BAKER UNIVERSITY

Redefining DariusA New Perspective on the Batlle of

Gaugamela

John Patchen12/12/2014

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Abbreviations Ancient Authors

AD- Astronomical Diaries and Related Texts from BabyloniaArr.- Arrian, Anabasis of AlexanderCurt.- Quintus Curtius Rufus, The History of AlexanderDS.- Diodorus Siculus, The Library of HistoryHdt.- Herodotus, The HistoriesJust. - Marcus Junianius Just.us, Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius TrogusPlb.- Polybius, The HistoriesPlu.- Plutarch, Parallel Lives: AlexanderXen.- Xenophon, Anabasis

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“All things together appeared full of terror to Darius, who

had already long been in a state of fear, so that he was the

first to turn and flee (Arr., 3.14.).” In light of other ancient

texts, Arrian was wrong. Historians must examine the facts,

statements, historical texts, tear apart the subtleties,

reconstruct the events of time, and correctly piece together what

occurred. We must do this with as much clarity as possible,

without previously held notions, and without sentimentalism.

Reconstruction of the past should focus on factual evidence, but

it is also scientific. In the absence of absolute evidence,

historians must draw conclusions based on the most likely

rational explanation that the evidence and facts present.

The ancient historians who recount Gaugamela present varied

accounts of what actually transpired. We do not even know the

actual site of the battle, due to conflicting accounts.1 Curtius

and Diodorus present more romanticized accounts; Arrian’s account

is decidedly “Greek,” and scathing in its assessment of Darius.

It presents Darius as a poor commander, lacking in the qualities 1 Arrian (3.8.7) states that Gaugamela was 600 stades from Arbela, whereas Ptolemy “Geographia” indicates Gaugamela some 200-320 stades from Arbela (Ptol., VI, i, 5).

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of a man, and a coward (Arrian, 3.22). Arrian’s assessment in

particular has influenced many modern scholars, who in turn have

branded Darius as a coward.2

All of the ancient historian's contributions skew the modern

perception of Darius. Yet, when carefully studied in their

totality, along with a passage from the Astronomical Diaries, they

present a stunningly clear picture of the Persian King of Kings.

When objectively analyzed and reconstructed, the facts present a

new portrayal of Darius. The evidence shows Darius was a quick

learner as a tactician, bold commander, loyal to his men, and an

extremely courageous individual.

Darius’s Historical Background

It is extremely important to understand Darius’s personal

background in order to understand why the traditional accounts of

his actions at Gaugamela are so confusing. Darius’s rise to King

of Persia occurred largely because of his bravery and loyalty to

the King Artaxerxes Ochus III most certainly, but also to Persia.

2 As superbly pointed out by Badian, 242; the following authors have, at various points in their careers published highly critical accounts of Darius: Tarn, “Alexander the Great (1948), Lauffer, in Alexander der Große, 2nd ed., (1981), and Dandamayev in A Political History of the Achaemenid Empire (1989).

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For Darius to flee and abandon his troops from the battle of

Gaugamela in fear or out of cowardice at the most pivotal time in

Achaemenid history, indeed the history of Persia to that point,

is contrary to what we know about Darius. Darius, in fact,

earned his throne largely because of his courage on the

battlefield (DS, 17.6.6, Just., 10.3.3).

Darius was initially unknown during the reign of the Persian

King Artaxerxes III, but was clearly of Achaemenid lineage.3

When Ochus purged the Achaemenid family because of his fear of a

conspiracy against him, he did not eliminate Darius because

Darius was unknown to him.4 Artaxerxes III would later come to

know Darius because of his exploit in single-handed combat

against an unnamed Cardussi chief (Just., 10.3.3 and DS,

17.6.6.). For this feat of bravery, Ochus awarded Darius the

satrapy of Armenia.5

Darius’s father was Arsanes and a grandson of Ostanes, who

in turn, was a brother to Artaxerxes II.6 His mother was

3 E. Badian, “Darius III,” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, Vol. 100 (2000): 244.4 Ibid.5 Ibid.6 Waldemar Heckel, Who’s Who in the Age of Alexander the Great, ( Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), Kindle Edition. Location 2391.

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Sisygambis, Arsanes’ sister, making Darius a member of the

Achaemenid family. In Darius III, Badian argues that Darius may

have been protected from execution based on his adoption of the

name Codomannus, a name he embraced some time after defeating the

Caudisii chief.7 According to Badian, the texts indicate that

Darius dropped his birth name of Artašãtu, shortly after adopting

the Codomannus name.8

Darius was then able to establish himself within the

Achaemenid inner circle. Badian points to Darius’s appointment

in the King’s postal service as a particularly notable

assignment.9 It is in this role that Darius firmly establishes

himself as a reliable and loyal member of the King’s inner

circle and he is able to gain the King’s trust. Badian goes as

far to note that Darius was a “friend of the King,” an honor only

bestowed to Arses, the King’s son and heir to the throne.10

Darius clearly established himself as a reliable and loyal member

7 Badian, 246-2478 Ibid, 247-248.9 Badian, 250.10 Ibid.

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of the King’s inner circle. Moreover, the King did not sense

Darius to be any particular threat to him or any of his heirs.11

Sometime between 339 and 338 BCE, Darius married Stateria,12

his sister (Arr., 2.11.9, Plu., 30.3, Just., 11.9.12). Darius

had three children—one son Ochus, and two daughters Statira and

Drypetis (Curt., 3.11.24.). Darius also had a unknown wife that

he apparently married sometime in the 350s, while satrap of

Armenia, and this relationship may have also produced a son,

Ariobarzanes.13

Artaxerxes III was assassinated by Bagoas, vizier of the

royal court (DS, 17.5.3). After Artaxerxes was murdered, Bagoas

placed Arses on the throne and murdered all of his brothers to

isolate him from his family, and make him easier to control (DS,

17.5.4). Arses grew tired of Bagoas’s control, as well as his

actions, and rebelled against him. Bagoas then murdered Arses in

336, and installed Darius as King of Persia (Ibid.)

11 Ibid.12 Badian, 250-251, argues that the marriage must have occurred in late 338, after the death of Artaxerxes III, owing to the treatment of rivals to the throne.

13 Ibid, 251.

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Badian theorizes that Bagoas specifically chose Darius to

placate the Persian nobles because of his history of bravery, and

also because of his patronage to Ochus—qualities that separated

him from other potential heirs to the throne.14 Diodorus states

that Bagoas chose Darius since he was a member of the royal

circle, and was the son of Ostanes, who in turn was the brother

of Artaxerxes II (DS, 17.5.5), a vital link to the Achaemenid

Dynasty.

Unlike Darius’s predecessors, Darius would not become

victim to another of Bagoas’s attempts to murder the King of

Persia. Darius quickly proceeded to respond to potential threats

to his own reign and quelled plots against him, Bagoas was one of

those Darius eliminated as potential threats. Bagoas had

intended to murder Darius, but Darius discovered the plot, and

Bagoas was forced to drink his own poison (DS, 17.5.6).

Darius ascended to the throne 336 BCE, before his

ascension, Artaxerxes III had defeated the Egyptian Pharaoh

Nectanebo II in 342 in his conquest of Egypt.15 Nectanebo II 14 Ibid.15 Stanley M. Burstein "Prelude to Alexander: the Reign of Khababash,” in Ancient History Bulletin Vol. 15 (2000), 149-151.

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fled to Upper Egypt, where the Nubian King Khababash16 offered

him asylum. Khababash is of note because he led a brief

rebellion against Persian occupation, though modern historians

debate as to exactly when Khababash ruled and when his rebellion

concluded.

Alan B. Lloyd suggests that Khababash rebelled against the

Persians either upon the death of Artaxerxes III or the death of

his son Arses, yet exactly when is remains undetermined.17 The

noted German scholar Friedrich Kienitz argues that Khababash

could not have rebelled under Artaxerxes, and attempts to

eliminate his son Arses as well.18 Leaving Darius’s reign as the

time of Khababash’s rebellion.19

Further complicating the issue, there are few historical

texts about Khababash and his rebellion. Texts credit Khababash

with two regnal years, according to Lloyd, but exactly when his

rebellion ended remains unclear. According to Phiroze Vasunia, 16 Alternative spellings: Khabash, Khabbash, or Chababash. The contemporary view of Khababash is that he was Nubian.

17 Alan B. Lloyd, “Egypt, 404-332 B.C.” in The Cambridge Ancient History, Second Edition, Vol. VI, The Fourth Century B.C. (Cambridge: University Press, 1994), 345.

18 Badian, 253 and F. K. Kienitz, Die politische Geschichte Agyptens vom 7. bis zum 4. Jahrhundert vor, (Berlin, Akadime-Verlung, 1953).

19 Ibid.

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Khababash’s reign ended in 335 BCE.20 If his rebellion did,

indeed, end during 335, then Khababash’s rebellion ended during

the reign of Darius, not Arses. This is of significance, because

it indicates that the rebellion began under Arses, and that

Darius was able to defeat a significant rebellion in Egypt early

in his reign as King of Persia.

Badian dismisses such a notion, since there is no mention of

Darius’s success in suppressing the Egyptian rebellion in any of

the Greek texts.21 Badian certainly has a legitimate point that

classical Greek historians would have taken advantage of Darius’s

success in Egypt to strengthen Darius’s stature, thereby making

Alexander’s eventual victory over him even more significant.

Badian dismisses the possibility of Darius successfully quelling

the rebellion too quickly, for even he points out that the Greeks

had no cites or forces involved in operations in Egypt.22 The

absence of a potential Darius victory in Egypt does not preclude

the possibility.

20 Phiroze Vasunia, The Gift of the Nile: Hellenizing Egypt from Aeschylus to Alexander, (Berkley: University of California Press 2001), 266.

21 Badian, 254.22 Ibid.

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As noted, Lloyd is of the belief that Darius was able to

reclaim Egypt early in his career. Nylander also holds the same

opinion,23 joining in Lloyd’s appraisal is noted scholar A.B.

Bosworth.24 Waldemar Heckel specifically mentions that Darius

was initially unable to deal with Alexander’s invasion of Asia

Minor because he was concluding the campaign in Egypt.25 Thus,

it would appear that amongst his published contemporaries, Badian

holds a minority opinion.

Darius’s personal history is counter to what the ancient

texts would lead one to believe, especially Arrian’s scathing

appraisal of Darius (Arr., 3.22). His history of courage on the

battlefield allowed him to be recognized by Artaxerxes III,

honored with the name Codomannus, and given a satrapy. He must

have performed well in the role of satrap, as he appointed to the

King’s postal service.26 He continued to prove his loyalty to

23 Carl Nylander, “Darius III,” 148.24 A.B. Bosworth, “Alexander the Great Part I: The events of the reign” in The

Cambridge Ancient History, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.25 Waldemar Heckel, 2405.26 Badian, 250. As a satrap, Darius would have control of a sizable military force. Badian hints that Darius may have worked his way through the king’s postal service to a position of high importance, perhaps even the central sector in Persepolis (p. 250). This is an interesting observation, as this appointment would have given Darius a much great knowledge of the whole of the Persian Empire, and its geography.

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the king and to Persia, and positioned himself firmly within the

royal circle.

Through his courage, loyalty, performance of duty, and

acceptance in the royal circle, Darius, without conspiring to do

so, placed himself in line for the throne when Arses was

murdered. Upon assuming the throne, Darius quickly eliminated a

threat to his own life, perpetrated by the individual who had

murdered his two predecessors. Within a very short period of

ascending to the throne, Darius then proceeded to reconquer

Egypt.

The evidence, when evaluated, indicates that Darius was not

a coward, nor was he inept. Indeed, Darius’s personal history

shows a man quite capable of adapting to situations very rapidly.

He was a man who learned quickly, had a strong sense of duty, and

a very sharp understanding of the situation and how to respond.

His loyalty to Artaxerxes III must have been unwavering, or he

would not have earned the King’s trust. More specifically, he

was one to accept challenges, not flee from them, as we see from

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his victory over the Cadusii chieftain and his response to

Khababash’s rebellion.

The Psychological Impact of Historical Events on Darius

Perhaps the greatest influences on Darius at Gaugamela were

the psychological events that transpired prior to the battle—

events which must have weighed heavily upon his mental state.

There were two particular events that were of such significance

that their impact on the battle cannot be overlooked. The first

event was the capture by Alexander of Darius’s family, and the

subsequent death of his wife Stateria. The second event, which

is perhaps more significant, is the lunar eclipse of 20 September

331 BCE.

Alexander’s forces captured Darius’s family after Darius

retreated from Issus (Arr., 2.11.3). During his hasty retreat,

Alexander was able to capture Stateira, as well as Darius’s son,

daughters, and mother (Ibid). Darius attempted to secure their

freedom from Alexander, first by offering to buy their freedom

(Arrian, 2.13.1-3, Curtius, 4.11.1-6, and Just., 11.11-12).

Later, Darius would offer a large part of his kingdom to

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Alexander in exchange for their release (Curt., 4.10.18-19, and

Just., 11.12).

One of the most important psychological aspects of the

captivity of Darius’s family was the death of his wife Stateira.

It is of note that there is little mention of Darius’s first wife

in the ancient texts, yet we know a great deal about Stateira.

Stateira’s death in captivity greatly affected Darius (Curtius,

4.10-18-19, Just., 11.12, and Plutarch 30.1). There are

contradictory accounts as to the exact nature of Stateira’s

death. Curtius suggests that she died because of the stress of

travel (Curt., 4.10.18-19). Plutarch indicates that Stateira

died in childbirth (Plu., 30.1) contradicting Curtius, though

Plutarch does suggest that Alexander was not the father (Ibid).

Aside from the psychological impact of the capture of his

family and the loss of his wife Stateira, the lunar eclipse of 20

September 331 BCE significantly impacted the events of Gaugamela.

It was an ominous foretelling of future events, and the King’s

decline. For Alexander, it foretold of his impending victory.

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Darius, however, faced the knowledge that he, and his kingdom,

were doomed.

Sachs and Hunger have translated the account of the

eclipse: "The 13th (of Ululu), moonset to sunrise: 8˚... lunar

eclipses, in its totality covered, 40th minute of the night

[totality?] [original broken...] Jupiter set; Saturn...during

totality, west wind blew, during clearing the east wind [...]

fourth?...; during the eclipse, death and plague." (AD, 179, No.

-330, obv. 2-4. ) The eclipse is confirmed by NASA databases,

which indicate the eclipse occurred on 20 September, 331 BCE.27

To understand the eclipse, we must understand the importance

of the moon in Babylonian culture. The moon represented Persia.

We know this from Herodotus, who recounts the Magi explaining the

significance of a lunar eclipse to Xerxes (Hdt, 7.37.3).

Likewise, the sun represented the Greeks (Hdt., 7.37.4). The

Chaldean Magi indicated the solar eclipse of 480 BCE would bring

27 National Aeronautics and Space Administration. “Catalog of Lunar Eclipses:-399 to 300 (400 BCE-301 BCE).” Eclipse 04036” -0330 Sep 20, 2006, accessed 3 December 2014. http://eclipse.gsfc.nasa.gov/5MCLEmap/-0399--0300/LE-0330-09-20T.gif.

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Xerxes favor (Ibid). Indeed the prophecy was true as Xerxes was

able to subdue Thessaly with little effort and gained a victory

at Thermopylae in August, though not without hardship.

In turn, the lunar eclipse of 331 BCE would signify an omen

of bad luck. Yet, the eclipse of the moon was not the only

significant factor. There were other omens during the eclipse

that compounded the situation. The importance of Jupiter and

Saturn during the eclipse adds additional importance to the

equation. Both planets had significant meaning to Babylonian

Zoroastrian mythology.

Jupiter signified the Babylonian god Marduk, the god of

water, vegetation, but more importantly judgment and magic. 28 He

was also the patron deity of the city of Babylon. Saturn

represented Shamash, the god of the Sun and justice.29 More

importantly, Jupiter is a positive planet, its presence in an

eclipse could have avoided the bad omen for Darius.30 The

28 Helmer Ringgren, Religions of The Ancient Near East, Translated by John Sturdy,(London: The Westminster Press, 1974), 66.

29 Ibid.30 Robartus van der Speck, “Darius III, Alexander the Great and Babylonian Scholarship” in A Persian Perspective: Essays in Memory of Heleen Sancis-Weerdenburg, Achaemenid History VII, Edited by Wourter Henklelman and Amelie Kuhrt, (Leiden: Nederlands Instituut vor het Nabije Oost, 2003), 294.

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mythological impact worsened by the presence of Saturn, a

negative planet.31 The coup de la mort for Darius as King of Persia

came in the form of two prophecies.

The first prophecy comes from the rules of the Šumma Sîn ina

tāmartīsū.32 Since Jupiter is a positive planet and Saturn a

negative, the king is safe. However, one of his noble

representatives will die in his place.33 The presence of Jupiter

itself is a sign of good omen, while the presence of Saturn

without Jupiter is a sign of bad omen. During the eclipse of 20

September, Jupiter was set and Saturn was present, magnifying the

negative omens.34

Since the eclipse occurred in the month of Ululu, the omens

were compounded. Spek notes the following translation: “ if in

Ululu, (an eclipse (of the moon) occurs during the evening

watch): the enemy will inflict a defeat on the land; the enemy

will enjoy my possessions.”35

31 Ibid.32 Ibid, 292.33 Ibid, 294.34 Ibid.35 Ibid.

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The second prophecy appears to speak directly of Alexander

and Darius, and comes from the 29th tablet of Enūma Anu Elil.

The prophecy speaks of an eclipse on the 13th day of Ululu, it

speaks of westerly winds, the son of the king, and an intruder

who becomes king for 8 years, and who will conquer the enemy

army, pursue his enemy and will have great luck.36 The passage

certainly seems to foretell of the events of Gaugamela.

The winds during the eclipse first blew from the west, then

shifted to the east. Alexander defeated Darius at Gaugamela, and

pursued him until his death in the summer of the following year.

He became King of the World, when Darius fled to the lands of the

east. Darius’s son, Ochus, a prisoner of Alexander and treated

well by him, never did see the Persian throne. Alexander would

rule Persia until June 323, just shy of eight full years, and

would conquer much of the known world, and enjoyed a tremendous

amount of success.37

Ancient sources mention the eclipse (Arr., 3.7.6, Curt.,

4.10.1-8, Plu., 31.8). Both Arrian and Curtius make note that

36 Ibid.37 Ibid.

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Alexander realized the significance of the eclipse omens.

Alexander was an educated man, and understood the importance of

knowing all aspects of the enemy and sacrificed accordingly, to

note the fortunes of the eclipse (Arrian, 3.7.6).

The psychological impact of the eclipse among the Persian

troops is only compounded by Darius’s flight at Issus, in which

his chariot and personal effects were seized. Upon his chariot

was the emblem of the Fravashi, the representation of the divine

mandate of the king’s authority, but also of this right to

rule.38 Thus, by seizing the chariot, and the Fravashi along

with it, in the eyes of the Persians, Alexander had taken

Darius’s right to rule.39

The eclipse, while not of specific significance in

Zoroastrian symbology to the average Persian soldier, still

provided significant impact psychologically. As Roy Willis

points out in World Mythology, in many Ancient Near Eastern

societies, any eclipse represented a disturbance of the cosmic 38 See Nylander, Darius III, 149-152, in which he argues that Darius’s retreat from Issus was necessary as the capture of the Persian King would upset the cosmic balance. Nylander explains how the capture of Darius’s chariot, armor and staff, with various Zoroastrian symbology was a egregious offense to allow to occur.

39 Ibid.

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balance.40 Thus, the soldiers would naturally be psychologically

impacted by the occurrence of any eclipse, but especially a lunar

impact, given the fact that the moon represented Persia, as

explained previously.

From a psychological aspect, the evidence suggests that

psychologically, Darius would have been under emotional duress.

His enemy held his family prisoners, and his wife died while in

captivity. This emotional strain was compounded days before the

battle by a lunar eclipse that foretold prophecy of his impending

defeat, and end of his dynasty. The evidence gives useful

insight as to Darius’s immediate reactions when the Macedonians

were able to breech the Persian center.

The ancient texts state that Darius fled at Gaugamela (Arr.,

3.14, Curt., 4.15.28-32, DS, 17.60.3-4) however, the evidence

presents the possibility that Darius’s flight was induced by

psychological factors. The Persian troops, impacted by the

cosmological imbalance foretold by the eclipse, not to mention

the knowledge of the fact that Darius had lost the symbols of his

Fravashi, began to flee when the events of the battle turned 40 Roy Willis, World Mythology, (New York: Holt and Company, 1993) 26-27.

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against the Persians. Darius, in turn, was forced to flee as the

troops nearest him began to flee, leaving him exposed to the

oncoming Macedonian assault.

Darius, The Battle of Issus, and its Effects

The Battle of Issus placed the initial stigma on Darius as a

poor commander. More importantly, he fled from the battlefield,

and his family taken prisoner. Yet, in the wake of Issus, the

evidence from the ancient sources shows a man with incredible

insight. It shows a commander willing to adapt his tactics and

strategy, in not only the sense of his short-term campaign

tactics, but also one who changes his entire strategy for the

campaign. The evidence also shows a commander who quickly learns

and institutes changes to correct weaknesses.

With the immense amount of modern scholarship about the

importance of Darius’s flight available, it is pointless to try

to offer additional analysis on the matter. Darius fled from the

battle. Arrian states that his flight damaged his reputation

(3.1.2) with Mazaeus. It is reasonable to conclude that Mazaeus

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was not the only Persian noble who viewed Darius’s flight

negatively.

Several factors that contributed to Darius’s defeat at

Issus, yet one significant factor was the restrictive terrain.41

Darius placed his army in this position by aggressive pursuit

Alexander after capturing Issus.42 Darius’s decision to charge

with his cavalry in such terrain limited their effectiveness

(Curt., 3.6.1). Two years later at Gaugamela, Darius

specifically chose terrain suited for his cavalry and chariots

(Arr., 3.8.7, Curtius, 4.9.9-10).

Issus dramatically influenced the manner in which Darius

equipped and deployed his army at Gaugamela. Darius suffered

heavy loss with his cavalry against the Macedonians, as well as

heavy losses with his infantry. The Persians that took the field

at Gaugamela were better equipped to match the Macedonians than

those that took the field at Issus. Darius implemented sweeping

changes to his army. So drastic were the changes that they

41 Cited by Polybius (Plb.,12.17) using Callisthenes as his source, as being fourteen stades, or approximately 1 ½ miles wide.

42 J.F.C. Fuller, The Generalship of Alexander The Great, ( 1960; repr., New York: DaCapo, 1990), 154-155.

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completely altered the manner in which the Persian army

traditionally fought, as well as traditional roles.

Darius armed his levied infantry with heavier armor and

trained the infantry prior to the battle. 43 The addition of war

elephants and scythed chariots to his army (Arr., 3.8.13) added a

heavy assault force capable of breaching both the heavy

Macedonian cavalry and infantry. Improvements to the cataphract

cavalry were designed to bring them to a level comparable to the

Companion Cavalry. 44 All of these changes to his infantry and

cavalry, as well as the addition of heavy assault forces, altered

the primary response of defense to the infantry instead of the

cavalry45 This becomes apparent in the manner in which Darius

deploys his army at Gaugamela (Arr., 3.11).

Perhaps the most interesting change that results from Issus

is the manner in which Darius pursues the campaign after the

battle. Darius’s operations immediately after Issus focused on

cutting off Alexander’s supply lines, communications, and forcing

43 Badian, 258.44 Ibid.45 Ibid.

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Alexander’s withdrawal towards Macedonia.46 The secondary focus

is to generate funds to rebuild an army.47 Both of these short-

term changes in strategy are to be expected.

However, Darius’s long-term strategic change is as bold as

the changes he made to his army. Darius’s long-term tactics

changed from an aggressive, unsystematic defense of his empire by

means of seeking out Alexander to a deliberate, methodical

defense. Darius would no longer seek out Alexander, instead he

would force Alexander to come to him at a location of his own

choice. At Granicus and Issus, the Persians marched to meet

Alexander; 48 at Gaugamela, it would be the Macedonians who would

march to meet the Persians.

Darius suffered a tremendous defeat at Issus; yet, he was

able to learn valuable lessons from his encounter with Alexander.

The evidence shows Darius’s ability to adapt his army and not

only to meet the capabilities of his enemy, but also to enhance

his own army’s capabilities. Darius learned to choose the

46 A.R. Burn, “Notes on Alexander’s Campaigns,” in The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol.72, 1952, 81-83.47 Ibid.48 Matt Waters, Ancient Persia: A Concise History of the Achaemenid Empire, 550-330 BCE, (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2014), Kindle Edition, 3111-3553.

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terrain to allow as much mobility as possible, increasing his

cavalry’s effectiveness. Perhaps most impressive was his change

in the way he altered the manner in which his army traditionally

fought, and in doing so, taking a tremendous risk in changing not

only roles within his army, but traditional social roles as

well.49 In arming the levied infantry, he allowed the cavalry to

assume a greater offensive role, and the levied infantry to

assume a greater defensive role.

Location of the Battlefield

In Notes on Alexander’s Crossing of the Tigris and the Battle of Arbela, Aurel

Stein describes in very precise detail his interpretation of the

most likely site of the battle. He draws his conclusion based on

the following factors: the most probable location of Alexander’s

crossing of the Tigris River, Arrian’s timeline of Alexander’s

movements after his crossing; Arrian, Curtius, and Diodorus’s

accounts of Alexander’s movements prior to the battle in

relationship to terrain features, and the author’s accounts of

Darius’s movements to the battlefield site.50

49 Badian, 258.50 Aurel Stein, “Notes on Alexander’s Crossing of the Tigris and the Battle ofArbela,” The Geographic Journal, Vol. 100, No. 4 (Oct., 1942): 157-163.

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Stein also takes into account his own travels through and

his observation of the area. Stein rejects the Arrian’s

description of the battlefield being 600 stades from Arbela, and

argues that Ptolemy’s Geographia offers a more accurate account at

200 or 320 stades.51 Stein eventually concludes that the battle

occurred near present day Kermalais (Karemlesh). He describes a

wide plain extending from Bartella (Bartallah) in the North to

Qaraqosh in the South.

The author believes that the area indicated by Stein has a

high probability of being the site of the battle. In terms of

terrain, it is most suitable. In terms of logistics, it offers

the greatest ability to support Darius’s army. E.W. Mardsen’s

excellent work on establishing an estimate of Persian cavalry at

the battle places the number of Persian cavalry at 34,000.52 The

Persian infantry was probably around 50,000, not including the

10,000 Immortals (Apple Bearers).53 Stein’s site is ideal, for

it sits very near the old caravan road that Stein notes on his

http://www.jstor.org/stable1788973 . Accessed November 20, 2014.51 Ibid, 159.52 E.W. Marsden, The Campaign of Gaugamela, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964), 19-37.53 Ibid.

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map.54 The site is also very near the Jabal ‘Ain-as Satrah,

which is described in the ancient texts. There are also numerous

small villages in the vicinity, which could have been used by

Darius as told by Diodorus. The site is the only one in the

region that fits all of the historical descriptions and offers

maneuverability on a large scale.

Darius’s Battle Strategy

Gaugamela was the last “stop” before Alexander reached

Babylon proper. A decisive victory at Gaugamela offered no

chance to stop the Macedonians from reaching Babylon. Darius was

wagering the rest of the Persian Empire on the outcome of this

one specific battle. It had taken Darius two years to raise

another army capable of challenging Alexander after Issus. For

Darius and the Persian Army, Gaugamela was the last stand (Curt.,

4.14).

54 Stein, 156.

Patchen 27

Darius knew well that the outcome of the coming battle would

mean either victory or defeat for Persia (Curt., 4.14.15).

Indeed, Darius was wagering the entire Persian Empire on the

outcome (Curt., 4.14.10). By allowing Alexander to advance deep

within the Persian Empire to a battlefield of his own choosing,

Darius was making a bold move.

Darius also had an overwhelming number of cavalry and

infantry at Gaugamela. Sources vary as to the exact number of

cavalry and infantry he possessed, but modern estimates place the

number at around 35,000 cavalry and approximately 50,000

infantry.55 He had learned much in his campaign with the

Macedonians. He had brought in heavy Greek mercenary infantry to

augment and bolster his own infantry (DS, 17.53.1-2). Darius was

willing to wager everything, but he was hedging his bet with his

powerful army.

It is not hard to see Darius’s strategy. His strategy was

simple, yet complex. His cavalry, supported by the newly

55 Arrian suggest a force of 40,000 cavalry, while Diodorus notes 200,000. Curtius documents 45,000 cavalry. Modern historian John Warry places the number of cavalry at 40,000 with 51,000 infantry, Marsden suggests 34,000 cavalry and around 50,000 supporting infantry.

Patchen 28

equipped heavier-armed infantry, which would help delay

Alexander’s own infantry and protect the Persian center, would

outflank the Macedonians, encircling the entire Macedonian army

and destroy Alexander along with the entire Macedonian army.

Darius’s primary objective would be to initially destroy

Alexander’s one true elite force—the Companion Cavalry. Once

Darius is able to destroy the Companion Cavalry and, hopefully,

Alexander along with it, his remaining cavalry would flank and

destroy the remaining, and hapless Macedonian infantry. The key

for the Persians at Gaugmela was the destruction of Alexander’s

heavy cavalry, and the Persian army was prepared specifically for

such a task.

Darius did not blunder into Gaugamela as he did Issus.

Gaugamela was a well-prepared and well thought out battle plan

from the Persian perspective, matched by an equally well thought

out Macedonian battle plan. Yet, the lunar eclipse had foretold

of the Darius’s impending defeat. The Babylonian gods had

abandoned the Persian king, and he was destined to fail at

Gaugamela.

Patchen 29

Secondary Contributing Factors

We must now address factors that played a significant role

during the battle. One, in particular, will change the entire

perspective of Darius’s withdrawal from the battlefield, for it

is of such importance that it dramatically alters not only our

perception of the battle, and Alexander’s strategy, but also our

perception of Darius’s understanding of how the battle was

unfolding. This factor is a fatal flaw within the command model

of the Persian army itself, one that extends back hundreds of

years, and has contributed to several decisive defeats for the

Persian army.

In Alexander’s Targeting of Persian Commanders, the author set forth

a historical model indicating that Alexander understood an

inherent flaw in the Persian command model that existed since the

first Greco-Persian Wars.56 Through a detailed examination of

key battles at Plataea and Cunaxa, it was established that the

targeting and elimination of the Supreme Persian commander

resulted in the breakdown and the retreat of the entire Persian

56 John Patchen, “Alexander’s Targeting of Persian Commanders: A Historical Examination,” 2013.

Patchen 30

army. This phenomenon occurred not once, but consistently upon

the death of the supreme commander in virtually every battle.

Furthermore, it was not limited to the supreme commander, but

extended to commanders of great influence among the Persian

troops.57

The Persians knew of this flaw, at least as far back as the

Battle of Cunaxa, for Cyrus the Younger deliberately attempted to

target his brother Artaxerxes. We know this because Xenophon

describes Cyrus’s tactic in his Anabasis (Xen., 1.8.12). However,

the Persian army command model remains relatively unchanged up to

the Battle of Gaugamela.

Darius assumed the traditional center-of-the-line position

at both Issus and Gaugamela, as per the Persian doctrine (Xen.,

1.8.22). This position was significant at both battles, because

Alexander deliberately targeted the Persian center and, at both

battles, he is able to drive into the Persian center. At Issus,

he drove Darius to retreat. Again, at Gaugamela, he is able to

drive into the Persian center as well.

57 Ibid.

Patchen 31

We have no evidence to suggest that Darius did not

understand the same weakness in the Persian command model. In

fact, the evidence suggests the opposite, that Darius would have

understood the weakness. Darius was a quick learner. We see

this in his response to the rebellion in Egypt, Bagoas’s

assassination, , and the way he adapted very quickly after Issus.

We must accept that Darius had it within his means to realize

that his army had a crucial flaw that could have disastrous

consequences.

Persian Battle Movements

We must now examine several crucial battlefield movements

that the Persians executed at Gaugamela, which provide much

insight not only to the actual plan that Darius had for defeating

Alexander, but also his psychological mindset. In understanding

pivotal command decisions, it is possible to ascertain the intent

that Darius had once the left flank collapses and he must make a

decision to withdraw. Consequently, they also indicate possible

actions Darius may have made during his withdrawal as well.

Patchen 32

The most pivotal aspect of Gaugamela was the action on the

Persian left flank. The outcome of Gaugamela hinged more on the

events that unfolded in this sector of the battlefield than in

any other, so we must carefully examine the actions taken by

Darius during the battle. Once Darius did achieve a breach in

the center of the Macedonian lines, his forces immediately pushed

deep into the baggage train, instead of attempting to encircle

and destroy Alexander and the Companion Cavalry These factors

were decisive in Darius’s defeat.

The Persian Left Flank

Darius began his attack by attempting to outflank Alexander

with his Scythian and Bactrian cavalry (Arr., 3.13). The

Macedonians repulsed the first wave of the attack, but upon the

engagement of Bactrian reserves, the forces of the left flank

renewed their assault (Ibid). At this point, Darius was fearful

that his scythed chariots would quickly be of no use and ordered

them into battle. Arrian states that the scythed chariots

inflicted little harm upon the Macedonians, (Arr., 3.13 ) while

Patchen 33

Diodorus states that the scythed chariots did indeed inflict

casualties among the Macedonian center. (DS, 17.58.4).

Darius’s Breech of the Macedonian Lines

As the action on the left flank progressed, the Persian

right flank attack proceeded remarkably well. The Persian

infantry with cavalry support had nearly encircled Parmenion (DS,

17.60.5). As a result of the oblique movement that Alexander

used to draw the Persian cavalry on the left flank away to open

his own breech, the Persians were able to achieve a breech of

their own, which they quickly exploited. Both Diodorus and

Curtius state that Mazaeus sent a large contingency of cavalry

and infantry through this center gap, created between the

Macedonian left and right flanks, to attack the Macedonian

baggage train, and free the Persian prisoners (Curt.,4.15.5, DS,

17.59.5).

It was here that Darius lost the Battle of Gaugamela. At a

crucial time in the battle, Darius’s desire to reach the

prisoners (more specifically his family) overshadowed the more

Patchen 34

pressing tactical situation. The cavalry and infantry sent to

attack the baggage train did indeed reach its objective.

However, they would have served a much greater immediate tactical

use if used to encircle crucial left flank.

By presenting Alexander with the threat of encirclement, it is

doubtful that Alexander would have been able to launch his

decisive attack into the Persian center. Instead, Alexander

would have been the one forced to withdraw, or perhaps have been

destroyed. The destruction of the Macedonian forces, and

Alexander himself, would have resulted in a the release of the

Persian prisoners in the baggage trains. Thus, Alexander, and

his encirclement and destruction was a greater priority to the

immediate success of the operation, then freeing the prisoners in

the baggage trains.

Darius’s Actions Post-Withdrawal

At least two sources state that Darius’s withdrawal was

impossible to view because dust obscured the view (Curt.,

4.15.32, DS, 17.61.1-2). Curtius and Diodorus are both in

Patchen 35

concurrence that Darius withdrew into a cloud of dust, while

Arrian and Plutarch mention nothing of the dust cloud. Curtius

and Diodorus certainly make a viable statement, as anyone who has

been exposed to even basic horse ridership knows that horses,

even at a trot will create dust. It is here that we must

consider our first historical quandary. How is it possible, from

this point forward, to discern Darius’s actions, or intent if he

cannot be seen?

It is not entirely clear whether Darius is withdrawing

because the tactical situation demanded it, or if he is

retreating in fear. There are conflicting texts from Arrian,

Diodorus, and Curtius that must be analyzed and objectively

reviewed. It is in the greater context that the picture becomes

clear. Arrian indicates that Darius fled out of panic (Arr.,

3.14), while Curtius and Diodorus suggest that the tactical

situation around Darius offered no other alternative except

withdrawal (Curt., 4.15.28-32, DS, 17.60.3-4).

All of the ancient texts are in concurrence that Darius

fled. Arrian’s text indicates that Darius was the first to turn

Patchen 36

and flee Arrian’s account is contradicted by Diodorus and

Curtius, who both state that Darius only fled after the troops

around him began to flee (Curt., 4.15.28-32, DS, 17.60.1-5).

Both Diodorus and Curtius are clear that the Persian forces began

to flee after they believe that a javelin had slain Darius

(Curt., 4.15.28, DS, 17.60.2). However, this was not the case,

as the javelin struck Darius’s chariot driver, killing him

instead (Ibid).

The result of the errant javelin was catastrophic

nonetheless. The Persians nearest to Darius, believing their

supreme commander had fallen, responded as they had historically

they began to flee. This historically dictated action was the

exact reason that Alexander intended to attack the Persian

center. The forces surrounding Darius at this moment—and the very

same forces beginning to flee were among his most elite.

Compounding the issue at Gaugamela is the Astronomical Diaries’s

passage that indicates that Darius’s troops deserted him at some

point during the battle. The Diaries context state, “On the 24th,58

in the morning, the king of the world […] the standard? [….] they58 The 24th of the Month of Ululu, or 1 October.

Patchen 37

fought with each other, and a heavy defeat of the troops of [….]

the troops of the king deserted him and [went] to their cities59 (AD, 179, No. 330,

obv, 15-17).”

One of the first actions indicative of Darius’s mindset

during the withdrawal was his conviction to die an honorable

death. Curtius indicates that Darius initially thought about

standing his ground and fighting, but then decided to withdraw

(Curt., 4.15.30). Justin validates Darius’s initial

unwillingness to withdraw. “Darius, when he saw his army

repulsed, wished himself to die, but was compelled by his

officers to flee.” (Just., 6.14.3) Darius’s resolve to die on the

battlefield with his troops, or at the least, near his army is

not the action of an individual who is cowardly, but rather the

action of an honorable commander—the modern day captain going

down with his ship.

It is also of note that during the withdrawal from the

battle that Darius’s commanders advised him to destroy key

bridges over the Lycus River (Great Zab) that would allow

Macedonian forces to pursue him during his withdrawal (Curt., 59 Author’s Italics.

Patchen 38

4.16.8-9, Just. 6.14.4). Darius refused to allow the destruction

of the bridges, which will cut off the remaining Persian forces

on the battlefield from possible escape (Ibid).

Diodorus suggests that Darius circled back behind into

villages to reorganize some of his troops (DS 17.61.1). This

contradicts the Arrian account that Darius fled from the battle

and continued to flee the immediate area until he reached Media.

Diodorus’s account is consistent with a king who has already

invested a significant amount of time and resources, as well as

completely changed his tactics, for the sole purpose of

engineering the defeating a single foe. This account also

provides some insight as to possible strategies that Darius may

have implemented during his withdrawal.

At the moment of his withdrawal, Darius’s had suffered a key

tactical defeat on the Persian left flank. At the same time, the

battle was progressing well for the Persians in other aspects.

The Persians had broken into the Macedonian baggage train, though

they eventually withdrew with heavy casualties (DS, 17.60.8).

More importantly, the Persian infantry with supporting cavalry on

Patchen 39

the right flank was not only holding the Macedonian infantry at

bay, they were close to achieving an encirclement. Alexander

broke off his pursuit of Darius because of the threat posed by

the Persian right flank (Arr., 3.15). If Darius did indeed

withdraw to a nearby village to reorganize his troops, his

options were limited.

Darius’s only true course of action, other than a full-

fledged retreat, would be to conduct what military tacticians

call in modern terms as a retrograde defense. In a retrograde

defense, the commander trades time for space.60 Specific units

are tasked with harassing and delaying the enemy (time) so that

as many the of commander’s forces as possible can withdraw safely

(space), known as delaying actions. Keys to a retrograde defense

are: avoiding a decisive engagement; preparing plans to enhance a

rapid, controlled execution; denying the enemy information on

current movements; avoiding surprise with current intelligence;

and combining deception with delaying actions to prevent the

enemy from closing in strength.61 While Darius did not have

60 Department of the Army, FM 3.20: Defensive Operations, (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2002) 8.29-8.31.61 Ibid.

Patchen 40

access to 20th century United States Army military field manuals,

the Diodorus account, and the Astronomical Diaries passage certainly

indicates that he attempted to perform a retrograde defense.

Diodorus states that Darius did not withdraw to the rear

with the other barbarians, but turned in the opposite direction.

(17.61.1-2). As noted earlier, part of a retrograde defense

requires deception and delay to prevent the enemy from closing

and destroying the bulk of the forces withdrawing. By turning in

the opposite direction of the main body of retreating forces, and

with only a small force covering him (Curt., 4.16.8), Darius

himself became the deception, placing himself in considerable

danger, especially if Alexander had continued to pursue him.

Such a deceptive move could not have been conducted without

some form of communication with his other generals, so Darius

would have halted at some point during the retreat to coordinate

this move. Where, exactly, remains a mystery, as the site of the

battle remains unknown. During this short halt, it is entirely

plausible that Darius would have sent a messenger to Mazaeus, the

commander of the right flank, in an attempt to save as many of

Patchen 41

the right flank forces. This premise is not without historical

evidence to support it.

Arrian, Curtius and Diodorus all concur that the Persian

right flank attack had progressed extremely well (Arr., 3.15,

Curt., 4.16.1-5, DS, 17.60.5-8). Once again all three sources

agree that the right flank was initially unaware of Darius’s

flight from the battlefield (Arr., 3.14, Curt., 4.16.1-4, DS,

17.60.5). However, Curtius specifically mentions that once “news

of the king’s defeat had reached Mazaues, and he, alarmed at his

side’s misfortunes, began to relax his pressure on the dispirited

Macedonians despite his superior strength (4.16.4).” Given the

size of the forces involved, the space that was created by

Alexander’s oblique movement that created the center gap in which

Mazaeus sent his forces to attack the baggage train, it is

entirely possible that the “news of the Kings’s defeat” arrived

by a messenger sent by Darius, informing Mazaeus of the

withdrawal plan.

The perception that Mazaeus “began to relax his pressure”

was actually the beginning of Mazaeus’s withdrawal. When

Patchen 42

Pamenion rallied the Thessalian cavalry believing that the

Persians were retreating in panic (Curt., 4.16.5), it became a

disorganized withdrawal. Instead of withdrawing to Arbela with

the rest of the Persian forces, Mazaeus, already discontent with

his King (Arr., 3.12), crossed the Tigris and returned to Babylon

hence the Astrological Diaries noting that the “the troops of the king

deserted him and [went] to their cities. (AD, 179, No. 330, obv,

15-17.)” Mazaeus’s desertion of Darius, may well have denied the

Persian king a sizable body of troops to mount an additional

defence or counter attack.62

The evidence, when examined in its context, presents and

entirely new scenario of Darius at Gaugamela. It cannot be

dismissed that Darius fled the battle after the Macedonians

breached the center of the Persian formation. However, the

evidence suggests that Darius displayed a significant amount of

courage and tactical awareness once he initially fled the

62 Reference Martin Doughtery, “Pydna” in Battles of the Ancient World (London: Amber Books, 2007) 129; where Doughtery describes how, in ancient warfare, casualties are initially light until on side is broken, or driven to retreat—whereupon the disorganized nature of retreat, or having one’s battle line broken results in high casualties. Based upon this historical reference, itis reasonable to infer that Mazeus’s casualties, up until his withdrawal, would also have been realitively few, giving Darius a sizable force of troops remaining if Mazeus could have broken away in an orderly manner.

Patchen 43

battlefield. It suggests that he was focused on saving as many

of his troops as possible, even risking his own life as the

distraction in the process. Finally, the evidence suggests that

Darius attempted to contact Mazaeus with the right wing, to

include his troops in the withdrawal, but they “deserted him and

[went] to their cities. (AD, 179, No. 330, obv, 15-17.”)

Darius’s Fate After Gaugamela

Why was Darius not immediately deposed, and eliminated?

The answer becomes clear when entire events of the battle are

examined closely and in depth: Darius must have distinguished

himself during the course of the battle to the extent that he had

enough support among the remaining Persian Army to continue to

lead them until Bessus and Narbarzanes could successfully mount

their coup against him.

The fact that Darius was not disposed of after Gaugamela

bears a great deal of weight. He was, by all accounts, no longer

King of Persia; Alexander had already conquered much of the

Persian Empire. As Badian points, out regicide and coups were

Patchen 44

not uncommon in Achaemind History.63 Yet the Persian nobles,

most notably Bessus, and Narbarxanes, did not immediately remove

Darius from his throne. In fact, Curtius states that Darius

still maintained the backing of his army after Gaugamela, after

calming his troops (Curt., 5.1.7-9).

Even up to the moment that Bessus and Narbarzanes arrested

him, Darius had the support of many of his nobles (Curt., 5.8.6-

5.9.1). After Darius’s arrest, the Persian camp was divided as

to the actions of Bessus (Curt., 5.9.14). The Persians had no

clear commander, and while Bessus attempted to win over the

remaining Persian army, the unanimous consent of the men was that

the desertion of the King was not acceptable (Curt., 5.9.16).

Darius eventually accepted his fate. The murder of Darius

occurred when Alexander and his forces drew near the Persian

forces, startling Bessus and Narbarzanes, who ordered Darius

bound and thrown in an ox cart.64 The Macedonians found Darius,

and Alexander was greatly disappointed, for he wanted to capture

Darius.65 Denied the honorable death he desired, cowardly

63 Badian, 264.64 Prevas, 69.65 Ibid.

Patchen 45

murdered by his own relative, Darius III, the last of the

Achaemenid kings died, and the Achaemenid dynasty perished with

him.66

Summation of the Evidence

Thus, a brief summation of the evidence presented suggests

the following:

1. Darius’s historical background shows one of courage and

loyalty, which is the primary reason he ascended to the

throne.

2. Upon ascension to the throne, Darius quickly suppressed a

rebellion in Egypt as well as a potential assassination

attempt.

3. Darius rapidly adjusted to lessons learned from the Battle

of Issus, altering his short-term, long-term strategic

66 Bessus did assume the title King of Kings of Persia, though modern historians do not recognize Bessus as a legitimate King of Persia, since Alexander had already conquered much of Persia already. Alexander, who ordered would capture Bessus and ordered his nose, and ears cut off—a traditional Persian punishment for regicide. Alexander then had Bessus executed.

Patchen 46

plans, tactical awareness, and the manner in which he

equipped his army.

4. Significant psychological factors were present that affected

Darius at Gaugamela

5. Darius’s flight at Gaugamela was not a full fledged retreat

as has been historically portrayed, instead the evidence

points to Darius’s attempt to withdraw as many of his troops

as he could, using himself as a diversion to provide safety

for his own troops.

Conclusion

Gaugamela changed the course of history. The Persian

Achaemenid dynasty ended, and Alexander firmly cemented his

legacy by claiming the Persian Empire. However, our

understanding of the battle, and more specifically Darius, his

actions, and his legacy, have been skewed by classical texts that

have a decidedly negative account of his ability to command, as

well as his personal character. Within these texts, we find

trinkets of evidence that, when dissected and examined

Patchen 47

individually and as a whole, begin to offer an entirely different

picture of the Persian king.

In the end, we see a picture of an individual fighting

desperately, yet with confidence, for his family, his empire,

and his people. A king and commander unwilling to accept defeat

and willing to sacrifice everything, including himself, to

achieve victory—or at a minimum save as many of the lives of his

own troops that he committed to battle. He is an individual whom

astrological events had doomed before battle, who continued to

fight, believing that Persia would prevail, even when those

around him might not. Even to the end, Darius wished for nothing

more than the chance of regaining his kingdom in battle, or at

least the honor of dying in battle (Curtius, 4.8.13-17). Yet

Bessus and his conspirators denied this from the Darius.

Darius’s treatment in death by Alexander exceeded his treatment

by many in life.

It is time now that we seriously reconsider the events at

Gaugamela, and specifically, our conceptions of Darius and his

actions. In light of the evidence brought forth, it is perhaps

Patchen 48

the least we can do as historians to right what may be one of the

greatest conceptual wrongs of Ancient Near Eastern history.

Darius was not a coward; he was the exact opposite—brave, noble,

courageous, determined, and willing to fight and die for his men,

and for Persia.

Patchen 49

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Patchen 53

Maps

Soviet Army Map, “J-10-38-32, Governorates of Dohuk, Nineveh, Erbil-Mosul.” Tblisi:TPPF, 1984.

United States Geological Survey “Topographical Terrain Map J38N” Topographical Terrain Map of Iraq, 1:200,000 Relief. Washington, D.C.: Defense Mapping Agency, 1983.

--.“Topographical Terrain Map J38T” Topographical Terrain Map of Iraq, 1:200,000 Relief. Washington, D.C.: Defense Mapping Agency, 1983.

--.“Topographical Terrain Map J38U” Topographical Terrain Map of Iraq, 1:200,000 Relief. Washington, D.C.: Defense Mapping Agency, 1983.