«y and Aging1995, Vo\. 10. No. 3, 404-415 Copyright 1995 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.

0882-7974/95/S3.00

Representations of Self Across the Life Span

Gisela Labouvie-Vief, Lisa M. Chiodo, Lori A. Goguen,Manfred Diehl, and Luanda Orwoll

Wayne State University

This research extends a cognitive-developmental approach to examining age differences in self-representation from adolescence to mature adulthood and later life. The authors suggest that matureadults move from representations of self that are relatively poorly differentiated from others or socialconventions to ones that involve emphasis on process, context, and individuality. Participants (nmen = 73, n women = 76), ranging in age from 11 to 85 years, provided spontaneous accounts oftheir self-representations and responded to measures assessing cognitive and emotional functioningand broad dimensions of personality. On average, self-representation scores peaked in middle-agedadults and were lowest in the preadolescent and older adult age groups. Level of self-representationwas related to cognitive and personality variables, but there was some evidence that the pattern ofcorrelates shifted from younger (ages 15-45) to older (ages 46-85) age segments.

There has been a rising interest in the last decade in the studyof the self and its development across the life span (Cross &Markus, 1991; Lipka & Brinthaupt, 1992; Noam, Powers, Kil-kenny, & Beedy, 1990). Although researchers in this endeavorhave proposed multiple definitions, theoretical frameworks, andmethods, a common theme appears to tie together these diverseapproaches. Recent interest in the self reflects a move of thefield away from the study of the self as a unitary, conscious-rational, and integrated entity, and toward a view of the self as astructure or set of processes characterized by multiplicity thatis contextually (culturally, historically, and interpersonally) sit-uated, that is the locus of changes and transformation, and thatis the site not only of integrative tendencies but also of tenden-cies toward fragmentation and distortion (e.g., Fischer &Ayoub, 1994; Gergen, 1991; Hermans & Kempen, 1993; Hig-gins, Bond, Klein, & Straumann, 1986; Markus & Wurf, 1987;Noam, 1988).

Recent developments in the study of the self mirror the sug-gestions of earlier theorists. The emerging focus on the self as acomplex, changing, multiplex structure is well mirrored by ma-jor proponents of a life span perspective on the self. Jung(1933), for example, suggested that the primary developmentaltask of adulthood is the individual's confrontation with contra-dictory aspects of the self as well as his or her historical recon-struction of those self-contradictions. In a similar fashion,

Gisela Labouvie-Vief, Lisa M. Chiodo, Lori A. Goguen, ManfredDiehl, and Lucinda Orwoll, Department of Psychology, Wayne StateUniversity.

This research was supported by National Institute on Aging GrantAG09203. We gratefully acknowledge the contributions of NathanCoyle, Kim Hines, Catherine Krueger, David Murphey, and SusanSchreiber and the helpful consultations with Sebastiano Fisicaro andLois Tetrick regarding some data analysis questions.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to GiselaLabouvie-Vief, Department of Psychology, Wayne State University, 71West Warren Avenue, Detroit, Michigan 48202. Electronic mail may besent via Internet to gvief@gopher.science.wayne.edu.

Erikson (1982) suggested that in late life, the individual con-fronts his or her goals and achievements and integrates suc-cesses and failures into a mature self-representation. Othershave echoed these theorists and suggested that in contrast todevelopment in childhood and adolescence, which is character-ized by an outward orientation and the acquisition of culturalnorms and standards, maturation during adulthood may bemore adequately characterized by an inward orientation (e.g.,Gutmann, 1987; Labouvie-Vief, 1994; Neugarten, 1968). Inthat inward turn, the adult may become more self-reflective andmore attuned to historical and emotional processes.

Recent cognitive-developmental researchers in the area ofadulthood and later life also have suggested that adulthoodbrings an enhanced emphasis on contradiction, change, andtransformation (Baltes & Staudinger, 1993; Kramer & Wood-ruff, 1986; Labouvie-Vief, 1994; Riegel, 1973) and that manyof the reorganizations of the self may be a part of such a broadercognitive restructuring in adulthood (Kegan, 1982; Labouvie-Vief, 1994; Noam et al., 1990). Studies examining postformaland dialectical thinking and wisdom-related cognitions havesuggested that the thinking of mature adults evolves in signifi-cant ways beyond that of adolescents and youths: The thinkingof youths remains relatively static and is based on dualistic, ei-ther-or thinking in which reality is predicated into such cate-gories as self versus other, right versus wrong, reason versusemotion, and so forth. In contrast, adults are better able to in-tegrate such oppositions and to think in terms of dynamic con-trasts, contextual differentiation, emotional and contextual em-beddedness, and patterned change rather than static categories(e.g., Baltes & Staudinger, 1993; Commons, Richards, &Armon, 1984; Kitchener & Brenner, 1990; Kitchener & King,1981; Kramer* Woodruff, 1986; Labouvie-Vief, 1992, 1994;Perry, 1968).

This study explored the possible implications of such mecha-nisms of cognitive restructuring for how individuals describeself-processes at different stages of adulthood. In doing so, wewere primarily interested in participants' spontaneous self-representations and how these representations change over the

404

SELF-REPRESENTATIONS 405

course of life. Thus, we were not interested in constraining in-dividuals' responses to any aspect, such as past or future selves(e.g., Markus & Wurf, 1987) or "ideal" and "ought" selves(Higgins, 1987, 1989). Rather, we were interested in how indi-viduals weave together such aspects when instructions are quiteunconstrained.

Thus far, similar attempts to spell out links between cogni-tive-developmental reorganizations and changes in the courseof the understanding of the self and others have focused pri-marily on the childhood years (see, however, Cross & Markus,1991). Following Kohlberg's (1969) lead, Selman (1980), Da-mon and Hart (1982, 1988), and Kegan (1982), for example,described how the basis for understanding the self and the na-ture of interpersonal relations changes radically between earlychildhood and adolescence. In childhood, the self remains em-bedded in concrete dyadic exchanges and is understood interms of concrete characteristics. However, the cognitive-emotional gains of adolescence result in more complex andabstract descriptions of the self and individuals in terms ofsystems, such as groups and institutions, and of more abstractcharacteristics, such as ideals and intentions (see also Kegan,1982; Livesley & Bromley, 1973; Selman, 1980; more recently,Case, 1991; Fischer, Shaver, & Carnochan, 1990). By adoles-cence, most individuals can describe the self and others infairly abstract systems of individuals and traits (see Harter,1983; Kegan, 1982; Kohlberg, 1984; Labouvie-Vief, 1992;Loevinger, 1993). The self and others and their interrelation-ships are framed in relatively organized, codified, and abstractexpectations.

Such a perspective that is focused on abstract systems may,however, at first emerge in a form that is still somewhat rigid.\buth appears to be a period in which perspectives remain rel-atively static: Continuity and sameness are valued, tolerance forambiguity and diversity are low, and adherence to conventionaland institutional norms structures the experience of the self andemotion. However, increased maturity brings greater flexibilityin which the contrast between subjective experience and socialnorm, the self and other, and positive and negative aspects of theself and reality can be acknowledged and tolerated. Emphasison stasis gives way to the evolution of a complex language of theself and emotion in which the self and reality are understoodfrom the perspective of change, transformation, transactionalprocesses, and dynamic tension (Armon, 1984; Helson & Rob-erts, 1994; Kegan, 1982; Labouvie-Vief, 1992; Labouvie-Vief,DeVoe, & Bulka, 1989; Levinson, Darrow, Klein, Levinson, &McKee, 1978; Loevinger, 1979, 1993; Noam, 1988).

Although many of these approaches are framed in terms ofchange processes, they also serve as a theoretical basis for order-ing cross-sectional age variance by levels of developmental com-plexity. In this study, we aimed to describe age-related differ-ences in self-representations from adolescence to late adult-hood. The specific conceptualization of reorganizations in theself adopted here extends earlier work on cognitive-develop-mental differences in individuals' understanding of their emo-tions (Labouvie-Vief, DeVoe, & Bulka, 1989; Labouvie-Vief,Hakim-Larson, DeVoe, & Schoeberlein, 1989). In this re-search, younger individuals described emotions in terms ofouter appearance, conventional standards, relatively static im-pulse monitoring, and an emphasis on control and the ideal. In

contrast, those older or of higher ego level conveyed a more vividsense of differentiation of the self from norms, of an individual-ity that was distinct, historically formed, and subject to changeand transformation, and of complex psychological transactionsboth within the self and between the self and others.

In contrast to this earlier study, in the current study we wereconcerned more specifically with charting similar patterns ofhow individuals of different ages and developmental status de-scribe themselves. As in the earlier research, we assumed thatsuch self-descriptions could be ordered along a cognitive-devel-opmental dimension of complexity, which comprises severalsubdimensions. All of these dimensions are informed by a the-ory of developmental change from adolescence to later life(Kegan, 1982; Labouvie-Vief, 1994; Noam et al., 1990). Asindividuals move out of more abstract institutional frames ofreference to ones that are judged more by unique individuality,a sense of self evolves that is distinct from the affective bondsshared with others and that is characterized by relatively uniquetraits and a complex psychological history. Individuals also arebetter able to integrate complex and multivalenced traits andemotions in the self and other, indicating an awareness of theself and others as truly complex beings and combining, if notreconciling, in themselves many opposing affects in sometimestragic fashion. Further changes occur in the ability to see the selfand other not just as a collection of concrete characteristics oftraits but as a self that is endowed with reflective processes (suchas thinking, wishing, intending, goal setting, etc.), by which oneparticipates in the shaping of his or her biography. Thus, selvesare described as dynamic, historical, and complex individuals,and the reciprocal interactions of historical, psychological, andinterpersonal transformations are richly detailed.

As in the previous research, we suggest that hypothesizedchanges can be translated into a series of levels. Our conceptionof these levels does not necessarily stress a series of age-related,stage-like transitions. Rather, this conception proposes an or-dering scheme that can be linked to mechanisms other than ageor some automatic, normative cognitive progression. To explorewhat variables, other than age and cognitive development, maybe related to levels formed the second objective of this research.Specifically, we expected that the variables that predict whetherindividuals advance in levels would be different at earlier andlater periods of life. Researchers have suggested that early devel-opment is more regulated by normative organismic and cogni-tive-developmental regularities (e.g., Flavell, 1970), whereaslater development may show more variation because of socio-cultural, motivational and affective factors, or both. Early de-velopment also has been associated with the internalization andmastery of a culture's norms and rules, or socialization,whereas later development has been often associated with thecritique and transformation of these norm systems, or individ-uation (e.g., Jung, 1933; Kohlberg, 1984; Labouvie-Vief, 1994;Neumann, 1973). Hence, we expected that whether older adultsreach high levels of self-representation might be related moreto personality and emotional variables than is true for youngerage groups.

MethodParticipants

Participants were part of a larger project focusing on self-develop-ment across the life span. Participants were randomly selected from

406 LABOUVIE-VIEF, CHIODO, GOGUEN, DIEHL, ORWOLL

three suburban communities in a major midwestern metropolitan areaand asked by mail to participate. The three communities were selectedto represent different income levels (low, medium, and high) on thebasis of the median housing value from 1990 census information. Ofthe 30% of individuals who responded to the mailing, an age and gender-stratified sample of 400 individuals was selected to represent seven agegroups (10-14, 15-19, 20-29, 30-45, 46-59, 60-69, and 70+). Fromthis total sample, an age and gender-stratified random subsample of 168participants was selected for more extensive qualitative study. Exclusionof participants with incomplete data on the variables of interest resultedin a final sample of 149 participants (n men = 73, n women = 76)distributed over the seven age groups (preadolescents: M age = 12.8years, range = 11.0-14.9; adolescents: M age = 17.3 years, range =15.1 -19.8; young adults: M age = 25.1 years, range = 20.4-29.9; adults:M age = 38.2 years, range = 30.2-45.7; middle-aged adults: M age =52.6 years, range = 46.6-59.5; older adults: Mage = 65.2 years, range= 62.2-68.8; elderly adults: Mage = 74.7 years, range = 70.9-85.8).

Participants' average annual family income was $55,000, rangingfrom less than $ 10,000 to over $ 150,000 a year. The majority (89%) ofthe participants were White. Compared with 1990 census information,participants in our sample were similar to the parent sample in incomebut tended to be more highly educated. Of those ages 25 and older inour sample, 12% reported graduating from high school, 25% reportedhaving some college education, 35% graduated from a college or univer-sity, and 25% completed a graduate degree. In comparison, from theparent sample, 25% reported graduating from high school, 20% hadsome college education, 31% graduated from a college or university, and8% completed a graduate degree.

Procedure

Participants took part in two 3-hr testing sessions that were sched-uled, on average, 2 weeks apart. They were paid $50 for their participa-tion. Participants were tested in small groups averaging 6 individualsby a specially trained student assistant. Testing sessions were held atlocations in the participants' communities. The test battery consisted ofan extensive personal background questionnaire, marker tests of crys-tallized and fluid intelligence, and a number of multiple choice and nar-rative assessments of attachment, emotions, and coping. For this study,only a subset of measures are described.

Measures

Representations of self. The focal measure of this investigation wasan assessment of self-representations. Each participant was instructedto use approximately 5 min to write a brief paragraph about him- orherself. However, reference to time merely served as a guideline; no timelimits were set, and participants could take the necessary time to com-plete the task, allowing for individual differences such as writing speed.The paragraph included a careful description of self, of likes and dis-likes, and thoughts about the self. Respondents wrote on a page with "I. . ." in the upper left corner.

Responses were transcribed verbatim and blinded for age. The result-ing text was divided into individual units. Each unit represented theexpression of a complete thought, usually indicated grammatically by aperiod. The process of unitization was completed by 2 individuals, with97% agreement. Differences in unitization were resolved throughdiscussion.

After unitization, individual units were rated according to a codingscheme developed in the context of a pilot study (Murphey, Labouvie-Vief, Orwoll, & Chiodo, 1992). Thirty-six participants ranging in agefrom 8 to 72 described the following targets: (a) themselves, (b) theirmother, (c) their father, (d) a man and a woman or a boy and a girl theyliked, (e) a man and a woman or a boy and a girl they disliked, and (f)

a typical man and woman or a typical boy and girl. In contrast to thispilot study, this research focused solely on descriptions of the self.

Participants' responses were categorized into five levels using a pro-cedure detailed below (see Labouvie-Vief et al., 1994). These levels rep-resent successively more complex representations of the self and other.Specifically, the coding scheme listed differences in level across five re-lated themes: roles, traits, interpersonal relationships, activities and in-terests, and physical descriptions. Because participants were free to ad-dress any of these themes, they were not scored separately, but any 1 ofthem could serve to assign responses to one of five levels defined by a setof unifying characteristics (see Table 1).

At Level 0, concrete-presystemic, selves are fused with close referencepersons such as parents; are described in global, concrete language; orboth. Participants' descriptions are focused on simple actions, physicalcharacteristics not integrated with psychological implications, or un-differentiated emotional reactions, with no references made to innerpsychological processes. At Level 1, interpersonal-protosystemic, indi-viduals' psychological and physical characteristics are described morein terms of immediate relationships and social networks. In general,focus is not on distinct individuality but on characteristics and featuresof the self which highlight in-group acceptability. Descriptions are con-ventional and static and reflect the values of the immediate social group.

At Level 2, institutional-intrasystemic, participants' self-representa-tions indicate a clearer sense of the self and other differentiation, result-ing in more distinctive descriptions of individual qualities and traits,and some descriptions of inner psychological motivations and tenden-cies. However, this awareness remains relatively superficial, reflecting afit of the individual with institutions such as work or marriage ratherthan more unique psychological dynamics and mechanisms. Individu-als are seen as having sets of inner reflective processes critical in thesetting and evaluation of goals. However, such goals remain closely tiedto institutional roles.

At Level 3, contextual-intersystemic, participants' self-descriptionsare more reflective of such institutional constraints and begin to ques-tion or contextualize conventional institutional goals and values. Focusis more on how contexts have shaped and transformed individual biog-raphy. Descriptions involve understanding of processes and contrastsover time, and psychological reasoning indicates the emergence ofawareness of interpersonal dynamics and psychological mechanisms.Focus is less on a stable self and more on personal, psychological, andspiritual transformations. The self becomes viewed as a dynamic systemsubject to change and transformation.

At Level 4, dynamic-intersubjective, the individualizing, contextua-lizing, and psychologizing tendency of Level 3 is elaborated more richlywith responses that vividly detail interpersonal dynamics and dynamicpsychological mechanisms in an explicit and highly differentiated form.Awareness of unconscious processes, motivations, and reciprocal in-teraction is demonstrated. Physical attributes are mentioned to eluci-date psychological processes. Responses have a dynamic process-oriented quality. The focus is on becoming and emergence. Conse-quently, identity is viewed as transforming over time as a result of aninner psychological reorganization.

In addition to these 4 levels, an uncodable category was defined. Unitswere considered uncodable if their content failed to provide any descrip-tive information about the target person (e.g., "deceased" or "I have noidea") or if their content commented on the task itself but did not revealanything about the participant or target (e.g.," Yeeesh, that's a toughie,""Enough about me," "I have no idea"). Overall, the number of proto-cols containing one or more uncodable units was very small: Out of 149protocols, only 4 contained uncodable units, totaling seven uncodableunits in all (one unit each for 3 protocols and six units for 1 protocol).

For each protocol, units were assigned level scores by a total of threetrained raters; one was an experienced rater from a previous study(Murphey et al., 1992), and two raters were trained for this project.

SELF-REPRESENTATIONS 407

Table 1Levels of Self-Representation

Level Description Example"

0 (concrete- The language used is simple and concrete. Characteristics andpresystemic) physical traits are seen as global. Events are detailed in

simple seriation. Action-oriented behaviors describeactivities. No references to goals or psychological processesoccur.

1 (interpersonal- Simple evaluations are made that reflect the values of theprotosystemic) immediate social group. Traits described are

nondifferentiated. Individuals are described in terms ofrelationships (simple descriptors) and social networks.Emphasis is on features of the self or others that make foringroup acceptance.

2 (institutional- Interpersonal descriptors indicate a clearer sense of theintrasystemic) individual within the social group. Traits at this level

indicate a more self-directed and goal-directed individualwhose evaluations are guided by achievement-oriented andconventional goals, values, and roles. Achievement of thesegoals and values is a frequent theme.

3 (contextual- Descriptions are critical of convention, involve an awarenessintersystemic) of how traits change, and give a sense of individuals with

their own value system. Institutional goals are reexaminedand put into historical or psychological perspective.Descriptions involve references to processes and contrastsover time.

4 (dynamic- Roles and traits are described at a complex psychologicalintersubjective) level and reflect awareness of underlying, often

unconscious, motivation and reciprocal interaction.Activities and goals are seen as subject to continual revisionas one gains knowledge of oneself and others. Reference isto multiple dimensions of life history and an emphasis onprocess, becoming, and emergence.

an engineerphysically-robust-strong 6 ft 280 Ibs.I am nice.I'm tall.I am pretty.I have two sisters.

I like to fool around and make my friends laugh.I am outgoing and friendly.I love my family.I am fun to be with.I have lots of friends.I am involved in many clubs at school.

I am family-oriented and active in my community.Effective as a mother.I am an empathic and committed friend.I have not been successful in my life.I work hard to support my children and really love them.Have tried with some success, to develop the patience of

my father and devotion of my mother.

I am a singer, an actress, and a writer and want to usethese talents more creatively than I do now.

I get along well with all people, but need to develop moreinsight as to what motivates other people.

Relearning who I am.I am adding new dimensions to my life in as many ways

as possible.

I struggle with the concept of who I am and have beenidentified (all giving mother, self sufficient, religious)and I think, feeling the need to be more individualizedwoman with specific needs and desires.

I work for profit now rather than for satisfaction, partlybecause of my (guilty) need to continue to support myfamily.

At this point in my life and my parents lives, they arebecoming dependant and I find myself reliving theabove tensions of struggling to remain my adult selfbut getting pulled back to my "younger" self as I havespent more time with them.

* Errors in grammar and spelling reflect actual responses.

Each protocol was blinded for age and was randomly assigned to 1 of 14sets for scoring. Each of the sets consisted of 11 to 13 protocols. Aninitial set was coded by all three raters. Each remaining set was codedby two raters. Disagreements about unit scores were resolved throughdiscussion by all of the raters. Interrater reliabilities (Pearson product-moment correlations) of self-representation scores ranged from .81 to.86, with a mean of .83.

To compute overall level scores, both an averaging process similar toLoevinger's (Loevinger & Wessler, 1970) item sum score and an overallrating similar to Loevinger's (Loevinger & Wessler, 1970) total protocolrating were considered. Of the two, the average score provides a morestringent criterion than a total protocol rating, as the proportion ofhighest level units receives less weight. Although such an average scorecannot be as readily interpreted in overall level, we decided to use thatscore for further analyses because it has several advantages. First, thereis no single criterion by which overall scores are assigned, making suchassignment quite intuitive. Second, averaging of scores resulted in amore reliable scoring system than a total protocol rating. Finally, as-signing single scores is more in keeping with traditional interpretations

of stage-level approaches, according to which individuals can be char-acterized by one particular level (see, e.g., Noam, 1988), whereas anaveraging procedure reflects a more contextualistic interpretation inwhich individual variability is an acceptable feature. Therefore, onlythe average self-representation scores were used in the following analy-ses. As a consequence, our results provide a very conservative estimateof overall level but give a more realistic estimate of the actual variationof individual responses.

Ego level. Asa measurement of individuals' developmental level in-dependent of age, ego level was assessed using the Sentence CompletionTest (Loevinger & Wessler, 1970). Participants were asked to completethe short form (Form 81), which consists of 18 sentence sterns (Hy Le,Loevinger, & Associates, 1989). Responses for each stem are classifiedaccording to the nine-level system, which includes six main levels andthree transitional levels: (a) impulsive, (b) self-protective, (c) self-protective/conformist, (d) conformist, (e) conformist-conscientious,(f) conscientious, (g) conscientious-autonomous, (h) autonomous,and (i) integrated.

Protocols were scored by a rater trained in the scoring procedure de-

408 LABOUVIE-VIEF, CHIODO, GOGUEN, DIEHL, ORWOLL

veloped by Loevinger and Wessler (1970). As total ego-level score, anitem sum score was computed using the procedure suggested by Loe-vinger and Wessler. Rater reliability was assessed by having a secondrater score a random subsample of 40 protocols. Interrater reliability(Pearson product-moment correlation) was .94 for the set of double-coded protocols.

Crystallized intelligence. The Vocabulary test (V-3) and the Sub-traction and Multiplication test (N-3) from the Kit of Factor-Refer-enced Cognitive Tests (Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Dermen, 1976)were used as markers of crystallized intelligence. The Vocabulary testassessed participants' verbal comprehension and required the selectionof a synonym for a given stimulus word from five alternatives. The Sub-traction and Multiplication test assessed participants' ability to performsimple numerical operations and required the subtraction of two-digitnumbers and the multiplication of a two-digit number with a single-digit number.

Fluid intelligence. The Letter Set test (I-1) and the Figure Classifi-cation test (1-3) from the Kit of Factor-Referenced Cognitive Tests(Ekstrom et al., 1976) were used as markers of fluid intelligence. TheLetter Set test assessed participants' inductive reasoning and requiredthe elimination of one letter set because of its dissimilarity with fourother letter sets. The Figure Classification test assessed participants'figural reasoning ability and required participants to match individualfigures with groups of stimulus figures on the basis of certain rules. Allintelligence tests were administered under standard timed conditions,and a total score was calculated for each test by adding the number ofcorrect responses.

California Psychological Inventory. The California PsychologicalInventory (CPI; Gough, 1987) was administered to assess personality-related correlates of participants' self-representations. Unlike other per-sonality inventories, the CPI measures "the kind of everyday variablesthat ordinary people use in their daily lives to understand, classify, andpredict their own behavior" (Gough, 1987, p. 1). Its 462 items are in-dicative of 20 "Folk Concept" scales including concepts such as self-acceptance, independence, self-control, empathy, tolerance, responsi-bility, dominance, or flexibility. According to the instructions for ad-ministration, the CPI was administered to all participants 15 years orolder; the preadolescent participants (age range = 11-14) did not com-plete the test.

Depressive symptoms. The current frequency of participants' de-pressive symptoms was assessed using the Center for EpidemiologicStudies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977). In contrast to otherdepression scales such as, for example, the Beck Depression Inventory(Beck, 1967), the CES-D focuses on milder depressive symptoms, withan emphasis on depressed affect or mood. Participants are asked to in-dicate how frequently they experienced the listed symptoms within thepast week. Each frequency level is translated into a numerical scoreranging from 0 (rarely or none of the time) to 3 (most or all of the time).Respondents' answers are summed in a total score, with higher scoresindicating a higher frequency of depressive symptomatology.

The CES-D has been used in household interview surveys and inclinical settings. Its use, however, has been specifically recommended forresearch involving nonclinical, community-based samples, because itfocuses on depressed affect and mood rather than the full range of de-pressogenic symptoms (Shaver & Brennan, 1991). The psychometricproperties of the CES-D are well established and have been reported byRadloff (1977).

Results

The study's findings are presented in two major sections cor-responding to the study objectives. First, analyses examiningage and sex differences in participants' levels of self-representa-tions across the life span are reported. Second, analyses exam-

ining individual-difference correlates of participants' self-representations are presented.

Age and Sex Differences

A 7 (age groups) X 2 (sex) univariate analysis of variance(ANOVA) was performed to examine age and sex differences inparticipants' self-representations. A statistically significantmain effect was found for age group, F( 6,135) = 6.44, p< .001,oi2 = . 183. Neither the main effect for sex nor the Age Group XSex interaction reached the .05 level of statistical significance.Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations of partici-pants' self-description scores by age group.

A Schefie post hoc test showed that the pre-adolescents' andelderly adults' mean self-representation scores were signifi-cantly lower than th« adults' and middle-aged adults' meanscores. Participants' self-representation scores increased frompre-adolescence into middle adulthood, with middle-agedadults having the highest scores. After midlife, participants' self-representation scores declined gradually with elderly adults'scores being at a similar level as preadolescents' scores.

Participants' mean self-representation scores indicated rela-tively low levels of self-representation overall, relatively minorage group differences, and similarity between the youngest andoldest groups. However, a somewhat different pattern emergeswhen the distribution of levels is examined by age group. Thispattern, displayed in Figure 1, suggests that mean scores maskthat the five levels are represented very differently within thevarious age groups. The pattern of levels by age group is dis-played in Figure 1. Overall, this pattern shows that the meanscores of the two youngest and two oldest groups were based ona predominance (about 80%) of scores averaging 1.75 or less.In contrast, scores of 1.75 or less constituted only about 37% ofthe young-adult, adult, and middle-aged groups' ratings. On theother hand, as elaborated in the discussion below, scores exceed-ing 2.00 were found only in the latter three age groups and con-stituted 24% of the responses of those age groups. Hence, youn-ger individuals' low means reflect homogeneously low levels ofself-representation. For most of the adult groups, low levels con-tinued to characterize the large proportion of individuals,whereas a smaller proportion occupied higher levels of self-representation.

In addition to the ANOVA, three separate 7 (age groups) X 2(sex) univariate analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) were per-formed to control statistically for individual differences in ego

Table 2Means and Standard Deviations of Self-Representation Scores

Age group M SD

Preadolescents ( 1 1 .0- 1 4.9)Adolescents(15.1-19.8)Young adults (20.4-29.9)Adults (30.2-45.7)Middle-aged adults (46.6-59.5)Older adults (62.2-68.8)Old-old adults (70.9-85.8)

11132435361917

1.151.521.741.841.871.511.34

0.400.280.510.480.490.430.38

Note. Age ranges are listed in parentheses.

SELF-REPRESENTATIONS 409

Percent100

90-

80

70-

60

50-

40-

30

20-

Scores

• 1.75

01.75-1.99

D 2.00-2.24

S 2.25-2.49

10-14 15-19 20-29 30-45 46-59 60-69 70+

Age Groups

Figure 1. Distribution of self-representation scores by age group.

level, crystallized intelligence, and fluid intelligence, which mayhave influenced participants' self-representation scores. Sepa-rate ANCOVAs rather than one simultaneous ANCOVA wereperformed so that interrelations among the covariates wouldnot obscure their relations with the dependent variable. Thecorrelations among the covariates and the dependent variableare presented in Table 3.

Results from the ANCOVAs were basically the same as theresults of the ANOVA. The main effect of age group remainedsignificant when covarying for ego level, F(6, 133) = 4.77, p <.001, u2 = A 12; for crystallized intelligence, F(6, 133) = 3.71,p < .01, ia2 = .080; and for fluid intelligence, F(6, 134) = 6.58,p < .001, w2 = . 180. In all 3 cases, the main effect for sex as wellas the Age Group X Sex interaction did not reach the .05 levelof significance. Together, these analyses show that the age groupdifferences remained significant when interindividual differ-ences in ego level, crystallized intelligence, and fluid intelligencewere statistically controlled for.

To rule out other alternative explanations for the age differ-ences in participants' self-representation scores, we performedthree additional ANOVAs. These analyses examined whetherthere were significant age group differences in the total numberof words, the total number of codable units, and the total num-ber of uncodable units in participants' self-representation pro-tocols. With regard to the total number of words, results showeda significant effect of age group, F (6, 142) = 2.57, p < .05, w2

= .062. A post hoc test showed that adults (M = 101.00, SD= 77.37) and elderly adults (M = 111.29, SD = 84.61) had

significantly longer protocols than preadolescents (M = 32.73,SD = 26.42). Elderly participants produced, on average, thelongest protocols; however, their mean self-representation scorewas similar to the preadolescents' mean score, suggesting thatlevels of self-representation cannot be accounted for by varia-tions in protocol length.

We found no significant age group differences for the total num-ber of codable protocol units and the total number of uncodableunits. We obtained additional support for the finding that partici-pants' self-representation scores were not related to protocollength when the correlation between self-representation score andthe total number of words was examined. The correlation was .08,which was not significantly different from zero.

We found significant sex differences for the total number ofwords, F( 1, 147) = 11.69, p < .01, o>2 = .067, and the totalnumber of codable units, F( 1, 147) = 5.65,p < .05, oi2 = .030.Women wrote, on average, longer self-descriptions than men(women: M = 107.13, SD = 68.36; men: M = 70.68, SD =61.39), t( 147) = -3.42, p < .01, which also resulted in a sig-nificantly larger number of codable protocol units (women: M= 7.97, SD = 4.62; men: M = 6.36, SD = 3.60), /(147) =-2.38, p<. 05.

Correlational Analyses

In addition to examining mean group differences in individ-uals' levels of self-representations, we aimed further analysesat examining aspects of the validity of the self-representationmeasure used in this study. Specifically, we examined (a) therelation of participants' self-representations to other cognitiveand personality measures and (b) the extent to which the cog-nitive and personality correlates differed by age. Results fromthis set of analyses are presented in three sections. Initially, re-sults from the data reduction performed with the CPI are pre-sented. This is followed by a presentation of the bivariate corre-lations between self-representations and cognitive and person-ality-related variables by age group. Finally, findings fromregression analyses are reported.

CPI personality factors. To obtain a parsimonious set ofpersonality variables, we factor analyzed the correlation matrixof the 20 CPI scales using the maximum-likelihood extractionmethod. We performed an oblique rotation to simple structure,and four factors were extracted on the basis of the eigenvaluecriterion (i.e., eigenvalues > 1.0). The obtained factor loadingpattern and the factor intercorrelations are shown in Table 4.Factor scores were calculated for each factor using the regres-

Table 3Correlations Among Covariates and Self-Representation Scores

Variable 1

Note. N= 148.**p<.01. ***p<.001.

SD

1 . Ego level —2. Crystallized intelligence3. Fluid intelligence4. Self-representation

.41*** -.12— .11

—

.41***

.35***

.21**—

88.0837.9460.70

1.65

10.3411.3822.290.50

410 LABOUVIE-VIEF, CHIODO, GOGUEN, DIEHL, ORWOLL

Table 4Factor Loadings and Factor Intercorrelations Resulting FromMaximum-Likelihood Factor Analysis of the CaliforniaPsychological Inventory (CPI)

Factor

Scale

Self-Acceptance (Sa)Dominance (Do)Sociability (Sy)Social Presence (Sp)Capacity for Status (Cs)Empathy (Em)Independence (In)Self-Control (Sc)Good Impression (Gi)Weil-Being (Wb)Achievement via Conformance (Ac)Socialization (So)Tolerance (To)Flexibility (Fx)Achievement via Independence (Ai)Responsibility (Re)Femininity-Masculinity (F-M)Communality (Cm)Intellectual Efficiency (le)Psychological Mindedness (Py)

Proportion of varianceCumulative proportion of variance

.94

.94

.91

.81

.76

.74

.70-.40-.08

.18

.35

.03

.10-.01

.33

.18-.23

.35

.45

.34

40.640.6

-.27.15

-.04-.15

.06-.02

.27

.91

.89

.81

.57

.56

.51-.14

.39

.48-.14

.26

.42

.45

20.060.6

.00-.25-.05

.19

.19

.18-.04

.01-.07

.05-.25-.21

.43

.73

.53-.02

.04-.22

.33

.35

8.669.2

.05-.13

.01-.12

.06-.03-.34

.11-.11-.16

.37

.30

.35-.02

.14

.52-.68

.25

.10-.14

6.275.4

Factor intercorrelations

1. CPI Factor 12. CPI Factor 23. CPI Factor 34. CPI Factor 4

.32

.22-.08

—.01.29 —-.06

—Note. Primary factor loadings are in bold.

sion method (Gorsuch, 1983); these factor scores were used forthe subsequent correlational analyses.

The loading pattern shown in Table 4 was similar to solutionsobtained by other investigators (for a summary, see Gough,1987). The first factor was defined by high loadings on thescales for Self-Acceptance (Sa), Dominance (Do), Sociability(Sy), Social Presence (Sp), Capacity for Status (Cs), Empathy(Em), and Independence (In). This factor was similar toCough's (1987) Extraversion factor. Specifically, individualsranking high on this factor described themselves as having agood opinion of themselves and as being assertive and task ori-ented, friendly and sociable, self-assured, spontaneous, self-confident in social situations, and ambitious, success oriented,and independent in their actions.

The second factor was defined by high loadings on the scalesfor Self-Control (Sc), Good Impression (Gi), Weil-Being(Wb), Achievement via Conformance (Ac), Socialization(So), and Tolerance (To). This factor was similar to Cough's(1987) Control factor. Persons ranking high on this factor de-scribed themselves as self-disciplined, in control of their emo-tions and temper, eager to please others, in good physical andemotional health and optimistic about the future, having astrong drive to do well, comfortable accepting ordinary rules,and tolerant of others' beliefs and values.

The third factor had its largest loadings on the scales for Flex-ibility (Fx) and Achievement via Independence (Ai), with asecondary loading on Tolerance (To); thus, this factor was sim-ilar to Gough's (1987) Flexibility factor. Persons scoring highon this factor presented themselves as being flexible and open tochange and variety, being easily bored by ordinary life, beingeager to take the initiative, and being open minded and tolerantof others' beliefs and values.

The fourth factor was least congruent with the results fromother studies (see Gough, 1987). In this sample, the loadingpattern indicated a shift of this factor in the direction of gender-specific characteristics and was marked by a positive loading onResponsibility (Re) and a high negative loading on the scale forFemininity-Masculinity (F-M). A high score on the latter scaleindicated more stereotypically feminine responses. We foundsecondary loadings on Achievement via Conformance (Ac) andTolerance (To). Individuals scoring high on this factor de-scribed themselves in terms that are traditionally associatedmore with masculine behavior; they described themselves asbeing responsible, taking duties seriously, and being decisiveand action oriented.

Together, these four factors accounted for 75% of the variancein the CPI data. The factor intercorrelations ranged from -.08 to.32, indicating only weak to moderate relations among the factors.

Bivariate correlations. The next step was to examine the pat-tern of correlates among the CPI factors, selected cognitive vari-ables, as well as depressive symptomatology. In so doing, we wereinterested not only in the overall pattern but in whether that pat-tern differed for earlier versus later segments of the life span.

For the first part of these analyses, the sample was dividedinto two age groups, reflecting two different linear relations be-tween age and self-representation. The younger group included71 participants (age range = 15-45) and was characterized bya positive linear relation between age and self-representation.The older group included 65 participants (age range = 46-85)and was characterized by a negative linear relation between ageand self-representation. As indicated earlier, preadolescents hadnot responded to the CPI and were, therefore, not included inthese analyses.

Pearson product-moment correlations were calculated to ex-amine the age-specific pattern of associations among cognitiveand personality-related variables and participants' self-repre-sentation scores. In particular, we expected that younger indi-viduals' self-representations would be related primarily to vari-ables indicative of their level of cognitive development, whereasolder individuals' self-representations would be more likely re-lated to a combination of personality-related and cognitivevariables.

Table 5 presents the bivariate correlations between cognitiveand personality variables and participants' self-representationscores by age group. Table 5 also contains the means and standarddeviations for each variable, showing that there was no restrictionof range problem in the older age group. In fact, analysis of thecorresponding standard deviations showed that none of the stan-dard deviations were significantly different. The last column inTable 5 shows the z scores, indicating which correlations were sig-nificantly different. The difference between two correspondingcorrelation coefficients was tested using Fisher's r to z transforma-tion as described in Glass and Hopkins (1984).

SELF-REPRESENTATIONS 411

Table 5Zero-Order Correlations of Cognitive and Personality Variables With Self-Representation

Younger age group" Older age group*

Variable M SD M SD

Ego levelCrystallized intelligenceFluid intelligenceCPI Factor 1CPI Factor 2CPI Factor 3CPI Factor 4CES-D

.33**

.30**

.11-.04

.00

.04

.22*

.04

88.32126.4271.07-0.07-0.28

0.08-0.1230.35

9.2017.5919.410.981.040.790.937.50

.36**

.47***

.48***

.46***

.11

.45***

.04-.36**

89.49129.5546.910.190.32

-0.090.10

28.12

9.3617.0218.471.000.811.020.816.52

-0.13-0.10-2.36**-3.07**-0.63-2.54**

1.052.38**

Note. CPI = California Psychological Inventory (Gough, 1987); CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Stud-ies Depression Scale (Radloff, 1977).* Age range = 15-45 years of age; n = 11. bAge range = 46-85 years of age; n - 65.*/><.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001.

As Table 5 shows, the magnitude of the correlations was sim-ilar for the two age groups with regard to ego level and crystal-lized intelligence. However, there were significant differenceswith fluid intelligence and personality-related variables. Spe-cifically, compared with younger participants, fluid intelligencewas a significantly stronger correlate of older participants' self-representations (z = -2.36, p < .01). Similarly, the CPI Factors1 (Extraversion) and 3 (Flexibility) were not correlated withyounger participants' self-representation scores; however, theywere significantly related to older participants' self-representa-tions (r = .46 and r = .45, respectively; z = -3.07 and z = -2.54,respectively; ps < .01). Thus, older participants' self-represen-tations were significantly related to their perceptions of them-selves as being self-confident in social situations, independent,self-assured and sociable, eager to take the initiative, and open-minded and tolerant of others beliefs and values, whereas youn-ger participants' self-representations were not related to thesepersonality traits.

Furthermore, there was a significant negative correlation (r =—.36, p < .01) between older individuals' self-descriptions andtheir self-reported depressive symptoms. In contrast, younger par-ticipants' self-descriptions were not related to depressive symp-tomatology (r = .04, p > .05). Specifically, older adults with higherscores on the CES-D (i.e., reporting a greater number of depres-sive symptoms) had lower self-representation scores and viceversa. The difference between the two age groups' correlations wasstatistically significant (z = 2,38, p< .01).

Regression analyses. Because the bivariate correlationssuggested an age-specific importance of correlates of partici-pants' self-representation scores, hierarchical multiple regres-sion was used as a more stringent method to examine the rela-tive importance of cognitive and personality variables for pre-dicting individuals' self-representation scores. Analyses wereconducted in two steps: First, we tested a grand model contain-ing interaction terms of age with the cognitive and personalityvariables in addition to the linear effects of the cognitive andpersonality-related variables. Second, if all of the interactionterms accounted for a significant amount of variance above andbeyond the linear effects, then we planned to conduct separate

regression analyses for each age group examining the age-specific importance of the cognitive and personality predictors.

Following the recommendations of Aiken and West (1991),variables included in the regression analyses were centered, andinteraction terms were generated between the centered vari-ables. We used hierarchical rather than simultaneous regressionanalysis to determine the relative importance of cognitive andpersonality-related variables above and beyond the effect of age.To assure a reasonable ratio between number of predictor vari-ables and sample size (sample size/number of predictors ̂ 10;see Stevens, 1992), only variables that were significantly corre-lated (p < .05) with the criterion variable were entered in theregression equation. We entered variables in blocks into the re-gression equation, and we computed the incremental F test(Cohen & Cohen, 1983) of the difference in R2 between theblocks of variables to determine whether the subsequent set orsets of predictors made a significant contribution to the total R2

above and beyond the contribution of the previous set or sets ofpredictors.

The order of entry was as follows: Step 1—age and age2 mod-eling both the linear and the nonlinear relation between age andself-representation scores; Step 2—the linear effects includingego level, crystallized intelligence, fluid intelligence, CPI Factor1 (i.e., Extraversion), CPI Factor 3 (i.e., Flexibility), andCES-D variables; and Step 3—the interaction terms of age with cog-nitive and personality variables. Because some of the interactionterms were highly interrelated, we entered them separately intothe regression equation to assess their independent contributionabove and beyond the linear effects. Table 6 presents the resultsof the multiple regression with the Age X CES-D interactionincluded as a predictor.

Table 6 shows that the term that modeled the nonlinear re-lation between age and self-representation (i.e., age2) was neg-ative and statistically significant, indicating the inverse U-shaped relation between age and self-representation. In addi-tion, the regression weights of fluid intelligence and the CPIFactor 3 (i.e., Flexibility) were statistically significant. Al-though ego level and crystallized intelligence were significantlycorrelated with participants' self-representation scores (ego

412 LABOUVIE-VIEF, CHIODO, GOGUEN, DIEHL, ORWOLL

Table 6Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for VariablesPredicting Self-Representation

Step and variable SEB

Step 1AgeAge2

Step 2Ego levelCrystallized intelligenceRuid intelligenceCPI Factor 1CPI Factor 3CES-D

Step 3Age X CES-D

.03-.13

.11

.06

.12-.03

.09

.01

-.09

.06

.05

.06

.07

.05

.04

.04

.04

.04

.05-.21*

.22

.12

.25*-.06

.17*

.02

-.16*

Note. R2 = .14 for Step l,p < .001; A/J2 = .17 for Step 2, p < .001;A/?2 = .02 for Step 3, p < .05. CPI = California Psychological Inventory(Gough, 1987); CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies DepressionScale (Radloff, 1977).•p < .05.

level: r = .34; crystallized intelligence: r = .38; ps < .001),their combined effect in predicting participants' self-represen-tation scores was not statistically significant because of theirhigh intercorrelation (i.e., r = .80). The most salient predictorof participants' self-representation scores was fluid intelli-gence. Of the four interaction terms (i.e., Age X Fluid Intelli-gence, Age X CPI Factor 1, Age X CPI Factor 3, Age X CES-D), only the Age X CES-D interaction was statistically sig-nificant. Thus, as suggested by the bivariate correlations, forthe older adults, reporting less depressive symptoms was asso-ciated with higher self-representation scores. Together, thevariables shown in Table 6 accounted for 33% of the variancein participants' self-representations.

That only one of the four interaction terms with age was sta-tistically significant was interpreted as limited support for theassumption of the age-specific importance of correlates of self-representations when a more stringent statistical method (i.e.,a method that also takes into account the relations amongcorrelates) was used. Thus, analyses ceased at this point, andseparate regression analyses by age were not conducted.

Discussion

The results of this study suggest that self-representations varyfrom adolescence to later life and that such self-representationscan be ordered along a series of cognitive-developmental levelsfrom less to more complex. Before about the age of 20, individ-uals tend to give self-descriptions suggesting that the self re-mains relatively undifferentiated from primary others or pri-mary social groups such as peers and family. In adulthood, thereis a greater proportion of responses that define the self as a moredifferentiated and more internal structure that relates to a sys-tem of normative institutional ideals and standards. In addi-tion, many adults begin to transcend such institutional descrip-tions and examine the institutional and contextual constraintsthat influence individual biographies. Now, the self is describedas a dynamic system subject to complex psychological and his-

torical processes and as the integrating site of conflictual andmultivalenced tendencies.

In our cross-sectional sample, such transformational think-ing peaked at midlife: The highest levels of self-representationwere reached by the 46-59-year-olds. However, although levelscores continued to increase to middle adulthood, the mean of1.87 in the middle-aged group suggests that relatively few adultsactually give very high-level responses. In part, this may be dueto the fact that our study used a very stringent criterion for de-termining levels. However, our findings are consistent withthose of other researchers (e.g., Armon, 1984) who have usedless stringent criteria. Hence, though our system of self-repre-sentation was developmentally based, the higher levels describesomewhat exceptional development rather than a statisticalnorm: Of the total sample, about 21 participants (24%) reacheda level score higher than 2.00, a score that could be said to reflecttruly transformational thinking. Interestingly, too, all of thosescores were located in the 20-59 age range; not a single individ-ual among the two youngest and the two oldest age groups hada score exceeding 2.00.

That adults were more likely to describe the self in terms of "change and transformation is in agreement with positions thatmidlife may be a period that for many adults brings reexamina-tions of the self and a restructuring of a sense of identity. Jung(1933), for example, proposed that the essence of midlife de-velopment is a deepening of a sense of self as individuals exam-ine their motivations and goals. They do so by reaching beyondthe "persona," or the conventionally and socially constitutedself. Many recent authors have echoed this proposal and re-ported empirical data indicating that many adults around mid-life appear to rework their definitions of self, their dreams, andthe issues that they feel give life meaning (Helson & Roberts,1994; Jacques, 1965; Levinson et al., 1978; Vaillant, 1977,1993). For example, Cross and Markus (1991) recently re-ported that from early to middle adulthood, the self is describedless in extreme idealizations and more in pragmatic institu-tional transitions relating to career and family—more emphasisis on qualification, concreteness, and on anchoring of life's bi-ography in specific detail, suggesting a focus on greater com-plexity and contextualization (see also Ryff, 1991).

While supporting notions of adult self-reorganizations, how-ever, our data also lend support to interpretations that place lessstress on the importance of age per se. Although, as a group,our middle-aged adults scored highest, many younger adultsachieved high scores as well, and conversely, more than 50% ofthe adult groups failed to reach an overall score of 2.00. Thus,rather than being age related, the ability to think in terms ofcomplexity and transformations often associated with matureadulthood may, in part, be accounted for by the evolution ofcognitive structures that are not strictly tied to age.

The type of thinking displayed by adults of the higher levelsof self-representations—with emphasis on context, emergence,and transformation—is often associated with higher forms ofadulthood cognition, such as dialectical (e.g., Kramer & Wood-ruff, 1986; Riegel, 1973), postformal (Kitchener & Brenner,1990; Labouvie-Vief, 1992), or wisdom-related thought. How-ever, our results suggest that such advanced forms of thinkingmay not truly be a characteristic associated with old age, butrather may characterize adults at the prime of their life. This

SELF-REPRESENTATIONS 413

contrasts with the claims of some researchers (e.g., Baltes &Staudinger, 1993) that older adults may be somewhat morelikely to display wisdom. However, in our research we made noattempt to select exceptional individuals, as when nominatingindividuals who are considered wise. Rather, we obtained oursample through a random sampling strategy, and in such a rel-atively normal community-based sample, advanced transfor-mational thought may be much more typical of adults in theprime of their life than of the older adults. Thus, this researchsuggests the importance of obtaining representative samples ofindividuals covering all age segments of the life span.

In our more representative sample, the ability to think interms of complexity and transformation is quite infrequent inlate life. As a group, older adults (ages 60 and over) showedresponses similar to the preadolescents and adolescents, with afocus on conventional traits and characteristics. This is evidentnot only if one examines age group differences but also if oneexamines the distribution of individual scores along the age di-mension. Among individuals ages 19 and younger or ages 60and older, only a very few (2 and 5 participants, or 8% and 14%,respectively) achieved an average level score of 2.00 or higher.In contrast, of the adults ages 20 to 59, a total of 43 individuals(48%) achieved at least a score of 2.00.

Supplemental analyses suggest that the lower proportion ofhigh-scoring elderly adults does not result from a simple artifactof the research method chosen. For example, because we askedparticipants to provide self-descriptions in a free written for-mat, it may be surmised that sensory and physical limitationsmight have constrained older individuals to give more basic andbrief responses. However, our results suggest that this age groupactually gave the longest protocols, suggesting that simple phys-ical restrictions in the ability to write fluent narratives were nota factor. It is also possible that some participants' written self-representations were not as elaborate as they would have beenhad they been asked to provide a self-description in a dyadic,face-to-face situation with a familiar interviewer. Currently,knowledge on how a specific method of data collection affectsthe quality of respondents' self-protocols is limited. Neverthe-less, our past data with interview-based data on individuals'emotions (Labouvie-Vief, DeVoe, & Bulka, 1989) are highlysimilar to the present pattern and suggest that the low scoresof the older groups are not merely an artifact of methodology.However, future research needs to provide more systematiccomparisons of different methods of assessment.

Currently, we do not know, of course, if the low proportion ofhigh-scoring older adults was a developmental or cohort effect.Future phases of the study will aim to disentangle these twosources of variation by including a sequential extension of thissample. However, even though we cannot rule out that the ob-tained age differences reflect more than just cohort effects, wesuggest that they can be ordered on a continuum of develop-mental complexity. Thus, whether as a result of ontogenetic de-clines or of cultural changes in transformational thinking, theoldest groups appear to be much more conventional, displayingan orientation toward proper or desirable self-descriptions.

One interesting finding of the current research is the sim-ilarity of level scores for the oldest and the youngest groups.Although our results indicate quantitatively that the meanscores of these two age groups were almost identical, they were

differentiated by marked qualitative differences as indicated bythe pattern of the self-representation correlates. When the sam-ple was divided into an ascending and a declining portion, wefound that, at the first part of the life span, individuals' levels ofself-representation were predicted by ego level and crystallizedintelligence. Although these variables continued to be signifi-cantly correlated with level of self-representation for the secondportion of the life span, other variables appeared to enter asmore important predictors. First, fluid intelligence, which wasuncorrelated with level of self-representation at the early por-tion of the life span, was significantly correlated in later life.This suggests that one reason for the lower self-representationlevels is due to restrictions on fluid intelligence that becomemore apparent in later life.

In addition, several emotion- and personality-related vari-ables were more strongly related to individuals' level of self-rep-resentation later in life. Specifically, examination of zero-ordercorrelations showed that individuals scoring high on depressivesymptomatology, low on a personality factor indicative of self-confident, assertive, and independent behavior, and low on apersonality factor indicative of flexible, open-minded, and self-directed behavior were less likely to achieve higher scores. How-ever, more powerful hierarchical regression analyses suggestedthat only depressive symptoms remained as a differential pre-dictor for the age groups. Thus, the findings of different person-ality and emotion-related predictors for different age groupsshould only be considered as preliminary evidence and shouldbe further explored with a larger sample and more powerfulmethodology.

These results suggest that similar levels of self-representationare not necessarily evidence of equivalent mechanisms atdifferent age intervals. For example, it is possible that part oflater-life development involves a reorganization of goals as indi-viduals become aware of time limits on their life course. Crossand Markus (1991), for example, found that the older adults intheir sample reported "hoped-for selves" that seemed to reflecta shift from "years since birth" to "time left to live." Similarly,Brandtstadter and his colleagues (Brandtstadter & Greve, 1994;Brandtstadter, Wentura, & Greve, 1993) have observed thatolder participants in their life span sample shift from assimila-tive to accommodative processes of self-representation. Brandt-stadter and his colleagues considered such shifts as importantstrategies by which older adults maintain a sense of control anda positive view of self and personal development in the face ofnegative biological, psychological, and social changes intrinsicto the aging process (see also Ryff, 1991).

Another interpretation of the different qualitative pattern ofcorrelates is possible as well. In an Eriksonian interpretation oflater-life development (e.g., Erikson, 1982; Vaillant, 1993), forexample, positive later-life development can be viewed as a fairlyideal outcome, one fostered by a developmental pathway char-acterized by fairly high levels of emotional health and psycho-social integration. In contrast, less desirable outcomes are theresult from developmental pathways that are characterized byrelatively low levels of emotional and psychosocial health. Thus,higher levels of depressive symptoms and rigidity can inhibitflexible thinking in the self-domain.

Several limitations of this study also need to be acknowl-edged. First, as mentioned earlier, these findings are based on

414 LABOUVIE-VIEF, CHIODO, GOGUEN, DIEHL, ORWOLL

cross-sectional and age-comparative data confounding age-related development with the effect of cohort. Longitudinal dataand a cohort-sequential extension of the study will aim to dis-entangle these two sources of variation in future analyses. Sec-ond, this study did not include an alternative measure of self-concept, and, therefore, information on the convergent validityof the presented self-representation scoring procedure is lim-ited. However, given that the correlations of participants' self-representations with ego level and scales from the CPI were inthe moderate range, we are reasonably confident that our assess-ment tapped participants' self-representations in a way that isdistinct from other constructs of personality. Nevertheless, fu-ture phases of the study will aim to provide more informationon the convergent validity of the self-scoring procedure.

Third, this study did not incorporate a measure of self-disclosure, and it is, therefore, unclear whether participants'self-descriptions were affected by their willingness to reveal in-formation about themselves. We believe, however, that this mayonly be a minor shortcoming because participants did not shyaway from revealing negative aspects of their selves and, thus,seemed to provide realistic and honest accounts of themselves.Furthermore, the empirical literature on the role of self-disclo-sure as an individual-difference variable has revealed rather in-consistent and controversial findings with actual self-disclosingbehavior (see Archer, 1979; Derlega & Berg, 1987). Of greaterimportance for a study such as ours, however, may be that thecomplexity of individuals' self-descriptions may be directly orindirectly affected by their private self-consciousness or privateself-awareness (Davis & Franzoi, 1987), which may operatethrough self-disclosure. Thus, measures of self-awareness andself-disclosure will be necessary in future phases of this study toaddress this issue.

Fourth, although the zero-order correlations indicated adifferent pattern of self-representation correlates by age group,more stringent multiple regression analyses provided only lim-ited support for the age specificity of these correlates. Thus, al-though theoretical conceptualizations of cognitive-emotionalmaturity in adulthood suggest an age-specific pattern, our dataprovide only tentative support.

In summary, this study reports findings about individuals'self-representations that contribute to the growing body of lit-erature on self-development across the life span (see Lipka &Brinthaupt, 1992). The findings are, in general, consistent withother recent research on changes in adults' possible selves (seeCross & Markus, 1991; Ryff, 1991) and with other cognitive-developmental work on the aging self (see Brandtstadter &Greve, 1994). Our data, however, also provide evidence thatdifferentiated self-representations are most common duringmiddle adulthood and that older adults' self-representations aremore likely to be less differentiated. Although this finding mayindicate that self-representations follow a developmental trajec-tory that is characterized by increasing differentiation duringthe first half of the life span and by de-differentiation during thesecond half, future research is needed to examine this hypothe-sis in greater detail.

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Received March 16,1994Revision received September 19,1994

Accepted September 19, 1994 •