BAKER UNIVERSITY
Redefining DariusA New Perspective on the Batlle of
Gaugamela
John Patchen12/12/2014
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Abbreviations Ancient Authors
AD- Astronomical Diaries and Related Texts from BabyloniaArr.- Arrian, Anabasis of AlexanderCurt.- Quintus Curtius Rufus, The History of AlexanderDS.- Diodorus Siculus, The Library of HistoryHdt.- Herodotus, The HistoriesJust. - Marcus Junianius Just.us, Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius TrogusPlb.- Polybius, The HistoriesPlu.- Plutarch, Parallel Lives: AlexanderXen.- Xenophon, Anabasis
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“All things together appeared full of terror to Darius, who
had already long been in a state of fear, so that he was the
first to turn and flee (Arr., 3.14.).” In light of other ancient
texts, Arrian was wrong. Historians must examine the facts,
statements, historical texts, tear apart the subtleties,
reconstruct the events of time, and correctly piece together what
occurred. We must do this with as much clarity as possible,
without previously held notions, and without sentimentalism.
Reconstruction of the past should focus on factual evidence, but
it is also scientific. In the absence of absolute evidence,
historians must draw conclusions based on the most likely
rational explanation that the evidence and facts present.
The ancient historians who recount Gaugamela present varied
accounts of what actually transpired. We do not even know the
actual site of the battle, due to conflicting accounts.1 Curtius
and Diodorus present more romanticized accounts; Arrian’s account
is decidedly “Greek,” and scathing in its assessment of Darius.
It presents Darius as a poor commander, lacking in the qualities 1 Arrian (3.8.7) states that Gaugamela was 600 stades from Arbela, whereas Ptolemy “Geographia” indicates Gaugamela some 200-320 stades from Arbela (Ptol., VI, i, 5).
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of a man, and a coward (Arrian, 3.22). Arrian’s assessment in
particular has influenced many modern scholars, who in turn have
branded Darius as a coward.2
All of the ancient historian's contributions skew the modern
perception of Darius. Yet, when carefully studied in their
totality, along with a passage from the Astronomical Diaries, they
present a stunningly clear picture of the Persian King of Kings.
When objectively analyzed and reconstructed, the facts present a
new portrayal of Darius. The evidence shows Darius was a quick
learner as a tactician, bold commander, loyal to his men, and an
extremely courageous individual.
Darius’s Historical Background
It is extremely important to understand Darius’s personal
background in order to understand why the traditional accounts of
his actions at Gaugamela are so confusing. Darius’s rise to King
of Persia occurred largely because of his bravery and loyalty to
the King Artaxerxes Ochus III most certainly, but also to Persia.
2 As superbly pointed out by Badian, 242; the following authors have, at various points in their careers published highly critical accounts of Darius: Tarn, “Alexander the Great (1948), Lauffer, in Alexander der Große, 2nd ed., (1981), and Dandamayev in A Political History of the Achaemenid Empire (1989).
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For Darius to flee and abandon his troops from the battle of
Gaugamela in fear or out of cowardice at the most pivotal time in
Achaemenid history, indeed the history of Persia to that point,
is contrary to what we know about Darius. Darius, in fact,
earned his throne largely because of his courage on the
battlefield (DS, 17.6.6, Just., 10.3.3).
Darius was initially unknown during the reign of the Persian
King Artaxerxes III, but was clearly of Achaemenid lineage.3
When Ochus purged the Achaemenid family because of his fear of a
conspiracy against him, he did not eliminate Darius because
Darius was unknown to him.4 Artaxerxes III would later come to
know Darius because of his exploit in single-handed combat
against an unnamed Cardussi chief (Just., 10.3.3 and DS,
17.6.6.). For this feat of bravery, Ochus awarded Darius the
satrapy of Armenia.5
Darius’s father was Arsanes and a grandson of Ostanes, who
in turn, was a brother to Artaxerxes II.6 His mother was
3 E. Badian, “Darius III,” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, Vol. 100 (2000): 244.4 Ibid.5 Ibid.6 Waldemar Heckel, Who’s Who in the Age of Alexander the Great, ( Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), Kindle Edition. Location 2391.
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Sisygambis, Arsanes’ sister, making Darius a member of the
Achaemenid family. In Darius III, Badian argues that Darius may
have been protected from execution based on his adoption of the
name Codomannus, a name he embraced some time after defeating the
Caudisii chief.7 According to Badian, the texts indicate that
Darius dropped his birth name of Artašãtu, shortly after adopting
the Codomannus name.8
Darius was then able to establish himself within the
Achaemenid inner circle. Badian points to Darius’s appointment
in the King’s postal service as a particularly notable
assignment.9 It is in this role that Darius firmly establishes
himself as a reliable and loyal member of the King’s inner
circle and he is able to gain the King’s trust. Badian goes as
far to note that Darius was a “friend of the King,” an honor only
bestowed to Arses, the King’s son and heir to the throne.10
Darius clearly established himself as a reliable and loyal member
7 Badian, 246-2478 Ibid, 247-248.9 Badian, 250.10 Ibid.
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of the King’s inner circle. Moreover, the King did not sense
Darius to be any particular threat to him or any of his heirs.11
Sometime between 339 and 338 BCE, Darius married Stateria,12
his sister (Arr., 2.11.9, Plu., 30.3, Just., 11.9.12). Darius
had three children—one son Ochus, and two daughters Statira and
Drypetis (Curt., 3.11.24.). Darius also had a unknown wife that
he apparently married sometime in the 350s, while satrap of
Armenia, and this relationship may have also produced a son,
Ariobarzanes.13
Artaxerxes III was assassinated by Bagoas, vizier of the
royal court (DS, 17.5.3). After Artaxerxes was murdered, Bagoas
placed Arses on the throne and murdered all of his brothers to
isolate him from his family, and make him easier to control (DS,
17.5.4). Arses grew tired of Bagoas’s control, as well as his
actions, and rebelled against him. Bagoas then murdered Arses in
336, and installed Darius as King of Persia (Ibid.)
11 Ibid.12 Badian, 250-251, argues that the marriage must have occurred in late 338, after the death of Artaxerxes III, owing to the treatment of rivals to the throne.
13 Ibid, 251.
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Badian theorizes that Bagoas specifically chose Darius to
placate the Persian nobles because of his history of bravery, and
also because of his patronage to Ochus—qualities that separated
him from other potential heirs to the throne.14 Diodorus states
that Bagoas chose Darius since he was a member of the royal
circle, and was the son of Ostanes, who in turn was the brother
of Artaxerxes II (DS, 17.5.5), a vital link to the Achaemenid
Dynasty.
Unlike Darius’s predecessors, Darius would not become
victim to another of Bagoas’s attempts to murder the King of
Persia. Darius quickly proceeded to respond to potential threats
to his own reign and quelled plots against him, Bagoas was one of
those Darius eliminated as potential threats. Bagoas had
intended to murder Darius, but Darius discovered the plot, and
Bagoas was forced to drink his own poison (DS, 17.5.6).
Darius ascended to the throne 336 BCE, before his
ascension, Artaxerxes III had defeated the Egyptian Pharaoh
Nectanebo II in 342 in his conquest of Egypt.15 Nectanebo II 14 Ibid.15 Stanley M. Burstein "Prelude to Alexander: the Reign of Khababash,” in Ancient History Bulletin Vol. 15 (2000), 149-151.
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fled to Upper Egypt, where the Nubian King Khababash16 offered
him asylum. Khababash is of note because he led a brief
rebellion against Persian occupation, though modern historians
debate as to exactly when Khababash ruled and when his rebellion
concluded.
Alan B. Lloyd suggests that Khababash rebelled against the
Persians either upon the death of Artaxerxes III or the death of
his son Arses, yet exactly when is remains undetermined.17 The
noted German scholar Friedrich Kienitz argues that Khababash
could not have rebelled under Artaxerxes, and attempts to
eliminate his son Arses as well.18 Leaving Darius’s reign as the
time of Khababash’s rebellion.19
Further complicating the issue, there are few historical
texts about Khababash and his rebellion. Texts credit Khababash
with two regnal years, according to Lloyd, but exactly when his
rebellion ended remains unclear. According to Phiroze Vasunia, 16 Alternative spellings: Khabash, Khabbash, or Chababash. The contemporary view of Khababash is that he was Nubian.
17 Alan B. Lloyd, “Egypt, 404-332 B.C.” in The Cambridge Ancient History, Second Edition, Vol. VI, The Fourth Century B.C. (Cambridge: University Press, 1994), 345.
18 Badian, 253 and F. K. Kienitz, Die politische Geschichte Agyptens vom 7. bis zum 4. Jahrhundert vor, (Berlin, Akadime-Verlung, 1953).
19 Ibid.
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Khababash’s reign ended in 335 BCE.20 If his rebellion did,
indeed, end during 335, then Khababash’s rebellion ended during
the reign of Darius, not Arses. This is of significance, because
it indicates that the rebellion began under Arses, and that
Darius was able to defeat a significant rebellion in Egypt early
in his reign as King of Persia.
Badian dismisses such a notion, since there is no mention of
Darius’s success in suppressing the Egyptian rebellion in any of
the Greek texts.21 Badian certainly has a legitimate point that
classical Greek historians would have taken advantage of Darius’s
success in Egypt to strengthen Darius’s stature, thereby making
Alexander’s eventual victory over him even more significant.
Badian dismisses the possibility of Darius successfully quelling
the rebellion too quickly, for even he points out that the Greeks
had no cites or forces involved in operations in Egypt.22 The
absence of a potential Darius victory in Egypt does not preclude
the possibility.
20 Phiroze Vasunia, The Gift of the Nile: Hellenizing Egypt from Aeschylus to Alexander, (Berkley: University of California Press 2001), 266.
21 Badian, 254.22 Ibid.
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As noted, Lloyd is of the belief that Darius was able to
reclaim Egypt early in his career. Nylander also holds the same
opinion,23 joining in Lloyd’s appraisal is noted scholar A.B.
Bosworth.24 Waldemar Heckel specifically mentions that Darius
was initially unable to deal with Alexander’s invasion of Asia
Minor because he was concluding the campaign in Egypt.25 Thus,
it would appear that amongst his published contemporaries, Badian
holds a minority opinion.
Darius’s personal history is counter to what the ancient
texts would lead one to believe, especially Arrian’s scathing
appraisal of Darius (Arr., 3.22). His history of courage on the
battlefield allowed him to be recognized by Artaxerxes III,
honored with the name Codomannus, and given a satrapy. He must
have performed well in the role of satrap, as he appointed to the
King’s postal service.26 He continued to prove his loyalty to
23 Carl Nylander, “Darius III,” 148.24 A.B. Bosworth, “Alexander the Great Part I: The events of the reign” in The
Cambridge Ancient History, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.25 Waldemar Heckel, 2405.26 Badian, 250. As a satrap, Darius would have control of a sizable military force. Badian hints that Darius may have worked his way through the king’s postal service to a position of high importance, perhaps even the central sector in Persepolis (p. 250). This is an interesting observation, as this appointment would have given Darius a much great knowledge of the whole of the Persian Empire, and its geography.
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the king and to Persia, and positioned himself firmly within the
royal circle.
Through his courage, loyalty, performance of duty, and
acceptance in the royal circle, Darius, without conspiring to do
so, placed himself in line for the throne when Arses was
murdered. Upon assuming the throne, Darius quickly eliminated a
threat to his own life, perpetrated by the individual who had
murdered his two predecessors. Within a very short period of
ascending to the throne, Darius then proceeded to reconquer
Egypt.
The evidence, when evaluated, indicates that Darius was not
a coward, nor was he inept. Indeed, Darius’s personal history
shows a man quite capable of adapting to situations very rapidly.
He was a man who learned quickly, had a strong sense of duty, and
a very sharp understanding of the situation and how to respond.
His loyalty to Artaxerxes III must have been unwavering, or he
would not have earned the King’s trust. More specifically, he
was one to accept challenges, not flee from them, as we see from
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his victory over the Cadusii chieftain and his response to
Khababash’s rebellion.
The Psychological Impact of Historical Events on Darius
Perhaps the greatest influences on Darius at Gaugamela were
the psychological events that transpired prior to the battle—
events which must have weighed heavily upon his mental state.
There were two particular events that were of such significance
that their impact on the battle cannot be overlooked. The first
event was the capture by Alexander of Darius’s family, and the
subsequent death of his wife Stateria. The second event, which
is perhaps more significant, is the lunar eclipse of 20 September
331 BCE.
Alexander’s forces captured Darius’s family after Darius
retreated from Issus (Arr., 2.11.3). During his hasty retreat,
Alexander was able to capture Stateira, as well as Darius’s son,
daughters, and mother (Ibid). Darius attempted to secure their
freedom from Alexander, first by offering to buy their freedom
(Arrian, 2.13.1-3, Curtius, 4.11.1-6, and Just., 11.11-12).
Later, Darius would offer a large part of his kingdom to
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Alexander in exchange for their release (Curt., 4.10.18-19, and
Just., 11.12).
One of the most important psychological aspects of the
captivity of Darius’s family was the death of his wife Stateira.
It is of note that there is little mention of Darius’s first wife
in the ancient texts, yet we know a great deal about Stateira.
Stateira’s death in captivity greatly affected Darius (Curtius,
4.10-18-19, Just., 11.12, and Plutarch 30.1). There are
contradictory accounts as to the exact nature of Stateira’s
death. Curtius suggests that she died because of the stress of
travel (Curt., 4.10.18-19). Plutarch indicates that Stateira
died in childbirth (Plu., 30.1) contradicting Curtius, though
Plutarch does suggest that Alexander was not the father (Ibid).
Aside from the psychological impact of the capture of his
family and the loss of his wife Stateira, the lunar eclipse of 20
September 331 BCE significantly impacted the events of Gaugamela.
It was an ominous foretelling of future events, and the King’s
decline. For Alexander, it foretold of his impending victory.
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Darius, however, faced the knowledge that he, and his kingdom,
were doomed.
Sachs and Hunger have translated the account of the
eclipse: "The 13th (of Ululu), moonset to sunrise: 8˚... lunar
eclipses, in its totality covered, 40th minute of the night
[totality?] [original broken...] Jupiter set; Saturn...during
totality, west wind blew, during clearing the east wind [...]
fourth?...; during the eclipse, death and plague." (AD, 179, No.
-330, obv. 2-4. ) The eclipse is confirmed by NASA databases,
which indicate the eclipse occurred on 20 September, 331 BCE.27
To understand the eclipse, we must understand the importance
of the moon in Babylonian culture. The moon represented Persia.
We know this from Herodotus, who recounts the Magi explaining the
significance of a lunar eclipse to Xerxes (Hdt, 7.37.3).
Likewise, the sun represented the Greeks (Hdt., 7.37.4). The
Chaldean Magi indicated the solar eclipse of 480 BCE would bring
27 National Aeronautics and Space Administration. “Catalog of Lunar Eclipses:-399 to 300 (400 BCE-301 BCE).” Eclipse 04036” -0330 Sep 20, 2006, accessed 3 December 2014. http://eclipse.gsfc.nasa.gov/5MCLEmap/-0399--0300/LE-0330-09-20T.gif.
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Xerxes favor (Ibid). Indeed the prophecy was true as Xerxes was
able to subdue Thessaly with little effort and gained a victory
at Thermopylae in August, though not without hardship.
In turn, the lunar eclipse of 331 BCE would signify an omen
of bad luck. Yet, the eclipse of the moon was not the only
significant factor. There were other omens during the eclipse
that compounded the situation. The importance of Jupiter and
Saturn during the eclipse adds additional importance to the
equation. Both planets had significant meaning to Babylonian
Zoroastrian mythology.
Jupiter signified the Babylonian god Marduk, the god of
water, vegetation, but more importantly judgment and magic. 28 He
was also the patron deity of the city of Babylon. Saturn
represented Shamash, the god of the Sun and justice.29 More
importantly, Jupiter is a positive planet, its presence in an
eclipse could have avoided the bad omen for Darius.30 The
28 Helmer Ringgren, Religions of The Ancient Near East, Translated by John Sturdy,(London: The Westminster Press, 1974), 66.
29 Ibid.30 Robartus van der Speck, “Darius III, Alexander the Great and Babylonian Scholarship” in A Persian Perspective: Essays in Memory of Heleen Sancis-Weerdenburg, Achaemenid History VII, Edited by Wourter Henklelman and Amelie Kuhrt, (Leiden: Nederlands Instituut vor het Nabije Oost, 2003), 294.
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mythological impact worsened by the presence of Saturn, a
negative planet.31 The coup de la mort for Darius as King of Persia
came in the form of two prophecies.
The first prophecy comes from the rules of the Šumma Sîn ina
tāmartīsū.32 Since Jupiter is a positive planet and Saturn a
negative, the king is safe. However, one of his noble
representatives will die in his place.33 The presence of Jupiter
itself is a sign of good omen, while the presence of Saturn
without Jupiter is a sign of bad omen. During the eclipse of 20
September, Jupiter was set and Saturn was present, magnifying the
negative omens.34
Since the eclipse occurred in the month of Ululu, the omens
were compounded. Spek notes the following translation: “ if in
Ululu, (an eclipse (of the moon) occurs during the evening
watch): the enemy will inflict a defeat on the land; the enemy
will enjoy my possessions.”35
31 Ibid.32 Ibid, 292.33 Ibid, 294.34 Ibid.35 Ibid.
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The second prophecy appears to speak directly of Alexander
and Darius, and comes from the 29th tablet of Enūma Anu Elil.
The prophecy speaks of an eclipse on the 13th day of Ululu, it
speaks of westerly winds, the son of the king, and an intruder
who becomes king for 8 years, and who will conquer the enemy
army, pursue his enemy and will have great luck.36 The passage
certainly seems to foretell of the events of Gaugamela.
The winds during the eclipse first blew from the west, then
shifted to the east. Alexander defeated Darius at Gaugamela, and
pursued him until his death in the summer of the following year.
He became King of the World, when Darius fled to the lands of the
east. Darius’s son, Ochus, a prisoner of Alexander and treated
well by him, never did see the Persian throne. Alexander would
rule Persia until June 323, just shy of eight full years, and
would conquer much of the known world, and enjoyed a tremendous
amount of success.37
Ancient sources mention the eclipse (Arr., 3.7.6, Curt.,
4.10.1-8, Plu., 31.8). Both Arrian and Curtius make note that
36 Ibid.37 Ibid.
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Alexander realized the significance of the eclipse omens.
Alexander was an educated man, and understood the importance of
knowing all aspects of the enemy and sacrificed accordingly, to
note the fortunes of the eclipse (Arrian, 3.7.6).
The psychological impact of the eclipse among the Persian
troops is only compounded by Darius’s flight at Issus, in which
his chariot and personal effects were seized. Upon his chariot
was the emblem of the Fravashi, the representation of the divine
mandate of the king’s authority, but also of this right to
rule.38 Thus, by seizing the chariot, and the Fravashi along
with it, in the eyes of the Persians, Alexander had taken
Darius’s right to rule.39
The eclipse, while not of specific significance in
Zoroastrian symbology to the average Persian soldier, still
provided significant impact psychologically. As Roy Willis
points out in World Mythology, in many Ancient Near Eastern
societies, any eclipse represented a disturbance of the cosmic 38 See Nylander, Darius III, 149-152, in which he argues that Darius’s retreat from Issus was necessary as the capture of the Persian King would upset the cosmic balance. Nylander explains how the capture of Darius’s chariot, armor and staff, with various Zoroastrian symbology was a egregious offense to allow to occur.
39 Ibid.
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balance.40 Thus, the soldiers would naturally be psychologically
impacted by the occurrence of any eclipse, but especially a lunar
impact, given the fact that the moon represented Persia, as
explained previously.
From a psychological aspect, the evidence suggests that
psychologically, Darius would have been under emotional duress.
His enemy held his family prisoners, and his wife died while in
captivity. This emotional strain was compounded days before the
battle by a lunar eclipse that foretold prophecy of his impending
defeat, and end of his dynasty. The evidence gives useful
insight as to Darius’s immediate reactions when the Macedonians
were able to breech the Persian center.
The ancient texts state that Darius fled at Gaugamela (Arr.,
3.14, Curt., 4.15.28-32, DS, 17.60.3-4) however, the evidence
presents the possibility that Darius’s flight was induced by
psychological factors. The Persian troops, impacted by the
cosmological imbalance foretold by the eclipse, not to mention
the knowledge of the fact that Darius had lost the symbols of his
Fravashi, began to flee when the events of the battle turned 40 Roy Willis, World Mythology, (New York: Holt and Company, 1993) 26-27.
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against the Persians. Darius, in turn, was forced to flee as the
troops nearest him began to flee, leaving him exposed to the
oncoming Macedonian assault.
Darius, The Battle of Issus, and its Effects
The Battle of Issus placed the initial stigma on Darius as a
poor commander. More importantly, he fled from the battlefield,
and his family taken prisoner. Yet, in the wake of Issus, the
evidence from the ancient sources shows a man with incredible
insight. It shows a commander willing to adapt his tactics and
strategy, in not only the sense of his short-term campaign
tactics, but also one who changes his entire strategy for the
campaign. The evidence also shows a commander who quickly learns
and institutes changes to correct weaknesses.
With the immense amount of modern scholarship about the
importance of Darius’s flight available, it is pointless to try
to offer additional analysis on the matter. Darius fled from the
battle. Arrian states that his flight damaged his reputation
(3.1.2) with Mazaeus. It is reasonable to conclude that Mazaeus
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was not the only Persian noble who viewed Darius’s flight
negatively.
Several factors that contributed to Darius’s defeat at
Issus, yet one significant factor was the restrictive terrain.41
Darius placed his army in this position by aggressive pursuit
Alexander after capturing Issus.42 Darius’s decision to charge
with his cavalry in such terrain limited their effectiveness
(Curt., 3.6.1). Two years later at Gaugamela, Darius
specifically chose terrain suited for his cavalry and chariots
(Arr., 3.8.7, Curtius, 4.9.9-10).
Issus dramatically influenced the manner in which Darius
equipped and deployed his army at Gaugamela. Darius suffered
heavy loss with his cavalry against the Macedonians, as well as
heavy losses with his infantry. The Persians that took the field
at Gaugamela were better equipped to match the Macedonians than
those that took the field at Issus. Darius implemented sweeping
changes to his army. So drastic were the changes that they
41 Cited by Polybius (Plb.,12.17) using Callisthenes as his source, as being fourteen stades, or approximately 1 ½ miles wide.
42 J.F.C. Fuller, The Generalship of Alexander The Great, ( 1960; repr., New York: DaCapo, 1990), 154-155.
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completely altered the manner in which the Persian army
traditionally fought, as well as traditional roles.
Darius armed his levied infantry with heavier armor and
trained the infantry prior to the battle. 43 The addition of war
elephants and scythed chariots to his army (Arr., 3.8.13) added a
heavy assault force capable of breaching both the heavy
Macedonian cavalry and infantry. Improvements to the cataphract
cavalry were designed to bring them to a level comparable to the
Companion Cavalry. 44 All of these changes to his infantry and
cavalry, as well as the addition of heavy assault forces, altered
the primary response of defense to the infantry instead of the
cavalry45 This becomes apparent in the manner in which Darius
deploys his army at Gaugamela (Arr., 3.11).
Perhaps the most interesting change that results from Issus
is the manner in which Darius pursues the campaign after the
battle. Darius’s operations immediately after Issus focused on
cutting off Alexander’s supply lines, communications, and forcing
43 Badian, 258.44 Ibid.45 Ibid.
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Alexander’s withdrawal towards Macedonia.46 The secondary focus
is to generate funds to rebuild an army.47 Both of these short-
term changes in strategy are to be expected.
However, Darius’s long-term strategic change is as bold as
the changes he made to his army. Darius’s long-term tactics
changed from an aggressive, unsystematic defense of his empire by
means of seeking out Alexander to a deliberate, methodical
defense. Darius would no longer seek out Alexander, instead he
would force Alexander to come to him at a location of his own
choice. At Granicus and Issus, the Persians marched to meet
Alexander; 48 at Gaugamela, it would be the Macedonians who would
march to meet the Persians.
Darius suffered a tremendous defeat at Issus; yet, he was
able to learn valuable lessons from his encounter with Alexander.
The evidence shows Darius’s ability to adapt his army and not
only to meet the capabilities of his enemy, but also to enhance
his own army’s capabilities. Darius learned to choose the
46 A.R. Burn, “Notes on Alexander’s Campaigns,” in The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol.72, 1952, 81-83.47 Ibid.48 Matt Waters, Ancient Persia: A Concise History of the Achaemenid Empire, 550-330 BCE, (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2014), Kindle Edition, 3111-3553.
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terrain to allow as much mobility as possible, increasing his
cavalry’s effectiveness. Perhaps most impressive was his change
in the way he altered the manner in which his army traditionally
fought, and in doing so, taking a tremendous risk in changing not
only roles within his army, but traditional social roles as
well.49 In arming the levied infantry, he allowed the cavalry to
assume a greater offensive role, and the levied infantry to
assume a greater defensive role.
Location of the Battlefield
In Notes on Alexander’s Crossing of the Tigris and the Battle of Arbela, Aurel
Stein describes in very precise detail his interpretation of the
most likely site of the battle. He draws his conclusion based on
the following factors: the most probable location of Alexander’s
crossing of the Tigris River, Arrian’s timeline of Alexander’s
movements after his crossing; Arrian, Curtius, and Diodorus’s
accounts of Alexander’s movements prior to the battle in
relationship to terrain features, and the author’s accounts of
Darius’s movements to the battlefield site.50
49 Badian, 258.50 Aurel Stein, “Notes on Alexander’s Crossing of the Tigris and the Battle ofArbela,” The Geographic Journal, Vol. 100, No. 4 (Oct., 1942): 157-163.
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Stein also takes into account his own travels through and
his observation of the area. Stein rejects the Arrian’s
description of the battlefield being 600 stades from Arbela, and
argues that Ptolemy’s Geographia offers a more accurate account at
200 or 320 stades.51 Stein eventually concludes that the battle
occurred near present day Kermalais (Karemlesh). He describes a
wide plain extending from Bartella (Bartallah) in the North to
Qaraqosh in the South.
The author believes that the area indicated by Stein has a
high probability of being the site of the battle. In terms of
terrain, it is most suitable. In terms of logistics, it offers
the greatest ability to support Darius’s army. E.W. Mardsen’s
excellent work on establishing an estimate of Persian cavalry at
the battle places the number of Persian cavalry at 34,000.52 The
Persian infantry was probably around 50,000, not including the
10,000 Immortals (Apple Bearers).53 Stein’s site is ideal, for
it sits very near the old caravan road that Stein notes on his
http://www.jstor.org/stable1788973 . Accessed November 20, 2014.51 Ibid, 159.52 E.W. Marsden, The Campaign of Gaugamela, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964), 19-37.53 Ibid.
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map.54 The site is also very near the Jabal ‘Ain-as Satrah,
which is described in the ancient texts. There are also numerous
small villages in the vicinity, which could have been used by
Darius as told by Diodorus. The site is the only one in the
region that fits all of the historical descriptions and offers
maneuverability on a large scale.
Darius’s Battle Strategy
Gaugamela was the last “stop” before Alexander reached
Babylon proper. A decisive victory at Gaugamela offered no
chance to stop the Macedonians from reaching Babylon. Darius was
wagering the rest of the Persian Empire on the outcome of this
one specific battle. It had taken Darius two years to raise
another army capable of challenging Alexander after Issus. For
Darius and the Persian Army, Gaugamela was the last stand (Curt.,
4.14).
54 Stein, 156.
Patchen 27
Darius knew well that the outcome of the coming battle would
mean either victory or defeat for Persia (Curt., 4.14.15).
Indeed, Darius was wagering the entire Persian Empire on the
outcome (Curt., 4.14.10). By allowing Alexander to advance deep
within the Persian Empire to a battlefield of his own choosing,
Darius was making a bold move.
Darius also had an overwhelming number of cavalry and
infantry at Gaugamela. Sources vary as to the exact number of
cavalry and infantry he possessed, but modern estimates place the
number at around 35,000 cavalry and approximately 50,000
infantry.55 He had learned much in his campaign with the
Macedonians. He had brought in heavy Greek mercenary infantry to
augment and bolster his own infantry (DS, 17.53.1-2). Darius was
willing to wager everything, but he was hedging his bet with his
powerful army.
It is not hard to see Darius’s strategy. His strategy was
simple, yet complex. His cavalry, supported by the newly
55 Arrian suggest a force of 40,000 cavalry, while Diodorus notes 200,000. Curtius documents 45,000 cavalry. Modern historian John Warry places the number of cavalry at 40,000 with 51,000 infantry, Marsden suggests 34,000 cavalry and around 50,000 supporting infantry.
Patchen 28
equipped heavier-armed infantry, which would help delay
Alexander’s own infantry and protect the Persian center, would
outflank the Macedonians, encircling the entire Macedonian army
and destroy Alexander along with the entire Macedonian army.
Darius’s primary objective would be to initially destroy
Alexander’s one true elite force—the Companion Cavalry. Once
Darius is able to destroy the Companion Cavalry and, hopefully,
Alexander along with it, his remaining cavalry would flank and
destroy the remaining, and hapless Macedonian infantry. The key
for the Persians at Gaugmela was the destruction of Alexander’s
heavy cavalry, and the Persian army was prepared specifically for
such a task.
Darius did not blunder into Gaugamela as he did Issus.
Gaugamela was a well-prepared and well thought out battle plan
from the Persian perspective, matched by an equally well thought
out Macedonian battle plan. Yet, the lunar eclipse had foretold
of the Darius’s impending defeat. The Babylonian gods had
abandoned the Persian king, and he was destined to fail at
Gaugamela.
Patchen 29
Secondary Contributing Factors
We must now address factors that played a significant role
during the battle. One, in particular, will change the entire
perspective of Darius’s withdrawal from the battlefield, for it
is of such importance that it dramatically alters not only our
perception of the battle, and Alexander’s strategy, but also our
perception of Darius’s understanding of how the battle was
unfolding. This factor is a fatal flaw within the command model
of the Persian army itself, one that extends back hundreds of
years, and has contributed to several decisive defeats for the
Persian army.
In Alexander’s Targeting of Persian Commanders, the author set forth
a historical model indicating that Alexander understood an
inherent flaw in the Persian command model that existed since the
first Greco-Persian Wars.56 Through a detailed examination of
key battles at Plataea and Cunaxa, it was established that the
targeting and elimination of the Supreme Persian commander
resulted in the breakdown and the retreat of the entire Persian
56 John Patchen, “Alexander’s Targeting of Persian Commanders: A Historical Examination,” 2013.
Patchen 30
army. This phenomenon occurred not once, but consistently upon
the death of the supreme commander in virtually every battle.
Furthermore, it was not limited to the supreme commander, but
extended to commanders of great influence among the Persian
troops.57
The Persians knew of this flaw, at least as far back as the
Battle of Cunaxa, for Cyrus the Younger deliberately attempted to
target his brother Artaxerxes. We know this because Xenophon
describes Cyrus’s tactic in his Anabasis (Xen., 1.8.12). However,
the Persian army command model remains relatively unchanged up to
the Battle of Gaugamela.
Darius assumed the traditional center-of-the-line position
at both Issus and Gaugamela, as per the Persian doctrine (Xen.,
1.8.22). This position was significant at both battles, because
Alexander deliberately targeted the Persian center and, at both
battles, he is able to drive into the Persian center. At Issus,
he drove Darius to retreat. Again, at Gaugamela, he is able to
drive into the Persian center as well.
57 Ibid.
Patchen 31
We have no evidence to suggest that Darius did not
understand the same weakness in the Persian command model. In
fact, the evidence suggests the opposite, that Darius would have
understood the weakness. Darius was a quick learner. We see
this in his response to the rebellion in Egypt, Bagoas’s
assassination, , and the way he adapted very quickly after Issus.
We must accept that Darius had it within his means to realize
that his army had a crucial flaw that could have disastrous
consequences.
Persian Battle Movements
We must now examine several crucial battlefield movements
that the Persians executed at Gaugamela, which provide much
insight not only to the actual plan that Darius had for defeating
Alexander, but also his psychological mindset. In understanding
pivotal command decisions, it is possible to ascertain the intent
that Darius had once the left flank collapses and he must make a
decision to withdraw. Consequently, they also indicate possible
actions Darius may have made during his withdrawal as well.
Patchen 32
The most pivotal aspect of Gaugamela was the action on the
Persian left flank. The outcome of Gaugamela hinged more on the
events that unfolded in this sector of the battlefield than in
any other, so we must carefully examine the actions taken by
Darius during the battle. Once Darius did achieve a breach in
the center of the Macedonian lines, his forces immediately pushed
deep into the baggage train, instead of attempting to encircle
and destroy Alexander and the Companion Cavalry These factors
were decisive in Darius’s defeat.
The Persian Left Flank
Darius began his attack by attempting to outflank Alexander
with his Scythian and Bactrian cavalry (Arr., 3.13). The
Macedonians repulsed the first wave of the attack, but upon the
engagement of Bactrian reserves, the forces of the left flank
renewed their assault (Ibid). At this point, Darius was fearful
that his scythed chariots would quickly be of no use and ordered
them into battle. Arrian states that the scythed chariots
inflicted little harm upon the Macedonians, (Arr., 3.13 ) while
Patchen 33
Diodorus states that the scythed chariots did indeed inflict
casualties among the Macedonian center. (DS, 17.58.4).
Darius’s Breech of the Macedonian Lines
As the action on the left flank progressed, the Persian
right flank attack proceeded remarkably well. The Persian
infantry with cavalry support had nearly encircled Parmenion (DS,
17.60.5). As a result of the oblique movement that Alexander
used to draw the Persian cavalry on the left flank away to open
his own breech, the Persians were able to achieve a breech of
their own, which they quickly exploited. Both Diodorus and
Curtius state that Mazaeus sent a large contingency of cavalry
and infantry through this center gap, created between the
Macedonian left and right flanks, to attack the Macedonian
baggage train, and free the Persian prisoners (Curt.,4.15.5, DS,
17.59.5).
It was here that Darius lost the Battle of Gaugamela. At a
crucial time in the battle, Darius’s desire to reach the
prisoners (more specifically his family) overshadowed the more
Patchen 34
pressing tactical situation. The cavalry and infantry sent to
attack the baggage train did indeed reach its objective.
However, they would have served a much greater immediate tactical
use if used to encircle crucial left flank.
By presenting Alexander with the threat of encirclement, it is
doubtful that Alexander would have been able to launch his
decisive attack into the Persian center. Instead, Alexander
would have been the one forced to withdraw, or perhaps have been
destroyed. The destruction of the Macedonian forces, and
Alexander himself, would have resulted in a the release of the
Persian prisoners in the baggage trains. Thus, Alexander, and
his encirclement and destruction was a greater priority to the
immediate success of the operation, then freeing the prisoners in
the baggage trains.
Darius’s Actions Post-Withdrawal
At least two sources state that Darius’s withdrawal was
impossible to view because dust obscured the view (Curt.,
4.15.32, DS, 17.61.1-2). Curtius and Diodorus are both in
Patchen 35
concurrence that Darius withdrew into a cloud of dust, while
Arrian and Plutarch mention nothing of the dust cloud. Curtius
and Diodorus certainly make a viable statement, as anyone who has
been exposed to even basic horse ridership knows that horses,
even at a trot will create dust. It is here that we must
consider our first historical quandary. How is it possible, from
this point forward, to discern Darius’s actions, or intent if he
cannot be seen?
It is not entirely clear whether Darius is withdrawing
because the tactical situation demanded it, or if he is
retreating in fear. There are conflicting texts from Arrian,
Diodorus, and Curtius that must be analyzed and objectively
reviewed. It is in the greater context that the picture becomes
clear. Arrian indicates that Darius fled out of panic (Arr.,
3.14), while Curtius and Diodorus suggest that the tactical
situation around Darius offered no other alternative except
withdrawal (Curt., 4.15.28-32, DS, 17.60.3-4).
All of the ancient texts are in concurrence that Darius
fled. Arrian’s text indicates that Darius was the first to turn
Patchen 36
and flee Arrian’s account is contradicted by Diodorus and
Curtius, who both state that Darius only fled after the troops
around him began to flee (Curt., 4.15.28-32, DS, 17.60.1-5).
Both Diodorus and Curtius are clear that the Persian forces began
to flee after they believe that a javelin had slain Darius
(Curt., 4.15.28, DS, 17.60.2). However, this was not the case,
as the javelin struck Darius’s chariot driver, killing him
instead (Ibid).
The result of the errant javelin was catastrophic
nonetheless. The Persians nearest to Darius, believing their
supreme commander had fallen, responded as they had historically
they began to flee. This historically dictated action was the
exact reason that Alexander intended to attack the Persian
center. The forces surrounding Darius at this moment—and the very
same forces beginning to flee were among his most elite.
Compounding the issue at Gaugamela is the Astronomical Diaries’s
passage that indicates that Darius’s troops deserted him at some
point during the battle. The Diaries context state, “On the 24th,58
in the morning, the king of the world […] the standard? [….] they58 The 24th of the Month of Ululu, or 1 October.
Patchen 37
fought with each other, and a heavy defeat of the troops of [….]
the troops of the king deserted him and [went] to their cities59 (AD, 179, No. 330,
obv, 15-17).”
One of the first actions indicative of Darius’s mindset
during the withdrawal was his conviction to die an honorable
death. Curtius indicates that Darius initially thought about
standing his ground and fighting, but then decided to withdraw
(Curt., 4.15.30). Justin validates Darius’s initial
unwillingness to withdraw. “Darius, when he saw his army
repulsed, wished himself to die, but was compelled by his
officers to flee.” (Just., 6.14.3) Darius’s resolve to die on the
battlefield with his troops, or at the least, near his army is
not the action of an individual who is cowardly, but rather the
action of an honorable commander—the modern day captain going
down with his ship.
It is also of note that during the withdrawal from the
battle that Darius’s commanders advised him to destroy key
bridges over the Lycus River (Great Zab) that would allow
Macedonian forces to pursue him during his withdrawal (Curt., 59 Author’s Italics.
Patchen 38
4.16.8-9, Just. 6.14.4). Darius refused to allow the destruction
of the bridges, which will cut off the remaining Persian forces
on the battlefield from possible escape (Ibid).
Diodorus suggests that Darius circled back behind into
villages to reorganize some of his troops (DS 17.61.1). This
contradicts the Arrian account that Darius fled from the battle
and continued to flee the immediate area until he reached Media.
Diodorus’s account is consistent with a king who has already
invested a significant amount of time and resources, as well as
completely changed his tactics, for the sole purpose of
engineering the defeating a single foe. This account also
provides some insight as to possible strategies that Darius may
have implemented during his withdrawal.
At the moment of his withdrawal, Darius’s had suffered a key
tactical defeat on the Persian left flank. At the same time, the
battle was progressing well for the Persians in other aspects.
The Persians had broken into the Macedonian baggage train, though
they eventually withdrew with heavy casualties (DS, 17.60.8).
More importantly, the Persian infantry with supporting cavalry on
Patchen 39
the right flank was not only holding the Macedonian infantry at
bay, they were close to achieving an encirclement. Alexander
broke off his pursuit of Darius because of the threat posed by
the Persian right flank (Arr., 3.15). If Darius did indeed
withdraw to a nearby village to reorganize his troops, his
options were limited.
Darius’s only true course of action, other than a full-
fledged retreat, would be to conduct what military tacticians
call in modern terms as a retrograde defense. In a retrograde
defense, the commander trades time for space.60 Specific units
are tasked with harassing and delaying the enemy (time) so that
as many the of commander’s forces as possible can withdraw safely
(space), known as delaying actions. Keys to a retrograde defense
are: avoiding a decisive engagement; preparing plans to enhance a
rapid, controlled execution; denying the enemy information on
current movements; avoiding surprise with current intelligence;
and combining deception with delaying actions to prevent the
enemy from closing in strength.61 While Darius did not have
60 Department of the Army, FM 3.20: Defensive Operations, (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2002) 8.29-8.31.61 Ibid.
Patchen 40
access to 20th century United States Army military field manuals,
the Diodorus account, and the Astronomical Diaries passage certainly
indicates that he attempted to perform a retrograde defense.
Diodorus states that Darius did not withdraw to the rear
with the other barbarians, but turned in the opposite direction.
(17.61.1-2). As noted earlier, part of a retrograde defense
requires deception and delay to prevent the enemy from closing
and destroying the bulk of the forces withdrawing. By turning in
the opposite direction of the main body of retreating forces, and
with only a small force covering him (Curt., 4.16.8), Darius
himself became the deception, placing himself in considerable
danger, especially if Alexander had continued to pursue him.
Such a deceptive move could not have been conducted without
some form of communication with his other generals, so Darius
would have halted at some point during the retreat to coordinate
this move. Where, exactly, remains a mystery, as the site of the
battle remains unknown. During this short halt, it is entirely
plausible that Darius would have sent a messenger to Mazaeus, the
commander of the right flank, in an attempt to save as many of
Patchen 41
the right flank forces. This premise is not without historical
evidence to support it.
Arrian, Curtius and Diodorus all concur that the Persian
right flank attack had progressed extremely well (Arr., 3.15,
Curt., 4.16.1-5, DS, 17.60.5-8). Once again all three sources
agree that the right flank was initially unaware of Darius’s
flight from the battlefield (Arr., 3.14, Curt., 4.16.1-4, DS,
17.60.5). However, Curtius specifically mentions that once “news
of the king’s defeat had reached Mazaues, and he, alarmed at his
side’s misfortunes, began to relax his pressure on the dispirited
Macedonians despite his superior strength (4.16.4).” Given the
size of the forces involved, the space that was created by
Alexander’s oblique movement that created the center gap in which
Mazaeus sent his forces to attack the baggage train, it is
entirely possible that the “news of the Kings’s defeat” arrived
by a messenger sent by Darius, informing Mazaeus of the
withdrawal plan.
The perception that Mazaeus “began to relax his pressure”
was actually the beginning of Mazaeus’s withdrawal. When
Patchen 42
Pamenion rallied the Thessalian cavalry believing that the
Persians were retreating in panic (Curt., 4.16.5), it became a
disorganized withdrawal. Instead of withdrawing to Arbela with
the rest of the Persian forces, Mazaeus, already discontent with
his King (Arr., 3.12), crossed the Tigris and returned to Babylon
hence the Astrological Diaries noting that the “the troops of the king
deserted him and [went] to their cities. (AD, 179, No. 330, obv,
15-17.)” Mazaeus’s desertion of Darius, may well have denied the
Persian king a sizable body of troops to mount an additional
defence or counter attack.62
The evidence, when examined in its context, presents and
entirely new scenario of Darius at Gaugamela. It cannot be
dismissed that Darius fled the battle after the Macedonians
breached the center of the Persian formation. However, the
evidence suggests that Darius displayed a significant amount of
courage and tactical awareness once he initially fled the
62 Reference Martin Doughtery, “Pydna” in Battles of the Ancient World (London: Amber Books, 2007) 129; where Doughtery describes how, in ancient warfare, casualties are initially light until on side is broken, or driven to retreat—whereupon the disorganized nature of retreat, or having one’s battle line broken results in high casualties. Based upon this historical reference, itis reasonable to infer that Mazeus’s casualties, up until his withdrawal, would also have been realitively few, giving Darius a sizable force of troops remaining if Mazeus could have broken away in an orderly manner.
Patchen 43
battlefield. It suggests that he was focused on saving as many
of his troops as possible, even risking his own life as the
distraction in the process. Finally, the evidence suggests that
Darius attempted to contact Mazaeus with the right wing, to
include his troops in the withdrawal, but they “deserted him and
[went] to their cities. (AD, 179, No. 330, obv, 15-17.”)
Darius’s Fate After Gaugamela
Why was Darius not immediately deposed, and eliminated?
The answer becomes clear when entire events of the battle are
examined closely and in depth: Darius must have distinguished
himself during the course of the battle to the extent that he had
enough support among the remaining Persian Army to continue to
lead them until Bessus and Narbarzanes could successfully mount
their coup against him.
The fact that Darius was not disposed of after Gaugamela
bears a great deal of weight. He was, by all accounts, no longer
King of Persia; Alexander had already conquered much of the
Persian Empire. As Badian points, out regicide and coups were
Patchen 44
not uncommon in Achaemind History.63 Yet the Persian nobles,
most notably Bessus, and Narbarxanes, did not immediately remove
Darius from his throne. In fact, Curtius states that Darius
still maintained the backing of his army after Gaugamela, after
calming his troops (Curt., 5.1.7-9).
Even up to the moment that Bessus and Narbarzanes arrested
him, Darius had the support of many of his nobles (Curt., 5.8.6-
5.9.1). After Darius’s arrest, the Persian camp was divided as
to the actions of Bessus (Curt., 5.9.14). The Persians had no
clear commander, and while Bessus attempted to win over the
remaining Persian army, the unanimous consent of the men was that
the desertion of the King was not acceptable (Curt., 5.9.16).
Darius eventually accepted his fate. The murder of Darius
occurred when Alexander and his forces drew near the Persian
forces, startling Bessus and Narbarzanes, who ordered Darius
bound and thrown in an ox cart.64 The Macedonians found Darius,
and Alexander was greatly disappointed, for he wanted to capture
Darius.65 Denied the honorable death he desired, cowardly
63 Badian, 264.64 Prevas, 69.65 Ibid.
Patchen 45
murdered by his own relative, Darius III, the last of the
Achaemenid kings died, and the Achaemenid dynasty perished with
him.66
Summation of the Evidence
Thus, a brief summation of the evidence presented suggests
the following:
1. Darius’s historical background shows one of courage and
loyalty, which is the primary reason he ascended to the
throne.
2. Upon ascension to the throne, Darius quickly suppressed a
rebellion in Egypt as well as a potential assassination
attempt.
3. Darius rapidly adjusted to lessons learned from the Battle
of Issus, altering his short-term, long-term strategic
66 Bessus did assume the title King of Kings of Persia, though modern historians do not recognize Bessus as a legitimate King of Persia, since Alexander had already conquered much of Persia already. Alexander, who ordered would capture Bessus and ordered his nose, and ears cut off—a traditional Persian punishment for regicide. Alexander then had Bessus executed.
Patchen 46
plans, tactical awareness, and the manner in which he
equipped his army.
4. Significant psychological factors were present that affected
Darius at Gaugamela
5. Darius’s flight at Gaugamela was not a full fledged retreat
as has been historically portrayed, instead the evidence
points to Darius’s attempt to withdraw as many of his troops
as he could, using himself as a diversion to provide safety
for his own troops.
Conclusion
Gaugamela changed the course of history. The Persian
Achaemenid dynasty ended, and Alexander firmly cemented his
legacy by claiming the Persian Empire. However, our
understanding of the battle, and more specifically Darius, his
actions, and his legacy, have been skewed by classical texts that
have a decidedly negative account of his ability to command, as
well as his personal character. Within these texts, we find
trinkets of evidence that, when dissected and examined
Patchen 47
individually and as a whole, begin to offer an entirely different
picture of the Persian king.
In the end, we see a picture of an individual fighting
desperately, yet with confidence, for his family, his empire,
and his people. A king and commander unwilling to accept defeat
and willing to sacrifice everything, including himself, to
achieve victory—or at a minimum save as many of the lives of his
own troops that he committed to battle. He is an individual whom
astrological events had doomed before battle, who continued to
fight, believing that Persia would prevail, even when those
around him might not. Even to the end, Darius wished for nothing
more than the chance of regaining his kingdom in battle, or at
least the honor of dying in battle (Curtius, 4.8.13-17). Yet
Bessus and his conspirators denied this from the Darius.
Darius’s treatment in death by Alexander exceeded his treatment
by many in life.
It is time now that we seriously reconsider the events at
Gaugamela, and specifically, our conceptions of Darius and his
actions. In light of the evidence brought forth, it is perhaps
Patchen 48
the least we can do as historians to right what may be one of the
greatest conceptual wrongs of Ancient Near Eastern history.
Darius was not a coward; he was the exact opposite—brave, noble,
courageous, determined, and willing to fight and die for his men,
and for Persia.
Patchen 49
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Patchen 53
Maps
Soviet Army Map, “J-10-38-32, Governorates of Dohuk, Nineveh, Erbil-Mosul.” Tblisi:TPPF, 1984.
United States Geological Survey “Topographical Terrain Map J38N” Topographical Terrain Map of Iraq, 1:200,000 Relief. Washington, D.C.: Defense Mapping Agency, 1983.
--.“Topographical Terrain Map J38T” Topographical Terrain Map of Iraq, 1:200,000 Relief. Washington, D.C.: Defense Mapping Agency, 1983.
--.“Topographical Terrain Map J38U” Topographical Terrain Map of Iraq, 1:200,000 Relief. Washington, D.C.: Defense Mapping Agency, 1983.
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