PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES OF THE US HEGEMONY: AN OUTLOOK FORTHE 21ST CENTURY

INTRODUCTION

“...world hegemony is described as a social structure, an economic structure,

and a political structure; and it simply cannot be one of these things but must be all

three. World hegemony, furthermore, is expressed in universal norms, institutions

and mechanisms which lay down general rules of behaviour for states and for those

forces of civil society that act across national boundaries – rules which support the

dominant mode of production.” (Cox, 1983).

The term hegemony originating from ancient Greek

‘hegemonia’ literally expresses the dominant and oppressive

status of one element in the system over the others. The

concept of hegemony greatly contributes to a better

understanding of current international relations and power

relations. Antonio Gramsci (1971) in his Prison Notebooks has

significantly contributed to the articulation of this concept

suggesting that power is not only dependent on force but also

on ‘consent’. According to Gramsci, hegemony represents the

status of the most powerful country in the international

system or the position of a dominant state in a specific

region. As the only remaining superpower, the United States

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(US) currently commands a degree of global influence

unparalleled since the end of British hegemony a century ago.

The US world-wide military engagements and its leadership in

all kinds of international institutions increasingly stimulate

international criticism including EU, China and Russia which

call for a multipolar system that could put an end to

unconstrained US predominance.1 Some realist political

scientists, such as Kenneth Waltz and Christopher Layne, call

attention to the temptations of unbalanced superiority and

predict the inevitable rise of new challengers.2 Other scholars

expect US hegemony to last for decades. Due to US huge

material superiority of its global leadership these scientists

claim that potential challengers lack both the resources and

the ambition to overthrow US leadership. 3 This contribution

1 John Vinocur. 1999. Going It Alone, U.S. Upsets France. International HeraldTribune; Robert Graham. 1999. Chirac hits at US Congress isolationism. FinancialTimes; David Shambaugh. 2000. Sino-American Strategic Relations: FromPartners to Competitors; John Pomfret. 1999. China Maps Changes In DefenseStrategy. International Herald Tribune; John Thornhill/James Kynge. 1999. Anti-Nato stance draws China and Russia closer together. Financial Times.2 Kenneth Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security 18.2 (1993): 44-79; Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise,” International Security 17.4 (1993): 5-51.3 William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” InternationalSecurity 24.1(1999): 5-41; 8; G. John Ikenberry, “Institutions, StrategicRestraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order,” International Security23.3 (1998/1999): 43-78; 76-78.

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evaluates the prospects for hegemonic challenge in the first

decades of the new century.

At the beginning of the 21st Century however, this

situation shows a change: since then the global political

landscape is becoming more dependent on economic building

except on power of the armies. In the 20th Century, the US

became the most powerful country on Earth. US dominated in

every aspect of global matters economically, militarily,

technologically and cultural fields. After the fall of the

bipolar system, the US became the dominant power. But nowadays

it portrays some dynamics changes in the international arena.

The US economy especially after the financial economic crises

has massive problems from fiscal deficit and public debt to

weak economic growth. After all, it has big impact on the

military prestige of the country which results the reduction

of the American arm all around the world. On the other hands,

many new economic powers are threatening the position of the

US especially in their economic power and by investments in

their armies and technologies. These methods are giving them a

great opportunity for further development. The US dilemma also

shows significant impacts on global international affairs,

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which can radically change the structure of the world order in

the future.

Thus, this paper aims to conceptualize the debate on

whether the US long global supremacy will fade away in the 21st

Century. As to comprehend the issue further, the discussion’s

angle would be encompassing on the hegemonic strategies, the

US economic and military pressures, potential competitors and

analysis of the US reactions as well as the rivals forecast.

A BRIEF OF THE US HEGEMONIC GRAND STRATEGIES

By eliminating the US great power rival, the Soviet

Union’s collapse curved the US into a position of uncontested

global hegemony. Since the Cold War’s end, the declared

objective of US grand strategy has been to consolidate and

extend US hegemony in the international system. This first

became clear in March 1992, when the initial draft of the

Pentagon’s Defence Planning Guidance (DPG) for Fiscal Years

1994-1999 was leaked to the New York Times.4 The DPG made clear

that the objective of US grand strategy henceforth would be to4 Patrick E. Tyler, ‘US Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No RivalsDevelop,’ New York Times , 8 March 1992, p.A1

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maintain US superiority by preventing the emergence of new

great-power rivals. As the DPG stated, ‘we must maintain the

mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even

aspiring to a larger regional or global role’. 5 This strategy

aimed not only at preventing the emergence of the rising China

or a resurgent Russia, but also the rise to great-power status

of US principal Cold War allies, Germany and Japan.

The Clinton administration reiterated that the US

hegemony was America’s key grand strategic objective. The May

1997 Report of the Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR), prepared

by the Clinton administration, clearly embraced the

geopolitical objective of maintaining American hegemony. The

1997 QDR’s underlying principle was that ‘The US is the

world’s only superpower today, and is expected to remain so

throughout the 1997-2015 period’. 6 Although not as blunt as

the DPG, in strikingly similar language the 1997 QDR makes

clear that the post-2015 objective of US grand strategy, and

the military posture would be to keep things just as they were

geopolitically: ‘it is imperative that the US maintain its5 ‘Excerpts From Pentagon's Plan: ‘Prevent the Re-emergence of a NewRival’,’ New York Times, 8 March 1992, p.A14.

6 William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defence Review (WashingtonD.C., May 1997).

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military superiority. Without such superiority, our ability to

exert global leadership and to create international conditions

conducive to the achievement of our national goals would be in

doubt.7 In the near-term, the 1997 QDR specified that the goal

of US grand strategy was to prevent ‘the emergence of a

hostile regional coalition or hegemon’.

In its fall 2002 National Security Strategy of the US,

the Bush II administration followed the Bush I and Clinton

administrations in making the maintenance of American global

hegemony the key objective of US grand strategy. Both act

strategically to prevent the emergence of rivals. The Bush II

administration’s 2001 Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) and its

2002 National Security Strategy, evidence a clear

determination to ensure that America’s global hegemony cannot7 Ibid. Like many bureaucratic documents, the QDR casts its policyrecommendation as the sensible middle ground between two unacceptablyextreme options. In the QDR, the first option rejected would focus USstrategy and force structure on near term threats, ‘while largely deferringpreparations for the possibility of more demanding security challenges inthe future.’ The second unacceptable option is the reverse: sacrificingcurrent capabilities to prepare for future threats from regional greatpowers or ‘global peer competitors.’ The path embraced by the QDR ‘focuseson meeting both near and longer term challenges, reflecting the view theour position in the world does not afford us the opportunity to choosebetween the two.’ The QDR thus clearly embraces the long-term objective ofpreventing the emergence of great power competitors. That is, it reaffirmsthe grand strategic objective of maintaining the US as the only great powerover both the near-term, and the post-2015 long term.

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be challenged. The 2001 QDR states that the United States

seeks to maintain ‘favourable power balances’ in key regions

like East Asia, the Persian Gulf and Europe.8 The US will

accomplish this aim by maintaining overwhelming military

superiority so that it ‘can dissuade other countries from

initiating future military competitions’ against the US, and,

if necessary, ‘impose the will of the United States... on any

adversaries.’9 The 2002 National Security Strategy states even

more clearly that the objective of American strategy is to

prevent any other state from building up military capabilities

in the hope of ‘surpassing, or even equalling, the power of

the United States’. In a break with the Bush I and Clinton

administrations, however, the Bush II administration has

incorporated the logic of ‘anticipatory violence’ into US

grand strategy. 10 The 2002 National Security Strategy and8 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (WashingtonD.C.: September 2001), pp.2, 4, 11, 15.

9 Ibid

10 It is perhaps more accurate to say that the Bush II administration,unlike its predecessors, openly incorporated pre-emption and preventive warinto US grand strategy. The Clinton administration did prepare to launch apre-emptive strike again North Korea during the 1994 crisis caused bydiscovery Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program. See Ashton B. Carter andWilliam J. Perry, ‘Back to the Brink,’ Washington Post, October, 20, 2002.To the extent the Bush I administration’s policy, in fact, was driven byconcerns about Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s push to acquire nuclearweapons, and other WMD capabilities, the 1991 Persian Gulf War could be

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policy statements by senior administration officials

(including President George W. Bush) have reserved to

Washington the right to act pre-emptively, or preventively to

cut down potential rivals before they become actual ones.

China’s emergence as a great power would challenge

directly the US global hegemony. The grand strategy clearly

aims to hold down China. While acknowledging that China is a

regional power, Washington evidently does not concede that

China can aspire to be a great power. 11 Discreetly warning

China against challenging the US militarily, the 2002 National

Security Strategy (NSS) warns Beijing that, ‘In pursuing

advanced military capabilities that can threaten its

neighbours in the Asia-Pacific region, China is following an

out dated path that, in the end, will hamper its own pursuit

of national greatness. In time, China will find that social

and political freedom is the only source of that greatness’.12

regarded as a preventive war.

11 For example, Defense Secretary William Cohen described China as an Asianpower. William Cohen, ‘Annual Bernard Brodie Lecture,’ University of California, Los Angeles, October 28, 1998 (DoD web site)

12 Department of Defense, The United States Security Strategy for the East-Asia Pacific Region 1998 (Washington D.C., 1998) p.30

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Notwithstanding Beijing’s views to the contrary, the US grand

strategy rejects the notion that China has any justifiable

basis for regarding the American military presence in East

Asia as threatening to its interests. Washington aims to

encourage China to become a ‘responsible member of the

international community’. ‘Responsibility’, however, is

defined as Beijing’s willingness to accept Washington’s vision

of a stable international order. It also means China’s

domestic political liberalization, and its development as a

free-market economy firmly anchored to the international

economy. As the Bush II administration’s 2002 National

Security Strategy declares, ‘America will encourage the

advancement of democracy and economic openness’ in China,

‘because these are the best foundations for domestic stability

and international order’13.

13 Clinton, ‘Remarks on US-China Relations;’ Cohen, ‘Annual Bernard BrodieLecture;’ The United States Security Strategy for the East-Asia PacificRegion 1998. As National Security Adviser Berger puts it: ‘Our interestlies in protecting our security while encouraging China to make the rightchoices’—especially choosing to allocate its resources to internaldevelopment rather than building up its military power. Berger, ‘AmericanPower.’

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In essence, then, American grand strategy requires China

to accept US hegemony. The strategy is silent, however, on

what the US will do if Beijing refuses to accept America’s

pre-eminence. On this point—notwithstanding that its emphasis

on the pre-emptive and preventive use of military power has

been debated mostly within the context of the US response to

terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and rogue states like Saddam

Hussein’s Iraq, the Bush II administration’s strategy has

obvious implications for potential peer competitors such as

China. Regardless of the hegemonic strategies, it would not

exclude Washington from facing with some obstacles for

instance the economic pressure and military dominance which

are among the major elements to sustain the hegemon status.

THE US ECONOMIC PRESSURE

During the second half of the 20th Century, US became the

largest exporter in the world and the biggest contributor to

the IMF, helping the developing countries financially and

trying to spread the capitalist principles of economy. Values

like laissez faire, individual responsibility or democratic

principles were the fundamental pillars of the US economy,10

society and policy as well. However, the situation started to

change in the late 1990s and worsened during the George W.

Bush administration in 2000. The Bush negative impact was the

war against terrorism. The particular reason for the huge

deficit is also the spending of the wars in Afghanistan and

Iraq. The statistics about the US financial and fiscal

conditions show weak improvement. For instance in fiscal year

2000, the US federal budget was 86.4 billion dollars surplus,

but for 2010 the White House predicted a more than US$1392.6

billion dollars deficit.

This economic crisis managed to stop the lasting economic

growth which made the US to step into recession. Later

recovery from this crisis was possible only because of a

stimulus from the federal government managed by Obama

administration. Since then the Federal Reserve has tried to

face the crisis with low interest rates (1%) and increasing

money supply to restart the economy. According to the Economic

Intelligence Unit (EIU), the US GDP in 2013 will grow only by

2.1%. Contrasting with other countries like China and India

grow faster on the economic level and in 2013 their GDP growth

will near 8% (Economic Intelligence Unit, 2012). However,

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Kupchan (2012) views that in 2050 China would be absolutely

the largest economy in the world and the US would be only in

the second position (Kupchan, 2012).

All in all, according to the World Bank Group (2012), the

US way of life is based on consumption which is caused the

turnover of this country from the world’s biggest creditor to

the largest debtor: the external debt of US is over 16

trillion dollars. However, the US is not only facing with the

economy problems but also with the currency. The US dollar is

the world’s official reserve currency and it is used by many

countries around the world. The outcome of the US dollar is in

close connection with oil. Furthermore, energy security is the

vital issue for the US. The high standard of living in the US

caused a demand for energy. Bozik (2012) stated that the US

produces 6.5 million barrels of oil per day and imports 9

million barrels per day. Bozik also stated that the US

produces 7.8% of world oil production but the share of the

country in worldwide consumption is 22.5%. The data shows that

it is impossible for the US to keep and cover such high

consumption in the long term. (See Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3)

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Figure 1: US ENERGY CONSUMPTION HISTORY (1776-2012)

Figure 2: US OIL DEMAND (2010-2035)

Figure 3: US ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2011

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THE DECLINE OF MILITARY DOMINANCE

Another key attribute to maintain the hegemonic position

of a state is military power. Since the end of the Cold War,

the position of world leadership in this sphere has been

occupied by the US. The half of the 20th Century was marked by

the arms race between the US and the Soviet Union, which also

testified to expenditures on defence and the modernization of

arsenals. During this period, no other states could compete

with these two military powers. After the collapse of the

Soviet Union and the bipolar system, the US embarked on a

journey as a single global hegemon. For the US a new challenge

emerged was to maintain and strengthen its position through

the world economic and military dominance.

After the end of the Cold War and the arms race, defence

spending of the US fell but it still possess the most powerful

military force in the world. According to the statistics for

the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),

in 1989 the US defence spending reached US$534.9 million and

gradually declined until 1998 when it reached the lowest

amount of the period at US$366.9 million. One of the most

serious threats to stability and the powerful position of the

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US were the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre on the

11 September 2001. The US responded to the attacks by launching

military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Following the

terrorist attack and the subsequent start of Operation

Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2001, the defence budget

increased to US$432.4 million (SIPRI, 2012). However in 2003

the US launched a military operation in Iraq which led to

further increases in defence spending. SIPRI (2008) stated

that in 2008 defence spending of the US was 41.5% of total

expenditure.

Meanwhile, McShane (2011) stated that the increase of US

defence spending in the period from 2001-2010 was 70%. The

first important step towards reducing expenditures was the

effort of Obama’s administration to bring the war in Iraq to a

responsible end and focus on operations in Afghanistan. The

war in Iraq was officially ended in December 2011. In order to

maintain a position of hegemony sustained economic growth is

necessary which provides funding for military spending.

According to the US Ministry of Defence, in 2011 the US

defence spending reached US$730.8 billion and in 2012 fell to

US$727.6 billion (National Defence Budget Estimates, 2013).

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Meanwhile on 6 February 2013, the Secretary of Defence Leon

Panetta and Army General Martin Dempsey had discussed on the

US defence budget forecasts in 2014. According to a

preliminary draft, the budget should include cuts of amount of

US$487 billion. The cuts reflected to retrenchment of the US

Navy, Air Force as well as the civil servants. As Leon Panetta

outlines, the US wants to focus on the creation of the Armed

Forces for the 21st Century where the numerical superiority

does not dominate but to focus on the qualitative and

technological superiority (See Figure 4).

Figure 4: US MILITARY SPENDING (1988-2012)

The above data is the SIPRI's measure of US military

spending rose sharply after the terrorist attacks of 2001. In

calendar year 2012, military spending declined from US$711

billion to US$668 billion. In dollar terms, this was the16

largest decline since 1991. The figure is likely to fall again

in 2013. However the US is still leading other countries in

military spending even though had undergone financially

leveraged resulting in significant cuts and a reduction in

defence budget (SIPRI) (See Figure 5)

Figure 5: MILITARY EXPENDITURE IN 2012 BY 15 STATES

POTENTIAL COMPETITORS OF THE US HEGEMONY: EU, CHINA AND RUSSIA

The US financial and economic problems, the burden of

state budget and subsequent high cuts cannot effectively

counteract the creation of a competitive superpower and so new

competitors begin to appear who may seriously jeopardize the

future status of US hegemony. One potential competitor is the

European Union (EU). Given its economic and military

misfortunes, the US now faces a formidable rival, the EU; it’s

equal in production and trade. With the initiation of the

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third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999,

the EU gained significant momentum for completing regional

integration. According to Kupchan, the EU is arriving on the

global stage. In a similar vein, John McCormick has contended

that the EU is a new breed of superpower within a post-modern

bipolar system. Even if the EU does not have a standing army,

it has nevertheless already established itself as a strong

political entity, anchored by France and Germany. Concerning

technological development, the US is still leading in many

fields; but Europe is catching up and may quite possibly reach

US overall level over the years to come. Hence, the only field

where Europe is far behind the US is military power. The EU

states trail the US in most military technologies, in nuclear

capability and especially in modern force projection capacity.

No doubt, Europe´s current military power is insufficient to

challenge the US and this is unlikely to change over the

course of the next decade. The financial burdens of the

enlargement project, large public debts and the mounting

problems of accounting, all indicate that the EU governments

will not soon find the money for large scale defence programs.

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However, it may still be too early to define the EU as the new

superpower (Richard, 2003).

However the most dominant competitor is China. According

to Global Trends 2030, China in recent years has invested a

large amount of funds to modernize the military. In 2009,

China invested about US$ 70.3 billion in the armed forces, but

some analysts stated that it was about 70% more than China

officially admits (Lawrence, 2009). Military and economic

development of China embarked on a Soviet way of dynamic China

plans to increase its defence budget up from the year 2012

which amounted to 650.6 billion Yuan increased to 10.7% to

720.2 billion Yuan for 2013 (China’s Defence Budget, 2013).

However, the Chinese Prime Minister Ween Jiabao has indicated

that the funds will not only be used to modernize the army and

safeguard national security but also to build 31 airports over

the next five years (Moore, 2013). Nevertheless the Chinese

trend of rising defence spending is clearly opposite of the US

cuts in defence. This fact is also points to the end of the

exclusive military dominance of the US in the next decade.

According to NIC Global Trends 2030, the Chinese military

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potential should overtake the US in the future probably in

2030.

Another important military power and ally of China is

Russia. The Russian Federation is a traditional rival of the

US in the modernization of armaments and military technology

in recent years which has significantly increased its

investment in defence. Since 2000 it is possible to observe a

gradual and slow increase in defence investment which in 2011,

by the Stockholm of International Peace Research Institute

(SIPRI) reached the amount of around US$ 71.9% trillion an

increased over the previous year by 9.3%. However, Fedorenko

(2012) stated that Moscow will continue to increase investment

in defence and plans to increase defence spending by 59% to

US$97 trillion by the year 2015. An important aspect which can

seriously compromise the position of the US hegemony is a

strategic partnership of Russia and China. In March 2003 China

concluded a large scale weapons contract with Russia. This

contract includes the purchase of 24 multi-purpose fighters

SU-35, 4 diesel-electric submarines and cooperation in the

long-range missiles (Savitsky, 2013). However Savitsky views

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that the contracts are not used only for the weapons system

but also can speed up weapon and technological modernization

in these two countries.

ANALYSIS: THE US REACTIONS AND THE HEGEMONIC RIVALS FORECAST

Washington however, faces perhaps a last chance to adopt

a grand strategy that will serve its interests in ensuring

that Chinese power is contained in East Asia but without

running the risk of an armed clash with Beijing. This strategy

is “offshore balancing”. According to this strategy, the US

should deploy military power abroad only in the face of direct

threats to vital American interests. The strategy recognizes

that Washington would not directly control vast parts of the

globe, setting priorities based on clear national interests

and relying on local actors to uphold regional balances of

power. The idea of offshore balancing is to balance national

power for maximum effectiveness while minimizing perceptions

that this power represents a threat. As an offshore balancer

in East Asia, the US would embrace a new set of policies

regarding Sino-American economic relations, political

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liberalization in China, the defence of Taiwan, and America’s

strategic posture in the region. An offshore balancing

strategy would require the US to approach economic relations

with China based on a policy of strategic trade rather than

free trade. A strategic trade policy would seek to curtail the

flow of high technology and direct investment from the US to

China.

Can the EU be considered an international power then?

Even though the EU is a great unifying project, one has to

admit that the EU has a long way to go in terms of political

integration and economic cooperation as well as consolidation.

As a matter of fact, it is fairly difficult to think of the EU

as a superpower in the classical sense of the word. The EU is

without a doubt a significant transatlantic/regional power14

however some argue that discussions on the EU as a soft power

display the Union’s real weakness.15 Opposed to this view,

other scholars maintain that its “soft” quality, that is, its

strength in non-military and non-coercive terms, makes EU a

14 Robert Kagan, (2003) “ Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in theNew World Order”, (New York: Knopf)15 Sophie Meunier and Kalypso Nicolaıdis, “The European Union as aconflicted trade power”, Journal of European Public Policy , Vol.13 No. 6,September 2006: 906–925.

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significant actor in the international scene.16 Although it is

a fact that the Union is one of the greatest economic actors

in the world trade, being a strong economic actor does not

serve for the EU to become a world power and exert political

influence in the internal political arena. As Waltz 17 and

others have argued, “the basic components of any kind of power

are force, political will, and legitimacy.” 18 And these

elements that Waltz lists seem to be what is missing in the

EU. Undoubtedly, the EU is an important “trade power” in terms

of having influence on policies of other countries. But can

the EU transform this economic power into a political one? As

they tackle this question, Sophie Meunier and Kalypso

Nicolaidis coined the term “conflicted trade power” to

describe the EU. 19 This means the EU may be a regional power

that is influential over Eurasia, yet in order to speak of the

EU as a superpower, one has to qualify whether the EU displays

16 Ian Manners (2002) “Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?”,Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2): 235–58; M. Leonard, (2005) WhyEurope Will Run the 21st Century , (London: Fourth Estate; K.E Smith.,2005) “Still civilian power EU?”, European Foreign Policy Unit WorkingPaper 2005/1, (London School of Economics).17 Kenneth N. Waltz (1979) Theory of International Politics, Reading, (MA:Addison-Wesley).18 Sophie Meunier and Kalypso Nicolaıdis, “The European Union as aconflicted trade power “, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 13 No. 6.19 Ibid

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a vast economic-financial-industrial might influence political

leadership and a military in challenging technological

capabilities. On the matter of defence, the EU is still

dependent on NATO. The role of their own security and defence

structure is limited to peacekeeping and economic sanctions. A

superpower will need a more potent military posture, a rapid

deployment capability and a massive striking force. Looking at

the above facts, it is unlikely that the EU will become a

superpower in the near term.

To believe that China is the next superpower, it’s also

necessary to assume that China’s economic growth will

continue. In fact, the likelihood that China’s growth will

slow down significantly in the next two decades is real and

even substantial. Several potential structural factors, such

as the demographic dividend (derived from a relatively younger

population), virtually unlimited access to the global markets,

high savings rates and discounted environmental costs, will

gradually disappear. Like Japan, China is becoming an ageing

society, due in no small part to the effectiveness of the

government’s stringent one-child policy (which limits urban

families to a single child). The share of the population 60

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years and above will be 17% by 2020 and this ageing will

increase healthcare and pension costs while reducing savings

and investments. However, even if China can become the world’s

largest economy, it does not mean that China will

automatically become a superpower. There are some other

conditions for China to become a real superpower. Such

conditions should include the level of per capita income,

social justice and income equality, the ability to become a

world leader of science and technology and the ability to

influence regional and global peace and order.

Russia however, Steven (2004) stated that Moscow intends

to re-emerge as a full-fledged superpower and "contrary to

conventional wisdom but the cost to the Russian people and

global security would be massive. Meanwhile Golts (2012)

argued that President Vladimir Putin's confrontations with the

US on nuclear issues are in pursuit of regaining superpower

status for Russia. It has been argued that Russia's foreign

policy toward bordering countries is designed with the

ultimate goal of regaining superpower status. Golts also

claimed that Russia was always a superpower that used its

energy to win friends and influence among its former Soviet

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satellites. Nonetheless, Russia is seems not to be a

superpower anytime soon as its population has been shrinking

and more people are dying than they are taking birth due to

the poverty and poor public health. According to World

Population Review (2013), the estimated 2013 population of

Russia is 143.5 million. This information shows that Russia's

run of increasing births and decreasing deaths. From January

to March 2013, the number of births shrank by about 4,000,

while the number of deaths increased the same amount. This

means the natural loss of population was about 20% larger than

in the previous year. While projections into the future of

Russia are very difficult, it's estimated that Russia will

fall from the 9th most populous country to 17th by 2050.

Russian Prime Minister Vladmir Putin has announced a plan to

boost Russia's declining population by encouraging immigration

and higher birth rates, but estimates show that Russia's

population will drop from 143 million in 2013 to only 107

million by 2050. Therefore, the aging population foresees to

constrict Russia's potential to re-emerge as a central world

power.

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CONCLUSION

Looking ahead, the US hegemony is seems to undergo a hard

way to sustain its superiority and maintain a significant

leading power in the 21st Century due to the emerging of other

powers in several aspects including economy, military and

cultural fields. Even though some view that the US hegemonic

impact is diminishing however, it is still impotent to put

other powers to be paralleled with the US supremacy and

capability to control the whole globe.

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