STATE OF MICHIGAN

IN THE SUPREME COURT

An appeal from the Michigan Court of Appeals The Hon. David H. Sawyer, The Hon. Thomas C. Cameron, and the Hon. Anica Letica

DAVINA GRADY,

Supreme Court No. ________ Plaintiff,

Court of Appeals No. 354091 and

Lower Court No. 18-014393-NI MERCYLAND HEALTH SERVICES, PLLC, Intervening Plaintiff-Appellee, and LIVONIA CARE PHARMACY, LG TRANSPORTATION & MANAGEMENT, INC., and NORTHLAND RADIOLOGY, INC., Intervening Plaintiffs, v MEEMIC INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant, and STEVEN PATRICK WAMBACH and JOHN P. O’SULLIVAN DISTRIBUTING, Defendants. _____________________________________________________________________________/ PAUL G. VALENTINO (P 34239) Attorney for Intervening Plaintiff-Appellee 43494 Woodward Avenue, Suite 203 Bloomfield Hills, MI 48302-5054 (248) 334-7787 paul@valentinolawpc.com

SECREST WARDLE SIDNEY A. KLINGLER (P 40862) DANIEL T. RIZZO (P 62140) Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant Meemic 2600 Troy Center Drive, P.O. Box 5025 Troy, MI 48007-5025 (248) 851-9500 sklingler@secrestwardle.com

_____________________________________________________________________________/

Defendant-Appellant Meemic Insurance Company’s Application for Leave to Appeal

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DEFENDANT-APPELLANT MEEMIC INSURANCE COMPANY’S APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL

SECREST WARDLE BY: SIDNEY A. KLINGLER (P 40862)

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant Meemic 2600 Troy Center Drive, P.O. Box 5025 Troy, MI 48007-5025 (248) 851-9500 sklingler@secrestwardle.com Dated: December 30, 2021

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Index of Authorities ii Statement of Judgment Appealed From v Statement of the Issues vi Counter-Statement of Facts 1 Argument I 8 Argument II 15 Argument III 20 Argument IV 22 Relief Requested 22

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES CASES Allstate Ins Co v A & A Med Transp Servs, Inc, unpublished per curiam decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals, issued January 23, 2007 (Docket Nos. 260766, 261504) 18,19 Aspey v Mem Hosp, 477 Mich 120; 730 NW2d 695 (2007) 13 Ben P Fyke & Sons, Inc v Gunter Co, 390 Mich 649; 213 NW2d 134 (1973) 20 Best Care Rehabilitation, Inc. v Allstate Ins Co, unpublished per curiam decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals, issued March 20, 2007 (Docket No. 272395) 18,19 Broe Rehabilitation Servs, Inc. v Allstate In Co, unpublished per curiam decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals, issued April 22, 2008 (Docket No. 275587) 18,19 Cherry v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 195 Mich App 316; 489 NW2d 788 (1992) 9 Cole v Ladbroke Racing Michigan, Inc, 241 Mich App 1; 614 NW2d 169 (2000) 21 Dampier v Wayne Co, 233 Mich App 714; 592 NW2d 809 (1999) 20 Hastings Mut Ins Co v Grange Ins Co of Michigan, 319 Mich App 579; 903 NW2d 400 (2017) 8 Healing Place at North Oakland Medical Center v Allstate Ins Co, v,1,4,5, 277 Mich App 51; 277 NW2d 51 (2007) 8,14,15 Johnson v Recca, 492 Mich 169; 821 NW2d 520 (2012) 16 Miller v Allstate Ins Co, 272 Mich App 284; 726 NW2d 54 (2006) 19,20 Miller v Allstate Ins Co, v,vi,1-8 481 Mich 601; 751 NW2d 463 (2008) 10-14,22

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Miller v Allstate Ins Co, 477 Mich 1062; 728 NW2d 458 (2007) 19 Miller v Allstate Ins Co (On Remand), 275 Mich App 649 (2007), affirmed on other grounds, 481 Mich 601; 751 NW2d 463 (2008) 19,20 Miller v Chapman Contracting, 477 Mich 102; 730 NW2d 462 (2007) 11 Preferred Medicine, Inc. v Allstate Ins Co, unpublished per curiam decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals, issued December 5, 2006 (Docket No. 263451) 18,19 Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466 Mich 57; 642 NW2d 663 (2002) 16 Robinson v City of Lansing, 486 Mich 1; 782 NW2d 171 (2010) 13,16 Sterling Heights Pain Mgmt v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Michigan, 335 Mich App 245; 966 NW2d 456 (2020) passim Vushaj v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Michigan, 284 Mich App 513; 773 NW2d 758 (2009) 15 Weymers v Khera, 454 Mich 639; 563 NW2d 647 (1997) 21 STATUTES 2012 PA 569 10 MCL 333.1101 to 333.25211 9,15,16 MCL 333.16101 to 333.18838 17 MCL 333.17001-MCL 333.17088 9 MCL 333.17048 17 MCL 450.221 et seq. 10 MCL 450.1101 et seq. 10

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MCL 450.1221 6,10-13 MCL 450.1281 et seq. 10 MCL 450.4201 9 MCL 450.4202(2) 3,6,12,13 MCL 450.4904 vi,7,9, 15,18 MCL 450.4904(2) passim MCL 450.4904(3) 18 MCL 450.4904(4) 18 MCL 450.4904(5) 5,15,16 MCL 500.3107 9 MCL 500.3107(1)(a) 3,8 MCL 500.3157 passim COURT RULES MCR 2.116(C)(10) 3 MCR 2.118 20 MCR 2.118(A)(2) 20 MCR 7.305(B)(3) 22

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STATEMENT OF JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM In this first party claim under the No-Fault Act in which Intervening Plaintiff, Mercyland

Health Services, PLLC seeks reimbursement for services provided to the insured, Davina Grady,

the trial court granted summary disposition for Defendant, Meemic Insurance Company, on the

grounds that the services were not compensable under the No-Fault Act because they were not

lawfully rendered as required by MCL 500.3157 (Tr. 8/7/19, pp 10-13; Exhibit A) (Order, 8/7/19;

Exhibit B). Specifically the trial court noted that Intervening Plaintiff’s sole member was not a

licensed physician as required by the Michigan Limited Liability Company Act (Exhibit A,

pp 12-13).

Mercyland appealed of right and the Court of Appeals reversed in a published opinion

issued November 18, 2021, reasoning that this Court’s decision in Miller v Allstate Ins Co,

481 Mich 601; 751 NW2d 463 (2008), as well as the Court of Appeals’ recent decision in Sterling

Heights Pain Mgmt v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Michigan, 335 Mich App 245; 966 NW2d 456

(2020), required the conclusion that Defendant lacked statutory standing “to challenge the alleged

improper formation of a Michigan professional limited liability company.” (Court of Appeals

Decision, p 2; Exhibit C.) Judge Sawyer, dissenting, opined that this case involved a licensing

requirement that was not at issue in Miller, nor addressed in Sterling Heights Pain Mgmt

(Exhibit C, Sawyer, J., dissenting, p 3). Judge Sawyer further opined, with citation to The Healing

Place at North Oakland Medical Center v Allstate Ins Co, 277 Mich App 51, 55; 277 NW2d 51

(2007), that “where licensure is required, a lack of such licensure renders the service unlawfully

rendered.” (Exhibit C, Sawyer, J., dissenting, pp 5-6.)

Defendant now seeks leave to appeal to this Honorable Court from the Court of Appeals

decision of November 18, 2021 (Exhibit C).

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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

I. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR WHEN IT HELD THAT THIS CASE WAS CONTROLLED BY MILLER V ALLSTATE INS CO AND THAT DEFENDANT LACKED STATUTORY STANDING TO ASSERT THAT INTERVENING PLAINTIFF’S SERVICES WERE NOT LAWFULLY RENDERED, WHERE DEFENDANT IS NOT CHALLENGING CORPORATE FORMATION OR EXISTENCE, BUT THE LICENSURE OF INTERVENING PLAINTIFF’S SOLE MEMBER AND MANAGER?

Intervening Plaintiff-Appellee says “No.” Defendant-Appellant says “Yes.” The Court of Appeals said “No.”

II. WERE INTERVENING PLAINTIFF’S SERVICES NOT LAWFULLY

RENDERED WHERE INTERVENING PLAINTIFF’S SOLE MEMBER AND MANAGER WAS NOT LICENSED AS A PHYSICIAN IN MICHIGAN AS REQUIRED BY MCL 450.4904?

Intervening Plaintiff-Appellee says “No.” Defendant-Appellant says “Yes.” The Court of Appeals majority did not reach this question. The trial court said “Yes.”

III. DID THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION IN ALLOWING DEFENDANT TO AMEND ITS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES TO ASSERT THAT THE SERVICES FOR WHICH MERCYLAND SEEKS REIMBURSEMENT WERE NOT LAWFULLY RENDERED?

Intervening Plaintiff-Appellee says “No.” Defendant-Appellant says “Yes.” The Court of Appeals majority did not reach this issue.

The trial court said “Yes.”

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COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS

Introduction

This case involves a claim by Intervening Plaintiff-Appellee, Mercyland Health Services,

PLLC (hereafter “Mercyland”), for personal protection insurance benefits for medical services

rendered to Plaintiff Davina Grady following a motor vehicle accident of November 8, 2017

(Mercyland Intervening Complaint; Exhibit D). Defendant-Appellant, Meemic Insurance

Company, moved for summary disposition on the grounds that Mercyland was not entitled to

collect personal protection insurance benefits pursuant to MCL 500.3157, because Mercyland did

not lawfully render services to Ms. Grady (Meemic Motion for Summary Disposition, p 10;

Exhibit E). The trial court agreed and granted summary disposition for Defendant Meemic as to

Mercyland’s claim (Order, 8/7/19; Exhibit B). Mercyland moved for reconsideration, which the

trial court denied (Order, 9/11/19; Exhibit F). Mercyland appealed of right, and the Court of

Appeals reversed in a published opinion, reasoning that this Court’s decision in Miller v Allstate

Ins Co, 481 Mich 601; 751 NW2d 463 (2008), as well as the Court of Appeals’ recent decision in

Sterling Heights Pain Mgmt v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Michigan, 335 Mich App 245

966 NW2d 456 (2020), required the conclusion that Defendant lacked statutory standing “to

challenge the alleged improper formation of a Michigan professional limited liability company.”

(Court of Appeals Decision, p 2; Exhibit C.) Judge Sawyer, dissenting, opined that this case

involved a licensing requirement that was not at issue in Miller, nor addressed in Sterling Heights

Pain Mgmt (Sawyer, J., dissenting, p 3; Exhibit C). Judge Sawyer further opined, with citation to

The Healing Place at North Oakland Medical Center v Allstate Ins Co, 277 Mich App 51, 55;

277 NW2d 51 (2007), that “where licensure is required, a lack of such licensure renders the service

unlawfully rendered.” (Exhibit C, Sawyer, J., dissenting, pp 5-6.)

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Factual Background

Mercyland is a Michigan corporation which conducts business as a medical care provider

in the State of Michigan (Exhibit D, ¶ 1). Mercyland is a Professional Limited Liability Company

(LARA filing; Exhibit G). Mercyland’s sole member and manager is Mohammed Abraham

(Exhibit G). Mohammed Abraham is not a licensed doctor in the State of Michigan (LARA search

record; Exhibit H). At Mercyland, Ms. Grady received medical services from physicians Reese

James and Keturah Jeffries, and nurse practitioner Emmitt Spradlin (Medical Records; Exhibit I).

Procedural Background

Defendant Meemic moved for summary disposition of Intervening Plaintiff Mercyland’s

claim for personal protection insurance benefits on the grounds that Mercyland was not entitled to

claim such benefits because its services were not lawfully rendered as required by MCL 500.3157

(Meemic Motion for Summary Disposition, pp 6, 10; Exhibit E). Defendant pointed to

MCL 450.4904(2), requiring that all members and managers of a professional limited liability

company such as Mercyland that renders professional services included within the public health

code “must be licensed or legally authorized in this state to render the same professional service.”

Id. Anticipating Mercyland’s reliance on Miller v Allstate Ins Co, 481 Mich 601; 751 NW2d 463

(2008), where the Court held that an insurance company lacked standing to challenge the corporate

status of a health care provider under the Business Corporation Act, Id. at 604, Defendant pointed

out that Miller was factually and legally distinguishable, involving the question of whether a

service provider was required to incorporate under the Professional Service Corporation Act rather

than under the Business Corporation Act (Exhibit E, p 11).

In response to Meemic’s Motion for Summary Disposition, Mercyland argued first that

Meemic could not assert that services were not lawfully provided because it failed to raise this

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defense in its affirmative defenses (Mercyland Response to Meemic Motion for Summary

Disposition, pp 5-6; Exhibit J). Mercyland further argued that because the services were provided

by persons holding licenses to render medical services, they were lawfully provided (Exhibit J,

p 7). Mercyland finally argued that pursuant to Miller v Allstate Ins Co, 481 Mich 601; 751 NW2d

463 (2008), Meemic lacked standing to challenge the legal status of Mercyland, because

MCL 450.4202(2) granted such power solely to the attorney general (Exhibit J, pp 8-9).

On the day Plaintiff’s Response was filed, Defendant amended its affirmative defenses to

include a new affirmative defense stating, “Defendant will show that some or all of Plaintiff’s

treatment was rendered unlawfully in violation of MCL §500.3157.” (Defendant Meemic’s

Amended Affirmative Defenses; Exhibit K.)

In its Reply to Mercyland’s Response to the Motion for Summary Disposition, Meemic

noted the filing of the Amended Affirmative Defenses, and further noted that while Plaintiff

objected, no motion to strike was filed (Meemic Reply to Mercyland Response to Motion for

Summary Disposition, p 2; Exhibit L).

The trial court heard oral argument on the motion on August 7, 2019 (Exhibit A). Following

argument by counsel, the trial court ruled as follows:

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well, may the record reflect I’ve had an opportunity to listen to oral argument. Defendant Meemic has filed this motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that – that intervening plaintiff, Mercyland, has not provided lawfully rendered services and, therefore, Meemic is not under any obligation to – to reimburse for any of the medical – medical procedures provided by Mercyland. So, the – the issue is, under MCL 500.31071A states that: “Personal protection benefits are payable to all – for all reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary services, products, accommodations for an injured person’s care, recovery or rehabilitation. Pursuant to MCL 500.3157, a physician, hospital, clinic or other person or institution lawfully rendering treatment to

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an injured person for an accidental bodily injury covered by personal protection insurance may charge a reasonable amount for the products, services and accommodations.” So, when you read these two statutes in conjunction, I believe that the Court of Appeals has indicated that lawfully rendered, that treatment must be in compliance with the licensing requirements. It is plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that the services rendered are compensable. Now, here defendant Meemic is contending that intervening plaintiff, Merry – Mercyland, was not properly licensed to render services within the meaning of Section 3157, because it’s owner and sole member, Mr. Abraham, is not a licensed physician in the State of Michigan. Now, intervening plaintiff, Mercyland, argues that based on Miller versus Allstate, a Supreme Court decision, Meemic does not have the right to challenge Mercyland’s corporate form, under the Business Corporation Act, however, I don’t think that Miller applies in this case because Meemic is not looking into the corporate form or structure. Meemic’s argument is that whether or not the services provided by Mercyland were lawfully rendered and, in the case, the Court reviewed the Court of Appeals cases of Healing Place at North Oakland Medical Center versus Allstate, which is at 211 Michigan Court of Appeals 51, a 2007 case. And, in this case, the Court concludes and finds that the language of Section 3157 concludes that the phrase lawfully rendered treatment permits an institution providing treatment to avoid licensure on the basis that the natural person providing the treatment at the institution is licensed. So, this case stands for the proposition that, if the person providing the services is required to be licensed, as well as the institution, both have to be licensed in order to meet the requirements of lawfully rendered. So, for those reasons – and there’s no dispute that – that Mercyland’s owner and manager and member, Mr. Abraham, is not a licensed physician in the state of Michigan, therefore, not in compliance, pursuant to the Professional Service Corporation Act or the Michigan Limited Liability Company Act. So, for those reasons, the Court is going to grant defendant’s motion for summary disposition, finding there is no genuine issue of material fact. Now, the side issue is that when Meemic filed its first affirmative defenses, that was the time prior to discovery being conducted, prior to the information that was provided with regards to some of the depositions being provided. The Court finds that if the – if the defendant had filed a motion to amend affirmative defenses, that motion would have been granted, based on the fact that this information was newly acquired and not—and not something that the defendant had at the time that the affirmative defenses was initially filed.

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(Exhibit A, pp 10-13) (emphasis added). An Order entered August 7, 2019 granted Meemic’s

Motion for Summary Disposition as to Mercyland for the reasons stated on the record (Exhibit B).

Mercyland moved for reconsideration, asserting for the first time that MCL 450.4904(5)

permitted Mr. Abraham to be a member or manager of a professional limited liability company

because he was licensed in another jurisdiction and did not himself provide services at Mercyland

(Mercyland Motion for Reconsideration, pp 8-9; Exhibit M). Citing several unpublished Michigan

cases, Mercyland again argued that Mr. Mohammed’s lack of Michigan licensure did not matter

because the services were actually provided by licensed individuals (Exhibit M, pp 10-13).

Mercyland attempted to distinguish Healing Place at North Oakland Medical Center v Allstate Ins

Co, 277 Mich App 51; 744 NW2d 174 (2007), arguing that the case did not require that

Mr. Abraham be licensed in Michigan, but merely held that where both the individual providing

services and the institution to which the individual belonged were required to be licensed, then

both must be licensed in order for services to be lawfully rendered (Exhibit M, pp 14-16). Finally,

Mercyland again argued that the decision in Miller v Allstate, 481 Mich 601; 751 NW2d 463

(2008) was controlling (Exhibit M, pp 16-17).

In an Order entered September 11, 2019, the trial court denied Mercyland’s Motion for

Reconsideration, noting that Mercyland presented the same issues already ruled on by the Court

either expressly or by reasonable implication, and that no palpable error that misled the Court and

parties was shown, nor did Plaintiff show that a different outcome would result from correction of

the alleged mistake (Order, 9/11/19; Exhibit F).

Intervening Plaintiff Mercyland appealed as of right to the Michigan Court of Appeals. The

Court of Appeals reversed the trial court in a published decision issued November 18, 2021

(Exhibit C). The Court of Appeals majority, relying on Miller v Allstate, 481 Mich 601; 751 NW2d

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463 (2008) and Sterling Heights Pain Mgmt v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Michigan, 335 Mich

245; 966 NW2d 456 (2020), held that “defendant insurer lacks statutory standing to challenge the

alleged improper formation of a Michigan professional limited lability company (PLLC)”

(Exhibit C, p 2). The majority discussed Miller, where the insurance company asserting the

unlawful rendering of services contended that the service provider improperly incorporated under

the Business Corporation Act (BCA) when it should have incorporated under the Professional

Services Corporation Act (Exhibit C, p 4). The majority quoted Miller as follows:

The Miller Court noted that MCL 450.1221 of the BCA provides the following: “The corporate existence shall begin on the effective date of the articles of incorporation . . . . Filing is conclusive evidence that . . . the corporation has been formed under [the BCA], except in an action or special proceeding by the attorney general.” . . . “In essence, MCL 450.1221 prevents any person – other than the Attorney General – from bringing any challenges to corporate status under the BCA: every such challenge would be doomed to failure, because the mere filing of articles of incorporation constitutes ‘conclusive evidence’ of the corporation’s legality.”

(Exhibit C, p 4, quoting Miller, 481 Mich at 610, 611-612.) The majority rejected Defendant’s

argument that it was not challenging Mercyland’s corporate status, noting that the same argument

was rejected by the Court of Appeals in Sterling Heights Pain Mgmt, where the Court noted that

the Michigan Limited Liability Company Act (MLLCA) contains a provision identical to the one

relied on in Miller. Specifically, MCL 450.4202(2) provides in part: “Filing is conclusive evidence

that all conditions precedent required to be performed under this act are fulfilled and that the

company is formed under this act, except in an action or special proceeding by the attorney

general.” MCL 450.4202(2). The majority in this case concluded that “like the insurer in Sterling

Heights Pain Mgt, Meemic does not have standing to assert an affirmative defense that challenges

Mercyland’s formation under the MLLCA.” (Exhibit C, p 5.)

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Judge Sawyer, dissenting, distinguished the instant case from Miller, citing “an important

additional factor present in the case before us, namely the requirement of MCL 450.4904(2) that

all members and managers of the PLLC must be licensed in the state of Michigan.” Judge Sawyer

continued:

This creates an additional licensing requirement that was not at issue in Miller nor addressed in Sterling Hts. That is, ultimately MEEMIC’s argument does not attack Mercyland’s status as a PLLC in the same way that in Miller the insurer attacked the status of the provider. Rather, MEEMIC’s argument more directly focuses on a requirement that members and managers of PLLCs that provide services under the public health code must themselves be licensed to provide those services.

(Exhibit C, Sawyer, J., dissenting, p 3.) Judge Sawyer opined that “we are not merely dealing with

a potential defect in the formation of the PLLC” and the case did not present an issue of standing

(Exhibit C, Sawyer, J., dissenting, p 6). Judge Sawyer went on to conclude that MCL 450.4904

“requires that all members and managers of a PLLC that renders services under the public health

code be licensed in the state of Michigan,” and a PLLC that includes a member or manager not

licensed in Michigan is not lawfully rendering services.” (Exhibit C, Sawyer, J., dissenting, p 6.)

Defendant now seeks leave to appeal to this Honorable Court.

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I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THIS CASE WAS CONTROLLED BY MILLER V ALLSTATE INS CO AND THAT DEFENDANT LACKED STATUTORY STANDING TO ASSERT THAT INTERVENING PLAINTIFF’S SERVICES WERE NOT LAWFULLY RENDERED, WHERE DEFENDANT IS NOT CHALLENGING CORPORATE FORMATION OR EXISTENCE, BUT THE LICENSURE OF INTERVENING PLAINTIFF’S SOLE MEMBER AND MANAGER.

Standard of Review

An appellate court reviews de novo a decision on a motion for summary disposition.

Healing Place at N Oakland Med Ctr v Allstate Ins Co, 277 Mich App 51, 55; 744 NW2d 174,

176 (2007). Issues of statutory construction are also reviewed de novo. Hastings Mut Ins Co v

Grange Ins Co of Michigan, 319 Mich App 579, 583; 903 NW2d 400, 402 (2017).

Law and Analysis

The Court of Appeals erred when it held that Defendant, Meemic Insurance Company,

lacked standing to assert that the services rendered by Intervening Plaintiff, Mercyland, were

unlawfully rendered and therefore not compensable pursuant to MCL 500.3157.

Pursuant to MCL 500.3107(1)(a), “personal protection insurance benefits are payable for

. . . [a]llowable expenses consisting of reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary

products, services and accommodations for an injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation.”

Further, MCL 500.3157 at all times relevant to this suit provided1 in pertinent part:

1 MCL 500.3157 was amended effective June 11, 2019, to provide in part as follows:

a physician, hospital, clinic, or other person that lawfully renders treatment to an injured person for an accidental bodily injury covered by personal protection insurance, or a person that provides rehabilitative occupational training following the injury, may charge a reasonable amount for the treatment or training.

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A physician, hospital, clinic or other person or institution lawfully rendering treatment to an injured person for an accidental bodily injury covered by personal protection insurance, and a person or institution providing rehabilitative occupational training following the injury, may charge a reasonable amount for the products, services and accommodations rendered.

MCL 500.3157.

Reading MCL 500.3107 together with MCL 500.3157, the Court of Appeals in Cherry v

State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 195 Mich App 316, 320; 489 NW2d 788, 790 (1992) opined that “it

is clear that the Legislature intended that only treatment lawfully rendered, including being in

compliance with licensing requirements, is subject to payment as a no-fault benefit.” In the trial

court and in the Court of Appeals, Defendant asserted that the treatment rendered to Davina Grady

was not in compliance with licensing requirements because the sole member and manager of

Intervening Plaintiff, Mercyland, was not licensed as required by law.

MCL 450.4201 of the Michigan Limited Liability Company Act provides in pertinent part:

A limited liability company may be formed under this act for any lawful purpose for which a domestic corporation or a domestic partnership could be formed, except as otherwise provided by law. A limited liability company formed to provide services in a learned profession, or more than 1 learned profession, shall comply with article 9.

MCL 450.4201. Article 9 of the MLLCA pertains to LLCs rendering professional services.

MCL 450.4904 provides in pertinent part:

if a professional limited liability company renders a professional service that is included within the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.1101 to 333.25211, then all members and managers of the company must be licensed or legally authorized in this state to render the same professional service.

MCL 450.4904(2) (emphasis added). The services provided by Intervening Plaintiff Mercyland

are within the public health code. MCL 333.17001-MCL 333.17088 governs medicine. Therefore,

Defendant argued, the members and managers of Mercyland are required to be licensed, and

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because it was undisputed that the sole member and manager of Mercyland, Mohammed Abraham,

is not licensed to practice medicine in the State of Michigan, any treatment rendered by Mercyland

was not lawfully rendered, MCL 500.3157.

In determining that Defendant lacked statutory standing to assert that treatment was not

lawfully rendered, the majority in this case relied on this Court’s decision in Miller v Allstate Ins

Co, 481 Mich 601; 751 NW2d 463 (2008), where this Court held that an insurance company

defendant lacked statutory standing to challenge a no-fault provider’s corporate status pursuant to

MCL 450.1221, “which grants the power to challenge corporate status solely to the attorney

general.” Id. at 604. However, the Miller case is different from the instant case in significant ways.

In Miller, the insurance company asserted that the no-fault provider actually incorporated under

the incorrect statutory act. Specifically, Allstate claimed that the provider, PT Works, had

unlawfully incorporated under the Business Corporation Act, MCL 450.1101 et seq., when it was

required to incorporate under the Professional Services Corporation Act, MCL 450.221, et seq. Id.

at 605.2 This Court phrased the initial question as “whether defendant Allstate may challenge the

incorporation of PT Works under the BCA.” Id. at 610. In answering this question in the negative,

this Court relied on MCL 450.1221 of the BCA, which states:

The corporate existence shall begin on the effective date of the articles of incorporation as provided in section 131. Filing is conclusive evidence that all conditions precedent required to be performed under this act have been fulfilled and that the corporation has been formed under this act, except in an action or special proceeding by the attorney general.

2 As the Court of Appeals noted in Sterling Heights Pain Mgmt, PLC, 335 Mich App at 250, n 2, the Public Services Corporation Act was subsequently repealed, 2012 PA 569, and the Business Corporation Act now contains a chapter pertaining to professional corporations, MCL 450.1281 et seq.

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MCL 450.1221. This Court held that MCL 450.1221 “prevents any person, other than the Attorney

General, from bringing any challenge to corporate status under the BCA: Every such challenge

would be doomed to failure, because the mere filing of articles of incorporation constitutes

“conclusive evidence of the corporation’s legality.” Id. at 611-612. This Court characterized the

meaning of MCL 450.1221 as follows:

This statute indicates that once articles of incorporation under the BCA have been filed, such filing constitutes “conclusive evidence” that: (1) all the requirements for complying with the BCA have been fulfilled and (2) the corporation has actually been formed in compliance with the BCA. Thus, the statute generally creates an irrebuttable presumption of proper incorporation once the articles of incorporation have been filed. The statute then creates a single exception to this general rule by granting the Attorney General the sole authority to challenge whether a corporation has been properly incorporated under the BCA. That is, only the Attorney General is not affected by the irrebuttable presumption in favor of legality. By naming only the Attorney General in this respect, the Legislature has indicated that the Attorney General alone has the authority to challenge corporate status, under the principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius, that is, “the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.” Miller v. Chapman Contracting, 477 Mich. 102, 108 n. 1, 730 N.W.2d 462 (2007). Thus, the filing of the articles of incorporation serves as “conclusive evidence” that PT Works has been properly formed, and this Court cannot, under the terms of MCL 450.1221, conclude otherwise, except as a consequence of a suit brought by the Attorney General.

Id. at 611 (emphasis added).

The majority in this case also relied on the Court of Appeals’ recent decision in Sterling

Heights Pain Mgmt, PLC v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Michigan, 335 Mich App 245; 966 NW2d

456 (2020), where the Court of Appeals, citing Miller, held that a defendant insurer lacked standing

“to challenge whether plaintiff [no-fault provider] was properly incorporated or organized.” Id. at

247. In Sterling Heights Pain Mgmt, the insurer moved for summary disposition arguing that

Sterling Heights Pain Management, PLC, did not lawfully render services to the injured person,

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MCL 500.3157, because, like in the instant case, the provider, which was incorporated under the

Michigan Limited Liability company Act, violated the Act’s requirement “that all members and

managers of a professional limited liability company (PLC) be licensed to render the same

professional services as the corporate entity.” Id. at 248. See MCL 450.4904(2). Reasoning that

MCL 450.4202(2)3 of the MLLCA contains a provision “identical to the one relied on in Miller,”

the panel in Sterling Heights Pain Mgmt, ultimately held that “Defendant’s argument that plaintiff

was organized in violation of the MLLCA is squarely controlled by Miller, which held on the basis

of an identical statutory provision to one found in the MLLCA that only the Attorney General has

standing to bring claims alleging incorporation defects.” Id. at 251-252, 253.

Defendant submits, however, that Miller does not compel the result reached by the Court

of Appeals in Sterling Heights Pain Mgmt, or in the instant case. In Miller, it is important to note,

the defendant insurance company was actually challenging the corporate status of the no fault

provider, by claiming that it was wrongly incorporated under the BCA. This is exactly what the

Legislature forbade in MCL 450.1221, which provides that “ Filing is conclusive evidence that all

conditions precedent required to be performed under this act have been fulfilled and that the

corporation has been formed under this act, except in an action or special proceeding by the

3 MCL 450.4202(2) provides:

(2) The existence of the limited liability company begins on the effective date of the articles of organization as provided in section 104. Filing is conclusive evidence that all conditions precedent required to be performed under this act are fulfilled and that the company is formed under this act, except in an action or special proceeding by the attorney general. The maximum duration of the limited liability company is perpetual unless otherwise provided in the articles of organization.

MCL 450.4202 (2).

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attorney general.” Id. (emphasis added). “Under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, a phrase must be

read in context. A phrase must be construed in light of the phrases around it, not in a vacuum.

Its context gives it meaning.” Apsey v Mem Hosp, 477 Mich 120, 130; 730 NW2d 695, 700–01

(2007). “[T]o discern the Legislature’s intent, statutory provisions are not to be read in isolation;

rather, context matters, and thus statutory provisions are to be read as a whole.” Robinson v City

of Lansing, 486 Mich 1, 15; 782 NW2d 171 (2010) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the very

first sentence of MCL 450.1221 – “The corporate existence shall begin on the effective date of

the articles of incorporation as provided in section 131” – provides context for the later language

indicating a filing is “conclusive evidence that all conditions precedent required to be performed

under this act have been fulfilled and that the corporation has been formed under this act.” The

Attorney General is the only person who can challenge the existence of the corporation under the

act. Put another way, only the Attorney General has standing to challenge whether the corporation

has been formed under the BCA. Exactly as this Court held in Miller, “the Legislature has indicated

that the Attorney General alone has the authority to challenge corporate status.”

In the instant case, as the trial court correctly noted, Defendant is not challenging the

corporate status of Appellant, Mercyland (Exhibit A, p 12), but rather arguing that the services

provided by Mercyland were not lawfully rendered, MCL 500.3157 because its sole member and

manager was unlicensed. This is not a case where Defendant is challenging the corporate existence

or corporate formation, a challenge that is statutorily reserved to the attorney general.

MCL 450.4202(2). As Judge Sawyer noted in his dissenting opinion, “we are not merely dealing

with a potential defect in the formation of the PLLC.” (Exhibit C, Sawyer, J., dissenting, p 6). The

MLLCA, as Judge Sawyer further noted, contains “an additional licensing requirement that was

not at issue in Miller nor addressed in Sterling Hts.” (Exhibit C, Sawyer, J., dissenting, p 3.) Thus,

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“MEEMIC’s argument does not attack Mercyland’s status as a PLLC in the same way that the

Miller insurer attacked the corporate status of the provider. Rather, MEEMIC’s argument more

directly focuses on a requirement that members and managers of PLLCs that provide services

under the public health code must themselves be licensed to provide those services.” (Exhibit C,

Sawyer, J., dissenting, p 3).

This case is qualitatively different from Miller in that the unlawfulness asserted here is not

merely in the technical manner of corporate formation, but in the licensure of the individual who

is the sole member and manager of Mercyland. The question of licensure has been addressed rather

extensively in the Michigan Court of Appeals. In The Healing Place at North Oakland Med

Center v Allstate Ins Co, 277 Mich App 51; 744 NW2d 174 (2007), relied upon by the trial court,

a provider that was not properly licensed was barred from collecting no-fault benefits pursuant to

MCL 500.3157. In The Healing Place, the Court of Appeals considered whether services provided

by an unlicensed adult foster care facility could be reimbursed as no-fault benefits. The insurer,

Allstate, produced evidence establishing that the services rendered by an entity by the name of

New Start, Inc., were in the nature of adult foster care. Id. at 58. Yet, Allstate also established New

Start, Inc. was not licensed as an adult foster care facility. Id. Under these circumstances, the Court

of Appeals held, the trial court correctly granted summary disposition for Allstate because the

services rendered by New Start, Inc., were not “lawfully render[ed].” Id. at 61. In Healing Place,

the Court made clear that it is not enough that the individual rendering treatment be licensed:

“[U]nder MCL 500.3157, if both the individual and the institution were each required to be

licensed and either was not, the ‘lawfully render[ed]’ requirement would be unsatisfied.” Healing

Place, 277 Mich App at 60. Here, both the individual treating physician and the sole member and

manager of Mercyland, Mohammed Abraham, were required to be licensed. Where one of them

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was not, the “lawfully render[ed]” requirement is not satisfied. Here, Mohammed Abraham, as the

sole member and manager of Mercyland, is in a real sense the institution. Pursuant to law,

MCL 450.4904(2), he was required to be licensed. Thus, this case is analogous to The Healing

Place, in that both the individual rendering treatment and the sole member and manager of the

institution, Mohammed Abraham, were required to be licensed. Because one of them was not

(Mr. Abraham), the lawfully rendered requirement of MCL 500.3157 is not met and Appellant is

not entitled to claim no-fault benefits.

II. INTERVENING PLAINTIFF’S SERVICES WERE NOT LAWFULLY RENDERED BECAUSE INTERVENING PLAINTIFF’S SOLE MEMBER AND MANAGER WAS NOT LICENSED AS A PHYSICIAN IN MICHIGAN AS REQUIRED BY MCL 450.4904.

As set forth above, Intervening Plaintiff’s sole member and manager, Mohammed Abraham,

was not licensed as a physician as required by MCL 450.4904, which provides in pertinent part:

if a professional limited liability company renders a professional service that is included within the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.1101 to 333.25211, then all members and managers of the company must be licensed or legally authorized in this state to render the same professional service.

MCL 450.4904(2) (emphasis added).

Intervening Plaintiff’s contention, raised for the first time in its Motion for

Reconsideration, that MCL 450.4904(5) saves it from unlawfully rendering services should be

rejected. “Where an issue is first presented in a motion for reconsideration, it is not properly

preserved.” Vushaj v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Michigan, 284 Mich App 513, 519; 773 NW2d

758, 761 (2009). But even if this issue is considered, it is without merit. MCL 450.4904(5)

provides:

(5) A licensed person of another jurisdiction may become a member, manager, employee, or agent of a professional limited liability company, but shall not render any professional services in this state

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until the person is licensed or otherwise legally authorized to render the professional service in this state.

MCL 450.4904(5).4

“An anchoring rule of jurisprudence, and the foremost rule of statutory construction, is that

courts are to effect the intent of the Legislature.” Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466 Mich 57,

63; 642 NW2d 663, 667 (2002). If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the Court

must assume that the Legislature intended its plain meaning and enforce the statute as written. Id.

Importantly, “to discern the Legislature’s intent, statutory provisions are not to be read in isolation;

rather, context matters, and thus statutory provisions are to be read as a whole.” Robinson v City

of Lansing, 486 Mich 1, 15; 782 NW2d 171 (2010) (emphasis in original). Courts “must give effect

to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute and avoid an interpretation that would render any

part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.” Johnson v Recca, 492 Mich 169, 177; 821 NW2d 520

(2012). Thus, Defendant submits that MCL 450.4904(5), quoted above, must be read together with

MCL 450.4904(2), which is again quoted here along with sections 3 and 4 to which section 2

refers:

(2) Except as provided in subsection (3) or (4), if a professional limited liability company renders a professional service that is included within the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.1101 to 333.25211, then all members and managers of the company must be licensed or legally authorized in this state to render the same professional service.

(3) One or more individuals licensed to engage in the practice of medicine under part 170, the practice of osteopathic medicine and surgery under part 175, or the practice of podiatric medicine and surgery under part 180 of article 15 of the public health code, 1978

4 Plaintiff has never produced any evidence that Mr. Abraham is actually licensed in another jurisdiction. Therefore, even if this statute meant what Plaintiff argued it means – that a person licensed in another jurisdiction may be a member of a professional limited liability company rendering medical services -- the factual predicate for its application is lacking.

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PA 368, MCL 333.16101 to 333.18838, may organize a professional liability company under this article with 1 or more other individuals licensed to engage in the practice of medicine under part 170, the practice of osteopathic medicine and surgery under part 175, or the practice of podiatric medicine and surgery under part 180 of article 15 of the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.16101 to 333.18838.

(4) Subject to section 17048 of the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.17048, 1 or more individuals licensed to engage in the practice of medicine under part 170, the practice of osteopathic medicine and surgery under part 175, or the practice of podiatric medicine and surgery under part 180 of article 15 of the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.16101 to 333.18838, may organize a professional limited liability company under this article with 1 or more physician's assistants licensed under article 15 of the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.16101 to 333.18838. Beginning on July 19, 2010, 1 or more physician's assistants may not organize a professional limited liability company under this act that will have only physician's assistants as members.

MCL 450.4904. When parts 2 and 5 are read together, it is plain that section 5 applies to

corporations that render services that are not included within the public health code. Thus, it is

permitted for an architect or engineer that is licensed in another jurisdiction to be a member or

manager of a corporation rendering architectural or engineering services. Looking back to

subsection 2, the same is not true of a professional limited liability company that renders

professional services included within the public health code. This is plainly apparent from the

inclusion of the phrase “if a professional limited liability company renders a professional service

that is included within the public health code” which is included in subsection 2 but not in

subsection 5. Plaintiff urged a reading of subsection 2 which would render this phrase nugatory.

Only if part 5 is read in isolation, independent of the other subsections of the same statute,

can it yield the meaning that Plaintiff desires, that is, that Mohammed Abraham could preside over

the entity of Mercyland, which undisputedly rendered services within the public health code,

without himself being licensed as a physician. In the Court of Appeals, Mercyland seized on the

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exceptions provided in parts 3 and 4 of MCL 450.4904 to argue that MCL 450.4904 “does not

require ALL members and managers of a Michigan PLLC be licensed in Michigan, but rather,

only requires that ALL licensed members and managers of a Michigan PLLC be licensed in the

same professional field of service, subject to the two permitted exceptions set forth in subsections

(3) and (4) of MCL 450.4904” (Intervening Plaintiff’s COA Brief as Appellant, pp 6-7). It is clear

that subsections 3 and 4 of MCL 450.4904 allow for the formation of PLLC’s comprised of persons

rendering different services within the health code. Thus, for example, persons licensed in the

practice of medicine may form a company together with persons licensed in osteopathic medicine

or podiatry, MCL 450.4904(3), or persons licensed in medicine, osteopathic medicine or podiatry

may form a company together with persons licensed as physician’s assistants, MCL 450.4904(4).

What remains clear, however, when we return to MCL 450.4904(2), is that barring those

exceptions, all members of a professional limited liability company that renders services included

within the public health code must be licensed in the same professional service.

Intervening Plaintiff argued in the Court of Appeals, with citation to four unpublished

decisions5 that it does not matter that the sole member and manager of Mercyland was unlicensed,

so long as the individuals who actually rendered care were properly licensed. These cases, apart

from the fact that they have no precedential value because they are unpublished, are all notable for

the fact that they rely on Court of Appeals authority that has been expressly vacated by this Court.

5 In the Court of Appeals, Intervening Plaintiff cited Allstate Ins Co v A & A Med Transp Servs, Inc., unpublished per curiam decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals, issued January 23, 2007 (Docket Nos. 260766, 261504) (Exhibit N), Best Care Rehabilitation, Inc. v Allstate Ins Co, unpublished per curiam decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals, issued March 20, 2007 (Docket No. 272395) (Exhibit O), Preferred Medicine, Inc. v Allstate Ins Co, unpublished per curiam decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals, issued December 5, 2006 (Docket No. 263451) (Exhibit P), and Broe Rehabilitation Servs, Inc. v Allstate Ins Co, unpublished per curiam decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals, issued April 22, 2008 (Docket No. 275587) (Exhibit Q).

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A & A Med Transp Servs, Inc., Best Care Rehabilitation, Inc., and Preferred Medicine, Inc., all

relied on Miller v Allstate Ins Co, 272 Mich App 284; 726 NW2d 54 (2006), where the Court of

Appeals held, without actually deciding whether the caregiving entity in question was improperly

incorporated, that it did not matter whether a caregiving entity was improperly incorporated,

“where the treatment itself was lawfully rendered by licensed physical therapists.” Id. at 286. But

this Court vacated this decision and remanded for the Court of Appeals to decide whether the

caregiving entity was properly incorporated, and once that determination was made, whether it

“lawfully rendered” treatment under MCL 500.3157. Miller v Allstate Ins Co, 477 Mich 1062;

728 NW2d 458 (2007).

On remand, the Court of Appeals found that the provider in question was in fact improperly

incorporated, but for the reasons articulated in its first opinion, the treatment was nevertheless

lawfully rendered because it was provided by licensed individuals. Miller v Allstate Ins Co (On

Remand), 275 Mich App 649, 653-654, 655-656 (2007), affirmed on other grounds, 481 Mich 601;

751 NW2d 463 (2008).6 This Court subsequently affirmed Miller on completely different grounds,

and in doing so expressly vacated the rationale of the Court of Appeals. Miller v Allstate Ins Co,

481 Mich 601, 616; 751 NW2d 463, 472 (2008). Thus, Plaintiff’s reliance on either of the Court

of Appeals decisions in Miller is unwarranted.

It is worth noting, furthermore, that even if either Court of Appeals decision in Miller were

good authority, this case nevertheless is distinguishable from them. In Miller, the question of

corporate formation hinged on whether the provider had incorporated under the correct statute.

Miller, 275 Mich App at 653-654. After finding that the corporation was improperly formed, the

6 Intervening Plaintiff’s fourth unpublished case, Broe Rehabilitation Services, Inc., relies on the second Court of Appeals decision of Miller v Allstate Ins Co (On Remand) 275 Mich App 649, 653-654, 655-656 (2007), affirmed on other grounds, 481 Mich 601; 751 NW2d 463 (2008).

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panel emphasized that “the treatment itself has nothing to do with corporate formation issues. Id.

at 657. This is plainly not true in the instant case, where the defect that Defendant complains of is

the failure of the sole member and manager to hold a license to practice medicine in Michigan. In

short, the situation here is not merely a technical defect in corporate formation, it is that the

individual who is the sole member and manager of Mercyland is not himself a physician. This goes

to the heart of the care itself and therefore distinguishes the instant case from either of the Court

of Appeals decisions in Miller.

III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN ALLOWING DEFENDANT TO AMEND ITS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES TO ASSERT THAT THE SERVICES FOR WHICH MERCYLAND SEEKS REIMBURSEMENT WERE NOT LAWFULLY RENDERED.

Standard of Review

The trial court’s decision to permit amendment of a pleading is reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. Dampier v Wayne Co, 233 Mich App 714, 721; 592 NW2d 809, 813 (1999)

(amendment of complaint).

Law and Analysis

“Affirmative defenses, even if not asserted in the initial answer, may be introduced by

amendment.” Ben P Fyke & Sons, Inc v Gunter Co, 390 Mich 649, 667; 213 NW2d 134, 141

(1973). The relevant rule, MCR 2.118, provides as follows:

Except as provided in subrule (A)(1), a party may amend a pleading only by leave of the court or by written consent of the adverse party. Leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.

MCR 2.118(A)(2). In this case Plaintiff made much of the fact that Defendant’s Amended

Affirmative Defenses were initially filed without leave of the Court. However, this is of no

consequence, where the Court ultimately granted leave on the record during the summary

disposition hearing. The Court specifically ruled, “if the defendant had filed a motion to amend

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affirmative defenses, that motion would have been granted , based on the fact that this information

was newly acquired and not – not something that the defendant had at the time that the affirmative

defenses was initially filed.” (Exhibit A, p 13.)

“A motion to amend ordinarily should be granted in the absence of any apparent or declared

reason, such as undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure

to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by

virtue of allowance of the amendment, or futility of amendment.” Cole v Ladbroke Racing

Michigan, Inc, 241 Mich App 1, 9–10; 614 NW2d 169, 174 (2000). Further, delay alone does not

warrant denial of a motion to amend, but may warrant denial if the delay was in bad faith or if the

opposing party suffered actual prejudice as a result. Weymers v Khera, 454 Mich 639, 659;

563 NW2d 647, 657 (1997).

In the Court of Appeals, Mercyland asserted that leave to amend should not have been

granted because the “unlawfully rendered” defense was not newly discovered, since the

depositions forming the basis for the defense (those of Drs. Sinha and Pribil) were available to

Defendant before its first responsive pleading was filed (Intervening Plaintiff’s COA Brief as

Appellant, pp 18-19). This claim of unwarranted delay was not accompanied by any assertion of

bad faith or prejudice to Intervening Plaintiff. See Weymers, supra. Therefore, Intervening Plaintiff

failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion by granting Defendant leave to amend its

affirmative defenses. In any case, the defense was newly discovered, since the depositions of

Drs. Sinha and Pribil, although taken before Defendant filed its first responsive pleading, were not

known to defense counsel at that time. Thus, the defense was newly discovered, but even if it were

not, Appellant has entirely failed to sustain its burden to show that any delay was in bad faith or

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would result in prejudice to Defendant. The trial court was well within its discretion in granting

leave to amend, and certainly no abuse of discretion has been shown.

IV. THIS CASE PRESENTS AN ISSUE OF MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE TO THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THIS STATE, SUCH THAT LEAVE TO APPEAL SHOULD BE GRANTED.

Leave to appeal is warranted because the issue of whether an insurance company has

standing to assert that a no-fault provider whose sole member and manager lacks licensure required

by Michigan law involves a legal principle of major significance to the state’s jurisprudence.

MCR 7.305(B)(3). Defendant submits that the Court of Appeals in Sterling Hts Pain Mgmt and in

the instant case, improperly extended the rule of Miller -- that only the attorney general may

challenge corporate formation under the Business Corporation Act– to preclude an insurer from

challenging the legality of a corporation whose sole member and manager lacks licensure as a

physician required by the MLLCA, MCL 450.4904(2). As Judge Sawyer noted in his dissent in

the instant case, “we are not merely dealing with a potential defect in the formation of the PLLC.”

(Exhibit C, Sawyer, J., dissenting, p 6.) Rather, this case involves a “licensing requirement that

was not at issue in Miller nor addressed in Sterling Hts.” (Exhibit C, Sawyer, J., dissenting, p 3.)

RELIEF REQUESTED

WHEREFORE, Defendant-Appellant respectfully requests that this Honorable Court grant

leave to appeal.

SECREST WARDLE BY: /s/SIDNEY A. KLINGLER______________ SIDNEY A. KLINGLER (P 40862) Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 2600 Troy Center Drive, P.O. Box 5025 Troy, MI 48007-5025 sklingler@secrestwardle.com Dated: December 30, 2021

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INDEX OF EXHIBITS

Exhibit A Transcript of Proceedings Held August 7, 2019 Exhibit B Order Granting Defendant Meemic Insurance Company’s Motion for Summary

Disposition as to Intervening Plaintiff Mercyland Health Services, With Prejudice, 8/7/2019

Exhibit C Court of Appeals decision, 11/18/2021 Exhibit D Mercyland Health Services, PLLC and LG Transportation & Management, Inc’s

Intervening Complaint Exhibit E Defendant Meemic Insurance Company’s Motion for Summary Disposition as to

Intervening Plaintiff Mercyland Health Services Exhibit F Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, 9/11/2019 Exhibit G LARA Filing Exhibit H LARA Search Exhibit I Medical Records Exhibit J Intervening Plaintiff, Mercyland Health Services, PLLC’s Response to Defendant,

Meemic Insurance Company’s Motion for Summary Disposition Exhibit K Defendant Meemic Insurance Company’s Amended Affirmative Defenses Exhibit L Defendant Meemic Insurance Company’s Reply to Intervening Plaintiff,

Mercyland Health Services, PLLC’s Response to Defendant, Meemic Insurance Company’s Motion for Summary Disposition

Exhibit M Intervening Plaintiffs, Mercyland Health Services, PLLC and LG Transportation &

Management, Inc. Motion for Reconsideration Exhibit N Allstate Ins Co v A & A Medical Transp Services, Inc., unpublished per curiam

decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals, issued January 23, 2007 (Docket Nos. 260766, 261504)

Exhibit O Best Care Rehabilitation, Inc. v Allstate Ins Co, unpublished per curiam decision

of the Michigan Court of Appeals, issued March 20, 2007 (Docket No. 272395) Exhibit P Preferred Medicine, Inc. v Allstate Ins Co, unpublished per curiam decision of the

Michigan Court of Appeals, issued December 5, 2006 (Docket No. 263451)

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Exhibit Q Broe Rehabilitation Services, Inc. v Allstate Ins Co, unpublished per curiam decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals, issued April 22, 2008 (Docket No. 275587)

7282791_2

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