Remaining Apolitical in a Political Crisis: Exploring Interest Group Politics

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Copyright © 2010 SAGE Publications www.sagepublications.com(Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore and Washington DC)Vol 26(1): 71–97. DOI: 10.1177/0169796X1002600104

Remaining Apolitical in a Political Crisis

Exploring Interest Group Politics

Rory PilossofUniversity of Sheffi eld

ABSTRACT

This article explores the fortunes of the leading farming periodical in Zimbabwe, The Farmer magazine, and how its parent body, the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) sought to control, censor and manipulate The Farmer and the coverage it gave the deepening crises in Zimbabwe. Doing so gives voice to a part of the white experience in Zimbabwe and also shows that the farming community was far from a cohesive entity. The article also shows that there are parallels in the CFU’s attitude towards The Farmer’s post-2000, and to that it expressed in the 1980s during the years of Gukurahundi. The CFU’s policy of ‘apoliticism’ affected the freedom of The Farmer at both times and ultimately led to the magazines closure in 2002.

Keywords: Zimbabwe, The Farmer magazine, the Commercial Farmers’ Union, apoliticism, affi rmative action, parochialism

Introduction

With the start of the government’s fast-track land reform programme in 2000, spearheaded by the country’s liberation war veterans, the plight of the white farming community became international headline news. Images of white farmers who were beaten, killed, exiled and driven from their homes became stock material for any coverage on the land invasions and their dramatic consequences. Along with this imagery, the voice given to farmers was one of shock, horror and dismay at events surrounding them and a complete sense of disbelief that the government could do such a thing to such an important sector of the economy and country. As a result farmers were, by and large, portrayed in direct opposition to the government that they, and the world, believed had sanctioned the invasions and evictions. However, this blanket portrayal of opposition is one that hides a number of more complicated dimensions to the way

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72 Journal of Developing Societies 26, 1 (2010): 71–97

farmers and their representatives engaged with the government and tried to fi nd solutions to the situation facing them. One of best ways to illustrate these hidden dimensions of the white farming community is through a close reading of what was the leading agricultural periodical in Zimbabwe, The Farmer magazine. This article will use this publication to explore not only the voices of the white farming community, but also how the Commercial Farmers’ Union (CFU)1 sought to control and manipulate these voices in order to preserve its relationship with the ruling elite and effect its own strategies of survival. As a magazine produced by and published for farmers, it provides an excellent source for examining such aspects of the white farming voice. In addition, and more importantly for this collection, such a reading enables one to use The Farmer as a window to explore white farmers’ views on national politics, Mugabe and his party, the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)(ZANU-PF), the land invasions and the rise and role of the opposition movement, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).2 Doing so fundamentally undermines the facade of a united and coherent white farming entity and offers insights into the complicated web of relations within and of that community.

By focusing on this white voice, this article hopes to open the way for a new path of scholarship, that is, to bring more attention and focus to bear on at least one part of the white experience in Zimbabwe, a group that has been severely under-represented in academic literature on postcolonial Zimbabwe. Whites have been, at best, neglected if not written out of so much of Africa’s post-colonial history, much to the literature’s detriment. This is by no means an attempt to say that ‘white’ voices or experiences are more important than ‘black’ ones (Cooper, 2008: 195). Rather, the argument is that study of groups like white elites who have found ways to function and maintain their positions in independent African states offers very valuable insights into how the new black governments conceive of the nation and ways to manage it. What Cooper terms the ‘ambiguities of independence’ can be explored in greater and more meaningful depth (Cooper, 2008: 167). In turn, understanding these interactions can revise knowledge of how these new leaderships behave and allow one to get behind the rhetoric of ‘the people’. Too much work on Africa has focused on the elite or the subaltern and those intermediary groups, be they rising middle classes or surviving orphans of empire, have fallen through the cracks. The white farmers of Zimbabwe represent such a group. This article will explore some of the complexities of their situation and dealings with government.

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Journal of Developing Societies 26, 1 (2010): 71–97

Pilossof: Exploring Interest Group Politics 73

Apoliticism and Affi rmative Parochialism

At the core of this article is an exploration of the ‘apoliticism’ of the white farmers and their representatives in post-1980 Zimbabwe. Although the Union (and The Farmer) has always claimed to be apolitical, even during the years of colonial and minority rule, this tactic became more pronounced after Independence with an obvious and radical withdrawal from active political engagement by practically all white farmers. Even Denis Norman, who was president of the Rhodesian National Farmers Union (RNFU, the CFU’s predecessor) at Independence and became Mugabe’s fi rst Minister of Agriculture said of his time in government: ‘I was apolitical and wanted to remain that way’ (Selby, 2006: 73).3 This seems like a highly untenable position for a minister to fi nd oneself in, yet it is one that the entire farming community bought into. They believed they could separate (their) land and politics and make such a stance work to serve their needs. Indeed, so effective was this withdrawal that it be-came a defi ning feature of the farming community. In 2000, Makumbe stated ‘the white commercial farmers said in 1980 we will not participate in politics, we will farm and make money. I think they said to hell with politics, so they have not contributed politically to good governance and democracy’ (2000e: 24). Without questioning whether or not white farmers active participation could have improved governance and democracy in Zimbabwe, the reality was that farmers retreated from that arena in the belief that this was the most likely way to ensure their survival in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe.

Integral to this chosen strategy was an attitude of affi rmative parochial-ism. The CFU, and by extension The Farmer, sought to preserve the white farming community as it was and it felt the best way to do this was promote its isolation and focus only on those issues that affected them. They insulated themselves from events around them by claiming to be ‘apolitical’, which in reality meant they supported the ruling powers in order to survive. The Farmer was an active participant in this process, under the directorship of the CFU. This promoted parochialism of the CFU was by no means constant. It not only waxed and waned from 1980–2002 due to changes within the farming community and hierarchy, but also responded to fl uctuations in the political, social and economic climate. Nevertheless, it was certainly a strategy the CFU reinvigorated when the land invasions started in 2000, but was also one that, on occa-sions, confl icted with an editorial board on The Farmer that was much

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more vigorous and politically sensitive than at any other time in the magazine’s history. Parochialism is usually invoked in a negative context being typically narrow, provincial or insular. However, emphasizing the affi rmative nature of the farmers’ parochialism stresses that it was a chosen strategy. This does not negate or preclude the negative aspect of the parochial attitude, but opens the space for questioning the motives of this inward looking nature of the white farming community and its leadership, which, when weighed up at the time of their implementation may assist in understanding why certain decisions were made and offer a more considered appraisal of such actions.

Having to renegotiate and re-imagine their place in a newly inde-pendent, black Zimbabwe was a complicated process for a wholly white (commercial or otherwise) entity. The CFU and The Farmer had the diffi cult task of ensuring they still spoke to and for their white rural constituencies, while, at the same time, showing themselves willing and active participants in the new national project of Mugabe’s Zimbabwe. There are obvious parallels with the Afrikaans mainstream media in South Africa. Of these Wasserman has written:

The repositioning of Afrikaans media in the post-apartheid era has been more complicated than a crude shift from ideological nationalism to consumerism. While on one hand there was marked attempt to turn Afrikaans into a mere commodity to be sold to a niche market, this consumerist turn was precariously balanced with an attempt to position Afrikaans within a new identity politics. (Wasserman, 2009: 62)

In a sense The Farmer was doing just this. It was a direct participant in protecting and fashioning the identity of ‘Zimbabwean’ white farmers, but at the same time it was publishing for the new black government in order to show that they, as a group, were comfortable with the new nation and were not going to do anything to undermine or jeopardize it. Even more pertinent to this article, elsewhere Wasserman and Botman have commented:

while media in post-apartheid South Africa are central participants in the continued power struggles for control of public discourse and political agendas, explicit support for political parties (as was the case under apartheid) has disappeared. Instead the media’s political positioning now only becomes evident through a critical reading of their structures, routines and discourses. Such a reading brings to light the fragmentation and disproportionate

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distribution of symbolic capital indicative of the fractures and contestations in broader society, as well as continuing political power struggles’. (Wasserman and Botma, 2008: 4)

It is just such a reading that will be brought to The Farmer to get a better idea of the divisions and power struggles evident within the community and country at large, and how the discourses employed refract and shape such divisions. To assist this process, a brief history of The Farmer and its publication will be provided fi rst before its coverage of events post-2000 is analyzed.

The History, Content and Production of The Farmer

The magazine was founded by Lionel Noaks in 1928 and was originally entitled Countrylife. The magazine subsequently underwent several name changes (to Vuka in 1940, then to The Rhodesian Farmer in 1946) before it became The Farmer in the 1970s (2000d: 26). This publication is a wonderfully rich source that offers a range of insights into many important aspects of the community’s history and functioning. Not only are immediate issues such as drought, labour and commodity prices covered in depth, but the same is true for the fundamental issues of existence and right of place (such as the coming of Independence and the land reforms post-2000). The principal and express purpose of the magazine was to speak to and for the white farming community: a pur-pose that was well established under white minority rule, but one that had to adapt to the ambiguities of Independence in ways that preserved its intent whilst conforming to the new political paradigm.

The organization and structure of the magazine is diffi cult to explore in exhaustive detail, since its archives are part of the CFU’s, which, with the current crisis, have suffered from a huge amount of neglect and dis-organization. This has meant that all papers relating to the magazine and its running are unavailable to the public at this time. However, there are other ways of gathering this information. Communications with Michael Rook, who held various posts on The Farmer’s editorial board and was, for over two decades, CEO of Modern Farming Publications Trust (MFPT) which was established to run The Farmer after 1980, have been extremely useful in building up a picture of the behind the scenes politics of The Farmer and its publication.

Until 1980, The Farmer was produced by the CFU and run out of their offi ces, although it claimed independent and editorial freedom from the

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Union. As the magazine said of itself in 1995, ‘although owned by the farmers, for decades [up to Independence] it enjoyed a reputation of being largely independent of Union politics’ (The Farmer, 1995: 26). However, after Independence, the CFU established the MFPT to run The Farmer ostensibly independently of the Union. Amid anxieties that the Union would be ‘infi ltrated’ by the new government, the Union decided to create some space between it and its publishing division. Rook explained:

As I recall MFP Trust was set up at independence [in] 1980 to safeguard the fi nances and editorial freedom of the CFU’s magazine section in the event that the Union would be forced to merge with the organizations representing black master farmers and peasant farmers (Rook, 2009).

While these developments ensured that The Farmer gained a new level of autonomy, the magazine was by no means free from CFU pressure. As Rook pointed out, the CFU still had a large degree of infl uence over the magazine:

At the beginning of 1980s the CFU president automatically chaired the [MFP]Trust with other farming CFU members. Latterly [post 1990] as the Union became more involved in land issues it distanced itself from the day to day running of The Farmer and allowed the Trust to be chaired by farmers that were not part of the CFU head offi ce structure. However CFU still retained its infl uence over The Farmer as every serving president and CFU director were automatically appointed to the Board of Trustees. (Rook, 2009).

Despite this control, The Farmer and the CFU went to great lengths to exaggerate the autonomy of magazine. Rook elucidated why:

To maintain The Farmer’s credibility and infl uence amongst licence holders the CFU hierarchy at times coerced The Farmer to go into print assuring readers that it had editorial freedom. The Farmer accepted that trade off with CFU in the knowledge that such an expression of independence could and would be used to full advantage the next time it crossed the line and confronted CFU policy. (Rook, 2009).

With this knowledge, one is able to explore what the Union sanctioned or censored in The Farmer. Indeed, one could go as far as saying that as a result of these manipulations, The Farmer carried much of the CFU’s own voice and allows explorations into the beliefs of Union and farming leadership over this period. This has increasing relevance when one considers that there is almost no access to that voice in any other form

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because, as already mentioned, of the state of the CFU’s own archives. It also shows where the CFU’s attitude confl icts with wider farming outlooks. It is these episodes of confl ict and censorship that reveal a great deal of the role the CFU and The Farmer played in constructing and controlling the information it released to the community.

Yet, the importance of The Farmer as a unit of study is not merely due to its publishing practices. Just as importantly The Farmer had a high level of circulation within the farming community. At Independence, every farmer received a subscription of the magazine free as part of their levies to the CFU. Considering that the Union represented such an overwhelming majority of white farmers, the magazine had a high level of circulation within its target demographic. Even more importantly, and something that should not be taken for granted, it seems that farmers actually read the magazine. A survey carried out by a CFU restructuring committee in 1995 showed that of a sample of just over 1,000 farmers (nearly a quar-ter of the white farming population), 96 per cent responded that they read The Farmer regularly (The Farmer, 1995: 22). Thus it is clear that The Farmer played an important role in the white farming community. Its future was ensured by CFU manoeuvres at Independence and, as a result, took on a new importance with farmers as their own publication that was free from governmental control. Attention will now turn to the reportage and content of The Farmer. A brief summary of its activity up to 2000 will be looked at before a more in-depth analysis of its post-2000 coverage.

The Farmer and the Farming Community from 1980–2000

From Independence to 2,000, relations between government and the white farmers underwent numerous revisions and changes. Robert Mugabe’s victory in the 1980 elections came as a rude surprise to much of the white establishment, not least of all to the relatively small white farming community, who at Independence numbered just under 5,000 (just 7 per cent of the white population) (Rukuni, 1994: 14). Considering Mugabe’s rhetoric on the land issue during the liberation war, this initial reaction of dismay and concern was an understandable one. There was a very real fear within the farming community that ZANU-PF success would lead to the compete destruction of white commercial agriculture (Miller, 1980a: 3). At the time of Independence Hill wrote that: ‘[a]t the back of every white Rhodesian’s mind is fear: fear of economic uncertainty in

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the new Zimbabwe, of losing jobs and property, of being outnumbered and humiliated; fear of the black man’s latent frustrations and violence’ (Hills, 1981: 186–87). This fear was palpable in The Farmer. The fi rst editorial of the year in 1980, titled ‘Traumatic Year’, attempted a review of the confusing events of 1979. While it found some cause for optimism in recent political developments, there was an overarching tone of skepticism. Ultimately it warned that:

More than paper promises are required if there is to be a renewal of confi d-ence of those whose skills and expertise are vital components to the welfare, prosperity and development of this land. And foremost among these with the know-how are farmers whose confi dence has been severely tested and who stand to lose most through the implementation of foolish political doctrine which is directly responsible for so much chaos in the Third World. To now lose the confi dence of agriculture – and in agriculture – can only spell national disaster. (Miller, 1980b: 3)

Such comments were and an obvious defence against the doctrines espoused by the ZANU-PF leadership, as the magazine sought to defend the position and place of white farmers. However, the farmers did not have to wait long to fi nd many of their initial fears of land acquisition and expropriation allayed. Immediately after Independence, Mugabe wasted no time in seeking to quell the concerns of whites in general, and white farmers in particular. On the eve of Independence he made his intentions clear: ‘If yesterday you hated me, today you cannot avoid the love that binds you to me and me to you. The wrongs of the past must now stand forgiven and forgotten’ (Selby, 2006: 113).

This message was delivered directly to farmers in various forms over the next few years. Firstly, Dennis Norman was made the Minister of Agriculture. This move did a great deal to bring the farmers and the government closer and start to foster a degree of trust and partnership between the two. Mugabe himself addressed the CFU’s annual congress in August and further endeared himself to the farming community. He stated:

Who doubts that our lives and the lives of seven and a half-million people lie in your hands? I therefore believe that you, the farmers, hold the future of our nation in your hands. I close [this speech] with the assurance that Government will do all in its power to assist you in the task of building a great Zimbabwe (1980: 18).

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Having feared the worst under black majority rule, farmers and the CFU welcomed such gestures and were relieved to fi nd their position and place in the country more secure. This developing partnership, not necessarily based upon genuine reconciliation as much as an expedient working relationship and ‘well calculated rhetoric’ on both sides, resulted in a remarkable transformation of Mugabe and ZANU-PF’s image in The Farmer (Sachikonye, 2004: 1). The obvious reason for this transformation was with contest for power now over, the CFU and The Farmer aligned themselves with the winners, the new elite in charge of its fortunes.

Palmer offers an excellent summary of events from 1980–1990 and shows how issues of land reform and farmer/government relations fared (Palmer, 1990). The basic pattern was one of initial partnership during the 1980s, where close relations between farmers and the government was facilitated, fi rstly, by the importance of the sector to the state, but also by key members of government and the CFU hierarchy that sought closer ties and communication (Bratton, 1987). People like Denis Norman, John Laurie (CFU president from 1984–86) and Dr Robbie Mupawose (Permanent Secretary for Agriculture from 1981–87) facilitated commu-nication between government and the CFU, and ensured a healthy working relationship. Other CFU presidents went even further in their public support for Mugabe and ZANU-PF. Bobby Rutherford, CFU president from 1986–88, was labelled ‘a card carrying political harlot, who spent more time with government than with his members’ (Selby, 2006: 177). His successor, John Brown, was quoted as saying that this ZANU-PF govern-ment was ‘the best government for commercial farmers that this country has ever seen’; evidence that the CFU was perusing a defi nite strategy of trying to foster close relations with government (Selby, 2006: 151–52). The Farmer refl ected this cosy partnership and did nothing to jeopardise it. In fact, it actively promoted it, fi rstly with many positive comments of government and its actions, and secondly by not contesting governments increasingly authoritarian hold on power, even when such actions put white farmers at risk.

The most obvious case in point in the 1980s was The Farmer’s coverage of the years of violence in Matabeleland known as Gukurahundi. The same reconciliation offered to the farmers by Mugabe was not extended to the people of Matabeleland, the support base of Mugabe’s rival Joshua Nkomo and his political party the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU). In 1983, under the pretext that unrest in Matabeleland was being

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caused by forces loyal to ZAPU, Mugabe deployed the newly trained Fifth Brigade to quell the unrest. What followed was a wave of horrifi c violence that from 1983 to 1986 is estimated to have claimed the lives of 20,000 people, while ‘hundreds of thousands of others were tortured, assaulted or raped or had their property destroyed’ (Phimister, 2007: 3).

While there certainly were rebel ZAPU elements ‘the scale of the threat posed by dissident activity ... was greatly exaggerated’ (Phimister, 2008: 198). In fact the dissidents are estimated to have only numbered 400 at most (The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 1997: 38). Nevertheless, white farmers were often victims of such activity. By 1987 more than 50 white farmers and their families had been murdered by dis-sidents (Selby, 2006: 170).4 The comprehensive report on Gukurahundi, Breaking the Silence, published in 1997 acknowledges that

it is generally accepted by all parties that dissidents were responsible for all the murders of white farmers and their families in the 1980s ... While the impact of dissidents on civilians in the communal lands was perceived as less harsh by far than that of 5 Brigade, the impact of the dissidents on the small commercial farming communities was dramatic’. (The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 1997: 38)

Unsurprisingly, these murders and attacks received a great deal of attention in The Farmer. ‘Security concerns’ were continually raised in the Matabeleland council meetings and the blame for the violence and destabilization was always placed on the ‘murderous dissidents’ or ‘cowardly bandits’ (The Farmer, 1984: 7).

Furthermore it continually put its faith in the government, which it portrayed as fully motivated to resolve the security concerns in the region. This representation was in line with that of the CFU leadership at the time. For example, in 1984, the CFU president John Laurie was quoted in The Farmer saying that the ‘commercial farming sector is fully aligned with the Government’s fi ght for stability and law and order’ (Laurie, 1984: 7). As the violence continued, the subsequent CFU president Bobby Rutherford reiterated this sentiment, confi rming that ‘numerous meetings have taken place with ministers and members of the security forces, and I wish to assure you [the farmers] of their concern and their determina-tion to see an end to the harassment and unwarranted loss of life’ (The Farmer, 1987a: 7).

In spite of the extensive coverage of this dissident activity and other ‘security concerns’ in The Farmer, there was absolutely no mention of

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the mass violence carried out by the Fifth Brigade on the people of Matabeleland. Rather the security forces were lauded for their efforts in eradicating the dissident threat. For example when the security forces killed the notorious bandit Gwesela in 1987, it was heralded as an act of great achievement.

The news that Gwesela ... has at last been killed has come as a great relief to many people, not least the people whom he and his gang have terrorised over the last few years. Farmers, farm workers, offi cials, tribesmen have all been victims of his ruthless and inhuman acts. … It is good that ordinary people realise that there is nobody who is above the law and that criminals will be dealt with. (1987b: 1)

For the victims and survivors of Gukurahundi, such statements of ‘the rule of law’ and the ‘cruel and inhuman acts’ of the dissidents alone are totally incongruous with their experiences. More than just an isolated episode of ‘tribal’ violence, ZANU-PF’s campaign in Matabeleland was a concerted and deliberate attempt to destroy the opposition base there. These tactics and practices have repeated themselves and became all too evident after 2000 and the rise of another viable opposition, the MDC (Eppel, 2004: 43).

The CFU and The Farmer’s deliberate and complicit silence on the issue needs some explanation. For understanding why, Rook’s comments make for an interesting reading. He stated with regards to the coverage of Gukurahundi, ‘the extent of the deliberately motivated genocidal policies then being perpetrated by the 5th Brigade in Matabeleland were at the time successfully shaded by government propaganda’. However, he went on to say that this was not the only reason for the circumspect reporting: ‘The Farmer then and later was sometimes subject to censorship by CFU. The degree of censorship was dependent on who was holding the Presidency at the time, and who was serving on the all powerful Council’ (Rook, 2009).

As already noted, members of the CFU hierarchy such as Laurie, Rutherford and Brown had very close ties to ZANU-PF and sought to keep things that way. Having survived the coming of majority rule, it is clear that the CFU wished to preserve its cosy relationship with the new government. Offering criticism on events in Matabeleland would have put that partnership in jeopardy, so, to avoid such a scenario, the CFU muzzled The Farmer and forced it to toe the CFU and party line.5 Even as the actions of the Fifth Brigade and escalating violence decimated

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white farming communities in the Midlands and Matabeleland, the CFU and The Farmer maintained their silence in order to remain ‘apolitical’. The problem with the CFU’s apoliticism was that it essentially boiled down to ‘support for the government in return for continuing privileges [which] really amounted to political advocacy for the ruling party and was certainly a conscious strategy’ (Selby, 2006: 177).

However, the 1990s saw the alliance between farmers and government erode signifi cantly, as the privileged status of the white farmers became less and less tenable (Moyo, 1995, Selby, 2006). 1990 in particular rep-resented a decisive watershed in relations between the two. Many of the more competent managers of dialogue had moved on and were re-placed by much more antagonistic and less subtle characters; Alan Burl (CFU president from 1990–1992) on the farmers side and new Minister for Lands and Agriculture, Witness Mangwende on the government side. In addition, the Lancaster House Constitution expired that year and it allowed the government to pursue compulsory acquisition as a land reform mechanism that further alienated white farmers from the government. Over the decade ZANU-PF found its political footing less and less secure. The successes of the 1980s were replaced by the harsh realities of the Zimbabwe’s failing economic fortunes. Zimbabwe was forced, by ‘established [global] orthodoxy’, to adopt a disastrous Economic Structural Adjustment Programme, which had a largely negative impact of the majority of Zimbabwe’s population. Economic growth stagnated while unemployment, infl ation and dissatisfaction all grew steadily. An increasingly desperate ZANU-PF turned to the land question and its resolution more and more as a source and solution to all the above prob-lems. Land has always been a key election tool for mobilizing political support, but over the 1990s the language and rhetoric employed by ZANU-PF became more and more aggressive. This was backed up by attempts at compulsory acquisition, which generally failed but raised tensions over the land and its ownership.

As the CFU become embroiled in dealing with issues of land reform The Farmer found more space to express itself and foster a more critical voice (Rook, 2009). In 1995 the magazine, boosted by a very favourable survey response to its distribution, admitted to a depressing period of self-censorship in the 1980s, which it had now overcome. The magazine resolved to ‘put the farmer back into The Farmer’ and engage more with their concerns (The Farmer, 1995: 26). It is this newfound confi dence and self-belief that would directly confl ict with the CFU’s policy towards political involvement and the state post-2000.

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2000 and Beyond

By 2000, the relationship between government and the CFU had taken a severe battering. The common perception is that the constitutional referendum of 2000 represented a fundamental shift in the interaction between the two. Selby has shown, however, that the relationship had been eroding throughout the 1990s, because of numerous issues of includ-ing those of compulsory acquisition, personality clashes and constant demonizing of white farmers by government media and press (Selby, 2006). The constitutional referendum of 2000 brought things to a head. The government-sponsored draft constitution contained a clause that ‘ob-liged’ Britain as the former colonial power to pay for the compensation of land taken by government (The Farmer, 2000c: 7). The farming commu-nity was, understandably, deeply concerned about such developments. Yet just as worrying for them was the rhetoric that accompanied the government’s drive to push through a ‘Yes’ vote. Lamenting the return of ‘evil’ in the form of racial confl ict, The Farmer was concerned about,

advertisements leading up to the referendum [that] openly attacked the white minority population: [such as] television ads on ZBC listed all the reasons why it was fi nally time to ‘send a clear message to the white settlers and take what is rightfully ours [the land]’. (200l: 9)

In turn the farmers put in a strong show of force to affect a ‘No’ vote. Obviously their numbers alone would not have been enough to have any dramatic impact on the result, but their labour force represented a huge voting block.6 As Selby illustrated, ‘while the NCA [National Con-stitutional Assembly] mobilized effectively in urban areas, farmers began to mobilize through local exercises, by urging farm-workers to reject the constitution, and by printing t-shirts and leafl ets calling for a “NO” vote’ (Selby, 2006: 277).

The Farmer shows exactly this process. Reporting after the event, Richard Winkfi eld in his regular column Bottom Line, wrote how he had invited all of his permanent employees to a meeting to explain the importance of registering and voting in the referendum. While stating this was not a ‘political rally’, because he abhorred political exhortation, this was ‘more like headmaster’s assembly and all I lacked was the cane... / I told them that if the leaders of Zimbabwe continued to foster corruption at the very highest level and continued to squander hard earned money, the jobs of our workers here were going to be on the line’ (Winkfi eld, 2000, 23).7

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The referendum and the active involvement of white farmers, through their own voting and the mobilization of farm labour, represented a brief fl irtation with political reawakening. But the extent of their political activity after this point was quickly revised after ZANU-PF’s backlash. Despite best efforts to claim it was not a political move, as Winkfi eld does above, it clearly was a move that brought the farming community into direct confl ict with political aims and objectives of Mugabe and ZANU-PF. It also shows how convenient the approach of apoliticism can be, and how manipulation of the term and its meaning allows a sense of vindication and security, even when the actions carried out are in direct opposition to the practices of apoliticism.

Mugabe, obviously shaken by his fi rst electoral defeat, came out in conciliatory mood and promised to respect the wishes of the people of Zimbabwe. However, the response of the ruling party was swift and ruthless. Mugabe and other party leaders ‘blamed the defeat on the white minority and ... promised retaliation in volatile political language’ (Raftopoulos, 2004: 13). Almost immediately after confi rmation of the result invasions of white owned commercial farmland started. The success of the NCA and the rise of the MDC as a viable opposition movement had reinvigorated much of civil society, but at the same time returned ZANU-PF’s violent, authoritarian and militaristic rule back into sharp focus. Analyses of ZANU-PF as ‘militaristic, vertical, undemocratic, violent and repressive’, who preferred to conduct politics ‘though the barrel of a gun’, were once again confi rmed (Freeman, 2005: 165, Phimister, 2008: 212). This vengeance and anger was brought to bear not only against the immediate political opposition of Morgan Tsvangirai and his party, but all those who were conveniently labelled as supporting him and his imperial backers. The white farmers slotted into this paradigm with remarkable ease (Raftopoulos, 2003). Mugabe’s loss in the constitutional referendum has long been seen as the catalyst to the land invasions, and once those started, The Farmer held no punches in reporting on events as and when they happened and as they saw fi t. It became increasingly ‘political’, and eventually carried as much commentary on the activities of the newly formed MDC, as it did on explicit farming matters.

As The Farmer, and the farming community celebrated the success of the ‘No’ vote, a series of well coordinated land occupations started around the country. These invasions, as they were labelled, received instant coverage in The Farmer. In the 2 March issue, the fi rst post-referendum invasions were reported: ‘Alleged members of the Zimbabwe National

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Liberation War Veterans Association are making yet another move to “take back the land” in a series of seemingly well-orchestrated land in-vasions throughout Zimbabwe’ (McNabb and Matare, 2000: 9). In the last weekend of February farms in all three Mashonaland provinces (East, Central and West), Masvingo and Manicaland provinces were invaded. Right from the beginning, coverage of such events in The Farmer carried discourse on the invasions that would become default positions for white farmers, namely that this had nothing to do with the land and that gov-ernment were directly involved (McNabb and Matare, 2000: 9).

By 2 March, over 70 farms had been occupied, with this number in-creasing by the day (Blair, 2002: 70). As it became clear that these new land occupations were different to others that had happened intermittently throughout Zimbabwe’s history, farmers, the CFU and The Farmer strug-gled to come to terms with the ramifi cations of what was unfolding (For more on squatter movements and land occupations see: Alexander, 2006, Alexander, 2003, Moyo and Yeros, 2005). The CFU, unable to ignore what was happening, used The Farmer to speak to its constituency. The Farmer made sure that it protected its independent image, by supplying this caveat:

This publication is not part of Zimbabwe’s Commercial Farmers’ Union, and does not normally give editorial space to the CFU – or to any other organization. But this week it has, and for a very simple reason: Zimbabwe stands on the edge of chaos and it has become necessary to take sides. So within these rather slim pages, with their news of land in-vasions, there is also a message from the CFU’s president (The Farmer, 2000f: 3).

The Farmer was trying to stress its independence at this crucial time but it is clear that CFU could and did use its infl uence to publish messages it felt were important. Assisting this cooperation was the fact that The Farmer was, at this early stage, obviously supportive of the CFU and their attempts to deal with events. A few months later, The Farmer, came out in even stronger support for the CFU and their chosen strategy of dealing with the land invasions. In an editorial in April, The Farmer set out to clear any ambiguities of alliance and affi liation. The magazine felt,

the need for The Farmer to take an unusual step: telling its readership where it stands. The Farmer is not part of Zimbabwe’s Commercial Farmers’ Union. It does not belong to the Union and has no affi liation with it … this is an independent magazine with no affi liation, political or otherwise, to any organization or body…. But that said, The Farmer’s readership is clearly

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defi ned: large-scale farmers and rural-based businesses and industries in the region. So yes, we agree with the ethos of commercial agriculture and we believe that the CFU provides an invaluable service to the industry – and not just during a crisis. (The Farmer, 2000k: 1)

This message was constantly backed up with calls for unity within the community, and the government was intent on using a tactic of divide and rule to fragment and weaken the strength of the white farmers.

But the stress on unity and need to promote a united front in the magazine shows that there were divisions and rifts in the community. And these opinions were rapidly diversifying as the land occupations radicalized people’s beliefs and the hope of an easy or quick resolution faded.8 Several factors increased the differences of opinion. Firstly, the invasions had far exceeded what farmers had expected as likely to happen. By the end of June, the CFU reported that 1525 farms (or 28 per cent of farms owned by its members) had been occupied (Harold-Barry, 2004: 269). Secondly the ensuing invasions were highly uneven processes, differing in nature from district to district, province to province (Buckle, 2001, Buckle, 2002, Sachikonye, 2004, Selby, 2006). The personalities involved, such as war veterans, police and political administrators had a huge infl uence on the actions on particular farms. But overall violence and intimidation were increasing, which further fueled the fears and concerns of white farmers. The murder of several farmers heightened the anxieties, and prompted a number of farmers to ask for more action and protection from the Union (For more on one of the most outspoken critics of the CFU’s stance see the letters and books of Catherine Buckle. Buckle, 2001, Buckle, 2002). The Farmer, still defending the CFU, replied in its leader:

If the CFU is not offering advice it is because there is no advice to offer ... What applies in the east of Zimbabwe is, invariably, at odds with what’s happening in the west. Some invaders are hostile, some deadly; but others are apologetic and even humorous. (The Farmer, 2000a: 1)

It was not only the lack of advice or action that was causing concern within the farming community, but the fact that farmers openly dis-agreed with the CFU’s decision to keep talking to government and the war veterans to fi nd a solution, even when it seemed obvious that neither of those parties respected any promises or arrangements made. After the murder of Allan Dunn at the beginning of May 2000, The Farmer defended the CFU and its decision to carry on talking to Government and the ‘war vets’: ‘If the CFU were to walk out of the talks – and they

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still might – there is every chance that the violence will increase tenfold, some say a hundredfold’ (2000i: 3). Undoubtedly it was a very trying time for farmers and the CFU to understand what was unfolding and what the best strategy for confronting the issues were. But the CFU decided that it would be best for the farming community to revert back to its pre-referendum stance and stay out of politics. And this illustrated by some interesting shifts in representation within The Farmer.

After the success of the ‘No’ vote campaign there was a great sense of unity with the farmers and other political entities. ‘In Mbare the people are laughing at this farce [the referendum] and for perhaps the fi rst time ever, they are sympathetic towards the nation’s farmers’ (The Farmer, 2000f: 5). However, the ensuing violence wrought against farmers caused a massive change in this attitude.

The perception (almost overwhelmingly incorrect) was that farmers had swept en masse to the Movement for Democratic Change. That was true until about a month ago. Now perception is that the farmers have swung towards ZANU-PF. The MDC will cry appeasement and expediency and be not a little angered by this, while unionized labour will look askance at employers whom they believed were bastions of support on the political, if not industrial, front…. Perhaps this proves what the Commercial Farmers’ Union has said all along; the business of farmers is business and being apolitical has its merits. (The Farmer, 2000j: 4)

Farmers now saw themselves alone on the front lines of the battle against Mugabe and his corrupt ZANU-PF. For the farmers, the land was the single origin to the crisis, and their failure to realize the multiple origins of the crisis further alienated them from much of society (for the multiple dimensions of the crisis see Hammar and Raftopoulos, 2003: 4–9). This message was hammered home again to farmers after the parliamentary elections, which The Farmer hardly covered and made no attempt to analyze. In a response to much of the anger directed at the CFU from various quarters for its handling of the crisis, The Farmer has this to say under the tragic title Out in the Cold and All Alone:

Everyone has advice, but no one has lifted a fi nger to help. And that includes the MDC. /… everyone also expects farmers: yes, through the CFU, to take on ZANU-PF single handedly. They want to watch the fi ght from the sidelines … there is only one force more powerful than ZANU-PF and that’s people power. And from the outset, this article has said that ZANU-PF cannot be trusted. … Isolation and loneliness of a protracted struggle without friends

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are the likely causes of the withdrawal, nothing more. And right or wrong, the decision has been made – but can only be reversed when farmers have proper support. So far there hasn’t been any sign that support will be forth-coming because whether it is apathy and nonchalance or simple cowardice we will never know, but not one has assisted commercial agriculture in any meaningful way. (The Farmer, 2000h: 1)

In the same article The Farmer manages to blame ZANU-PF for the farming community’s isolation from domestic politics, as a part of their sinister divide and rule tactic.

Meanwhile The Farmer maintained that the faming community was unifi ed behind the CFU leadership: ‘the fact remains that organized agriculture’s politics are managed by consensus – and the consensus is unequivocally in favour of the path being taken by agriculture’s leaders’ (The Farmer, 2000b: 1). It also believed that there was a great deal of empathy for farmers throughout the nation: ‘the overwhelming majority of Zimbabweans, be they in the communal lands or the townships, are sympathetic to the plight faced by organized agriculture’ (The Farmer, 2000g: 5). But evidence from within The Farmer’s own pages, and from without, shows that neither were the farmers united, nor was there a broad consensus of sympathy for white farmers and their plight. Farmers were often seen as aloof, wealthy and racist and there is little surprise in the fact that the rhetorical and physical attacks of Mugabe on the white farmers fell on such fertile soil, domestically and regionally. In 1991, The Farmer carried a survey on how other Zimbabweans ‘see us [white farmers]’. These are just some of the responses the magazine decided to publish:

I have been angered and frustrated by their attitude to blacks. – LawyerThey are a bunch of ****** [sic], very racially prejudiced. – AccountantI wonder if the know how they make us feel, treating us like second-rate citizens in our own country. – Trainee bank manager. (The Farmer, 1991: 11, 13)

The CFU’s image fared no better as Selby has pointed out. Black commercial farmers established the Indigenous Commercial Farmers Union (ICFU) in 1991 because the CFU offered no representation for black farmers. To emphasize the point an independent consultant ‘iden-tifi ed the racial exclusiveness of the CFU as their biggest weakness and greatest threat’ (Selby, 2006: 187, 242). Sentiments such as these had as much currency at the turn of the millennium, as there was no fundamental change to the makeup and operational remit of the CFU.

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Furthermore, farmers themselves were not unifi ed over the crises facing them. A perfect insight into this is found in the letters section of The Farmer. In March 2000, Catherine Buckle and Nick Arkell both wrote in to ask what the Union was doing and why the deafening silence on the invasions (Arkell, 2000, Buckle, 2000). They felt that a more decisive and aggressive stance should have been taken by the CFU and it was not a wise plan to continue to negotiate with the government. However, an even more telling example, and a key moment in the history of The Farmer which fundamentally underscores the confl icts and divisions within the community came in June 2000. Ian Smith himself, returned to his humble farming roots, wrote into the magazine to criticise its editorial policies:

I am deeply concerned that the bulk of the editorial comments in our magazine are directed at the political scene, and that these are in confl ict with the course which Nick Swanepoel [ex-president of the CFU] and others working with him are striving to secure ... for people in responsible positions of authority to provoke hostility and confl ict with the powers in totalitarian control, is the height of irresponsibility, and can only further endanger our farming com-munity…. After all there are a number of independent newspapers which constantly criticise and condemn government, and they do a much better job than The Farmer…. It is a sad fact of life that our Farmer magazine ... has denigrated into a third rate political rag. I believe the time has come for our CFU executive to disperse with this dreadful embarrassment and fi nd a responsible replacement. (Smith, 2000: 4)

This scathing letter produced a fl urry of responses, in support of both The Farmer and Smith. In defence of Smith, Margaret Payne wrote in calling Smith ‘just another poor commercial farmer’, and that there ‘are lots and lots of people who happen to think he is a great guy and don’t know that life under his government was a lot better than life under the present one’ (Payne, 2000: 5). Others wrote in supporting The Farmer’s political coverage and hailed it as one of the most important sources of information of what was actually happening in the rural areas. Yet others, who saw through the CFU/Farmer claims of independence, wrote in condemning the proximity of The Farmer to the CFU accusing The Farmer of being as ‘free thinking as the Herald [the state run daily newspaper] just prior to the elections’ (Logan, 2000: 3).

Whatever the pressures it was under, The Farmer continued its crusade to report on the political context and its impact on rural affairs. In fact, in 2001 it even expanded the scope of its coverage. Not only did it continue to

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report on the violence wrought against farmers in ever increasing graphic detail (such as including photos of murdered farmers), but began to talk of the fate of the disenfranchized farm workers. The magazine produced a number of hard-hitting features on the plight of exiled farmer workers and the problems they now faced (2001a, 2001b). This kind of coverage wore on The Farmer’s relationship with the CFU who had put all their eggs in one basket and decided to pursue a policy of ‘quiet diplomacy’ with government. Moments of tension are clear in the ‘Leader’ column, where comments about editorial freedom and the need to keep telling the story of white farmers carry much more importance when read in this context. For example, after the bombing of the Daily News offi ces in February 2001, the ‘Leader’ noted the interesting reaction in the farming community. Stating it would take a brave person to defend the bombing, the author drew the connection to the fact that ‘increasingly, there are those who believe that brutality on Zimbabwe’s farms doesn’t need perhaps, we shall say, quite as much exposure as it did in the past’ (The Farmer, 2001c: 1). The implication is obvious. Those wishing to muzzle The Farmer, in a sense, condone what happened with the Daily News and the shutting down of a fellow ‘independent’ press.

Soon, however, the fate experienced by the Daily News was one shared by The Farmer. On the 2 April 2002, The Farmer published its last edition. Proclaiming the ‘end of an era’ and that it was yet ‘another victim of the Zimbabwean Crisis’ this last publication lamented the closure of a magazine that for over 70 years had served the white farming community. In his fi nal editorial, Brian Latham had no regrets for his and his staffs reporting of the land invasions. He wrote:

it was a story we felt had to be told. History will judge critically those who believed, for whatever reason, that there was merit in burying the truth – or even leaving the telling of the truth to other newspapers with less interest in the farming community. We were never going to pretend it wasn’t happening…. Critics say we made it diffi cult for the Commercial Farmers’ Union. Well, for us the union is its members, the people being intimidated, threatened, extorted, chased from their homes, robbed and murdered. To us, [these victims] are far more important than the people in Agriculture House [the CFU head-quarters]…. We sense, but do not know, that the new paper will give less atten-tion to the appalling plight facing farmers and farm workers. (The Farmer, 2002: 8)

This new magazine never came to light. It is clear from Latham’s com-ments that there was a great deal of pressure put on The Farmer to reign in

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its reporting. When approached about The Farmer’s closure, Rook claimed the vast majority of farmers wanted it to remain in publication. He also questioned the Union’s claims of fi nancial diffi culties for the magazine’s closure and revealed that he had come up with a business model to keep The Farmer alive with active subscriptions. But the CFU refused to take his proposals into consideration (2009). It is clear that the CFU wished to keep dealing with ZANU-PF, as it felt that this was the best way to try and secure some sort of future for itself and its constituency, and it believed, or knew, that The Farmer, in its present form, was a direct threat to such a policy. Its attempts to control the magazine and its coverage had failed, so the one decisive option it had was to shut the magazine down. Having given up on political involvement and shunned any offi cial semblance of support for the MDC, the CFU turned to dissenting voices within its own establishment in a bid to further safeguard itself.

Conclusion

What must be remembered, however, is that this decision to shut down The Farmer, though dramatic, was a continuation of CFU policy towards the magazine rather than a fundamental shift. When one looks back to the 1980s, The Farmer was constrained by very similar practices. However, the confi ned atrocities of Gukurahundi (and their proximity to Independence) did not cause the massive fi ssures in the farming com-munity as events post-2000 did. As a result of the CFU’s handling of the land invasions, it soon lost the support of many farmers and The Farmer’s editorial board. As Latham’s comments make clear, the issue of victimhood became blurred by the CFU’s approach. The CFU only concerned itself with those farmers still on the land, because to pursue the case for those evicted would mean confrontation with the government. This bias towards only those farmers on the land meant it alienated those farmers who had already been evicted. With that number growing all the time, sympathy for them and fear among the remaining farmers turned attitudes against the CFU and its policy of ‘quiet diplomacy’ in dealing with government. Yet the CFU remained committed to such a policy. In accordance, it distanced itself from any form of political opposition (the MDC or otherwise) and it chose to stifl e The Farmer and other dis-senting farming voices to protect whatever relationship it still believed it had with the government. When The Farmer began to distance itself from the CFU’s approach, the response was swift and emphatic. In keeping with its attitude of affi rmative parochialism, it believed that it could exist

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outside the wider politics of events in the country. This is shown in many of its dealings with government post-Independence, and it expresses itself in the Union’s infl uences over the reportage and content of The Farmer. The Farmer, whilst often adopting the CFU line, also challenged its control, but ultimately was bound to CFU directives as events both in the 1980s and post-2000 so dramatically prove. The Farmer’s demise is one that has been shared other forms of media, independent or otherwise, in Zimbabwe’s repressive environment over the last decade. In addition, the survival tactics of the CFU have been mirrored by others who have come under fi re from ZANU-PF. Most notably, there may be a case for arguing that the MDC, in its present guise as part of the Government of National Unity, has adopted similar approaches to the crisis by seeking to work within ZANU-PF’s paradigms and refusing to confront the government head on. As a result, both institutions or parties still exist, but both have been fundamentally undermined by such actions and decisions.

As this article has illustrated, studying the voices of this white community offers opportunities to explore in more detail, to borrow Cooper’s term again, the ‘ambiguities’ of Independence and how these played out and evolved in the post-colonial era. Doing so confronts simultaneously the nationalist rhetoric of the liberation government and the inclusive and developmentalist language of the white farmers. In teasing these tensions out, this article seeks to show that decisions take and tactics employed, by both the state and the white farmers, were not entrenched or static, but were ones that were informed by changing leadership and political, social and economic contexts. As Cooper has said, ‘preserving the sense of ambiguity and ambivalence is not simply a matter of academic refi nement, but of recognizing, in the present as much as the past, the possibility of alternative political goals and strategies’ (Cooper, 2008: 195). The study of such elites, intermediaries and other orphans of empire across Africa and their interaction with the state, colonial and post-colonial, can only strengthen such an approach and reveal a great deal more of the intricacies of the continents contested past and troubled present.

NOTES

1. The CFU, originally the Rhodesian National Farmers Union, was established in 1942 as a result of the amalgamation of various farming bodies and organizations, which came together to form a unifi ed body to represent the interests of white farmers. By Independence the CFU had established itself

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as the representative body of white farmers and continued to enjoy such a position until events after 2000 began to undermine its authority.

2. ZANU, originally led by Ndabaningi Sithole, formed in 1963, as a result of a split from ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Peoples Union) which itself had only formed in 1961 and was banned by the Rhodesian state in 1962. ZANU was then banned in 1964 but continued to operate from exile until allowed to return and contest the 1980 elections. In those elections, ZANU was renamed ZANU-PF in order to differentiate itself from Sithole’s Rhodesian and Smith sanctioned Zanu which was also participating in the election (Astrow, 1983: xiii). ZANU-PF has since been in power throughout Zimbabwe’s independent history. The MDC was formed in September 1999. The strengthening alliance between the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and other civic groups in the 1990s led to the birth of the MDC, as calls for a new opposition party became more and more pressing due to ZANU-PF’s mishandling of the country and economy (Raftopoulos, 2003: 228).

3. Yet this did not stop Norman offering a great deal of support and praise for government’s approach to land reform and management in his own book on peasant agriculture (Norman, 1986).

4. Dissidents claimed that they ‘murdered those white farmers they perceived as hostile, without a clear redistribution policy’ (The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe, 2007: 40).

5. One is reminded of the poem by the German pastor Martin Niemöller: When the Nazis came for the communists, / I remained silent; / I was not a communist. / Then they locked up the social democrats, / I remained silent; / I was not a social democrat. /Then they came for the trade unionists, I did not speak out; / I was not a trade unionist. / Then they came for the Jews, / I did not speak out; / I was not a Jew. / When they came for me, /there was no one left to speak out for me. For more on this poem and Niemöller, see Professor Harold Marcus’ webpage. Available at http://www.history.ucsb.edu/faculty/marcuse/niem.htm (accessed, 24 May 2008).

6 . The land reforms and invasions have also been seen primarily as an attack on the farming labour as a voting bloc. Considering the scale of their contri-bution to the constitutional referendum, ZANU-PF feared that if allowed to vote freely in the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections, the commercial farm labour could be the swing votes between the rural (ZANU-PF) and urban (MDC) voting blocs. See Justice for Agriculture (2008: 13–4).

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7. Despite his protestations of no political or emotional exhortation, Winkfi eld basically told all the men present they would have no future if they did not vote against Mugabe. Nevertheless he felt he was doing the right thing. ‘We are living in enlightening times. Twenty years ago this sort of communication would have stunk of paternalism’. He fails to see that method and delivery are more important than content and his own imagery of a headmaster’s assembly does him no favours.

8. The land invasions radicalized more than the farmers’ voices. For other aca-demic voices fervently supportive of the land reforms/invasions, see Moyo (2004), Moyo and Yeros (2005). And for an exiled voice strongly against the reforms/invasions, see Godwin (2006). The interesting thing about Moyo and Godwin is that both used to be well respected for their balanced assessments of political situations in Zimbabwe. For a discussion on both, see Pilossof (2008).

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p. 24.The Farmer (2000f) ‘Leader’, 16 March, 1.The Farmer (2000g) ‘Making Themselves Unpopular’, 28 November, p. 5.The Farmer (2000h) ‘Out in the Cold and All Alone’, 22 August, p. 1 and p. 11.The Farmer (2000i) ‘Talking Turkey? Maybe but it’s no Ordinary Turkey’, 11 May, The Farmer (2000j) ‘Think of the Present, but Don’t Forget the Future’, 4 May,

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The Farmer (200la) ‘Words to Remember’, 17 February, p. 5.The Farmer (2001b) ‘Farm Workers in the Spotlight’, 18 September, pp. 12–13.The Farmer (2001c) ‘Farm Workers’ Plight Continues to Worsen’, 28 August, p. 7.The Farmer (2001d) ‘Let it All Out’, 13 February, p. 1.The Farmer (2002) ‘The End of the Line’. The Farmer, 2 April, p. 8.Wasserman, H. (2009) ‘Learning a New Language: Culture, Ideology and Eco-

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Rory Pilossof is a PhD student reading History at the University of Sheffi eld. Address: 9 Burgoyne Road, Sheffi eld, Walkley, S6 3QA, UK. [email: [email protected]].

Remaining Apolitical in a Political Crisis: Exploring Interest Group Politics

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