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Pragmatic Hegemony: Questions and Convergence Author(s): Brendan Hogan Source: The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2015), pp. 107-117Published by: Penn State University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/jspecphil.29.1.0107Accessed: 26-05-2015 15:32 UTC

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journal of speculative philosophy, vol. 29, no. 1, 2015 Copyright © 2015 The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA

Pragmatic Hegemony: Questions and Convergence

Brendan Hogan new york university

abstract: The question concerning the connection of scientific inquiry to democratic

praxis is central to both Antonio Gramsci and John Dewey. They share a common

philosophical origin in Hegel and are essentially both in the tradition of Left Hegelian

thought. Likewise, their respective analyses of the forces obstructing democratic eman-

cipation were sharply focused on the distortions of social life caused by economic agents

cooperating under hugely unequal power relations. As Gramsci wrote from his prison

cell from 1929 to 1937 in Italy, Dewey went through his most fruitful philosophical

period in the United States, including his writings on politics and democracy. They both

found targets of critique by diagnosing the pathologies of public life resulting from the

power of private capital interests in collusion with a co-opted representative body, the

authoritarian crimes and attendant culture of fascism, and the theoretical rigidity of

the Soviet Marxists. In addition, true to their Hegelian roots, they marshaled their cri-

tiques of the abstractions of liberalism and its attendant moral and economic theory by

insisting on the embedded, cultural, and historically deep contexts in which emancipa-

tory practice need take place.

keywords: Gramsci, Dewey, philosophy of social science, democracy, contract, ideology,

hegemony, pragmatism, economics

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In tandem with Gramsci’s reformulation of the “philosophy of praxis,” John Dewey’s model of social inquiry offers an alternative relationship between scientific inquiry and politics to those on offer from the dominant schools in mainstream social science and political theory. Specifically, what connects their conceptions of the relationship of science and democracy, in its robust normative sense, are their respective emphases on the normative powers and collective action requisite for such social inquiry, their common roots in a Left Hegelian tradition, and the intertwining of both epistemic and emancipatory ends that drive scientific inquiry.1 Despite Gramsci’s dis-missal of pragmatism as “only contributing to a Rotary Club movement and to the justification of conservative and reactionary movements”2 and Dewey’s lack of violent revolutionary zeal, their respective philosophical positions also converge in proffering a vision that registers the hegemonic character of “forms of life” at a level basic to any understanding of human philosophical anthropology or human agency. That is to say, each thinker does not abstract and hypostatize human capacities, a “rational choice” function, for instance, of the human being in any a priori, essentialist, or ahistorical character. Neither abstracts human action out of the social situation and its many constraints and shaping forces on the agency of the subject.3 Rather, the subjects’ constitution and the dialectic between their socially funded receptivity and their subject-centered spontaneity become the locus of an alternative vision, which for both thinkers is rooted in scien-tifically funded practices geared toward resolving problems of domination and injustice in inherited systemic social structures and embodied in insti-tutions across the spectrum of human activity from economy to education.4 Both thinkers place self-awareness through social processes of intellectual inquiry as a key criterion of emancipatory practice.

Gramsci writes, “Critical understanding of oneself, therefore, comes through the struggle of political ‘hegemonies,’ of opposing directions, first in the field of ethics, then of politics, culminating in a higher elaboration of one’s own conception of reality.”5 As Dewey writes, “Creative activity is our great need; but criticism, self-criticism, is the road to its release.”6

In addition to avoiding abstractions,7 they both emphasize the critical power of scientific hypotheses in leading practices according to the cre-ative potential of human agents in particular historical circumstances. To highlight the strong family resemblance between their positions, I examine the philosophy of social inquiry in Dewey’s and Gramsci’s understandings of the philosophy of praxis. This examination demonstrates their shared

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distance from the positivist and reductivist members of their Marxist and pragmatist cohorts, respectively, and emphasizes the common project that these two Left Hegelians share, rooted in their conception of social creative intelligence advanced by critical self-consciousness.8

To this end, I review both Gramsci’s and Dewey’s understandings of the relationship of the structure to the aims of scientific practice, which normatively constrain any collective attempt at emancipation from those forces that engender ideological self-conceptions and frustrate free con-scious creativity in the human community. What emerges from such an analysis is that while Gramsci has a variety of passages demonstrating an antipathy for “American pragmatism,” it is clear that his understanding of the role of science in a philosophy of praxis is similar to Dewey’s own idea of an experimental and creative radical democracy.

Much recent work in pragmatic political thought has attempted to redress a perceived deficit in this American-born philosophy. This perceived deficit concerns, among other shortcomings, a lack of critical resources to address fundamental social and political problems that are systemic and exploitative in nature as well as an overly optimistic approach to piecemeal social reform. Recent work by Torjus Midtgarden has helped to correct these misconceptions. Any attentive reading of Dewey’s texts concerning economy and politics should hopefully clear some deadweight from the path toward a dialogue between Gramsci’s thought and John Dewey. It is the starkest reminder of Dewey’s political position with respect to the lib-eral capitalist order as it emerged and shaped the world up until World War I. Dewey, in his Lectures in China in 1919, reflects upon the fundamen-tally economic touchstone of the self-understanding of bourgeois freedom in the modern age and why liberals claimed that it accomplished for the human individual what slavery and feudalism had so brutally oppressed. This touchstone is of course the contract, the agreement between the indi-vidual worker and the owner of capital:

Dewey points out, the notion of “free contract between persons . . . ignores the fact that the parties to a contract must be of equal abil-ity, if the contract is in reality to be an agreement reached willingly and freely” (Dewey, Lectures in China, 112–3). Hence given the mas-sive inequality of resources between capitalist and worker “there is not even a pretence of equality of ability in the two parties to such a contract” (Lectures in China, 114). Such inequality has serious

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consequences: it gives the capitalist the legally sanctioned ability to not only control the actual activities of the workers but the ability to effectively prevent them from exercising and developing them from participation in “matters of policy” (Dewey, Lectures in China, 165).9

According to Midtgarden, Dewey further “emphasizes how legally valid contracts between capitalists and workers in Western societies are ‘agreed to’ under economic conditions such that ‘workers sign the contract under the force of circumstances, and not by the exercise of free will.’”10 While this is a fairly mundane observation for Gramscians, it is deeply chal-lenging to many who would consider themselves pragmatists of a political or philosophical variety. It changes the characterization offered of philo-sophical pragmatism and is far from any description that fits Gramsci’s dismissal, funded as it was, in part, by the misinterpretations of the Italian thinkers of the early twentieth century. In my opinion, it also ought to change the direction of much recent pragmatic political theorizing.

In addition, and especially in the late 1920s and 1930s while Gramsci himself was creatively and fundamentally reworking Marxist thought in his various prison cells, Dewey himself was excoriating the oppressive, alienat-ing, and specifically reifying tendencies of the justificatory discourse of lib-eralism on his own soil and also criticizing the ideology of Soviet Marxism and fascism from a distance. Dewey’s own critique of the failures of repre-sentative democracy, while not as trenchantly or rigidly cast in the vocabu-lary of Marx, did not pull any punches with respect to the mendacity and exploitation exhibited in its instantiation in the U.S. electoral system. In the late 1920s and through the 1930s, Dewey squarely faced the challenge of articulating a viable theory of popular emancipation against the abuses and distortions of a political economy of representation that reduced politics to “the shadow that business casts upon society” and systematically created an underclass of uneducated and uncultivated laborers. In his essay from the early 1930s “The Need for a New Party,” Dewey writes,

The deadlocks and the impotence of Congress are definitely the mir-ror of the demonstrated incapacity of the captains of industry and finance to conduct the affairs of the country prosperously as an inci-dent to the process of feathering their own nests. It would be ludi-crous, were it not tragic, to believe that an appeal to the unregulated activities of those who have got us into the present crisis will get

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us out of it, provided they are relieved from the incubus of political action. The magic of eating a hair of the dog which bit you in order to cure hydrophobia is as nothing to the magic involved in the belief that those who have privilege and power will remedy the breakdown they have created. As long as politics is the shadow cast on society by big business, the attenuation of the shadow will not change the substance. The only remedy is new political action based on social interests and realities.11

Dewey’s theory of new political action as presented five years earlier in The Public and Its Problems takes up the challenge of mobilizing the people through an alternative arrangement of collective action via the establishment of a public sphere that is essentially a more populist and pluralist version of Gramsci’s party organ in The Modern Prince.12 For Dewey, the public sphere has the potential, and had previous historical reality, to constitute an agency or vehicle for the introduction of intellectual and rational evaluation and investigation of political action. Habermas’s own Habilitationsschrift echoes much of Dewey’s analysis of the disappear-ance and “eclipse” of this agency of intelligence in society, a public that is not reducible to mere civil society or the state. In addition, and cru-cially for understanding the critical character of his theory, Dewey precedes Habermas’s analysis of the commercialization of public life and the com-modification of public consciousness.13 In passage after passage Dewey in The Public and Its Problems attributes the eclipse of anything like a public sphere to be in no small part the result of mundane and repetitious labor. Mechanistic behavior in labor is seen by Dewey as a root cause of a pattern of culture in which work is followed by cheap enjoyments, those that do not allow for aesthetic experiences but, rather, reinforce the stultification of imagination and the creative power of labor under “free” contract condi-tions. Like Gramsci, Dewey does not abstract from the cultural prerequi-sites of any emancipated public. In this, he collapses the democratic way of life with the notion of community itself: “Regarded as an idea, democracy is not an alternative to other principles of associated life. It is the idea of community life itself.”14

In Dewey’s examination of the disappearance of a sphere of democratic social inquiry that begins with the frustrated interests of citizens and the objective features of a problematic situation historically defined and realis-tically understood, he opens the space for the realization of the twin ideals

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of democratic self-realization and a rationally ordered society. Rather than evoking a model of the public sphere that abstracts from the implicit norms of some past epoch or event (coffeehouse culture in eighteenth-century Europe etc.), Dewey in fact is historically aware enough to understand that, to paraphrase, what is needed is more democracy, yes, but democracy of a qualitatively different kind. That is to say, the historicist strain in Dewey does not evoke abstract ahistorical moral norms to be implemented in the present through the imposition of a public sphere that magically steers the two forces of state and civil society. Rather, though Dewey argues that the cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy, it requires “a machinery of an entirely different kind.”15 Part of social inquiry’s task is the struggle for collective action that responds to these ills with the requisite political and economic machinery.

Crucially, this movement to establish a public is also a movement of inquiry. That is, the abstract separation of philosophy and politics, of the-ory and practice, that Gramsci repeatedly targets is overcome by Dewey’s model as expressed in this work. Democracy when realized becomes a form of inquiry. Inquiry, for Dewey, at the social level is a form of collective action that engages in the experimental reconstruction of social institutions and practices for the sake of addressing problems that are rooted in the conflicts of individuals both internal to their conscious expressive selves and between expressive selves in a pluralistic society. Though many in the Marxist tradition, in addition to Gramsci, have disparaged pragmatism as “bourgeois philosophy made in the USA,” the origins of both Gramsci’s and Dewey’s philosophical biographies begin with Hegelian foundations and move gradually toward a Marxian understanding of the relation of theory and practice. In short, Gramsci’s epistemic and ethical goal that the intelligentsia engage the varieties of people in their particular historical and cultural locations to illuminate how the party expresses their true political and economic interests is paralleled by Dewey’s own understanding of the integration of democracy, education, emancipation, and enlightenment as a cultural accomplishment.

For Dewey, then, the social sciences must not take their cue from the abstract metatheoretical presuppositions of positivism or the meth-odologies of the natural sciences as they were articulated at both his and Gramsci’s time. Rather, social inquiry must be problem focused, with a rec-ognition of the objective features, what Dewey refers to as the “qualitative individuality,” of any problematic situation. This recognition then forces

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method, and thus inquiry, into a quite different sphere of action than the methods of natural science.

Specific examples of the ways in which the social sciences misun-derstand their subject matter and thus the problems that ought to be the subject of social inquiry abound. However, one dominant trend of the last 130 years, the reduction of action to the model of homo economicus, deserves mention. The attempted transformation of the discipline of economics from its classical formulation among the great political economists through the marginalist revolution and into the mathematized discipline it is today has had great consequences for democracies globally. Neutralizing the moral intuitions and commitments that guided Smith, Ricardo, and, yes, Marx and supplanting these normative aims via a supposedly value-free inquiry akin to the natural sciences made two mistakes, at least, from the perspec-tive of Dewey’s theory of inquiry. First, it introduced methodological indi-vidualism as the sine qua non of economic explanation. No longer would collective agency, as determined by a social ontology, be granted permis-sion within the economists’ club. Instead, all gross economic phenomena would be reduced to the individual rational choices of utility maximizers and then aggregated to a sum that produces social reality. The supplant-ing of socially emergent ontological classes for the utility-maximizing, situation-specific, rational choice of an individual among other strategic individuals eliminated reference to the reality of class struggle. Second, this individual’s agency, on this model, is reduced to a merely instrumen-tal rationality of means and ends based upon a schedule of preferences and a set of information. Rationality becomes the automatic calculation of action vis-à-vis preferences and situational constraints. In any situation, the schedule of preferences is off the table as a flexible component subject to rational evaluation of an epistemological, psychological, or moral kind.16 Dewey takes full aim at the family of theories akin to this model in his early article “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology” and throughout his writ-ings. More recently, Ruth Anna Putnam and Hilary Putnam ably demon-strate the incoherence of this position in “Epistemology as Hypothesis.”17 And even more recently Elizabeth Anderson succinctly highlights the chicanery involved in the pillar of neoclassical economics and the homo economicus that stalks the other social sciences with the following withering dismissal: “There is probably no other hypothesis about human behavior so thoroughly discredited on empirical grounds that still operates as a stan-dard working assumption in any discipline.”18

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That so much of the architecture of globalization has rested upon models that take these two assumptions as scientific begs the question of the ideological nature of economics as it operates in the field of social prob-lem solving. If one is suspicious of this strong characterization of ideology, one need only trace the influence of these falsified assumptions in economic policy, consider economists’ failure to secure the predictions that warranted their acceptance in the first place, and finally note that economists separate themselves into the two camps of mainstream or “orthodox” practitioners and “heterodox.” The mainstream economists, of course, embrace the two elements above. Dewey and Gramsci take aim at this marriage of method-ological individualism and utility maximizing throughout their work and aim to build models of social inquiry that accommodate a wider view of rationality and an understanding of social classes as agents with interests in their own right. I leave it to the reader to consider the question, “Does the implementation of policies grounded upon such ideological sleight of hand have effects on the personalities and cultures in which they operate, espe-cially when they are the main intellectual rationalization used to steer such complex, large, systemic phenomena as the labor force, the production and distribution of goods and services, and the planning of central bankers and politicians to meet the economic stresses of any particular period?”

For Gramsci, as is well known, the party, the body of the emancipatory movement within the bourgeois state, must serve the educational and hege-monic function of at once recognizing the native and marginal elements of those to be unified in the struggle against domination and at the same time educating them to their true interests, the dynamics of historical struggle, and the situation in which they currently find themselves. In this sense, Gramsci offers rather tight strictures on his model of childhood education, especially for the purpose of creating intellectuals for the party, as many commentators have noted.19 However, as Joseph Femia has demonstrated in Gramsci’s Political Thought and other works, it would be wrong to extrap-olate from the practical rigors of establishing a leadership of intellectuals whose responsibility it is to cultivate the habits and practices of an eman-cipated society to argue that Gramsci is in any way simply advocating a censorious, rigid, and authoritarian force: “In scientific discussions, as one supposes that the interest is the search for truth and the progress of science, he demonstrates himself more advanced who takes the point of view that his adversary can express an exigency that must be incorporated, even if as a subordinate moment, in his own construction. To understand and evaluate

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realistically the positions and reasons of the adversary (and sometimes the adversary is all past thought) means precisely to be liberated from the prison of ideologies (in the worst sense, of blind ideological fanaticism).”20

Intellectuals, then, are able to integrate and foster the virtues of dialogi-cal intelligence and open inquiry as a constitutive element in the creation of a new hegemony. The virtue of bringing Dewey together with Gramsci is that the common Left Hegelian, postliberal philosophical platform fosters a vision of an emancipated society that does not devolve to an abstract fantasy with respect to what is required to achieve it.21 The socially emergent and historically situated character of intelligence and science is of paramount importance in both thinkers. Both thinkers understand that any emanci-pated society requires the formation of habit structures and practices that form a “way of life,” a theory of the good, perennially occupying the back-seat in liberal political theory. That liberalism, for the most part, cannot own up to its own hegemonic character in shaping a culture to carry out particular imperatives only shows the need for social inquiry into the ten-sions and contradictions in the self-image of liberalism, the kind of social inquiry that reveals the economic linchpin of liberal democracy, the labor contract, for the kind of social pathology it is. It remains to be seen exactly how Gramsci’s keen insight into the articulation of the need for and recon-struction of the crucial category of leadership reconciles itself with a culture of radical democracy and free inquiry and how Dewey’s call for emergent publics around existent historical and social problems can exist without the massive convulsion of the social fabric of liberal countries rooted, as he puts it, in “domination.”

notes

Versions of this article were delivered at the American Philosophies Forum, the International Gramsci Society in Barcelona at Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia–Madrid, and at the New School for Social Research. I would like to thank the audiences at these various sites for their questions. The article was also supported by the research project Reconstruction of Democracy: Beyond Deliberation and Recognition (FFI2012-38009-C02-01, Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad, Spain). In addition, thanks are in order for Elisabeth A. Graves and Mark Fagiano who helped with the final stages of preparing the text.

1. It is my larger contention that while the emphasis on the epistemic virtues requisite for achieving the aims of a legitimately ordered democracy is a welcome extension of recent democratic theory, it is additionally necessary to combine these

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gains with a stronger recognition of what this requires in order to be practicable, but that is beyond the scope of this article.

2. Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International, 1971), 373.

3. I mention “rational choice” here especially to invoke what is arguably the pillar of the ideological apparatus of social science in the last century and especially neoclassical economics.

4. Practicability is a question of first-order importance if political theorists are to avoid an abstract character in the vicious sense, a vice, it is fair to say, Dewey and Gramsci were equally adamant in skewering, be it in terms of the positivists and reductive materialists in the former or in terms of Bukharin’s sociology in the latter. Given the practical and social dimension of all science that both Dewey and Gramsci highlight in their accounts, social scientists must avoid the well-founded charge that the dominant schools in their disciplines are increasingly engaged, in Ian Shapiro’s words, in a “flight from reality.” This flight into abstraction is most succinctly characterized as both an absorption of mathematical modeling techniques of human behavior at the conceptual level and the wholesale adoption of the rational choice model of human agency.

5. Antonio Gramsci, “The Study of Philosophy,” in “The Modern Prince” and Other Writings, trans. and ed. Louis Marks (New York: International, 1957), 67.

6. John Dewey, “Construction and Criticism,” in The Later Works of John Dewey, vol. 5, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), 143.

7. See Ralph Sleeper, The Necessity of Pragmatism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), for an interpretation of Dewey’s thought as primarily targeting “abstract thought.”

8. These two elements, antireductivist naturalism and antipositivism, are familiar aspects of Gramsci’s and Dewey’s work. For a good recent interpretation of the shared aspects of their projects with respect to individualism and democracy, see Nadia Urbinati, “Detecting Democratic Modernity: Antonio Gramsci on Individualism and Equality,” Philosophical Forum 29, nos. 3–4 (1998): 168–81.

9. Torjus Midtgarden, “Critical Pragmatism: Dewey’s Social Philosophy Revisited,” European Journal of Social Theory, January 2012, 8, quoting John Dewey, Lectures in China, 1919–1920, trans. and ed. R. W. Clopton and T-C. Ou (Honolulu: University of Honolulu Press, 1973). In another context I quote this same text in Midtgarden’s work. In that piece I am concerned with articulating a notion of hegemony in a pragmatic vein, with special attention to the concept of domination. Here, this text is establishing the level of agreement between Gramsci and Dewey on the lack of freedom in the labor–capital contract and thus in the bedrock of the liberal political order. See Brendan Hogan, “Hegemony, Social Inquiry, and the Primacy of Practical Reason,” in Persuasion

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and Compulsion in Democracy, ed. Jacquelyn Kegley and Krysztof Piotr Skowronski (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2013), 69–82.10. Midtgarden, “Critical Pragmatism,” 17, quoting Dewey, Lectures in China.11. John Dewey, “The Need for New Party,” in The Later Works of John Dewey,

1925–1953, vol. 6: 1931–1932, Essays, Reviews, and Miscellany, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985), 163.12. See John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, in The Later Works of John

Dewey, 1925–1953, vol. 2: 1925–1927, Essays, Reviews, Miscellany, and “The Public and Its Problems,” ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), 235–372. Also see Antonio Gramsci, “The Modern Prince,” and Other Writings (New York: International, 1980).

13. Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989).14. See Dewey, Public and Its Problems, 328.15. Ibid., 325. James Bohman’s work in democratic theory is especially attuned to

this need, as exemplified especially in his Democracy Across Borders: From Dêmos to Dêmoi (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007).16. The oeuvre of Martin Hollis is an especially clear, and devastating,

exposition of the incoherence of the rational choice model on its own merits. See in particular his Reason in Action: Essays in the Philosophy of Social Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).17. Ruth Anna Putnam and Hilary Putnam, “Epistemology as Hypothesis,”

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 26, no. 4 (October 1, 1990): 407–33.18. Elizabeth Anderson, “Beyond Homo Economicus: New Developments in

the Theory of Social Norms,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 29, no. 2 (April 1, 2000): 173.19. See Antonio Gramsci, “Organisation of Education and Culture,” in

“The Modern Prince” and Other Writings, ed. and trans. Louis Marks (New York: International, 1957), 126–34.20. Antonio Gramsci, quoted in Joseph Femia, Gramsci’s Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolutionary Process (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 179.21. Dewey’s invocations of a “new liberalism” notwithstanding, the normative

force of his critique and exposition of liberal political economy, his Hegelian trajectory, and the description of the wage labor contract as domination all point in a postliberal direction. Indeed the global political economic order since 1945 only reinforces his diagnoses of the 1930s.

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