Regionalism in the Americas and the Hierarchy of Power

Regionalism in the Americas and the Hierarchy of PowerAuthor(s): Gordon Mace, Louis Belanger and Jean Philippe TherienSource: Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Summer, 1993),pp. 115-157Published by: Center for Latin American Studies at the University of MiamiStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/165947 .

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Regionalism in the Americas and the Hierarchy of Power

Gordon Mace, Louis Belanger, and Jean Philippe Thbrien*

IT SEEMS that regionalism is making a comeback nowadays (Rostow, 1990).1 Not so much in the real world where

different types of regional arrangements never ceased to be a functional part of the workings of the international system since the 1950s, but more so in the scientific production of international relations scholars.

Those old enough to recollect the 1960s will remember how such journals as International Organization and the

Journal of Common Market Studies, to name only two, were filled with articles largely dominated by theoretical and meth-

odological considerations concerning the study of regionalism.

Gordon Mace is Director of the research program of the Centre quebegois de relations internationales and Professor of International Rela- tions in the Department of Political Science, Laval University (Quebec). He is co-author (with Louis Belanger and Louis Balthazar) of a book on Quebec's international relations and has published articles on foreign policy and regional integration in a number of scholarly journals.

Jean-Philippe Therien is Associate Professor of Interational Relations in the Department of Political Science, at the University of Montreal. He is the author of a book on the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and has published several articles on Canadian foreign policy and foreign aid.

Louis Belanger is a research associate with the Centre quebecois de relations internationales of Laval University (Quebec).

* The authors wish to acknowledge the very useful work of collecting and analyzing data of their research assistants Frederic Fortin, Frangois Jubinville and Martin Roy. They would also like to acknowledge the financial support offered by the Fonds FCAR and would like to express their gratitude to Andrew Axline, David Haglund, Harold Klepak and Peter McKenna, who made very useful comments on first drafts of this paper. They also wish to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. It goes without saying, however, that the authors remain solely responsible for the actual content of the article.

115



116 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

The two main foci were then "regions"2 and "regional integration."3 However, by the mid-1970s scientific production on regionalism and integration almost ceased to exist4 as scholars previously active in the field shifted their attention to other subjects of interest.

After a lull of a little more than a decade, it appears that scholars are coming back to the study of regionalism. A team at the Centre d'(tudes et de recherches interationales (CERI) in Paris has an ongoing project on regionalism in Africa. Specialists on rural development at the Centre Sahel, in Quebec City, are using a regional integration framework to structure their analysis of development problems in the Sahel countries. Research institutes in Europe are reactivating projects on community-building in the European Economic Community (EEC) while initiating new ones on trans-border regionalism. Regional cooperation is also becoming a major theme of research in Asia. And then there is Latin America where regional integration has never ceased to be an object of interest,5 but where new forms of regionalism are now being explored.

I. REGIONALISM IN THE AMERICAS

FROM a general point of view, the recent literature on international relations points to a growing impression that

the world economy is now in the process of restructuring itself on the basis of major trading blocs in Europe, in North America and in Asia aroundJapan (Belous and Hartley, 1990b; Strange, 1991; Rosecrance, 1991). What is not clear is just how efficient these blocs will prove to be (Cooper, 1990) and what impact they will have on multilateral trade (Tussie, 1991).6 Also unclear is whether this commercial regionalism might not take other forms, possibly extending itself into the larger economic realm, if not- eventually- into the political-diplomatic field.

In the case of the Americas, the last couple of years have witnessed a renewal of interest in the phenomenon of regionalism in the Western Hemisphere. Some have now come to



MACE, BELANGER AND THERIEN: REGIONALISM IN THE AMERICAS 117

envision the possibility of an emerging Hemispheric bloc. This came about following a certain revitalization of the Organiza- tion of American States (OAS) and, more importantly, in the wake of President Bush's announcement of his Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) in June 1990. The establishment of a common market arrangement among the countries of the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR) and the signing of the Canada- United States Free Trade Agreement, along with the initiation of negotiations leading to a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), also played a major role in strengthening the vision of a Hemispheric-wide regionalism.

However, this is certainly not a vision shared by everyone. On the contrary, many believe that there are more obstacles than positive factors on the way to realizing the old American dream of inter-American cooperation, or even Hemispheric free trade. Andrew Hurrell, for one, states that "... the notion that a cohesive and exclusive regional bloc is likely to emerge in the Americas follows from a one-sided analysis of inter- American relations" (Hurrell, 1992: 139). He bases his argument on three types of consideration. The first consideration is that US economic interests in Latin America are no longer as strong as they once were and that, due to the strongly multilateral orientation of US trading patterns, its interests do not appear to be consonant with a closed, exclusivist, regional bloc. Secondly, there is the fact that Latin American govern- ments want to keep their options open and maintain economic and diplomatic relations with countries outside the Hemi- sphere, particularly in Europe and Asia. Third, if regionalism is to be considered as a phenomenon capable of encompassing more than purely commercial or economic ties, then opposing views between the United States and Latin America on such issues as democratization, the environment and security might well constitute serious obstacles to Hemispheric regionalism (Hurrell, 1992: 132-135).7

If, as noted, conflicting views do exist regarding Hemi- spheric regionalism, then what about other forms of regionalism in the Americas? What is the possibility that more limited




forms of regionalism, functional or geographic, might develop in the Western Hemisphere? Here again the picture is not clear.

For some, the only possibility, in this sense, lies in North America. This view holds that the only region in the Americas where conditions favorable for a free trade area - and, eventually, for larger economic integration - exist is in the region composed of Canada, the United States and Mexico (Cooper, 1990; Farrow and York, 1990; Strange, 1991). Susan Strange even argues that this is the only trading bloc really capable of functioning as a threat to multilateral trade because of its emphasis on protectionist, exclusivist measures (Strange, 1991).8

Nevertheless, if many analysts see a trading bloc in North America limited to Mexico, Canada and the United States, there is by no means a total agreement with regard to the boundaries of that system. Andres Serbin, for example, believes that the North American trading bloc already includes most of the Caribbean countries (Serbin, 1991). In a very interesting analysis of world trade patterns for 1968 and 1983, Peschel, on her part, concluded that the world trading system of 1983 was composed of four "integration areas and/or trade blocs of high intensity". These were Western Europe, Eastern Europe, America and South-East Asia (Peschel, 1990: 84). In discussing the Americas, her analysis brought her to the conclusion that the countries which make up the Latin America Free Trade Association (LAFTA), rather than forming a single bloc, are, in fact, split in two, with the region's main trading center being located in North America. Although these conclusions confirm those reached by other studies on regionalism in the Americas, this unanimity is by no means complete. Peschel writes, in effect:

Other American countries, mostly to be classified as newly industrializing countries, form a trade bloc with USA/Canada/Mexico, yet are not clustered together with them into one integration area. These somewhat ambigu- ous results are completely in line with the idea that the USA and Canada and, on a minor level, Mexico form an industrial centre ofgravitywhereas the other Latin Ameri-




can states may belong to its periphery [our emphasis] (Peschel, 1990: 85).

Which means, from her point of view, that regionalism in the Americas might not be limited only to North America after all. This, then, and contrary to other analyses, leaves open not only the possibility for Hemispheric regionalism, but also the possibility of other regional systems elsewhere in the Americas as well.

This last eventuality is not altogether excluded from the literature. Frederick Turner, for example, is not the only one to anticipate the advent of a regional system in South America, or, at least, in the Southern Cone, around the Brazil-Argentina axis (Turer, 1991). Like others, he envisions the possibility of a Hemispheric system that could be dominated by two regional centers, one located in North, and one in South, America.

There are even others, building on this idea, who compli- cate the equation. Taking the Group of Three (Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia) as a focus for analysis, they look closely at the situation of Venezuela and Colombia which, because they are geographically distant from both regional centers, might attempt to foster the development of a third regional system, at least in the political-diplomatic realm.9

Consequently, whatever outcome may develop concerning regionalism in the Americas, one thing is absolutely clear. This brief review of the literature indicates that there is not yet an adequate understanding of what is happening, right now, in terms of regionalism in the Americas. Alternative, and sometimes conflicting, views make it impossible to draw a clear picture of current trends in the Americas, whether towards, or away from, regionalism.

One explanation of this confusing situation is that there is no clear definition of regionalism. Though there have been previous attempts at operationalizing the concept of regional systems (see, for example, Thompson, 1973), and at defining more precisely the concept of regional integration (De Vree, 1972), so far there has been no satisfactory construction of this theoretical effort.10 It is not even certain that those definitions




reached 10-20 years ago could encompass the subtle changes at work in contemporary regionalism.

This problem of inadequate conceptualization of regionalism as an object of study appears in different passages of the current literature on regionalism in the Americas.1 In a survey of this literature, it is never certain if the author is referring to commercial regionalism or if the allusion is to a broader form of regionalism, one that would encompass economic and political aspects of the phenomenon.

Consequently, the main research problem that confronts the study of regionalism in the Americas is one of alternative, and even opposing, views. This problem is based, in turn, on a larger one involving an operational definition of the phenomenon. Some scholars have tried to work, in this sense of the problem, by proposing working definitions. Hurrell, for one, defines regionalism as:

... a set of policies by one or more states designed to promote the emergence of a cohesive regional unit, which dominates the pattern of relations between the states of that region and the rest of the world, and which forms the organizing basis for policy within the region across a range of issues (Hurrell, 1992: 123). In employing this definition, Hurrell recognizes that he is

placing the emphasis on just one aspect in the emergence of regionalism, namely policies, to the detriment of others, such as factors relating to language, geography or culture.

Although policy is certainly an important factor in deter- mining the outcome of regionalism, we would argue that this is far from the sole element to be considered when delineating the phenomenon. From our point of view, a thorough study of regionalism would need to focus on at least four elements.

1. Transactions. This basic assumption of the transactional school of regionalisml2 implies that a certain pattern of increased transactions (economic, political, cultural) between member countries of a regional system, as opposed to transactions with countries outside that system, must be




in evidence for regionalism to exist. We strongly agree with this assumption.

2. Institutional arrangements. Transactions by themselves do not constitute a sufficient condition for regionalism. To function, a regional system needs some kind of institutional arrangement to structure and regulate transactions while, at the same time, offering a framework for discussion of themes and policies that affect the whole region. Verification of the existence and effectiveness of these institutional arrangements is also a pre-condition testify- ing to the presence (or absence) of regionalism.

3. Policies..Here we agree with Hurrell that states' policies favourable or unfavourable to regionalism are also an important factor to be taken into consideration when studying a regional phenomenon. Policies can be exam- ined here at two levels. In the first instance, we find policies pursued within the framework of an integration scheme that might be compatible or not compatible, as was the case with Chile's behaviour in the Andean Pact. At another level are national policies developed outside the integration scheme but which, nevertheless, have an impact on regionalism, whether by supporting, or opposing, that condition.

4. Values. We would argue that a certain level of common values with regard to the functioning of the economy, democracy, human rights, and so on is also a necessary precondition for the existence of regionalism.13 In order to assert that regionalism is developing in a

certain geographical region, we would therefore need to verify the existence of a trend in favour of all four aspects noted above. This being said, we would also argue that, before the above is even considered, we need to have an adequate understanding of the distribution of power within a given geographical region. Here, a useful analogy can be drawn from economic theory. If, as Hirschman (1958: chap. IV) and others stated some years ago, economic growth tends to take place around "poles of growth," then regionalism would seem to




have a better chance to develop around poles of power. Because of their power of attraction, major powers of a given region act as a center for transactions and, therefore, as a focus for regionalism.'4

Of course we know who the major powers in the Americas are. What we know a little bit less is how the capabilities of these major countries have changed over the past 20 years, and how their relationship with their neighbours, particularly with middle-size countries, has evolved during that time.15 There might have been significant changes in the level of relative power capabilities and, therefore, important modifications in the relationship between countries of a given geographical region or sub-region. These changes, having a potentially significant bearing on the outcome of regionalism, cannot be ignored. This is why the first prerequisite in the study of regionalism in the Americas implies an appraisal of how the distribution of power has evolved, or altered, over a given period of time in that region. This is the main topic addressed in this article.

II. MEASURING POWER CAPABILITIES

WYp THIN THE discipline of international relations, there is a longstanding interest in the scientific study, and analy-

sis, of power.'6 This tradition goes back many decades and involves many aspects related to the concept of power.

One of the important paths followed in this pursuit of knowledge regarding the nature of power has been the study of national capabilities. A major rationale for this kind of research was based on a major assumption of the "realist" school of international relations that an understanding of the dynamics of world politics, at a certain period in time and in a particular geographical context, would best be achieved through thorough knowledge of the distribution of power among states in a given international system or sub-system.

A review --of the literature shows that most research designed to measure national power has generally focused on




four dimensions of a state's capabilities: (1) geography (population, territory, natural resources); (2) the economy (economic power, commercial power, level of development); (3) the political dimension (stability of regimes, cohesion, diplomatic involvement, etc.); and (4) the military dimension (budgetary expenses, size of conventional and nuclear forces). Some scholars have proposed that a distinction should be made between real and perceived power (Ferris, 1973), advocating that the focus of attention should properly be on real power - i.e., the resources over which a state exercises exclusive control - since, ultimately, this represents the only means available to the state for pursuing the national interest. This concept has come under criticism on the grounds that a state's national capabilities cannot be adequately understood and evaluated unless viewed in relation to the national capabilities of other states (Goldmann, 1979; see also Sjostedt, 1979). Charles Doran (1991) appears to endorse this view, however, in proposing the distinction between absolute and relative power in elaborating his theory of power cycles.

Over the years, quite a few attempts have been made regarding measurement of national capabilities. Probably the most far-reaching attempt was that of Ray Cline (1980), whose work influenced many analysts in this field. One of the most recent efforts is that of Charles Doran. A summary of the results of his latest research will appear in a forthcoming book, but he has already presented his index of measurements and discussed some of the findings obtained thus far.17

For the period after 1950, Doran proposes measurement based on the following indicators. As indicators of size, he proposes measuring iron-and-steel production, population, and defense spending. Indicators of development are energy use and gross national product (GNP) per capita. Together, size and development provide a measure of national capability (Doran, 1991: 52).

Doran's choice of indicators is congruent with what is usually found in current research on the measurement of national capability.18 Of course, some indicators are more




widely used than others. This is the case with population (Doran, 1991; Cline, 1980; Wallace, 1973), defense spending (Ferris, 1973; Gilpin, 1975),19 and GNP per capita.20 Others appear less frequently but are nevertheless highly regarded in some circles. This is the case for production of iron and steel and for energy use, as we have seen with Doran, as well as for diplomatic recognition21 and external trade (discussed in Krasner, 1985).

This being said, it is quite evident that one could argue extensively (and sometimes indefinitely, as witnessed by past literature on the subject) in favour of, or against, each one of the indicators used in this type of exercise. But common sense, rather than purely methodological rules, would seem to offer the more appropriate basis for choice here. Consequently, and in accordance with mainstream analysis in this regard, we have made the choices outlined in the following paragraphs.

Measurement of national capability is based on seven indicators regrouped along five dimensions. Size is measured by population and gross domestic product (GDP).22 Develop- ment is measured by GDP per capita.23 Defense spending gives us a measure of military strength,24 while diplomatic missions do the same for political prestige.25 Finally, commercial power is determined by total exports.26 It should be noted that, although some of the elements are rearranged differently, the resulting yardstick resembles the one proposed by Doran. We simply leave out his indicators of energy use and iron/steel production, and we add trade and diplomatic missions. All in all, and on the basis of the existing literature, we feel that our set of indicators do respect the conditions established by Doran himself, namely: (1) they are arbitrary measures; (2) but at the same time generally accepted as reliable and valid; (3) and are non-elastic measures of data used to index essential concepts in the field (Doran, 1991: 49).

This leaves us with the problem of aggregation which has never been adequately resolved in the literature. Are we not losing part of the reality with aggregate indexes and how should we proceed with aggregation so as not to arrive at a too




artificial result? We agree with Doran that international relations need yardsticks, and we believe that discussion resulting from aggregate indexes can escape an artificial character provided that the necessary caveats are clearly stated. With regard to the weight to be given to component indicators in the aggregation process, we again agree with Doran when he writes that" ... neither an empirical nor a theoretical argument could be found to give the indicators other than equal weight" (Doran, 1991: 54). Thus we have structured our research design accordingly. Taking into consideration the general aim of our research project, we assign a relatively higher weight to economic indicators.

From a practical point of view, the index is calculated by giving each country, for each selected indicator, a value as a function of its relative status to the country which has obtained the highest score and to which we have assigned 1000 points. We then determine the average of the recorded values for the six indicators, which gives us the aggregate index for each country's capacity. From this index, we establish the rank order of the powers. Results are also expressed in decile ranking, so that we have available to us, for the purpose of analysis, a yardstick of the spread between countries, taking into account variations at both the base and the summit of the hierarchy.27

The following section presents the main findings of our analysis concerning the hierarchy of power in the Americas at three periods in time: 1966-1969, 1976-1979 and 1986-1989.28 At all times, we have tried to be careful not to exclude any state, except in cases where no data were available or when irregular appearances might present problems in the statistical analysis. However, construction of the aggregate index has made it necessary to exclude a country for which data was missing for one of the three periods covered. In all, 24 countries were selected. Exclusion applies mostly to small countries of the Caribbean and does not, therefore, distort the overall picture to any great extent.




III. THE RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS

A. Population Size

First of all, it will come as no surprise to note that the demographical spread of the United States, the most populous country in the Hemisphere, has been reduced in favor of the Latin American countries. Thus Brazil, which is ranked second and which, so to speak, leads the general progressive move- ment among countries in the South, gains 1.5 points in relative spread, measured according to decile ranking, over the two 10- year periods covered by the study. We then note that this population increase is growing proportionally faster in Brazil and in the Andean countries than in the remainder of the southern continent.

In rank order, these trends show that Brazil and Mexico have been consolidating their positions in second and third place, respectively. However, in the hierarchy of those who emerge here as intermediate powers, rankings are disturbed by the surge of the Andean countries, who are pulling down the lead of Canada and Argentina. In effect, during the 1970s, Canada relinquished its fifth place position in favour of Colombia. A bit lower on the table, Nicaragua is also progress- ing slowly up the hierarchy, moving to 18th place from its former position in the 20th spot, at the same time costing two places to Uruguay and Jamaica.

It would thus appear that changes in the demographic size of the countries in the region are promoting new rankings among the middle powers, in which the most populous Andean countries are bringing major pressures to bear on such intermediate powers as Argentina and Canada, whose popu- lations are growing at a lower rate.



Table 1 Hierarchy and Dispersion of Countries According to Population I -1966-1969 M USA- II- 1976-1979 M USA- III -1986-1989 M USA-

Country hab. Decile 1000 Country hab. Decile 1000 Country hab. Decile 1000

1 USA 199.67 10.00 1000.0 1 USA 221.48 10.00 1000.0 1 USA 243.97 10.00 1000.0

2 Brazil 86.47 4.31 433.1 2 Brazil 111.61 5.02 503.9 Z Brazil 142.94 5.85 585.9

3 Mex. 46.50 2.30 232.9 3 Mex. 64.74 2.90 292.3 3 Mex. 82.03 3.34 336.2

4 Arg. 22.96 1.12 115.0 4 Arg. 27.13 1.19 122.5 4 Arg. 31.34 1.26 128.4

5 Canada 20.56 1.00 102.9' 5 Col. 24.71 1.08 111.6 5 Col. 30.38 1.22 124.5

6 Col. 19.22 0.93 96.2 6 Canada 23.38 1.02 105.5 6 Canada 25.78 1.03 105.6

7 Peru 12.51 0.59 62.7 7 Peru 16.21 0.70 73.2 7 Peru 21.00 0.83 86.1

8 Ven. 9.48 0.44 47.5 8 Ven. 13.83 0.59 62.5 8 Ven. 18.52 0.73 75.9

9 Chile 8.94 0.42 44.8 9 Chile 10.68 0.45 48.2 9 Chile 12.65 0.49 51.8

10 Ecuador 5.49 0.24 27.5 10 Ecuador 7.56 0.31 34.1 10 Ecuador 10.07 0.38 41.3 . 11 Guat. 4.77 0.21 23.9 11 Guat. 6.46 0.26 29.1 11 Guat. 8.56 0.32 35.1

12 Bolivia 4.50 0.19 22.5 12 Bolivia 5.24 0.20 23.6 12 Bolivia 690 0.25 28.3

13 Haiti 4.07 0.17 20.4 13 Dom. R. 5.10 0.19 23.0 13 Dom. R. 6.82 0.25 27.9

14 Dom. R. 3.78 0.16 18.9 14 Haiti 4.79 0.18 21.6 14 Haiti 6.18 0.22 25.3

15 Salvador 3.21 0.13 16.1 15 Salvador 4.29 0.16 19.4 15 Salvador 5.09 0.18 20.9

16 Uruguay 2.71 0.10 13.6 16 Honduras 3.38 0.12 15.3 16 Honduras 4.73 0.16 19.4

17 Honduras 2.33 0.08 11.6 17 Paraguay 2.91 0.09 13.2 17 Paraguay 3.98 0.13 16.3

18 Paraguay 2.16 0.07 10.8 18 Uruguay 2.87 0.09 13.0 18 Nic. 3.56 0.11 14.6

19 Jamaica 1.82 0.06 9.1 19 Nic. 2.40 0.07 10.8 19 Uruguay 3.05 0.09 12.5

20 Nic. 1.72 0.05 8.6 20 C. R. 2.09 0.06 9.4 20 C. R. 2.83 0.08 11.6

21 C. R. 1.61 0.05 8.1 21 Jamaica 2.09 0.06 9.4 21 Jamaica 2.36 0.06' 9.7

22 Panama 1.33 0.03 6.7 22 Panama 1.79 - 0.04 8.i 22 Panama 2.30 0.06 9.4

23 T.&T. 1.01 0.02 5.1 23 T.&T. 1.05 0.01 4.7 23 TT.& 1.22 0.02 5.0

24 Guyana 0.68 0.00 3.4 24 Guyana 0.82 0.00 3.7 24 Guyana 0.79 0.00 3.2

Source: IMF. International Financial Statstics.




B. Size of the Economy The size of national economies is measured according to

their gross domestic product (GDP).29 It permits immediate ranking of countries relative to one another and identification of changes, such as with those previously identified changes found in the analysis of population evolution, and it confirms others. We should first note that, generally, the rate of growth of the US economy is such that, notwithstanding the growth of population in the Latin American countries, they have great difficulty in reducing the spread relative to, and separating them from, the United States. This is even more evident when one compares the rank order and decile ranking of the first and last periods. We are, nonetheless, led to nuance this statement when we observe that the very large countries have succeeded in significantly improving their relative positions. This is especially true of Brazil, which holds third place. If we compare Brazil to Canada, second to the United States in terms of real GDP, we note that, at the end of the 1960s, the Brazilian economy was equivalent to less than half (45.3 %) that of the Canadian economy whereas, today, it is almost two thirds (64.4 %). Here again, Argentina's position in 5th place is now being challenged by Venezuela.30 Colombia, for its part, is consolidating its seventh-place ranking, ahead of Chile, which is in difficulty and even gave up its place, temporarily, to Peru during the 1976-1979 period.

A quick glance at the decile ranking and the index allows us to confirm the general lessening of spreads between the Andean countries, such as Colombia, and the intermediate countries in difficulty, like Argentina and Venezuela. This relative rise in power of some Andean countries is also the consequence of a drop (or a relative stagnation) of the countries in Central America. Thus, Ecuador replaces Guatemala in tenth place, and the relative loss of power by Trinidad/Tobago and El Salvador has brought Bolivia up to the 12th rank from the its former position in the 14th spot. Farther down, we note the fall of Nicaragua which, combined with the relative stagnation of the small Central



I- 1966-1969 Country bil

1 USA 2 Canada 3 Brazil 4 Mex. 5 Arg. 6 Ven. 7 Col. 8 Chile 9 Peru

10 Guat. 11 Ecuador 12 T.&T. 13 Salvador 14 Bolivia 15 Uruguay 16 Nic. 17 Panama 18 C. R. 19 Honduras 20 Jamaica 21 Dom. R. 22 Paraguay 23 Haiti 24 Guyana

Table 2 Hierarchy and Dispersion of Countries According to Real GDP USA- II- 1976-1979 USA- III- 1986-1989 USA-

..US$ Decile 1000 Country biL US$ Decile 1000 Country biL US$ Decile 1000 2570.80 176.90 80.05 73.39 53.10 36.54 15.75 11.99 10.87 5.93 5.46 4.56 4.22 4.12 4.10 3.54 2.08 1.90 1.89 1.86 1.77 1.62 1.27 0.48

10.000 1000.00 - 1 I o _ 0.686 0.310 0.284 0.205 0.140 0.059 0.045 0.040 0.021 0.019 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.012 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.000

68.81 31.14 28.55 20.65 14.21 6.12 4.66 4.23 2.31 2.12 1.77 1.64 1.60 1.59 1.38 0.81 0.74 0.74 0.72 0.69 0.63 0.49 0.19

1 USA 2 Canada 3 Brazil 4 Mex. 5 Arg. 6 Ven. 7 Col. 8 Peru 9 Chile

10 Ecuador 11 Guat. 12 Bolivia 13 T.&T. 14 Salvador 15 Uruguay 16 Nic. 17 Dom. R. 18 C. R. 19 Panama 20 Paraguay 21 Honduras 22 Jamaica 23 Haiti 24 Guyana

3354.13 315.73 178.91 135.44 68.92 62.17 27.48 16.17 13.44 12.58 10.57 7.16 6.86 6.68 5.32 5.15 3.71 3.53 3.41 3.13 2.94 2.16 1.82 0.61

Source: IMF. International Financial Statistics.

10.000 1000.00 1 USA 4355.60 0.940 0.532 0.402 0.204 0.184 0.080 0.046 0.038 0.036 0.030 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.014 0.014 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.000

94.13 2 Canada 53.34 3 Brazil 40.38 4 Mex. 20.55 5 Arg. 18.53 6 Ven. 8.19 7 Col. 4.82 8 Chile 4.01 9 Peru 3.75 10 Ecuador 3.15 11 Guat. 2.13 12 Bolivia 2.05 13 T.&T. 1.99 14 Salvador 1.59 15 Uruguay 1.53 16 Dom. R. 1.11 17 Paraguay 1.05 18 Panama 1.02 19 C. R. 0.93 20 Nic. 0.88 21 Honduras 0.65 22 Jamaica 0.54 23 Haiti 0.18 24 Guyana

385.38 248.13 174.74 69.07 66.49 39.50 18.76 18.52 16.59 11.84 6.56 6.55 5.95 5.88 4.97 4.92 4.74 4.43 3.94 3.87 2.19 2.05 0.45

10.0001000.00 0.884 88.48 0.569 56.97 0.400 40.12 0.158 15.86 0.152 15.27 0.090 9.07 0.042 4.31 0.041 4.25 0.037 3.81 0.026 2.72 0.014 1.51 0.014 1.50 0.013 1.37 0.012 1.35 0.010 1.14 0.010 1.13 0.010 1.09 0.009 1.02 0.008 0.90 0.008 0.89 0.004 0.50 0.004 0.47 0.000 0.10

o

0

z

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American countries, permitted the Dominican Republic and Paraguay to climb from the 21st and 22nd ranks, respectively, to 16th and 17th positions, also respectively. Finally, note the chasse-crois going on between Chile and Peru.

C. The Level of Development The per capita GDP31 is considered as an adequate

measure of the level of a country's industrialization and development even if, in some cases, like those economies dependent on a single export commodity, it must be used with caution. This indicator first shows us, rather bluntly, the enormous differences in the distribution of wealth across the American continent. The extent of the data, like the distance between the maximum (USA) and minimum (Haiti) values, increases between each instant of the scale, going first from $12,560 to $14,758 and then to $17,516. The decile rank, which situates each country within that scale, was lower during 1986- 1989 than in 1966-1969 for the greater majority of countries.

Only a few countries - Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Colombia and Paraguay - improved their relative positions seen from that angle. Within this group, once again it is the progress of Brazil that is impressive, considering the size of its population. This country has succeeded in raising itself from the 16th place up to the 13th place during the first decade studied and, again, from the 13th up to 9th place in the second decade. Thus, Brazil was able to overtake Ecuador, even though the latter experienced pronounced improvement in its relative standing as well: advancing from the 15th to the 10th rank. Colombia and Paraguay, on their parts, who, at the end of the 1960s, had shared the lot of the continent's poorest countries, gradually acceded to the 14th and 15th places, respectively, thanks to a slightly higher-than-average rate of growth. Note also the recovery of Chile which took place during the 1980s: after having dropped from 10th place down to the 16th ranking in the 1970s, it finally rebounded to 12th place, thanks to making a significant economic recovery.



Table 3 Hierarchy and Dispersion of Countries According to Per Capita GDP I - 1966-1969 USA- II - 1976-1979 USA- III- 1986-1989 USA Country $US Decile 1000 Country $US Decile 1000 Country $US Decile 1000

1 USA 12872 10.00 1000.0 1 USA 15138 10.00 1000.0 1 USA 17848 10.00 1000.0 2 Canada 860i 6.60 668.2 2 2Canada 12161 7.98 803.4 2 Canada 14960 8.35 838.2 3 T.&T. ' 4497 3.33 349.4 T.3 T.&T. 6558 4.19 433.2 3 T.&T. 5372 2.88 301.0 4 Ven. 3855 2.82 299.5 4 Ven. 4495 2.79 296.9 4 Ven. 3592 1.86 201.3 5 Arg. .2312 1.59 179.6 5 Arg. 2540 1.46 167.8 5 Arg. 2205 1.07 123."6 6 Nic. 2052 1.38 159.4 6 Nic. 2166 1.21 143.1 6 Mex. 2130 ' 1.03 119.4 7 Mex. 1576' 1.01 122.4 "Mex. 2089 1.16 138.0 7 Panama 2068 0.99 115.9 8 Panama 1564 1.00 121.5 8 Panama 1908 1.04 126.0 8 Uruguay 1926 0.91 107.9 9 Uruguay 1510 0.95 117.3 9 Uruguay 1853 1.00 122.4 9 Brazil 1736 0.80 97.3

10 Chile 1341 0.82 104.1 10 C. R. 1683 0.88 111.2 10 Ecuador 1648 0.75 92.4 11 Salvador 1316 0.80 102.2 '11i Ecuador 1661 0.87 109.8 11 C. R. 1564 0.70 87.7 12 Guat. 1244 0.74 96.7 12 Guat. 1636 0.85 108.1 12 Chile 1482 0.66 83.0 13 C. R. 1174 0.69 91.2 13 Brazil 1602 0.83 105.8 13 Guat. 1383 0.60 77.5 14 Jamaica 1025 0.57 79.6 ' 14 Salvador 1556 0.80 102.8 14 Colombia1300 0.55 72.8 15 Ecuador 993 0.54 77.1 15 Bolivia 1368 0.67 90.3 15 Paraguay 1234 0.51 69.1 16 Brazil 924' 0.49 71'.8- .16 iChile 1257 0.59 83.0 16 Salvador 1168 0.48 65:4 17 Bolivia 915 0.48 71.1 17 Col. 1111 0.50 73.4 17 Nic. 1110 0.44 62.2 18 Peru 869 0.44 67.5 18 .Paraguay 1071 0.47 70.7 18 Bolivia 951 0.35 53.3 19 Col. 819 0.40 63.6 19 "''Jamaica 1034 0.44 68.3 19 Jamaica 926 0.34 51.9 20 Honduras 814 o0.40 63.2 20 Peru 999 0.42 66.0 20 Peru 884 0.32 49.5 21 Paraguay 752 0.35 58.4- 21 Honduras 869 0.33 57.4 21 Honduras 817 0.28 45.8 22 Guyana 715 0.32 55.6 ..22 Guyana 749 0.25 49.5 22 Dom. R. 729 0.23 40.9 23 Dom. R. 469 0.12 36.4 23 Dom. R. 728 0.24 48.1 23 Guyana 573 0.14 32.1 24 Haiti 313 0.00 24.3 24 Haiti 380 0.00 25.1 24 Haiti 332 0.00 18.6 Source : IMF. International Financial Statistics.

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These relative improvements in situation for some have, inevitably, a downside for others. Once again, it is the countries in Central America that tumble down the ladder or, in the best of cases, were able to maintain their relative

positions. Essentially, this improvement in hierarchical stand-

ing for some, as in the cases of Panama and Costa Rica, came

primarily from the slide of others. These were mainly Nicara-

gua, which slid from 6th to 17th place during the 1980s, and El

Salvador, whose decline was more gradual, declining, succes-

sively, from 11th to 14th place and, then, to the 16th rank in order.

Initially ranked between Argentina and Mexico, Nicaragua's spectacular fall upset the order among intermediate powers which, situated on the scale under the rather special duo made

up of Trinidad/Tobago and Venezuela, make up the principal focal points for Latin American development. The decline of

Argentina's economy enabled Mexico to rise to 6th place, and with good prospects for advancing to the 5th spot.32 It must be

emphasized here that these movements must often be ascribed to the decline of some countries rather than to the absolute rise in power of others. Thus we note that Argentina and Nicaragua, clearly distinguishable from the other Latin American countries

by their rate of development at the end of the 1960s, saw their relative position decline in the absence of other centers of

power emerging. Consequently, the space between 1.25 and

1.75, which those two countries originally occupied on the

dispersion scale, as expressed in decile rank, is now empty.

D. Commercial Power

The analysis of the progress of commercial power of the countries of the Americas33 shows clearly that, in terms of relative spreads compared to the United States during the entire

period studied, only a few were able to improve their situation while the majority were manifestly unable to keep up with the rate of expansion of exports of the northern countries. These favoured few are also among the most important, with the



Table 4 Hierarchy and Dispersion of Countries According to Exports I- 1966-1969 USA- II- 1976-1979 USA- III- 19861989 USA- Country M $US Decile 1000 Country M $US Decile 1000 Country M $US Decile 1000

1 USA 33684 10.00 1000.00 1 USA 140423 10.00 1000.00 1 USA 288349 10.00 1000.00 2 Canada 11754 3.48 348.94 2 Canada 47615 3.38 339.08 2 Canada106225 3.68 368.39 3 Ven. 2833 0.83 84.12 3 Brazil 12486 0.88 88.92 3 Brazil 28768 0.99 99.77 4 Brazil 1897 0.55 56.32 4 Ven. 10224 0.72 72.81 4 Mex. 20097 0.69 69.70 5 Arg. 1510 0.44 44.82 5 Arg. 6028 0.42 42.93 5 Ven. 10014 0.34 34.73 6 Mex. 1262 0.36 37.47 6 Mex. 5543 0.38 39.47 6 Arg. 7977 0.27 27.67 7 Chile 945 0.27 28.05 7 Col. 2759 0.18 19.65 7 Chile 6145 0.21 21.31 8 Peru 817 0.23 24.27 8 Chile 2608 0.17 18.57 8 Col. 5224 0.17 18.12 9 Col. 546 0.15 16.20 9 T.&T. 2247 0.15 16.00 9 Peru 2830 0.09 9.81

10 T.&T. 450 0.12 13.35 10 Peru 1946 0.13 13.86 10 Ecuador 2179 0.07 7.56 11 Jamaica 237 0.06 7.03 11 Ecuador 1465 0.09 10.43 11 T.&T. 1443 0.04 5.01 12 Guat. 225 0.06 6.69 12 Guat. 1075 0.06 7.66 12 Uruguay 1317 0.04 4.57 13 Ecuador 215 0.05 6.37 13 Salvador 941 0.05 6.70 13 C. R. 1218 0.04 4.22 14 Salvador 203 0.05 6.03 14 C. R. 819 0.05 5.84 14 Guat. 1100 0.03 3.81 15 Honduras 184 0.04 5.47 15 Dom. R. 762 0.04 5.43 15 Honduras 857 0.02 2.97 16 Uruguay 181 0.04 5.36 16 Jamaica 730 0.04 5.20 16 Dom. R. 814 0.02 2.82 17 C. R. 162 0.04 4.81 17 Bolivia 672 0.04 4.79 17 Jamaica 784 0.02 2.72 18 Bolivia 160 0.04 4.76 18 Uruguay 656 0.03 4.67 18 Bolivia 658 0.02 2.28 19 Dom. R. 160 0.04 4.75 19 Nic. 627 0.03 4.47 19 Salvador 623 0.02 2.16 20 Nic. 154 0.03 4.56 20 Honduras 571 0.03 4.07 20 Paraguay 541 0.01 1.87 21 Guyana 114 0.02 3.40 21 Panama 362 0.01 2.58 21 Panama 313 0.00 1.09 22 Panama 91 0.02 2.70 22 Guyana 278 0.01 1.98 22 Nic. 278 0.00 0.96 23 Paraguay 49 0.00 1.46 23 Paraguay 255 0.01 1.82 23 Guyana 228 0.00 0.79 24 Haiti 40 0.00 1.19 24 Haiti 177 0.00 1.26 24 Haiti 187 0.00 0.65 Source: IMF. Direction of Trade.




result that the gap which separates the middle powers from the other Latin American countries is growing. In effect, Brazil and Mexico record a net decrease in the relative spread which separates them from the United States. This is also true for Canada, which stands alone between the United States and the intermediate powers of the South. We also note, a bit lower down on the table, some progress on the part of Colombia and significant gains by Chile during the 1980s, following its fall-off during the 1970s.

Major gains in the value of exports for Mexico and Brazil, linked to declines from Venezuela and Argentina, modified the ranking of intermediate powers. During the interval separating the two first measurements, Brazil rose to third place which had been, up til then, occupied by Venezuela. Then, during the second period, Mexico overtook both Argentina and Venezu- ela, jumping from 6th to 4th place. A group of sub-intermediate powers can now be considered, bor from the meeting between two declining powers, Venezuela and Argentina, with one rising, Chile, and one holding steady, Colombia. Thus the overall picture displays such a mixture of varying trends that one is led to conclude that the whole configuration is both risky and unstable.

As far as the situation concerning the weakest countries goes, generally the ranking reveals a decline in position for the main countries of Central America and the Caribbean: Nicara- gua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, Jamaica and Trinidad/ Tobago. This has worked to the advantage of certain South American countries, especially Uruguay and Paraguay, which, due to their larger size, share with the latter a common space on the scale of exporting powers.

E. Political Prestige

As mentioned in the second part of the article, political prestige is measured by the presence of diplomatic missions in each of the states.34



Table 5 Hierarchy and Dispersion of Countries According to the Presence of Diplomatic Missions I-1966-1969 USA- II- 1976-1979 USA- II- 1986-1989 USA- Country Decile 1000 Country Decile 1000 Country Decile 1000

1 USA 115.5 10.00 1000 1 USA 128 10.00 1000 1 USA 148.5 10.00 1000 2 Canada 64 5.54 554 2 Canada 86.5 6.39 676 2 Canada 97.5 6.15 657 3 Brazil 63 5.45 545 3 Brazil 77.5 5.61 605 3 Brazil 81.5 4.94 549 4 Arg. 61.5 5.32 532 4 Arg. 76 5.48 594 4 Arg. 70 4.08 471 5 Mex. 51.5 4.46 446 5 Mex. 61.5 4.22 480 5 Ven. 69 4.00 465 6 Uruguay 44 3.81 381 6 Ven. 61.5 4.22 480 6 Mex. 68 3.92 458 7 Col. 41.5 3.59 359 7 Peru 51.5 3.35 402 7 Peru 54 2.87 364 8 Peru 40.5 3.51 351 8 Col. 49.5 3.17 387 8 Col. 50 2.57 337 9 Chile 40 3.46 346 9 Chile 47 2.96 367 9 Chile 46.5 2.30 313

10 Ven. 39.5 3.42 342 10 Uruguay 44.5 2.74 348 10 Uruguay 44.5 2.15 300 11 Ecuador 33.5 2.90 290 11 Ecuador 41 2.43 320 11 Ecuador 41.5 1.92 279 12 Guat. 32 2.77 277 12 Panama 36 2.00 281 12 Nic. 39.5 1.77 266 13 Bolivia 28.5 2.47 247 13 C. R. 35 1.91 273 13 C. R. 35.5 1.47 239 14 Salvador 27 2.34 234 14 Guat. 32 1.65 250 14 Panama 35.5 1.47 239 15 Panama 25.5 2.21 221 15 Bolivia 32 1.65 250 15 Guat. 33 1.28 222 16 Nic. 25 2.16 216 16 Salvador 27 1.22 211 16 Bolivia 33 1.28 222 17 Dom. R. 24 2.08 208 17 Nic. 26 1.13 203 17 Dom. R. 27.5 0.87 185 18 C. R. 23.5 2.03 203 18 Dom. R. 25.5 1.09 199 18 Paraguay 27 0.83 182 19 Honduras 23.5 2.03 203 19 Jamaica 25 1.04 195 19 Jamaica 27 0.83 182 20 Jamaica 10 0.87 87 20 Paraguay 24 0.96 188 20 Salvador 26 0.75 175 21 T.&T. 9 0.78 78 21 Honduras 23 0.87 180 21 Honduras 25 0.68 168 22 Guyana 6 0.52 52 22 Haiti 22 0.78 172 22 Haiti 21 0.38 141 23 Haiti 0 0.00 0 23 Guyana 14.5 0.13 113 23 T.&T. 17.5 0.11 118 24 Paraguay 0 0.00 0 24 T.&T. 13 0.00 102 24 Guyana 16 0.00 108 Source: Europa World Yearbook.




In terms of relative spread, Table 5 reveals that, between the end of the 1960s and the end of the 1970s, diplomatic representation increased in the great majority of countries at a slightly higher rate than in the United States; this is what the general increase in the index calculated on the basis of the highest value tells us. However, since this increase was particularly significant in the smaller states, who experienced a much greater lag than was true of the larger states, the relative position of each compared to the whole (represented by the decile rank) increased for only 7 states, of whom 4 were intermediate powers: Canada, Brazil, Argentina and Venezu- ela. From the end of the 1970s to the end of the 1980s, only Nicaragua and Trinidad/Tobago experienced a relative growth in diplomatic representation on their territory at a higher level than that of the United States - which results in a relative rise, simultaneously, in the index (based on the highest value) and in the decile rank.

These evolutionary tendencies were accompanied by some significant changes in the rank order of the countries. To begin with, we note a change in the position of Venezuela, which rose from 10th to 5th place over the whole time frame, higher than Mexico and hard on the heels of Argentina who, in 4th place, witnessed an unqualified lowering of diplomatic presence on its territory over the past few years. Thus, at the end of the period, there are 4 intermediate powers who occupy, roughly, the interval which varies between 4 and 5 in decile ranking: Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and Mexico, from whom Canada tends to move away and occupy a significantly higher rank. The other countries then find themselves sepa- rated from this platoon by at least a point in decile ranking. Over the years, Peru has strengthened its position in 7th place, a position which it took over from Colombia during the first interval. Uruguay, which had led these latter countries during the 1966-1969 period now finds itself in 10th place and behind Chile. Among the Central American countries, it is interesting to observe that Costa Rica and Nicaragua, reaping some advantage from their political situation for once, increased their relative political prestige by moving, respectively, from 16th to




12th rank and from 18th to 13th place. Meanwhile, El Salvador and Honduras slipped back: from the 14th and 19th place, respectively, to 20th and 21st instead.

F. Military Power

If military spending35 is relied on as an indicator of military power, we note some significant modifications in the distribution of the latter during the period under study. First we become aware of a certain fragmentation coincident with an increase in intermediate power grouping. During the 1966- 1969 period, we can easily identify two groups of intermediate powers. The first (comprising Canada, Argentina and Brazil) holds a decile ranking higher than 0.1 and is characterized by active competition between the latter two countries. The other group is made up of Venezuela, Colombia and Mexico, powers that hold a decile ranking higher than 0.02 and, again, show the last two in close competition. In the 1976-1979 period, this order underwent modification, showing Chile's rapid rise to power while Colombia's military effort appeared to stagnate. Though the make-up of the first group didn't change, the decile ranking of these middle powers now exceeds 0.2.36 As far as the second group goes, it is now composed of Venezuela, Chile and Mexico, all of whom hold a decile ranking higher than 0.04 but lower than 0.1. Colombia, on its part, now holds, along with Peru, a decile rank in the area of two one-hundredths of a point.

The 1986-1989 period is identified mainly by a significant increase in military effort by the United States and a permutation in the hierarchies of each of the intermediate categories. First of all, a significant drop in Argentina's military expenditures not only enabled Brazil to reach third place, but also enabled Canada to place a significant distance between itself and the first intermediate group. The second group now includes only Chile, who has progressed to 5th place, and Venezuela. Mexico, having caught up with Colombia, who has made a strong comeback, and Peru, which maintains its effort,



Table 6 Hierarchy and Dispersion of Countries According to Military Spending I- 1966-1969 USA- II-1976-1979 Country M $ Decile 1000 Country M $

1 USA 258649 10.0000 1000.00 1 USA 195651 2 Canada 5911 0.2282 22.85 2 Canada 7033 3 Arg. 3777 0.1457 14.60 3 Arg. 5520 4 Brazil 3647 0.1407 14.10 4 Brazil 4818 5 Ven. 856 0.0328 3.31 5 Ven. 1471 6 Col. 542 0.0206 2.10 6 Chile 1074 7 Mex. 531 0.0202 2.05 7 Mex. 982 8 Chile 231 0.0086 0.89 8 Peru 490 9 Peru 187 0.0069 0.72 9 Col. 431

10 Uruguay 125 0.0045 0.48 10 Uruguay 203 11 Salvador 94 0.0033 0.36 11 Bolivia 199 12 Bolivia 74 0.0025 0.29 12 Salvador 164 13 T.&T. 68 0.0023 0.26 13 Ecuador 139 14 Nic. 52 0.0017 0.20 14 Nic. 138 15 Ecuador 52 0.0017 0.20 15 T.&T. 136 16 Guat. 42 0.0013 0.16 6 Guat. 101 17 Paraguay 29 0.0008 0.11 17 Paraguay 68 18 Haiti 27 0.0007 0.11 18 Jamaica 54 19 Jamaica 22 0.0005 0.08 19 Honduras 43 20 Dom. R. 19 0.0004 0.07 20 Panama 40 21 Honduras 18 0.0004 0.07 21 Guyana 39 22 Panama 17 0.0003 0.07 22 Dom. R. 23 23 C. R. 14 0.0002 0.05 23 C. R. 23 24 Guyana 9 0.0000 0.03 24 Haiti 21 Source: Sipi Yearbook.

USA- Decile 1000 10.0000 1000.00 0.3584 35.95 0.2811 28.21 0.2452 24.62 0.0741 7.52 0.0538 5.49 0.0491 5.02 0.0239 2.50 0.0210 2.20 0.0093 1.04 0.0091 1.02 0.0073 0.84 0.0060 0.71 0.0060 0.71 0.0059 0.70 0.0041 0.51 0.0024 0.35 0.0017 0.28 0.0011 0.22 0.0010 0.21 0.0009 0.20

III - 1986-1989 USA- Country M $ Decle 1000

1 USA 297739 10.0000 1000.00 2 Canada 9756 0.3269 32.77 3 Brazil 4034 0.1347 13.55 4 Arg. 3096 0.1032 10.40 5 Chile 1470 0.0486 4.94 6 Ven. 1244 0.0410 4.18 7 Col. 855 0.0279 2.87 8 Mex. 782 0.0255 2.63 9 Peru 620 0.0201 2.08

10 Nic. 351 0.0110 1.18 11 Honduras 235 0.0071 0.79 12 Guat. 199 0.0059 0.67 13 Salvador 198 0.0059 0.66 14 Ecuador 174 0.0051 0.58 15 Bolivia 171 0.0050 0.57 16 Uruguay 167 0.0049 ,0.56 17 T.&T. 144 0.0041 0.48 18 Panama 104 0.0027 0.35 19 Paraguay 65 0.0014 0.22 20 Dom. R. 51 0.0009 0.17 21 Guyana 32 0.0003 0.11

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0.0001 0.12 22 Haiti 28 0.0002 0.09 0.0001 0.12 23 Jamaica 26 0.0001 0.09 0.0000 0.11 24 C.R. 23 0.0000 0.08




consequently enlarge the group in the two-hundredths of a point decile ranking.

In the second decade, three Central American countries -Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala - gained ground at

the expense of the South American countries, especially Ecuador, Bolivia, and Uruguay. This leads us to conclude that, for small countries, military expenditures can serve as an indication of weakness rather than of strength, taking into account that internal problems, such as guerillas and terrorism, manifestly act directly on that indicator.

G. Aggregate Index

If we first consider the evolution of relative spread for the whole period, it is a striking conclusion that only four countries have experienced constant progress in their rank in the decile, i.e., first Canada, Brazil and Mexico, all three of which are at the top of the hierarchy just below the United States, and then Paraguay, as an exception, which has moved slowly up to the 18th position from its original 22nd ranking. That is to say that, in a general way, the first four countries of the lead group have increased their relative spread vis-a-vis all the others during the period under study. This observation also leads us to conclude that changes in the rank order of countries are caused by the fact that several countries have moved down on the decile scale in a more pronounced way than others, thus losing their weight relative to the whole. We are led to a less stringent diagnosis when we consider, rather, the evolution of the relationship to the United States, calculated according to the weighted index "United States = 1000." Nevertheless, in order to improve one's relative importance, it is not enough to have a capacity that grows at a faster rate than the one which is overtaking us, one must also ensure that the one who follows is not also increasing his capacity even faster as well.

Reading Graph 1 permits easy visualization of (1) the Canada-Brazil-Mexico intermediate group and (2) Mexico's gradual separation from the unit it formed with Argentina and



The Hierarchy of Power in the Americas

Graph 1 Dispersion of Powers Area of

Enlargement next page

i 7 1111111 Y

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O 0 t3

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U.S.A. Canada Brazil Mexico Venezuela 1

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Venezuela _. AlIlInnV! U.S.A. Canada Brazil |\

Argentina Mexico

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8.00 7.00 6.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 8.00 7.00 6.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.00

U.S.A.

1966-69

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Graph 1 Enlargement of 0 - 1.0

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1986-891 Colombia Peru Chile Nica ParaguaHaiti Colombia Peru ~kPanama Bolivia Jamaica

Irinidad Ecuador Niaraa Paraguay Hd ati r

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1976-79 / /fB Peru'/ Chile /Ecua or costBoiviaEl Salvaor \

o nuras Trinidad Urugua Rica Nicaragua Dominican Paraguay & Tobago Colombia anama uatemal a Jaia epublic Guyana 1966-69 'A

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Chile Peru

Trinidad Ec ador Panama Hti he Uru uay & T bago icaragua El Salvadoi Honduras Guyan

1.00 0.90 0.80 0.70 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.00

Decile 0:1

? Centre qu6b6cois de relations internationales 1992



Table 7 The Hierarchy and Dispersion of Countries According to the Aggregate Index I - 1966-1969 II -1976-1979 HI - 1986-1989

Rank Country 1 USA 2 . Canada 3 Brazil 4' Argentina 5 Mexico 6 'Venezuela

7 Colombia 8 Chile 9 Uruguay

10 Peru 11 Tri.-&-To. 12 Guatemala 13 Ecuador 14 Nicaragua 15 . El Salvador 16";. Panama 17 Bolivia 18 Costa Rica 19' . Honduras 20 Dom. R. 21 jamaica 22 Paraguay 23 Guyana 24.. Haiti

Index Decile 1000.00 10.00 294.31 2.89 191.97 1.86 151.19 1.45 144.88 1.38 131.76 1.25 90.60 "' 6.:83 88.14 0.81 86.55 0.79 85.00 0.78 74.63 60.67 67.79 0.61 67.23 0.60 65.11 0.58 60.01 6 .0.53 58.76 0.51i 57.84 0.50 51.40 0.44 47.43 0.40 44.78- 0.37 30.57 0.23 11.90' 0.04 o10.66 0.03 7.74 0.00

Ranx country 1 USA

2 Canada 3 Brazil 4 Mexico 5 Argentina 6 Venezuela 7 ePeru

'

8 Tri.-&-To. 9 Chile

10 Colombia 11 Uruguay 12 Ecuadlor 13 Panama f4 Costa Rica 15 Guatemala i6- Bolivia 17 Nicaragua 18 El Salvador .19 .Jamaica 20 Dom. R. 21 Paraguay 22 Honduras 23 Haiti

24 Guyana

Index Decile^ RanI Country Index Decile 10.00 3.23 2.08 1.42 1.38 1.32 0.5368 0.6740 0.61

0.57 --

0.55..... 0.53 0.43 0.40 0.39 0.35 0.33 0.30 0.19

0.19... 0.18 0.15 0.09 0.06" .........

1 USA 2 Canada 3 Brazil 4 Mexico 5 Venezuela 6 Argentina 7 Colombia 8 Peru 9 Chile

10 Tri.-&-To. 11 Uruguay 12 E.....cuador 13 Panama 14 Nicaragua 15 ......Costa Rica 16 Guatemala 17 Bolivia 18 Paraguay 19 "El Salvador 20 Dom. R. 21 Jamaica 22 Honduras 23 Haiti 24 Guyana

100000 10.00 348.35 3.32 2'33.71 2.15 170.99 i.51 132.67 1.11 129.55 1068 94.02 0J72 85.90 '0.63 79.76 0.57 71.81 0.49 71.08 0.48 70.84 0.48 61.15 0.38 ..'57.64 0.34 57.27 "0.o34 5...6.99 0.34 51.36 0.28 45.08 0.22 .4427 0.21 43.02 0.1i9 41.11 0.18 39.70 0.16 31.09 0.07 24.02 0.00

1000.00 342.31 230.35 165.94 162:2 ..... 156.45 93J8 93.04 87.75

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MACE, BELANGER AND THERIEN: REGIONALSM IN THE AMERICAS 143

Venezuela at the end of the 1960s and 1970s. The latter two

appear on the verge of being relegated to the bottom of the

diagram, where one finds countries whose decile ranking is less than 1. Here, changes in position appear more rapid because the scale used is smaller. This section allows one to visualize the increase in the gap which separates the small countries from the medium powers. This gap had changed from 0.42 decile points (at the end of the 1960s) to 0.64 by the end of the 1970s. And this gap would have continued to widen had it not been for the combination of Argentina's decline with Colombia's prodigious recovery. In effect, if the trend observ- able in the last period continues, it would be completely rational to foresee the formation of a sub-intermediate group, very unstable to be sure, whose decile ranking would be between 0.75 and 1, and which would include Venezuela, Argentina and Colombia. During this time, the gap between the middle powers and the poorest began to close somewhat.

All of these movements have evidently brought about

major changes in the order in which these countries are ranked vis-a-vis one another. In effect, by the end of the 1980s, only 8 countries occupy the same rank they held at the end of the 1960s. Of these, 4 did not change at all - the United States

(1st), Canada (2nd), Brazil (3rd) and the Dominican Republic (20th) - while another 4 regained their initial place after

having changed positions during the study period: Colombia

(7th), Nicaragua (14th), Bolivia (17th) and Jamaica (21st).

The 1970s, under this heading, can be considered a very unsettled time when one considers that it witnessed 19 changes to the rank order of the various countries. At least 9 countries (4 from Central America, 3 from the Southern Cone and one Andean) descended on the hierarchical scale to the benefit of 10 others (the Caribbean countries, 3 Andean ones, 2 Central

American, and one from the Southern Cone) that gained at their

expense. In contrast, the 1980s witnessed just 12 such changes in rank order. Although only 4 countries rose in the hierarchy during this time, two of these were particularly significant: Colombia bounded back to 7th place after having previously




fallen to 10th, and Nicaragua returned to 14th place following a time in the 17th position. Among the 8 countries who lost ground during this time, the most noteworthy is the case of Argentina, who lost more than 30 points and dropped back to 6th place, from which it has yet to recover.

Overall, we can conclude that the countries of North America, together with Brazil and Paraguay, improved their positions relative to the whole. Among the others, the Andean and Central American countries which did not have armed insurrections on their territory improved their position relative to countries in the Southern Cone, while the main Caribbean islands, as well as countries with economies dependent upon a single export commodity, maintained their relative and hierarchical positions.

Finally, the results remind us of the importance and durability of some factors of political capability and permit us, as well, to question the validity of others. Population, for example, which current analysis often disregards, enables a country like Peru to maintain its position among the top 10 states despite a low level of development. On the other hand, small countries like Trinidad/Tobago, whose trade is highly dependent upon a limited range of products, may find themselves ranked disproportionately high on the aggregate index due to the weight it accords to economic factors, per capita GDP in particular.

CONCLUSION

XPLAINING regionalism in the Americas requires a prelimi- nary understanding of the distribution of power in the

Western Hemisphere. Without an examination of the regional power structure, analysis runs the risk of falling into a conception of international relations where states would be considered, in the abstract, as equally sovereign units. Too many studies that deal with various aspects of international cooperation - whether regional or global in scope - neglect to take into account the fact that the ability of states to decide



MACE, BELANGER AND THERIEN: REGIONALSM IN THE AMERICAS 145

and to act is structured in a hierarchical manner. In line with the assumption that international relations are ultimately based on power, the aggregate data presented above constitute a starting point for furthering research on regionalism in the Americas. These data offer a relatively clear picture of the geographical distribution of political and economic resources on the continent. Accordingly, they make possible the identification of those states most likely to play a leading role in the institutionalization of regional cooperation.

The evolution of the regional structure of power in the Americas may be interpreted in terms of both continuity and change. First of all, it is clear that the distribution of resources throughout the Hemisphere has not undergone any radical transformations over the last two decades. This relative stability can be explained (1) by the fact that major changes in the international system generally take place over long periods of time, and (2) by the wide gap that existed between the main centers of power and the other countries of the Hemisphere at the beginning of the period under study. While the United States has maintained its hegemonic role in the continental scale of power unchallenged, Canada and Brazil have con- firmed their second and third position, respectively. Despite a limited national market, the Canadian economy is highly industrialized and Canada's participation in the Group of 7 (G-7) is a revealing illustration of its international status. By contrast, Brazil's political power is based primarily on the size of its population, which, incidentally, could surpass that of the United States within a couple of generations. The configuration of power in the Americas is also characterized by the enduring marginalization of the same countries: Haiti and Guyana. Beyond the permutation of their ranking in the 1970s, the persistence of their situation at the bottom of the power structure points to the negligible influence they can exert on the evolution of regional cooperation in the Hemisphere.

Along with these elements of continuity, the hierarchy of power within the Hemisphere has also been marked by change during the period under examination. Considering the study's




objectives, the transformations that affected the top end of the aggregate ranking carry more significance because strong states are the only ones capable of generating the resources required to establish efficient schemes of regional cooperation. From that perspective, Argentina's setback - from 4th place to 6th - is particularly striking. Among other consequences, the progressive weakening of Argentina's power has made its long-standing rivalry with Brazil less acute. Mexico, on the other hand, has been highly successful in increasing its overall capabilities, its major debt problem notwithstanding. Building on the opening of its economy, Mexico seems to have durably become the 4th major power of the Hemisphere. It must also be emphasized that, though it has advanced one rank relative to other countries, Venezuela's power base decreased mark- edly over the last 20 years. Combined with Colombia's recent breakthrough, Venezuela's decline suggests that traditional power relations within the Andean area are currently undergo- ing a process of realignment. The Central American isthmus has finally been the scene of some modifications in the Hemi- spheric distribution of political and economic resources. Al- though these changes appear to have had little impact on the dynamics of regionalism in the Americas, this by no means implies that the effect on the Central American region itself will be negligible.

The foregoing observations confirm that the Americas are characterized by the presence of two major poles of power the United States and Brazil - around which regional cooperation is more likely to materialize and grow. Regional initiatives undertaken without the participation of at least one of these two countries (e.g., the Andean Group, the Central American Common Market, the Group of Three) inevitably suffer from the relative weakness of their leadership. It is true that the regional power of attraction of the United States and Brazil is far from being equal. However, the distance between the two countries suggests that their coexistence as distinct catalysts of regional cooperation is possible. In the North, the conclusion in 1992 of a free-trade agreement between the United States, Canada and Mexico (NAFTA) reinforces the logic of a commer-




cial grouping that had received its first impulse in 1989 with the Canada-United States treaty. For the time being, the 1992 agreement raises two types of fundamental questions. It remains to be seen if the strengthening of economic interactions between the three North American countries will spill over into a strengthening of political interactions. Also, it is unclear whether the North American process of integration can be expanded geographically toward Central America and the Caribbean. In the South, the creation in 1991 of MERCOSUR (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay) illustrates the renewed political will of Southern Cone states to establish an increasingly integrated sub-regional market. In spite of its initial success. MERCOSUR remains nonetheless fragile, not only because of internal tensions but also because of its competition with NAFTA. It is symptomatic that Argentina and Chile have both indicated their hope to take part in the North American free trade zone.

Various indicators suggest that regional cooperation in the Americas is currently going through a phase of expansion. This situation cannot be explained on the basis of intra- hemispheric forces only. Above all, it appears as a reaction to growing pressures from the external environment that have reduced the competitiveness and the political influence of the Hemisphere as a whole in international affairs. This being said, the exact form that regionalism in the Americas will take in the years to come remains uncertain. At least two scenarios can be envisaged: continental regionalism - from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego - where the United States would act as the hegemon, or sub-continental regionalism that would be based on two unequal sub-regional blocs. It is difficult to predict which of these two scenarios is more likely to happen. In the final analysis, the future structure of regionalism in the Americas largely depends on the United States and Brazil and their ability to reach a consensus concerning the very nature of their respective national interests.




's, H^it DoiDomin can Rep. h.,-:KV

in. &Tob.

I-uyana

, Eacador

The Hierarchy of Power in the Americas lo0 1966-1969

Legend Rank (decile)

* 5.0 to 10.0 * 2.0 to 5.0 I3 1.5 to 2.0 E 1.0 to 1.5 Ej 0.5 to 1.0 0 0.0 to 0.5

? Centre qu6becois de relations intemationales, 1992.

Chile




? I" iait Dominica Re.

6kim

The Hierarchy of Power in the Americas '

1986-1989 Legend

Rank (decile)

* 5.0 to 10.0 2.0 to 5.0

E 1.5 to 2.0 E1 1.0 to 1.5

0.5 to 1.0 1 0.0 to 0.5

? Centre quebecois de relations intemationales, 1992.

in. &Tob.

Guyana

lolivi

Chile

uguay

I




NOTES

1. This paper is only part of a larger study of patterns related to regionalism in the Americas undertaken by the authors and their colleagues Balthazar, Bemier, and Gosselin at Laval University's Centre quebecois de relations internationales. It deals with the distribution of power considered as a prerequisite for an overall survey of variables related to regionalism, such as transactions, institutions, values and national policies.

2. The focus here was on the study of factors that make it possible to identify geographical or functional regions in the international system (see, among others, Russett, 1967; Cantori and Spiegel, 1970).

3. The study of regional integration emcompassed, more or less, three general approaches. The pluralist approach, based on the work of Karl Deutsch (1954 and 1957), emphasized a community-building model. Ernst Haas' neo-functional approach proposed an understanding of regional integration as a process of spillover from economic to political arrangements (see, for example: Haas, 1958 and 1970; Nye, 1970; Schmitter, 1969 and 1970). The third perspective was Lindberg's political approach, in which progress toward integration was measured by the evolving capacity of decision-making by community institutions (Lindberg, 1967; Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970).

4. Notable exceptions are found in the works of Mytelka (1979) and Axline (1977), who employed an approach better suited to the analysis of regional integration in the Third World.

5. Witness the ongoing publications of the Instituto para la Integraci6n deAmerica Latina in Buenos Aires and, in particular, its excellent journal Integracion Latinoamericana.

6. A 1989 National Planning Association survey showed that 88% of US executives were seeing the world economy as shifting in the direction of more regional trading blocs. However, 63% of these executives were of the opinion that this would hurt the world economy and 75% thought that this would hurt the current round of talks in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATr] (see Belous and Hartley, 1990a: 6).

7. This point of view is shared by others. For example, Farrow and York (1990) do not even foresee the possibility of Hemispheric free trade.




8. It was also the general sense of her comments during the panel on regionalism at the meeting of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) in Buenos Aires, July 1991.

9. Serbin's analysis goes in this direction (Serbin, 1991).

10. As already noted some 20 years ago; see, for example, Puchala (1972).

11. Notice, for example, how Peschel (1990) arrives at conclusions regarding an "integration area" on the basis of mere studies of trade patterns.

12. Major works include Russett (1967), Brams (1966), and Cantori and Spiegel (1970).

13. Community of values as a precondition for the success of

integration is a recurrent theme in the literature on regional integration (see Haas, 1964: 119; Deutsch et al., 1957: 46-57; and Etzioni, 1962: 928). It has also been shown that a lack of common ideological basis can negatively affect an integration process (see Mace, 1981).

14. The notion of "core areas" was initially introduced by Karl Deutsch in the literature on regional integration. The assumption was that integration had a better chance to succeed if a core area existed that could act as a magnet for transactions and communications, like the case of the France-Germany axis in Europe (see Deutsch et al., 1957: 38-73). We make the same assumption in our study of regionalism in the Americas.

15. Studies on the ranking and distribution of power in the Americas are extremely rare. A notable exception is found in the work of Lambert (1984). But for our purposes, the book has two problems. The period covered ends in 1980, and the author limits his analysis to economic indicators. Nevertheless, he arrives at interesting conclusions with respect to regionalism. For example, he notes the growing gap between large, semi-industrialized countries, such as Mexico and Brazil, and the smaller Latin American economies, including Argen- tina.

16. An excellent review of applications in found in Stoll and Ward (1988); see also Baldwin (1979).

17. See, in particular, Chapters 2 and 3 of Charles Doran's Systems in Crisis (1991).

18. But this type of exercise is certainly not without its critics. Jeffrey Hart (1976), for one, highlights three particular problems: actualization of resources, delimitation of resources, and absence of interdependence phenomenon.




19. All do not agree, however, on the importance of this indicator (see Baldwin, 1979; and Keohane and Nye, 1977: Chapter 2).

20. Gross national product (GNP) is widely used, but many believe that GNP per capita constitutes a more robust indicator because it reflects more adequately the levels of industrialization, productivity, and education of a given state (see Hendel, 1981).

21. Russett's analysis has shown the usefulness of this indicator in relation with the political influence of a state in a regional subsystem; see his Power and Community in World Politics (Russett, 1974).

22. Gross national product (GNP) measures the performance of the national economy by taking into account the total value of goods and services made by nationals. Gross domestic product (GDP) does the same, but it leaves out foreign operations by nationals and includes domestic operations by foreigners. Both measures are widely used to compare economic performances, but GDP was preferred here because of the importance given to it by the United Nations Statistical Office and because it was felt that it is a more adequate measure of national capability.

23. See Note 20.

24. Size of armies, measured by number of weapons or manpower could also be considered, as mentioned earlier. But expenditures appeared to be the most significant indicator to be used alone.

25. It is often said that diplomatic missions are easier to open than to close. They would, therefore, not be an accurate measurement of political prestige at a given time. But, as we will see, some countries do lose diplomatic representation and we think, with Michael Wallace, that it is still an important indicator of attributed status: "Of the many national decisions which would be influenced by attributed importance, the most sensitive, comparable, and measurable would be decisions to send, or not to send, diplomatic representatives to the various national capitals" (Wallace, 1973: 38).

26. Traditionally, the "realist school" has not considered com- merce as an important indicator because power was viewed princi- pally in terms of national and self-sufficiency attributes. That way of viewing things, however, no longer applies since the interational- ization of economic production is linked, for an ever-expanding number of sectors, to the ability to compete. Ray Cline also seeks, in his model, to evaluate the influence a strong commercial volume gives to a state in the contemporary international system (Cline,




1980). And this seems to us to be a fundamental element of power. Therefore, we have decided not to take into account the level of self- sufficiency because we consider that the negative effects produced by a disadvantageous commercial structure have their repercussions on the whole of the economic performance measured elsewhere. Thus, we simply measure commercial power in terms of the value of exports in current dollars.

27. Although we are concious of the fact that this way of presenting the data lays emphasis on the general distribution of power rather than on the relative importance of certain poles of power among sub-regional groupings, we think that such measurement must be done before referring precisely to pre-constructed areas of analysis.

28. The choice of these 4-year periods is based upon an examination of events in the Americas. We tried to choose periods when impacts from regional and international events was kept at a minimum. We have an overall period of 20 years, with intervals of 10 years. So each measurement is the mean of the results obtained for the last 4 years of each decade. Exceptions were made in cases where data were not available for particular countries and years, as well as for diplomatic representation where 2 years (the first and last) seemed sufficient. Thus, our indicators are less sensitive to annual variations, which can be quite important for some of them.

29. Each country's GDP is calculated on the basis of data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It is first adjusted in national currency to the 1985 value, reducing distortions due to inflation in the process, and then converted to US dollars at the 1985 rate.

30. Venezuela has already produced, during 1988, a GDP higher than that of Argentina: $70.6 billion as opposed to $69.3 billion.

31. Per capita GDP is calculated on the basis of data used in the preceding sections.

32. Besides, during 1989, Mexico's per capita GDP was higher than that of Argentina: $2,135 versus $2,075,

33. We use data from the International Monetary Fund.

34. Calculated on the basis of data obtained in the Europa World Yearbook.

35. Data from SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) are expressed here in 1988 US dollars.




36. This is mainly imputable to an important drop in US defense spending as well as a favourable exchange rate for Latin American countries.

37. In fact, the year 1982 may constitute a more appropriate yardstick in this regard. This, in effect, was the year when the Canadian government finally agreed to conclude sectoral free trade agreements with the United States, thereby officially ending the Canadian policy of the Third Option, adopted in 1972. A major aspect of that policy implied a diversification of Canada's overall external relations in order to reduce what was considered an unacceptable level of Canadian dependence on the United States. The year 1982 marked the beginning of the end of that policy.

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Regionalism in the Americas and the Hierarchy of Power

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