the leverage, influence and power they otherwise lack to effect political change on either a local or an international scale."19

Similarly to Hoffman's approach, many scholars have given up the seemingly fruitless

attempt to give one clear-cut definition of what terrorism is, but have rather tried to comprise

the concept by developing definitional criteria they consider as being essential. Likewise

Hoffman, Richard English points to the importance of the psychological dimension of

producing a terror of fear among the directly targeted groups, as well as among a wider

implied audience and hereby highlights that this happens "in the hope of maximizing political

communication and achievement” 20 . Louise Richardson develops seven crucial

characteristics of terrorism that partly overlap with those mentioned above. Richardson

additionally points out that terrorism - most importantly - is the deliberate targeting of

civilians., that terrorist acts and victims tend to have symbolic significance to increase the

shock value, and that terrorism is the act of sub-state groups.21

If one compares the prevailing definitions and defining criteria discussed in the literature, one

can certainly derive overlapping points. Those crucial elements are the shocking nature of

the violent act often conducted against targets with symbolic character, designed to produce

a far-reaching psychological impact, a general climate of extreme fear amongst a wider

target group, as the attack is not only aimed at the immediate victims, but at a wider

audience, to eventually influence the behavior of governments or communities according to

the political aims of the perpetrators22. Problematic hereby is however, that for many of the

criteria given, it remains unclear how they should be interpreted: How far should a far-

19

Hoffman 2006:41 20 English 2009:24 21 Richardson (What Terrorists want): 20ff. 22 Hoffman 2006:40f.; English 2009:24; Wilkinson 2001:13; Richardson 2006:20-3; Heitmeyer 2005: 141.

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reaching psychological impact reach? What is a wider target group? This seems to be open

to the respective context, but also leaves room for a loss of intersubjective comprehensibility.

Wilhelm Heitmeyer, in his work on right-wing terrorism, goes beyond these “classical”

conceptualizations of terrorism. He highlights the "threat potential" of terrorism as a

definitional element. This potential, according to him,

"makes it possible for terrorist groups to exert permanent pressure on certain targeted groups, that is, to 'terrorize' them in an unspectacular way such that members of the particular targeted group must, at any time (and now also in any place) expect to become

victims of power. "23

By taking into account this element, Heitmeyer suggests to extend the common definitional

framework of terrorism focusing mainly on the terrorist act itself to include "the subjective

side of the victim's groups”24. Heitmeyer also suggests that the acts of right-wing groups

should be taken into account when analyzing terrorism, as these groups are well able to turn

certain neighborhoods or areas into what he calls 'zones of fear', so that they fulfill the central

terrorist criterion of placing people in a permanent state of fear.

However, the problems with this extension of the common definitional framework of terrorism

are somehow obvious: If one takes into account not only groups that openly conduct

shocking terrorist attacks to instill fear within a wider group - but rather also unspectacular

acts-, then how are we to differentiate forms of violence? Such a conceptual stretching or the

blurring of lines between several forms of political violence and terrorism does not only make

straight-forward analysis difficult, but does also lead to problems when trying to find practical

approaches against these different forms of violence. It therefore remains necessary to work

with a concept of terrorism seen as extraordinary and that encompasses clear-cut criteria.

Right-wing terrorism and the German context

"[R]ight-wing extremist terrorism [can be] briefly defined as the systematic use (or threat) of

violence to intimidate categories of people for political purposes."25

Right-wing terrorism can be seen as conducted in the name of "ethnical identity, purity and

supremacy" against facilities or humans that do not belong to this certain ethnicity26. What

differentiates right-wing terrorism from right-wing extremist violence is, according to Thomas

Grumke, the fact that violence is used systematically to generate political changes, instead of

occurring spontaneously out of everyday-situations27. However, as with all social phenomena

researched, it is necessary - and especially in the often as un-precedent seen case of the

23 Heitmeyer 2005:144 24 Heitmeyer 2005:144 25 Bjørgo 1995:6 26 Grumke 2013 27 Grumke 2013

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NSU - to put the object of analysis in its context to be then able to derive an appropriate

concept of right-wing terrorism.

Even though minister of the Interior, Hans-Peter Friedrich, called the National Socialist

Underground "a new form of right-wing extremist terrorism"28 very quickly after the acts of the

NSU were uncovered, many German authors and scholars have argued that right-wing

terrorism in Germany is not a new phenomena29. Without going into too much detail at this

point, it can be said that especially in the early 1980s, there have been acts and groups

widely considered as right-wing terrorism. These groups conducted violent attacks with

explosives or weapons on behalf of a national-socialist ideology, such as the so-called

"Deutsche Aktionsgruppen" or the "Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann"30 . Against this historical

background, scholars such as Armin Pfahl-Traughber argue that one can see a specific

concept of right-wing terrorism in the German context:

"This […] includes the willingness of politically motivated use of force in the name of nationalism or racism combined with the integration into a small group of like-minded associates, who regularly conduct attacks as part of a long-term political strategy."31

This concept of right-wing terrorism in Germany has also shown some differences to other

forms of terrorism, such as the left-wing attacks of the Red Army Fraction (RAF)32. Earlier

forms of right-wing terrorist attacks, for example, didn't go along with confessional messages

- neither in Germany, nor with other right-wing terrorist attacks in Europe, such as the 1980

attack of the Bologna-station of Italian neofacists. Toralf Staud and Johannes Radke also

point to the shootings of non-whites and series of bank hold-ups conducted by John

Ausonius in Sweden in the 1990s, who was praised by the international, right-extremist

Blood&Honor Network for his clandestine acting and non-confession. Several authors as well

as the Commission of Enquiry working on the NSU also point to the principle of 'leaderless

resistance' that was prominent in the right-wing scene since the 1970s33. In publications of

the “Blood&Honor”-network, "patriots of today" were called to prepare for the war of the races

and to "create secret structures and be ready to sacrifice one's life"34. However, in their 2013

final report, the Commission of Enquiry stated that the German Federal Office for the

Protection of the Constitution had missed to compare the happenings in Germany with

similar acts in Europe, as the NSU was likely to be influenced by prevailing concepts35.

To sum up, several factors can be seen as important criteria for right-wing terrorism,

specifically in a German context: Right-wing terrorism wants to intimidate certain groups of

28 Zeit-Online 2013 29 see Busch 2012; Grumke 2013; Pfahl-Traughber 2011, 2012; Gensing 2011; Staudt/Radke 2013 30 Busch 2012; Staud/Radke 2013 31 Pfahl-Traughber 2012 (translation HS) 32 Gensing 2011; Busch 2012; Staud/Radke 2013 33

Staud/Radke 2013; Deutscher Bundestag 2013:855; Busch 2012 34

Staud/Radke 2013 35

Deutscher Bundestag 2013:855

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people (not the broader public), is often conducted in a clandestine way and carried out by

small groups as part of a “leaderless resistance”. Thus, when looking at the case of the NSU

and analyzing whether or not it can be seen as terrorist, it is necessary to keep these

specifics in mind and to include them into the analysis.

Conceptual thresholds, differentiation and frameworks for analysis

To be able to distinguish far-right terrorism from political violence, it is necessary to derive

clear analytical guidelines and criteria from the definitional concepts illustrated afore.

However, political violence in particular is a diffuse and ambiguous concept. Therefore,

where the threshold between far-right political violence and terrorism can be drawn when

looking at a specific case depends on two factors: Firstly, on the concept of terrorism used,

which then marks the “end” of other forms of political violence. And secondly, on the specific

context and the characteristics of the case under investigation. Thus, for the study at hand, a

clear-cut working definition of terrorism must rather suffice to show where right-wing terrorism

begins. As the scope of this work is limited, it shall thus only be analyzed whether the actions

of the NSU can be seen as terrorism. If it turns out that the NSU - as some have proposed -

cannot be seen as terrorist, further research of what exact form of political violence it

represents instead must be conducted elsewhere.

However, from the debate on the conventional concepts of terrorism, some characteristics

can be drawn to be applied in a case analysis. In addition, criteria can be added to

incorporate the specific contextual attributes of the case under investigation. These criteria

shall be listed and used as categories for an exemplary, qualitative content analysis,

structured in two layers. Firstly, five “conventional” categories of terrorism shall be used -

namely: Politically aims and motives (political change); violence / threat of violence;

psychological impact/climate of fear beyond immediate victims; deliberate targeting of

civilians, symbolic character (de-individuation) and communication of message to broader

audience. These five criteria can be seen as central and overlapping criteria discussed in the

literature. Secondly, three categories shall be added to the categorical scheme of analysis

taking into account the specifics of (German) right-wing terrorism: Ideological motivation,

small group/cell structure (leaderless resistance) and clandestine acting (no confession).

In what follows, this analytical framework shall be exemplarily applied to text-material on the

NSU following a qualitative content analytical approach. To guarantee an all-embracing

viewpoint and to consider different perspectives, material will be taken from official

investigation documents of the German Federal Government and Federal Parliament, from

the primary material of the NSU in the form of their confessional video, and finally, from an

exemplary choice of online articles from media that can be considered as high-level

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reporting36. These documents will then be analysed following a qualitative content-analytical

approach as suggested by Philipp Mayring. 37 Hereby, categories are deductively build

following the assumptions made in the relevant literature, statements from the material are

assigned to the categories, by what the material is broken down to its essential contents in a

structured and intersubjectively comprehensible. In what fallows, the main findings along

each category will be discussed. However, due to the limited scope of this work, this is only a

part of the evidence found in the material, whereas the rest can be found in the Appendix.

3) Exemplary case analysis: The National Socialist Underground in Germany

Political aims and motives of the actions

„Their criminal acting - constructed on a continuing basis - was expressed by the sentence ‘As long as no basic changes in politics, press and freedom of opinion do take place, the activities will be continued’, following the maxim ‘deeds, not words’.“ 38

This statement by the Commission of Enquiry on NSU of the German Bundestag reflects not

only what the group itself states in the first few seconds of their confessional video, but it

clearly highlights the political dimension and motivation underlying the actions of the NSU.

Even though the NSU have not - during the period of their killings - openly communicated a

political message or demands, this shows that there was, indeed, a political background to

the murders, and that the political status quo, a multicultural society, was not acceptable for

the group39. Hereby, the basic political aim in this context was the “preservation of the

German nation”40 and a fetching-back of ancient times41.

The use or threat of violence

As is apparent when looking at the case of the NSU, violence was used on a high scale.

Between 1998 and 2011, the NSU committed nine murders against migrants or persons with

migrant background, conducted two bomb attacks in Cologne with more than 20 injured

people and killed a policewoman. “The gang, evidently consumed by hatred of foreigners,

shot their victims in the face.”42

36

The selection of the articles did at some point happen arbitrarily insofar as firstly, only certain media were

selected - the Spiegel, Zeit, Süddeutsche, ARD, Deutsche Welle and articles of the Bundeszentrale für Politische

Bildung. Secondly, the articles analysed do only cover some reporting and may thus miss out some viewpoints.

Due to the limited scope of this work, this was inevitable. 37

Mayring 2008 38 Deutscher Bundestag 2013:73 39 Apabiz 2011:29f. 40 Deutscher Bundestag 2013: 73 41 Apabiz 2011:1 42 Crossland 2011

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Psychological impact of the actions and creation of a climate of fear

In their recent reports, the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution has

stated that the actions of the NSU have led to extreme uncertainty amongst migrants, and to

a degree of approval in parts of the right-wing scene, and are thus “as such” qualified for

developing a communicative impact” 43.

An exemplary analysis of some newspaper articles leads to similar observations: Here, the

focus of reporting lays on the subjective feelings and experiences of migrants in Germany -

especially those whose names were on the target-lists of the NSU - and of relatives of the

victims after the NSU-happenings. According to these articles, many people with migrant

background - especially of Turkish origin and owners of small stores - have stated that since

the NSU-killings, they have felt fear of being a potential target of right-wing terrorist attacks

themselves44. Additionally, as Jens Witte reports in a Spiegel-article in early 2012,

“Turkish immigrants in Germany have lost faith in the German state as a result of the murder series allegedly committed by the Zwickau neo-Nazi terror cell, a new study shows. Three-quarters of respondents fear there will be further racially motivated killings.”45

Some of the reporting also focuses on the experiences of the relatives of the immediate

victims and show how the murders had psychologically impacted them and had led to living

in great anxiety, permanent fear and mistrust.46

The exemplary analysis clearly shows how the actions of the NSU have had psychological

impacts beyond the immediate victims, which can be interpreted as the creation of a climate

of fear amongst certain groups, especially those with migrant background even if the society

as a whole might not have been psychologically impacted..

Deliberate targeting of civilians and symbolic character of the acts

As the Commission of Enquiry of the German Bundestag states, the NSU had chosen their

victims deliberately: Initially, persons with southern European - mainly Turkish - origin should

be randomly selected - according to their racial beliefs - and murdered by shootings.47 This is

well-reflected in the confessional video of the NSU, where the actions against migrants are

shown and ridiculed.48 It is important to realize that the victims were “ordinary’ people caught

in every-day-life situations that obviously were non-combatants in any sense - thus fit into the

concept of de-individuation:

43 BfV 2012:64 (own translation) 44

Gezer/Kaiser 2013; Henkel/Schölermann 2012 45

Witte 2012 46

Brandt et al. 2011; Sundermann 2013 47

Deutscher Bundestag 2013:73 48

Apabiz 2011

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“Instead of attacking high-profile targets like politicians, the NSU murdered nine immigrants, mostly shopkeepers, eight of them of Turkish descent and one Greek man, as well as a German policewoman.”49

Furthermore, the NSU had seemingly meticulously explored potential victims on which they

kept detailed lists. In addition, they also had investigated symbolic targets such as Turkish or

Islamic facilities, as well as politicians.50 All of these points suggest that, on the one hand, the

victims of the NSU were deliberately targeted civilians as they were randomly picked -

though well-explored - and killed just because of their ethnic origin. They can be seen as

symbolic in the sense that they were selected as “representatives” of their ethnicity.

Altogether, the killings of the NSU seem to fulfil the criterion of deliberate and de-individuated

targeting civilians used to shock a larger audience.

Communication of a message to a broader audience - or clandestine acting?

As the true identity of the group was supposedly only known by few people and as the

actions were not ascribed to them for more than a decade - thus the political goals were not

communicated - the actions of the group are often considered as not fitting into the “classical

terrorist” pattern, but does rather indicate clandestine acting51.

“As a result, there could be no copycats, no public supporters, as in the case of the RAF, and no way of gauging the public reaction to the attacks. The trio had to be content with the knowledge of what they had done.” 52

Considering this clandestine acting, Armin Pfahl-Traughber argues that it might also be

possible that the group had stayed silent according to the principle common for historical

right-wing terrorism in Europe - that of „deeds, not words“ in the sense of a “propaganda of

the deed”.53 The NSU itself - in its confessional video - points to their basic convention of

“deeds, not words”54, which would then mean that the acts itself can be understood as the

message.55

Additionally, it is argued in the report of the German Bundestag that “[b]y using the same

firearm, the acts were supposed to be consciously perceived as serial executions by the

public”, thus transmitting a certain message. 56 The fact that the NSU had created a

confessional video but hadn’t circulated it until 2011 may - as some authors have suggested

- indicate that the group has had in mind something bigger, or felt strong enough now to take

on all of society.” 57

49

Crossland 2013 50

Leyendecker/Schultz 2012; Crossland 2013 51

Pfahl-Traughber 2011; Menke 2011 52

Baumgärtner et al. 2011 53

Pfahl-Traughber 2011 54

Apabiz 2011:1 55

Gensing 2011 56 Deutscher Bundestag 2013:73 57 Baumgärtner et al. 2011

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Thus, it is, on the one hand, obvious that the NSU had not directly communicated a clear

message to the public, acting clandestine for years. Since the actions were not even

attributed to right-wing extremism, it is questionable whether they were meant to be self-

explanatory58. On the other hand, the argument that the acts can themselves be seen as

some sort of message is supported in several of the analysed texts. In the end, as Patrick

Gensing argues that the act is the message: “In right-wing extremism, elimination is political

programme, not only means to an end, but the end itself.” 59 Thus, it can at least be argued

that the criterion is fulfilled when the actions are put into their historical European context.

Specifics of right-wing terror: Ideological basis and cell structure

The criteria specific for right-wing terrorism in Germany and Europe since the Second World

War can be evaluated very briefly. As the report of the Federal Ministry puts it, the NSU

justifies its actions with the “preservation of the German nation”, based upon an ideology of

inequality and xenophobia60, as reflected in the confessional video of the group, where

migrants are shown as the targets of the violence, and nationalist slogans are put up61.

Furthermore, according to the Federal Ministry, it can be assumed that the NSU was

embossed by widespread far-right concepts such as the one of “leaderless resistance”.62

This fits their structure as a leaderless cell, working from the underground but within a looser

network of indirect supporters.63 Thus, with their ideology, their clandestine acting and their

leaderless acting fit in with common principles of right-wing terrorism in Europe.

4) Conclusions and Prospects

Can the actions of the NSU be considered as terrorism - or are they rather just political

violence, hate crimes for example? What can this tell us about the question of the conceptual

boundaries between far-right political violence and terrorism? To give clear-cut answers to

these questions might, in the end, not be possible - especially not when it comes to

generalizations. However, two important conclusions can be derived from an exemplary

analysis of the case of the National Socialist Underground in Germany.

In many points, the case fits in with the “classical” definitional criteria of terrorism. This is

clear in points such as the use of violence, the deliberate targeting of civilians and the

underlying political motives of the actions. More difficult is the assessment of the other

58 Lehr 2013: 18 59 Gensing 2011 60 BfV 2012:64 61 Apabiz 2011 62 BfV 2012:63f. 63 Gensing 2011

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criteria. Did the actions of the NSU create a broader psychological impact and climate of fear

and shock beyond the immediate victims? They certainly have created fear and institutional

mistrust amongst the wider potential target group of the NSU, thus amongst many people

with migrant background, even if not amongst the society as a whole. According to

Heitmeyer’s extended definition of terrorism and his appeal to include the “subjective side of

the victim’s groups”64, this would definitely fulfill his procedural understanding of terrorism65.

Moreover, as it is not clearly defined in the “classical” understandings of terrorism what is

meant by “wider audience”, it could also be argued that even though only certain groups of

the society are psychologically impacted by the actions, a “climate of fear” is created “beyond

the immediate victims” of the acts - even when not extending the understanding of terrorism

as Heitmeyer does.

A second, debatable point is the criteria of the communication of a broader message. Here,

several competing arguments dominate in the official governmental reports, amongst authors

of online articles as well as within the more academic debate. However, even though a

clearly pronounced message was not communicated by the NSU and their political demands

stayed unknown, there were, firstly, some signs that the group wanted the murders to be

perceived as serial, and that they had prepared for communicating their message to a wider

public. Secondly, if the happenings are put into the context of right-wing terrorism in

Germany and Europe, it can be argued that clandestine acting for the purpose of the end -

the eliminations as such - is common for historical cases. This would then mean, that if in

cases of right-wing political violence specific criteria are added to the conventional concept of

terrorism, the criterion of the communication of a message to a broader audience - namely

the act itself - could be considered fulfilled in the actual case of the NSU.

That the actions of the NSU can or even should be put in a more direct context of right-wing

terrorism in Europe can also be supported by the fact that in addition to the group’s

clandestine acting and propaganda of the deed, other principles of this specific terrorism can

be seen as fulfilled in the case of the NSU - namely the principle of “leaderless resistance”,

which is expressed in the structure of the group, as well as the underlying ideological

motivation of the actions, which is in this case linked to the political motivation.

In conclusion of the exemplary analysis of the case of the NSU, it shall therefore be argued

that the actions of the group can be seen as terrorism - when putting the case in its historical

context and, therefore, expanding the definitional criteria of terrorism. They clearly go beyond

what would be considered as hate crime, as they certainly underlay a wider ideology.

64

Heitmeyer 2005:144 65

Heitmeyer 2005:144

14

This is where more general conclusions can be made in terms of the question where political

violence ends and terrorism begins - namely these, that there are no general assumptions or

criteria. It can be said, however, that when trying to distinguish far-right political violence

such as hate-crimes from terrorism, it is important to view the specific case in its context.

Whilst the conventional terrorist criterion of the psychological impact of an act and creation of

a climate of fear beyond the immediate victims is important in any case when trying to

distinguish terrorism from other forms of political violence, the criterion of spreading a

message to a broader audience might be amended when looking at cases in Europe, as in

this context, the act itself might be the message.

15

5) References

Apabiz (2011): Transkript Bekennervideo NSU. Berlin: Antifaschistisches Pressearchiv und Bildungszentrum Berlin e.V. Online accessible via http://www.apabiz.de/publikation/NSU-Transkript.pdf, retrieved 04/11/2013.

Baumgärtner, Maik/ Dahlkamp, Jürgen/ Kaiser, Simone/ Neumann, Conny/ Röbel, Sven/ Stark, Holger/ Ulrich, Andreas; Winter, Steffen (2011): The Brown Army Faction: A Disturbing New Dimension of Far-Right Terror. In: Spiegel Online, 14/11/2011. Online accessible via http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-brown-army-faction-a-disturbing-new-dimension-of-far-right-terror-a-797569.html, retrieved 02/11/2013.

BfV (2012): Verfassungsschutzbericht 2011. Berlin: Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz. Online accessible via http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/download/vsbericht-2011.pdf, retrieved 04/11/2013.

BfV (2013): Verfassungsschutzbericht 2012. Berlin: Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz. Online accessible via http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/download/vsbericht-2012.pdf, retrieved 04/11/2013.

Bjørgo, Tore (1995) (Ed.): Terror from the Extreme Right. Cass Series on Political Violence, 1. London: Frank Cass.

Busch, Christoph (2012): Der "Nationalsozialistische Untergrund" im Lichte rechtsradikaler Gewalt. Berlin: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung. Online accessible via http://www.bpb.de/geschichte/zeitgeschichte/deutschlandarchiv/135578/der-nsu-im-lichte-rechtsradikaler-gewalt?p=all%20-%20footnode47-47, retrieved 05/11/2013.

Couto, Richard A. (2010): The Politics of Terrorism: Power, Legitimacy, and Violence. In: Integral Review 6/1, 63-81. Online accessible via http://www.integral-review.org/documents/Couto,%20Politics%20of%20Terrorism,%20Vol.%206%20No.%201.pdf, retrieved 05/11/2013.

Crossland, David (2011): 'Shameful' Crime: German Officials Under Fire in Neo-Nazi Terror Case. In: Spiegel Online, 14/11/2013. Online accessible via http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/shameful-crime-german-officials-under-fire-in-neo-nazi-terror-case-a-797572.html, retrieved 08/11/2013.

Deutscher Bundestag (2013): Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des 2. Untersuchungsausschusses nach Artikel 44 des Grundgesetzes. Drucksache 17/14600, 22/08/2013. Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag. Online accessible via http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/146/1714600.pdf, retrieved 04/11/2013.

English, Richard (2009): Terrorism: How to Respond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Enzmann, Birgit (2013): Politische Gewalt: Formen, Hintergründe, Überwindbarkeit. In: Enzmann, Birgit (Ed.): Handbuch Politische Gewalt: Formen - Ursachen - Legitimation - Begrenzung, 44-52. Wiesbaden: Springer.

Gensing, Patrick (2011): Rechtsterrorismus: Die Tat ist die Botschaft. In: Tagesschau.de, 24.11.2011. Online accessible via http://www.tagesschau.de/kommentar/rechtsterrorismus138.html, retrieved 05/11/2013.

Goodwin, Matthew/Ramalingam, Vidhya (2012): The New Radical Right: Violent and Non-Violent Movements in Europe. London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue. Online accessible via http://www.strategicdialogue.org/ISD%20Far%20Right%20Feb2012.pdf, retrieved 02/11/2013.

Grumke, Thomas (2013): Rechtsterrorismus/NSU. Glossareinträge. BIK-Netz. Berlin: Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend. Online accessible via http://www.biknetz.de/glossar/glossary-

16

detail/rechtsterrorismusnsu.html?type=0&cHash=7bbd3f03abc80d465b6e37fddb185cb1, retrieved 05/11/2013.

Heitmeyer, Wilhelm (1992): Rechtsextremistische Orientierungen bei Jugendlichen. Weinheim/München: Juventa-Verlag, 4th edition.

Heitmeyer, Wilhelm (2005): Right-Wing Terrorism. In: Bjorgo, Tore (Ed.): Root Causes of Terrorism. Myths, Reality and Ways Forward. London/ New York: Routledge., 141-153.

Hoffmann, Bruce (2006): Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press, rev. and exp. edition.

Kundnani, Arun (2012): Blind Spot? Security Narratives and Far-Right Violence in Europe. ICCT Research Paper, 06/2012. The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. Online accessible via http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Kundnani-Blind-Spot-June-2012.pdf, retrieved 02/11/2013.

Lehr, Peter (2013): Still Blind in the Right Eye? A Comparison of German Responses to Political Violence from the Extreme Left and the Extreme Right. In: Taylor, Max/ Currie, P.M./ Holbrook, Donald (Eds.): Extreme Right-Wing Political Violence and Terrorism. London: Bloomsbury.

Mayring, Philipp (2008): Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse. Grundlagen und Techniken. Weinheim: Beltz, 10th edition.

Nieburg, Harold L. (1969): Political Violence: The Behavioural Process. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

OSCE (2013): Hate Crime. Vienna: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Online accessible via http://www.osce.org/odihr/66388, retrieved 05/11/2013.

Pfahl-Traughber, Armin (2011): Der Rechtsterrorismus im Verborgenen. Versuch einer Antwort auf zehn Fragen. Berlin: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung. Online accessible via http://www.bpb.de/politik/extremismus/rechtsextremismus/47832/der-rechtsterrorismus-im-verborgenen, retrieved 02/11/2013.

Pfahl-Traughber, Armin (2012): Geschichte des Rechtsterrorismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Eine Analyse zu Entwicklung, Gruppen und Vergleich. In: Einsichten und Perspektiven, 1/2012, 16-31. Online accessible via http://www.blz.bayern.de/blz/eup/01_12/5.asp, retrieved 02/11/2013.

Richardson, Louise (2007): What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat. London: John Murray.

Ritzmann, Alexander (2011): Ist die NSU wirklich eine Terrororganisation? In: Der Tagesspiegel, 22/11/2011. Online accessible via http://www.tagesspiegel.de/meinung/andere-meinung/gastkommentar-ist-die-nsu-wirklich-eine-terrororganisation/5874774.html, retrieved 02/11/2013.

Schmid, Alex P./ Jongman, Albert J. (2005): Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature. Piscataway: Transaction Publishers.

Staud, Toralf/ Radke, Johannes (2013): Ohne Führer und Bekennerschreiben. Berlin: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung. Online accessible via http://www.bpb.de/politik/extremismus/rechtsextremismus/167686/ohne-fuehrer-und-bekennerschreiben, retrieved 02/11/2013.

Taylor, Max/ Holbrook, Donald/ Currie, P.M. (2013): Extreme Right Wing Political Violence and Terrorism. New Directions in Terrorism Studies. Bloomsbury: Bloomsbury Academic.

Waldmann, Peter (2002): Terrorismus als weltweites Phänomen. Eine Einführung. In: Frank, Hans/ Hirschmann, Kai (Eds.): Die weltweite Gefahr: Terrorismus als internationale Herausforderung. Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 11-26.

17

Wilkinson, Paul (2011): Terrorism vs. Deomcracy: The Liberal State Response. Abingdon: Routledge, 3rd edition.

Zeit-Online (2011): Mordserie: Weiterer mutmaßlicher Rechtsterrorist festgenommen. In: Zeit Online, 13/11/2011. Online accessible via http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2011-11/komplize-rechtsextremismus, retrieved 09/11/2013.

Analysed Documents

Baumgärtner, Maik/ Dahlkamp, Jürgen/ Kaiser, Simone/ Neumann, Conny/ Röbel, Sven/ Stark, Holger/ Ulrich, Andreas; Winter, Steffen (2011): The Brown Army Faction: A Disturbing New Dimension of Far-Right Terror. In: Spiegel Online, 14/11/2011. Online accessible via http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-brown-army-faction-a-disturbing-new-dimension-of-far-right-terror-a-797569.html, retrieved 02/11/2013.

Brandt, Andrea/Dahlkamp, Jürgen/Popp, Maximilian/Ucta, Ufuk (2011): Neo-Nazi Terror Cell: Suspicions Destroyed Lives of Victims' Relatives. In: Spiegel Online, 13/12/2011. Online accessible via http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/neo-nazi-terror-cell-suspicions-destroyed-lives-of-victims-relatives-a-803275.html, retrieved 08/11/2013.

Crossland, David (2013): 'You're the Next!': Did Neo-Nazis Target Ex-Chancellor Schröder? In: Spiegel Online, 09/10/2013. Online accessible via http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/neo-nazi-nsu-terrorists-may-have-targeted-chancellor-gerhard-schroeder-a-926953.html, retrieved 08/11/2013.

Crossland, David (2011): Sources of Unanswered Questions: Neo-Nazi Terror Cell Still Shrouded in Mystery. In: Spiegel Online, 15/11/2011. Online accessible via http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/scores-of-unanswered-questions-neo-nazi-terror-cell-still-shrouded-in-mystery-a-797947.html, retrieved 09/11/2013.

Fürstenau, Marcel (2013): NSU-Mordserie erschütterte Deutschland. In: Deutsche Welle Online, 13/04/2013. Online accessible via http://www.dw.de/nsu-mordserie-ersch%C3%BCtterte-deutschland/a-16741219, retrieved 08/11/2013.

Gensing, Patrick (2011): Rechtsterrorismus: Die Tat ist die Botschaft. In: Tagesschau.de, 24/11/2011. Online accessible via http://www.tagesschau.de/kommentar/rechtsterrorismus138.html, retrieved 05/11/2013.

Gensing, Patrick (2012): Anklageschirft gegen den NSU: Dokument des Grauens. In: Tagesschau.de, 15/11/2012. Online accessible via http://www.tagesschau.de/inland/nsuanklage100.html, retrieved 08/11/2013.

Gezer, Özlem/Kaiser, Simone (2013): NSU Hit List: Would-Be Neo-Nazi Victims Live in Fear. In: Spiegel Online, 09/07/2013. Online accessible via http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/would-be-neo-nazi-victim-lives-in-fear-despite-nsu-trial-a-910067.html, retrieved 08/11/2013.

Henkel, Angelika/ Schölermann, Stefan (2012): NSU-Ermittlungen und die Angst der Migranten. In: NDR-Info, 03/11/2012. Online accessible via http://www.ndr.de/regional/dossiers/der_norden_schaut_hin/gegner_und_protest/migranten115_page-2.html, retrieved 08/11/2013.

Leyendecker, Hans/Schultz, Tanjev (2012): Wie akribisch der NSU seine Morde plante. In: Süddeutsche, 16/11/2012. Online accessible via http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/prozess-gegen-nsu-terroristin-zschaepe-wie-akribisch-der-nsu-seine-morde-plante-1.1525830, retrieved 08/11/2013.

18

Leyendecker, Hans (2011): Die rätselhaften Mörder der NSU: Reliquien des Irrsinns. In Süddeutsche, 21/11/2011. Online accessible via http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/die-raetselhaften-moerder-der-nsu-reliquien-des-irrsinns-1.1190196, retrieved 08/11/2013.

Menke, Birgit (2011): Videos der Zwickauer Zelle: Ermittler rekonstruieren Totenkopf-Botschaft. In: Spiegel Online, 14/12/2011. Online accessible via http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/videos-der-zwickauer-zelle-ermittler-rekonstruieren-totenkopf-botschaft-a-803636.html, retrieved 08/11/2013.

Pfahl-Traughber, Armin (2011): Der Rechtsterrorismus im Verborgenen. Versuch einer Antwort auf zehn Fragen. Berlin: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung. Online accessible via http://www.bpb.de/politik/extremismus/rechtsextremismus/47832/der-rechtsterrorismus-im-verborgenen, retrieved 02/11/2013.

Sundermann, Tom (2013): Der Albtraum nach dem Mord. In: Zeit Online, 05/11/2013. Online accessible via http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2013-11/nsu-prozess-kubasik/komplettansicht, retrieved 08/11/2013.

Witte, Jens (2012): Losing Faith in the State: Turks in Germany Fear Racially Motivated Murders. In: Spiegel Online, 13/01/2013. Online accessible via http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/losing-faith-in-the-state-turks-in-germany-fear-racially-motivated-murders-a-808949.html, retrieved 08/11/2013.

APPENDIX

• System of Categories 1: Governmental Reports on the NSU

• System of Categories 2: Confessional video of the NSU (Transcript)

• System of Categories 3: Secondary Sources / Newspaper Articles

System of categories 1: Governmental Reports on the NSU

Sources:

Deutscher Bundestag (2013): Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des 2. Untersuchungsausschusses nach Artikel 44 des Grundgesetzes [Recommendation and Report of the 2nd commission of enquiry by Article 44 of the Basic Constitutional Law]. Drucksache 17/14600, 22.08.2013. Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag. Online accessible via http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/146/1714600.pdf, retrieved 04.11.2013.

BfV (2013): Verfassungsschutzbericht 2012 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2011]. Berlin: Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz. Online accessible via http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/download/vsbericht-2012.pdf, retrieved 04.11.2013.

BfV (2012): Verfassungsschutzbericht 2011 [Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2011]. Berlin: Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz. Online accessible via http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/download/vsbericht-2011.pdf, retrieved 04.11.2013.

Criterion (Category)

Evidence from case study Paraphrase (translation) Occurrence Classical

terrorism

Right-wing

terrorism

Politically aims and motives (political change)

“Ihr auf Dauer angelegtes strafbares Wirken brachten sie mit dem Satz ‚Solange sich keine grundlegenden Änderungen in der Politik, Presse und Meinungsfreiheit vollziehen, werden die Aktivitäten weitergeführt‘ zum Ausdruck und stellten es unter die Maxime ‚Taten statt Worte‘. Spätestens ab dem Jahr 2001 gaben sie sich den Namen ‚Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund (NSU)‘ und traten unter dieser Bezeichnung ab 2002 durch die Versendung eines mit politischen Zielen des ‚NSU‘ gefüllten Propagandabriefes an mindestens zwei rechtsextremistisch geprägte politische Magazine auch nach außen auf."1

The actions - permanent in nature - followed the principle “deeds no words” until changes in politics, press and freedom of opinion would take place. In 2002, with the sending of a propaganda-letter to a minimum of two right-wing extremist magazines filled with political goals, they also appeared under the name of National Socialist Underground outwardly. The basic political aim in this context was the “preservation of the German nation”.

Aim of political change

"Danach sollten zunächst Menschen südeuropäischer, vornehmlich türkischer Herkunft, durch die die Gruppe nach ihren völkisch-rassistischen Vorstellungen den ‚Erhalt der deutschen Nation‘ bedroht sah, willkürlich ausgewählt und durch hinrichtungsgleiche Erschießungen getötet werden." 2

1 Deutscher Bundestag 2013: 73


Violence / threat of violence

Zwischen 1998 und 2011 wurden zehn Morde, zwei Sprengstoffanschläge und 15 Raubüberfälle verübt3

• davon 9 Morde an türkischen bzw. griechischen Staatsangehörigen oder Personen mit Migrationshintergrund

• zwei Sprengstoffanschläge in Köln (iranisches Lebensmittelgeschäft, 1 Verletzte; Friseursalon von türkischem Staatsangehörigen � 22 Verletzte)

• ein Angriff auf zwei Polizeibeamte, 1 Tote

• 15 bewaffnete Raubüberfälle (Supermarkt, Bank Filialen)

Violence was used on a high scale, as between 1998 and 2011, the NSU committed 9 murders against migrants or persons with migrant background (mainly Turkish males), conducted two bomb attacks in Cologne with many injured people, the killing of a policewoman, as well as 15 armed robberies, mainly on banks.

Use of violence

Psych. impact, climate of fear beyond immediate victims

“Dennoch könnte der Umstand, dass der NSU jahrelang Morde bzw. schwerste Anschläge ohne entsprechende Tatbekennungen („Taten statt Worte“) verübte, die bei Migranten eine erhebliche Unsicherheit und in Teilen der rechtsextremistischen Szene eine gewisse Zustimmung – mutmaßlich auch ohne Kenntnis des rechtsterroristischen Hintergrunds der Taten – erzeugt haben, potenzielle Nachahmer zu entsprechendem Handeln motivieren.“4

The heavy murders and attacks committed by the NSU without confession has led to extreme uncertainty amongst migrants, and to some degree of approval in parts of the right-wing scene, may inspire or motivate potential imitators to act in a similar way. “The actions of the NSU are as such qualified for developing this twofold communicative impact. They generate uncertainty and fear among migrants

Existence of fear amongst migrants

“ Die Taten des NSU sind als solche geeignet, diese doppelte Kommunikationswirkung zu

3 see Deutscher Bundestag 2013: 71f.

4 BfV 2013: 64

entfalten. Sie erzeugen Unsicherheit und Angst bei Migranten und können in der rechtsextremistischen Szene mit – teilweise allerdings unausgesprochener – Sympathie rechnen.“6

and can count on sympathy - though partially unexpressed - within the right-wing extremist scene.”5

Deliberate targeting of civilians, symbolic character

"Danach sollten zunächst Menschen südeuropäischer, vornehmlich türkischer Herkunft, durch die die Gruppe nach ihren völkisch-rassistischen Vorstellungen den ‚Erhalt der deutschen Nation‘ bedroht sah, willkürlich ausgewählt und durch hinrichtungsgleiche Erschießungen getötet werden." 7

Initially, persons with southern European - mainly Turkish - origin should be randomly selected and murdered by shootings, as the group saw - according to their racial and racist beliefs - the ‘preservation of the German nation’ threatened by these persons.

Deliberate targeting of civilians

Communication of message to broader audience

Clandestine acting (no confession)

"Ab 2001 erstellte die Vereinigung allerdings aus am Tatort selbst gefertigten Lichtbildern sowie einschlägigen Ausschnitten aus Zeitungen und Fernsehsendungen Videoaufzeichnungen, in denen sie sich in zynischer, ihre Opfer verhöhnender und verunglimpfender Art und Weise zu diesen zwölf Taten bekannten. Aus diesen elektronischen Aufzeichnungen erstellten sie spätestens ab Mai 2006 eine DVD, auf der die Anschläge in Zeichentrickfilme der Comic-Serie ‚Paulchen Panther‘ eingearbeitet und dargestellt sind und hielten sie in adressierten

From 2001 on, the members of the NSU created videos with images of the victims and press and TV reports of the killings they had conducted, thus confessing these actions. Their DVD picturing the cartoon figure ‘Paulchen Panther’ with the images of their acts was kept within ready-addressed envelopes to be send to several public recipients, but was just mailed after the death of two of the NSU members, Mundlos and Bönhardt.

Clandestine acting Plan to communicate message Action is message Actions qualified for

6 BfV 2012: 64 5 BfV 2012: 64 (own translation) 7 Deutscher Bundestag 2013: 73

Briefumschlägen bereit, um sie zu einem ihnen als geeignet erscheinenden Zeitpunkt propagandistisch geeigneten Empfängern zukommen zu lassen." 8

“The actions of the NSU are as such qualified for developing this twofold communicative impact. They generate uncertainty and fear among migrants and can count on sympathy - though partially unexpressed - within the right-wing extremist scene.”9 “By using the same firearm, the acts were supposed to be consciously perceived as serial executions by the public.” 10 The real identity of the members of the NSU and their terrorist goals was only known by a very limited group of supporters who helped them to act from the underground and to disguise their identities.

communicative impact

„Terrorismus – der mittels schwerer Straftaten an Leib, Leben und Eigentum anderer Menschen geführte ‚bewaffnete Kampf‘ für politische Ziele – kann auch als Kommunikationsstrategie verstanden werden. Er zielt einerseits darauf, Unsicherheit, Angst und Schrecken zu verbreiten. Andererseits sollen Sympathie und Unterstützung im eigenen Lager erzeugt werden. Hierzu verfassten die Mitglieder des NSU entsprechende Tatbekennungen, die aber aus bislang unbekannten Gründen erst Ende 2011 öffentlich verbreitet wurden. Die Taten des NSU sind als solche geeignet, diese doppelte Kommunikationswirkung zu entfalten. Sie erzeugen Unsicherheit und Angst bei Migranten und können in der rechtsextremistischen Szene mit – teilweise allerdings unausgesprochener – Sympathie rechnen.“11 “Durch die Verwendung ein und derselben Schusswaffe sollten diese Taten in der


9 BfV 2012: 64 (own translation) 10 Deutscher Bundestag 2013: 73 11 BfV 2012: 64

Öffentlichkeit bewusst als serienmäßige Hinrichtungen wahrgenommen werden."12 „Die wahre Identität und terroristische Zielsetzung des Trios war – nach dem Ergebnis der bisherigen Ermittlungen – nur einem begrenzten Kreis von Unterstützern und Gehilfen bekannt. So wird den vier mutmaßlichen und ebenfalls angeklagten Unterstützern des NSU Beihilfe zur Verschleierung der wahren Identität der NSU-Mitglieder vorgeworfen […].“13

Ideological

basis

„So rechtfertigte auch der NSU seine Morde mit dem ‚Erhalt der deutschen Nation‘. Ausgehend von einer Ideologie der Ungleichheit und einer Überbewertung ethnischer Zugehörigkeit erfahren Personen „undeutscher Herkunft“ eine Abwertung und Entmenschlichung. Dies ist der Nährboden für fremdenfeindliche Gewalt.“14

The NSU justifies ist actions with the ‚preservation of the german nation’. This is based upon an ideology of inequality and of overestimation of ethnical belonging, so that persons with ‘non-german’ origin experience degradation and dehuminization - breeding grounds for xenophobic violence.

Nationalist ideology Racist ideology /xenophobia

„In jedem Fall ist die radikale Fremdenfeindlichkeit der Szene als ideologische Basis der Terrorzelle anzusehen.“15

Small

group/Cell

structure

(leaderless

„Entstehung und Existenz des NSU sind – aus heutiger Sicht und unter Berücksichtigung des derzeitigen Erkenntnisstandes – im Kontext der Entwicklung des Rechtsextremismus

One has to look at the case of the NSU in the context of the development of right-wing extremism in Germany in the last decades. In this scene, texts were

Network structure Concept of

12 Deutscher Bundestag 2013: 73 13 BfV 2013: 61 14

BfV 2012: 64 15

BfV 2012: 63f.

resistance) in den 1990er Jahren zu werten. […] Zugleich kursierten im rechtsextremistischen Spektrum Texte, die zum bewaffneten Kampf aufrufen. Verbreitet und diskutiert wurden beispielsweise der von William Pierce (unter Pseudonym) in den ‚Turner Diaries‘ propagierte Rassenkrieg und das von Louis Beam entworfene Konzept des ‚leaderless resistance‘, welches autonome terroristische Aktionen voneinander unabhängiger Zellen vorsieht. In Schriften des neonazistischen Netzwerks ‚Blood & Honour‘ (in Deutschland im Jahr 2000 durch den Bundesminister des Innern verboten) wurden diese Ideen aufgenommen bzw. ähnliche Überlegungen angestellt und weiterverbreitet. Unabhängig davon, ob die Mitglieder des NSU derartige Strategiepapiere bei ihren Taten als konkrete Handlungsleitlinien verwendeten, erscheint ihre Prägung durch derartige Schriften und das oben beschriebene Milieu des gewaltbereiten Rechtsextremismus der 1990er Jahre aufgrund ihres Vorlaufs naheliegend.“16

being spread appealing for armed fight, the propagated ‘war of the races’ (Turner Diaries) and the concept of ‘leaderless resistance’, that envisages terrorist acts of independently acting cells. These ideas were absorbed and widely spread via publications of the neo-nazi network ‘Blood&Honor’ . An embossment of the NSU by these ideas and concepts in this context seems most likely, as the group had had links to neo-nazi networks and groupings.

leaderless resistance Cell structure

16

BfV 2012: 63f.

System of categories 2: Confessional video of the NSU (Transcript)

Source: Apabiz (2011): Transkript Bekennervideo NSU. Berlin: Antifaschistisches Pressearchiv und Bildungszentrum Berlin e.V. Online accessible via http://www.apabiz.de/publikation/NSU-Transkript.pdf, retrieved 04/11/2013.


Evidence from case study Paraphrase (translation) Evaluation Classical

terrorism

Right-wing

terrorism


Inscription: „Solange sich keine grundlegenden Änderungen der Politik, Presse und Meinungsfreiheit vollziehen werden die Aktivitäten weitergeführt.“ (p. 1)

„As long as no changes in politics, press and freedom of opinion will take place, the activities will be carried on.” The status quo or the world today is not acceptable for “Pink Panther”, thus he decides to fetch back the olden days.


Narrator: „Oh nein, was für 'ne schlimme Welt, wo nichts mehr gilt, wenn einer Hilfe bellt. Es denkt der Paul, das war nicht immer so. […] (p.29) Und Paul beschließt in diesem Augenblick, ich hol die gute alte Zeit zurück.“ (p. 30)


Map of Germany with heading: „Deutschlandtour“ and the label of the NSU. In the middle of the map, there’s a newspaper snippet saying „9. Türke erschossen“. (p. 12)

Images of the victims and killings show how the NSU used violence.

Use of violence


Map of Germany with heading: „Deutschlandtour“, the label of the NSU and eight pink stars. In the middle of the map, there’s a newspaper snippet saying „Angst vor dem Serienkiller“. (p. 11)

Video shows a newspaper headline saying „Fear of the serial killer”.

Existence of fear among part of society (target group)

Deliberate targeting of

Images and film clips of the NSU-victims and killings are shown in the video as well as other

Migrants as targets Deliberate targeting of migrants

civilians, symbolic character

migrants or people with migrant background, e.g. in the streets or in front of shops.

Communi-cation of message to broader audience


„Der nationalsozialistische Untergrund ist ein Netzwerk von Kameraden mit dem Grundsatz – Taten statt Worte.“ (p. 1)

“Deeds, not words” is the basic convention of the National Socialist Underground.

Deed as message

Ideological basis

Poster with inscription: „Heute Aktion Dönerspieß“. Beneath it: Picture of a group of Migrant men with nails and blood painted on their heads (p. 27)

Migrants are shown as the targets of the violence. In addition, nationalist slogans are shown.

Racist ideology Nationalist ideoloy

Poster with inscription: „Steh zu deinem Volk, Steh zu deinem Land, unterstütze den NSU“ (p. 2)

Small group/ Cell structure (leaderless resistance)

„Der nationalsozialistische Untergrund ist ein Netzwerk von Kameraden mit dem Grundsatz – Taten statt Worte“

The NSU is a network of comrads.

Network structure

System of categories 3: Newspaper Articles/Secondary Sources

Sources17:

Baumgärtner, Maik/ Dahlkamp, Jürgen/ Kaiser, Simone/ Neumann, Conny/ Röbel, Sven/ Stark, Holger/ Ulrich, Andreas; Winter, Steffen (2011):

The Brown Army Faction: A Disturbing New Dimension of Far-Right Terror. In: Spiegel Online, 14/11/2011. Online accessible via

http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-brown-army-faction-a-disturbing-new-dimension-of-far-right-terror-a-797569.html, retrieved

02/11/2013.

Brandt, Andrea/Dahlkamp, Jürgen/Popp, Maximilian/Ucta, Ufuk (2011): Neo-Nazi Terror Cell: Suspicions Destroyed Lives of Victims' Relatives. In:

Spiegel Online, 13/12/2011. Online accessible via http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/neo-nazi-terror-cell-suspicions-destroyed-lives-

of-victims-relatives-a-803275.html, retrieved 08/11/2013.

Crossland, David (2013): 'You're the Next!': Did Neo-Nazis Target Ex-Chancellor Schröder? In: Spiegel Online, 09/10/2013. Online accessible via

http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/neo-nazi-nsu-terrorists-may-have-targeted-chancellor-gerhard-schroeder-a-926953.html,

retrieved 08/11/2013.

Crossland, David (2011): Sources of Unanswered Questions: Neo-Nazi Terror Cell Still Shrouded in Mystery. In: Spiegel Online, 15/11/2011.

Online accessible via http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/scores-of-unanswered-questions-neo-nazi-terror-cell-still-shrouded-in-

mystery-a-797947.html, retrieved 09/11/2013.

Fürstenau, Marcel (2013): NSU-Mordserie erschütterte Deutschland. In: Deutsche Welle Online, 13/04/2013. Online accessible via

http://www.dw.de/nsu-mordserie-ersch%C3%BCtterte-deutschland/a-16741219, retrieved 08/11/2013.

Gensing, Patrick (2011): Rechtsterrorismus: Die Tat ist die Botschaft. In: Tagesschau.de, 24/11/2011. Online accessible via

http://www.tagesschau.de/kommentar/rechtsterrorismus138.html, retrieved 05/11/2013.

Gensing, Patrick (2012): Anklageschirft gegen den NSU: Dokument des Grauens. In: Tagesschau.de, 15/11/2012. Online accessible via

http://www.tagesschau.de/inland/nsuanklage100.html, retrieved 08/11/2013.

17

The selection of sources revised was based on the catalogue of analytical criteria applied: Archives of main German newspapers and online

media pages were searched alongside different categories used as keywords in the search engines of these archives.

Gezer, Özlem/Kaiser, Simone (2013): NSU Hit List: Would-Be Neo-Nazi Victims Live in Fear. In: Spiegel Online, 09/07/2013. Online accessible via

http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/would-be-neo-nazi-victim-lives-in-fear-despite-nsu-trial-a-910067.html, retrieved 08/11/2013.

Henkel, Angelika/ Schölermann, Stefan (2012): NSU-Ermittlungen und die Angst der Migranten. In: NDR-Info, 03/11/2012. Online accessible via

http://www.ndr.de/regional/dossiers/der_norden_schaut_hin/gegner_und_protest/migranten115_page-2.html, retrieved 08/11/2013.

Leyendecker, Hans/Schultz, Tanjev (2012): Wie akribisch der NSU seine Morde plante. In: Süddeutsche, 16/11/2012. Online accessible via

http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/prozess-gegen-nsu-terroristin-zschaepe-wie-akribisch-der-nsu-seine-morde-plante-1.1525830, retrieved

08/11/2013.

Leyendecker, Hans (2011): Die rätselhaften Mörder der NSU: Reliquien des Irrsinns. In Süddeutsche, 21/11/2011. Online accessible via

http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/die-raetselhaften-moerder-der-nsu-reliquien-des-irrsinns-1.1190196, retrieved 08/11/2013.

Menke, Birgit (2011): Videos der Zwickauer Zelle: Ermittler rekonstruieren Totenkopf-Botschaft. In: Spiegel Online, 14/12/2011. Online accessible

via http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/videos-der-zwickauer-zelle-ermittler-rekonstruieren-totenkopf-botschaft-a-803636.html, retrieved

08/11/2013.

Pfahl-Traughber, Armin (2011): Der Rechtsterrorismus im Verborgenen. Versuch einer Antwort auf zehn Fragen. Berlin: Bundeszentrale für

Politische Bildung. Online accessible via http://www.bpb.de/politik/extremismus/rechtsextremismus/47832/der-rechtsterrorismus-im-

verborgenen, retrieved 02/11/2013.

Sundermann, Tom (2013): Der Albtraum nach dem Mord. In: Zeit Online, 05/11/2013. Online accessible via

http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2013-11/nsu-prozess-kubasik/komplettansicht, retrieved 08/11/2013.

Witte, Jens (2012): Losing Faith in the State: Turks in Germany Fear Racially Motivated Murders. In: Spiegel Online, 13/01/2013. Online

accessible via http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/losing-faith-in-the-state-turks-in-germany-fear-racially-motivated-murders-a-

808949.html, retrieved 08/11/2013.


Evidence from case study Paraphrase (translation) Occurrence Classical

terrorism

Right-wing

terrorism


“In the film, which SPIEGEL has viewed, the authors call themselves a ‘national network of comrades whose principle is to value action above words. As long as fundamental changes do not occur in politics, press and in freedom of opinion, the activities will continue.’”18

As long as there are no fundamental political changes, the NSU will continue their activities. The bill of indictment highlights the political dimension of the murders. By using the same Ceska for their killings, the NSU wanted them to be perceived as serial executions. The shock of the acts was to be increased by surprising and shooting the victims in every-day situations.


„Die Anklageschrift betont die politische Dimension der Morde. Der NSU wollte demnach, dass seine Morde als serienmäßige Hinrichtungen wahrgenommen würden, daher sei bei neun Anschlägen die Ceska 83 mit Schalldämpfer benutzt worden. Der Schrecken der Morde sollte noch dadurch erhöht werden, dass die Opfer in Alltagssituationen überrascht und erschossen wurden. Bei allen Morden traten Böhnhardt und Mundlos unmaskiert auf. Nach mehreren Taten fotografierten sie ihre Opfer.“19

18

http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-brown-army-faction-a-disturbing-new-dimension-of-far-right-terror-a-797569.html 19

http://www.tagesschau.de/inland/nsuanklage100.html


“The ‘National Socialist Underground’, consisting of at least three members, two men and a woman, has claimed responsibility for the killing of eight Turks and one Greek man between 2000 and 2006, as well as the murder of a German policewoman in 2007, and two bombings in which more than 20 people, primarily with immigration backgrounds, were injured.”20

The NSU is responsible for the killings of eight Turkish men, one Greek man, one German policewoman as well as two bombings with more than 20 injured between 2000 and 2007. The gang shoot their victims in the face - evidently consumed by hatred of foreigners.

Use of violence

“The trio of right-wing extremists, two men and a woman, are accused of committing a spate of murders that has baffled police for over a decade: the shooting of eight Turkish men and one Greek man, who had all run small businesses or fast-food stands, between 2000 and 2006. It became known as the "Doner Killings," a reference to the popular Turkish fastfood sandwiches known as Döner Kebabs. The gang, evidently consumed by hatred of foreigners, shot their victims in the face.”21


"These days, fear has a permanent spot at the Ceylans' kitchen table and a role in their daily life. Last year, for example, their landlady, who knows nothing about the NSU's earlier surveillance of the Ceylans' shop, installed smoke detectors in the bakery simply on the grounds that she considered any business run by Turks to be a potential target for attack."22

Many people with migrant background - especially Turks and owners of small stores - have stated that since the killings by the NSU, they have fear of being a potential target themselves. According to a recent study, three-quarters of Turkish

Existence of fear amongst migrants

20

http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/scores-of-unanswered-questions-neo-nazi-terror-cell-still-shrouded-in-mystery-a-797947.html 21

http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/shameful-crime-german-officials-under-fire-in-neo-nazi-terror-case-a-797572.html 22

http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/would-be-neo-nazi-victim-lives-in-fear-despite-nsu-trial-a-910067.html

„Nicht nur Spitzenfunktionäre der türkischen Vereinigungen beklagen immer wieder mangelnde Empathie der deutschen Mehrheitsgesellschaft mit den Sorgen von Migranten nach dem Auffliegen der Zwickauer Terrorzelle. Auch vor Ort in den Gemeinden ist dieser Vorhalt zu hören. Fatih Köse ist da nur ein Beispiel. Die Folge für ihn: ‚Ich habe das Vertrauen in die staatlichen Organisationen verloren, ich fühle mich von ihnen nicht beschützt.‘“23

immigrants in Germany fear that there will be further racially motivated killings - and they have lost faith in the German state. Especially for the relatives of the victims, the murders had meant great anxiety, permanent fear and mistrust.

“Turkish immigrants in Germany have lost faith in the German state as a result of the murder series allegedly committed by the Zwickau neo-Nazi terror cell, a new study shows. Three-quarters of respondents fear there will be further racially motivated killings.”24

“But when he heard the news, everything came rushing back: how the family had tried to defend itself against rumors and how it had lived under a dark shadow for so long. Now the shadow was finally lifting. It was the neo-Nazis. When Tasköprü told his mother the news, she smiled -- and died two hours later. The three shots that killed Süleyman destroyed Ali's life, permeating it with mistrust, fear and disappointment.”25

23

http://www.ndr.de/regional/dossiers/der_norden_schaut_hin/gegner_und_protest/migranten115_page-2.html 24

http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/losing-faith-in-the-state-turks-in-germany-fear-racially-motivated-murders-a-808949.html 25

http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/neo-nazi-terror-cell-suspicions-destroyed-lives-of-victims-relatives-a-803275.html

“Falsche Vorwürfe, Gerüchte und Angst, dass wieder etwas passiert: Im NSU-Prozess berichten die Tochter und die Witwe des Opfers Mehmet Kubasik vom Leben nach dem Mord.“26

Deliberate targeting of civilians, symbolic character

„88 Namen finden sich auf einer Liste, die die mutmaßlichen rechtsextremen Mörder aus Zwickau angefertigt haben. Aufgezählt werden Vertreter türkischer und islamischer Organisationen - sowie die Bundestagsabgeordneten Montag von den Grünen und Uhl von der CSU.“27

Whilst until 2011, the NSU had murdered ‘ordinary’ people, mostly immigrants in their shops, they had also explored high numbers of potential targets, amongst them symbolic targets such as Turkish or Islamic facilities, as well as politicians - even ex-chancellor Schroeder appeared within the data acquisition of the NSU. They compiled long lists with potential targets and detailed information on target, surroundings and feasibility. “The NSU has supposedly explored their enemies meticulously for symbolic attacks.” 28

Deliberate targeting of civilians Potential, symbolic targets

Die Ermittler fanden 90.000 Datensätze mit 10.116 Adressen. Der NSU soll seine Feinde akribisch für symbolträchtige Anschläge ausgeforscht haben. Ein Schwerpunkt lag laut Anklage auf türkischen oder islamischen Einrichtungen und auf Asylbewerberheimen. Auch Parteien und Politiker, türkische Unternehmer und jüdische Einrichtungen standen auf den Listen. Die Dateien trugen Namen wie "Asyl1" oder "flüchtling3". Ein Beispiel für die Notizen des NSU: "Asylheim, Tür offen ohne Schloss, Keller zugänglich".29 “Neo-Nazi terrorist group the National Socialist Underground appears to have had former center-left German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in its

26

http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2013-11/nsu-prozess-kubasik/komplettansicht 27

http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/liste-mit-abgeordneten-namen-aufgetaucht-neonazis-sollen-politiker-morde-erwogen-haben-1.1190705 28

http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/prozess-gegen-nsu-terroristin-zschaepe-wie-akribisch-der-nsu-seine-morde-plante-1.1525830 29

http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/prozess-gegen-nsu-terroristin-zschaepe-wie-akribisch-der-nsu-seine-morde-plante-1.1525830

sights at one point, according to court testimony given by a policewoman on Tuesday. Police sifting through computer files found in the NSU's burned-out apartment in the eastern town of Zwickau discovered several photo montages showing Schröder behind bars with a Star of David badge on his chest under the sentence written in English: "You're the next!" Schröder is not Jewish.“ […] Instead of attacking high-profile targets like politicans, the NSU murdered nine immigrants, mostly shopkeepers, eight of them of Turkish descent and one Greek man, as well as a German policewoman in a nationwide killing spree that lasted from 2000 until 2006.”30

Communi-cation of message to broader audience


“Police searching the burnt-out house found four DVDs, packed and ready to be sent to the Left Party, several news organizations and Islamic cultural centers, in which the group bragged about the killings, poked fun at the police, and showed photos of blood-soaked victims, apparently taken by the killers themselves. The murdered men were all shopkeepers with two of them running doner kebab shops. As a result, the murders became known as the Doner Killings.”31

The NSU created DVDs in which the group bragged about the killings, poked fun at the police, and showed photos of blood-soaked victims, apparently taken by the killers themselves. These DVDs were held ready and addressed to be sent to the Left Party, several news organizations and Islamic cultural centres and may have intended to ignite the next stage of their actions after 13

Clandestine acting Principle of “action no words” / action is message Plan to communicate message

30

http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/neo-nazi-nsu-terrorists-may-have-targeted-chancellor-gerhard-schroeder-a-926953.html 31

http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/scores-of-unanswered-questions-neo-nazi-terror-cell-still-shrouded-in-mystery-a-797947.html

Im Fall der rätselhaften Mörder der NSU erhebt sich die Frage, warum sie die Waffe nicht beseitigten. Es gibt bislang nur Spekulationen, aber vieles deutet darauf hin, dass sie ein Signal setzen wollten, etwa: Wir waren wieder da, und ihr blickt immer noch nicht durch. Die erste Generation der Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) hatte auf der Rückseite von Autokennzeichen Fingerabdrücke hinterlassen. Das braune Killerkommando hinterließ die Spur der Česká.36

years of silence. As the members of the NSU always used the same weapon, this might have served as a signal - “we were here again, and you still don’t look through it.” 32 As they also kept objects from their victims, these things might have served as trophies. “It seems as if, in the end, Böhnhardt and Mundlos did want to leave behind a document detailing their exploits.” 33 However, some authors also suggest that the group may have had in mind something bigger, or may just then have felt strong enough for confession. It might also be possible that the group had stayed silent according to a principle. „It seems as if the perpetrators had wanted to justify the latter [clandestine acting] with the statement „actions no words“ on their confessional DVD in the sense of a ‘propaganda of the deed’.”34

The agitprop videos, addressed to several media outlets and Islamic cultural centers, were apparently intended to ignite the next stage, a propaganda campaign, after 13 years of silent terror. The neo-Nazis apparently felt strong enough now to take on all of society. [...] Why, for example, did Mundlos, Böhnhardt and Zschäpe want to keep Kiesewetter's pepper spray, weapon and handcuffs? For neo-Nazis with a 9mm Luger automatic pistol in their closet, four-year-old pepper spray couldn't have been very useful. Mundlos and Böhnhardt could also have put Kiesewetter's weapon in a plastic bag and dropped it into a lake, and no one would have been able to solve the murder. They could have done the same thing with the Ceska that was used for the doner killings. These items only acquire significance as trophies. The DVDs also fit into this pattern. It seems as if, in the end,

36

http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/die-raetselhaften-moerder-der-nsu-reliquien-des-irrsinns-1.1190196 32

http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/die-raetselhaften-moerder-der-nsu-reliquien-des-irrsinns-1.1190196 33


http://www.bpb.de/politik/extremismus/rechtsextremismus/47832/der-rechtsterrorismus-im-verborgenen

Böhnhardt and Mundlos did want to leave behind a document detailing their exploits.” 37

“The act is the message. […] In right-wing extremism, elimination is political programme, not only means to an end, but the end itself.” 35 In the end, however, they acted silently and clandestine for years, and only a small network of people must have known of their hiding and actions. The song "Döner-Killer" which came out in 2010 by a right-wing extremist group might be a hint that some people in the scene knew of the actions.

„Die Besonderheit des NSU als rechtsterroristische Gruppe besteht erstens in der besonders intensiven Gewaltbereitschaft mit allein zehn Morden und zum anderen in ihrem jahrelangen öffentlichen Schweigen über den politischen Hintergrund dieser Taten. Letzteres schienen die Täter selbst mit der Aussage "Taten statt Worte" auf der Bekenner-DVD im Sinne einer "Propaganda der Tat" begründen zu wollen. Das damit angesprochene Selbstverständnis von anarchistischen Terroristen im 19. Jahrhundert ging aber immer davon aus, dass Attentate entsprechend politisch gedeutet würden. Gerade dies war aber bei den Morden des NSU nicht der Fall.“38 „Die Tat ist die Botschaft. […] Im Rechtsextremismus ist die Vernichtung politisches Programm, nicht nur Mittel zum Zweck, sondern der Zweck an sich.“39

37


http://www.tagesschau.de/kommentar/rechtsterrorismus138.html 38

http://www.bpb.de/politik/extremismus/rechtsextremismus/47832/der-rechtsterrorismus-im-verborgenen 39

http://www.tagesschau.de/kommentar/rechtsterrorismus138.html

„But none of them ever left any indication that there could be a political motivation for their crimes, and right-wing extremists were also kept out of the loop. As a result, there could be no copycats, no public supporters, as in the case of the RAF, and no way of gauging the public reaction to the attacks. The trio had to be content with the knowledge of what they had done. From a crime-fighting perspective, it was a recipe that ensured survival for 13 years. Silence was a sort of survival guarantee, even if it came at the cost of no one understanding the racist motivations for their alleged deeds. Only in the last few months did the neo-Nazis apparently feel strong enough to take the next step and reveal the reasons behind their deeds. Perhaps the trio had indeed gathered a group of supporters and was planning to launch a new deadly offensive."40

„Andererseits müssen Zschäpe, Mundlos und Böhnhardt genau darauf geachtet haben, mit wem sie Kontakt hielten, zu groß muss die Gefahr gewesen sein, dass jemand im Rausch etwas ausplaudert. Die Ermittler gehen derzeit der Frage nach, ob das Lied "Döner-Killer" Folge eines derartigen Fehlers war. Die rechtsextreme Band "Gigi & Die braunen Stadtmusikanten" veröffentlichte es 2010, es endete mit dem Vers ‚Denn neun sind nicht genug‘“.41

40

http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-brown-army-faction-a-disturbing-new-dimension-of-far-right-terror-a-797569-4.html 41

http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/videos-der-zwickauer-zelle-ermittler-rekonstruieren-totenkopf-botschaft-a-803636.html

Ideological basis

„Auf schier unerträgliche Weise werden die Opfer verhöhnt. Vier Mal fällt derselbe Satz, der jeweils um den Namen eines Opfers ergänzt wird: "Jetzt weiß ..., wie ernst uns der Erhalt der deutschen Nation ist." Nach Informationen von SPIEGEL ONLINE sind Totenköpfe zu sehen, an denen Schilder mit den Daten der Morde baumeln.“42

In their videos, the group ridicule their victims in a unbearable way and highlight “how serious the preservation of the German nation” is for them. The victims - apart from one German policewoman - are men with migrant background. “The motive for the acts was therefore xenophobia, dehumanizing racism.” 43

Nationalist ideology Racist ideology /xenophobia

Außerdem entdecken die Fahnder in den Trümmern ein makaberes Video, in dem sich die Autoren ihrer seit September 2000 begangenen Morde rühmen. Bei den Opfern handelt es sich neben der Polizistin um neun Männer mit Migrationshintergrund. […] Das Tatmotiv ist also Fremdenhass, menschenverachtender Rassismus.44

Small group/Cell structure (leaderless resistance)

Die Taten seien gemeinsam geplant worden, es gab keine Anführer, sondern den gemeinsamen Willen, aus rassistischen Gründen Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund zu ermorden.45

The killings were committed and planned by the hard core of the NSU - jointly and leaderless -, namely Beate Zschäpe, Uwe Mundlos and Uwe Bönhardt. However, they had four to twelve closer supporters that helped them with their life in the underground, as well as a looser network of mostly indirect supporters of up to 129 people.

Network structure Cell structure Concept of leaderless resistance

There are some indications that the trio from Thuringia was merely the hard core of a terrorist cell of the sort that has until now only been the stuff of audacious conspiracy theories. Were they a miniature underground army, a sort of Brown Army Faction like the far-left Red Army Faction which terrorized Germany in the 1970s, consisting of two men and one woman, equipped with 19

42

http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/videos-der-zwickauer-zelle-ermittler-rekonstruieren-totenkopf-botschaft-a-803636.html 43

http://www.dw.de/nsu-mordserie-ersch%C3%BCtterte-deutschland/a-16741219 44

http://www.dw.de/nsu-mordserie-ersch%C3%BCtterte-deutschland/a-16741219 45

http://www.tagesschau.de/inland/nsuanklage100.html

weapons and the ability that all terrorists share, namely to deactivate their conscience?46

Das Netzwerk der Zwickauer Terrorzelle war größer als bislang bekannt: 129 Personen gehörten einem Medienbericht zufolge zum Umfeld des NSU. […] Als harter Kern der Terrorgruppe gelten die vier Angeklagten, die neben Beate Zschäpe ab Mitte April in München vor Gericht stehen werden, sowie knapp ein Dutzend weiterer Beschuldigter, gegen die noch ermittelt werde. Hinzu kämen zahlreiche Helfer und Helfershelfer, die direkt oder indirekt Kontakt mit den mutmaßlichen Terroristen hatten, denen sie unter anderem Geld, falsche Papiere oder Waffen beschaffen sollten.47

46


http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/zwickauer-terrorzelle-nsu-soll-helfer-gehabt-haben-1.1631955

Right-wing Political Violence Or Terrorism? An Exemplary Analysis of the National Socialist...

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