Previously Unknown Soviet Documents and Polish Americans During World War II

Polish American StudiesVol. LXXI, No. 1 (Spring 2014)©2014 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois

Previously Unknown Soviet Documents and Polish Americans During World War II

by

Paweł Markiewicz

Historiography centered on Polish Americans during World War II is extensive and detailed, covering many groups with varying political affiliations. Donald Pienkos and others have presented meticulous studies of the work of the Polish National Council as well as the formation and wartime role of the Polish American Congress, both in English and in Polish. Wacław Jędrzejewicz sketched the role of the National Committee of Americans of Polish Descent (KNAPP), while Pol-ish historian Sławomir Cenckiewicz has also presented various articles in Polish regarding this group, its key figures, as well as the monitoring of American Polonia by communist Poland’s security apparatus. Articles have also presented the activi-ties of leftist Polonia, while Don Binkowski provided a two-volume compendium centered on Leo Krzycki, the Polish American labor leader and close associate of several leftist Poles. Bolesław Gebert also provides a Polish-language memoir of his own work in the United States.1

1Donald Pienkos, For Your Freedom Through Ours: Polish American Efforts on Poland’s Behalf, 1863–1991 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991) and PNA: A Centennial History of the Polish National Alliance of the United States of North America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984). Joanna Wojdon provided a Polish-language analysis of the Polish–American Congress in W imieniu sześciu milionów: Kongres Polonii Amerykańskiej w latach 1944–1968 (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2005). Ewa Cytkowska Siegriest recently published a new, valuable Polish-language examination of the Polish issue in the United States during World War II in Stany Zjednoczone i Polska, 1939–1945 (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Neriton, 2013). Sławomir Cenckiewicz, Oczami bezpieki 1. Szkice i materiały z dziejów aparatu bezpieczeństwa PRL (Łomianki: Wydawnictwo LTW, 2012); “Ignacy Matuszewski (1891–1945)—emigracyjne losy,” Arcana, no. 35 (2000); and

54 Polish AmericAn studies

Of great interest is the fact that one group that had a profound impact on Polish American affairs during the wartime years has not been analyzed in great depth. Although functioning on a smaller scale than the Polish American fraternals or the Polish American Congress, the members of leftist Polonia were able to flourish thanks in large part to their close association with the labor sector through which they found a considerable, mainstream audience. Of course, their open support and agreement with President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s foreign policy in relation to the Soviet Union also gained them a more favorable position in Washington, DC. This undersized Pol-ish American faction shared great attachment to Soviet leader Josef Stalin and the Soviet Union. The events of 1943 began the downfall of the Polish government in London. These events refer to the discovery of the Katyń graves in April, which led to the break in diplomatic relations between the Polish government in London and the Soviet Union. In July, prime minister and commander in chief of Polish Armed Forces in the West, General Władysław Sikorski died in a mysterious plane crash at Gibraltar. This tragedy removed a well-respected statesman from the leading posi-tions of the London government and within the Allied camp. The initial meeting at Teheran in November saw the first debate regarding the Polish issue among the three Allied leaders. This meeting provided Stalin with the image that the Western leaders would not quarrel or fight over Poland. As a result of these events, the left-ist Polish Americans initiated a mainstream drive that had two key objectives: (1) a counter-propaganda campaign against the Polish American fraternals to provide a pro-Soviet Polish American perspective, and (2) further denunciation of the legiti-macy and claims of the London Poles. Three key individuals had shown particular interest in and approval of Moscow and sought to fracture Polonia’s overwhelming support for the London government: labor activist Leo Krzycki, professor of eco-nomics and intellectual Oskar Lange, and the labor activist and editor of the Głos Ludowy newspaper Bolesław Gebert. These three men would be joined by Reverend Stanisław Orlemański, a Catholic priest from a Polish American parish in Springfield, Massachusetts, as the leaders of this movement. In turn, these men were considered “progressives” who were most capable of splitting away from the more moderate and

“Roosevelt Przeciw Polsce,” Uważam Rze Historia, no. 8 (November 2012). Robert Szymc-zak analyzed the OSS Nationalities Branch and their close monitoring of Polish Americans in “Uneasy Observers: OSS Foreign Nationalities Branch and Perception on Polish Nationalism in the United States During World War II,” Polish American Studies 61, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 7–73. Don Binkowski, Leo Krzycki and the Detroit Left (Xlibris, 2001). Robert Szymczak also wrote on the topic of Oskar Lange, Polish intellectual and leftist activist in the United States in “Oskar Lange, American Polonia, and the Polish-Soviet Dilemma of World War II: The Public Partisan as Private Emissary,” Polish Review 40, no. 1 (1995): 3–27. Anna Cienciała, “New Light on Oskar Lange as an Intermediary Between Roosevelt and Stalin in Attempts to Create a New Polish Government, January–November 1944,” Acta Polonia Historica73 (1996): 89–134. Charles Sadler, “Pro-Soviet Polish-Americans: Oskar Lange and Russia’s Friends in the Polonia, 1941–1945,” Polish Review22, no. 4 (1977): 25–39. Bolesław Gebert, Z Tykocina za Ocean (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1982).

conservative Polish Americans while in turn forming a pro-Soviet element within this highly patriotic and overwhelmingly anti-Soviet ethnic enclave.2 The work of these men soon made its way into official Soviet and Polish pro-communist propaganda and was regarded as the official Polish American perspec-tive, while individuals such as Lange were considered by the Soviets as the voice of Polonia. Their outspokenness often heavily criticized their two chief targets, the leaders in the London government-in-exile and the mass of Polonia who supported it. Examples abound. At a meeting on Polish–Soviet friendship in New York, Lange labeled the government of Stanisław Mikołajczyk as a “semi-fascist” and “anti-democratic regime.” He went on to say “we must stop encouraging those Polish elements which gamble on an American-Soviet conflict,” almost a direct shot at the fraternals of Chicago and KNAPP who supported the reestablishment of prewar

2Robert Szymczak, “Uneasy Observers: OSS Foreign Nationalities Branch and Per-ception on Polish Nationalism in the United States During World War II,” Polish American Studies56, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 34.

Professor Oskar Lange, an economist at the University of Chicago who supported the Soviet-backed Lublin govern-ment. Courtesy of the Narodowe Archiwum Cyfrowe.

Soviet DocumentS anD PoliSh americanS During WorlD War ii 55


Poland and the authority of the London government. Reverend Orelmański also spoke at this meeting, declaring emphatically that “we will join hands with Russia to completely destroy Hitlerism and to bring peace and prosperity to the Polish nation for centuries to come.”3 In late 1943, Lange and Orlemański formed the Kościuszko League to provide financial support for the Kościuszko Division, a Polish unit fight-ing alongside the Soviet Red Army. A fundamental resolution agreed upon by this group centered on the territorial dispute that became a fundamental divisive issue between the Allies and the Polish government-in-exile who aspired to see postwar Poland emerge within the pre-1939 borders. The Kościuszko League resolved that “Soviet Russia should have what territories British and American authorities may

Reverend Stanisław Orlemanski, founder of the pro-Soviet

Kosciuszko League, upon his graduation from Orchard Lake Seminary in 1910. Courtesy of the Polish Museum of America.

3Dr. Oskar Lange Reverend Stanisław Orlemański, et. al, “We Will Join Hands With Russia,” (speech presented at the America’s Stake in Polish–Soviet Friendship (New York, 1944), 12–14, 20.

regard as rightfully belonging to the Soviets,” while Orlemański listed as a goal of the League to “help to completely destroy the pro-Nazi publications, the pro-Nazi leaders in our organizations and also the pro-Nazi leaders among our clergy here in America.”4

One can imagine the reaction of Polonia to these men’s activities. Polish Ameri-can newspapers vilified them as communists while Polonia organizations issued statements condemning their public declarations and actions. Wacław Jędrzejewicz, cofounder of the Józef Piłsudski Institute in New York City, regarded the Kościuszko League as a tool to further educate Polish Americans in the pro-Soviet direction.5 However, it was a trip by Oskar Lange and Reverend Orlemański to the Soviet Union in April 1944 that caused the greatest uproar within Polonia, as well as generating questions and insights in the larger American mass media. During their trip, the two men reported on the state of soldiers in the Polish army forming in the USSR and visited children’s homes and schools. The two men also met personally with Soviet dictator Josef Stalin and Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov.6 This trip proved to be a propaganda mission that sought to portray the goodwill of the Soviet Union while at the same time expressing solidarity between the pro-communist Poles there and their Polish American counterparts. Upon their arrival back to the United States, Lange and Orlemański spoke very favorably of their visit, praising and lauding the USSR as well as the communist Poles. President Roosevelt even invited Reverend Orlemański to the White House to describe his travels. Speaking with the American leader for over two hours, the Polish priest reported that the Kościuszko Division soldiers were Polish patriots who, along with the Red Army, would liberate Poland. Orlemański further underscored these Poles’ loyalty by stating “These are true Poles. I heard their confessions. I said mass for them. These are the same Catholics as my parishioners in Springfield.” Secretary of State Cordell Hull asked Lange to assess

4Richard C. Lukas, The Strange Allies: The United States and Poland, 1941–1945 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1978), 53. 5Wacław Jędrzejewicz, Polonia amerykańska w polityce polskiej: Historia Komitetu Narodowego Amerykanów Polskiego Pochodzenia (Łomianki: Wydawnictwo LTW, 2006), 151–52. 6Polish American communist activist Bolesław Gebert played a major role in arranging this visit through his close contact and cooperation with Borysov, the editor of the Russkii Golos in New York. Furthermore, Gebert suggested that any invitation sent to these men should not be from the Soviet government, but rather from a social organization. As a result, the Union of Polish Patriots officially “invited” Lange and Orlemański (the invitation was signed by Wanda Wasilewska, Zygmunt Berling, Bolesław Drobner, and Anrdzej Witos). Gebert, Z Tykocina za Ocean, 177. Lange came away with the reaction that members of the Polish left in the USSR and in underground Poland had banded together and come to an understanding regarding the common battle against the Nazis. After his conversation with Stalin, he also came away with the belief that a chief priority of the USSR’s politics was the creation of a strong, independent, and democratic Poland, friendly to the USSR. Gebert, Z Tykocina za Ocean, 180.



his time spent in the USSR. In his written report, Lange defined the principles upon which future U.S. and USSR/Polish relations should be based.7 The positive portrayal of the USSR posed many problems for Polonia, es-pecially because through their outspokenness and pro-Soviet views these leftist Polish Americans could openly and publicly agree to many of Stalin’s principles, particularly the postwar border question, while not straying away from U.S. policy regarding the USSR or alienating their loyalty to Roosevelt and his policies with reference to U.S.–Soviet and Soviet–Polish relations. Predictably, news of the travels of these two men that appeared in the main-stream American and the ethnic press elicited a wave of protest and antipathy from the greater body of Polonia. Polish Ambassador Jan Ciechanowski received a telegram from London stating that Moscow radio had broadcast the arrival of Lange in the USSR and asked him to confirm whether this information was indeed true.8 At its board meeting in May 1944, KNAPP released a statement in which it considered Reverend Orlemański an “open promoter” of the totalitar-ian principles of rape and a tool of subversive communist actions.9 The Chicago Daily Tribune wrote: “Chicago leaders of Polish extraction said yesterday their nationals throughout the country are aroused both to anger and ridicule by the mission to Moscow” of Lange and Orlemański and that this mission was intended “to mendaciously represent several millions of Americans of Polish descent as idolaters of Stalin and as much is offensive to all Americans of Polish descent.”10 Representative John Lesinski declared that “Lange is a self-appointed, one man representative of the Americans of Polish extraction and is attempting to sell Communist Russia to Poland so that Poland would then become a republic—but within the boundaries of Russia.” The backlash to the outspokenness and pro-Soviet sympathies of Reverend Orlemański was even louder. Ambassador Ciechanowski sent detailed reports and

7Lukas, The Strange Allies, 54–55. In a telegram to Orlemański, Krzycki wrote “We believe your mission over there (in the USSR) will bring about friendlier understanding and relations between our Polish brethren and their strong neighbor, the Russians, and will lead to close political and economic collaboration between these two national neighbors, resulting in a truly independent, free, and prosperous people’s Poland.” Binkowski, Leo Krzycki and the Detroit Left, 85. 8Hoover Institute Archives (HIA), Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Washington, DC, box 68, folder 4, “Telegram to Amb Ciechanowski, April 27, 1944, ‘Lange, Oskar, professor.’” 9Jędrzejewicz, Polonia amerykańska w polityce polskiej, 152; and HIA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, box 129, folder 23, “1944, countries, United States, Komitet Narodowy Polski Amerykan Polskiego Pochodzenia.” 10Willard Edwards, “Poles Aroused over Priest’s Trip to Russia,” Chicago Daily Tribune, May 2, 1944; and “Poles Protest Trip to Moscow by U.S. Priest,” Chicago Daily Tribune, May 6, 1944.

press clippings of Orlemański’s activity back to London.11 Representative Les-inski condoned the visit on the floor of the House of Representatives, declaring: “Remembering Judas Iscariot who betrayed his Lord for thirty pieces of silver, I can’t help wondering what price this priest is asking to betray the land of his fore-fathers, his church and the loyal Americans of Polish descent.” John Olejniczak, president of the Polish Roman Catholic Union, said: “It is surprising . . . because Father Orlemański does not represent any one at all. He certainly doesn’t represent the Poles or those of Polish extraction in this country. And if he has gone simply as an American citizen, what good does his trip do them?”12 The Catholic Church in the United States was also shocked at the visit and stunned at Orlemański’s activities. Monsignor Michael J. Ready, general secretary of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, said publicly that it was “false that any Catholic official, high or low, was consulted” by Orlemański before his trip.13 In an editorial to the New World, the official publication of the Archdiocese of Chicago, the editor stated that Orlemański’s visit was “an attempt to split Polish sentiment in the United States and to attach importance to the establishment of a communist government in Poland.”14

The work and activity of the leftist Polish Americans certainly drove a wedge of division of opinion into Polonia and succeeded in forming a mainstream pro-Soviet opinion. This short analysis presented regarding leftist Polonia, as with the majority of historical accounts on their topic, has centered primarily on Western historiographical material. Of course, this is understandable because the base for these men’s activities was indeed the United States. However, since they were seen with favor and approved by Stalin and they propagated his principles in the United States, a pertinent question would be “what does the Eastern, particularly former Soviet historiography, or even former Polish-communist historiography, contain on this topic?” A query on the topic of Lange and Orlemański led to the discovery of two heretofore unknown Russian-language documents that I would like to present here for the first time. These documents appeared in a primary source monograph titled Sowietskij Faktor w Wostocznoj Jewropie, which encompassed Soviet state documents from 1944 to 1953. Apart from the two valuable documents to be dis-cussed, Sowietskij Faktor also contains transcripts of the meeting between Stalin and Polish Prime Minister Stanisław Mikołajczyk in August 1944, documents relating to the disarming of the Home Army (Armia Krajowa; AK) soldiers, docu-

11HIA, Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Washington, DC, box 74, folder 7, “Orlemański, Stanisław, Father.” 12Edwards, “Poles Aroused over Priest’s Trip to Russia”; and “Report Priest on Red Mission Is Sent by F.D.R.,” Chicago Daily Tribune, May 3, 1944. 13“Prelate Denies Catholic O.K. of Priest’s Trip,” Chicago Daily Tribune, May 4, 1944. 14“City Catholic Paper Attacks Priest Envoy” Chicago Daily Tribune, May 5, 1944.


Figures 3 and 4 are from a card catalog of people with communist connections and beliefs kept by the Polish Intel-ligence Unit ESTEZET based in New York City during World War II. This unit cooperated with the Americans in gather-ing information regarding communist activities in the United States. The “K,” which appears in red in the originals, stands for the Polish initial for “komunista” or communist. Courtesy of the Joseph Piłsudski Institute of America.

ments relating to the Polish Army in the USSR, the activities and correspondence with the Polish National Liberation Committee (PKWN), and documents relating to Soviet influence and presence in nations such as Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania. However, the two documents selected here provide a unique and nuanced perspective on leftist Polonia. The first and longer document, number 6 in the Sowietskij Faktor, provides a transcript of the conversation and issues touched upon between Stalin and Reverend Orlemański during the latter’s visit to the USSR. As the document’s title states, the two men touched upon the Polish army in the USSR (which Orlemański visited), the state of Polish political organizations in the United States, and the future Polish government. The value of this document cannot be overstated for it offers insight into exactly what the two men discussed, the full context of which, up until now, was unknown or simply generally summarized. From the context of the conversa-tion, one can see that Orlemański was regarded as more than just a Polish Ameri-can prelate simply for the fact that church matters are discussed in the context of political gain, particularly to portray Stalin and the USSR as religiously tolerant toward Polish Catholics. Reading the transcript of the conversation, one can also feel the importance that Stalin gives to Orlemański. Stalin had before him not the traditional Polish priest—vehemently anti-Bolshevik and anticommunist—but rather a sympathizer, a man of the cloth who was willing to split with the traditional anticommunist portrayal among the “stubborn people,” to divide the flock rather than to bring it together, and to go so far as to voluntarily step out of the religious life so much as to not change his nonreligious beliefs. One can see Stalin almost regarding Orlemański as a warrior with a collar. The second document, number 12, mentions Oskar Lange within the PKWN, the first procommunist body that administered liberated Polish territory in 1944. The idea of the possible inclusion of Lange and other procommunist Polish Americans was presented by Stalin in order to give the portrayal of a truly diverse governing body. A graduate in economics from the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, Lange became a leftist sympathizer during his studies in Poland. In 1937 he emigrated to the United States, first to California, where he taught as a professor, and then to Chicago, and later New York. He earned a reputation as a good worker and sought to distance himself from being considered a communist by associating himself with the more broadly defined left. He became close friends with Wanda Wasilewski, the procommunist Pole who organized the Związek Patriotów Polskich (Union of Polish Patriots—ZPP) in the USSR. Just as Orlemański used his religious calling to influence Polish Americans, Lange did likewise by linking his scholarly background with the blue-collar, working-class Polish Americans and Slavs. His speeches, lectures, and exposés often centered on the topics of U.S.–Soviet and Polish–Soviet friendship. Although not formally entering into the PKWN, Lange eventually renounced his American citizenship and returned to Poland where he was nominated as commu-nist Poland’s first ambassador to the United States. He also served as delegate to the



United Nations Security Council, deputy chairman of the Polish Council of State (1961–65), and an acting chairman of the Council of State.15

Both documents have been translated from Russian with little divergence from their context and with certain clarifying notes in brackets within the texts.

No. 616

Transcript of J. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov with Reverend Stanisław Orlemański (USA) about the Polish Army in the USSR, Polish political organizations in America, composition of the government of Poland, and other [topics].

Moscow May 4, 1944 SECRET

At the outset, Orlemański talks with comrade [abbreviated from the Rus-sian “tovarishch” as “tov.”] Molotov. Responding to questions on what is his impression of the Polish Army, Orlemański said that he saw 17,000 Polish soldiers, among the latter being 8,000 recruits. Orlemański delivered a speech to them on Tuesday. He saw the guns and weapons with which the Soviet government had equipped the Polish army. This sight left a great impression on him. His speech was received with enthusiasm by Polish soldiers. Fur-thermore, Orlemański spoke with chaplains, the Polish army now containing 5. These chaplains already contacted the bishop in Lutsk, and he promised to send more new priests. Orlemański observed the colossal destruction made by the enemy. He saw the vigorously working Soviet people. Women work alongside men. This harmonious work of women and men is of great importance for the future of Russia.

Molotov, agreeing with Orlemański, tells him that tomorrow the govern-ment issues a loan of 25 billion rubles and he thinks that the population of the Soviet Union will support the loan.

Orlemański replies that he is sure of it. The Soviet people look happy, happy, in spite of the difficulties experienced by them. The Soviet people are convinced that better times will come.

15“Lange to Yield Citizenship to be Poles’ Envoy,” Chicago Tribune, August 20, 1945. 16“No. 6 Zapis’ becedy I.V. Stalina i V.M. Molotova s ksendzom S. Orleman’skim (SShA) o pol’skoi armii v SSSR, pol’skikh politicheskikh organizatsiiakh v Amerike, sostave budushchego pravitel’stva Pol’shi i dr.,” in Sovetskii faktor v Vostochnoi Evrope 1944–1953, DOKUMENTY, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1999), 58–62.

Molotov says Orlemański wants to see J. V. Stalin. Molotov, can inform J. V. Stalin that Orlemański is now with him in the Kremlin.

Orlemański replies that he wanted to meet with J. V. Stalin, but, not wanting to take his time, he prepared questions he wanted to ask Molotov to present to J. V. Stalin. If Orlemański now sees Stalin, he can immediately answer all the questions.

Molotov telephoned comrade [abbreviated as “tov.”] Stalin and reported to him that Orlemański is with him.

Orlemański says that in his speeches to the Poles, he spoke from the heart, and therefore his speech made such a strong impression on the Polish sol-diers, especially those recruits who have recently arrived from Poland and never heard of him.

Molotov said that the word, coming from the heart of man, is of particular importance for the warrior.

[They] Entered the office of Comrade Stalin, after greeting Orlemański, he asked him how his journey to the Polish army went and what is his impres-sion.

Orlemański, with admiration, spoke about his journey, repeating what he told comrade [abbreviated as “tov.”] Molotov, emphasizing the quality of the weapons that the Soviet government gives the Poles.

Comrade Stalin said that soon we will help the Poles create their cavalry.

Orlemański says that due to his trip to the Soviet Union there is a slight commotion in America. A number of American newspapers opposed him [Orlemański].

Comrade Stalin asked whether the Kościuszko League publishes its own newspaper.

Orlemański responds that the Kościuszko League publishes two weekly newspapers Nasz Świat and Głos Ludowy.

Comrade Stalin asked whether there are newspapers in the other Polish organizations in America.

Orlemański answers in the affirmative. He says that in America, the situa-tion with the Polish question is not particularly favorable. Polish Catholics are under the influence of the clergy. Orlemański would like to inform J. V. Stalin on one of his secrets. Orlemański founded the Kościuszko League. The representative of the Pope [papal nuncio] in Washington gave an order to the bishop, to whom he [Orlemański] was subject, stating that he [Orlemański] cease his activities. However, the bishop was well aware of it and knew



Orlemański, and he did not fulfill the order of the Papal representative. Now that he [Orlemański] came here, Catholics in America have begun to claim that he had come without the permission of his bishop. They do this in order to reduce his [Orlemański’s] prestige in the eyes of the faithful. However, he [Orlemański], feels right, and will not change his beliefs and is even ready in case of need to leave his career. He [Orlemański], said last time that something needs to be done in order to split the Polish Catholics in America. This is a stubborn people. But he [Orlemański] is certain that he can make sure that they come over to our side.

Comrade Stalin asked how to do it.

Orlemański says that it would be good if he could receive a secret letter from J. V. Stalin to the Papal representative in Washington, in which J. V. Stalin would guarantee that the Catholic Church in Poland will not be persecuted. Such a statement by J. V. Stalin would be a hard hit for the British, who restored the Catholic Church against the Soviet Union. The British policy is insincere. They want to weaken Russia and Poland, and after the war they will try to restore Germany against Russia and Poland. The British are against the transfer to Poland of the German territories in the West, because they know that this will mean strengthening Russia and Poland, and the weakening of Germany. The British are against the fragmentation of Germany.

Comrade Stalin remarked that when in Tehran, it was smashing Germany that he, comrade Stalin, and Roosevelt agreed to, and Churchill was less determined on this issue.

Orlemański remarks that he had expected this. Orlemański says that if he could win the sympathy of the Catholic population in America, J. V. Stalin would not care who will be president of the United States. Let this be Dewey. Stalin could then forget about it and decide the question of the borders of Poland directly with the Poles. He [Orlemański] thinks that a letter from J. V. Stalin to the representative of the Pope in Washington would be of tremendous value.

Comrade Stalin asks whether it is possible to arrange that Orlemański write to him, J. V. Stalin, a letter with questions and ask for him to answer them. If America really believes that the Soviet government was going to take reprisals against the Catholic Church, it is just weird. He, Stalin, is ready to answer Orlemański’s relevant questions. There is no religious persecution, should not be, and never will be. The Soviet government would take reprisals against those who persecute religion.

Orlemański answers that this would have been enough. The point seems to be so that the Roman Catholic Church is opposed to Russia, but this is due to the intrigues of England. England aims to establish contacts with the Orthodox

Church in Russia, and thus penetrate Russia to carry out their political plans. The British tend to dominate the world and achieve it with other people, in the first place Slavs. The Slavs did not have to bring more children to the children later in the war that spilled blood for the British. Poland and Russia have to be strong, despite the desire of Britain. It is necessary to put an end to British domination over the world. Slavs should now dominate the world. If it were not for the British, then the second front would be open for a long time. Roosevelt wants to open a second front, but the British opposed it for political reasons. They want to weaken the warring parties to strengthen their rule. In America there is a growing dissatisfaction toward the British, because they use American resources for some selfish reasons.

Comrade Stalin remarked that, while in England the Tories are in power, it will always be the case.

Comrade Stalin asked how he can help the cause.

Orlemański replied that if he would have a statement from Stalin that will be enough.

Comrade Stalin asked what other progressive political organizations are there in America besides the Kościuszko League.

Orlemański lists these organizations. In total, there are about 1 million Poles in these organizations. He [Orlemański] thinks that the remaining 4 million Poles living in America, he would be able to win over to their side.

Comrade Stalin said that as he spoke, one of the Catholic Polish priests living in America, it seems Svetlik [Śwętlik?], would like to come to the Soviet Union.

Orlemański says that he just wanted to talk about that with J. V. Stalin today.

Comrade Stalin said that Svetlik can come to the Soviet Union, if he wishes.

Orlemański expresses his satisfaction.

Orlemański asks what kind of authorities will the Polish patriots create, when they come to Poland.

Comrade Stalin answers that the Union of Polish Patriots thinks that after entry into Poland a Polish government should be created. This government should contain the Poles who struggled in Poland. Polish Patriots do not object to the inclusion in this government of Poles living in America, and some of the Polish emigrants, based in London. However, they hint at Mikołajczyk. As for America, they speak of Lange and about Orlemański. Then, this government is meant to include one or two people from the Union of Polish Patriots. But the majority in the government should belong to those Poles who are now



working in Poland. This is the plan of the Union of Polish Patriots. We Rus-sians believe that such a plan is appropriate, but we believe that the Polish government should be established on Polish territory.

Orlemański says that this is a good plan, but, in his opinion, it would be better to create on Polish territory not a government, but a committee, as a commit-tee would be looked at in a more favorable light to the outside world in terms of intervention in the internal affairs of Poland. In any case, he [Orlemański] promises to provide the names of those Poles living in America who could enter the Polish Committee. These Poles need to contact the U.S. government and get permission to leave the United States. Saying goodbye, Orlemański says that in the event of the success of his activities in the United States, he will once again come to the Soviet Union, not alone, but with Svetlik.

Recorded by V. Pavlov.

No. 1217

Transcript between adviser and representative of the USSR to the PKWN V. G. Yakovalev with the president of the PKWN, E. Osóbka-Morawski,18 on

17“Zapis’ besedy sovetnika Predstavitel’stva pravitel’stva SSSR pri PKNO V.G. Ia-kovleva s Predsedatelem PKNO E. Osubka-Moravskim o vydelenii transporta dlia pol’skoi storony, uchastii O. Lange v rabote PKNO id r.,” in Sovetskii faktor v Vostochnoi Evrope 1944–1953, DOKUMENTY, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1999), 89–90. 18Edward Osóbka-Morawski (1909–97) was born into a worker’s family and became a workers’ cooperative activist. During the war, he became a leading member of the left-wing socialist underground group that claimed to be the true socialist party, serving as a member of its central committee. Under the name of the Polish Workers’ Socialist Party (Robotniczo Polska Partia Socjalistyczna—RPPS), this group soon began to work closely, although not always smoothly with the Polish Workers Party (Polska Partia Robotnicza—PPR). As a result of his activities and contact with the Polish communist underground, Osóbka-Morawski served as the vice-chairman of the provisional “people’s parliament,” the National Council of the Homeland (Krajowa Rada Narodowa). After the Soviet takeover of Poland, he became chairman of the communist-dominated interim government, the Polish Committee of National Liberation (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego). In 1945, he was appointed prime minister of the Provisional Government of National Unity (Tymcza-sowy Rząd Jedności Narodowej), which governed postwar Poland until the parliamentary elections of 1947. Osóbka-Morawski’s representation in these various communist-dominated governments served to portray these bodies as democratically inclusive of various Polish underground political parties and activists. During his time as an underground activist, Osóbka took the pseudonym “Morawski,” which he later attached to his given surname. Edward Kospath-Pawłowski, Chwała i Zdrada: Wojsko Polskie na Wschodzie, 1943–45 (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Inicjał, 2010), 142; and Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1956), 114–15.

the allocation of transport for the Polish side, the participation of O. Lange in the work of the PKWN, and other [topics].

Lublin September 6, 1944 SECRET

On the instructions of Comrade N. A. Bulganin, I visited Morawski. I gave him a personal letter from Bulganin to allocate for the needs of the Pol-ish Committee of National Liberation Soviet Government motor cars—450 trucks, 500 “Willy” cars, and 350 motorcycles. Morawski read the letter with great appreciation toward the decision of the government of the USSR. Then I handed Morawski a telegram from Lange on August 30, in which the latter indicates that he cannot work in the PCNL [PKWN] up to the moment when Roosevelt did not deem it possible to resolve the issue of the recognition of the Committee by the United States. Morawski told me that today is the last meeting of the members of PCNL with a discussion of the draft law on agrarian reform. A new feature not provided for in the first version of the project, and which is now included in the decree, is to abandon the allotment of land to those who shy away from mobilization to the Polish Army in rows or remain in the AK and do not want to disarm and be included in the common struggle of the people for a new democratic Poland. Morawski told me that this addition was unanimously adopted by the Committee and all members of the discussion of the PKWN draft law passed it unanimously, with the exception of Witos, which, as stated by Morawski, had a slightly different point of view on one of the questions. I asked on what issue. Morawski said he did not remember. All members of the Committee unanimously adopted yesterday at the first meeting all the basic principles of the law. At the end of the conversation Morawski gave me a letter from the county, raising questions concerning Poles in the Red Army who came to Poland from Soviet territory and are considered Soviet citizens. Morawski asked not to call these people to the Red Army, as in the next few days the issue of resettlement of persons of Polish origin from the west-ern regions of Ukraine and Belarus to Poland will be generally addressed. I promised to pass this on to Comrade N. A. Bulganin and inform Morawski of the decision.

Adviser Yakovlev

The two documents presented offer an insight into two controversial Polish American activists during World War II. What is clear is the exchange between Reverend Orlemański and two of the Soviet Union’s most important leaders. It



is evident that Stalin took a great interest in Orlemański and his activities in the United States within the Polish American spheres through his work as a parish priest and as a leading figure in the Kościuszko League. However, what is also of great interest is Orlemański’s concern in matters regarding the future of the Ro-man Catholic Church in postwar Poland and the composition of Poland’s future government. His advice to Stalin is that any Polish authorities should not have the moniker of a “government” but rather a “committee.” Perhaps Orlemański’s opinion led Stalin to approve of the name “Polish Committee of National Libera-tion” rather than “Polish Government of National Liberation” for the first interim governing authority on Polish soil. Also of great interest is the fact that Stalin seri-ously considered the inclusion of Polish Americans within postwar Poland’s interim government, particularly Lange and Orlemański. Orlemański told Stalin he would prepare a list of Polish Americans he considered best for inclusion. Whether such a list exists will rest on more research of Soviet documents and archives. Evident is the difficulty of including Lange in the National Liberation Committee due to President Roosevelt’s wavering as to whether or not to officially recognize this body, further illustrating the difficulty of the wartime Polish “question.”

Previously Unknown Soviet Documents and Polish Americans During World War II

Documents

Transcript of Previously Unknown Soviet Documents and Polish Americans During World War II