PRE STAFF COURSE 2016

CURRENT AFFAIRS

(PART - I)

The information given in this document is not to be communicated either directly or indirectly to the press or to any person not holding an official position in the service of the Government of India/ State Government of the Union of India.

PUBLISHED BY THE DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF MILITARY TRAINING (MT-2)

INTEGRATED HEADQUARTERS OF MoD (ARMY)

INDEX

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CHAPTER TOPIC PAGE NO

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PART I : THE PAPER

1. - Suggested Approach to Tackle Current Affairs Syllabus

1 4

2. - Syllabus 5 6

PART II : INDIA‟S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

3. Chapter-1 Indo - Afghanistan Relations 7 20

4. Chapter-2 Indo - Australian Relations 21 24

5. Chapter-3 Indo - Bangladesh Relations 25 39

6. Chapter-4 Indo - Bhutan Relations 40 48

7. Chapter-5 Indo - Canadian Relations 49 51

8. Chapter-6 Indo - China Relations 52 65

9. Chapter-7 Indo - Central Asian Relations 66 73

10. Chapter-8 Indo - Egypt Relations 74 79

11. Chapter-9 Indo - French Relations 80 88

12. Chapter-10 Indo - German Relations 89 92

13. Chapter-11 Indo - Iran Relations 93 107

14. Chapter-12 Indo - Ireland Relations 108 -

15. Chapter-13 Indo - Israel Relations 109 114

16. Chapter-14 Indo - Japan Relations 115 127

17. Chapter-15 Indo - Maldives Relations 128 135

18. Chapter-16 Indo - Mongolia Relations 136 137

19. Chapter-17 Indo - Myanmar Relations 138 143

20. Chapter-18 Indo - Nepal Relations 144 151

21. Chapter-19 Indo - Pak Relations 152 169

22. Chapter-20 Indo - Russia Relations 170 184

23. Chapter-21 Indo - South Korea Relations 185 189

24. Chapter-22 Indo - Sri Lanka Relations 190 201

25. Chapter-23 Indo - Thailand Relations 202 208

26. Chapter-24 Indo - UAE Relations 209 211

27. Chapter-25 Indo - UK Relations 212 214

28. Chapter-26 Indo - US Relations 215 231

29. Chapter-27 Indo - Vietnam Relations 232 236

30. Chapter-28 Indo - Japan-US Relations 237 238

31. Chapter-29 India‘s Look East Policy 239 243

32. Chapter-30 PM‘s 3 Nation Tour (Seychelles, Mauritius & Sri Lanka)

244 248

33. Chapter -31 Indo Africa Summit 249 250

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PART - III: INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

34. Chapter-32 Afghanistan 251 262

35. Chapter-33 Bangladesh 263 266

36. Chapter-34 China 267 285

37. Chapter-35 South China Sea 286 290

38. Chapter-36 Sino-Japanese Relations 291 293

39. Chapter-37 Sino-Pak Relations 294 298

40. Chapter-38 Sino-Russian Relations 299 303

41. Chapter-39 Iraq 304 319

42. Chapter-40 Israel-Palestine Problem 320 322

43. Chapter-41 Japan 323 326

44. Chapter-42 Kenya 327 328

45. Chapter-43 Myanmar 329 332

46. Chapter-44 Nigeria 333 337

47. Chapter-45 Pakistan 338 343

48. Chapter-46 Pak - US Relations 344 346

49. Chapter-47 Scotland Referendum 347 348

50. Chapter-48 Somalia 349 350

51. Chapter-49 Syria 351 360

52. Chapter-50 Tibet 361 363

53. Chapter-51 Ukraine 364 373

54. Chapter-52 US-Cuba Relations 374 377

55. Chapter-53 Yemen 378 383

56. Chapter-54 Europian Refugee Crisis 384 385

57. Chapter-55 ARCTIC Region Controversy 386 389

58. Chapter-56 Greece Crisis 390 396

59. Chapter-57 Arms Trade Treaty 397 399

60. Chapter-58 Indian Ocean 400 402

61. Chapter-59 ISIS 403 407

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PART - I: THE PAPER

SUGGESTED APPROACH TO TACKLE CURRENT AFFAIRS

GENERAL 1. The Current Affairs (CA) papers have been following a definite trend in the last few years. The pattern of question papers is similar with very few variations. The analysis of the question papers is given in succeeding paras. 2. Layout. The question papers are arranged in three sections. The format is explained below:-

(a) Section 1. Three essay type questions with answers of 250 words are set in this section. Only two out of these three are to be answered. Each question carries 50 marks.

(b) Section 2. The section has 11 questions of 30 marks each. These questions require short answers of 150 words each. Only 10 out of these 11 are to be answered.

(c) Section 3. The questions in this section require very short answers of 50 to 70 words each. Five of the six questions set, each carrying 20 marks, are to be answered.

3. Distribution of Topics. The questions set in the CA paper generally require answers which are factual in nature. The thinker and application types of questions are very few and that too not in the classical sense. Certain questions, which elicit analysis of the aspects under discussion, are asked. Views of the students are also asked. 4. Generally the topics covered are as follows:-

(a) National Affairs. (b) International Affairs.

5. Important Aspects (National Affairs). In the National Affairs, certain topics which are given prominence are as under:-

(a) Economic, Finance and Budget. (b) Constitutional and Political Affairs. (c) Defence. (d) Internal Sit. (e) Space and Science. (f) Sports.

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6. Important Aspects (International Affairs). In the international affairs, Aspects which have direct or indirect bearing on India are areas of focus. These incl following aspects:-

(a) Peace and Stability.

(b) Social Changes.

(c) World Economy.

(d) Advancements in Science and Technology.

(e) Economic Order.

(f) Scientific Development

(g) Political Upheavals/Solutions.

(h) Strategic Issues. 7. Important Points to Remember. Few important points which need to be remembered while answering CA questions are as follows :-

(a) The questions which are set in the CA paper require detailed factual information in the answer.

(b) Generally, the weightage given to national and international affairs is 45% and 55% respectively.

(c) Generally the topics of international affairs which have bearing on political, strategic, economic development and security of the country find prominence.

(d) Economic, financial, constitutional and political affairs are generally asked each year with 10 to 15 percent of the weightage

(e) Other national affairs to include inter state/intra state affairs and disputes also get adequate weightage

(f) The questions on sports get 2-10% weightage

8. Causes of Failure. The main causes of failure in this paper are as under:-

(a) The nature of the paper is such that many aspirants take it very casually.

(b) Candidates do not devote adequate time to this subject.

(c) The question paper demands detailed knowledge of the factual aspects under discussion, whereas the casual approach leads to awareness of superficial details only.

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(d) Absence of supplements giving latest developments. Important events till 15 Aug 2012 must be known.

Tackling the Paper 9. Before putting the answer on the paper, it is always good to quickly plan the sequence in which the ideas are to be presented. Effort in this regard should not be treated as waste of time. This helps in presenting the answer in clear, concise, neat and clean form. It is important that basic rules of SD are adhered to. 10. The important aspects which need to be remembered are as follows:-

(a) Questions of Section 1 & 2 must be answered in the pattern of a military paper but in a clear concise and brief form.

(b) The thumb rule for answering these questions is to divide the answers into basic entities, which are relevant to the topic. A suggested method is as follows:-

(i) Background. Facts about the genesis or reasons for the inception, of the problem/situation in brief. This part deals with cold facts and contains the figures dates and statistics, which relate to the subject.

(ii) Present Situation. Give the current status to include latest development towards deterioration/improvement in situation. This part should also include maximum factual data such as figures, dates etc.

(iii) Analysis of the Situation. Here the examinee should include the general fallout and effect of the situation. Original thought and clear analysis will fetch good marks.

(iv) Effects for/on India. This part may be separately included frrm the analysis if the impact/effect of the situation holds major impact for india.

(v) Tendency to over ensure by breaking down same points as also to show off knowledge should be curbed.

11. Answering Technique. It is advisable to start each answer on a fresh page. Avoid speculative answering, if the factual data or information is not known. This situation should not arise if you have carried out thorough study of the subject. 12. Short Answer Questions. It should be ensured that questions in sections II & III are answered in brief and to the point form. Extra marks are unlikely to be obtained by being very verbose and overshooting the word limit. As a simple guide, one to one and half pages (150-200 words or 15-20 lines) is considered adequate for section II and half a page (50-60 words or 5-6 lines) for section III. Syllabus

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13. The syllabus for the CA paper has been given in SAO 7/S/2005/GS in detail and the study for the subject needs to be structured as such. MT-2 Pamphlet CA 14. This pamphlet covers events up to 31 Oct 2015. The candidates are advised to supplement this material and keep up to date from other sources.

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SYLLABUS FOR DEFENCE SERVICES STAFF COLLEGE ENTRANCE EXAMINATION (WRITTEN)

Subject

Syllabus

Remarks/Recommended Study

Current Affairs & Area Study Total Mks-500, Pass Mks-200, Time allowed -3 hours.

Aim The aim of Current Affairs paper is to test the candidates ability to understand and analyse current major international and national issues and give their recommendations DETAILS OF SYLLABUS 1. International Affairs

(a) Foreign Policy & International relations. (b) Peace & stability with repercussions on India. (c) Political events & issues. (d) External conflicts with repercussions on Indian Defence Forces. (e) Social & environmental Issues. (f) International Organizations/ forums in context of Indian sub- continent. (g) Sports & entertainment Events. (h) International security environment. (i) Regional disputes of global significance. (j) Indo-China border Management.

2. National Affairs

(a) Constitutional & political Affairs.

(b) Internal Security & Integrity of the nation.

(c) National policies to include foreign and defence. (d) Political events /state

Issues & problems. (e) Internal conflicts with repercussions on Indian Defence Forces & recommended solutions

1. Candidates are advised to study the following major periodicals and journals dealing with topical world events. A suggested list of important journals is given below:-

(a) Strategic Digest. (b) Strategic Analysis. (c) India Quarterly. (d) Defence Watch. (e) USI Journal. (f) Survival (g) CLAWS Journal. (h) Indian Defence - Review. (k) Force

2. The following official journals dealing with international affairs and foreign policy are recommended for study:-

(a) Military Intelligence Review published by Directorate General Military Intelligence and Strategic Perspectives published by Additional Directorate General of Perspective Planning, IHQ of MoD(Army) and available in formation headquarters. (b) Indian and Foreign review published by Ministry of External Affairs.

3. Major National dailies particularly their leading articles and editorials. A suggested list of important magazines/sources is given below:-

(a) Magazines like:- (i) India Today. (ii) Frontline. (iii) Outlook.

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(f) Sports. (g) Entertainment. (h) Disaster mgt. (i) Indian defence forces Deploy abroad. (j) Defence research. (k) Energy exploration

security & implications. (l) Annual Reports of various

union Govt Ministries. (m) Modernisation in the Armd Forces. (n) Water wars in the Asia context.

3. Economic Affairs.

(a) International economic

environment and trade. (b) National economy. (c) Fin, budget & five year

Plans. (d) International economic

Issues/ organizations. (e) Industrial & agricultural developments. (f) National, Railway and

defence budget. (g) Defence budget and related recommendations. (h) Taxation Reforms. (i) Infrastructure development.

4. Area Study.

(a) Country study in military context detail overview of history demography, political sub-divs, topography, natural resources, climate & communication with an aim to analyse the following:-

(iv) News Week/ Time (v) The Week. (vi) The Economist. (vii) Competition Success.

(b) News Analysis. Existing ashpoints/fault lines across demographic/ ethnic/ political lines and their effects on long term policy and stability in the region.

(a) Radio and TV Programmes recommended for viewing/ listening Current Affairs.

(b) Air. Radio news including discussions and debates.

(c) Foreign Radio Broadcasts on topical issues and news.

(d) Doordarshan & other TV Channels:-

(i) Daily News. (ii) News features. (iii) Commentaries and discussions.

(e) Officers will be required to understand and analyse the impact of science and technology on the economic, political and strategic defence spheres of national policy making, especially with regard to the formulation of five year plans, modernization plans and long term strategic policies.

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PART - II: INDIA‟S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

CHAPTER - 1

INDO - AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS

Introduction 1. India's Interest in Afghanistan. Analysts point out that India‘s interests in Afghanistan can be summed up as follows.-

(a) Primary Interest. To ensure the continuity of relations between the people of India and Afghanistan.

(b) Stability of Polity. India believes that this process can be strengthened only if it supports the trends and policies in Afghanistan, which will ensure the economic well being of the Afghans, stability of the polity and modernisation of that country from the grip of extremist powers. (c) India has no interest of interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and will be willing to deal with whichever government is in effective power there. However, India's stand is clear that an Afghanistan dominated by externally supported Islamic extremist forces will not be in India's political and geo-strategic interests. (d) Bilateral Cooperation. India will not participate in any manner in the conflicts in Afghanistan. It will be willing to continue bilateral cooperation in those spheres, which will be of mutual benefit, especially those which benefit the Afghan people.

2. Strategic Threat to India.

(a) Threat to Regional Stability. Afghanistan provides strategic depth to Pakistan. Afghanistan allied with a hostile Pakistan forms a significant strategic threat to India affecting its regional security environment, according to analysts. (b) Hub of Extremist. Pakistan was training the Taliban cadres to create disturbances in Central Asian countries. Afghanistan was becoming a hub for generating violent extremist forces in the neighbouring countries. This was seriously jeopardizing India's national security. (c) Global Terrorism. According to the US assessment about 20,000 to 25,000 mercenary Mujahideen were operating in Afghanistan from various Islamic countries during the Taliban rule. Over a period of time this could have formed the germinating catalyst for terrorism in different parts of the world.

3. Pressure on Jammu and Kashmir.

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(a) Pakistan's complicity with terrorists and mercenaries aligned with Saudi dissident Osama Bin Laden, based in Afghanistan, had manifested itself during the Kargil conflict.

(b) Analysts point out that Taliban‘s success in Afghanistan will increase pressure on Jammu and Kashmir and extend Pakistan's strategic reach to the gates of Central Asia.

4. Stabilising the Situation in Afghanistan. Analysts point out that friendly relations with Afghanistan are important to India not only in terms of bilateral relations but also from the economic point of view as India's economic cooperation with the Central Asia Republics will be facilitated. Background 5. Najibullah Government. After the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, India maintained contact with President Najibullah's government as well as with the various Peshawar based Mujahideen groups to be able to establish a working relationship with whichever government stabilized itself in Afghanistan. 6. Indian Embassy in Kabul. Although the Najibullah government progressively weakened, no stable alternative government came into being. India maintained its embassy in Kabul till the conflict-compelled India to close down the mission. 7. Recognition to Rabbani Government. India recognized the Government of President Rabbani and continued to maintain contacts with it. 8. Marginalisation of India's Role.

(a) Analysts point out that over the years India was marginalised in the international discourse aimed at resolving the Afghan problem. (b) Except of cosmetic participation in the UN efforts and in one conference in Iran, India had been excluded from a number of international meetings on Afghanistan. (c) Reasons. The reasons according to analysts were the weak negotiating position of the Rabbani Government and the suspicion and the antagonism which the Taliban had against India. Pakistan's resistance to India's participation in such meetings was also a factor behind India's marginalization, according to analysts.

9. India's Stakes in Afghanistan.

(a) Strategic and Economic Stakes. Analysts observe that the murder of the Indian engineer in Afghanistan underlined the high strategic and economic stakes for India in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. The brutal killing of the engineer raised questions of exposing the Indian's working in Afghanistan to potential terrorist attacks by the Taliban. India's resolve to continue providing assistance to the people of Afghanistan is based on its importance in terms of strategic location and history and the influence India has regained in that country after 11 Sep 2001, according to analysts.

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(b) Growing Profile in Afghanistan. India's profile in Afghanistan is growing and covers diverse sectors such as economy, technology and education. This situation is in contrast to the one before the rout of Taliban where it had no contact with the Government. (c) Engagement with Afghanistan. Analysts point out that India's engagement with Afghanistan is vital for the on-going fight against terrorism in the region that derives material and moral support from the Taliban and the Afghan opium Lords. During the Afghan President‘s visit to India both countries pledged to deepen their cooperation in fighting terrorism and asked Pakistan to join hands to defeat the menace. (d) Afghanistan's Reconstruction. India has pledged $650 million for Afghanistan's reconstruction in a number of projects ranging from road construction, infrastructure and grass roots development. (e) Trade & Investment. Analyst feel that there are bright prospects of enhanced trade and investment between India and Afghanistan. This is evident from the interest shown by foreign investors in Afghanistan and the Afghan economy showing signs of recovery. (f) Neutralisation of Pakistan. Analysts point out that India's close relationship with Afghanistan helps to neutralize Pakistan's clout in the region. The Taliban has been used as a weapon against India by sections within the Pakistan establishment. Thus a committed relationship with Afghanistan has strategic advantages. Finally, analysts feel that India needs to enhance its take in the long- term development of Afghanistan and strengthen people-to-people contacts.

10. India – Afghanistan - US Trilateral Dialogue (26 Sep 2012).

(a) The first trilateral dialogue between India, Afghanistan and the US was held in New York on 26 Sep 2012. (b) The three countries discussed the situation in Afghanistan along with other regional issues, including terrorism. (c) The trilateral dialogue marked the further strengthening of Afghanistan‘s cooperation with two of its key friends and partners who were fully behind the vision of a secure, peaceful, democratic and prosperous Afghanistan. (d) The trilateral dialogue set the tone for a series of consultations among the three countries having common interests in south and central Asia. (e) The three countries pledged to work together on common challenges and opportunities including combating terrorism and violent extremism, reviewing cultural exchanges and increasing regional trade, investment and economic integration. (f) India and the US made it clear that the trilateral dialogue was not targeted against Pakistan, which is wary of India‘s role in Afghanistan.

11. India-China Dialogue on Afghanistan.

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(a) On 18 Apr 2013, India and China held their first talks on Afghanistan in Beijing. (b) Both countries share common concerns on ensuring stability in Afghanistan in view of terrorism and their investments in that country, according to analysts. (c) The two sides agreed the Afghanistan issue concerns regional security and stability (d) China and India were two important countries in the region and consultations on Afghanistan held them to coordinate positions, deepen cooperation and contribute to early settlement of the issue (e) Both countries reiterated their support for an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned reconciliation process. (f) The dialogue between India and China is part of the current bilateral and multilateral talks on Afghanistan, in the lead up to the withdrawal of NATO forces in 2014.

12. Conference at Almaty (Kazakhstan 26 Apr 2013).

(a) The second follow-up conference of Foreign Ministers to the Istanbul meeting of 2011 was held in Almaty, Kazakhstan on 26 Apr 2013. (b) The conference was attended by over 12 Foreign Ministers including India‘s External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid. (c) The conference named as ―Heart of Asia‖ was part of the Istanbul Process series which is aimed at stabilising Afghanistan. (d) India chaired the combined Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) of trade, commerce and investment opportunities. (e) India‘s leadership in the economic CBMs within the Istanbul Process was rooted in the belief that Afghanistan would experience lasting peace only if short-sighted perceptions of competition and strategic depth were replaced by collaboration and economic investment in Afghanistan. (f) India has focused on economic empowerment of Afghanistan. This approach led India to eliminate basic customs duties on all Afghan products. (g) The greatest challenge to Afghanistan was the persistent threat of terrorism from beyond its borders.

13. Hamid Karzai‟s Visit to India (20 May 2013).

(a) The President of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai visited India on 20 May 2013.

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(b) Mr Karzai would discuss with India the flare-up on the Durand Line, the colonial-era border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, in addition to ways to strengthen Afghan security situation. (c) Afghanistan had already agreed and signed a strategic pact with India and based on that agreement, India assists Afghanistan on several grounds, including the military sector. (d) In order to strengthen Afghan security forces, the Afghan President would ask India to help his country with military needs and shortages. (e) In 2011, India signed a strategic partnership with Afghanistan, allowing the two countries to expand training as the Afghan forces prepare to takeover security from foreign troops in 2014. (f) India has been training a limited number of Afghan military officers at its military institutions, but has not provided weapons assistance except for some vehicles (g) India‘s cooperation with Afghanistan was focused on development projects but security was also an important aspect given the challenges it faced. (h) The question of equipping Afghan forces was best discussed through the strategic partnership agreement and a meeting would be held later in 2013 to discuss security and political matters. (j) Pakistan has always resisted India‘s involvement in Afghanistan, seeing it as a plan to encircle it.

Situation in Afghanistan 14. Presidential Election in Afghanistan.

(a) Presidential election was held in Afghanistan on 05 Apr 2014 to choose a successor to President Hamid Karzai marking the country‘s first democratic transfer of power. (b) Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai, serving his second-term, is barred by the Constitution from running for a third-term. (c) The President is elected as an individual and not as a representative of a party in the Afghan system. (d) According to the Afghanistan‘s Independent Election Commission (IEC) the voter turnout was 60% of the 12-million electorate. (e) The voter turnout included all ethnic groups in Afghanistan and women voting in large numbers estimated to be 35% of the turnout.

15. High Voter Turnout.

(a) India termed the Presidential election in Afghanistan as a resounding rejection of the designs and ideology of terrorists and their supporters.

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(b) The Afghan people including women and youth had spoken in loud and clear terms. This was an important message that everyone should listen to. (c) India appreciated the large turnout in the Presidential election in Afghanistan as the resolve to exercise their franchise despite the threat of violence and intimidation from terrorists and those who do not wish to see a strong democratic and sovereign Afghanistan.

16. Second Round of Presidential Election.

(a) In the first round of Presidential election in Afghanistan no candidate could secure more than 50% of the vote which is mandatory according to the Afghan Constitution. (b) Mr. Abdullah Abdullah secured 45% of the vote and his main rival Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai 31.6%. (c) The second round of the Presidential Election was held on 14 Jun 2014, which again saw a higher voter turnout of 52% despite threats and violence that killed 50 people. (d) Preliminary results announced on 08 Jul 2014, gave Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai a vote of 56.44%, but Abdullah Abdullah rejected the outcome (e) Thousands of supporters of Mr Abdullah gathered in Kabul demanding that he form a parallel government. (f) On 13 Jul 2014, the Presidential rivals Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani agreed to an audit of all eight million votes cast in the run-off elections, following intense shuttle diplomacy by the US Secretary of State John Kerry.

17. Significance of Election.

(a) A credibly elected Afghan President and a Government with the people behind them would be able to successfully tackle the challenge of insurgency and also improve the economic situation. (b) The new President and Government of Afghanistan would require the financial support of the international community and the help of US troops based in Afghanistan, according to analysts. (c) The Presidential elections are seen as crucial for stability in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the NATO forces in 2014.

18. Attack on Indian Consulate.

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(a) On 23 May 2014, heavily armed terrorists attacked Indian consulate in Herat but were repulsed by the Indo-Tibetan Border Police guards stationed at the consulate in western Afghanistan. (b) Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi condemned the attack and applauded the efforts of India‘s security personnel and Afghan security forces for their valiant efforts to fight the terrorists in Herat. (c) The attack on the Indian consulate in Herat was allegedly carried out Pakistan-based terrorist outfit Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). (d) The attack on the Indian consulate was a message to the Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who was invited to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi‘s swearing-in ceremony, of the dangers of defying military hawks hostile to peace with India. (e) The attack underlined that the threat to India interests in Afghanistan emerged as a foreign policy challenge to the new NDA government under Prime Minister Narendra Modi (f) In Jun 2014, an Indian Jesuit priest was abducted in Herat province of Afghanistan bordering Iran.

19. Withdrawl of US Forces.

(a) Beginning of 2015, the US would have approximately 9,800 service members in different parts of Afghanistan, together with its NATO allies and other partners. (b) By the end of 2015, the US would reduce that presence by roughly half, consolidating US troops in Kabul and Bagram Airfield. (c) By the end of 2016, the US forces would complete their withdrawal from Afghanistan. (d) Ending of the US presence in Afghanistan and the gradual shift of US personnel to an advisory role, the Afghans would be responsible for securing their country. (e) The US would no longer patrol Afghan cities or towns, mountains or valleys as that was the task for the Afghan people

20. Implications of US Withdrawal.

(a) The US forces would complete their withdrawal from Afghanistan 15 years after they came to Afghanistan to oust the Taliban regime and hunt its ally Osama bin Laden, the leader of the al-Qaeda, the author of the Sep 2001 terror attacks in the US. (b) The Taliban crumbled in face of the US offensive in 2001, but later regrouped to launch an insurgency drawing the US in its longest war. (c) Currently, there are around 51,000 US-led NATO troops are deployed in Afghanistan.

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(d) Currently, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) total tps is around 3,50,000. (e) The withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan would be risky as the effort to transfer responsibility for security to Afghan forces remains elusive as the Afghan troops were proving to be unprepared for the job. (f) The resolve of the Afghan forces would be tested with the Taliban accelerating the fighting with the killing of a number of high-prolife government functionaries. (g) The Afghan President Hamid Karzai welcomed the troop withdrawal, and termed it as a good step in the favour of the US as well as Afghanistan, and extended his support to it. (h) The Afghan President Hamid Karzai refused to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the US-led forces and has left to the new President who would take office in Aug/Sep 2014. (j) The US President‘s announcement of having 9,800 troops in Afghanistan in the beginning of 2015 was the bare minimum requirement to backstop the Afghan forces, provide training, and conduct counterterrorism missions (k) US should not have drawn an arbitrary timeline for the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and instead the decision should have been based on conditions on ground and whether it was confident that the Afghan security forces could meet the Taliban threat. (l) Complete withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan would lead to the loss of US air bases used for drone attacks against al-Qaeda in Pakistan and for responding to a nuclear crisis in the region. (m) The Taliban denounced US plans to have its troops in Afghanistan till 2016 and threatened to wage war against the occupation until the very last foreign soldier pulled out. (n) India would be little relieved that the US is not completely withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan but it would also be compelled to engage more of its resources in the fight in Afghanistan to keep the Taliban at bay, according to defence experts. (o) With Pakistan likely to revive its influence over the Taliban in Afghanistan (p) After the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan in 2014, there needs to be a regional arrangement in place involving countries like Russia, China, India and Pakistan

21. US Soldier Released in Exchange of Militants.

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(a) On 01 Jun 2014, Bowe Bergdahl, the only US soldier captured by the Taliban was freed in exchange for five Taliban insurgents in a deal brokered by Qatar. (b) The US Defence Secretary said that the prisoner swap could create an opening for direct talks with the Taliban and provide a breakthrough for peace in Afghanistan. (c) The spiritual leader of Taliban, Mullah Mohammad Omar issued a statement praising the victory in a sign seen by analysts as potential confidence building measure. (d) Many Republican lawmakers in the US criticised the prisoner swap with the Taliban and wanted to know whether the Taliban prisoners would return to fighting the US.

22. Taliban Funds.

(a) In Jun 2014, a UN report warned that the Taliban revenues were boosted in the past year with narcotics income, revenue from corruption and extortion, and increasingly drawing on revenue from the illegal exploitation of natural resources. (b) As finances had grown, the Taliban had become more of an economic actor, with incentives to preserve this income and less potential incentive to negotiate with the government. (c) The UN report underlined growing concerns that a resurgent Taliban could provide logistics and finances for Indian jihadists known to be with it.

23. Implications of US Withdrawal for India.

(a) India told the US that it did not want to get involved in the security affairs of Afghanistan but would continue its development efforts there. (b) In the wake of the US withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, India needs to calibrate its Afghanistan policy. (c) After the withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan, India faces the twin threats of a resurgent Taliban and the ISI in Pakistan which looks at Afghanistan as its exclusive playground. (d) India also needs to push for a regional approach that addresses the security vacuum after the withdrawal of the US troops and takes care of the concerns of all stakeholders. (e) India needs to diplomatically utilise the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) to evolve collective security in the region especially in Afghanistan. (f) As a major stakeholder, India must ensure that its interests and investments in Afghanistan are not side-lined after the withdrawal of the US and other foreign troops. (g) India needs to continue with its assistance projects and deepen its ties with the Afghan Army and strengthen its relations with Pashtun political groups.

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(h) India also needs to engage Pakistan to make it clear that a stable Afghanistan would be in the interest of both countries as gateway to Central Asia. (j) The main problem is from the safe sanctuaries provided to the Taliban in Pakistan‘s border areas with Afghanistan. (k) A serious concern for India after the withdrawal of the US troops would be the desire of the military establishment in Pakistan to control the government in Afghanistan. (l) India has stressed the importance of improving the capacity of the Afghan government to fight and overcome terrorism. (m) India expressed hope that there would be no exit strategy for the international community from Afghanistan. (n) India held talks with China, Japan and Iran to address the problem of funding the security demands in Afghanistan which could cost around $4 billion a year after the withdrawal of US forces. (o) India needs to build on the trilateral engagement with the US and Afghanistan to secure its assets in Afghanistan.

24. India‟s Assistance after US Withdrawal.

(a) After the withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan, the country would witness a military vaccum and hopes that India would emerge as a major player in filling the gap. (b) Afghanistan hopes that a prominent military dimension would raise the Indo-Afghan relations to the next level. (c) Afghanistan has requested India for military and training assistance as the withdrawal date for US-led forces approaches. (d) India and Afghanistan must strengthen their strategic cooperation as Afghanistan does not have the defence its needs to fight ―proxy terror groups‖ (e) In Dec 2013, Afghanistan requested India for supplying tanks, helicopters and ground vehicles, which India politely turned down. (f) India supported infrastructure projects and provided military training to Afghan troops and police forces in India. (g) India has refrained from supplying military hardware to Afghanistan to avoid upsetting Pakistan which may construe the military help as interference in Afghanistan.

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(h) India and Afghanistan were working at a trilateral transitory agreement with Iran to trade goods via the Iranian port of Chabahar, which is being refurbished by India, as an alternative to the land route via Pakistan.

25. Current State of Indo-Afghan Relations.

(a) Indo-Afghan relations have acquired a different orientation after the formation of a new government in Afghanistan under President Ashraf Ghani. (b) The New President of Afghanistan assumed office in Sep 2014 and visited China (Oct 2014), Pakistan (Nov 2014), the UK (Dec 2014), Saudi Arabia (Mar 2015) and the US (Mar 2015). (c) Delay in Dr Ashraf Ghani‘s visit to India sent a message of reprioritisation of Afghanistan‘s foreign policy and its relations with India, marking a sharp change in contrast to the warmth displayed by his predecessor Hamid Karzai towards India. (d) India is concerned over the new Afghan President‘s plan of reconciliation with the Taliban and his new-found closeness to Pakistan. (e) In contrast to his predecessor, Dr. Ghani‘s policy towards talks with Taliban is seen as a major shift on two counts in India- bigger role for Pakistan in mediating talks and the Afghan government‘s willingness to talk without pre-condition that they give up violence. (f) Currently, India and Afghanistan have a different perception over the groups responsible for violence in Afghanistan – the new Afghan President feels the recent attacks were carried out by the Islamic State (IS), while India believes that Pakistan-backed groups were responsible. (g) There was also shift in the new Afghan President‘s stand on countering terrorism, from charging Pakistan with complicity in terror attacks by the Taliban, to a more cooperative approach with Pakistan. (h) In early Apr 2015, India supplied three Cheetah military helicopters built by Hindustan Aeronautical Ltd. to Afghanistan. (j) India and Afghanistan were working to frame a new defence mechanism with India increasing its capacity building programme for the Afghan armed forces.

26. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani‟s Visit to India (27-29 Apr 2015). (a) First Visit to India by the New Afghan President.

(b) Talks with India‟s Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

(i) Hoped to increase regional cooperation where the energy of Central Asia would flow to South Asia, where pipelines, fibre optics, railways and connectivity, air, ground and virtual would connect them. (ii) India shared Afghanistan‘s pain over persisting terrorism and was deeply grateful to Afghanistan security forces for protecting Indians in

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Afghanistan as they would their own. (iii) Dr Ghani said that they must have a unified approach and must be united both in the region and globally to contain terror. (iv) Mr Modi said that Afghanistan‘s direct surface link to India and the rest of South Asia, and increased connectivity to sea, could turn Afghanistan into a hub that connects Asia‘s divers regions. (v) India was prepared to join the successor agreement to Afghan-Pakistan Trade and Transit Agreement (APTTA) which would re-establish one of the oldest trading routes of South Asia. (vi) Mr Modi reaffirmed his commitment to take the Chahbahar port project in Iran. (vii) India and Afghanistan would also quickly conclude a bilateral Motor Vehicles Agreement (viii) India conveyed fresh support for its flagship projects in Afghanistan- Habibia School in Kabul, the Indira Gandhi Child Health Care Hospital and Red Crescent Society Fund for treatment of children with congenital heart disease. (ix) India and Afghanistan have a shared interest in the success of an Afghan - led and Afghan-owned process which should be conducted within the framework of the Constitution of Afghanistan, without the shadow of violence. (x) The Afghan-led and Afghan-owned process should reinforce the political, economic and social progress of the last 14 years and it should protect the rights and aspirations of all sections of the society, including Afghan women. (xi) India also offered to meet Afghanistan‘s defence needs.

(c) Joint Statement

(i) India and Afghanistan committed to work to strengthen their strategic partnership and were determined to combat the scourge of terrorism. (ii) Both sides agreed to sign six agreements within the next three months including extradition treaty, mutual legal assistance treaty, transfer of sentenced persons and bilateral motor vehicle streaty and a consular pact for diplomatic passport holders. (iii) Both sides welcomed India‘s proposal to join as fourth partner to the negotiations for the Pakistan-Afghanistan-Tajikistan trade and transit agreement. (iv) Both sides agreed to push forward making the Chahbahar Port a reality and a viable gateway to Afghanistan and central Asia.

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(d) Significance of the Afghan President‟s Visit. (i) Visit to India had produced a forward looking outlook and that ties would be expanded for peace, stability and prosperity. (ii) Acknowledged that India was part of his ‗five-circle‘ foreign policy concept which are neighbours, Islamic world, Western & developed countries, Asia and international organisation. (iii) Welcomed India‘s emphasis on bilateral and multilateral transit and transport agreement. (iv) India was ready to welcome Afghan trucks at the ICP Attari and was prepared to join the successor agreement to Afghan-Pakistan Trade Transit Agreement (APTTA). (v) Both countries agreed to conclude a bilateral Motor Vehicles Agreement which would put pressure on Pakistan to Join the SAARC Motor Vehicles Agreement apart from giving transit access to India. (vi) If Pakistan joins other SAARC nations to sign the Motor Vehicles Agreement and implements the APTTA, it could bring in immense benefits to the region in the form of road connectivity. (vii) Dr Ghani also sought to build a sub continental network to cooperate on fighting terror emphasising that the new and mutating threat from IS or Daesh, its Arabic acronym, has changed the game. (viii) India believes that the terror challenge in the region and to Afghanistan comes from the Taliban and Pakistan-based terror groups. 27. India's Stakes in Afghanistan.

(a) Afghanistan India's Gateway to the West. (b) High Strategic and Economic Stakes. (c) India has Regained Influence in Afghanistan. (d) Engagement with Afghanistan Vital for the Fight Against Terrorism in the Region. (e) Bright Prospects of enhanced Trade and Investment between the Two Countries. (f) A Close Relationship with Afghanistan neutralises Pakistan's clout in the region. (g) Need to strengthen people-to-people contacts in Afghanistan.

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28. Focus of India‟s Afghan Policy. (a) Ensuring Afghanistan's territorial integrity and political stability. (b) Preventing the return of Taliban-inspired terrorism and religious extremism. (c) Afghanistan will emerge as a key land passage for the Caspian basin gas and oil which are crucial for India‘s growing energy requirements.

29. Securing India‟s Interests in Afghanistan.

(a) India‘s development projects in Afghanistan remain the target of the Taliban. (b) India‘s role in the long-term stability of Afghanistan is opposed by the Taliban as it would strengthen the democratic Government in that country (c) India needs to consider long-term scenarios of its political, diplomatic and military options in Afghanistan. (d) India can work towards the creation of a regional grouping for long-term stability in Afghanistan. (e) India also needs to widen its engagement with different sections in Afghanistan. (f) The resurgence of Taliban a grave concern for India and other neighbours (g) Pakistan should stop supporting the Taliban and the Haqqani terrorists (h) Regional Arrangement for a Neutral Afghanistan.

(i) After the phased withdrawal of the US and other foreign troops from Afghanistan a regional agreement between Afghanistan and its neighbours has been advocated. (ii) The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) which includes Russia, China and the Central Asian Republics, came out in support of ―neutral‖ Afghanistan (iii) The concept of ―neutrality‖ should be upheld as no peace deal will hold in Afghanistan unless the outside interference by its neighbours comes to an end. (iv) India and Iran have also extended their support to the SCO‘s position of ―neutrality‖ in Afghanistan.

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CHAPTER - 2

INDO - AUSTRALIAN RELATIONS

Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott‟s Visit to India, (4-5 Sep 2014). 1. Civil Nuclear Agreement with Australia.

(a) On 05 Sep 2014, India signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with Australia in New Delhi during the visit of the Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott to India. (b) India and Australia held five rounds of negotiations since 2012 when the later reversed its policy on nuclear cooperation with India. (c) Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott said that the exception was made keeping in view India‘s model behaviour on its nuclear capabilities. From the time of Independence, India had scrupulously followed International laws regardless of the ups and downs of the political situation in New Delhi. (d) Australia would now be a long-term reliable supplier of uranium to India and would provide for the supply of uranium, production of radio isotopes, nuclear safety and other areas of cooperation.

2. Energy and Food Security for India.

(a) Australia could become an utterly reliable source of energy, resource and food security for India. (b) The signing of the civil nuclear energy cooperation agreement and the urgency imparted for coal imports from Australia for thermal power plants facing severe shortage of coal in India has made Australia a core energy partner for India.

3. Economic Relations.

(a) Need for increasing the two-way trade and hoped that the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the two countries would be concluded by 2016. (b) Two-way trade between the two countries was only $15 billion and Indian investment in Australia was well under $20 billion. (c) While India had invested over $1 billion in Australia in the last 10 years, Australia‘s FDI in India stood at only $600 million in the last 14 years.

4. India‘s Prime Minister Narendra Modi would visit Australia for the G-20 summit and bilateral meetings. This would be the first visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Australia in 28 years.

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5. Significance of the Australian Prime Minister Visit.

(a) Indo-Australian relations were enhanced with the signing of the civil nuclear cooperation agreement between the two countries during the visit of the Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott to India. (b) Australia could be a crucial nuclear energy partner for India as it has 40% of the world‘s uranium reserves. (c) The strengthening of Indian economy and its rise as a significant market and a source of capital were one of the reasons behind Australia reversing its earlier nuclear policy to access India‘s market and capital. (d) The civil nuclear cooperation agreement between India and Australia could be the key to enhanced energy relations between the two countries. (e) The growing engagement between Australia and India in energy and food security could make way for a broader strategic relationship between the two countries, which could become a crucial defence component. (f) Australian Prime Minister said that India‘s partnership was essential to sustain the US-led stress on maintaining the strategic balance in East Asia. (g) Indo-Australian relations have grown from strength to strength in recent years with the convergence of interests between the two countries in broad spectrum of areas including regional security, energy and resources, trade and education. (h) Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi‘s diplomatic outreach to two key countries in the Asia-Pacific, Japan and Australia point to the maturing of India‘s ‗Look East Policy‘ and provide a platform for the establishing strategic convergences. (j) Outcomes of India‘s recent engagements with Japan and Australia reflect a geostrategic shift from Euro-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific area.

Narendra Modi‟s visit to Australia (15-18 Nov 2014). 6. First Visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Australia since 1986. 7. Talks between the two Prime Ministers.

(a) India and Australia agreed to a Framework for Security Cooperation which will include exercises between armies, navies and air forces, besides cooperation in counter-terrorism, maritime security, non-proliferation and cyber security. (b) India and Australia also set up a mechanism to discuss the ―synergies in integrating defence system‖ which includes research and development cooperation on integrating defence equipment of both countries currently purchase like the C-17 Hercules aircraft of the US. (c) Both countries wanted an early conclusion of negotiations for a

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comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA). (d) Both side also sought an early conclusion of the Civil Nuclear Agreement. (e) India and Australia signed five pacts on social security, transfer of prisoners, combating narcotics trade, tourism and arts & culture.

8. Narendra Modi‟s Address to the Australian Parliament.

(a) Australia was a major partner of India in every area of India‘s national priority. (b) Called for closer economic and security cooperation between the two countries, including maintaining maritime security. (c) Both countries need to strengthen cooperation to combat terrorism and cooperate closely in international fore like the East Asia Summit (EAS), the G-20 and the Indian Ocean Region Association. (d) Terrorism was changing character and expanding its reach. Internet had made recruitment and call to violence self-generated. (e) Both sides need to work together and with others to create an environment and culture that promoted the currency of co-existence and cooperation; in which all nations small and big, abide by international laws and norms, even when they have bitter disputes. (f) Australia had immense opportunities to participate in India‘s progress. In turn, India would be the answer to Australia‘s search for new economic opportunities and its desire to diversify its global economic engagement.

9. Significance of the Visit.

(a) Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi‘s visit to Australia was significant as it came 28 years after the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi‘s visit in 1986. (b) Mr Modi‘s address to the diaspora in Sydney and his address to the Joint session of the Australian Parliament were well received. The talks between the Indian and Australian Prime Ministers were significant as they would lead to the bilateral relations being upgraded apart from bringing in more clarity on key issues. (c) Mr Modi said that the Indo-Australian relations were a natural partnership, arising from their shared values and interests, and their strategic maritime locations. (d) India and Australia had a great economic synergy and there were huge opportunities for partnership in every area they could think of – agriculture, agro-processing, resources, energy, finance infrastructure, education, and science and technology. (e) If all goes well, Australia would export uranium to India under suitable safeguards because cleaner energy was one of the most important contributions that Australia could make to the wider world.

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(f) By the end of 2015, Australia would have a Free Trade deal with India which was potentially the world‘s largest market. (g) India and Australia had agreed to speed up negotiations on the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement and India had asked for easier access for Indian business to the Australian market and quicker investment approvals. (h) The Indian Prime Minister welcomed the New Framework for Security Cooperation and pointed out that security and defence were important and growing areas of new India-Australia partnership for advancing regional peace and stability, and combating terrorism and trans-national crimes. (j) The Indian Prime Minister thanked his Australian counterpart, the people and the federal and the State governments of Australia for a wonderful visit.

10. Conclusion.

(a) The exchange of visits between the Prime Ministers of India and Australia have led to the strengthening and deepening of Indo-Australian relations which were indifferent during the Cold War. (b) Australia is important for its energy requirements – uranium, coal, petroleum, copper ores and non-monetary gold– while India offers Australia a large market for its energy export and specialised skill development in sectors like agriculture, food processing, and infrastructure. (c) India and Australia are also key partners in maritime security and shipping lanes across Asia, as both are located in the Indian Ocean. (d) Both countries are working towards finalising a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, but bilateral trade has lagged behind at just $15 billion, against a target of $40 billion in 2015. (e) Australia formally requested for a quadrilateral dialogue with the intent of joining the India-US-Japan trilateral talks as part of the ―Asia dialogue‖. (f) Australia wanted to join the Indo-US ‗Malabar‘ naval exercise annually along with Japan. (g) The signing of the Indo-Australian Framework Security Cooperation is aimed at seeking India‘s greater engagement in the Indo-Pacific region which is strategically important for its economic significance as well as for the frictions between China and its neighbours.

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CHAPTER - 3

INDO - BANGLADESH RELATIONS

Introduction 1. Salient Features of Indo-Bangladesh Relations.

(a) Interdependent. India and Bangladesh are interdependent on each other. (b) Commonalities. The two countries share the same rivers, common past, cultural heritage and a language. (c) Bangladeshi Migrants. Hundreds of thousands of Bangladeshi migrants reside in India and thousands cross over every year. (d) Porous Border. The porous border is a concern because it has been used by terrorists to cross over to India. (e) Ganga Waters Treaty. The 1996 Treaty on the sharing of Ganga waters has been working. (f) Repatriation of Chakmas. The Chakmas have been repatriated and bilateral trade has grown. (g) Demarcating the Border. After the border skirmishes in early 2001, there was determination on both sides to complete the task of demarcating the border. The same has been done recently. (h) Transit Facilities through Bangladesh. The issue of transit facilities for India‘s North-East, and the utilisation of Bangladesh‘s natural gas has recently been finalised. (j) Insurgent Groups in Bangladesh. India‘s concern over the utilisation of Bangladesh‘s territory by anti-India elements. (k) Members of SAARC and BIMST-EC. The two countries are members of SAARC and BIMST-EC- an economic group formed in 1997 linking Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand.

2. Areas of Contention.

(a) A major area of contention has been the construction and operation of the Farakka Barrage by India to increase water supply in the river Hoogly. Bangladesh insists that it does not receive a fair share of the Ganges waters during the drier seasons, and gets flooded during the monsoons when India releases excess waters.

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(b) There have also been disputes regarding the transfer of Teen Bigha Corridor to Bangladesh. Part of Bangladesh is surrounded by the Indian state of West Bengal. On 26 Jun 1992, India leased three bigha land to Bangladesh to connect this enclave with mainland Bangladesh. There is dispute regarding the indefinite nature of the lease. (c) Terrorist activities carried out by outfits based in both countries, like Banga Sena and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami. Recently India and Bangladesh had agreed jointly to fight terrorism. (d) Illegal Immigration. The border is porous and migrants are able to cross illegally, though sometimes only in return for financial or other incentives to border security personnel. Bangladeshi officials have denied the existence of Bangladeshis living in India and those illegal migrants found are described as having been trafficked. Cross border migrants are also at far higher risk of HIV/Aids infection. (e) Continuous border killing of Indian and Bangladeshi people, aiding illegal immigrants, helping in armed dacoity, fake money transfer from Pakistan and illegal drug trade by border security personnel of Bangladesh is one of the major problems between Bangladesh and India. (f) There was a minor glitch in their relation when Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh accidentally mentioned that 25% of Bangladeshis are anti-Indian, during an informal press meet.

3. Irritants.

(a) The sharing of Ganga water. (b) The Chakma refugees problem. (c) Transit and shipping facilities. (d) Insurgents having bases and camps in Bangladesh. (e) Huge trade imbalance between India and Bangladesh. (f) Border problem.

4. Sharing of Ganga Waters.

(a) India and Bangladesh signed a 30 year old Ganga Water Accord on 12 Dec 1996. The Accord, which has 12 Articles, came into force on 01 Jan 1997. (b) The formulations for sharing of Ganga Waters from Farakka barrage has been worked out for the 150 day dry season from 01 Jan to 31 May. (c) The significance of the accord lies more in enhancing bilateral relations. It paves way for bilateral co-operation in all spheres which will benefit the people of the two countries and bring stability and prosperity in the region.

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5. Chakma Refugees.

(a) The Chakmas, who follow the Buddhist religion, inhabit the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in Bangladesh. About 60,000 Chakma refugees had crossed to Tripura in India since Apr 1986 following disturbances in the region. (b) With the signing of the Peace Accord between the Bangladesh Govt and the Chakma, the problem was solved. (c) The 60,000 Chakmas refugees in Tripura were returned to Bangladesh in six phases.

6. Transit and Shipping Facilities.

(a) Transit through Bangladesh, for connecting North-East India with the mainland, has been a contentious issue between the two countries. (b) India wants the transit facilities for movement of Indian citizens and goods of the North-East through Bangladesh. Such transit facilities will reduce the cost of goods and overcome communication bottlenecks. India has stated that such a transit would economically benefit Bangladesh to a great extent. (c) Transit facilities are also important to India for security reasons in view of the insurgency in the North-East. (d) India also wants the reopening of the river route connecting Assam with Bangladesh as it would give the North-East direct access to international markets through the Chittagong Port.

7. Terrorist Bases in Bangladesh.

(a) India has told Bangladesh that insurgents from the North-East of India are having bases in Bangladesh which is a threat to India‘s security. (b) Bangladesh has clarified that it has no interest in supporting any insurgency-related activity against India or harbouring any insurgents in Bangladesh, which vitiates friendly relations with India.

8. Trade Imbalance. The trade imbalance between the two countries is in favour of India. Bangladesh seeks the withdrawal of countervailing duty imposed by India and duty on 106 items to reduce the imbalance. 9. Joint Working Groups (JWGs).

(a) In Dec 2000, the foreign Secretaries Bangladesh and India agreed to set up two Joint Working Groups (JWG), to demarcate the boundary and exchange enclaves. (b) One JWG was setup to address the issue of territories in adverse possession of the two sides. Currently, the total area under Bangladesh‗s adverse possession is 2,749.16 acres whereas India holds 2,972.25 acres, according to media reports. These areas fall in West Bengal, Meghalaya and Assam.

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10. Border Clashes.

(a) On the night of 15-16 Apr 2001, the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) captured India-held Pyrdiwah village in Meghalaya. Three battalions comprising of 3,000 men of the BDR and the Bangladesh Army occupied the Pyrdiwah outpost, held by the BSF (Border Security Force). (b) According to the Inspector General of the BSF, the BDR made an unprovoked attack in Boraibari of Assam‘s Mankachar sector on 18 Apr 2001, three days after the takeover of Pyrdiwah. During the exchange of fire, a part of 16 BSF jawans got separated from the rest of the troops and fell into the hands of the Bangladeshis. The BSF men were murdered in cold blood and not in border clash, according to the BSF.

11. War Crime Tribunal.

(a) The liberation came after nine months of violence in which three million people died, thousands of women raped and 10 million people took refuge in the bordering States of India. (b) The Sheikh Hasina Government set up two War Crimes Tribunals to try those accused of committing large-scale murder, rape, loot and arson during the 1971 Liberation War. (c) On 21 Jan 2013, the War Crimes Tribunal awarded death sentence to a former Jamaat-e-Islami leader, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. (d) Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, also known as ‗Bachchu Razakar‘, was the leader of the student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami, went into hiding after the War Crimes Tribunal issued an arrest warrant against him in Apr 2012. (e) On 05 Feb 2013, the War Crimes Tribunal sentenced senior Jamaat-e-Islami leader Abdul Quader Mollah to life imprisonment for crimes against humanity during Bangladesh‘s Liberation War in 1971. (f) The International Crimes Tribunal - 2 said that five out of six charges against Abdul Qauder Mollah had been proved beyond doubt. (g) The Jamaat-e-Islami protested against the Tribunal‘s verdict and enforced a nationwide general strike. (h) Since 05 Feb 2013, thousands of students demonstrated in Shahbag, a square in centre of Dhaka demanding death penalty for Abdul Quader Mollah. (j) The secular parties, freedom fighters, pro-liberation organisations and the ruling Awami League expressed disappointment at the death penalty not being awarded to Mollah.

12. India‟s Support to War Crimes Trial.

(a) India backed Bangladesh in the on-going War Crimes trial of the perpetrators of crimes against humanity during the Liberation War in 1971.

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(b) Commended Bangladesh on having followed a judicial process, carried through with a very detailed judicial examination, to come to a very legal judgment. (c) India made it clear that the outcome of the War Crimes trial and the on-going demonstrations were purely an internal matter of Bangladesh.

13. US Extended Support to the War Crimes Trial.

(a) While extending support to the War Crimes trial for the perpetrators of crimes against humanity in the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971, the US stressed on the need for holding a free and fair trial. (b) UK, Germany and France also extended their support to the War Crimes trial.

14. Bangladesh won Maritime Dispute with India.

(a) On 07 Jul 2014, the verdict on the dispute regarding the delimitation of the maritime boundary between India and Bangladesh was delivered by the UN Tribunal. (b) The United Nations Tribunal awarded Bangladesh 19,467 sq.km of the 25,602 sq.km sea area of the Bay of Bengal. (c) The verdict of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) came after five years of arguments and counter-arguments, spot visit by judges and examination of survey reports. (d) On 08 Oct 2009, Bangladesh went in for arbitration over the delimitation of maritime boundary under the United Nations Convention on Law of Sea (UNCLOS) (e) The focus of the argument was on issues like the location of the land boundary terminus, delimitation of the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, and the continental shelf within and beyond 200 nautical miles. (f) This was a victory of friendship between Bangladesh and India. The maritime dispute between the two countries had come to an end following the verdict. (g) Both the countries would act in accordance with the verdict since they went to the court voluntarily.

15. Significance of Improving Relations with Bangladesh.

(a) Democratic and Pluralistic Society in Bangladesh is in India's Interest. (b) Developments in Bangladesh have a bearing on India's Long-Term Security Interests. (c) Bangladesh Largest Market for Indian Goods. (d) Shared Prosperity. (e) India Only Potential Customer for Bangladesh's Gas Exports.

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(f) India could not realise its full potential unless it strengthens its relations with neighbours particularly Bangladesh. (g) India was willing to work with all political parties and shades of public opinion and the people of Bangladesh. (h) Transit through Bangladesh would help India transport goods and passengers to its northeast through a much shorter route. (j) Bangladesh would also gain from providing transit facilities to India by way of gaining the transit fee, improving its domestic transportation. (k) India and Bangladesh have charted a new course and their cooperative approach serves as a model for other countries to resolve their problems with neighbours.

16. Bangladesh High Court Declared Jamaat-e-Islami Illegal.

(a) On 01 Aug 2013, the Bangladesh High Court declared the Jamaat-e-Islami‘s registration with the Election Commission (EC) illegal and barred it from taking part in any national election. (b) The judgement was delivered over a writ petition filed in 2009 challenging the legality of the Jamaat‘s registration. (c) The petition said that the listing of the Jamaat-e-Islami as a political party was in violation of the Constitution and the Representation of People Order (RPO) Ordinance, 2008, conducted before the 2009 Parliamentary elections. (d) Election Commission‘s decision to register the Jamaat as a political party as illegal and unconstitutional, as it was a communal political party and did not believe in Bangladesh‘s independence and sovereignty.

17. War Crimes Tribunals.

(a) Probe Launched into Alleged War Crimes.

(i) On 20 Aug 2013, the investigation agency of Bangladesh‘s War Crime Tribunals launched a formal probe into the alleged war crimes committed by the Jamaat-e-Islami as a political party during Bangladesh‘s Liberation War in 1971. (ii) The probe was launched after two War Crimes Tribunals, set up to deal with war-time offences through several verdicts put the focus on Jamaat-e-Islami‘s role in the 1971 Liberation War. (iii) Ten top leaders of Jamaat-e-Islami, which supported the Pakistan Army as a political party to resist Bangladesh‘s independence from Pakistan, were facing trials in two War Crimes Tribunals.

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(iv) Five of the top leaders of Jamaat-e-Islami were already convicted of crimes against humanity and genocide and sentenced to death or imprisonment for life-time and 90 years. (v) The probe launched by the investigation agency of Bangladesh‘s War Crime Tribunals would also investigate the activities of the auxiliary forces of the Pakistan army like Razakars, Al-Badr,Al-Shams and Peace Committee, all of these outfits were allegedly manned and run by the Jamaat-e-Islami.

(b) Support from International Community for War Crimes Trials.

(i) On 29 Sep 2013, Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina urged the international community to lend support to the War Crimes Trials for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the 1971 Liberation War. (ii) During the 68th session of the UN General Assembly the Bangladesh Prime Minister told the international leaders that the War Crime Trials were indispensable to establish justice, human rights and the rule of law. (iii) The completion of trials would purge Bangladesh of the stigma it had been carrying for 42 years (iv) Pakistani troops and their collaborators perpetrated genocide, rape, arson and crimes against humanity in the former East Pakistan when over three million people died and a quarter of a million women were raped.

(c) Jamaat-e-Islami Leader Abdul Quader Mollah Executed. On 12 Dec 2013, Abdul Quader Mollah, an ally of Pakistan occupation forces in 1971, who was convicted by the War Crimes Tribunal for genocide and mass rape during Liberation War, was executed in Dhaka.

(d) Pakistan Expressed Concern.

(i) Pakistan‘s National Assembly and Punjab Provincial Assembly expressed concern over the execution of the Jamaat-e-Islami leader Abdul Quader Mollah. (ii) Pakistan‘s Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan termed the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami leader‘s execution ―a judicial murder‖ for supporting Pakistan. (iii) Pakistan‘s Jamaat-e-Islami also protested the execution, stressing that Mollah was executed because he was loyal to Pakistan and supported the Pakistan army during the 1971 war.

(e) Bangladesh Protested Interference by Pakistan.

(i) On 18 Dec 2013, Bangladesh lodged a strong protest with Pakistan for its reactions to the execution of a top war crime convict Abdul Quader Mollah, requesting Pakistan to refrain from interference in its domestic affairs.

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(ii) Nationwide protests were held in Bangladesh over Pakistan‘s criticism of the hanging of the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami leader. (iii) Pakistan had proved that it never accepted the victory of Bangladesh in the Liberation War in 1971, and it still had allies in Bangladesh.

18. Parliamentary Elections in Bangladesh.

(a) Bangladesh Prime Minister Offered an All-Party Interim Government to Conduct the Parliamentary Elections. (b) Bangladesh Opposition Rejected the Prime Minister‘s Offer and would not participate in the Elections without a Non-Party Caretaker Administration. (c) Interim Government Headed by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Sworn in (18 Nov 2013). (d) Parliamentary Elections Held Amid Boycott.

(i) Parliamentary elections were held in Bangladesh on 05 Jan 2014, with reports of a low turnout because of panic among the voters due to widespread boycott by the opposition parties (ii) The Bangladesh Parliament or Jatiya Sangsad, has 300 seats, of which 153 seats returned winners without contest. (iii) The opposition alliance led by the former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia called for a 48-hour countrywide strike to demand the scrapping of the elections. (iv) The Ruling Awami League was determined to go ahead and foil the opposition plan to create a constitutional void and claimed that the elections were held properly even though the opposition stayed away.

(e) Awami League won Absolute Majority.

(i) The ruling Awami League led by Sheikh Hasina won an absolute majority in the Parliamentary elections boycotted by the opposition. (ii) The Election Commission declared results of 139 seats out of the 147 seats for which elections were held. The Awami League won 104 seats (iii) The Awami League won 127 seats uncontested and had 231 seats in the 300-member Parliament or Jatiya Sangsad, giving it a clear three-fourths majority in the new Parliament. (iv) Jatiya Party of the former President HM Ershad won 31 seats and would be the next opposition.

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(f) Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina‟s Second Successive Term.

(i) On 12 Jan 2014, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her 49-member Cabinet was sworn in by the President Abdul Hamid. (ii) This would be Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina‘s second successive term and the third overall. (iii) Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina said that she was willing to take all possible steps to protect democracy if a consensus could be reached with the BNP-led opposition alliance. (iv) The Prime Minister insisted that the opposition would have to behave and stop violence and disruption. (v) Ms Hasina stressed that the BNP had to sever its relations with the Jamaat-e-Islami, the anti-Bangladesh party, before holding any talks with the government.

19. Death Sentence to ULFA Chief Paresh Barua.

(a) A special court in Chittagong announced the death sentence to the chief of breakaway United Liberation Front of Asam (ULFA), Paresh Barua and 13 others, including two former Bangladesh Ministers, in connection with an arms haul in 2004. (b) Trucks carrying weapons and ammunition were seized by the police from the state-owned Chittagong Urea Fertilizer Ltd. (c) Investigations later revealed that the weapons were manufactured in China and were being shipped to the ULFA in Assam. (d) Paresh Barua has been absconding since the recovery of the weapons and ammunition and the court sentenced him in absentia. (e) The Law Minister of Bangladesh Anisul Huq hailed the judgement stressing that it would act as a deterrent.

20. India-Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement (LBA). (a) 1974 Indo-Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) was signed between the then Prime Minister of India, Mrs Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rehman founder of Bangladesh to settle such disputes. (b) Land Boundary Agreement Signed in 2011 during the Visit of the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Bangladesh:- (i) Both sides signed a new Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) which would end the longing running friction between India and Bangladesh. (ii) India and Bangladesh signed the protocol under the 1974 Indira-Mujib Land Boundary Agreement, which would deal with five long-standing issues.

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(iii) Exchange of enclaves and adversely possessed lands. (iv) Demarcation of 6.5km of un-demarcated border. (v) Allowing Bangladeshis to use ―Tin Bigha Corridor‖ for 24 hours. (vi) Finalisation of a strip map. (vii) India had 111 enclaves in Bangladesh covering an area of 17,158 acres with an estimated 150,000 residents. (viii) Bangladesh had 51 enclaves in India covering an area of 7,110 acres with an estimatedpopulation of 50,000. (ix) In addition, 38 patches of Indian territory covering an area of 3,000 acres are in the possession of Bangladesh. (x) 50 patches of Bangladesh territory covering about 3,345 acres are held by India. (c) Territory to be transferred from India to Bangladesh: (i) West Bengal – 1,958 acres. (ii) Meghalaya - 42 acres. (iii) Assam – 268 acres. (d) Territory to be transferred from Bangladesh to India: (i) West Bengal – 2,398 acres. (ii) Meghalaya – 241 acres. (iii) Tripura – 138 acres. 21. India‟s Parliament Unanimously Approved Land Boundary Agreement. (a) On 07 May 2015, India‘s Parliament unanimously approved the Constitution (119th Amendment) Bill, operationalising the 1974 India-Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement (LBA). (b) The Bill became the 100th Constitutional amendment. (c) The four affected States of India – Bengal, Assam, Tripura and Meghalaya have to endorse theBill in their Assemblies to give India and Bangladesh a fully demarcated border. 22. Significance of Passage of the Bill. (a) The unity on the Bill sent a very positive message to Bangladesh.

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(b) The passage of the Constitution Amendment Bill operationalising the Indo – Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) was applauded by Bangladesh across political and social circles. (c) Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina said that the adoption of the Bill was a huge diplomatic success. (d) Ratification of the Bill by the Parliament of India was a major breakthrough and a positive step towards resolving border disputes with neighbouring nations. (e) The bipartisan spirit in which the Bill was passed by the Parliament was very significant, as it provided a template for cooperation between the Government and the Opposition in other important legislative matters. (f) LBA was ratified in the original form as envisaged by India and Bangladesh in their 2011 agreement. (g) The Operationalisation of the Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) would give a boost to Indo-Bangladesh relations and regional growth (h) The Operationalisation of the LBA would help both countries to settle other issues like the Teesta river water sharing and transit facilities. (j) Demarcation of boundary would be significant in the management of the border with Bangladesh and security at the India-Bangladesh border would be substantially enhanced. (k) Resolution of the Indo-Bangladesh border problem would also help in speeding up the development of border infrastructure that would boost the regional economy with significant benefits for India‘s North - East. (l) With the smooth passage of the Constitution Amendment Bill for the operationalisation of the Indo-Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement (LBA), India has conveyed to the people of Bangladesh that it was ready to cooperate with their country as a close partner. 23. Bangladesh Ratified the Land Boundary Agreement (LBA). (a) On 25 May 2015, the Bangladesh Cabinet chaired by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina ratified the protocol on the Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) with India.

(b) The ratification by the Bangladesh Cabinet was the last of the approvals needed for the implementation of the protocol on the LBA.

(c) Exchange of instruments would now take place during the visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Bangladesh in Jun 2015, according to the Bangladesh Cabinet Secretary Musharraf Hossain Bhuyan. (d) Under the protocol on the LBA, 111 Indian enclaves inside Bangladesh and 51 Bangladesh enclaves inside India would be exchanged.

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(e) Bangladesh would also get 2,777 acres of land while India would get 2,267 acres. 24. Prime Minister Narendra Modi‟s Visit to Bangladesh (6-7 Jun 2015).

(a) West Bengal Chief Minister also Joined the Prime Minister during the Visit. (b) Agenda of the Visit.

(i) The centrepiece of the Prime Minister‘s visit to Bangladesh would be the exchange of the instruments of ratification for the India-Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement (LBA). (ii) Connectivity would be the theme of negotiations as India and Bangladesh would announce initiatives on bus services, movement of goods, waterway trade and sub-regional motor vehicles agreement between Bhutan, Bangladesh, India and Nepal. (iii) India would also increase substantially the power supplies to Bangladesh, particularly by the eastern of the country, and supply more diesel, apart from signing a cooperative arrangement on telecom and Internet lines.

(c) Prime Minister Began his Visit with Homage to Martyrs. (d) India and Bangladesh Exchanged the Instruments of ratification of the Land Boundary Agreement (LBA)

(i) On 06 Jun 2015, India and Bangladesh exchanged the instruments of ratification of the India - Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) in a historic step towards improving bilateralties. (ii) The move would end the stateless existence of more than 50,000 people in 162 enclaves on both sides of the Indo-Bangladesh border. (iii) The exchange of enclaves began on the midnight of 31 Jul 2015. (iv) The residents of the enclaves would have the rights to choose their nationality and citizenship. (v) India and Bangladesh agreed to ensure orderly, safe and secure passage of the residents of enclaves along with their personal belongings and moveable property to the mainland of India or Bangladesh.

(e) India and Bangladesh signed 22 agreements and MoU on economic cooperation, trade and investment, security, infrastructure development, education, science and technology and culture. (f) Connectivity Deals.

(i) Kolkata-Dhaka-Agartala and Dhaka-Shillong-Guwahati Bus Service.

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(ii) Coastal Shipping. (iii) Renewal of Protocol on Inland Waterways and Transport. (iv) Agreement to Allow Indian Cargo Vessels to Use the Chittagong and Mongla Ports in Bangladesh. (v) Regional Connectivity between Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN).

(g) India Extended $2 Billion Line of Credit to Bangladesh.

(i) India extended a $2 billion line of credit to Bangladesh which would create 50,000 jobs in India and provide a boost to the Make in India initiative. ii) A line of credit is a promise to provide loans at subsidised rates from agencies like Exim (Export-Import) Bank. (iii) The $2 billion line of credit would provide a big boost to project exports from India and help Indian companies and also to create jobs.

(h) Bangladesh Signed two MoUs with Indian Companies to Set Up 4,600 MW Power Plants. (j) Highlights of the Joint Statement.

(i) People-to-people contact was the strongest of India-Bangladesh links. (ii) It reflects their growing mutual confidence and shared commitment to expand their relationship. (iii) Both sides agreed to establish Special Indian Economic Zonesin Mongla and Bheramara. (iv) India‘s Prime Minister Narendra Modi said that he was confident that with the support of the State Governments, the two countries could reach a fair solution on the sharing of waters of the Teesta and Feni rivers. (v) The rivers of both countries should nurture their relationship, not become a source of discord. (vi) Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi‘s visit had instilled a new dynamism and confidence in the relationship and both sides were committed to forming an equal social structure for the people of both countries. (vii) The two countries had agreed to foster greater connectivity for the development of South Asia. (viii) The new deals and protocol and the flagging off of bus services were examples of their commitment to seamless connectivity across the region.

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(ix) Indian investments in Bangladesh would help bridge the trade gap between the two countries. (x) Bangladesh and India were not just neighbours, but nations bound by the threads of history, religion, culture, language and kinship & a passion for cricket. (xi) Bangladesh would continue to adopt ―zero tolerance‖ approach in dealing with terrorism and extremism to make the borders peaceful and prosperous.

(k) Prime Ministers of India and Bangladesh Exchange 1971 Memories.

(i) Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi presented his Bangladesh counterpart Sheikh Hasina a memento depicting the helm of INS Vikrant, the Indian naval ship which played a crucial role in shortening the war, cutting off the reinforcements sent from the then West Pakistan to the East. (ii) The Bangladesh Prime Minister gave her Indian counterpart a photograph of the signing of the historic instrument of surrender of the 93,000 Pakistani military men to the India-Bangladesh Joint Command in Dhaka on 16 Dec 1971.

(l) Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi received the Bangladesh Liberation War Award on behalf of the former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee.

25. Significance of the Prime Minister‟s Visit to Bangladesh.

(a) Prime Minister Narendra Modi said that his visit to Bangladesh was going to strengthen the bond between two nations, benefitting the people of the two countries and the region. (b) The highlight of the visit was the ―historic‖ exchange of instruments of ratification of the India-Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) which settles India‘s 4,096 km long land border with Bangladesh and confers citizenship rights to the residents of the enclaves. (c) With the LBA and the resolution of the maritime boundary, India has been completely settled its boundary with Bangladesh. (d) For the first time both countries agreed to move forward by signing deals to enhance connectivity. (e) Connectivity deals signed during the visit would boost Bangladesh‘s economy and India‘s access to its north-eastern States. (f) The agreements on coastal shipping between India and Bangladesh would contribute to the growth of Bangladesh‘s shipping industry.

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(g) Prime Minister‘s visit laid out a template for a successful neighbourhood policy making clear India‘s approach for a mutually beneficial partnership as a way forward for the region. (h) India‘s partnership approach was highlighted by the agreement to raise the line of credit to $2 billion, eliminate technical barriers to market access and to ease the movement of people and goods across the borders of the two countries. (j) Bangladesh‘s decision to set up two Special Economic Zones for Indian industry would provide adestination for Indian investments and address the problem of balance of trade. (k) Bangladesh Prime Minister assured India that she would not allow her country to be used as a safe heaven or launch pad for terrorists and militants operating against India. (l) India‘s Prime Minister Narendra Modi emphasised that India‘s economic growth was not a threat to countries like Bangladesh but presented an opportunity for a mutually beneficial partnership which would also help in the development of the region, according to analysts. (m) As India and Bangladesh overcame bilateral problems, the time was ripe to go forward and tackle sub-regional or trilateral issues.

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CHAPTER - 4

INDO - BHUTAN RELATIONS

1. Background.

(a) Democratic Process in Bhutan. The fourth King of Bhutan Jigme Singye Wangchuk initiated the democratic process in Bhutan about 25 year ago. The process included phased devolution of powers from the Centre to the district and block levels. (b) 1998. Transfer of power from monarchy to an elected Cabinet. (c) 2005. King Jigme Singye Wangchuk commanded holding of the first Parliamentary elections through a royal decree. (d) Dec 2006. King Jigme Singye Wangchuk abdicated the throne in favour of his eldest son King Keshar Namgyal Wangchuk.

2. First Parliamentary Elections.

(a) Democratic Constitutional Monarchy. The first-ever parliamentary elections were held in Bhutan on 24 Mar 2008 when an electorate of 3.18 lakh elected 47 members to the National Assembly. The elections were a final step in making Bhutan a democratic constitutional monarchy. In 2007, Bhutan completed 100 years of monarchy. (b) DPT Swept the Elections. The first-ever parliamentary elections in Bhutan were a two-party contest with 72% of the electorate casting votes. The Druk Phuensum Tshogpa (DPT) led by the former Prime Minister, Jigmi Thinley swept the polls winning 44 out of the 47 seats to the National Assembly. The People's Democratic Party could win only 3 seats. (c) First Prime Minister of Bhutan. On 10 Apr 2008, Jigmi Y Thinley of the DPT became the first elected Prime Minister of Bhutan. Mr. Thinley received the 'Dakyen' (ceremonial scarf) from the King Jigme Khesar Namgyal. (d) Constitution. The agenda of the first meeting of Bhutan's Parliament included the adoption of the Constitution, planning the centenary of the monarchy in Bhutan and the coronation of the King, and the adoption of Bhutan's Tenth Plan.

3. New Government's Policies.

(a) The New Prime Minister and his Cabinet would consolidate the policies adopted by the Kings over the years. (b) The new Government is also committed to the concept of Gross National Happiness (GNH) conceived in the earlier 1970s by the then King. The GNH policy is premised on the contention that happiness is a societal goal. It's

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pillars are socio-economic development, environmental upkeep, cultural preservation and good governance. The GNH is the guiding policy in the Plan documents. (c) The New Democratic Government of Bhutan has promised to pursue exemplary and mutually beneficial ties with India. It would also strive to deepen economic ties between the two countries. (d) While attaching high importance to bilateral and multilateral relations, the Government would also play an active role in promoting regional and international understanding and cooperation.

4. India's Assistance in Parliamentary Elections.

(a) Assistance to Election Commission. India extended assistance to the Election Commission of Bhutan by providing it with electronic voter‘s machines. The election officials of Bhutan also gained first-hand information on conducting elections by being witness, in batches, to Assembly elections held in some States in India over the past year. (b) Assistance to Bhutan during Transition. India praised the formation of constitutional, democratic monarchy in Bhutan and offered to provide all possible assistance to the royal government of Bhutan during its period of transition. India also praised the King of Bhutan for his contribution to the successful conduction of the first-ever parliamentary elections in Bhutan.

5. Challenges for New Government.

(a) Nepali Refugees. Although Bhutan's first-ever Parliamentary elections were welcomed by the international community, the non-inclusion of 1,00,000 Nepali refugees from Bhutan in the voters list came under criticism. In 1990, around 1,00,000 Nepalese were forced out of Bhutan, when they protested against discrimination and called for democracy. Many of those expelled continue to live in refugee camps in Nepal. (b) Addressing the Ethnic Issues. Analysts point out that addressing the ethnic issues like the neglect of Nepali refugees from Bhutan would be a challenge for the new Government as Bhutan still has a sizeable number of ethnic Nepali populations. (c) Boundary with China. The foreign policy challenge for the new democratic Government of Bhutan would be to settle the boundary issue with China. The Tibet crisis has made China more sensitive and assertive.

6. Peaceful Transition to Democracy. In Mar 2008 Bhutan made a peaceful transition to democracy after 100 years of monarchy. Analysts point out that Bhutan's peaceful transition to democracy came at a time when other neighbouring countries like Nepal, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Myanmar are struggling to establish democratic form of governments. 7. Initial Reluctance. Initially there was reluctance for change to democracy among a section of the people of Bhutan who had faith in monarchy rule than in the accountability of

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untried political parties. Analysts feel that the initial reluctance to embrace democracy could be related to Nepal's failed experiment with constitutional monarchy. 8. Democratic Bhutan Significant for India. Analysts point out that Bhutan's transition to democracy is very significant for India which has long-standing bilateral ties based on trust and cooperation. Bhutan's first generation of professionals was educated in India which is Bhutan's most important development partner. From India's security point of view a democratic, friendly and confident Bhutan is very significant. 9. India Signals Shift in Policy. By rewriting a 57-year old friendship treaty with Bhutan that was seen as unequal and undermining Bhutan's independence and sovereignty, India has signalled a shift in its policy towards smaller neighbours. Analysts point out that India's bold departure from the past shows the Government's commitment to modernise friendly relations with the smaller neighbours. 10. Indo-Bhutan Friendship Treaty. The 1949 Indo-Bhutan Friendship Treaty, signed during the time of the India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, was based on the treaty that Britain had imposed on Bhutan in the early 20th century. 11. More Independence in Foreign Policy. Article 2 of the 1949 Treaty asked Bhutan to be "guided by the advice of Government of India in regard to its external relations." The change in the Treaty will allow the Bhutan Government to a more independent say in its foreign policy. 12. Contemporary Nature of Relations. The changes in the Indo-Bhutan Friendship Treaty reflect the contemporary nature of the relationship and aims at strengthening the relationship in a manner that is responsive to and serves each other's national interests through close cooperation, according to the spokesperson of India's Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). 13. Broadening Economic Relations. The changes in the Treaty also involve broadening the scope of economic relations, particularly enabling further intensification of relations in the hydel power cooperation, trade and commerce, according to the MEA spokesperson. 14. Highlights of Updated Treaty.

(a) No Longer Guided by India on Foreign Affairs.

(i) Article 2 of the 1949 Treaty stressed that the Government of India undertakes no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan. On its part, the Government of Bhutan agrees to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations. (ii) The Article 2 of the updated Treaty has dropped the provision of India's guidance on Bhutan's external affairs. It emphasises that Bhutan and India shall cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests.

(b) Neither government would allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other, according to the updated treaty.

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(c) India's Approval to Buy Arms & Ammunition Not Required.

(i) The 1949 Treaty required Bhutan to take assistance and approval of India for the import of arms, ammunition and machinery.

(ii) The updated Treaty stated. "The Government of India agrees that the Government of Bhutan shall be free to import, from or through India into Bhutan, whatever arms, ammunition, machinery, warlike material, or stores as may be required or desired for the strength and welfare of Bhutan as long as the Government of India is satisfied that the intentions of the Government of Bhutan are friendly and there is no danger to India from such importations.

(d) Extradition Treaty. There is a new clause that deals with extradition in the updated Treaty. Analysts point out that this is critical in view of the fact that anti-India rebels had, previously, set up training camps in Bhutan, which had to be cleared by military action.

(e) Provisions for Cooperation in Economic and other Fields. The updated Indo-Bhutan Friendship Treaty includes fresh provisions for expanding economic relations and cooperation in the fields of science and technology, education, health, sports and culture. It also contains a reference to cooperation in the hydroelectric sector.

(f) Treatment of Nationals of both Countries & Free Trade Regime. The MEA spokesperson stressed that the updated Treaty does not envisage a change in the treatment of nationals of both countries, or in the free trade regime between the two nations. Under the old Treaty both countries are obliged to accord national treatment to each other's citizens.

15. Second Parliamentary Elections in Bhutan (13 Jul 2013).

(a) Tri-Cameral Parliament System in Bhutan.

(i) Head of the State. King Jigme Khesar Namgyal Wangchuck. (ii) National Council or Upper House. 25 members with five of them being appointed by the King and 20 elected from 20 districts. (iii) National Assembly or Lower House. 47 members elected from 47 constituencies. (iv) Prime Minister Nominated by the Party that wins most seats in the National Assembly. (v) The Prime Minister has a fixed term of five years.

(b) Preliminary Round of Voting (31 May 2013).

(i) The ruling Druk Phuensum Tshogpa (DPT) won 45% of the votes. (ii) The opposition People‘s Democratic Party (PDP) won 33% of the votes.

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(c) Final Round of Voting (13 Jul 2013).

(i) The People‘s Democratic Party (PDP) led by Tshering Tobgay won a majority 32 seats in the 47- seat National Assembly. (ii) The ruling Druk Phuensum Tshogpa (DPT) could win only 15 seats. (iii) India‘s Chief Election Commissioner VS Sampath was invited as the lone foreign observer in Bhutan‘s Parliamentary elections. (iv) India provided logistical support by gifting 4,130 electronic voting machines to Bhutan

(d) Reasons behind PDP Victory.

(i) The PDP focused on highlighting that the ‗Gross National Happiness‘ concept was nothing more than an empty slogan. (ii) In the last few weeks of the campaign the PDP focused on the strained relations with India, where it laid the blame for India‘s withdrawal of subsidy to Bhutan for cooking gas and kerosene among other things on the mishandling by the ruling DPT.

16. Significance of Bhutan for India.

(a) Bhutan's transition to democracy is very significant for India which has long-standing bilateral ties based on trust and cooperation. (b) From India's security point of view a democratic, friendly and confident Bhutan is very significant. (c) Although Bhutan is a small nation it is strategically very important for India. (d) By 2020, India is targeting to generate 10,000 MW of electricity from hydel projects in Bhutan. (e) India was surprised by the previous Bhutanese Prime Minister Jigme Thinley reaching out to China and establishing diplomatic ties with many other countries without taking India into confidence. (f) The new Prime Minister designate of Bhutan Tshering Tobgay has said that his government would deepen the understanding and goodwill existing between India and Bhutan.

17. India‟s Significance to Bhutan.

(a) India is very significant for Bhutan as over half of India‘s foreign Development assistance goes to Bhutan. (b) India has promised Rs 3,400 crore of assistance for Bhutan‘s Tenth Five Year Plan.

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(c) Bhutan‘s income is also primarily through the sale of electricity to India via various hydro-electric projects, which are mostly paid through grants and lines of credit. (d) Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has written to Bhutan‘s Prime Minister designate that he has asked his officials to prepare for discussions over India‘s Plan assistance to Bhutan. (e) India would not allow the rural poor in Bhutan to suffer and the efforts would be made to expedite terms and conditions for new financial assistance to Bhutan. (f) Bhutan's first generation of professionals was educated in India which is Bhutan's most important development partner.

18. Financial Assistance to Bhutan.

(a) Since 1961, India has provided financial assistance to Bhutan‘s five-year development plans. (b) In 2013, India committed Rs 4,500 crore for the period up to 2018. (c) The Indo-Bhutan ties also include cooperation and investment in infrastructure development, health education and hydropower projects.

19. Trade and Energy Ties.

(a) India accounts for more than 90% of Bhutan‘s exports and imports. (b) Bhutan supplies India with 1,416 MW of power from its three major hydroelectric power projects. (c) In 2013, there was a problem between the two countries on the decision of Bhutan to raise power tariffs and delay in projects. (d) India and Bhutan signed the framework ‗Inter-Governmental Agreement‘ for the development of joint venture hydropower projects through the public sector undertakings of the two Governments.

20. Security.

(a) From India's security point of view a democratic friendly and confident Bhutan is very significant. (b) Although Bhutan is a small nation it is strategically very important for India. (c) India and Bhutan have a 699 km common border which is manned by the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) on the Indian side and the Royal Bhutan Army (RBA) on the Bhutan side. (d) The Indian Army maintains a training mission in Bhutan called the Indian Military Training Team which is responsible for the military training of the RBA.

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(e) The RBA has close ties with India where its officers are also trained. The RBA depends on India‘s eastern air command for air assistance. (f) In 2003, Bhutan had launched ‗Operation All Clear‘ to dismantle the camps of ULFA, Bodo insurgents and the KLO (Kamtapur Liberation Organisation) from southern Bhutan. (g) The Indian Army played a key role in the operation where 30 camps of the anti-India terror groups were dismantled. (h) Currently, Bhutan has assured India that it would soon launch an operation to flush out anti-India insurgent groups active in West Bengal and the north-eastern States operating from its territory. (j) Bhutan is expected to launch the operation in the coming months to flush out the KLO and insurgent groups of north eastern India. (k) The KLO was seeking a separate State of Kamtapur including six districts of West Bengal and four districts of Assam.

21. Bhutan‟s Transition to Democracy.

(a) Bhutan has undergone radical changes from a monarchy to a democracy. (b) In 2013, Bhutan held its second democratic elections where for the first time resentment against India was openly expressed for the cutting of fuel subsidies. (c) The People‘s Democratic Party (PDP) led by Tshering Tobgay won a majority 32 seats in the 47-seat National Assembly. (d) PDP focused on the strained relations with India, where it laid the blame for India‘s withdrawal of subsidy to Bhutan for cooking gas and kerosene among other things on the mishandling by the ruling DPT.

22. China‟s Growing Ties with Bhutan.

(a) China has is trying to establish formal ties with Bhutan, where it does not have a diplomatic mission despite sharing a 500 km border with Bhutan. (b) China and Bhutan have to resolve the border issue with the Chinese territorial claims in western Bhutan close to the Siliguri Corridor, called the ‗Chicken‘s Neck‘, the narrow strip of land connecting West Bengal to the North-eastern States of India. (c) China and Bhutan have held many rounds of talks on the border issue but have not come close to resolution. (d) India was surprised by the previous Bhutanese Prime Minister Jigme Thinley reaching out to China and establishing diplomatic ties with many other countries without taking India into confidence.

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(e) The new Prime Minister of Bhutan Tshering Tobgay has said that his government would deepen the understanding and goodwill existing between India and Bhutan.

Indian Prime Minister‟s Visit to Bhutan (15-16 Jun 2014). 23. First Bilateral Visit by India‘s New Prime Minister Narendra Modi. 24. B4B Ties.

(a) Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met his Bhutanese counterpart Tshering Tobgay and the King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuk. (b) Mr Modi vowed to nurture Indo-Bhutan bilateral relations which he described as B4B – Bharat should stand for Bhutan and Bhutan for Bharat. (c) The primary focus of both the meetings was the extensive development cooperation between the two countries and measures to enhance the economic ties. (d) India was committed to Bhutan‘s happiness and progress. (e) Peace, security, development and tourism were the areas specified by the Indian Prime Minister to push bilateral ties.

25. Indian Prime Minister Inaugurated the Supreme Court Complex and Unveiled the Foundation Stone of a 600 MW Hydropower Project. 26. Doubling of Scholarships & Assistance for Digital Library.

(a) Prime Minister Modi announced the doubling of scholarships being provided to Bhutanese students in India to Rs 2 crore. (b) India also promised to assist Bhutan in setting up a digital library.

27. Security Ties.

(a) India and Bhutan decided to step up their security ties to cover security interests and cooperation in a wide variety of fields. (b) India and Bhutan agreed to closely cooperate on issues of national interests and not to allow each other‘s territory to be used for interests inimical to each other. (c) The two sides expressed satisfaction with the cooperation between the two countries related to their mutual security.

28. Narendra Modi‟s Address to Bhutan‟s Parliament.

(a) A strong Bhutan would benefit India like a strong and prosperous India would be beneficial for the countries of the region, especially the SAARC members. (b) India‘s prosperity was important, as then it could help small countries and perform its duty of a good neighbour.

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(c) Praised Bhutan for allocating a large portion of its budget to education. (d) India planned to an e-library network in Bhutan and would double scholarships being given to students in Bhutan. (e) In a short span of time, Bhutan has developed immense faith in democratic institutions.

29. Significance of Visit.

(a) The first foreign visit by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Bhutan underlined the special and unique status for Bhutan in India‘s foreign policy. (b) India was extremely satisfied with Prime Minister Narendra Modi‘s visit to Bhutan and the Indian side gave an assurance to Bhutan that a change of Government would not affect their ties and the past commitments would be fulfilled. (c) The visit reinforced the relations between the two countries. (d) Prime Minister Narendra Modi was of the view that the hydropower projects being implemented in Bhutan should be completed in a speedy manner. (e) The visit to Bhutan was also in conformity with the Mr. Modi‘s desire to establish better relations with India‘s neighbours. (f) During his visit the Prime Minister emphasised that a strong and economically vibrant India was necessary for peace and stability in the region. (g) China‘s growing influence in India‘s neighbouring countries is a cause of concern, with China financing and building ports in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Pakistan. (h) The Prime Minister‘s visit was also significant in the context of the diplomatic challenges faced by India in the whole of South Asia. (j) During the Prime Minister‘s visit to Bhutan both sides reiterated that neither side would allow its territory to be used for purposes inimical to the other. (k) The visit signified that India needs to protect and nurture its relations with Bhutan to cement bilateral relations and expand friendship.

30. China Welcomed Indian Prime Minister‟s Visit to Bhutan.

(a) China rejected suggestions of any competition with India for strategic space in India‘s neighbourhood by emphasising that it was happy to see the development of friendly, cooperative, mutually beneficial relations between its other neighbours. (b) China said that it was full of confidence over the future of relations with India.

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CHAPTER - 5

INDO - CANADIAN RELATIONS

Prime Minister Narendra Modi‟s Visit to Canada. 1. The Visit to Canada by the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on 15-17 Apr 2015, was the First by an Indian Leader in More than 40 Years. 2. Focus of the Visit.

(a) Agreement for uranium supplies to India (b) Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (c) Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (d) Counter terrorism cooperation (e) Partnership at the G20

3. Supply of Uranium to India.

(a) Canada agreed to supply 3,000 tonnes of uranium for India‘s nuclear reactors under a $254 million deal. (b) The agreement was signed after comprehensive talks between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper. (c) The agreement was signed after two years of negotiations following the 2013 civil nuclear deal between India and Canada. (d) Cameco Corporation of Canada would supply 3,000 tonnes of uranium over five years to India with the supply starting from 2015, according to officials. (e) Canada becomes the third country to supply uranium to India after Russia and Kazakhstan. (f) The supply of uranium would be under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

4. Call for a UN Resolution to Combat Terrorism.

(a) India called for a UN resolution to jointly combat terrorism and its support base. (b) Threat of terrorism was growing; its shadow extending over cities and lives across the world.

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(c) India and Canada would deepen their cooperation to combat terrorism and extremism and would also promote a comprehensive strategy, and consistent policy and action against all sources of terrorism and its support.

5. Visa-on-Arrival for Canadians.

(a) The new visa policy would support greater engagement and people-to-people contacts between India and Canada. (b) The Canadian nationals would also be eligible for 10-year visas now.

6. Other Areas of Cooperation.

(a) Space – MoU signed between Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and the Canadian Space Agency. (b) Education – MoU signed between India‘s National Skill Development Council and Canadian institutes. (c) Civil Aviation – Air port development to be partnered by India‘s Ministry of Civil Aviation and Transport Canada. (d) Railways, Social Security and Health Sectors - Both countries to cooperate in the railways, social security and health sectors.

7. Significance of Prime Minister‟s Visit.

(a) PM visited Canada to build a strategic partnership with Canada in pursuit of India‘s economic transformation and a more peaceful, secure and stable future of both countries. (b) Bilateral relations had been adrift in the past, but in recent years, India and Canada had begun rediscovering each other. (c) Gave a major boost to civil nuclear cooperation with Canada with the signing of the agreement to supply 3,000 tonnes of uranium to India from 2015. (d) The agreement on procurement of uranium from Canada for India‘s civilian nuclear power plant launched a new era of bilateral cooperation and a new level of mutual trust and confidence. (e) The supply of uranium was important as India was keen to have clean energy. (f) Six areas of bilateral cooperation received a major boost – space, civil aviation, education, railways, social security and health. (g) Broader economic cooperation also received a boost with Prime Minister Narendra Modi seeking Canada‘s cooperation and investment in every area of India‘s national development priority – energy and infrastructure, manufacturing and skil s, smart cities and agro-industry and research and education.

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(h) The visa-on-arrival facility extended to the 1.2 million strong Indo-Canadian community was significant as the community has been at the core of bilateral relations since a long time. (j) The statement by the Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper that Canada overwhelmingly stood by the unity and integrity of India, was significant as some pro-Khalistan groups were still active in Canada.

8. Significance of Prime Minister‟s Three-Nation Tour.

(a) India‘s Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited France, Germany and Canada from 9-17 Apr 2015. (b) Prime Minister signed a number of significant agreements, including the supply of 36 Rafale fighter jets by France and the supply of 3,000 tonnes of uranium by Canada to Indian nuclear power plants. (c) Visit to the three countries was significant as all three nations are members of G7, are industrialised democracies, and technologically advanced nations. (d) Significant in boosting bilateral relations with the three countries with the aim of leveraging them to India‘s advantage especially in the economic sphere. (e) During his meeting with the industrial leaders in these countries, Mr Modi invited them to participate in ‗Make in India‘, Digital India and Clean India initiatives underlining the big opportunities available to them in a business friendly environment. (f) The Prime Minister‘s interaction with the Indian diaspora in all the three countries appeared to be aimed at promoting India‘s influence and development by making them ambassadors of India‘s cause and to encourage them to invest in India.

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CHAPTER - 6

INDO - CHINA RELATIONS Introduction 1. Changing Global Balance. According to Singapore's Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew, the rise of India and China was changing the global balance. India and China together account for 40% of the world's working age population and 19 per cent of the global economy in PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) terms, according to Mr Lee in the next 20 years their collective share of the global economy could match their percentage of the global population.

2. Asian Renaissance. Mr Lee stressed that Asia's place in the world would depend on how both India and China work together as they rise and actively set out to avoid ending up in opposing camps.

3. It was vital that India and China understand where they stand vis-a-vis each other, according to Mr Lee. He opined that the two countries must not be paranoid and suspicious of each other. Instead they can cooperate and compete economically, and each improves its performance by using the other's progress as benchmarks. 4. India's Strategic Concerns. (a) Sino-Pakistan relations and the help provided by China to Pakistan's nuclear programme. (b) China's refusal to recognise Arunachal Pradesh as a part of India. (c) Construction of Chinese naval facility on the Coco islands in Myanmar. 5. Trust Deficit. Despite the establishment of a strategic partnership between India and China in 2005, a serious trust deficit remains between the two countries, according to analysts. It requires courage and political vision on both sides to work at balancing the complex set of factors to strengthen Sino-Indian bilateral relations. Background 6. Diplomatic Recognition. India accorded diplomatic recognition to the People‘s Republic of China on 30 Dec 1949. The People‘s Liberation Army (PLA) made China independent through a revolution in 1949. 7. Accords Signed. The relations between India and China in the 1950‘s were very cordial and peaceful. In 1954, the Chinese Premier, Mr Zou, En Lai visited India which led to the signing of two Accords as follows. (a) First Accord. India recognised Tibet as an integral part of China and considered it to be an autonomous region of China.

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(b) Second Accord. The declaration of Panchsheel in the Joint Committee. The Panchsheel enshrines the five principles of co-existence as follows:-

(i) Respect for Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of all States. (ii) Non-aggression. (iii) Non-interference in Territorial affairs. (iv) Equality and Mutuality. (v) Peaceful Co-existence.

8. Wars. In the late 1950‘s China occupied small portions of territory along the Indo-Tibet Frontier. In 1962, India and China fought a war which resulted in China occupying sizeable portions of the India territory in the West (Ladakh) and in the East (Arunachal Pradesh). 9. Parliamentary Resolution. The Indian Parliament passed a resolution in 1962, pledging to wage an unending struggle till the complete recovery of Indian territory from China and it also forbade cessation of any occupied territory to China as part of any border settlement. 10. Normalisation of Relations. In the 1980‘s more efforts were made to normalise the relations. The real break-through in the relations between the two countries came during the path-breaking visit undertaken by Mr Rajiv Gandhi in 1988. 11. Detente. The 1990‘s saw the beginning of the ‗detente‘ in the context of changing equations in the global scenario. China‘s President, Mr Jiang Zemin visited India in Nov 1997. This was the first ever visit by a Chinese Head of State to India. Four agreements were signed during the visit. 12. Deterioration in Relations. There had been deterioration in Sino-Indian relations after the conduction of nuclear tests by India. China adopted a brazenly partisan attitude by terming India‘s nuclear tests as ―outrageous‖ but describing Pakistan‘s nuclear tests as only ―regrettable‖. Senior officials in the government of India articulated the ―China threat‖. 13. Normalisation of Relations. In Apr 1999, China restarted an official dialogue with India. The Joint Working Group (JWG) was convened in Beijing after 11 months delay because of China‘s refusal to set dates. The visit by the External Affairs Minister of India, Mr Jaswant Singh, to China in Jun 1999, followed by the President, Mr Narayanan‘s visit in early 2000, helped in the normalisation of bilateral relations. 14. Irritants in Relations.

(a) Sino-Pak Defence Relationship. The overt and covert military assistance provided by China to Pakistan is the biggest impediment in improving Sino-Indian relations. The Sino-Pakistan collusion in the nuclear field is seen as China‘s long term strategy in gaining supremacy in Asia. (b) Boundary Disputes. The non-resolution of Aksai Chin and other boundary disputes. China has laid claim to 90,000 square kms of Arunachal Pradesh.

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Analysts feel that by not resolving the boundary disputes China wants to keep India under strategic pressure. (c) Military Bases in Tibet & Myanmar. China has built military bases in Tibet and Myanmar which are seen by India as a threat to its national security.

Outstanding Territorial Issues 15. Background.

(a) Shimla Conference. The 4060 km long Sino-Indian border has been the bone of contention between the two countries. The border dispute goes back to the Shimla Conference of 1914 when the representatives of British India, Tibet and China met. It was decided in the Conference that:-

(i) Tibet was an autonomous country. (ii) The McMahon Line would be the boundary between India and Tibet. (iii) Chinese sovereignty of some sort would extend over Tibet.

(b) Agreement not signed by China. At the 1914 Conference the representatives of India and Tibet signed the agreement; China did not, thereby disputing the McMahon Line. (c) Mc Mahon Line. The Indo-China-Tibet boundary or the McMahon line in the East and the boundary (Aksai Chin) along Ladakh in the West remained a boundary by usage and understanding. The result was that the precise boundary was not demarcated, leading to border skirmishes in 1962 and the Chinese penetration into the Sumdurung Chu Valley of Arunachal Pradesh in 1986. (d) Main Areas of Dispute.

(i) The McMahon Line is not recognised by China. (ii) The integration of Arunachal Pradesh into India is also not recognised by China.

(e) India‟s Position.

(i) The border in the West should remain at the 1959 position thereby implying that it does not recognise China‘s claim over Aksai Chin. The northern borders of Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim correspond to the McMahon Line and hence the boundary. (ii) India also holds that China is in Possession of Indian territory which it occupied during the 1962 conflict. (iii) The territory west of Karakoram within Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) belongs to India and has been illegally ceded by Pakistan to China.

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(f) China's Position.

(i) China claims 90,000 sq km, which is almost the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh. (ii) Occupies 38,000 sq km, which is Aksai Chin in Kashmir. (iii) Occupies 5,000 sq km of Shaksgam valley ceded to it by Pakistan in Jun 1963. (iv) Does not recognise the McMahon Line.

(g) Talks to Resolve Dispute.

(i) 1993 Accord. In 1993, during the visit of former Indian Prime Minister, Mr Narasimha Rao, the Sino-Indian Accord to establish peace and tranquillity along the LAC (Line of Actual Control) was signed. Both countries declared an end of possible air violations of the border by their air force. (ii) JWG. The meeting of the experts from both sides laid foundation for a dialogue by the Sino-Indian Joint Working Group (JWG), the apex body negotiating the final settlement of the border dispute. The JWG was first set up by the Rajiv Gandhi Government in 1988, and is to meet every year, alternately in New Delhi and Beijing. (iii) CBMs. The agreement on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) signed during the visit by the Chinese President to India in 1997 reiterates the determination of both sides to seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement of the boundary question. (iv) 1995. Both sides identified eight pockets of dispute. (v) 2000. Maps of middle sector exchanged. (vi) 2003. Special Representatives appointed after the then Prime Minister Vajpayee's China visit. (vii) 11 Apr 2005. Agreement on political parameters and guiding principles signed.

16. Three Main Territorial Disputes.

(a) Arunachal Pradesh.

(i) In 1972 Arunachal Pradesh became a Union Territory and gained full statehood in 1986. (ii) China refuses to recognise Arunachal Pradesh as part of India. (iii) China claims 90,000 square km as their territory - almost the whole of Arunachal Pradesh - calling it "South Tibet". (iv) The border dispute is the legacy of the British colonial rule.

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(v) The 1914 British demarcated boundary called the Mc Mahon Line is not recognised by China. The boundary is now known in both India and China as the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

(b) Aksai Chin Region.

(i) India accuses China of occupying 38,000 square kilometres in Jammu and Kashmir, in the Aksai Chin region, north-east of Ladakh. (ii) Aksai Chin, also called the Soda Plain, is almost uninhabited and desert-like.

(c) Trans-Karakoram.

(i) Under the Sino-Pakistan Boundary agreement of 1963, Pakistan illegally ceded 5,180 sq km of Indian Territory (Trans-Karakoram tract) to China. (ii) The transfer is disputed by India as it is part of Jammu and Kashmir.

17. India‟s Complex Engagement with China.

(a) Diversity and range of issues which have engaged India and China (b) The phenomenal growth witnessed in trade was a major element in the India-China relations. (c) There was convergence of views between India and China on a number of issues (d) The border talks were in the second stage in the movement forward in the resolution of the borders issues

18. China a Bigger Challenge to India than Pakistan.

(a) China was a bigger challenge to India than Pakistan, given the power it has to impact the country in various spheres. (b) China is more important in terms of India‘s global vision, and due to the fact that relations between the two countries could impact the region. (c) China could be a very important partner in Asia and Africa and elsewhere. It would play a significant role in the UN. (d) China is also a constant reminder to India that it needs to put its economy on the right tract.

19. Current Irritants in Bilateral Relations.

(a) Border Intrusions by China.

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(b) China‘s action of issuing e-Passports with a Map Depicting Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin as part of Chinese Territory. (c) Trade Imbalance in Favour of China.

20. Border Intrusions by China.

(a) On 15 Apr 2013, about 40 Chinese People‘s Liberation Army (PLA) troops intruded 19 km into India‘s territory across the Line of Actual Control (LAC). (b) The Chinese troops set up tents in the Daulat Beg Oldi sector in eastern Ladakh. (c) China denied that the PLA troops had set up a tented post on Indian Territory in Ladakh maintaining that its troops remained within its own territory. (d) India sent an equal strength of Indian Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) personnel to set up tents 300 metres away from the tents of the Chinese troops. (e) Under the aegis of the recently set up Joint Mechanism on Coordination and Consultation on Border Affairs, the two sides were in contact over the phone to guard against the incursion developing into a flash point in bilateral ties. (f) There were intensive diplomatic contacts with India‘s Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai coordinating with military authorities and India‘s Ambassador to China, S. Jaishankar holding talks with Chinese Foreign Office. (g) On 05 May 2013, China pulled back its troops from the Daulat Beg Oldi sector in eastern Ladakh to end the three-week stand-off. (h) The agreement was reached at the diplomatic level, while the modalities were agreed at the flag meetings. (j) After the flag meetings, the commanders from both countries shook hands and ordered their troops, facing each other 300 metres away, to dismantle their tents. (k) The Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) was signed by India and China.

21. e-Passports with Map Depicting Disputed Areas part of Chinese Territory.

(a) In Oct/Nov 2012, China started issuing new electronic passports with maps depicting Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin as part of the Chinese territory. (b) In response India started to issue visa stickers stamped with a map showing both Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin as part of India. (c) India‘s National Security Adviser Shiv Shankar Menon downplayed the map controversy by stating that the issue had to looked through a broader prism.

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22. Trade Imbalance in Favour of China.

(a) Bilateral trade between India and China was around $65.47 billion in 2013 (b) In 2013, India‘s trade deficit with China was $31 billion. Indian exports to China totalled $17 billion in 2013, a decline of 9.4% largely due to curbs on the export of iron ore, which was India‘s biggest export to China. (c) The widening trade imbalance has been a source of concern (d) The record trade imbalance has raised questions on the sustainability of the relationship. (e) Currently, India is only exporting raw material like iron ore and is seeking a better environment in China for its export mainstays - Pharmaceuticals and software. (f) India has reminded China how it solved the problems faced by its telecom companies and expects reciprocation with regard to pharmaceuticals and software. (g) India expects a more diversified trade basket from China.

23. Xi Jinping‟s visit to India, 17 – 19 Sep 2014.

(a) China's President Xi Jinping's visit to India will go down the history in five major aspects. Firstly, there were many unprecedented departures from the past in these interactions. Prime Minister Narendra Modi receiving Xi at Ahmadabad signifies the onset of regional diplomacy in India. Possibly for the first time, agreements were signed at the regional (Gujarat state) level on sister cities, sister states and development related issues. This has been the trend recently after Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh and other states pushed the envelope of diplomacy by engaging in the economic field with others. (b) The agreement further legitimizes this process of regional state's outreach. Also, resembling the California meeting between President‘s Xi and Obama in Jun 2013 that yielded a "new type of major power relations" for the two, the interactions in Ahmadabad were conducted in a very informal manner with possibly very few formal issues coming up on the agenda. (c) Unlike his predecessors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, Xi and his wife Peng Liyuan have shown remarkable flexibility and were at ease during the Sabarmati River side events. It is said that both Jiang and Hu were very stiff during their interactions not only with domestic actors but with foreign leaders as well. Hu is also known never to have publicly interacted with children. In contrast was a recent photo of Xi meeting his mother on her birthday. During the Sabarmati trip, Xi displayed flexibility by squatting at the Mahatma's floor, trying his hand at charkha, sitting along with Peng on a jhoola, etc. (d) Secondly, China and India interactions indicated the tough bargaining at Hyderabad House and both Modi and Xi expressed strong opinions on economic, territorial dispute and other issues. While China was the first to reach out to Modi after his elections — reflected in Premier Li Keqiang's phone call in May, foreign

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minister Wang Yi's visit in June and the BRICS interaction on 14 Jul - China's diplomatic initiatives faced a challenge as Maritime Silk Road was not endorsed; Bangladesh-India-China Myanmar Economic corridor was conditionally accepted provided it ensures "peaceful, stable and cooperative environment". India also did not receive $100-300 billion from China in investments. (e) Thirdly, China finally opened up its money bags to India, although just a trickle at $20 billion in investments in the next five years. While for the last four years Indian leaders have been complaining about the burgeoning trade deficits (with which India lost $169 billion in trade deficits to China between 2007 and 2013) and non-opening of China's economy to Indian products. (f) Fourthly, Indian leaders stood their ground on the territorial dispute, visas, river waters and the like. Modi stated in his media interaction to the conditional normalisation of relations with China thus: "a climate of mutual trust and confidence; respect for each other's sensitivities and concerns; and, peace and stability in our relations and along our borders are essential for us to realise the enormous potential in our relations". In the light of the increasing border transgressions at Chumar and other areas, this signalling from India is significant. (g) Most significant of all the above, however, is the emerging personal chemistry between the two leaders of two rising Asian countries. The Ahmadabad outing and discussion at Delhi between Modi and Xi are useful and are of long-term significance and will have a definite bearing on the stability in relations in years to come. As two credible nuclear powers, these personal interactions are necessary. This is important for the long-term economic development of both the countries. (h) Significance of President Xi Jinping‟s Visit.

(i) Chinese President Xi Jinping‘s visit to India marked a shift in India‘s diplomatic handling of the bilateral relations. Both sides also showed that the strategic ties would be separate from the economic ties as India welcomed China‘s investments of around $20 billion in Indian projects. (ii) China agreed to address India‘s concerns on the imbalance in bilateral trade. (iii) President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi found common ground to resolve the border row as part of a roadmap that would steer India-China relations in future. (iv) The Chinese President invited India to be part of new inclusive security architecture in theAsia-Pacific which was significant in view of the US China-centric pivot to Asia. (v) There was tough bargaining between Indian and China during the visit. (vi) India did not endorse China‘s Maritime Silk Route. (vii) The Bangladesh-India-China-Myanmar (BICM) corridor was accepted by India on the condition that it ensures peaceful, stable and cooperative environment.

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(viii) India did not receive the expected $100 billion investments from China. (ix) Both leaders expressed strong views on territorial disputes, economic and other issues. (x) The India-China Summit had led to an agreement that ―cooperation would remain the main theme‖ of India-China relations. (xi) The overall positive environment during the visit of the Chinese President carried the message that India and China were capable of managing their relations despite their differences on certain issues.

24. Stand-off on LAC in Ladakh. On 10 Sep 14 , China‘s People‘s Liberation Army (PLA) reportedly moved 500 soldiers to Chumar village on the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), 300 km South-East of Leh in Jammu and Kashmir. Chinese nomads known as Rebos put up tents at Demchok, 500 meters into Indian territory. India‘s Prime Minister Narendra Modi raised the issue with the Chinese President Xi Jinping during his visit to India. On 26 Sep 2014, India‘s External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj met her Chinese counterpart Wang Yi in New York on the side-lines of the UN General Assembly to resolve the issue. Ms Swaraj said that the stand-off at Chumar had been resolved and the withdrawal of troops would be completed by 30 Sep 2104. The two sides also agreed that a meeting of the Working Mechanism for the Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs (WMCC) would be convened in India on 16-17 Oct 2014 to discuss various issues pertaining to the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in the border areas. Prime Minister Narendra Modi‘s public expression of India‘s concerns on repeated Chinese incursions into Indian territory also played a vital role in the resolution of the border stand-off with China. The border stand-off with China highlighted the urgency of demarcating the LAC and resolving the issue on a permanent basis. 25. Narendra Modi‟s Visit to China, 14-16 May 2015. (a) Prime Minister was accompanied by the Chief Ministers of Gujarat and Maharashtra for his visit to China. (b) Talks between the Leaders.

(i) Both leaders discussed ways of building better cooperation and trust between the two countries. (ii) Problematic issues like the boundary row and the balance of trade was also discussed. (iii) Discussed Maint peace and tranquillity at the boundary and cooperation on tackling terrorism. (iv) The attack on a guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan on 14 May 2015 that killed four Indians among the 14 people killed, and the gunning down of 43 minority members in a bus attack in Karachi, Pakistan were also discussed. (v) Need for strengthening trust so as to have peace and tranquillity at the boundary and discussed the issue of trans-boundary rivers, according to

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officials.

(c) e-visa Facility for Chinese Nationals. (i) Move was part of a concerted effort by his government to bring the world‘s two largest populations in closer contact. (ii) The e-visa facility would enable Chinese applicants to apply for visas online a few days before they travel, and having them processed and granted on arrival in India.

(iii) China had repeatedly requested India to cut some of the security and visa regulations for Chinese businessmen and tourists.

(iv) 2015 and 2016 were designated as ‗Visit India‘ and ‗Visit China‘ years respectively.

(d) 24 Agreements. India and China signed 24 agreements, which for the first time, allow a pervasive dialogue among the State, cities and businesses of India and China as they become key drivers of India‘s foreign policy with China. 13 Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) were signed strengthening people-to-people ties including ―sister-city‖ ties between Hyderabad and Qindao and Aurangabad and Dunhuang. Consulates would be set up in Chennai and Chengdu. Yoga colleges would be set up in Kunming and Yunnan. MoU signed between Doordarshan and China‘s state-run CCTV. India-China Forum of State Provincial Leaders was launched in the presence of the Chief Ministers of Gujarat and Maharashtra. The Forum seeks China as a partner to draw State-level businesses into the global mainstream. The Forum was launched after India made it clear that it wanted to develop a more positive narrative in its relationship with China and to build higher level of trust. A number of decisions could be taken quickly by the State governments. These interactions would also make the State governments more sensitive and aware of the international dynamics and requirements. India‘s relationship with China was one of its most important strategic partnerships.

(e) Bid for Permanent UNSC Seat & Membership of NSG. China‘s support for India‘s permanent membership of a reformed UN Security Council (UNSC) and for India‘s membership of export control regimes like the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) would do more than just strengthen their international cooperation. For the first time, China said that it had taken note of India‘s interest to become a member of the 44-nation NSG, which controls the civil nuclear technology regime. China said that it backed India‘s aspiration to play a big role in the world body. China is the only permanent member of the UNSC with a veto power to come out in support of India‘s bid to become a permanent UNSC member.

(f) Talks between the Prime Ministers of India and China.

(i) Focussed on confidence building measures to ensure that the borders remain calm, while the Special Representatives of the two countries continued their talks on resolving the boundary problem. (ii) A hotline between the two Army Headquarters would be established and additional points along the frontiers would be opened to enable local

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border commanders to hold crisis-management meetings. (iii) Annual exchange visits between the two military headquarters and neighbouring military commands would continue. (iv) Indian Prime Minister reiterated the importance of clarification of Line of Actual Control (LAC). (v) Discussed wide range of issues including boundary dispute, trade imbalance, terrorism, climate change and UN reforms. (vi) The two sides agreed to set up a high-powered task force to address India‘s concerns on the increasing trade deficit and lack of access to its pharmaceuticals, IT and agricultural products. (vii) Mr Modi suggested that China should take a strategic and long term view of the relations between the two countries. (viii) India and China have had complex ties over the last few decades and the two countries have ahistoric responsibility to turn their ties into a source of strength for each other and a force of good for the world. (ix) Mr Modi stressed that both countries need to be sensitive to each other‘s interests and think of creative solutions to issues that had become irritants– from visa policies to trans-border rivers. (x) If India and China had to realise the extraordinary potential of their partnership, they must also address the issues that lead to hesitation and doubts, even distrust, in their relationship. (xi) The two leaderships decided to enhance strategic comn and coordination in the region. (xii) Outer space and nuclear energy were emerging as new are as for collaboration in the future. (xiii) A Space Cooperation Mechanism had been established which would steer a five year outline for partnership and would also cover lunar and deep space exploration, between the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and the China National Space Administration. (xiv) Both sides would engage in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. (xv) On Climate Change, both countries urged the developed countries to increase their pre-2020 emission reduction targets and honour their commitment to provide $100 billion per year by 2020 to the developing countries.

(g) Narendra Modi‟s Meeting with CEOs of Chinese Companies. India‘s

Prime Minister held a meeting with CEOs of top Chinese companies,including Jack Ma of Alibaba and Lin Min of Xiaomi in Shanghai. A conference of Indian and Chinese CEOs followed the meeting with 21 Memorandums of Understanding

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(MoUs) worth $22 billion being signed. China was the world‘s manufacturing base and India runs the ―back-offices‖, it would be best if the two collaborate on digital commerce.

(h) Significance of Prime Minister‟s Visit to China.

(i) Prime Minister Narendra Modi said that his visit to China would deepen bilateral ties and create a new milestone for Asian relations. (ii) Emphasis in India-China relations has been on enhancing the economic relations to nullify the strategic differences and other irritants. (iii) The Indian Prime Minister‘s reciprocal visit to China was significant for enhancing the bilateral relations, especially relating to trade and economics. (iv) Address India‘s concernsat the trade deficit by stating that both countries were cognisant of this deficit and were taking steps to address it. (v) The 21 agreements worth $22 billion signed between the Indian and Chinese companies underlined the growing economic ties between the two countries. (vi) Reiterated the principle of ‗equity‘ and common but differentiated responsibilities to address issues of Climate Change and also reiterated the support of both countries for the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol. (vii) Extending e-visas to Chinese citizens was seen as a significant measure to enhance people-to-people exchanges which are vital for thawing the bilateral relations between India and China. (viii) India‘s Prime Minister Narendra Modi delivered a clear message to China on all issues of concern and stressed the need for China to reconsider its approach on some of the issues that hold the relations back from realising full potential of their partnership. (ix) Prime Minister Modi was accorded a high-level reception in the first stop of the visit in Xian. (x) The first India-China State and Provincial Leaders‘ Forum meeting was held during the visit in the presence of the Chief Ministers of Gujarat and Maharashtra. (xi) India-China bilateral relations were poised to play a defining role in the

21st century in Asia and indeed globally.

(xii) Peace and tranquillity on the India-China border was recognised as an important guarantor for the development and continued growth of bilateral relations. (xiii) Pending a final resolution of the boundary question, the two sides committed to implementing the existing agreements and continue to make

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efforts to maintain peace and tranquillity in the border areas. (xiv) A record number of 45 agreements were signed during the visit, including 24 inter-government agreements in outer space, cyberspace, earthquake preparedness, maritime science, smart city, consular establishment, finance, education, exchange between political parties, States and Provinces, think tanks, etc. (xv) The visit was conducted in a very friendly atmosphere, with Prime Minister Narendra Modi being warmly received by the Government and people of China.

26. Conclusion. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi‘s visit to China was significant in trying to rebuild trust between the two countries after the two countries reached a flashpoint on issues like:-

(a) The Chinese incursions in Chumar (Ladakh) in Sep 2014. (b) The Indo-US moves on the South China Sea. (c) China building infrastructure projects in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). (d) Other areas of mistrust between the two countries are–China‘s activity in the Indian Ocean and the nature of its growing relations with India‘s neighbouring countries like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal. (e) In order to safeguard its security interests, India is modernising its military and building infrastructure along its border areas and is also coordinating with democracies like the US and Japan to maintain a balance of power in the region. (f) Apprehension in China that India was being drawn into a China-containment policy followed by the US and its allies Japan and Australia, under the veil of freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific. (g) The People‘s Daily of China suggested that the fundamental interests of China and India required peace, goodwill and cooperation. (h) India‘s main concerns that were restraining relations with China include the delay in the clarification of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and the use of territory in Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir (PoK) in defining the Pakistan-China economic corridor. (j) The clarification of the LAC should be part of the evolving process of confidence-building measures (CBMs) put in place for ensuring peace along the border. (j) Prime Minister Narendra Modi emphasised that the clarification of LAC could be done without prejudice to the position of both countries on the boundary question. (k) Prime Minister also stated with clarity, India‘s objections to the proposed Pakistan-China economic corridor passing through PoK.

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(l) India‘s Prime Minister suggested the need for both countries to overcome the strategic differences and build further momentum to realise a strong India-China

partnership for the 21stcentury.

(m) China‟s Stand on Expansion of UN Security Council (Sep 15).

(i) In a setback to India's bid for a permanent seat in an expanded UN Security Council, the US, along with Russia and China, has opposed negotiations to reform the powerful UN body, refusing to contribute to a text that will form the basis for the long-drawn reform process. (ii) China said that UNSC reform is multifaceted, covering not only issues such as enlarging the Council's membership and strengthening representation, but also increasing efficiency and improving working methods. It added that Member States are still seriously divided on the Security Council reform and no general agreement has been reached on any solution so far. (iii) According to China UNSC reform should not be carried out at the expense of the unity of Member States. China also stated that all member States will remain committed to the inter governmental negotiations process, adopt a flexible and pragmatic attitude, gradually build mutual trust and meet each other halfway. No solution on which Member States are seriously divided or approach that may cause division among Member States will have China's Support.

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CHAPTER - 7

INDO - CENTRAL ASIAN REGION (CAR) RELATIONS Introduction 1. Five Central Asian Republics. Comprises of the five former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Its population of 50 million people includes over 100 different ethnic groups, the dominant group being Uzbeks. The region borders China, Russia, Iran and Pakistan. 2. Third Largest Hydrocarbon Resource. The Caspian Sea in Central Asia is the third largest hydrocarbon resource after the Persian Gulf and Siberia. It has 16% of the world‘s oil resource and 53% of the world‘s gas resource. The littoral States of the Caspian Sea include Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Iran and Russia.

3. Landlocked Countries. The Central Asian Republics are landlocked and seek transit routes for their oil and gas resources. Their economies have suffered severe hardships due to the wars in the Caucasus, Russia‘s non-cooperation in the construction of oil pipelines westwards, civil war in Afghanistan and the US sanctions against Iran which has discouraged international investors from investing in oil pipelines through Iran.

4. Islamic Factor. The independence of the Central Asian Republics coincided with the globalisation of the ‗Islamic factor‘ as a vital socio-political and cultural force in the world politics, according to analysts. Most of the Central Asian Republics are secular but are currently threatened by the fundamentalist Islamic militants.

5. External Forces. The spread of international terrorism into Central Asia from the Afghan-Pakistan hub is leading to a strategic realignment of external forces according to analysts. India and Russia will have to play a greater role in the region to curb the spread of terrorism.

6. CAR Key to Stability in Eurasia. Analysts point out that the Central Asian Republics hold the key to the stability and security of Eurasia and the world. Caspian Sea basin in Central Asia with its untapped oil and mineral wealth will determine the course of global relations in the next century.

7. Security Pact between Four Central Asian Countries. Four Central Asian countries- Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan- met in Tashkent on 21 Apr 2000 to sign a security pact to jointly combat terrorism, political and religious extremism and transnational organised crime. The decision was taken after a series of recent terrorist attacks. The Uzbek President Mr Islam Karimov cited Afghanistan as the main source of fanaticism and extremism in the region.

Importance of Central Asia to India

8. Common Concerns. India and the Central Asian Republics have friendly relations and share common concerns like fundamentalism ethno-nationalism and trans-border terrorism. The Central Asian Republics are basically secular and are not inclined towards

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Islamic fundamentalism. On Kashmir they fully support India‘s position. This will be significant to India from its security point of view.

9. The Central Asian Republics are passing through a difficult formative stage of nation building. Tajikistan has remained relatively unstable due to inter-ethnic and inter-clan conflicts. The other republics are also vulnerable to these problems, according to analysts. The growing instability in the region has always had a direct effect on India‘s security. Thus, it is in India‘s strategic interests to ensure that the region remains stable and that no external powers exploit the situation.

10. Sharing of Intelligence. Faced with the common threat of terrorism from the Afghan-Pakistan hub, India and the Central Asian countries have decided to share intelligence. There is common concern about determining the location of terrorist camps, cross-border networking of insurgents and their financial back-up.

11. India‟s Energy Security. Analysts feel that the Central Asian Republics with their large resources of oil and gas will be of crucial importance to India‘s energy security in future. They can also be significant economic partners of India in future.

12. Great Game for Oil in Central Asia.

(a) The Great Game for Oil in Central Asia pits the Western oil companies against Russia. Analysts point out that India is set to play an important role in the oil geopolitics in Central Asia and Russia. (b) Observers feel that the real game is between India and China. (c) Analysts feel that the Central Asian Republics and Russia were trying to balance China by bringing in India. (d) The agreement on Satpayev oil block in Kazakhstan signed during the visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Afghanistan in Apr 2011 gave India its first foothold in Central Asia. The ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) is likely to commit Rs 2,500 crore in the project which could lead to other prospects elsewhere in the region. (e) India is also discussing the Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (TAPI) gas pipeline to select an operator for the project from among the US, Russian and Chinese companies. The operator would build the pipeline and transport the gas while absorbing the risks. (f) India is also negotiating for a stake in the Russian strategic hydrocarbon reserves in Trebs, Titov and Sakhalin-III. (g) India has three phase oil diplomacy in the region - Oil exploration contract in Kazakhstan, TAPI gas pipeline and a stake in the Russian hydrocarbon reserves.

Importance of India to Central Asia. 13. Common Threat from Fundamentalism. India‘s importance to the Central Asian Republics is seen in the context of the common fundamentalist threat shared by India and

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these nations. In Feb 1999, the Uzbek Capital of Tashkent was rocked by bomb blasts on selected targets by Pakistan-backed fundamentalists. India could play a key role in the broader fight against fundamentalism in these countries. 14. India‟s Increased Involvement in Commercial & Security Arenas. The growing evidence of Pakistan‘s involvement in cross-border terrorism in this region has enhanced India‘s diplomatic clout, according to analysts. Pakistan‘s backing of terrorists has made the Central Asian countries to distance themselves from Islamabad. Unlike Pakistan the Central Asian republics have more faith in India and want its increased involvement both in commercial as well as security arenas.

15. India‟s Role in a Stable Afghanistan. The continuing instability in Afghanistan has affected the economic prosperity of these countries. The economic prosperity of the oil and gas rich Central Asian Republics is held at ransom by the Afghan crisis as oil and gas pipelines have to pass through Afghanistan. India is playing a major role in reconstruction of Afghanistan to bring lasting peace and stability to the region, according to analysts. Prime Minister Narendra Modi‟s Visit to CAR (06-13 Jul 2015). 16. Agenda for the Visit.

(a) Range of issues from increasing trade and investment to counter-terrorism. (b) Improved surface connectivity. (c) Energy security. (d) Meetings with leaders of the Central Asian Republics. (e) Signing of bilateral agreements.

17. Visit to Uzbekistan.

(a) Talks with Uzbekistan President in the Capital Tashkent.

(i) Important bilateral and regional issues including the situation in Afghanistan. (ii) India and Uzbekistan signed three pacts to boost cooperation between their foreign offices and in the field of tourism and culture. (iii) Enhancing strategic, economic and energy relations. (iv) Support for a genuine Afghan-owned process of peaceful revival of the country. (v) Strengthen coordination between the law enforcement agencies and special services of both countries.

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(b) Uranium from Uzbekistan.

(i) Both leaders discussed steps to implement the contract for supply of uranium from Uzbekistan signed earlier.

(ii) In 2014, Uzbek state-owned mining firm had agreed to supply 2,000 tonnes of uranium ore to India in a period of four years.

(c) India asked Uzbekistan to join the North-South corridor that would connect India and the ports of Iran to transport corridors leading up to Central Asia and Russia. (d) India sought the support of Uzbekistan to join the Ashgabat agreement, for setting up a transit and transport corridor between Uzbekistan, Iran, Turkmenistan and Oman.

18. Visit to Kazakhstan.

(a) Talks with Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev in the Capital Astana. (b) India and Kazakhstan Signed Five Agreements, including a contract for supply of uranium for four years and a defence agreement to enhance military cooperation.

(c) 5,000 Tonnes of Uranium to India. (i) The signing of the contract to supply India 5,000 tonnes of uranium from 2015 to 2019 was a testimony to the systematic development of cooperation in the energy sphere. (ii) Kazakhstan is the world‘s leading producer of uranium and had earlier supplied 2,100 tonnes of uranium to India between 2010 and 2014. (iii) Kazakhstan was one of the first countries with which India launched civil nuclear cooperation.

(d) Indian Prime Minister‟s Address at Nazarbayev University.

(i) Both India and Central Asia can not achieve their full potential without each other; nor would the region be more stable without cooperation from the two. (ii) Both countries would strengthen defence and security cooperation in the region. (iii) Both countries would also combat terrorism by the strength of their values and common commitment to humanism. (iv) Central Asia had always rejected the forces of extremism and this was an important source of strength that brought India and Central Asia together.

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19. Visit to Turkmenistan.

(a) Talks with Turkmenistan President in the Capital Ashgabat.

(i) Step up efforts against cross-border threats of terrorism, organised crime and illegal drug trafficking and stressed on their commitment for a stable Afghanistan. (ii) Terrorism as a major threat facing the region and stressed that both countries had shared interests in a peaceful and stable Afghanistan and Central Asia. (iii) Both countries also had a common purpose in combating terrorism and extremism in the region. (iv) Need to enhance connectivity which was a key aspect of the relationship. (v) The Indian Prime Minister proposed that Turkmenistan should become part of the International North-South Corridor.

(b) Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) Gas Pipeline.

(i) The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline project is $10 billion project with over 1,800 km pipeline to supply 3.2 billion cubic feet of natural gas per year from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. (ii) The TAPI gas pipeline was expected to be operational by 2018. (iii) The TAPI gas pipeline project was a significant initiative in the relationship between India and Turkmenistan. (iv) The Indian Prime Minister conveyed to the President of Turkmenistan that multiple options should be explored for the TAPI project including the land-sea route through Iran. (v) The TAPI gas pipeline could transform regional economic cooperation and bring prosperity along the route. (vi) Readiness for India‘s long-term investment in the energy sector in Turkmenistan.

(c) Joint Statement.

(i) Called TAPI project a key pillar of economic engagement between the two countries. (ii) Both leaders recognised that the implementation of the TAPI project would have a transformational impact on trade.

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(iii) Both leaders decided to take measures for early implementation of this important regional project. (iv) The two leaders affirmed their strong commitment toward stimely implementation of this strategic project, and noted that the selection of its Consortium Leader, to be finalised by 01 Sep 2015, would mark a crucial step.

(d) India and Turkmenistan signed seven agreements, including an agreement on cooperation in the field of defence.

20. Visit to Kyrgyzstan.

(a) Talks with Kyrgyzstan President in Capital Bishkek.

(i) Both countries sought a peaceful and secure neighbourhood at a time of challenges in the region and had shared interest in combating extremism and terrorism that had become a threat without borders. (ii) India‘s Prime Minister thanked Kyrgyzstan‘s strong support for permanent membership of India in an expanded UN Security Council (UNSC). (iii) The Indian Prime Minister sought the Kyrgyzstan President‘s support for early completion of the UN reforms.

(b) Defence Ties.

(i) Bilateral defence ties between India and Kyrgyzstan were strong and a joint exercise Khanjar 2015 had just been completed. (ii) Both countries had decided to hold joint military exercises on an annual basis. (iii) The new agreement on defence cooperation would provide a framework to broaden bilateral engagement which would also include defence technology.

(c) Four Agreements and Two MoUs.

(i) India and Kyrgyzstan signed four agreements including one to increase defence cooperation and hold annual joint military exercises. (ii) Two MoUs were also signed for cooperation between the Election Commissions of the two countries and on cooperation in the sphere of Standards.

(d) Indian Prime Minister donated medical equipment for a Level-II field hospital and inaugurated the first telemedicine link between India and Central Asia. (e) Joint Statement.

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(i) Both sides expressed grave concern at the rising trend of extremism, radicalism and terrorism in the region and the whole world. (ii) The Indian side appreciated the steps taken by the Kyrgyzstan government in combating terrorism and in retaining the secular character of Kyrgyz society. (iii) The two sides agreed to expeditiously consider signing an agreement on combating international terrorism and other crimes.

21. Visit to Tajikistan.

(a) Talks with Tajikistan President in Capital Dushanbe.

(i) Both leaders pledged to intensify cooperation against terrorism. (ii) Mr Modi noted that the two countries were located in the proximity of the menace. (iii) Both leaders also agreed to increase defence cooperation. (iv) The Indian Prime Minister reiterated his country‘s commitment to support to the development of Tajikistan‘s defence capacities to enhance stability and security. (v) The talks also focused on boosting trade, investment and connectivity.

(b) India and Tajikistan signed two agreements in the fields of skill development and culture. (c) Joint Statement.

(i) The two leaders noted the rising trend of extremism and terrorism in many parts of the world and in their immediate neighbourhood, posing a threat to India and Tajikistan as well as the region. (ii) Both leaders decided to reinvigorate official interactions in the framework of the Joint Working Group on Counter Terrorism and instructed that the JWG meet at an early date.

22. Significance of Prime Minister‟s Visit to CAR.

(a) Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi‘s visit to all the five Central Asian Republics was the first visit by an Indian Prime Minister since former Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru‘s visit in 1955. (b) Visit to all five Central Asian countries demonstrated the importance that India attached to a new level of relationship with Central Asia. (c) Gave impetus to trade, energy security, counter-terrorism and connectivity.

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(d) The Prime Minister‘s visit was significant in giving a fillip to trade between India and the Central Asian Republics as a number of agreements were signed with the aim of enhancing the trade ties. (e) India and Uzbekistan discussed steps to implement the contract of supply of 2,000 tonnes of Uranium by Uzbekistan to India and a contract was signed with Kazakhstan for the supply of 5,000 tonnes of uranium to India. (f) Mr Modi laid stress on counter-terrorism cooperation, training forces and countering radicalism. (g) The Central Asian Republics were worried about the growing numbers of their youth being attracted to the IS terror group in Iraq and Syria. (h) Given India‘s efforts to counter Islamic radicalism, these Central Asian countries that were moderate, democratic and secular were natural allies. (j) Prime Minister Narendra Modi‘s discussions on counter-terrorism and other security aspects with the leaders of the Central Asian countries were significant for India‘s national security strategy, as these countries border are neighbours of Afghanistan, where India is keenly observing the security situation after the pull out of US-led forces.

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CHAPTER - 8

INDO - EGYPT RELATIONS

1. Egyptian President‟s Visit to India (18-19 Mar 2013).

(a) First Visit by Egypt‘s New President Mohamed Morsi. Egypt‘s democratically elected new President Mohamed Morsi visited India for the first time in Mar 2013. (b) Seven Agreements Signed. Both sides signed seven agreements including a MoU on cyber security, setting up an IT centre in Egypt‘s Al Azhar University, cooperation in intellectual property rights and prevention of illicit traffic in antiquities. Agreements were also signed in areas related to information technology where both sides are eager to accelerate cooperation. (c) Enhancing Defence Cooperation. Both sides agreed to enhance their defence cooperation which had been stalled since the 1950s. (d) Both sides discussed regional and international issues including West Asia, the Gulf and the Northern African region. In these areas Egypt has considerable influence and India‘s position is also respected, according to analysts. (e) India conveyed its steadfast support to the Palestinian cause and expressed its deep appreciation for the role played by Egypt in trying to forge unity between the Palestinian groups and work towards a peaceful resolution of the long standing issue. Both sides agreed on the need for a peaceful resolution of all issues through dialogue. (f) Both sides were looking at cooperation in non-strategic areas such as socio-economic development programmes skill development, higher education, agriculture and health care. (g) India acknowledged the courage and sacrifices of the people of Egypt in ushering in a new era of democracy and appreciated the Egyptian President for able leading his country in building strong institutions and frameworks for democracy, social justice and inclusive economic development. (h) India emphasised that Egypt‘s successful transition to democracy would be an important model for the region and the world. (j) Mr Morsi invited Indian companies to participate in the Suez Canal corridor project which aims at developing the banks into a thriving financial and industrial centre. He pointed out that once developed; the project could become a hub for Indian exports to Africa and beyond.

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2. Significance of Visit.

(a) Egypt‘s location, as a bridge between Asia and Africa, astride a major global trade route and together with its skilled human resources makes it an attractive business destination for India, according to the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. (b) The agreements signed between India and Egypt during the Egyptian President‘s visit to India was a clear manifestation of their desire to impart a new dynamism to their relationship according to Dr Singh. (c) Egypt‘s President Mohamed Morsi said that his country wanted to enhance defence ties with India apart from exploring the small and medium enterprises. (d) Mr Morsi said that his visit showed that Egypt was keen to cooperate with India. (e) Mr Morsi pointed out that a true partnership with India would boost the revival of Egypt‘s economy, reinforce its security and institutionalise its fledgling democracy. He stressed that he was looking forward to a unique strong, institutional and mutually beneficial relationship with India. (f) For India, Egypt could be a hub for North Africa and Africa, according to the Egyptian President. (g) Analysts opine that improving relations with Egypt has geopolitical significance for India as it restores the balance in India‘s West Asia policy as well as its Africa policy.

Situation in Egypt 3. Court Ordered the Release of Former President Hosni Mubarak (21 Aug 2013).

4. Egypt Declared Muslim Brotherhood a Terrorist Group.

(a) On 25 Dec 2013, Egypt‘s military-installed government declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organisation banning all its activities. (b) The government would not allow it to even stage protests. (c) The government‘s declaration would increase the crackdown on the movement that resulted in the death of more than 1,000 people, mostly the Islamists, in street clashes.

5. Referendum on New Constitution (Jan 2014).

(a) On 02 Dec 2013, a 50-member panel appointed by the government completed amending Egypt‘s Constitution passed in 2012 under ex-President Mohamed Morsy. (b) The new Constitution required Presidents to declare their financial assets annually and empowered law makers to vote out an elected President with a two-third majority.

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(c) The new Constitution banned parties founded on religion or sect. (d) The new Constitution unequivocally stated the equality of men and women. (e) The new Constitution guaranteed the rights of Egyptians with special needs and the elderly. (f) The new Constitution gave the military unfettered freedom to choose the country‘s Defence Minister from within its ranks and granted him immunity for two, four-year presidential terms. (g) Egypt‘s new Constitution was put to referendum in mid-Jan 2014. (h) According to Egypt‘s election committee 98% of voters approved the new Constitution. (j) The High Election Committee said that 38.6% of Egypt‘s more than 53 million eligible voters participated in the referendum. (k) The supporters of deposed President Mohamed Morsi and the banned Muslim Brotherhood group boycotted the referendum.

6. Army Chief to Run for Presidency.

(a) On 27 Jan 2014, the Egypt‘s Supreme Council of the Armed Forces by consensus mandated the Army Chief and Defence Minister Field Marshal Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, to stand in presidential elections. (b) Egypt‘s interim President Adly Mansour issued a presidential decree on 27 Jan 2014, promoting the Army Chief to the rank of Field Marshal, the highest in the military. (c) Army Chief Field Marshal Abdel Fattah al-Sisi‘s popularity increased when he announced the ouster of Mr Morsy in Jul 2013 amid nationwide mass protests against the President.

7. Deposed President Mohamed Morsy‟s Stands Trial.

(a) Deposed President Mohamed Morsy stood trial (28 Jan 14) with 130 co-defendants in a case where he is accused of carrying out a plat to bring down the Egyptian state and its institutions. (b) Mr Morsy also faces three other trials, where he is accused of killing protesters, colluding with the Palestinian Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah to mount a terrorist campaign in Egypt. (c) If convicted, Mr Morsy could face the death penalty.

8. Legitimacy of the New Constitution.

(a) The 98% approval of the new Constitution in the referendum signalled its legitimacy, though doubts were expressed whether the new Constitution would be a

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stepping stone for a democratically elected government to take charge in Egypt, according to analysts. (b) New Constitution offered a semblance of stability to Egypt‘s efforts to move towards an era of freedom, civil rights and democracy. (c) The new Constitution is an improvement over the previous Constitution drafted by a Muslim Brotherhood committee. (d) New Constitution falls short of safeguarding minorities and protecting the rights of civilians. (e) With the Army Chief Field Marshal Abdel Fattah al-Sisi set to run for Presidential elections, Egypt runs the risk of returning to the authoritarian era. (f) Constitutional guarantees for enhanced powers and immunity for the army, police and judiciary have raised concerns that Egypt may slip back to authoritarian rule. (g) Egypt‘s road to democracy would depend on how the military handles the mandate of legitimacy given to it by the Constitution.

9. Death Sentences to Supporters of Ousted President Mohamed Morsy.

(a) On 24 Mar 2014, an Egyptian court sentenced 529 members of the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood to death for murder and other offences. (b) On 26 Apr 2014, an Egyptian court sentenced 13 supporters of deposed President Mohamed Morsy to prison terms ranging from five to 88 years for rioting. (c) On 28 Apr 2014, an Egyptian court sentenced to death 683 members of the Muslim Brotherhood, including the organisation‘s Supreme Guide, Mohamed Badie.

10. International Outcry.

(a) Mass death sentence passed by an Egyptian court against the supporters of the ousted President Mohamed Morsy triggered an outcry among the legal community in Egypt as well as international human rights groups. (b) The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt issued a statement accusing Egypt‘s military-backed interim authorities of launching genocide against protesters. (c) Egypt‘s Lawyer‘s Syndicate said that it would publicly expose the legal violations in the verdict. (d) The human rights group, Amnesty International, expressed outrage at the mass death sentences and condemned the ruling as ―grotesque‖.

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11. Presidential Election (26-27 May 2014).

(a) The Presidential election was held in Egypt after the frontrunner and former Army Chief Abdel Fattah al-Sisi deposed President Mohamed Morsy of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jul 2013 and crushed his Islamist movement. (b) The election was extended by a day amid reports of low turnout. (c) The Muslim Brotherhood and revolutionary youth groups boycotted the election. (d) The frontrunner and former Army Chief Abdel Fattah al-Sisi won the election with 93.3% of the votes cast. (e) Around 46% of Egypt‘s 54 million voters participated in the elections. (f) The low voter turnout was attributed to voters staying home duo to political apathy, opposition to military man becoming the President, discontent at suppression of freedoms among the liberal youth, and calls for boycott by the Muslim Brotherhood. (g) Observers from the European Union said that the Presidential election did not meet the Egyptian constitutional principles of free association and expression.

12. Implications of former Army Chief as President.

(a) Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is seen by supporters as a strong leader who can end the turmoil in Egypt since the revolution that ousted Hosni Mubarak. (b) Critics of the new President expressed fears that the former Army Chief could be another autocrat who would preserve the Army‘s interests and derail hopes of democracy and reform. (c) Mr Sisi was unlikely to make any significant policy changes in the country‘s foreign policy. (d) Major global and regional powers were unlikely to criticise the new President‘s policies on both the international and domestic front. (e) The US government wants to continue its $1.5 billion annual aid to Egypt, most of which is utilised for arms purchase from US firms. (f) Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, all of which are not comfortable with the Muslim Brotherhood, had donated $12 billion to Egypt in recent years. (g) Major global and regional powers including Israel give precedence to stability over democracy in Egypt.

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13. Summary: Indo - Egypt Relations.

(a) The popular protests against President Hosni Mubarak and his subsequent removal from power in 2011 drove Egypt into deep political instability. Presidential elections held in 2012 saw the emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood coming to power and Mohammed Morsi becoming the President of Egypt. Morsi visited India in Mar 2013 and both countries signed agreements on information and communication technology, cyber security, cultural heritage, micro and small enterprises, vocational training etc. Morsi's rule ended abruptly due to intervention by the military and Abdel Fattah El Sisi became the new president of Egypt. (b) Throughout the political turmoil in Egypt, India has consistently expressed solidarity with the people of Egypt appealing to the leadership to see the winds of change and address the aspirations of the youth. As Sisi continues to restore peace and order in his country, he has shown substantial interest in reviving India-Egypt relationship. India has invited Sisi for the upcoming Third India-Africa Forum Summit to be held in New Delhi in Oct this year. Nitin Gadkari, Minister of Shipping, Road Transport and Highways visited Egypt as the Prime Minister's representative to attend the opening ceremony of the New Suez Canal in 05 Aug 2015. (c) The visit of Minister for External Affairs Sushma Swaraj to Cairo on 23-24 Aug 2015 was intended to bring both the countries closer by identifying mutual issues of concern and pledging to work together. Fighting terrorism has been identified as an important issue for both India and Egypt as they are concerned with the growing menace of the Islamic State (IS). As the IS continues to spread its activities throughout the region, both India and Egypt are trying their best to insulate themselves from the threat and cooperate in their fight against it. (d) India and Egypt signed an agreement in 1995 to combat terrorism and organised and transnational crime. Though not much cooperation has happened on the ground, the resurgence of terrorism throughout the region provides an opportunity for both countries to cooperate. (e) Since the death of Nasser and the subsequent weakening of the NAM, India-Egypt relationship has gone through a period of decline. Sisi is trying to bring Egypt back to the centre of regional politics as well as Arab affairs and may invite larger Indian role in the region. A pragmatic approach of dealing with the sensitive regional issues by India and Egypt will be in the interest of both.

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CHAPTER - 9

INDO - FRENCH RELATIONS

Introduction 1. Improvement in Indo-French Relations. There has been a marked improvement in Indo-French relations after years of neglect, which saw a stagnation of trade, the limited French interest in the Indian market, and the French interest in arms sale to Pakistan. 2. Reasons for Improvement in Relations.

(a) Common Strategic Interests. India and France share many common strategic interests and concerns. (b) Political Autonomy. Both have strong traditions of political autonomy. (c) Multipolarity. Both have a stake in promoting multipolarity in international relations. Both the countries favour a more equitable international system, in line with new demographic, economic and geo-political realities. France wants Europe to be one of the poles in the new order and India another. (d) Agreement on Civilian Nuclear Cooperation. France has shown a better understanding of the underlying reasons for India‘s nuclear tests. India and France signed a bilateral agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation in Sep 2008. French help in talks with the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) were crucial in seeking changes to the rules governing exports of nuclear goods within the NSG. (e) Defence Cooperation. The Indo-French defence cooperation goes back to the 1950‘s with uninterrupted sales and maintenance despite India's 1998 nuclear tests. The French Mirage-2000 aircraft plays a strategic role in the Indian defence plans. Currently, India and France are engaged in increasing the military cooperation in many fields. (f) UN Security Council Membership for India. France has backed India‘s claim to permanent membership in an expanded UN Security Council. It is the third permanent member of the Security Council - after Russia and Britain- to publicly back India‘s claim.

3. Key Areas of Relationship.

(a) Cooperation in Key Areas. Academic exchanges, scientific and technical cooperation in high technology, and industrial cooperation through the development of direct investment. (b) Global Issues that Require a Collective Response. The combat against global warming and emerging diseases, and world economic and financial regulation. In this regard, the suggestion of France to enlarge the Group of 8

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(G-8) to G-13 to include India, China, Brazil, South Africa and Mexico is significant for India.

Background 4. Assistance during Wars. During the UN embargo on arms supplies to India in 1965 following the Pakistani attack, France under the leadership of General De Gaulle came to India‘s assistance. During the Bangladesh war also the French attitude was sympathetic. 5. Nuclear Energy. There has been a long period of Indo-French cooperation in the field of nuclear energy and space technology. France replaced the US as the supplier of low enriched uranium for Tarapur reactor. The arrangement continued till the 90‘s when the France joined the NPT.

6. Foreign Policy of France. Analysts feel that France has been conducting three foreign policies & India has experienced all the three foreign policies of France:-

(a) As part of the Western alliance. (b) In exercise of its own independence. (c) To serve its commercial interests.

7. Strategic Dialogue.

(a) Proposal Formalised in 1988. The decision for a strategic dialogue was taken in Jan 1998, during the French President‘s visit to India. The proposal was formalised during the former Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee‘s visit to France in 1998. (b) Issues Covered by the Dialogue. The Indo-French Strategic Dialogue covers a wide range of issues including the strategic balance in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, India‘s relations with China and Pakistan, India‘s nuclear doctrine, the progress in the unification of European Union, and NATO and its doctrine.

8. Bilateral Ties.

(a) France backed India at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) meetings in 2008 that ended India‘s isolation from the civil nuclear mainstream. (b) France is one of the few countries, apart from the US and Russia, with whom India has signed a nuclear cooperation agreement. (c) India and France continue to hold joint naval exercises and France was selected as the Indian Air Force‘s first partner for joint fighter level exercises in 2003. (d) France is India‘s third largest supplier of defence equipment and has maintained it as a reliable partner.

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9. Significance of Agreement on Civil Nuclear Energy.

(a) Participation in Civil Nuclear Programme. The signing of the Indo-French Agreement on cooperation in civil nuclear energy reflects that interest in participating in India's civil nuclear energy programme is not limited to the US only. India need not depend entirely on the US for nuclear fuel and reactor supplies as and when it is able to import both for its civil nuclear programme. (b) The Agreement brings out the fact that there is more to civil nuclear cooperation than mere supply of fuel or transfer of nuclear technology. India and France have additional cooperation in the civil nuclear energy sector in the form of Indo-French Joint Committee on Atomic Energy along with an on-going dialogue between the nuclear safety authorities of the two countries. (c) India as a Non-Proliferating Nuclear Power. Analysts point out that the civil nuclear agreement strengthens India's position as a non-proliferating nuclear power. The French President Nicolas Sarkozy complimented India on its non-proliferation record and noted its moratorium on further nuclear weapon testing.

10. French Rafale MMRCA.

(a) Features of Dassault Rafale MMRCA.

(i) Length - 15.27m (ii) Wingspan - 10.80m (iii) Empty Weight - 9,500 kg (iv) Loaded Weight - 14,016 kg (v) Fuel Capacity - 4,700 kg (vi) Top Speed - 2,130 km/h (vii) Range - 3,700 km (viii) Powerplant - 2 x Snecma M88-2 (ix) Crew- 1-2

(b) The Rafale is a twin-engine, delta-wing jet which can fly in high altitude with a speed of up to 2,130 km/hr. (c) It has been in service for the French Air Force since 2006 and has played air support roles in the Afghan war and NATO‘s campaign in Libya in 2011. (d) India has chosen the Rafale MMRCA to replace the Indian Air Force‘s (IAF) ageing MiG-21s and augment its fleet of Sukhoi 30MKIs. (e) The acquisition of the Rafale MMRCA would help the IAF to overcome the problem of reducing number of squadrons.

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(f) The French Rafale is capable of air-to-air, air-to-surface and carrier-based missions. It has a more advanced radar system and can be configured to land on an aircraft carrier. (g) Another advantage of the Rafale is that it is logistically and operationally similar to the Mirage-2000, hence the IAF would require only a few changes to the existing infrastructure. (h) The Rafale can carry nuclear payloads and with modifications could be inducted by the Navy for its aircraft carrier force. (j) The Rafale MMRCA would give the IAF capability of performing a variety of role with the same number of platforms, according to defence analysts. (k) The acquisition of the French Rafale MMRCA widens India‘s strategic options in a multi-polar world, according to analysts. The deal could provide leverage to India to increase cooperation with France in a wide range of sectors, especially in the defence and nuclear fields where technology and expertise could be shared. France had said that it would not be bound by the new NSG ban on the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) equipment. (l) The French President Nicolas Sarkozy said that winning the contract for the supply of 126 MMRCA to India concerns more than aviation, it was a vote of confidence in the entire French economy. (m) The deal would give momentum to France‘s interest in working with India on important global issues like bringing changes in the international nuclear order, according to analysts.

11. French President Francois Hollande‟s Visit to India (14 - 15 Feb 2013).

(a) Talks with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. (b) Economic Ties.

(i) Agreed to give a boost to economic relations between India and France after disappointing results from the earlier plans. (ii) In 2012 the bilateral trade between the two countries was $9.4 billion as both countries failed to meet the target of € 12 billion.

(c) Energy.

(i) Agreed to strengthen bilateral civil nuclear scientific cooperation while expressing satisfaction over the current collaborative projects in peaceful uses of nuclear energy. (ii) Reviewed the progress on the initial setting up of two European Pressurised Reactors (EPRs) at Jaitapur

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(iii) Negotiations are being held since the last three years between India‘s Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) and Areva SA of France for the construction of six EPRs at Jaitapur

(d) Defence.

(i) Laid emphasis on strengthening cooperation in high technology programmes and projects including joint research and development and transfer of technology. (ii) The leaders noted that the projects for the Scorpion submarine and the upgrade of Mirage 2000 were moving forward. (iii) Concluded negotiations for the Short-Range Surface-to-Air Missile (SRSAM) (iv) Noted the progress of the on-going negotiations on the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) programme and looked forward to the conclusion. (v) Wanted to continue the cooperation in combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden and other areas.

(e) MoU Signed for Cooperation in Railways. 12. Significance of French President‟s Visit.

(a) First Visit to a Large Asian Country. (b) While India and France were strategic partners in defence, space and energy, there was need to expand the cooperation and create economic and business partnerships. (c) The French President‘s visit pointed to the keenness of taking the strong diplomatic, political and strategic bilateral ties to a new level (d) In Jan 2013, India had backed the decision of France to send troops to Mali to oust the Islamist rebels who had taken over northern Mali (e) Indo-French defence and security cooperation have gained momentum in recent years with both countries having greater naval cooperation to combat sea piracy (f) India and France agreed to enhance the two-way trade by having an annual dialogue on economic and financial issues.

13. Growing Bilateral Ties.

(a) France backed India at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) meetings in 2008

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(b) France is one of the few countries, apart from the US and Russia, with whom India has signed a nuclear cooperation agreement. (c) India and France continue to hold joint naval exercises and France was selected as the Indian Air Force‘s first partner for joint fighter level exercises in 2003. (d) Trade, cultural and people-to-people contacts are being worked on by both sides. (e) France is India‘s third largest supplier of defence equipment and has maintained it as a reliable partner.

French Foreign Minister‟s Visit (30 Jun to 01 Jul 2014). 14. First Western Visitor to India after New Government.

(a) French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius visited India from 30 Jun to 01 Jul 2014. (b) Mr Fabius was the first high-level Western visitor to India after the formation of a new Government in India. (c) French Foreign Minister met Prime Minister Narendra Modi, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj and Defence and Finance Minister Arun Jaitley. (d) Both sides reiterated their commitment to further strengthen and expand bilateral relations (e) Both countries reiterated their commitment to take forward the bilateral relations in defence, trade and nuclear energy. (f) India‘s Prime Minister sought French cooperation in urban planning, tourism, skill development and low-cost defence manufacturing (g) France was keen to expand the cooperation and relationship following the assumption of office by the new Government in India (h) Next step was for the French firm Dassault and for the Indian government to discuss the details and hopefully reach a conclusion at the earliest.

15. Dassault Rafale Deal.

(a) On 31 Jan 2012, India selected Fighter Dassault Rafale over the Eurofighter Typhoon in the $10 billion contract for the supply of 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) (b) On 24 Jun 2014, Defence Minister Arun Jaitley stated that the Centre would take considered decision on the deal. (c) A ―work share‖ formula between Dassault, the French firm manufacturing the fighter jets, and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) had been achieved

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(d) 18 fighter jets would be flown in from France and the remaining 108 would be manufactured in India. (e) HAL would have a technology transfer arrangement with Dassault and Snecma, the French engine maker. (f) Induction of Dassault Rafale fighter jets which have been in action in Afghanistan and North Africa, would bolster the ―Air Dominance‖ doctrine of the Indian Air Force (IAF). (g) The IAF has already invested in the multi-role SU-30 planes and Mirage-2000 fighters, capable of launching deep strikes instead of restricting themselves to only air defence. (h) France has already converted part of their fleet for nuclear weapons delivery, however, it is not clear if these fighter jets would become part of India‘s ―Nuclear Triad‖ if the IAF inducts the Dassault Rafale jets in its fleet.

16. Cooperation in Civil Nuclear Energy. (a) France has submitted a tender for two 1,650 megawatts nuclear reactors for Jaitapur site in Maharashtra and intends to add four more nuclear reactors at this site. (b) India‘s Nuclear Liability Law, which puts the onus of compensation on the supplier, in case of a nuclear accident was not an issue between India and France

17. Co-Development of SRSM „Maitri‟ Missile.

(a) The French Foreign Minister was also slated to discuss with the Indian Government, the conclusion of the SRSM (Short-Range Surface-to-air Missile) ‗Maitri‘ missile programme to be co-developed by the DRDO and the French MBDA.

18. Significance of Visit.

(a) Significant as it helped in removing hurdles to the emergence of a full-fledged strategic partnership between the two countries. (b) India and France have a mutually beneficial relationship with France keen on trading its high technology and India looking to boost its defence preparedness, energy security and international profile. (c) Significant progress towards concluding the Dassault Rafale fighter jets multibillion dollar deal and the stalled contract for two French nuclear reactors at Jaitapur in Maharashtra. (d) The nuclear deal to set up two 1,650 megawatts nuclear reactors at Jaitapur and add another four reactors would lead to an installed capacity of 10,000 megawatts. (e) The Rafale deal and the European Pressurised Reactors (EPR) would give India advanced technology through transfers of state-of-the-art know how.

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(f) The political significance of the French Foreign Minister‘s visit was that it provided India an opportunity to enhance its relations with Europe which remained a major player in a multipolar world.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi‟s Visit to France (10-11 Apr 2015). 19. India‘s Prime Minister Narendra Modi started his nine-day visit to France, Germany and Canada on 10 Apr 2015. A common theme of the visit to the three nations was that all of them were G7 countries, they had industrialised democracies, and India has considerable economic interest in partnering with these countries which was relevant to its industrial programmes. 20. 36 Rafale Fighter Jets (Flyaway Condition). At a joint press conference with the French President Francois Hollande, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced that keeping in mind the critical operational necessity of fighter jets in India, he had requested the French President for 36 Rafale jets in flyaway condition as quickly as possible under a government-to-government deal. 21. Reasons behind Direct Purchase. Three key reasons for the direct purchase of 36 Rafale fighter jets from France.

(a) Depleting strength of fighter jets of the IAF. (b) Long delays in the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) negotiations. (c) Sharp increase in price.

22. The Indian Air Force‘s (IAF) fighter aircraft strength decreased to 34 squadrons from the sanctioned 42 and would further decrease due to phasing out of the Russian MiG-21s and MiG-27s in the years ahead. 23. The replacements in the form of Medium Multi-Role Aircraft (MMRCA) and Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas were subject to long delays. 24. The price increase to over $20 billion was also seen as a concern with other major modernisation programmes in the offing, according to analysts. 25. A direct purchase of the Rafale jets would cut down the costs as there was no technology transfer and the delivery of the jets would also be quicker. Cooperation in Civil Nuclear Energy 26. India and France signed 17 pacts after the talks between Prime Minister Modi and President Francois Hollande. Both countries signed an agreement to go ahead with the stalled nuclear project in Jaitapur in Maharashtra. Under the Jaitapur project, French company Areva was to set up six nuclear reactors with a total power generation capacity of 10,000 MW. The Jaitapur project has been stalled due to differences over the cost of the power generated. The current agreement was signed between India‘s Larsen and Toubro and French Areva with aim of cutting costs by increasing localisation and to improve the financial viability of the Jaitapur project.

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French Support for „Make in India‟ 27. The „Make in India‟ initiative received a boost when Airbus, the aircraft manufacturer, said that it planned to raise its Indian outsourcing to $2 billion and was keen to manufacture in India. When Mr Modi visited the Airbus facility in Toulouse in France, the Airbus CEO Tom Enders said that Airbus supported Indian Prime Minister‘s ‗Make in India‘ call and was ready to manufacture in India, for India and the world. 28. French President Announced $1 Billion Investment in India for Infrastructure Development. France would partner India in urban development of infrastructure such as railways and defence and nuclear sector, according to Mr Hollande. 29. France and India signed a Railway protocol which seeks to establish cooperation between Indian French Railways for semi-high speed rail and station renovation. Under the Railway protocol, Indian Railways and French National Railways (SNCF) would co-finance an execution study by SNCF for a semi-high speed project on upgrading the Delhi-Chandigarh line to 200 kms per hour and re-development of Ambala and Ludhiana railway stations in Punjab. 30. France would also help in development of „Smart Cities‟ in India to be identified by the Indian government. 31. Significance of the Prime Minister‟s Visit to France.

(a) Analysts point out that defence and nuclear energy are two main areas of Indo-French strategic partnership and Prime Minister Narendra Modi‘s visit to France was significant in producing substantial movement in these areas. (b) Mr Modi‘s visit to France helped in proceeding forward with the Jaitapur nuclear project which was stalled for a long time. (c) Another key aspects of significance was the French support for ‗Make in India‘ initiative, especially in defence sector and the plan of Airbus to manufacture in India and increasing its Indian outsourcing to $2 billion. (d) During Mr Modi‘s visit the French President Francois Hollande announced an investment of $1 billion in India‘s infrastructure development including construction of high-speed railway lines and development of ‗smart cities‘. (e) It was also significant that India and France agreed to cooperate on a space mission for Mars during the visit of the Prime Minister. (f) Anti-terror training, tackling climate change and renewable energy technologies were also discussed between the two sides during the Prime Minister‘s visit to France.

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CHAPTER - 10

INDO - GERMAN RELATIONS 1. Shift in Indo – German Relations.

(a) Security Interests. Germany, Europe‘s biggest economy, wants to enhance its relation with India. The political differences between India and Germany due to India‘s nuclear tests in 1998 have been resolved and both countries have developed a convergence of security-related interests in the region. (b) Def MoU in 2006. A major shift in Indo-German relation took place in 2006 with the signing of a defence Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) ending the political differences between the two countries. (c) Common Challenges. India and Germany recognise that they exert a benign influence in their regions and can contribute in ways that are positive in meeting the common challenges they face. (d) German Change in Approach on Jammu & Kashmir. Germany has shed its earlier intrusive approach on Jammu and Kashmir and has condemned the terrorist incidents in India.

2. Increase in Indo-German Trade. Indo-German trade has been steadily increasing at an annual rate of 20% since the launch of India‘s economic reforms in 1991. The trade surplus was in India‘s favour during this period. Germany has been negotiating a reduction in India‘s import tariffs as intermediate goods account for a large proportion of India‘s trade. Moreover, Germany being the largest exporter in the world would like to increase its share of Asia‘s huge market. 3. Germany Applauds India‟s Stable Polity & Economic Growth. German Chancellor Angela Merkel complimented India for its stable polity and high economic growth rate. However, she pointed out that India needs to address the question of low wages and widespread poverty. India needs to ensure that fair distribution of income and a proper strategy to alleviate poverty. 4. Production in Europe Tied to Growth in Asia. The German Chancellor pointed out that Europe had an interest in seeing higher economic growth in Asia as the potential to develop Europe‘s domestic market was limited. The possibility of increased production in Germany and Europe was tied to the growth potential in Asia. 5. Development Important to Counter Terrorism. Dr Merkel stressed that stable development of Asia was important to counter terrorism, especially in Pakistan, India and Indonesia. She felt that the political situation and the level of stability in Pakistan has not reached a satisfactory level. Narendra Modi‟s Visit to Germany 6. Second -Leg of Prime Minister‟s Three Nation Tour. Prime Minister Narendra

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Modi visited Germany from 12 to 14 Apr during the second leg of his three nation tour to France, Germany and Canada. 7. Inaugurated the Hannover Business Fair.

(a) India‘s Prime Minister Narendra Modi along with German Chancellor Angela Merkel inaugurated the Hannover business fair. (b) India was working on a predictable and transparent environment to open up investments. (c) ‗Make in India‘ was not a slogan or a brand but a new national movement. (d) Invited German investors to India stressing that the opportunities it offered were seamless and vast for a vibrant economic partnership. (e) Germany was India‘s valuable partner and the two countries shared a close and warm relationship that had grown in depth and diversity. (f) Germany was ready to give a new dimension to partnership with India.

8. India‘s Prime Minister and the German Chancellor held detailed discussions on various aspects of bilateral relations and international issued of mutual interest during their talks in Berlin. 9. Indo-German Economic Relations.

(a) Germany is the 8th

largest foreign investor in India with Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) of $995.7 million in 2014. (b) Currently, more than 1,600 Indo-German collaborations and around 600 Indo-German joint ventures were in operation. (c) In 2014, the overall exchange of goods and services between India and Germany was €15.96 billion a decrease of €1.14 billion in 2013. (d) India‘s exports to Germany increased to €7.03 in 2014 while imports decreased to €8.92 billion from €9.19 billion in 2013.

10. India-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Discussed.

(a) Prime Minister Narendra Modi sought German Chancellor Angela Merkel‘s help for an early conclusion of a balanced and mutually beneficial India-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which has been stalled for two years. (b) Ms. Merkel said that a FTA between India and the EU would require compromises by all sides. (c) The India-EU FTA was launched in 2007, the talks for a Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement between the two sides have not progressed much due to differences on key issues.

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(d) India and the European Union (EU) are yet to sort out issues related to tariffs and movement of professionals. (e) The EU wants significant duty reductions in automobiles, apart from tax reduction in wines,spirits and dairy products, as well as a strong intellectual property regime. (f) India wants the EU to grant it a ‗data secure nation‘ status. India is not considered data secure by the EU which has implications for India‘s IT units wanting EU market access. (g) Mr Modi said that he had requested Ms Merkel that India and EU should resume the negotiations quickly and conclude a balanced and mutually beneficial agreement at the earliest. (h) Development of India as a manufacturing hub and expansion of infrastructure of India would also be beneficial for trade. India‘s imports would also grow which would be beneficial for German companies. (j) Ms Merkel said that it was decided that talks should continue between India and the EU as both sides had come a long way and it would be desirable if they crossed the hurdle.

11. Third Indo-German. On 04 Oct 2015, German Chancellor Angela Merkel travelled to India for the Third Indo-German Inter-Governmental Consultations accompanied by members of her government (Minister for Foreign Affairs, Science & Technology Minister, Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development, Food & Agriculture Minister) and a contingent of business leaders. 12. Visit to Raj Ghat & Rashtrapati Bhavan. Angela Merkel visited Mahatma Gandhi's memorial & was accorded a ceremonial welcome at the Presidential Palace prior to the Third Indo-German Inter-Governmental Consultations which led to the signing of MoUs. Germany returned a 10th century relic, a state of the Hindu goddess Durga in her Mahishasuramardini avatar, which had been stolen from India. 13. Trade Discussions. On 6 Oct 2015, Prime Minister Narendra Modi held trade discussions on Indo-German science, technology & education cooperation with Angela Merkel in Bengaluru, India's aerospace and ICT hub, besides exploring opportunities to improve bilateral trade. 14. 18 MoUs Signed.

(a) Promotion of German as a foreign language in India and the promotion of modern Indian languages in Germany. (b) Summary record of the negotiations on development cooperation. (c) Indo-German solar energy partnership. (d) Skill development, vocational education and training. (e) Security cooperation.

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(f) Aviation security. (g) Disaster management. (h) Cooperation in agricultural studies. (j) Supporting participation of young Indian scientists in natural sciences for the Lindau Nobel Laureate Meetings. (k) Extension of the tenure of the Indo-German Science and Technology Centre (IGSTC). (l) Indo-German Partnerships in higher education (IGP). (m) Plant protection products. (n) Development of cooperation in the field of railways. (o) Cooperation in the field of manufacturing. (p) Setting up a fast-track system for German companies in India. (q) Cooperation in the field of advanced training of corporate executives and junior executives from India. (r) Cooperation in food safety between the Federal Institute for Risk Assessment (BFR) and the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI). (s) Cooperation in food safety between the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) and the Federal Office of Consumer Protection and Food Safety (BVL).

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CHAPTER - 11

INDO - IRAN RELATIONS

Introduction 1. Significance of Indo-Iran Relations.

(a) Shared Interests.

(i) India's Relations with Iran are marked by close historical, civilisational and multifaceted ties. (ii) Bilateral cooperation between India and Iran has acquired a strategic dimension with enhanced cooperation in the fields of energy, trade and commerce, information technology and commerce. (iii) Indo-Iranian political cooperation has rapidly increased since the mid-1990s. (iv) They have common interests in Afghanistan and Central Asia, India and Iran were affected by the policies of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Thus, preventing the Taliban from spreading their influence in the region became a shared objective between India and Iran. Their continuing cooperation in rebuilding the infrastructure in Afghanistan is a symbol of shared interests converging. (v) India and Iran are cooperating in building a transit corridor that would connect Afghanistan to Iran. India is also building the road link between Zaranj and Delaram. This corridor would connect Afghanistan's garland road system to the Chabahar port of Iran. Afghanistan would no longer depend solely on the Pakistani ports for its trade.

(b) Iran an Important Islamic Nation to Checkmate Pakistan. Analysts point out that India wants a powerful friend in the Islamic world to checkmate Pakistan. In this regard, Iran is an important Islamic nation well-endowed with oil and natural gas.

(c) Energy Security.

(i) Iran is a key factor in India‘s energy security calculations. Iran is the second largest supplier of oil to India. (ii) Iran is also India‘s potential gateway to Central Asia, Afghanistan and Europe. India and Iran are trying to develop transport corridors from India to these destinations through Iran.

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(d) Increased Cooperation in International Fora.

(i) Iran has blocked Pakistan's attempts to draft anti-India resolutions at the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC). (ii) India welcomed Iran's inclusion as an observer in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). (iii) India and Iran are observers at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

2. Outstanding Issues.

(a) Non-implementation of the bilateral liquefied natural gas deal. (b) Status of the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. (c) Iran's Nuclear Programme.

Background. 3. Improving Bilateral Relations. Over the past decades, Indo-Iranian relations have not been smooth. However, the bilateral relations started to improve since the visit of India‘s then Prime Minister, Mr. Narasimha Rao in 1993. 4. Iranian President‟s Visit to India in 1995. The then President of Iran, Mr Akber Hashemi Rafsanjani visited India in 1995. It was the first visit by an Iranian President to India after the Islamic Revolution had overthrown the Shah of Iran in 1979. 5. Efforts to Build on the Friendly Relations. India and Iran have been making efforts to build on the friendly relations. As moderates gained ground in Iran, India has reciprocated in good measure to the change in Iran‘s foreign policy and bilateral ties have expanded to new areas. Iran has shown its intent to push forward this positive trend to exploit the vast potential in the economic and commercial spheres. 6. Visit to India by Speaker of Iran.

(a) The Speaker of Iran‘s Parliament (Majlis), Ali Larijani visited India in Feb 2013. During his visit, Mr Larijani met President Pranab Mukherjee, the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid. (b) The Speaker of Iran‘s Parliament most important interaction was with India‘s National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon. (c) Both sides exchanged views on the available formats for making the payments for oil imported by India from Iran. India‘s difficulty in making payments for oil imported from Iran is due to sanctions on Iran and the stalled negotiations between Iran and the P5+1, according to analysts. (d) Both sides also discussed communication links along with Afghanistan. The first India-Iran-Afghanistan trilateral meeting was held in Aug 2012 on the eve of the Non-Aligned (NAM) Summit in Iran.

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(e) Both sides also discussed the opportunities available for India in the energy sector of Iran with a gas pipeline expected to reach the port of Chabahar and the declaration of a contiguous area as a free trade zone.

7. India‟s External Affairs Minister‟s Visit to Iran.

(a) Development of Chabahar Port.

(i) During his visit to Iran on 04 May 2013, India‘s External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid announced India‘s participation in the development of Iran‘s Chabahar port project. (ii) The Chabahar port in Iran is 76 km from the Gwadar port in Pakistan, which is being built and operated by China. (iii) The Chabahar port is strategically crucial and is Iran‘s best access point to the Indian Ocean.

(b) Significance of Chabahar Port.

(i) Analysts point out that India‘s participation in the development of the Chabahar port would reinforce its strategic ties with Iran and Afghanistan ahead of the withdrawal of the NATO forces from Afghanistan in 2014. (ii) India‘s participation in the up gradation of the Chabahar port would have geopolitical resonance, according to analysts. (iii) The development of the Chabahar port would lessen the landlocked Afghanistan‘s dependence on Pakistan‘s ports for access to the sea, according to analysts. (iv) It is also pointed out that the trilateral arrangement between India-Iran-Afghanistan would balance the joint forays in the Indian Ocean by Pakistan and China. (v) The handing over of the Gwadar port by Pakistan to China would provide sustained anchorage to Chinese ships on the edge of the Arabian Sea, nearer to the Strait of Hormuz, the gateway for the passage of the world‘s energy supplies. (vi) The handing over of the Gwadar port by Pakistan to China could have imparted urgency in India‘s decision to announce its participation in the upgradation of the Chabahar port. This would help in containing China‘s influence in the region, according to observers.

(c) Iran offered India a production sharing regime for oil exploration in off-shore Farzad B project.

(d) Both sides discussed ways to enhance trade relations and people-to-people contacts.

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8. Constructive Engagement.

(a) India‘s External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid said that his visit to Iran should be seen as the continuation of the tradition of constructive engagement between India and Iran. (b) The visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Iran for the NAM Summit in Aug 2012 was a clear expression of India‘s commitment and value it attached to its relations with Iran, according to Mr. Khurshid.

9. India, Iran and Afghanistan Need to Sign a Transit Agreement to Streamline their Logistical Lines. India‘s External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid emphasised that India, Iran and Afghanistan should sign a parallel transit agreement to streamline their logistical lines. 10. India and Iran Looking Beyond Energy to Impart Positive Momentum to Their Relationship. Analysts point out that the visit by the Iranian President to India helped in imparting positive momentum to their relationship. Despite the setback to bilateral relations after India's vote against Iran in the IAEA board, the two sides have shown maturity in reviving their bilateral relations. Indo-Iran relations now look beyond energy with both countries having shared geopolitical interests in Afghanistan alternative transit routes to Central Asia, West Asian Security and other areas. 11. Indo-Iran Cooperation would Strengthen Regional Stability and Security. Analysts feel that the growing Indo-Iran cooperation would strengthen regional stability and security. Iran has helped India establish a strategic hold in Afghanistan by allowing transit through Bandar Abbas port of Indian goods for reconstruction in Afghanistan. India does not want the Middle East to become a conflict zone and has advised Iran to exercise restraint and honour its international commitments as member of the NPT. Thus, Indo-Iran dialogue holds great potential, according to analysts. 12. Barack Obama‟s Address to the UN General Assembly (24 Sep 2013).

(a) Encouraged by the commitment of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani government to a more moderate course, underscoring that the path of diplomacy must be tested in negotiations. (b) Directing the US Secretary of State John Kerry to pursue this effort with the Iranian government, in close coordination with the European Union (EU), the UK, France, Germany, Russia and China. (c) Stressed that while persisting with the status quo might deepen Iran‘s isolation, Iran‘s genuine commitment to go down a different path would be good for the region and the world.

13. Iranian President‟s Address to the UN General Assembly (25 Sep 2013).

(a) Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said that he was prepared to engage in time-bound and results-oriented talks on Iran‘s nuclear programme.

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(b) Iran‘s two-pronged approach –It‘s nuclear programme had been, and would always be, exclusively for peaceful purposes; and it would retain the right to uranium enrichment and reject illegitimate pressures to impede the right. (c) Nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction had no place in Iran‘s security and defence doctrine, and contradicted its fundamental religious and ethical convictions. (d) Iran‘s national interests made it imperative that it removed all reasonable concerns about its peaceful nuclear programme. (e) The Iranian President emphasised that Iran‘s right to implementing enrichment activities domestically and its enjoyment of related nuclear rights would be the only path towards achieving the first objective of nuclear negotiations. (f) Iran‘s nuclear technology, including enrichment, had already reached industrial scale, and it was, therefore an illusion, and extremely unrealistic, to presume that the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme could be ensured through impeding the programme via illegitimate pressures

14. US-Iran Talks (UN).

(a) On 27 Sep 2013, the US and Iran held their first highest-level talks after a long gap at the United Nations. (b) The US Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif held the talks in positive terms. (c) Both sides had a very constructive meeting, according to Mr Kerry. He said that Mr Zarif had put some possibilities on the table, but insisted that there was more work to be done. (d) Iran proposed fully implementing an agreement on its nuclear programme within a year.

15. US and Iranian Presidents FirstTalk since 1979.

(a) In a bid to end more than three decades of estranged relations, the Presidents of the US and Iran spoke over the phone on 28 Sep 2013, and agreed to work on resolving global suspicions that Iran was trying to build a nuclear weapon. (b) The US President said that the long break underscored the deep mistrust between the two countries, but it also indicated the prospect of moving beyond that difficult history. (c) The Iranian President said that he wanted his trip to the UN to be a first step and a beginning for better and constructive relations with countries of the world as well as a first step for a better relationship between the two great nations of Iran and the United States of America.

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16. Support to the Iranian President.

(a) On 02 Oct 2013, Iran‘s Parliament strongly supported President Hassan Rouhani‘s US outreach to dispel mistrust between the two countries. (b) A group of 230 Parliamentarians, out of 290, signed a statement expressing support for the Iranian President for presenting the image of a powerful and peace-seeking Iran which saw talks and interaction for the settlement of regional and international issues. (c) On 05 Oct 2013, Iran‘s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said that he supported the diplomatic initiative of the government and attached importance to its activities in the trip to the UN. (d) However, the Iran supreme leader said that Iran was pessimistic towards the Americans and does not put trust in them.

17. Talks with P5+1 (Geneva, 15 Oct 2013). The talks ended a six-month stand-off over Iran‘s refusal to curb uranium enrichment in exchange for the easing of sanctions. 18. Russia Expanding Relations with Iran.

(a) Russia was expanding its military relations with Iran, as part of its effort to re-emerge as a major power in the Gulf. (b) Russia‘s Air Force commander Lt Gen Viktor Bondarev visited Iran on 22 Oct 2013. (c) The focus of the talks between the Russian and Iranian defence officials was on air defence tactics as Iran apprehends threat of air strikes by Israel and the US against its nuclear infrastructure. (d) Russia‘s efforts to form a durable security relationship with Iran followed its strong relations with Syria. (e) On 16 Jan 2014, the Foreign Ministers of Russia, Iran and Syria held an unprecedented trilateral meeting in Moscow to fine-tune their positions ahead of the Geneva-2 international conference on Syria.

19. Nuclear Deal with P5+1 (Geneva).

(a) On 24 Jan 2014, Iran signed a landmark agreement with the P5+1 (the US, Russia, China, France, UK and Germany) accepting constraints on its nuclear programme in exchange for partial relief from sanctions. (b) The Geneva agreement was the first step in a six-month process leading to a final agreement to permanently resolve the decade-old problem of Iran‘s nuclear programme. (c) P5+1‟s Offer to Iran.

(i) Release of $4.2 billion in Iran‘s oil sales revenue from frozen accounts.

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(ii) Suspension of restrictions on Iran‘s trade in gold, petrochemicals, car and plane parts. (iii) EU would not impose any new nuclear-related sanctions on Iran‘s petrochemical exports.

(d) Iran Agreed to Restrict Its Nuclear Activities.

(i) Stop enriching uranium above 5%, reactor-grade, and dilute its stock of 20% enriched uranium or convert it to oxide which makes it harder to enrich. (ii) Not to increase its stockpile of low enrichment uranium. (iii) Freeze its enrichment capacity by not installing any more centrifuges, leaving more than half of its existing 16,000 centrifuges in operable. (iv) Not to fuel or to commission the heavy-water reactor it is building in Arak or build a reprocessing plant that could produce plutonium form the spent fuel. (v) Accept more intrusive nuclear inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including daily visits to some facilities.

(e) IAEA Inspectors Visited Iran‘s Arak Heavy-Water Nuclear Plant (08 Dec 2013). (f) Talks between Iran and P5+1 (30-31 Dec 2013).

(i) Expert-level talks between Iran and the P5+1 commenced to work out details for implementing the Geneva nuclear accord. (ii) Talks were stalled at an earlier round over the interpretation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) that was signed in Geneva on 24 Nov 2013. (iii) Iran held the position that the JPA does not prevent it from developing a new generation of centrifuges. (iv) The West does not endorse Iran‘s position on the new generation of centrifuges. (v) The expert-level talks between Iran and the P5+1 ended on a positive note raising hopes that an agreement on implementing the Geneva nuclear accord could be reached during political consultations.

(g) Iran Would Get $4.2 Billion of its Blocked Funds in Phases. (h) Iran Stops Production.

(i) On 20 Jan 2014, Iran stopped production of 20% enriched uranium with the entry into force of the interim Geneva nuclear accord termed the Joint Plan of Action (JPA).

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(ii) The suspension of 20% uranium enrichment by Iran marked the first step towards negotiating a long-term agreement aimed at ending the nuclear problem with Iran and averting war. (iii) Iran had begun to take concrete and verifiable steps to halt its nuclear programme which presented an unprecedented opportunity to resolve global concerns over the nuclear programme. (iv) The US Secretary of State John Kerry approved the waiver to ease sanctions which would allow limited relief to help Iran‘s troubled economy. (v) The European Union (EU) also suspended a range of sanctions against Iran after the latter began implementing the Geneva Nuclear Accord of Nov 2013 to curb its nuclear programme. (vi) Nuclear Talks between Iran and P5+1 (Vienna, 20 Feb 2014). The P5+1 and Iran agreed on a timetable and framework for a comprehensive and final agreement by 20 Jul 2014.

20. Significance of Agreement with P5+1.

(a) The US President Barack Obama said that diplomacy opened up a new path toward a world that was more secure – a future in which it can be verified that Iran‘s nuclear programme is peaceful and that it cannot build a nuclear weapon. (b) Iran saw the opportunity to end an unnecessary crisis and open new horizons based on respect, based on the rights of the Iranian people and removing any doubts about the peaceful nature of Iran‘s nuclear programme. (c) The nuclear deal with Iran was made possible by a series of quiet, backchannel bilateral discussions between Iran and senior US officials. (d) The nuclear deal, which is backed by Iran‘s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, provides for improved verification of Iran‘s nuclear programme and constraints on its installation of new centrifuges. (e) The nuclear agreement with P5+1 would lead to the lifting of the main sanctions on Iran‘s oil and banking that have crippled the country‘s economy. (f) Iranians were united across the political spectrum in celebrating the signing of the nuclear agreement with P5+1, reflecting the hope that the deal would reduce the threat of war and revive the economy with the lifting of sanctions. (g) In the long term, the nuclear deal would help in the normalisation of Iran‘s relations with the US for the first time since the 1979 Islamic revolution. (h) The nuclear deal was also significant for the global oil sector as the gradual entry of Iran into the global crude oil market could lead to lower crude oil prices as Iran could cut rates to attract buyers. (j) Nuclear deal with Iran was a game changer and had the potential to negate the risk of a wider Middle East war.

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(k) The Geneva nuclear accord is also significant geopolitically as it gives the US and the EU an opportunity to normalise ties with Iran and undermine the growing influence of Russia and China over Iran. (l) If the deal results in normalisation of ties between the US and Iran, it would provide an exit route for the US from Afghanistan while reducing its dependence Pakistan.

21. Significance for India.

(a) Vindicated India‘s stand that Iran‘s nuclear stand-off must be resolved diplomatically. (b) The deal is also significant in reducing the diplomatic pressure on India as it had to balance four aspects – growing strategic partnership with the US, strong military relations with Israel, economic and social investments in Afghanistan and its civilizational relations with Iran. (c) The nuclear deal would also boost India‘s energy ties with Iran. (d) India‘s Foreign Secretary Sujata Singh reviewed with Iran‘s Deputy Foreign Minister Ibrahim Rahimpur, the list of India-Iran cooperative projects that were put on hold because of the US sanctions. (e) On 30 Nov 2103, India was among the nations that qualified for an exception from unilateral sanctions imposed by the US on nations importing oil from Iran. (f) The deal is also significant for normalisation of India‘s trade ties with Iran.

22. Final Deal between Iran and P5+1.

(a) Joint Comprehensive Plan.

(i) On 14 Jul 2015, Iran and the six major powers P5+1 or EU3 (France, UK and Germany)+3 (US,Russia and China) reached a final Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action after 18 days of marathon talks in Vienna. (ii) The historic nuclear deal is aimed at ensuring that Iran does not produce a nuclear bomb, opening up Iran‘s stricken economy and ending decades of mistrust with the West. (iii) The final nuclear deal also aims to resolve the 13-year standoff over Iran‘s nuclear programme after numerous diplomatic failures and threats of use of military force.

(b) Salient Features.

(i) Iran would reduce its current stockpile of low-enriched uranium by 98% to 300 kg for 15 years. (ii) Iran would reduce its enrichment capacity by two-thirds.

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(iii) Iran would stop using its underground facility at Fordow for enriching uranium. (iv) UN inspectors would be allowed to enter Iran‘s nuclear sites, including military sites. (v) UN arms embargo on Iran would be in place for five years. (vi) International sanctions against Iran would be lifted to allow it to sell oil again and use the global financial system for trade. (vii) If Iran is judged by an International Panel not to be living up to the Nuclear Accord, the sanctions could ―Snap Back‖. (viii) New restrictions would prevent Iran, for a set period of time, from experimenting with designing warheads and conducting experiments on multipoint detonations.

(c) UNSC Endorsed the Nuclear Deal.

(i) On 20 Jul 2015, the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously endorsed the nuclear deal withIran, clearing the way for lifting of international sanctions against Iran.

(ii) The unanimous adoption of the UNSC resolution formally endorsed the nuclear agreement reached between the P5+1 and Iran after almost 2 years of negotiations.

(iii) If Iran respects the nuclear agreement, seven UN resolutions passed

since 2006 to sanction Iran for its nuclear programme would gradually beterminated.

(d) EU Approved the Nuclear Deal.

(i) On 20 Jul 2015, the European Union (EU) approved the nuclear deal

with Iran as a first step towards lifting EU economic sanctions against Iran. (ii) The EU Foreign Ministers meeting in Brussels pointed out that it was a

balanced deal and that there was no better option available. (iii) The message was a signal to the US Congress to follow, according to

analysts. (iv) The EU would retain its ban on the supply of ballistic missile technology

and sanctions related tohuman rights on Iran.

(e) US Stand on Nuclear Deal.

(i) Landmark nuclear deal with Iran was a vindication of his diplomatic approach and chance for a new direction in decades to the vexed relations with Iran.

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(ii) It was irresponsible to walk away from the nuclear agreement and vowed to veto any effort by the Republican-controlled US Congress to block it.

(iii) The US President said that the nuclear deal cut off every pathway to an

Iranian atomic weapon. (iv) Today, because America negotiated from a position of strength and

principle, it had stopped the spread of nuclear weapons in the region. (v) The nuclear deal offered an opportunity to move in a new direction and

should be seized. (vi) If Iran steps back from measures agreed in the nuclear deal, all

sanctions would snap back into place. (vii) The alternative to diplomacy was more violence in a region already

beset by instability. (viii) No deal meant a greater chance of more war in the Middle East. (ix) Nuclear deal with Iran was based on verification, not trust and noted

that differences between the two countries were real.

(f) Israel‟s Stand. (i) Nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 was a historic mistake and

hinted that he remained ready to order military action against Iran. (ii) In every area where it was supposed to prevent Iran attaining nuclear

arms capability, there were huge compromises. (iii) Israel had previously hinted that it could take military action if needed to

stop Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon capability. 23. Implications of Nuclear Deal. (a) Global & Regional Significance. (i) Nuclear agreement for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action reached

between Iran and the P5+1was a positive step that would resolve the 13 year standoff between Iran and the West.

(ii) Iran nuclear deal is significant for global non-proliferation and regional

balance and stability. (iii) The nuclear deal laid the foundations for a realignment of equations in

West Asia with the potential to transform the war-ridden region in the long term.

(iv) Nuclear deal with Iran was a game changer and had the potential to

negate the risk of a wider Middle East war.

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(v) The final nuclear accord with Iran is also significant geopolitically as it gives the US and the EU an opportunity to normalise ties with Iran and undermine the growing influence of Russia and China over Iran.

(vi) In the long term, the nuclear deal would help in the normalisation of

Iran‘s relations with the US for the first time since the 1979 Islamic revolution. (vii) Key benefit of the nuclear deal was that it removed the obstacles to

rapprochement between the US and Iran. (viii) Changing geopolitical system in West Asia was also responsible

for bringing the US and Iran together as both countries were cooperating in Iraq in the war against the Islamic State (IS).

(ix) Iran being a regional power in West Asia and its influence spreads to

Iraq, Syria and southern Lebanon. (x) If US-Iran cooperation can be extended to the region by allowing Iran to

reclaim its economic and diplomatic status, it could have a positive impact on various conflicts in the region.

(xi) Iran‘s nuclear agreement with the P5+1 is the first step in eliminating

the threat of a nuclear arms race in West Asia.

(xii) The nuclear deal marks the start of a change in power equations in West Asia with Iran‘s rapprochement with the US leading to a new balance of forces between Shias and Sunnis and Muslims and Jews, lessening the US dependence on Pakistan.

(xiii) Iran could become a potentially valuable partner as the US has

withdrawn its forces from Afghanistan in Dec 2014. Iran could also help in stabilising Afghanistan and deter the Taliban.

(xiv) Iran, which has considerable influence over the Syrian government,

could also help in charting out an effective settlement in Syria. (xv) Iran also has considerable influence on Iraq and could help in reducing

the tensions between Shias and Sunnis in that country. (xvi) There could be a drop in the global oil prices as oil production from Iran

would increase oil supplies. (b) Global and Regional Challenges.

(i) The nuclear deal with Iran faces challenges as the Republican-Controlled US Congress may stall the deal. (ii) Israel is also opposed to the deal and any rapprochement between the US and Iran. (iii) Saudi Arabia, another regional power, is also opposed to any rapprochement between the US and Iran.

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(iv) Critics feel that the nuclear deal gave Iran time and space to build a nuclear bomb which may spark an arms race in the region. (v) The nuclear deal threatens US influence with Israel and the Arab countries. (vi) Nuclear deal would increase Iran‘s ability to foment unrest in West Asia.

(c) Significance for Iran.

(i) Iranians were united across the political spectrum in celebrating the signing of the nuclear agreement with P5+1, reflecting the hope that the deal would reduce the threat of war and revive the economy with the lifting of sanctions.

(ii) Under the nuclear deal all the nuclear facilities in Iran would be allowed

to continue operations which will allow the Government of Iran to tell the Iranian public that Iran‘s right to generate nuclear power remains intact.

(iii) The nuclear deal would result in the unlocking of $100 billion in

frozen funds and the end of sanctions on Iran‘s central bank, oil company, shipping and airlines which would be hugely beneficial for Iran‘s crippling economy.

(iv) The resumption of oil supplies would be very significant for Iran‘s

economy which had shrunk 20% due to the ban on oil exports. (v) The arms embargo on Iran would also end if the IAEA concludes that its

nuclear programme is peaceful. (vi) The nuclear deal provides Iran an opportunity to play a constructive role

in West Asia. (vii) Iran can also play a key role in neutralising the threat of Islamic State

in the region. 24. Implications for India. (a) Significance for India.

(i) India welcomed the successful conclusion of negotiations on the Iranian nuclear issue, between Iran and the EU 3+3 and the UN atomic energy agency IAEA. (ii) India had always maintained that the issue should be resolved peacefully through dialogue by respecting Iran‘s right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy while upholding the international community‘s strong interest in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran‘s nuclear programme. (iii) With regard to the second aspect, the IAEA had an important role, which had been underlined by the agreement between Iran and the Agency

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on a road map for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues. This too was a welcome development. (iv) Easing of sanctions against Iran would allow India to import additional and cheaper oil from Iran. (v) India also wants to import natural gas from Iran. (vi) Expanding energy partnership was one of the main issues discussed between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in Ufa, Russia on the side lines of the SCO meeting. (vii) India would get access to Afghanistan for trade via Iran‘s Chabahar port. (viii) Iran is the key to India‘s plan for physical access to Central Asia and beyond. (ix) Would help in lifting sanctions on the banking and insurance sectors and would help in correcting the trade imbalance between India and Iran. (x) The annual bilateral trade between India and Iran is about $14 billion, with a high balance of trade problem, as India was unable to pay Iran about $8.8 billion for oil due to the sanctions. (xi) India had also been under pressure from the US and the international community to cut its oil imports from Iran and had to stop oil imports altogether in Mar 2015. (xii) With the lifting of sanctions oil imports from Iran would be regularised and would also be cheaper due to Iran‘s estimated production of at least 500,000 barrels of oil per day by 2016. (xiii) In strategic terms, a stronger Iran free from sanctions would be in India‘s interest with regard to stability in Afghanistan and West Asia.

(b) Concerns for India.

(i) Outcome of nuclear deal with Iran could make the situation in West Asia more volatile with a backlash from Israel, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. (ii) A nuclear arms race could be triggered in the region with Saudi Arabia trying to match Iran‘s nuclear capabilities leading to closer cooperation between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. (iii) India would have to balance its support for Iran with its growing relations with Israel which has taken a strong stand against the nuclear deal. (iv) Once Iran‘s economy is opened, it may not give preferential treatment to India, as Russia China have been stronger supporters of Iran, and the US and EU could offer better technology and opportunities.

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25. Conclusion. (a) Iran‟s Significance to the World.

(i) Iran has the fourth-largest oil reserves and the second-largest gas reserves in the world. (ii) Iran has 9.3% of the world‘s oil reserves - about 137 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. (iii) Iran is the third largest crude oil exporter in the world after Saudi Arabia and Russia. (iv) In 2010, Iran accounted for 5.2% of the world oil production.

(b) Significance for Iran. (i) Oil is a significant part of Iran‘s economy, contributing to approximately 72% of all export revenue. (ii) The share of oil in Iran‘s economy has decreased from 40% of the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to 10.5%. (iii) However, oil and gas still account for 65% of Iran‘s fiscal revenue. (iv) Iran imports food items like maize and raw materials like steel.

(c) India‟s Stakes in West Asia.

(i) India wants to tap the iron reserves in Afghanistan worth $3 trillion through Iran‘s Chabahar Port and build a 900-km railway line to link it with Afghanistan. (ii) Iran is also crucial for connecting India with Central Asian and Caucasian countries which could be a valuable source of hydrocarbons and minerals for India. (iii) India needs oil and gas from Iran and other countries in West Asia like Saudi Arabia and Iraq. (iv) The energy rich West Asian states form part of India‘s extended neighbourhood and wants the region to be free from geo-strategic volatility and nuclear arms race.

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CHAPTER - 12

INDIA - IRELAND RELATIONS 1. Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Ireland for a day on 23 Sep 2015. He is the first Indian PM after Jawaharlal Nehru in 1956 to visit the country. 2. Economic Relations. Relations between India and Ireland date back to independence and in 2013, the total trade in goods and services was pegged at euro 2.48 billion. The key items of Irish export include computer hardware and software, pharmaceuticals and chemicals, food and machinery. Indian exports to Ireland cover textiles, garments and clothing accessories, pharmaceuticals, light engineering goods and chemicals. Major Indian companies with a presence in Ireland include pharma majors like Wockhardt, Sun Pharma and Reliance Genemedix and information technology firms like First Source, Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), HCL and Wipro. 3. Meeting of Heads. PM Modi held talks with the head of the Ireland government, Taoiseach Enda Kenny and spoke about international challenges like terrorism. "I was pleased to exchange views on a broad range of international challenges, including terrorism, radicalisation and the situation in Europe and Asia," PM Modi said at a joint media event with Mr Kenny. 4. Address to Indian community. Following the government-level interactions, the Prime Minister interacted with the Indian community in Ireland at a special event hosted at Hotel Double Tree Hilton in Dublin. 5. This visit will develop strong people-to-people and economic ties with Ireland in the years to come.

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CHAPTER - 13

INDO - ISRAEL RELATIONS

Introduction 1. India has been a strong supporter of the Palestinian cause and its relations with Israel earlier were at the minimal level with only an Israeli consulate in Mumbai. Bilateral relations with Israel have improved after India established diplomatic ties with Israel in 1992. Background 2. Evolution of ties over the years is as under:

(a) 1948 to 1990. India, as a friend of Arab States, opposed the creation of Israel. In 1950, India allowed the opening of an Israeli consulate in Bombay. The relations between the two countries were not very friendly due to the Cold War, India being considered a friend of erstwhile USSR. Also, India had been supporting the Palestinian cause which was not in line with the claims of Israel.

(b) 1991 to 2008. The relations started improving after a change in the thought process/policy of India post-Cold War. Diplomatic ties were established in 1992 followed by the visit of Israeli Foreign Minister, Mr Shimon Peres, to India. Since then the relations have been on the upswing due to convergence of interests, including purchase of defence equipment. Israel is one of the key suppliers of defence related equipment to India like the BARAK missile system, Searcher UAV's etc.

3. Israel's Importance to India.

(a) Defence Supplier. According to defence analysts, Israel has emerged as a major supplier of HiTech weaponry to India. Israel supplied India with the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).

(b) Countering Terrorism. India can share Israel's experience in counterterrorism. Both sides can work together for ensuring that terrorism radiating from the Pakistan Afganistan axis is kept separated.

(c) Economic Relations. The two way trade between India and Israel reached $1 billion, with the potential to grow even more. The two sides can also cooperate in fields of science and technology, especially in the spheres of info tech.

(d) Permanent Seat in UN. Israeli support can further India's claim as it can actively engage in the peace process in the West Asian crises.

(e) Countering Pan-Islamic Threats. The threat emerging out of Islamic fundamentalism in the region and state sponsored cross border terrorism requires coordinated efforts in intelligence, expertise which is readily available with the Israelis. This would also help India to marginalise Pakistan as sponsor of terrorism,

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bringing instability in the region. (f) Cooperation in Agriculture. Israel is helping India in the field of latest techniques to improve agricultural growth in the deserts and providing know how of latest technology to enhance agricultural productivity.

4. Importance of India to Israel.

(a) Political, Diplomatic & Strategic Benefits. Analysts point out that closer relation with India could have significant political, diplomatic and strategic benefits for Israel. India's support for Israel at the international stage would help it break out of the cycle of censure whenever it tries to defend its vital interests assertively.

(b) Nuclear Technology from Pakistan to Arab World. Israel wants to ensure that nuclear delivery systems and the mass destruction technology from Pakistan, does not reach its Arab neighbourhood. Israel, which had a troubled security relationship with Iran, does not want the latter to benefit from Pakistan's know how in this field. India, which has adversarial relations with Pakistan, can help Israel to achieve this. (c) Maritime Security. South East Asia is emerging as an important region for Israeli trade. Israel has an interest in India for shoring up its maritime security. India, which has the largest Navy in the Indian Ocean littoral, is well placed to safeguard commercial shipping lanes in this zone. Thus, India is emerging as a key partner of Israel in safeguarding its vital strategic interests in Asia.

(d) Defence Industry. Israeli defence industry is likely to gain maximum from the arms deal between the two countries.

(e) International Terrorism. Both the countries are suffering from terrorist acts emerging from Pakistan and other Islamic countries and can share and coordinate efforts to counter it.

(f) West Asia Crises. India's relations with PLO are well known and Israel can put across its point of view through India to settle the Palestine issue.

Current Situation 5. India‘s foreign policy shift on Israel began with the international impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Nonalignment and anti-colonial solidarity seemed moth-eaten in a world of unrivalled American power and triumphant capitalism. India pivoted, aligning itself more closely with the United States. It also began to strengthen ties with Israel, with both countries exchanging ambassadors in 1992. 6. India‘s engagement with Israel has grown substantially in the last two decades on military, scientific, commercial and agricultural matters. The affinity has been less ideological than pragmatic, each side understanding the other‘s needs. Israel remains uncomfortable about India‘s close ties with Iran, just as India looks warily at Israel‘s relationship with China. 7. India‘s Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj insisted in July that ―there is absolutely no change in India‘s policy towards Palestine, which is that we fully support the Palestinian

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cause while maintaining good relations with Israel.‖ That might sound like fence sitting, but it‘s a policy shared by all Indian governments of the past 20 years.

India‟s Stance on Israel – Gaza. 8. India‘s government rejected a request for a parliamentary resolution condemning Israel‘s military attacks on Gaza, saying New Delhi had to find other ways to show support for the Palestinian cause while growing its relations with Israel. 9. In a debate that lasted nearly three hours, opposition leaders pressed the Indian Parliament to pass a strongly worded resolution denouncing Israel for what some members described as the ―disproportionate‖ and ―indiscriminate‖ use of ―brute force‖ in Gaza that has resulted in the deaths of hundreds of civilians in recent weeks. Rejecting the proposal, foreign minister Sushma Swaraj said Indian lawmakers should instead encourage both sides to return to the negotiating table and revisit an Egypt brokered ceasefire agreement that the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas had earlier rejected. ―India fully supports the Palestinian cause while at the same time maintaining its ties with Israel,‖ Ms Swaraj said in the Rajya Sabha, the upper house of Parliament. 10. Prime Minister Narendra Modi signed a multilateral declaration during a summit of BRICS nations in Brazil, calling on Israel and Palestine to resume negotiations leading to a ―two state solution‖ with a ―contiguous and economically viable Palestinian state existing side by side in peace with Israel.‖ 11. Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh‟s Visit to Israel (5-6 Nov 2014).

(a) Mr Rajnath Singh met Israel‘s top government functionaries on homeland security issues.

(b) India is Israel‘s largest purchaser of defence equipment. (c) Mr Singh met Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and held discussions

to strengthen India‘s ―very warm‖ relations with Israel.

(d) The Israeli Prime Minister said that Indian and Israelis shared the combination of ingenuity and continuity. (e) India‘s Union Home Minister said that India and Israel shared very warm and cordial bilateral relations and India looked forward to strength it further. (f) Mr Singh visited the Holy sites in the old city of Jerusalem and also undertook a helicopter tour of Jordan Valley and Israel‘s northern and southern region with Israel‘s National Security Adviser Yossi Cohen.

12. Significance of Home Minister‟s Visit.

(a) Israel‘s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu responded positively to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi‘s ‗Make in India‘ initiative and told the visiting Indian Home Minister Rajnath Singh that Israel was keen to take advantage of the initiative.

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(b) Mr Netanyahu said that he would send an Israeli delegation to India to explore manufacturing opportunities in various sectors. (c) Israeli industries, especially in the defence sector, could take advantage of the ‗Make in India‘ initiative and shift their manufacturing base to India which could reduce the manufacturing costs of different products and systems. (d) Future emphasis should be to build a hi-tech Indo-Israeli partnership befitting the two leading knowledge economies.

13. Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Ya‟alon‟s Visit to India (18-19 Feb 2015). (a) Participated in ―Aero India 2015‖ in Bengaluru and also held high-level meetings in Delhi.

(b) It was the first visit by an Israeli Defence Minister since the establishment of relations between India and Israel over two decades ago. (c) Headed a delegation of the Israeli Ministry of Defence officials, including Director General of Ministry of Defence Major General (Res.) Dan Harel and CEOs of Israel‘s Defence Companies. (d) Fifteen Israel companies and hundreds of Israeli representatives took part in the Aero India event. (e) The Israeli Defence Minister offered all help and technology to make Prime Minister Narendra Modi‘s ‗Make in India‘ initiative a great success. (f) The Israeli Defence Minister met India‘s Prime Minister and talked about the growing defence and security relations between the two countries. (g) Israel‘s relations with India had become strong because of common values, interests and respect. Both countries had found ways to cooperate on security and defence behind the scenes. (h) Israel had rich experiences in turning disadvantages into advantages in many sectors like defence and security, agriculture and water. (j) The Israeli Defence Minister offered his country‘s experiences, technology and know-how in assisting India advance further as both respect each other and had common interests. (k) Israel, a tiny country which had fought enemies from all around by developing new technologies to intercept rockets and missiles, could cooperate closely with India in the defence and security sector with its offers of flexible technology transfer.

Parliamentary Elections in Israel. 14. On 18 Mar 2015, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu won a stunning victory in the Parliamentary elections securing a third consecutive term. Mr Netanyahu‘s rightwing Likud party won 30 of the 120 seats in the Parliament (Knesset). The centre-left Zionist Union won 24 seats.

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15. Mr Netanyahu signed an agreement giving a key role to the far-right Jewish Home that firmly opposes a Palestinian State. The formation of a rightwing ruling coalition marked a shift to the right by giving increased prominence to the Naftali Bennett‘s Jewish Home party, which backs the government‘s settlement activity.

16. The inclusion of the far-right Jewish party could complicate Israel‘s already strained relations with Palestinians and the international community, according to analysts.

Palestine Joined the International Criminal Court.

17. On 01 Apr 2015, Palestine formally joined the International Criminal Court (ICC) and hoped that it could open the way for a possible prosecution of Israelis for alleged war crimes. 18. The Palestinians called upon Israel to join the ICC, which was set up in 2002 to try crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide.

19. After decades of failed negotiations with Israel, the Palestinians have been trying for recognition at international bodies including the ICC.

Vatican Recognised Palestine. 20. On 26 Jun 2015, the Vatican signed a treaty with the State of Palestine and hoped that it would lead to improved relations between Israel and the Palestinians.

21. The accord, the result of 15 years of negotiations, covered essential aspects of the life and activity of the Catholic Church in the State of Palestine, according to statement by the Vatican.

22. The agreement could be a stimulus to bringing a definitive end to the longstanding Israeli-Palestine conflict, which continued to cause suffering for both parties, according to Vatican‘s Foreign Minister, Archbishop Paul Gallagher.

23. The Vatican called for Israel and the State of Palestine to take courageous decisions so that the much desired two-State solution may become a reality as soon as possible.

24. Israel‘s Foreign Ministry expressed its disappointment and called the signing of the treaty between Vatican and the State of Palestine a hasty step that hurt the prospects of peace.

25. Israel cannot accept the unilateral determinations in the agreement which do not take into account Israel‘s essential interests and the special historic status of the Jewish people in Jerusalem, according to a statement by the Israeli Foreign Ministry. 26. UN Report Accused Israel and Hamas of War Crimes.

(a) On 22 Jun 2015, the UN Commission of Inquiry on the 2014 Gaza Conflict announced that both Israel and HAMAS might have committed war crimes during the 2014 Gaza war.

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(b) The UN Commission of Inquiry said that it had gathered substantial information and credible allegations that both sides had committed war crimes during the conflict. (c) The extent of the devastation and human suffering in Gaza was unprecedented and would impact generations to come, according to the chair of the Commission, New York Judge Mary McGowan Davis. (d) The Commission voiced concern that a sense of impunity prevailed across the board for violations allegedly committed by the Israeli forces, whether it be in the context of active hostilities in Gaza or killings, torture and ill-treatment in the West Bank. (e) The report criticised both sides, but specifically decried the huge firepower used by Israel in Gaza. 6,000 airstrikes and 50,000 artillery shells were fired during the 51-day operation. (f) Israel termed the report of the UN Commission of Inquiry as biased and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that his country does not commit war crimes. (g) Israel defended itself against a terror organisation which called for its destruction and that itself carried out war crimes, according to Mr Netanyahu. (h) Hamas welcomed the UN report‘s condemnation of Israel for its war crimes. (j) The UN report reinforced the will of the Palestinians to go to the ICC, according to a Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) official.

27. India Abstained from Vote Against Israel.

(a) On 03 Jul 2015, India abstained from a vote against Israel at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva. (b) The UNHRC resolution welcomed the UN Human Rights Council report, which found evidences of alleged war crimes committed by both Israel and Hamas during the Gaza conflict in 2014, especially calling for accountability of Israeli officials. (c) Forty One countries voted in favour of the UNHRC resolution against Israel

and only one country, the US voted against. (d) Earlier in Jul 2014, India had voted against Israel and in favour of the UNHRC resolution that instituted the Commission of inquiry into the Gaza conflict.

28. The Government of India denied any shift in India‘s policy towards Israel stressing that India had abstained because the UNHRC resolution had included a reference to taking Israel to the ICC, which India considers ―intrusive.‖ 29. Even in the past, whenever a UNHRC resolution had made a direct reference to the ICC, India‘s general approach had been to abstain, according to the official spokesperson. 30. Israeli Ambassador to India Daniel Carmon appreciated India‘s stand and thanked it.

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CHAPTER - 14

INDO - JAPAN RELATIONS Introduction 1. Changing Global Order. Analysts point out that the global strategic opinion is currently debating the global power shift from the West to the East. This implies the change in international relations in the coming years. India and China are seen as the powers on the rise. Japan the largest economy in Asia is also seen as a major player. It is felt that the Euro-Atlantic order is giving way to Asia-Centric order. 2. Relations between India – China – Japan.

(a) In the changing international relations and shift of global focus to Asia, the relations between India, China and Japan would have a profound impact on the peace, security and development in Asia and the evolution of a multilateral global order. (b) In political and security terms India and Japan do not have any dispute but both have complex territorial disputes with China.

3. Issues between India & Japan.

(a) Global Partnership. Analysts point out that India and Japan are currently engaged in a global partnership with a strategic orientation. Global partnership denotes dialogue on issues of international concern, while a strategic partnership would signal a closer overall relationship. (b) Economic Partnership. The two sides are also negotiating a bilateral economic partnership agreement. Japan Agreed to Fund Six Infrastructure Projects Worth Rs 10,500 Crore - India Highest Recipient of Official Development Assistance (ODA) from Japan (c) Maritime Security. The Japanese Foreign Office Spokesperson said that Japan was exploring the possibility of inviting India to join Japan, the US and Australia for maintaining maritime security through anti-piracy and anti-terror cooperation. (d) Defence. India's Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon said that India and Japan had agreed to structured discussions in the defence field in May 2006 during the visit of India's Defence Minister to Japan. The Coast Guards of the two countries were already holding annual exercises and a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the two sides had been agreed upon in Nov 2006. (e) Civil Nuclear Energy Programme. India has sought Japan's support for its civil nuclear energy programme as Japan is a key member of the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group with which India will have to reach an agreement to take the Indo-

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US civil nuclear deal forward.India and Japan Agreed to Set Up a Working Group on Civilian Nuclear Energy.

4. Japanese Prime Minister‟s Visit (28 Dec 2011).

(a) Sixth Indo-Japan Annual Summit. Japan‘s New Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda visited India for the sixth annual Indo-Japan summit on 28 Dec 2011. (b) Both sides sought to expand cooperation in the 60th year of establishing diplomatic ties. India and Japan decided to expedite work on infrastructure projects. (c) Both Sides Agreed to increase the currency swap arrangement from $3 billion to $15 billion. According to the agreement Japan would accept rupees and give dollars to India up to a stipulated limit, and similarly India would take yen and send dollars to Japan if they demand it. The aim of currency swap is to allow a country to manage its short term foreign exchange liquidity problems. Japan which has surplus dollars can provide India which is facing short term exchange issues through the swap arrangement. Currently, Japan‘s reserves are worth $1.3 trillion while India has approximately $300 billion. (d) Japan would proceed with the negotiations on the civil nuclear agreement after giving due consideration to nuclear safety, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, according to the Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda. It was also Japan‘s duty to share the experiences and the lessons learnt from the nuclear power accident at Fukushima and continue to contribute to nuclear safety around the world, according to Mr Noda. (e) The cooperation regarding peaceful uses of nuclear energy was conducive to Japan‘s efforts to address climate change and to strengthen the global partnership with India. (f) India‘s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Japanese counterpart agreed to expand cooperation in maritime security including safety and freedom of navigation and anti-piracy activities, by promoting bilateral and multilateral exercises and through information sharing, as well as dialogues. Both leaders welcomed the joint exercises between the Coast Guards of the two nations proposed to be held in Jan 2012. (g) Both leaders resolved to develop greater cooperation in combating terrorism through sharing of information and utilising the India-Japan Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism, as well as multilateral fora such as the Financial Action Task Force and the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum. (h) Both sides reaffirmed the importance of counter-terrorism cooperation at the UN and recognised the urgent need to finalise and adopt the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and called upon all States to cooperate in resolving the outstanding issues expeditiously. (j) India would like to see more Japanese investment and technology transfer to it which would be facilitated, according to the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. He pointed out that the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from Japan accounted for just over 1% of its total outward FDI flows.

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5. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh‟s Visit to Japan (27 – 29 Mar 2013).

(a) Agenda.

(i) Deepening the Strategic Partnership (ii) Pushing for an early conclusion of a bilateral agreement on civil nuclear cooperation (iii) Enhancing Defence Ties (iv) Bridging the large bilateral trade deficit

(b) Regional and Global Partner.

(i) Prime Minister Manmohan Singh described Japan as a ‗key regional and global partner for India‘ stressing that there was a growing congruence in the interests of both countries. (ii) The visit allowed the India and Japan to take stock of the progress in projects such as the Western Dedicated Freight Corridor and Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor (iii) The Dedicated Freight Corridor (DFC) covers two routes 2,762 km long - the Eastern Corridor from Ludhiana to Dankuni and the Western Corridor from Jawaharlal Nehru Port in Navi Mumbai to Tughlakabad in Delhi/Dadri. (iv) Japan was keen on promoting its bullet train project in India.

(c) Address to Japan-India Association.

(i) India and Japan were among the major actors in the India-Pacific region and it was the responsibility of both countries to foster a climate of peace, stability and cooperation and to lay an enduring foundation for security and prosperity. (ii) Both countries should promote wider and deeper regional economic integration and enhance regional connectivity (iii) Maritime security across the linked regions of the Indian and Pacific Oceans was essential for regional and global prosperity (iv) India‘s relations with Japan were important not only for its economic development but also because India looks at Japan as a natural and indispensable partner in its quest for stability and peace in the vast region in Asia (v) India and Japan had increasingly convergent world views and growing stakes in each other‘s prosperity and shared interests in maritime security as both faced similar challenges to energy security.

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(vi) There were strong synergies between the two economies, which need an open, rule-based international trading system to prosper. (vii) Together, both countries seek new architecture for the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). (viii) Defence and security dialogue, military exercises and defence technology collaboration between the two countries should grow and both should consult and coordinate more closely on global and regional forums. (ix) India required Japanese technology and investment. At the same time India offered increasing opportunities for the growth and globalisation of Japanese companies for the overall prosperity and growth of Japan.

6. Nuclear Energy.

(a) Directed officials of their countries to accelerate the negotiations of an Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. (b) Prime Minister Manmohan Singh reiterated India‘s commitment to its unilateral and voluntary moratorium on nuclear explosive testing. (c) The two Prime Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to working together for immediate commencement and an early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally effectively verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). (d) Both sides expressed their commitment to continue working to prepare the ground for India to become a full member in the international export control regimes

7. Industrial Corridor.

(a) Both leaders noted the importance of development in the Chennai-Bangalore areas while renewing their commitment to reinforcing their cooperation. (b) Accelerate the improvement of infrastructure such as ports, roads, bridges and industrial parks, as well as electricity and water supply in Ennore, Chennai and adjoining areas and to monitor the progress, utilising the Tamil Nadu Investment Promotion Programme (TNIPP). (c) The TNIPP to be formed with Japanese assistance seeks to increase the flow of funds to build quality urban infrastructure in the State (d) Japan‘s interest in supporting the Introduction of high-speed trains in India and appreciated its high-level of expertise in designing and implementing high-speed railway. (e) India‘s Prime Minister conveyed that India would plan such projects based on its infrastructure priorities, commercial viability and financial resources. (f) Dr. Singh welcomed the signing of the Exchange of Notes for yen loan totalling 71 billion yen ($0.7 billion) for the Mumbai Metro Line-III project.

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8. Defence Cooperation.

(a) Both sides agreed to institutionalise joint exercises by their navies. (b) Both countries decided to establish a Joint Working Group to explore the modality of cooperation on the Japanese advanced sea plane Shinmaywa or US-2. (c) India‘s Department of Atomic Energy and Japan‘s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry signed a memorandum for cooperation on the development of rare earths industry in India.

9. Expanding Indo-Japan Relations.

(a) Since the visit of former Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in 2005, there has been an unprecedented level of engagement between India and Japan, according to analysts. (b) Japan is the only country besides Russia with which India holds annual summit meetings. (c) The expanding relations were evident by the visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Japan in Mar 2013, Japanese Emperor Akihito‘s rare visit to India in Dec 2013 and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe‘s visit to India in Jan 2014. (d) Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has made relations with India a central pillar of Japan‘s foreign policy objectives for the region.

10. Economic Relations.

(a) Japan‘s investments have played a key role in building India‘s infrastructure, including the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor (b) Bilateral trade between India and Japan reached $18.6 billion in 2013. (c) Japan‘s investments in India have increased from $145 million in 2004 to $1.75 billion in 2011. (d) Japan‘s cumulative development assistance committed to India has reached $36.7 billion

11. Nuclear Cooperation.

(a) In Sep 2013, India and Japan held talks on a civil nuclear accord in Tokyo. (b) The negotiations which began in 2010 were put on hold since the Fukushima nuclear accident in Mar 2011. (c) Japan wants additional commitments from India as it is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

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(d) India has maintained that commitments given while signing civil nuclear agreements with the US, France and Russia were good enough for Japan as well. (e) A letter was written in 2008 by the then Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) assuring the global community of India‘s commitment to a moratorium on nuclear tests, cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Additional Protocol and the separation plan for civil and strategic use reactors.

12. Japanese Emperor‟s Visit to India (30 Nov – 05 Dec 2013).

(a) First time that a Japanese Emperor had Visited India. (b) Significance of Emperor‟s Visit.

(i) Though the Japanese emperor is the symbol of the State, his visits were used by Japan to underline the pinnacle of relations. (ii) Japan stressed that the main purpose of the emperor‘s visit to India was to add ballast to the bilateral relations. (iii) Japanese emperor‘s visit to India came at a time when both nations were building up a strategicpartnership based on a sound economic foundation. (iv) The six-day visit by the Japanese emperor to India signalled the deepening relations between the two countries with the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe wanting to boost economic and strategic relations with India

(c) China Hoped for Conducive Indo-Japanese Relations.

13. Japanese Defence Minister‟s Visit.

(a) Japanese Defence Minister Itsunori Onodera visited India on 06 Jan 2014. (b) Both sides resolved to continue their defence consultation and cooperation, including in maritime security. (c) Presentation of their nation‘s National Security Strategy and Defence Programme Guidelines that were adopted in Dec 2013. (d) India and Japan are close to signing a deal to export Japan‘s US-2 amphibious aircraft for the Indian Navy, for operating in Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the Lakshadweep. (e) China‘s unilateral announcement of the Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) was also discussed by the Defence Ministers of India and Japan. (f) Decided to strengthen Indo-Japan defence consultation and cooperation, including maritime security to further consolidate and strengthen the strategic and global partnership between India and Japan.

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(g) India and Japan would hold the third ―2 plus 2‖ dialogue and the fourth Defence Policy Dialogue at the Defence Secretary level in Delhi in 2014. (h) Both sides would promote exchanges on UN peacekeeping operations between Indian Army‘s Centre for UN Peacekeeping (CUNPK) and Japan‘s Peacekeeping Training and Research Centre, Joint Staff College and Central Readiness Force of its Ground Self Defence Force.

14. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe‟s Visit.

(a) Chief Guest at the Republic Day.

(i) Mr Abe became the first Japanese Prime Minister to be the Chief Guest at India‘s Republic Day parade on 25 & 26 Jan 14. (ii) The Japanese Prime Minister was the fourth Asian leader to be received as the Chief Guest at the Republic Day parade in the last five years following leaders from South Korea, Indonesia and Thailand. (iii) The trend of having leaders from East Asia as Republic Day Guests points to India‘s deepening engagement with the region.

(b) Summit Meeting Between the Prime Ministers of India and Japan (25 Jan 2014).

15. Defence and Security Relations.

(a) Continuation of the efforts by both countries to forge closer, political, defence and security relations. (b) Widen the strategic partnership with India through the creation of a dialogue mechanism between the National Security Advisers of both countries. (c) India and Japan decided to make joint naval exercise a permanent feature with India inviting Japan to join the Indo-US Malabar series. (d) In 2007, the presence of Japan and Australia in the Malabar series led to protests from China with the subsequent dropping of both countries from subsequent chapters. (e) The Prime Ministers of India and Japan reviewed the progress made in Japan selling US-2 amphibious aircraft to India. (f) With a new government of India taking over in Jun 2014, both sides decided to hold three important security consultations after the change of government.

16. Cooperation in Civil Nuclear Energy.

(a) India‘s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh noted that the discussion between the two countries for a civil nuclear energy agreement had gained momentum.

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(b) The Japanese Prime Minister also pointed to the importance of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which has not been put into force mainly due to India‘s resistance. (c) India‘s Prime Minister felt that India‘s own commitment not to conduct any more nuclear tests should suffice to convince Japan into signing a bilateral civil nuclear pact.

17. Eight Pacts Signed.

(a) India and Japan signed eight pacts in wide-ranging sectors of economy, health, academics and energy. (b) Half of the pacts signed were connected with Japan‘s aid, indicating that soft loans and grants would continue to be an integral part of Japan‘s strategy of reaching out to India (c) Japan‘s Prime Minister promised more aid of which 70% would go for implementing the phase-III of the Delhi Metro project.

18. Economic Cooperation.

(a) Japan decided to lower non-tariff barriers to import shrimps that would help Indian fishermen. (b) Underlining the importance of people-to-people contact, both Prime Ministers hoped that the Japanese Overseas Cooperation Volunteer scheme would be expanded to uncovered sectors while visa regimes were being relaxed by both countries. (c) Tamil Nadu Investment Promotion Programme for India‘s economic development was taken into account with the Prime Ministers looking at possibility of extending similar programmes to other States.

19. Significance of Japanese Prime Minister‟s Visit.

(a) Would help in cementing the bilateral relations which have been expanding steadily since 2005 (b) Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said that Japan is at the heart of India‘s ‗Look East Policy‘ and is also a key partner in India‘s economic development (c) Japanese Prime Minister‘s visit just weeks after the visits of the Japanese emperor and the Japanese Defence Minister underscored the importance of Indo-Japanese relations (d) In the last four years, the strategic aspect of Indo-Japanese relations has expanded substantially with annual summits and a multi-layered strategic dialogue at different levels

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(e) A significant announcement during the Japanese Prime Minister‘s visit was the creation of a dialogue mechanism between India‘s National Security Adviser and the head of Japan‘s recently set up National Security Council. (f) India and Japan reaffirmed the importance of joint maritime exercises between Indian Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF). (g) The large business delegation accompanying the Japanese Prime Minister pointed to the significant economic dimension to India‘s relations with Japan. (h) Japanese Prime Minister also announced enhanced aid to India majority of which would be utilised to fund India‘s infrastructure development which would go a long way in reversing India‘s industrial decline. (j) Another significant aspect of the visit was that both sides reiterated that discussions on a civil nuclear deal between had gained momentum and efforts were on for an early conclusion of an agreement. (k) The visit of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to India would help in deepening India-Japan relations with enhanced cooperation in the defence, economic and nuclear sectors.

Prime Minister‟s Vis to Japan 20. The Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Japan on 01 and 02 Sep 14. During this visit, India and Japan pledged to realize the full potential of India Japan Strategic and Global Partnership for continuing progress and prosperity for their people. The key highlights of the visit are as given below:-

(a) Prime Minister Modi described Japan's importance in India's foreign policy and economic development and her place at the heart of India's Look East Policy. (b) India and Japan are Asia's two largest and oldest democracies, with ancient cultural links and enduring goodwill between their people. The two countries are joined together by convergent global interests, critical maritime interconnection and growing international responsibilities. (c) Relationship between the two countries draw strength and vitality from the exceptional consensus on the importance and potential of this relationship across the political spectrum, the business community and people in all walks of life in the two countries. (d) The two Prime Ministers welcomed the progress of individual cooperation programs and projects enumerated in the factsheet and directed the respective relevant authorities to further advance cooperation in a mutually satisfactory manner.

21. Political, Defence and Security Partnership.

(a) The two Prime Ministers decided to continue the practice of annual summits and to meet as often as possible on the margins of regional and multilateral meetings.

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(b) They underlined the importance of the 2 plus 2 dialogue, involving Foreign and Defence Secretaries, for their growing strategic partnership and decided to seek ways to intensify this dialogue. (c) Reaffirmed the importance of defence relations in strategic partnership, signing of the Memorandum of Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Defence, Japan‘s continued participation in India US Malabar series of exercises. (d) Cooperation in defence equipment and technology and discussions in the Joint Working Group on cooperation in US2 amphibian aircraft. (e) Security of maritime and cyber domains, preserve the integrity and inviolability of these global commons.

22. Global Partnership for Peace and Security.

(a) Building a strong partnership to promote economic and social development, capacity building and infrastructure development in other interested countries and regions. (b) Engage with other countries in the region and beyond to address the region's challenges, deepen regional cooperation and integration, strengthen regional economic and security forums and promote peaceful resolution of disputes. . (c) Condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. Sharing of information and intelligence. (d) Respect to energy security, in a stable and peaceful Middle East, West Asia and the Gulf regions. (e) Call for sustained international commitment to promote Afghanled economic development, political pluralism and capacity building in security in Afghanistan beyond 2014. (f) Urgent need for comprehensive reform of the UN Security Council, especially its expansion in both permanent and nonpermanent categories, to make it more representative, legitimate, effective and responsive to the realities of the 21st century.

23. Civil Nuclear Energy.

(a) Prime Minister Modi appreciated the decision of the Government of Japan to remove six of India‘s space and defence related entities from Japan's Foreign End User List. They looked forward to enhanced trade and collaboration in high technology. (b) Support for India to become a full member in the four international export control regimes: Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar Arrangement and Australia Group, with the aim of strengthening the international nonproliferation efforts.

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24. Partnership for Prosperity.

(a) Transforming the infrastructure and manufacturing sectors in India with continuous support for India‘s economic development. (b) Target of doubling Japan‘s foreign direct investment and the number of Japanese companies in India within five years. (c) Realize 3.5 trillion yen of public and private investment and financing from Japan, including Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), to India in five years, to finance appropriate public and private projects of mutual interest including in the areas of next generation infrastructure, connectivity, transport systems, Smart Cities, rejuvenation of Ganga and other rivers, manufacturing, clean energy, skill development, water security, food processing and agro industry, agricultural cold chain and rural development. (d) Public-private initiatives between the two countries to set up Electronics Industrial Parks in India. (e) Special emphasis on Japan's cooperation for enhanced connectivity and development in Northeast India and linking the region to other economic corridors in India and to Southeast Asia. (f) Initiative for Smart Cities and renewal of heritage cities, including the city of Varanasi. (g) Progress in the ongoing flagship projects of India Japan economic partnership, such as the Western Dedicated Freight Corridor (DFC), Delhi Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC), Chennai Bengaluru Industrial Corridor (CBIC) and committed to accelerate their implementation.

25. Significance of Indian Prime Ministers Visit.

(a) Japan has committed to doubling its current investment in India to $35 billion over the next five years. This will be primarily towards developing India‘s infrastructure and will involve Japanese firms. The agreement also envisages a doubling of Japanese firms doing business in India. (b) Japan has also pledged $500 million towards the Public Private Partnership Infrastructure Financing Project to the India Infrastructure Finance Company Limited (IIFCL). Additionally, Japan will also provide about $156 million for the Guwahati Sewerage Project in Assam. (c) Work towards industrial infrastructure development with the creation of Smart Community projects in six Indian states as part of the Delhi Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC) Project. The DMIC project will involve cooperation in developing power plants, assured water supply, highvolume urban transport, logistics facilities and skill development programs for youth in regions along the corridor. (d) Ponneri in Tamil Nadu, Krishnapatnam in Andhra Pradesh and Tumkur in Karnataka have been marked as potential industrial nodes, and officials from both

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countries have been instructed to finalise the Master Plan and the Development Plan of these cities by Mar 2015. (e) Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy of India and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) in the field of new and renewable energy. (f) India and Japan signed an agreement on the development of the Shinkansen system Bullet trains for India, starting with the Mumbai Ahmedabad corridor. (g) Japan has agreed to ease foreign enduser entities list for India. As a starter, it has removed 6 Indian space defence related entities from its restricted list. (h) The Joint Working Group will work on speeding up cooperation on the US2 amphibian aircraft, which will include transfer of the aircraft and its technology to India. (j) Japan will work with India on creating smart cities, starting with the KyotoVaranasi project. As part of this, Japan will help India to develop urban infrastructure to make Varanasi a ‗smart‘ city.

(k) India will set up a Special Management Team within the Prime Minister‘s Office to deal exclusively with Japanese investment. This special cell will facilitate Japanese investments so that they do not get bogged down in red tape.

26. Conclusion.

(a) Viewing Bilateral Relations form the Prism of Strategic Interests a Major-Shift in Indo-Japanese Relations:-

(i) Agreed move to view the bilateral relations from the prism of strategic interests in the regional and global perspectives signifies a major shift in Indo-Japanese relations. (ii) The long-term strategic interests of India and Japan coincide. (iii) The India-Japan security cooperation was projected as a force of stabilisation in the Asia-Pacific region.

(b) Japan and India are Natural Allies with No Conflict of Strategic Interest and Share Common Goals of Building Stability, Power Equilibrium and Multilateral Cooperation in Asia.

(c) Indo - Japanese Economic Ties.

(i) Japan has aided infrastructure projects in India with many projects in the pipeline. (ii) The markets in India could stimulate Japan‘s economy and Japan could meet India‘s growing needs for capital and technologies.

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(d) India and Japan have to Work Together for the UN Reforms as both are Aspiring for Permanent Security Council Seats.

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CHAPTER - 15

INDO - MALDIVES RELATIONS

1. Current Situation in Maldives.

(a) Presidential Elections in Maldives.

(i) On 07 Sep 2013, Presidential elections were held in Maldives 18 months after its first democratically elected President Mohamed Nasheed stepped down. (ii) Over 2.39 voters voted in the Presidential elections of the 1192 island nation. (iii) As no candidate could secure 50%-plus-one vote to be declared winner, there was a second round of election was to be held on 28 Sep 2013. (iv) On 23 Sep 2013, the Supreme Court of Maldives ordered indefinite postponement of the second round of Presidential elections based on a petition filed by the Jumhooree Party claiming that the elections were not free and fair. (v) India called upon all concerned in Maldives to address the current situation at the earliest so that the electoral process could be resumed in a manner that respects the will of the Maldivian people. (vi) On 17 Oct 2013, India sent its Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh to Maldives to encourage the country to hold the second round of Presidential elections as scheduled on 19 Oct 2013. (vii) India‘s stand was supported by all major powers and some of its neighbours with diplomats from P5+1(Permanent Members of UNSC and Germany) apart from Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Australia. (viii) On 19 Oct 2013, the Maldivian police prevented the country‘s re-scheduled Presidential elections from being held citing the Supreme Court ruling. (ix) On 09 Nov 2013, the second round of Presidential elections was held. (x) In the final round of Presidential elections held on 16 Nov 2013, Abdulla Yameen, half-brother of former President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, of the Progressive Party of Maldives (PPM) won narrowly. (xi) Mr Nasheed conceded defeat and said that he was pleased that Maldives finally had a democratically elected leader.

(b) India welcomed the victory of Abdulla Yameen in the Presidential Elections.

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(c) Abdulla Yameen Abdul Gayoom Sworn in as the President of Maldives.

(i) On 16 Nov 2013, Abdullah Yameen Abdul Gayoom was sworn in as the President of Maldives by the Chief Justice. (ii) The new 54-year-old President pledged to work with neighbours and the international community. (iii) Mr Yameen said that he would strive to make Maldives the safest and most developed nation in the region. (iv) India and the US were among the first countries to congratulate the new President and stressed that they looked forward to working closely with the new leader.

(d) Challenges before the New President.

(i) The new President of Maldives Abdulla Yameen has to assure his deeply divided country that he would not follow the path of his half-brother, former President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, who ruled the country with an iron hand for 30 years. (ii) Since, the ouster of former President Mohamed Nasheed, Maldives had come to a standstill and had witnessed a clash of institutions that form the backbone of democracy. (iii) Strengthening the institutions that form the backbone of democracy is one of the key challenges facing the new President. (iv) Mr Yameen also faces the challenge of fixing the economic problems facing Maldives.

(e) India‟s in Engaging with Maldives.

(i) India, Maldives closest friend and neighbour, adopted a very mature approach in engagement with its neighbour. (ii) Although there were calls from different countries for India‘s intervention in Maldives to set right the democracy, India showed restraint and did not interfere in the internal affairs of its neighbour. (iii) New President of Maldives Abdulla Yameen Abdul Gayoom assured India‘s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that we prioritised relations with India and was keen on finding ways to enhance the long-standing close friendly relations between the two countries. (iv) Warmth expressed by the new Maldivian President in his letter to India‘s Prime Minister was the result of India‘s stand of supporting only the democratic process while being even-handed with all the candidates in the Presidential elections.

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2. Maldivian Defence Minister‟s Visit to India (12 Dec 2013).

(a) India‘s commitment to continue strengthening bilateral defence relations with Maldives, and announced opening of Indian military medical facilities to the defence personnel of Maldives. (b) The Indian Defence Minister said support would be continued to strengthen the Maldives National Defence Force (MNDF). (c) India‘s assurance to Maldives came after two years of troubled relations between the two countries after the ouster of former President Mohamed Nasheed. (d) Training of Maldives medical specialists in India and deputation of Indian Armed Forces medical specialists to Maldives to strengthen existing medical infrastructure. (e) Measures to enhance interactions between the two Armed Forces and agreed to hold the next round of joint exercise in 2014.

3. Maldivian President‟s Visit to India (1-2 Jan 2014).

(a) First Official Foreign Visit of the New President of Maldives. (b) India gave State Visit Status.

(i) India gave the Maldivian President‘s visit the status of a state visit which was a manifestation of the importance India attached to its relations with Maldives. (ii) Mr Yameen‘s choice of India for his first foreign trip was indicative of the robust relationship between the two countries. (iii) The President of Maldives was in India to chair the convocation ceremony of South Asia University, as Maldives was currently chairing the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

(c) Maldivian President met Top Leadership.

(i) The Maldivian President met the entire top leadership of India and discussed the full gamut of the bilateral relationship. (ii) Both sides are seeking to normalise the relations that suffered a setback following the political turmoil that engulfed Maldives after the ouster of former President Mohamed Nasheed.

(d) Both Sides Signed Package of Measures to Restart Work on Projects.

(i) India offered Maldives new assistance. (ii) Both sides signed a package of measures to restart work on projects whose pace had slackened after the ouster of former President Mohamed Nasheed.

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(iii) The projects include the construction of a national police academy, refurbishing of the Indira Gandhi Hospital in Male and setting up a faculty for teaching tourism and hospitality.

(e) Maldives wants Out-of-Court Settlement with GMR on the Airport Project.

4. Indian Concern.

(a) India‟s Recent Turbulent Ties with the Maldives.

(i) India has been providing security support to the Maldives through military patrol aircraft, helicopters and warships for securing the country‘s territory from terrorists and pirates. (ii) India‘s relations with Maldives have witnessed some turbulence in the wake of the political instability after the ouster of the then President Mohamed Nasheed in Feb 2012. (iii) The cancellation of the Male airport contract of the Indian Infrastructure firm GMR was another setback to bilateral ties.

(b) Concerns for India in the Maldives.

(i) India is concerned at the rising Islamism in the Maldives. (ii) Decline of the Maldivian Economy. (iii) Lack of Progress in Building Suitable Institutions of Democracy.

(c) India has High Stakes in the Maldives because of its strategic location, rising fundamentalism and increased competition from China. (d) Maldivian President‟s Visit Significant for Reviving Relations.

(i) The visit to India by the new Maldivian President Abdulla Yameen Abdul Gayoom was significant in reviving the bilateral ties between the two countries. (ii) Mr Yameen chose India for his first official foreign reflecting the keenness of Maldives to revive bilateral relations with India along with the strengthening of defence ties. (iii) India and the Maldives would benefit from strengthening bilateral relations and reviving friendly ties.

5. China‟s Growing Relations with Maldives.

(a) Chinese President Xi Jinping Visited Maldivies, 15 Sep 2014.

(i) First visit by a Chinese President to Maldives.

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(ii) Mr Xi welcomed Maldives intent to get actively involved in the 21st

century Silk Road initiative. (iii) Maldives was a key link of the Maritime Silk Road, and China planned to utilise its ports.

(b) Bridge Construction by China (02 Dec 2015).

(i) China and Maldives signed an accord to conduct a preliminary study for constructing a bridge to connect the capital Male with the international airport. (ii) Chinese President Xi Jinping had said that he hoped the bridge would be named ―China-Maldives Friendship Bridge‖. (iii) The project underlined the growing ties between China and Maldives,

which is seen as a major element of China‘s 21st century Maritime Silk Road,

according to analysts.

(c) India‟s Concerns.

(i) Maritime Silk Road initiative of China has raised certain concerns in India, which is opposed to the militarisation of the Indian Ocean. (ii) India‘s National Security Advisor Ajit Doval had stressed at a conference in Sri Lanka that the Indian Ocean must remain a zone of peace. (iii) The 1971 UN General Assembly resolution on Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace called upon great powers not to allow escalation and expansion of military presence in the Indian Ocean, needed to be revisited.

6. Maldives Water Crisis (5-7 Dec 2014).

(a) On 04 Dec 2014, a major fire destroyed the generator of the Male Water and Sewerage Company, the biggest water treatment plant. (b) About 1,50,000 residents of Male were left without water as Maldives has no natural water sources and depends on treated sea water. (c) A distress call was made by the Maldivian Foreign Minister Dunya Maumoon to India‘s External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj. (d) The Indian Air Force dispatched five transport aircraft, including three C-17 Globemasters and two IL-76s, carrying a large consignment of potable water. (e) One Naval warship, INS Sukanya, an Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV), with two Reverse Osmosis plants on-board with a capacity to produce 20 tonnes of fresh water per day was also sent to Male. (f) The Maldives Government put out distress calls to the US, China and Sri Lanka. India was the first and best placed to respond.

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(g) India was quick to respond to the needs of a SAARC neighbour and was happy to help in any way it could. (h) The Defence Minister of Maldives Mohamed Nazim expressed his deep appreciation and heartfelt thanks for India‘s prompt response to alleviate the problems of Maldivians in the true spirit of their close and time-tested ties. (j) On 07 Dec 2014, India delivered about 1,000 tonnes of fresh water to Male. (k) INS Deepak, a large fleet tanker carrying 900 tonnes of water from Mumbai reached Male while two C-17s of the Indian Air Force (IAF) also delivered another 90 tonnes of potable water. (l) Indian warships had the capability to produce drinking water using their desalination plants and INS Deepak was capable of producing 100 tonnes of water every day. (m) The responsiveness, unique capabilities, flexibility and versatility of warships in meeting various contingencies had yet again been demonstrated.

7. Political Turmoil in Maldives.

(a) Former President Nasheed Arrested, 22 Feb 2015.

(i) Former President Mohammed Nasheed was arrested in Male under anti-terrorism laws for allegedly ordering the arrest of a senior judge in 2012 that triggered violence in Maldives. (ii) Mass protests were held by the supports of Mr Nasheed against his detention on terror charges. (iii) The Government of Maldives defended the arrest of Mr Nasheed on charges of terrorism and accused the former President of performing stunts to grab global attention. (iv) Mr Nasheed‘s arrest sparked international condemnation, with India and the US also voicing concern over his detention. (v) India said it was concerned over the developments in the Maldives, including the arrest and manhandling of Mr Nasheed, and asked all those involved to resolve their differences within the constitutional framework. (vi) The US asked Maldives to take steps to restore confidence in their commitment to democracy, judicial independence, and rule of law in the wake of Mr Nasheed‘s arrest.

(b) Nasheed Sentenced to 13 Years in Prison, 14 Mar 2015.

(i) Former President of Maldives Mohamed Nasheed was sentenced to 13 years in prison under the country‘s Anti-Terrorism Act for ordering the arrest of a Chief Judge, Abdullah Mohamed, when he was President in Jan 2012.

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(ii) Human rights groups said that the trial was flawed. (iii) Mr Nasheed called on his supporters to take to the streets to protest against the sentence. (iv) Mr Nasheed‘s Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) said the verdict dealt a blow to the young democracy seven years after it embraced multi-party elections. (v) Conviction of Mr Nasheed came at a time of growing opposition to the government of President Abdulla Yameen and would prevent Mr Nasheed from running for President in the 2018 elections. (vi) On 15 Mar 2015, Mr Nasheed‘s appeal against the arrest order was dismissed by the High Court in Male.

(c) India‟s Concern.

(i) India expressed deep concern over the developments in Maldives and said that it was closely monitoring the situation. (ii) Indian Prime Minister‘s visit to Maldives in Mar 2015 was cancelled, though no reason was given. (iii) India asked Maldives to ensure that space for legitimate political dissent was safeguarded and safety and security of foreign workers was secured. (iv) Pro-democracy and human rights activists were demanding that India should put pressure on the current leadership in Maldives to consider the release of the former President, Mohamed Nasheed, and other political detainees.

(d) Concern of the US. Democracy was in danger in the Maldives where the former President Nasheed had been imprisoned without due process.

(e) Maldives Asked Critics to Respect Verdict.

(i) Maldives President Abdulla Yameen called on everyone to respect the verdict. (ii) Urged international partners to engage constructively, based on mutual respect and dialogue in consolidating and strengthening democratic values and institutions in the country. (iii) India, the US and the EU expressed concern over the arrest of Mr Nasheed.

8. Conclusion.

(a) Recent Turbulent Ties with Maldives.

(i) India has been providing security support to the Maldives through

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military patrol aircraft, helicopters and warships for securing the country‘s territory from terrorists and pirates. (ii) India‘s relations with Maldives have witnessed some turbulence in the wake of the political instability after the ouster of the then President Mohamed Nasheed in Feb 2012. (iii) The cancellation of the Male airport contract of the Indian Infrastructure firm GMR was another setback to bilateral ties.

(b) Concerns for India.

(i) India is concerned at the rising Islamism in the Maldives. (ii) Decline of the Maldivian Economy. (iii) Lack of Progress in Building Suitable Institutions of Democracy.

(c) India has High Stakes in the Maldives because of its Strategic Location, Rising Fundamentalism and Increased Competition from China. (d) Decline of Maldivian Economy. India is also concerned over the economic decline of Maldives. The dollar has become scarce, overseas workers would not be able to repatriate more than $1000 a month. The government has also imposed a Goods and Services Tax and a profit tax to shore up sagging revenue. (e) Lack of Institutions of Democracy. India is concerned at the lack of progress in building suitable institutions of democracy in the Maldives. The state of the institutions, especially the judiciary and the police was deplorable. There was need to work on reforms in these two crucial areas, otherwise the events like the current crisis would keep repeating, according to analysts.

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CHAPTER - 16

INDO - MONGOLIA RELATIONS

1. Prime Minister‟s Visit. Indian Prime Minister Narender Modi visited Mongolia on 17 May 2015. This was the first visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Mongolia.

2. Talks between Prime Ministers.

(a) India‘s Prime Minister held wide ranging talks with the Mongolian counterpart. (b) Both leaders pledged to take bilateral economic partnership to a new level. (c) India would provide a Line of Credit of $1 billion to support expansion of Mongolia‘s economic capacity and infrastructure. (d) The destinies of India and Mongolia were closely linked with the future of Asia Pacific region.

3. Joint Statement.

(a) The two sides committed to consolidate ties and upgrade the comprehensive partnership to ―strategic partnership.‖ (b) India and Mongolia agreed to renew their Treaty of Friendly Relations and Cooperation. (c) India and Mongolia support the evolution of open, balanced and inclusive security architecture in Asia Pacific region based on collected efforts, considering legitimate interests of all States of the region guided by respect for norms and principles of international law.

4. 13 Agreements. India and Mongolia Signed 13 Agreements that include Cyber security, renewable energy, enhancing border defence, policing and surveillance, air services, agriculture and health sector.

5. Significance of Prime Minister‟s Visit.

(a) Mongolia was also an integral part of India‘s Act East Policy. (b) Pitched for closer bilateral relations amid China‘s bid for enhancing its regional influence. (c) Bilateral relationship between the two countries was not measured on the scale of commerce or driven by competition against others. It was a relationship of immeasurable positive energy that came from their spiritual links and shared ideals. (d) 25 years of democracy is celebrated in Mongolia & 60 years of Indo-Mongolian diplomatic relations, both countries know that best for their relations lies

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ahead of them. (e) The Indian Prime Minister‘s talks with his Mongolian counterpart were significant as there was strong convergence of views on bilateral relations and their regional and international partnerships. (f) The agreements India signed with Mongolia spoke of the depth of the relationship-covered economic relations, development partnership, defence and security, and people-to-people contacts.

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CHAPTER - 17

INDO - MYANMAR RELATIONS Introduction 1. Reviving Bilateral Relations. India's relations with Myanmar have been ambiguous and distant for about three decades. Indo-Myanmar relations are now being revived. Myanmar is an important neighbour of India and nurturing relations with it is of political, strategic and security interest to India, according to analysts. 2. Reasons for Reviving Bilateral Relations.

(a) Myanmar's Geo-Strategic Importance. Myanmar is strategically very important to India and is the centre piece of India's "look east" policy. Both countries share a common border and Myanmar offers a land corridor to South-East Asia. The northern frontiers of Myanmar constitute a tri-junction with Bangladesh, China and eastern frontiers of India.

(b) Security Interests in the Bay of Bengal. Myanmar is an important country on the rim of the Bay of Bengal, lying astride the south-eastern trade routes of India. Andaman and Nicobar islands of India are closer to the south-eastern coast of Myanmar. Therefore the developments in that area can affect the security interests of India in the Bay of Bengal. (c) Counter North-East Insurgency. India's cooperation with Myanmar is essential to counter drug smuggling, narcotics and the north-eastern insurgent groups which use the porous border between the two countries to their advantage. Both sides have explored the possibility of launching joint operations and have successfully cooperated in a joint operation code named "Golden Bird" against the ULFA (United Liberation Front of Assam). (d) Countering other Powers in Myanmar.

(i) Analysts point out that it is important for India to ensure that Myanmar does not become part of an exclusive area of influence of other powers in the region with whom India has" uneasy relations. (ii) Countering China. India wants Myanmar to limit China's physical access to the east of the Chindwin River, a tributary of the Irrawady which splits the country into nearly two halves. Any movement to the west of Chindwin can expose India's sensitive North-Eastern region to China's surveillance. (iii) Countering Pakistan. India knows that Pakistan is seeking a foot-holdin Myanmar, with the long-term objective of encouraging insurgency in North-East India. However, political and economic bonds between India and Myanmar have deepened in the recent past.

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(e) Land bridge to South-East Asia. India's North-Eastern States need an eastward access for their trade flow which is not possible without improving relations with Myanmar. Myanmar is a land bridge between India and South-East Asian countries. Myanmar is now a member of the ASEAN and a gateway to the economically vibrant region. Hence Myanmar has been brought into the ambit of India's "look east" policy. (f) Importance to National Security & Regional Engagements. The growing warmth in Indo-Myanmar relations, despite India's sympathy of the pro-democracy movement in Myanmar led by Ms Aung San Suu Kyi, is a reflection of India's conscious decision to give paramount importance to its national security and regional engagements as part of it ―look east" policy, according to observers.

Background 3. Military Rule in Myanmar. For more than three decades, Myanmar has been ruled by the military. In 1988, General Ne Win resigned as Chairman of Myanmar's only political party, the Burma Socialistic Programme Party Ms Aung San Suu Kyi also returned to Myanmar from UK in 1988. 4. Setting up of SLORC. In 1988, popular uprising started against the military Government. The military crushed the protests and recaptured power by setting up the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). The brutal suppression of the democratic uprising resulted in a number of deaths. 5. Democratic Elections. Democratic elections were held by the SLORC in 1990. The National League for Democracy (NLD) of the dissident leader Ms Aung San Suu Kyi won the elections capturing 392 of the 485 seats. However the military regime annulled the verdict and arrested Ms Suu Kyi and hundreds of political activists. 6. Set Back to Indo-Myanmar Relations. In 1990, Indo-Myanmar relations received a setback when the military authorities of Myanmar refused to accept the 1990 electoral verdict. India's commitment to democracy created distances with Myanmar. 7. Myanmar's Entry into ASEAN. In May 1997, the ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) decided to admit Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos into its fold. 8. Neutrality in International Affairs. Observers point out that Myanmar‘s military is fiercely nationalistic and has played an active role in the country's politics since it gained independence. 9. It has appropriated to itself the role of the guardian of the country's political destiny. It has been strictly neutral in international affairs. 10. Indo – Bangladesh - Myanmar Gas Pipeline. On 13 Jan 2005, the Energy Ministers of India, Bangladesh and Myanmar meeting in Yangon agreed to the construction and operation of a pipeline which will allow natural gas to flow from the fields off the coast of Myanmar to India via Bangladesh. 11. China‟s Growing Presence in Myanmar.

(a) China and Myanmar have pledged to deepen their political cooperation.

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(b) China‘s political adviser Jia Qinglin visited Myanmar in Apr 2011. (c) China extended support to the newly-elected President Thein Sein. (d) Myanmar‘s New President visited China in May 2011 to discuss a plan to allow Chinese navy to dock in Myanmar‘s ports and get direct access to the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean. (e) Myanmar would have to consider India‘s apprehensions about China‘s naval expansion in its neighbourhood before acceding to China‘s request. (f) Myanmar is significant for China for both energy resources and the strategically-significant Indian Ocean port in that country (g) Myanmar had allowed two warships from China to dock at Thilawa Port as they were returning from a counter-piracy operation in the Indian Ocean in Aug 2010. (h) China is keen to reduce its dependence on the Malacca Straits as a route for its oil imports.

12. India's Policy towards Myanmar.

(a) India supports the democratic movement in Myanmar. (b) Shift in Policy Owing to Strategic & Economic Concerns.

(i) Shared common border of difficult terrain and common security problems. (ii) Myanmar was tilting sharply towards China. (iii) India faced a problem of being flanked East and West by two China-allied nations. (iv) The shift in India‘s position came in 1990s. (v) The change in India‘s attitude was reciprocated by the SPDC. (vi) Economic integration with South-East Asia is essential for faster development of India's North-East.

(c) Importance of Myanmar.

(i) Location of Myanmar - Gateway to ASEAN, Important for India's Look East Policy. (ii) Myanmar's Support is Crucial to Curb Insurgency in the Northeast. (iii) Myanmar's Oil and Gas Reserves Significant for India's Energy Security

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(iv) Engaging the Military Regime in Myanmar to Balance the Influence of China

(d) Balance between Short-Term & Long-Term Interests.

(i) Analysts point out that Myanmar presents a challenge for India's foreign policy (ii) The establishment of a stable, peaceful and secure State that meets the aspirations of the people of Myanmar would be in the long-term interests of India. (iii) India now has the task of rebuilding relations with the pro-democratic forces in Myanmar led by Aung San Suu.

Current Status 13. External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj has been in Naypyitaw, Myanmar for the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (AMM), the East Asia Summit meeting of foreign ministers, and the ASEAN Regional Forum. Myanmar is becoming increasingly important for India in both a strategic and economic context. High level visits have become a regular feature between them.

(a) Some of the major projects taken up by India include the resurfacing and upgrading of the 160 km Tamu-Kalewa-Kalemyo road and the Kaladan project that will connect Kolkata Port with Sittwe Port in Myanmar (which is still in progress). A bus service from Imphal to Mandalay will begin in Oct. (b) India is also helping Myanmar by setting up high speed data links in 32 cities. Some other Indian companies such as Essar, GAIL, and ONGC Videsh Ltd have invested in Myanmar‘s energy sector. Tata Motors has set up a heavy turbo truck assembly plant with financial assistance from the Indian Government. (c) Bilateral trade has grown from $12.4 million in 198081 to $2.18 billion in 2013-14. Agricultural items like beans and pulses and forest based products make up nearly 90 percent of India‘s imports. Myanmar is also the beneficiary of a dutyfree tariff preference scheme for least developed countries (LDCs). Both countries also signed a border trade agreement in 1994 and have two trade points along their 1,643 km border. (d) Myanmar is strategically important to India as it is the only ASEAN country that shares a border with India. It is also the only country that can act as a link between India and ASEAN. Myanmar is India‘s gateway to Southeast Asia and could be the required impetus to realize India‘s Look East Policy. India has also decided to upgrade the KalewaYargyi road segment to highway standard, while Myanmar would develop the Yargyi-Monywa portion, and this would help to connect Moreh in India to Mae Sot in Thailand via Myanmar. This in turn would improve India‘s connectivity and relationship with both Myanmar and Thailand. (e) There are several advantages that India has over China with regard to Myanmar. One is the democratic process, which results in different governments at the centre and states through free and fair elections. There is also the respect for

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institutions that are strong enough to hold the country together. Finally, cooperation in different multilateral forums such as ASEAN and BIMSTEC strengthen the relationship between the two countries. (f) The proposed BCIM corridor will run from Kunming, capital of China‘s Yunnan province which borders Myanmar, to Kolkata snaking through Mandalay in Myanmar and Dhaka and Chittagong in Bangladesh. (g) Another infrastructural corridor in the region, being pushed by China, is in the works. China has already proposed the Bangladesh China India Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor which is meant to cover 1.65 million square kilometers encompassing about 440 million people in the four countries.

Significance of the Visit 14. President U Thein Sein assured India that Myanmar will never allow its territory to be used for anti-India activities as visiting External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj raised serious concern over some North Eastern militant outfits taking shelter in this country. 15. The two sides deliberated on various issues including ways to increase bilateral trade and investment and improve road, sea and aerial connectivity. 16. Early implementation of trilateral highway project between India, Myanmar and Thailand and flight services from Delhi to Yangon via Bodh Gaya. 17. The 3,200 km trilateral highway project will link India, Myanmar and Thailand and open up connectivity with other ASEAN countries. 18. Setting up of a Joint Consultative Committee between the two countries to have a platform to discuss various issues. Myanmar Foreign Minister‟s Visit to India. 19. Myanmar Foreign Minister U Wunna Maung Lwin visited India on 16 Jul 2015. The first meeting of the India-Myanmar Joint Consultative Commission was chaired by India‘s External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj and her Myanmar counterpart U Wunna Maung Lwin.

(a) India and Myanmar agreed to fight the scourge of terrorism and insurgent activity in all its forms and manifestations. (b) Regular meetings of the bilateral regional border committee would be held for better border management, according to a joint statement. (c) Both sides reiterated that territories of either country would not be allowed to be used for activities inimical to the other, according to the joint statement. (d) Both Ministers discussed the need for undertaking negotiations for early conclusion of the MoU on movement of people across the land border. (e) A meeting of the India-Myanmar Joint Boundary Working Group would be scheduled soon to resolve the border issues.

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(f) A joint survey would be undertaken by both sides to inspect the earth blockage site on the Ti-Ho (Tizu) river on the India-Myanmar border to inspect the efforts made by local authorities of Mizoram to remove the debris and restore the normal course of the river. (g) India‘s External Affairs Minister said that India was committed to supporting the modernisation of the Myanmar Armed Forces and in building a professional and capable Myanmar Navy to safeguard and ensure its maritime security, according to the joint statement. (h) Both sides also agreed to foster cooperation in the energy sector, trade and commerce, according to the joint statement.

20. High-Level Visits Enhance Relations. India and Myanmar share strong geo-political and geo-economic importance in the region. There is an element of pragmatism which influences the need for enhanced Indo-Myanmar relations. The visit by Myanmar‘s Foreign Minister to India in Jul 2015 further enhanced Indo-Myanmar relations. 21. Relations Based on Strategic Compulsions. Analysts point out that India has to look at Myanmar through the prism of its security and economic linkages with South-East Asia. Whether it is a democratic or military Government in Myanmar, India‘s strategic compulsions will not change. 22. Broadbasing the Relationship. With help from Myanmar India has been able to control the insurgent activities along the 1,670 km long sensitive Indo-Myanmar border. India also wants to broad base relations with Myanmar to other areas and formalise cross-border trade. 23. Deepening Economic & Strategic Relations.

(a) Analysts point out that India is steadily deepening its economic and strategic relations with Myanmar. Myanmar occupied a central place in India‘s vision and approach of rebuilding its Eastern connections, according to the then President of India Pratibha Patil. (b) India is also moving ahead with building roads in Myanmar, besides setting up a hydroelectric station and a communication and IT project. (c) India and Myanmar were expanding defence ties with India deciding to assist the modernisation of the Myanmar Armed Forces and Navy. (d) Both Countries agreed to intensify cooperation between security forces and border guarding agencies to fight insurgency and secure the border areas. (e) The agreement came a month after India launched a counter-terrorism operation against militants in Myanmar.

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CHAPTER - 18

INDO - NEPAL RELATIONS Introduction 1. Close Bonds between the two Countries: India and Nepal share many common bonds historical and geographical, cultural and economic. India and Nepal have wide ranging cooperation including large development projects in the infrastructure, rural, health and community welfare sectors. 2. With Nepal becoming a Republic after 240 years of monarchy, India has to deal with a new Nepal. In order to make India's engagement with a new Nepal constructive and mutually beneficial there is a need to understand the radical transformation Nepal has undergone in recent years. An upsurge of socioeconomic aspirations, rise of people's power and spread of political consciousness at the grass roots has been witnessed in Nepal. Background 3. Indo-Nepalese Accord of Peace and Friendship. The 1950 accord stated that ―neither government shall tolerate any threat to the security of the other by a foreign aggressor‖ and obligated both side ―to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighbouring state likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations subsisting between the two governments.‖ These accords cemented a ―special relationship‖ between India and Nepal that granted Nepal preferential economic treatment and provided Nepalese in India the same economic and educational opportunities as Indian citizens. Nepal insists that the Treaty was signed in haste and should be modified to suit the present circumstances. 4. Water Sharing of the Mahakali River. The Mahakali river accord was signed in 1996 and provided for the development of the Mahakali Basin. It envisaged the construction of 2000 MW hydroelectric project in Nepal along the development of the Tanakpur and Sharda barrages and construction of 22 bridges in the Kohalpur Mahakali area inside Nepal. The Treaty will result in power generation at a low cost. The basin development will immensely benefit both the countries. The Treaty also accommodates Nepal‘s main demand that it should benefit from the Tanakpur project as a matter of ―right‖ and not as a ―gift‖ and in recognition of its contribution in the form of land for the left afflux bund. Importance of Nepal 5. Political and Security Concerns for India.

(a) Porous Border. India has an open and porous border with Nepal and terrorist elements cross over into Indian Territory. However, India is vigilant to the threat of terrorism, and will not allow its territory to be used by forces inimical to the people of Nepal, according to the spokeswomen of the Ministry of External Affairs. (b) Fertile Ground for Violence. The disturbances in Nepal can create serious political and security problems for India. The floating Napalese population between

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India, Nepal and Bhutan, with an indeterminate national identity will provide fertile ground for violence and other crimes. (c) ISI. An unstable Nepal would also provide opportunities to Pakistan‘s Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) and terrorist and separatist elements from the India‘s North-East. (d) Effect on Indo-Nepal and Sino-Indian Relations. Nepal is a buffer State between India and China. The turmoil in Nepal could get enmeshed in foreign policy and security decisions, which could have detrimental effect on Indo Nepal and Sino Indian relations. (e) Complex Security Dimensions. The security dimensions for India in relation to Nepal are complex and influenced by the district geography of the landlocked country. Although, the China factor is a perennial challenge to India, recent trends, however, suggest that the Chinese may not encourage and zero sum approaches in the region. (f) Use of Nepal by for Anti India Activities. Pakistan‘s ISI is perceived to be highly active in Nepal and the hijacking of Indian Airlines flight from Kathmandu in Dec 1999 is case in point. (g) Operational & Logistical Assistance to Nepal. India can provide Nepal with operational and logistical assistance to make the counter insurgency operations successful. This support and cooperation is necessary in view of the long term productive potential of bilateral cooperation between the two countries.

6. Elections in Nepal.

(a) Constituent Assembly (CA) Elections.

(i) The second Constituent Assembly (CA) elections were held in Nepal on 19 Nov 2103.

(ii) More than 70% of Nepal‘s 12 million voters voted in the elections defying a boycott call and threats of violence. (iii) Nepal‘s Election Commission said that the voter turnout registered record levels exceeding those of the 2008 elections.

(b) Nepali Congress Emerged as the Leading Party.

(i) In the 601-member Constituent Assembly 240 are elected through direct voting, 335 by Proportionate voting and 26 are nominated by the government. (ii) A party needs 301 seats to get an absolute majority. (iii) The Nepali Congress (NC) emerged as the leading party in the second Constituent Assembly Elections by winning 105 of the 240 directly elected seats.

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(iv) The Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) came second with 91 seats and the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) won 25 seats. (v) The other 335 Proportionate voting seats where the voters pick up a political party would be divided among the 122 competing political parties according to the proportion of the total vote each party gets. (vi) The Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) withdrew from the counting after initial results showed that they were losing most of the seats. (vii) The Maoists alleged that the elections were rigged.

(c) Political Parties: Four-Point Agreement (24 Dec 2013).

(i) Constituting a Parliamentary Committee to investigate and Submit Suggestions on Questions Raised about the CA Election (ii) Preparing the Draft of the New Constitution as Per the Spirit of the 12-Point Agreement, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Interim Constitution within six months and Promulgate it in a Year (iii) Accord on Forming a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and Commission on Enforced Disappearances (iv) Request the Election Commission Yet Again to Extend the Deadline to Submit the Names of the Elected Candidates under the Proportional Representation (PR) Electoral System for Five More Days.

(d) First Meeting of the CA – Nepali Leaders Promise to Draft the Constitution Within a Year (22 Jan 2014)

(e) Shushil Koirala the New Prime Minister.

(i) On 09 Feb 2014, the Nepali Congress (NC) and the CPN-UML signed a seven-point agreement paving the way for Mr Sushil Koirala of the NC to become the new Prime Minister. (ii) As per the agreement between the NC and the CPN-UML, there would be no election for the post of President and Vice-President for now (iii) On 10 Feb 2014, Sushil Koirala was elected Prime Minister of Nepal after he secured more than two-thirds of the votes in the Legislature – Parliament. (iv) On 11 Feb 2014, Mr Koirala assumed office. (v) Government under his leadership would promote internal capital and external investment and would create economic opportunities within the country to end poverty and unemployment.

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(f) Chandra Nembang, Chairman of Constituent Assembly.

(i) On 18 Feb 2014, CPN-UML‘s Subash Chandra Nembang was elected unopposed as Chairperson of the Constituent Assembly. (ii) The Constituent Assembly Chairperson is also the Speaker of the Legislature-Parliament.

(g) India‟s Stand.

(i) India welcomed the successful conduct of free and fair elections in Nepal for the Constituent Assembly-cum-Parliament. (ii) India described the elections as an important step towards realising Nepal‘s goal of a democratic and prosperous future. (iii) India emphasised that the early promulgation of a new Constitution, together with progress on development agenda, would contribute to peace, prosperity and stability in Nepal. (iv) As a close friend and neighbour, India was ready to support the government and people of Nepal in their historic endeavours

(h) China the Largest Contributor of FDI in Nepal.

(i) China had overtaken India to become the largest contributor of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Nepal over the first six months of the financial year 2013-14. (ii) China‘s increasing FDI in Nepal underlined China‘s expanding economic presence and strategic influence in Nepal. (iii) Chinese investment reached $174 million between Jul 2013 and Dec 2013 accounting for over 60% of the total FDI commitment (iv) China‘s FDI investment in Nepal marked a three-fold increase compared to 2011-12. (v) China had begun to surpass the investment from India into Nepal since last year. (vi) As the political course took positive shape following the Constituent Assembly election, the Chinese investors introduced huge amount of FDI. (vii) China was undertaking major deals in Nepal on the basis of its ability to provide concessional finance and get state-run contracts to implement projects. (viii) China‘s major investments in transport and infrastructure sectors could enhance its influence and reduce that of India in Nepal, which is strategically located between the two countries

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Current Situation

7. Joint Commission Meeting. The Indo-Nepal Joint Commission was formed in 1987 as the highest authority to discuss and review the entire gamut of bilateral relations. The Joint Commission was to meet every two years in the capitals of the two countries, but the meetings were not held after the second one. India‘s External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj attended the third meeting of the Indo Nepal Joint Commission being held after a gap of 23 years. 8. Meetings with Nepalese Leadership. India‘s External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj met key leaders of Nepal and conveyed India‘s goodwill for Nepal and pledged engagement at the highest level. added benefit for Nepal was to reduce the large trade deficit with India. Nepal‘s trade deficit with India had widened to Rs.210 billion. 9. Joint Statement.

(a) India and Nepal agreed to review and update the Treaty of Peace and Friendship 1950. (b) Both sides agreed to implement the Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIPPA). (c) Both sides agreed to finalise the text of a Power Trade Agreement at the earliest. (d) Stressed on the prioritisation of the Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project on the Mahakali river that borders India and Nepal. (e) Directed the Nepal India Boundary Working Group to commence field works at the earliest to look into missing border pillars and boundary disputes.

10. Narendra Modi‟s Visit to Nepal. India‘s Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Nepal from 03-04 Aug 2014. Mr Modi‘s visit was the first by an Indian Prime Minister in 17 years. 11. India‘s Prime Minister Narendra Modi was the first foreign guest invited to address the joint session of the Constituent Assembly and Parliament. The key issues highlighted in his address are as given below.

(a) India was committed to the economic development of Nepal. (b) The Indian Prime Minister announced $1 billion line of credit for Nepal‘s infrastructure development. (c) HIT formula for Nepal–Highways, Information ways and Transways and Transmission lines. (d) Assured the work on the Pancheswar Multipurpose Project would begin in a year.

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(e) Praised Nepal for entering the path of peace by shunning violence and stressed it could be a model all over the world once the Constitution was written.

12. Talks between the two Prime Ministers.

(a) Three Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) were signed.

(i) Tourism development in Nepal, (ii) Goitre Control Programme in Nepal, and (iii) Cooperation between the State controlled television channels Doordarshan and Nepal Television (NTV).

(b) Terms of reference on the Pancheshwar Development Authority were exchanged. (c) India told Nepal that it was ready to revise the Treaty of Peace and Friendship 1950.

13. Significance of Narendra Modi‟s Visit.

(a) India and Nepal had laid the foundation for a new relationship. (b) The Prime Minister‘s visit highlighted the Government‘s focus on India‘s immediate neighbourhood at a time when Nepal is engaged in the drafting of a new Constitution. (c) Prime Minister Modi tried to touch upon the political, economic and cultural aspects to turn around the bilateral ties which had begun to stagnate over the last few years. (d) Bilateral relations with neighbours must promote the wellbeing of all the SAARC countries. A vibrant SAARC would be in India‘s interests in an increasingly multipolar world defined by dynamic geopolitics, according to analysts. (e) India decided to bolster Nepal‘s energy security by agreeing to establish a two phased products pipeline, which would carry petroleum products from Raxaul in Bihar to Kathmandu. (f) India and Nepal also decided to resolve once and for all the pending Indo Nepal border issues, including the differences over Kalapani and Susta.

(g) India‘s extension of a $1billion line of credit to Nepal for infrastructure projects and his support to Nepal for building HIT – Highways, Information ways and Transways and Transmission lines is seen as a significant strategic diplomacy in the backdrop of increasing Chinese influence in India‘s immediate neighbourhood.

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Salient Features of the Interim Constitution Of Nepal 14. Nepal‘s new Constitution was promulgated on 20 Sep 2015. The Constitution with 308 Articles, 35 parts and nine schedules is the seventh constitution in the history of Nepal since 1948. The salient features of the constitution are as following:-

(a) Sovereignty. The sovereignty of Nepal is vested in the people of Nepal. (b) Secularism. The word ‗secularism‘ is retained in the Constitution. (c) The Federal Parliament. The country will have Federal Parliament consisting of two Houses – the House of Representatives and the National Assembly. The House of Representative will have 275 members; out of it, 165 will be elected directly, while 110 members shall be elected from proportional representation electoral system. (d) The Federal & Provincial Executive. The executive power of the country will rest with the Council of Ministers, while the President will be the head of the state. (e) Judiciary. There will be three courts – Supreme Court, High Court and District Court – in Nepal. (f) Emergency Power. President may declare emergency in case a grave emergency arises linked to sovereignty or territorial integrity of Nepal or the security problem in any part of the country. (g) Amendment of the Constitution. The Constitution is flexible; it can be amended by two-thirds majority of Parliament members.

15. Concerns of Madhesis. In the case of a person born to a Nepali woman citizen married to a foreign citizen will not be able to get citizenship by descent. This clause is discriminatory in relation to Madhesis. Which describes the provision of granting Non-Resident Nepali Citizenship to Nepalis, does not favour the Madhesis. The Article states, ―The person, who has acquired the citizenship of a foreign country and is residing in a country other than the SAARC country and who or whose father or mother, grandfather or grandmother was a citizen of Nepal by descent or birth and, later on, acquired the citizenship of a foreign country, may be conferred with the non-residential citizenship of Nepal, entitling him/her to the economic, social and cultural Rights as provided for in a Federal law.‖ The Madhesis could have benefited if SAARC countries were included in the list. The people of Terai region, particularly the Madhesis and Indian citizens living in the border areas of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, where cross-border marriages are common and which are known for Roti-Beti ka rishta, will be the worst affected. Many believe that the fear of Indian ―demographic aggression‖ in Nepal compelled Nepal‘s law makers to modify the earlier clause of citizenship by descent. Here, Nepal and India differ; India considers social and cultural bonding as one of the key factors behind the unique and special relationships between the two countries, while Nepal considers it as a threat to its identity. 16. India‟s Concern to the New Constitution. The main crux of the problem from the Indian viewpoint is that the Madhesis have reacted violently to their country‘s new constitution which had been in the making for last seven years. Madhesis, along with the Tharus, form the bulk of population of Terai. The Terai region constitutes one-fifth of Nepal‘s

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landmass, but accounts for over half of the nation's population. The Madhesis have been fighting for equal representation in the country's political structure and the new constitution, according to them, has failed to meet their aspirations. Nepal‘s new constitution promises to identify seven provinces of the country for administrative purposes, an exercise which it says will be completed in a year. Madhesis feel that they have been shortchanged and it perhaps explains the latest spate of violence gripping Nepal.

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CHAPTER - 19

INDO - PAK RELATIONS

Backgound 1. Formed. 14 Aug 1947, carved out of the Muslim majority areas of the British ruled Indian subcontinent. West Pakistan and East Pakistan (Bangladesh) Separated by about 1,600 km of Indian Territory. 2. Population. 31.6 million with majority Sunni Muslims, Shias account for 15% of the population. Three percent minorities including Hindus, Christians, etc.About 1.2 million Afghan refugees. 3. Wars with India. 1947-48 (Kashmir dispute), 1965 (Kashmir dispute) and 1971 (liberation of Bangladesh). 4. Oct 1958. Mohammed Ayub Khan, Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army Seized power. 5. Mar 1969. Opposition rioting in East Pakistan forced Ayub Khan to hand over power to Major General Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan. 6. Dec 1970. Awami League of East Pakistan won the General elections Yahya Khan suspended the Government triggering widespread riots in East Pakistan. 7. Dec 1971. Pakistani troops surrender after India‘s armed intervention in the civil war. East Pakistan became independent Bangladesh. Yahya Khan resigned and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto won the Presidential elections. Parliamentary system was adopted paving way for Bhutto to become the Prime Minister. 8. Jul 1977. General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq, Pakistan‘s Chief of Army Staff seized power. 9. Apr 1979. General Zia executed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on charges of conspiracy to murder. 10. Aug 1988. General Zia died in a mysterious plane crash. 11. Nov 1988. Benazir Bhutto, daughter of Zulfikar Bhutto, became Pakistan‘s first women Prime Minister. 12. Aug 1990. Benazir‘s Government was dismissed amid charges of corruption and mismanagement. 13. Nov 1990. Nawaz Sharif of Islami Jamhoori Ittehad was sworn in as the Prime Minister of Pakistan.

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14. Oct 1993. Benazir started mass demonstrations resulting in the early dismissal of Nawaz Sharif. She was later voted back to power in the subsequent elections. 15. Nov 1996. Benazir Bhutto was dismissed by President Farooq Leghari amid charges of corruption and incompetence. 16. Feb 1997. Nawaz Sharif, sworn in as the 13th Prime Minister of Pakistan. 17. Military Rule. Pakistan has been ruled by the Army for 33 of the 68 years of its existence.

(a) First Coup. General Iskander Mirza overthrew an elected government in 1958. His Army Chief Gen. Mohammed Ayub Khan took over within days and got elected President in 1960. (b) Second Coup. Gen Ayub Khan resigned in 1969 after several months of violence, rioting and unrest in the then East Pakistan. Ayub Khan handed over power to Gen Mohammed Yahya Khan, who declared martial law, in the country and let loose a reign of terror in East Pakistan. (c) Third Coup. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was overthrown on 05 Jul 1977 by the then Army Chief Gen Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq. Bhutto was imprisoned and later executed on 04 Apr 1979 on charges of complicity in a 1974 political murder. (d) Fourth Coup. On 12 Oct 1999, the Nawaz Sharif Government was dismissed by the Army top brass. The Pakistani Army Chief, General Pervez Musharraf, appointed himself the Chief Executive of Pakistan in a proclamation imposing a state of Emergency in the country. Later Gen Musharraf appointed himself as the President of Pakistan.

18. Reasons behind Pakistan Reverting to Military Rule.

(a) Role of Pakistan Army.

(i) Supra Governmental. Analysts point out that the Army in Pakistan has incrementally acquired an institutional identity and role which is supra-governmental and transcends all other constitutional and institutional arrangements of governance in Pakistan. (ii) Ideological Guardian. The Army has designated itself as the protector of the ideology of Pakistan and the guardian of national values. It has bestowed upon itself the right to intervene even against the constitution of the republic, according to analysts. (iii) Higher Responsibility than Civilian Governments. The Pakistan Army has claimed for itself a responsibility higher than of any civilian Government regardless of the processes by which such Governments come to power. (iv) India as an Enemy. Defence analysts point out that the Pakistani Army needs India as an enemy to enable it to play the role of an ideological guardian. Therefore it is not in the interest of the army to have

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good relations with India. This led to the Kargil misadventure and the logical consequence of Kargil is the fourth spell of Army rule. (v) Hold Over Foreign Policy. The Pakistan Army had always controlled the foreign policy of the country despite the civilian rule, according to analysts. The civilian Governments had to toe the Army‘s line on foreign policy. (vi) External Factors.

(aa) Tensions with India. The significant influence of the Army in Pakistan is also a reflection of the external factors, according to analysts. The three wars with India and the continuing tensions in relations between the two countries have given a central role to the Army in Pakistan. (ab) Civil War in Afghanistan. The civil war in Afghanistan has also strengthened the Army‘s role in Pakistan. (ac) Legitimacy of Military Coups. Analysts point out that the Army in Pakistan is willing to tamper with the nation in its determination to preserve itself. Therefore coups are considered perfectly legitimate by the Pakistani Army, according to analysts.

(b) Fragility of Democracy in Pakistan.

(i) Elected Governments Vulnerable. Most of the elected Governments in Pakistan have been under the influence of the army or under the shadow of the President, who had the power to dismiss them. (ii) Fragility of Democratic Institutions. There has been military rule for almost 30 years in Pakistan. The military coups in Pakistan underline the fragility of democratic institutions in that country, according to analysts. (iii) Ideological, Internal and External Factors. Analysts feel that the failure of democracy to gain firm foothold in Pakistan can be interpreted in terms of ideological, external and internal considerations. (iv) Lack of Nationhood. The weakness of democratic institutions in Pakistan is partly due to the lack of sufficiently strong tradition of nationhood, according to analysts. It is pointed out that Pakistan was founded largely on the anti-India factor. This factor could not provide the right setting for the democratic spirit to flourish.

(c) Mismanagement by Civilian Governments.

(i) The failure of politicians to provide stable governments has also been a major factor behind the facade of military rule in Pakistan. The situation has been further aggravated by the corruption and mismanagement of civilian regimes and the provincial divide in the country.

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(ii) The civilian leaders have not strengthened the democratic institutions by weakening the hold of the army. They have only paid lip service to democracy and used the democratic institutions for narrow financial and political gains, according to analysts. (iii) Failure to Evolve Institutional and Political Process. Since its inception, Pakistan has failed to evolve institutional and political processes that could acquire the necessary momentum and autonomy to form the base for a democratic state structure.

19. Jihadi Groups in Pakistan.

(a) Aggressive Militant Groups. The Jihadi groups in Pakistan are the most aggressive among a growing array of activists and organisations replacing or challenging the crumbling state institutions, according to a US media report. (b) World‟s Most Explosive Place. Jihadi groups have played a major role in transforming South Asia into the world‘s most volatile region and Pakistan into the world‘s most explosive country. The militants see the entire world as the battlefield for their holy war (jihad). (c) Unable to Rein in Militants. Pakistan is now home to at least 128 camps for militants dedicated to retrieving Kashmir and widening the Islamic world. Once the militants were proxies of the government. Now even the government including military is unable or unwilling to rein them in according to the report. (d) Offshoots of Groups Created During Afghanistan War. The current militant groups are offshoots of the groups launched with the help of Pakistan‘s ISI during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980‘s. But they weren‘t disbanded after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, according to the report. (e) Discontent with Political Parties. The US media report indicated that the key reason for the Islamic trend in Pakistan was widespread discontent with the political parties that have left the country on the brink of a failed state with political instability, weak economy and a breakdown in law and order. Four military coups haven‘t helped. (f) Threat to Pakistan‟s Society and Polity. Analysts point out that using jihad and gun culture as tools of State policy to acquire strategic depth in Afghanistan and the territory in Jammu and Kashmir have backfired on Pakistan. Drugs, weapons and terrorism originally meant for export are now threatening to destroy Pakistan‘s own society and polity.

(i) Drugs. According to analysts, Pakistan allowed the production, refining and export of drugs during the soviet occupation of Afghanistan. By allowing the trade to thrive Pakistan has created a generation of drug addicts within the country. (ii) Weapons. The proliferation of weapons during the Afghanistan operation led to the arming of various ethnic groups within Pakistan itself. These have been used in the sectarian violence by different groups and form a grave threat to law and order in the country and society in general.

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(iii) Terrorism. By sponsoring terrorism, Pakistan has let loose a monster in the form of drugs, weapons and jihadi culture that may destroy its political and social culture. This is the cost Pakistan is paying for waging a proxy war, according to analysts.

20. Restoration of Democracy.

(a) 2002- Hung Parliament after Elections. General Elections were held in Pakistan on 10 Oct 2002. In the 342-member National Assembly, the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam) a Pro-Musharraf party emerged as the largest party with 118 seats. The Muttahida-Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), an extremist religious alliance won 45 seats compared to the two seats it had won in the last elections. (b) Nov 2002 - Musharraf Sworn in President Again. On 16 Nov 2002, Gen. Musharraf was sworn in President of Pakistan for a further period of five years on the basis of the referendum held in Apr 2002. He took oath under the 1973 Constitution. He will be President till 16 Nov 2007, unless impeached by parliament or unseated by courts. (c) Aug 2004 - Shaukat Aziz Sworn in as the Prime Minister. On 28 Aug 2004, the former Finance Minister, Shaukat Aziz, was sworn in as the new Prime Minister of Pakistan. (d) Feb 2008- Pakistan People‟s Party. On 18 Feb 2008, Pakistan People‘s Party won maximum seats in the election along with Pakistan Muslim League (PML). Both the parties formed the new coalition government with Yusuf Raja Gillani as PM of Pakistan. Asif Ali Zardari was nominated as the President.

21. Shimla Accord.

(a) Signed by India's then Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi and Pakistan's then President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in Jul 1972 after the 1971 Bangladesh war. (b) Contains a set of guiding principles which include respect for each other‘s territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-interference in each other‘s internal affairs and putting an end to hostile propaganda against one another. (c) Mutual commitment to the peaceful resolution of all issues through direct bilateral approaches. (d) Agreement to uphold the sanctity of the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir. (e) Neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation nor shall both prevent the organisation, assistance or encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and harmonious relations. (f) Representatives of the two sides would meet to discuss modalities and arrangements for the establishment of durable peace and normalisation of relations, including a final settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir issue.

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(g) The Shimla Agreement restored bilateralism in Indo-Pak relations which had been abandoned at Tashkent in 1966. Analysts feel that the Shimla Agreement remains the bedrock on which a durable structure of peace and friendship can be built.

22. 1988. India and Pakistan signed an agreement to not to attack each other's nuclear facilities. 23. 1999 - Bus Visit to Pakistan.

(a) Historic Visit. On 20 Feb 1999, the Indian Prime Minister, Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee, boarded the bus from Amritsar for Lahore. For the first time after partition, the border was opened to road traffic and Mr Vajpayee became the first Prime Minister to visit Pakistan through the border gate. (b) Third Prime Ministerial Visit. This was the third Prime Ministerial visit to Pakistan. The first one was by Mr Jawaharlal Nehru after the partition. The second was by Rajiv Gandhi in Jul 1989. (c) Lahore Declaration. During the visit the "Lahore Declaration" was signed by the Prime Ministers of both the countries. The Lahore Declaration re-defines the relationship between the two countries in the post-nuclear situation setting out the operative principles. The Memorandum of Understanding, to which the two Foreign Secretaries affixed their signatures, lists the specific nuclear CBMs agreed upon by the two countries. Signed by the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan on 21 Feb 1999 at Lahore.

24. 2001 - Agra Summit. General Pervez Musharraf, the President of Pakistan, visited India from 14-16 Jul 2001, on the invitation of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee. 25. Composite Dialogue Process.

(a) Composite Dialogue from Feb 2004. To carry the process of normalisation forward, the President of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf and the then Prime Minister of India, Atal Behari Vajpayee, agreed during their meeting on 06 Jan 2004, in Islamabad, to commence the process of the composite dialogue from Feb 2004. The two leaders were confident that the resumption of composite dialogue will lead to peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides. (b) Two Plus Six Dialogue. The agenda for Indo-Pak composite dialogue is based on the ―two plus six" dialogue as follows:-

(i) Two. The two key issues are peace and security, including confidence building measures (CBMs) and Jammu and Kashmir. (ii) Six. The remaining six issues are as follows:-

(aa) Siachen. (ab) Sir Creek. (ac) Tulbul Navigation Project / Wular Barrage.

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(ad) Terrorism and drug trafficking. (ae) Economic and commercial cooperation. (af) Promotion of friendly exchanges.

26. Growing Extreamism in Pakistan.

(a) Strikes Against Amendment to Blasphemy Law.

(i) In Jan 2011, strikes were called across Pakistan by religious parties and hardliners to against any move to amend the controversial blasphemy law. (ii) Banned militant groups operating under new names, including Jammat-ud Dawah backed the strikes. (iii) The hardliners called for the resignation of Pakistan People‘s Party (PPP) leader and Parliamentarian Sherry Rehman, who submitted a private bill for changing provisions of the law. (iv) On 02 Feb 2011 Sherry Rehman decided not to pursue the draft legislation to amend the blasphemy law under pressure from the PPP leadership. (v) Citizens for Democracy (CFD), an umbrella group of individuals and organisations opposed the misuse of the blasphemy law and religion in politics.

27. Implications of Growing Extremism.

28. The killings of politicians and journalists highlight the twin aspects of the growing extremism in Pakistan, according to analysts. 29. Pakistan‘s security establishment, the law enforcing agencies and other government institutions have been infiltrated by extremism and sympathisers of militant groups. 30. The growing extremism in Pakistan is primarily the result of the security establishment having used the extremist/terror elements as instruments of State policy, according to analysts. 31. Since the Gen. Zia ul-Haq era, laws like blasphemy law have made it possible to sentence people to death virtually on hearsay. Analysts feel that the blasphemy law could be used to target minorities, settle personal scores and also to raise the bogey of Western conspiracy against Islam and Pakistan. 32. The ability of the religious parties to hold the country hostage has been another reason for the rising extremism in Pakistan, according to analysts. Given the failure of the secular parties, the religious parties have exploited the anger of the disempowered masses into disaffection articulated among religious lines.

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33. Concessions given to radical groups for political reasons had created a situation where in these groups now orchestrate the public mood, leaving the administration with few options, according to analysts. 34. Kishenganga Hydroelectric.

(a) On 18 Feb 2013, the Court of Arbitration at the Hague allowed India to go ahead with the construction of the Kishenganga hydroelectric project in North Kashmir. (b) The Court rejected Pakistan‘s plea that the project was a violation of the 1960 Indus Water Treaty. (c) The Court of Arbitration in its award said that India could go ahead with the diversion of the waters of Kishenganga for hydroelectric power generation. (d) India was restrained by the Court from adopting the drawdown flushing technique for clearing sedimentation for the 330 MW river project (e) Pakistan had objected to the drawdown flushing on the ground that it would affect flows at its downstream Neelam project. (f) India had three months to apply for interpretation and clarifications.

35. Significance of the Judgement.

(a) The award of the Court of Arbitration at the Hague reaffirmed the validity of India‘s position regarding the Kishenganga Hydro-Electric Project (KHEP) by allowing diversion of water from the KHEP as envisaged by India. (b) Highlighted once again that India is adhering to all the provisions of the Indus Water Treaty. (c) India was studying the details of the award, according to the Ministry of External Affairs.

36. General Elections in Pakistan.

(a) Elections for the National Assembly and State Provinces were held in Pakistan on 11 May 2013. (b) This were the first-ever elections in Pakistan under a civilian watch enabling the transition from one civilian government to another in its 65-year existence. (c) The voters turned up in large numbers to exercise their franchise despite the threats of suicide bombing by the Pakistani Taliban. (d) The impressive voter turnout indicated that the people favoured democracy in Pakistan and that the democracy in Pakistan had matured, according to analysts. (e) India and Kashmir were not the issues in the election which was fought mainly on economic issues.

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37. National Assembly.

(a) Total Seats – 342. (b) Directly Elected Members – 272. (c) Seats Reserved for Women – 60. (d) Seats Reserved for Minorities – 10.

38. PML (N) Won Majority.

(a) The Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) headed by the former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif won 126 seats of 272 seats directly elected for the National Assembly. The PML (N) polled 14.9 million votes. (b) The ruling Pakistan People‘s Party (PPP) won 32 seats and received 6.9 million votes. (c) Former cricketer Imran Khan‘s Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) won 28 National Assembly seats and polled 7.7 million votes. (d) The defeat of the PPP was attributed to inflation, crumbling infrastructure and corruption during its rule.

39. Nawaz Sharif Sworn in as the Prime Minister for the Third Time (05 Jun 2013).

(a) PML(N) leader Nawaz Sharif was sworn in as the Prime Minister for an unprecedented third time. He was the Prime Minister in 1990 and 1997 for two incomplete terms. (b) Mr Nawaz Sharif received 244 votes in 342-seat National Assembly. (c) The 63-year old leader kept the foreign and defence portfolios to deal effectively with the Army, with which he has a history of strained relations. (d) Mr Sharif entered politics under the patronage of military ruler Gen Zia-ul Haq. (e) Currently, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is seen as a mature politician and a pragmatist.

40. Foreign Policy Roadmap.

(a) Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said that neighbours would be the focus of immediate attention in Pakistan‘s foreign policy. He pointed out that unless the region is peaceful, the country‘s efforts for growth and development would not meet with success. (b) Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif vowed to progressively pursue normalcy in relations with India while actively seeking solutions to outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir.

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(c) Mr Sharif said that he was keen on resumption of the India-Pakistan peace process that was interrupted in 1999 by the then army chief Gen Parvez Musharraf, who ousted the Sharif Government in a military coup. (d) On Afghanistan, the Pakistan Prime Minister stressed the importance of evolving regional consensus on supporting a stable government and peace. He affirmed that a policy of an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned process of Peace and reconciliation would be pursued.

41. Challenges to New Government.

(a) Among the challenges facing the Nawaz Sharif Government in Pakistan are the badly ailing economy which could force the country to seek an international bailout. (b) The government has to quickly address macroeconomic issues. (c) Massive energy shortages that leave the some citizens of Pakistan without power for up to 20 hours a day are another area of serious concern for the government. (d) Tackling the on-going militant activity by the Pakistan Taliban and other Extremists will be another challenge for the new government. (e) The Sharif government would have to evolve new approaches with the concurrence of the armed forces to neutralise the Pakistan Taliban and end sectarian violence. (f) Another key challenge for the Nawaz Sharif government in Pakistan would be to correct the civil-military imbalance and reclaim the national agenda from the security establishment, according to analysts. (g) There is deep ethnic, linguistic and economic diversity between the Provinces in Pakistan, with trust between the provinces being very low. (h) The new government faces the challenge of reaching out to all provinces to restore trust and balanced development.

42. If the current scenario in Pakistan continues then the country is liable to become a centre of fundamentalist violence and terrorism that would have repercussions beyond South Asia. 43. Observers point out that there is factionalism within the intelligence-military nexus. 44. Pakistan‘s civilian Government appears to be in no position to arrest the country‘s slide.

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45. Pakistan‟s Nuclear Programme.

(a) Credible Minimum Deterrence (08 Sep 2013).

(i) Pakistan would continue to adhere to the policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence, without entering into an arms race with any other country. (ii) Pakistan would not remain oblivious to the evolving security dynamics in South Asia and would maintain a full spectrum deterrence capability to deter all forms of aggression. (iii) Pakistan‘s commitment to play its due part as a main stream partner in the global non-proliferation regime, and renewed the country‘s keen interest in joining the multilateral export control regimes on non-discriminatory basis. (iv) Pakistan had the requisite credentials for full access to civil nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to meet its growing energy needs for continued economic growth. (v) Importance of Pakistan‘s positive outreach and enhanced engagement with all the multilateral export control regimes, including membership for the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). (vi) Pakistan would continue to participate constructively in the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process. (vii) Pakistan was ready to share its expertise with other interested states by providing fuel cycle services under IAEA safeguards and providing training placements at its entres of Excellence on nuclear security, according to the NCA statement.

(b) Pakistan‟s Civil Nuclear Power Projects.

(i) Pakistan‘s Nuclear Energy vision 2050 envisaged nuclear power generation of about 40,000 MW by 2050 for a strong and dynamic Pakistan. (ii) On 26 Nov 2013, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif set in motion the country‘s argest civil nuclear power project with China‘s help. (iii) The 2200 MW nuclear power project in Karachi would take 72 months to complete. (iv) To achieve the goal of energy security, nuclear power would form an increasingly significant component

(c) Fourth Nuclear Reactor at Khushab.

(i) Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) of the US, which used commercial satellite imagery to monitor developments at Pakistan‘s Khushab nuclear complex, said that the external construction of the fourth reactor building appeared to be complete.

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(ii) Pakistan‘s Khushab nuclear complex, located 200 km from Islamabad, is dedicated to the production of plutonium for nuclear weapons. (iii) Pakistan was working to increase production at the Khushab nuclear complex so that it could build more miniaturized plutonium-based nuclear weapons. (iv) Pakistan is believed to have depended on illicit procurements for the four nuclear reactors at Khushab. (v) The Khushab nuclear complex originally has one nuclear heavy water reactor in the 1990s and work began on the second one in 2000-02, the third one in 2006 and the fourth one in 2011. (vi) The expansion of the Khushab nuclear site with the addition of reactors 2,3 and 4 appeared to bepart of a strategic effort by Pakistan to boost weapon-grade plutonium production.

(d) Security Policy of Pakistan (25 Feb 2014).

(i) The Pakistan government had made a fundamental shift in its approach to tackling terror and from now on surgical strikes would be used by the military to hit the perpetrators of violence. (ii) The government had several options before it, to maintain status quo, or have a focused dialogue for peace or a military operation. The new National Internal Security Policy had elements of all three. (iii) If the government was going in for a military operation, then it would be with political consensus. (iv) Government was clear that it would respond to terror strikes and ending terror was not only aquestion of achieving peace but also important for the future of the country. (v) The National Internal Security Policy had a secret component and strategic and operational aspects as well, according to the Interior Minister. (vi) The new Policy envisaged better coordination of intelligence agencies and provisions to trainand arm security forces. (vii) A Joint intelligence directorate comprising of all the 26 big and small intelligence agencies would be formed for counter terrorism with National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) as the premier counter terrorist organisation.

46. National Internal Security Policy (NISP).

(a) Pakistan‘s first ever National Internal Security Policy (NISP) is aimed at protecting the national interests of Pakistan.

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(b) The NISP includes three key aspects – dialogue with all stakeholders, isolation of terrorists from their support systems and enhancing deterrence and capacity of the security apparatus. (c) NISP envisaged a de-radicalisation programme which involved bringing madrassas into mainstream education. (d) The National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) would develop and coordinate a National De-Radicalisation Programme Design. (e) The NISP envisaged the integration of mosques and madrassas in the national and provincial educational establishment by mapping and integrating the existing and new madrassas and private sector educational institutions. (f) The NISP said a large number of terrorists, either are, or have been students of madrassas where they were brainwashed to take up arms against the state. (g) The madrassa and mosque remained an important point of focus for any government policy to stem the spread of extremism in Pakistan. (h) The madrassa system could not be excluded from the internal security parameters of the country. (j) Controlling the funding of terrorists was a major challenge. (k) Dialogue offered a political means to end internal disputes but this was not the only option though it was the most preferred way to bring peace and reconciliation. (l) Doors were open for negotiations with all anti-state and non-state groups within the limit of the Constitution and without compromising the primary interests of territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state.

47. Implications of Talks with TTP.

(a) The dialogue approach to tackle terrorism in Pakistan is based on the belief that terrorism would end in Pakistan when the country withdraws from the US War on Terror. (b) After demonstrating its ability to mount terror attacks at will across the country, the TTP is seeking to dictate terms to the government. (c) TTP is a conglomerate of around 40 terrorist, criminal and sectarian groups which would make it difficult to make any progress in the talks as the talks could be sabotaged by one or other of the terror groups. (d) The TTP‘s aim is not to establish its own governance system in a limited area, but to take control of the Pakistani state to use it as a base to spread its ideology to other countries. (e) Pakistan‘s response to terrorism is characterised by confusion, absence of a national consensus on the way to tackle the menace, a lack of will and capacity to

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stand up to terrorism which has led to the state surrendering to the extremists and terrorists. (f) Apart from the TTP there are other extremist groups engaged in sectarian violence, some targeting India and others linked to Afghanistan. (g) Pakistan has so far not taken any meaningful action against terrorists due to the reluctance of the army to take on groups such as the Haqqani network, and the backing of a large section of the political class for dialogue with the terrorists. (h) No action has been taken against anti-India terror groups as the Pakistan army regards them as assets. (j) If Pakistan continues with a confused response to terrorism it could result in greater instability and increasing lawlessness in the country especially after the withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan.

48. Terrorism in Pakistan – Implications for India.

(a) India‘s focus has been on anti-India terror groups in Pakistan, however, they are all part of Pakistan‘s larger terror conglomerate which cannot be ignored as the adverse effects could be felt in India as neighbouring country (b) Pakistan‘s success or failure to control terrorism would impact not only its own future but would also have a major impact on the stability and security of the region. (c) The Pakistan establishment needs to take decisive action across-the-board against militants. (d) In the current scenario of increasing instability in Pakistan, India needs to keep its counter-terror machinery on full alert. (e) Growing section of people in Pakistan who are in favour of a constructive engagement with India to take advantage of the increasing trade and economic links. (f) India needs to engage constructively with this segment of people in Pakistan while been fully alert to counter the dangers of terrorism emanating from Pakistan‘s soil.

49. Airstrikes & Ground Offensive against TTP.

(a) On the directions of the government, armed forces of Pakistan had launched a comprehensive operation against foreign and local terrorists who were hiding in sanctuaries in North Waziristan. (b) The coordinated operation named Zarb-e-Azb (Sword of the Prophet) involved air force, artillery tanks and thousands of ground troops. (c) Abu Abdul Rehman Almani, the Uzbek mastermind of attack on Karachi airport, and several other commanders had been killed in the strikes.

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(d) On 17 Jun 14, Pakistani jets bombed targets in North Waziristan killing 37 insurgents. (e) The military offensive marked the end of the government‘s peace negotiations with the TTP. (f) The military operation also resulted in the exodus of civilians from the North Waziristan tribal area. (g) On 30 Jun 2014, Pakistani military launched a ground offensive against militant strongholds near the border with Afghanistan. (h) The ground offensive was the second phase of the operation against the militants in North Waziristan tribal area – a lawless area in northwest Pakistan.

50. Need for Decisive Steps to Eliminate Terrorism.

(a) Military operation by the Pakistan forces in North Waziristan tribal region has been a long-standing demand by the US and the West, which accused Pakistan of using the area to give sanctuary to the Haqqani network of militants who had launched raids on NATO targets inside Afghanistan. (b) The Pakistan government needs to go beyond airstrikes and put ground forces in North Waziristan tribal areas. (c) Sustained counter-insurgency operations in Pakistan‘s northwest region near the Afghan border would effectively cut off the TTP from its Afghan counterpart along with the Haqqani network. (d) If the Pakistan state structure is to survive, then the Pakistan military and government have to end the establishment‘s link with the militants. (e) There needs to be a two-pronged strategy – one at the military level and other at the societal level – to end the selectivity policy of encouraging some militants and taking on others. (f) The Pakistan military-intelligence establishment also needs to be cleansed of elements with links to terrorists. (g) The international community would extend its full support to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the Pakistani establishment in eliminating the terror infrastructure from the soil of Pakistan. (h) Pakistani society is now accepting the domestic source of their terror problems. India can help by engaging with any section of Pakistani society that is prepared for such engagement.

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51. Meeting of Prime Ministers on Sidelines of SCO Summit (Ufa, Russia, 10 Jul 15).

(a) The Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi met his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif in Ufa, Russia on 10 Jul 2015 on the side-lines of the SCO summit. The meeting broke the stalemate in bilateral relations between the two countries.

(b) Significance of the Meeting.

(i) The meeting between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan in Ufa, Russia to restart engagement between the two countries was positive and proved that the strength of the fundamentals of the bilateral relationship with both sides always returning to talks despite problems to derail the relationship. (ii) The Joint Statement issued after the talks between the two leaders said that both sides would cooperate with other to eliminate the menace of terrorism from South Asia. (iii) The Joint Statement between the two countries was seen as a breakthrough after months of acrimony and passive aggression between India and Pakistan. (iv) The emphasis laid on five points in the Joint Statement indicated some sincerity on the part of the civil establishment in Pakistan towards India‘s concerns. (v) The Joint Statement did not give any indication of resumption of composite dialogue between the Foreign Secretaries of the two countries. Security experts pointed out that there was no commitment from Pakistan to stop terrorism.

52. Ceasefire Violations.

(a) On 16 Jul 2015, India‘s Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar said that the situation on the India-Pakistan border had worsened in the past few days due to unprovoked firing by Pakistan on the International Border and the Line of Control (LoC) that left one women dead and several others injured. (b) India accused Pakistan of aiding an infiltration attempt by suspected terrorists in the Jammu sector. (c) Indian forces had been instructed to give a befitting response and retaliate in equal measure to any aggression from Pakistan, according to media reports. (d) Pakistan‘s unprovoked firing along the International Border and Line of Control (LoC) after the meeting between the Prime Ministers of both countries points to a familiar pattern of backtracking due to pressure from domestic politics and the security establishment. The violation of ceasefire along the border has become a major bilateral issue between India and Pakistan, according to analyst.

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(e) The current ceasefire violations by Pakistan appear to be due to the political fallout due to the Ufa agreement between the two countries.

53. Failure of NSA Level Talks.

(a) The talks were first mooted in the joint press statement of the two foreign secretaries at the Ufa meeting of the Indian and Pakistani prime ministers. The two NSAs were to meet in Delhi, potentially clearing the way for the Indian prime minister to travel to Pakistan for the SAARC summit next year. Skeptical reports in the run-up had hinted that the Pakistan army was bearing down on Nawaz Sharif, pressuring him to halt the meeting. This gave a window for Indian skeptics to snipe at the idea. This positioning prior to the talks had more or less ensured that they would have been, at best, as the Pakistani NSA Sartaj Aziz put it, ―ice-breaking.‖ (b) The issue was the agenda of what the NSAs would discuss. India was adamant that the talks would be about terrorism and terrorism alone as decided during Ufa Pakistan wanted a broader agenda that included a territorial dispute over Kashmir. (c) Each side blamed the other for trying to re-interpret an understanding made in Ufa, Russia when India and Pakistan's prime ministers met on the side-lines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit. (d) Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was strongly criticized at home not to mention Kashmir in the formal announcement at Ufa. His foreign office had to repeatedly explain that the mention of ―all outstanding issues‖ in the statement implied the inclusion of Kashmir. (e) The Indian administration, on the other hand, was able to sell this as a diplomatic victory. A dialogue with Pakistan ―with a focus on terrorism,‖ was considered ―a very good result,‖ according to G. Parthasarthi, a former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan. (f) It was impossible for Islamabad to sell the talks with India to the Pakistani public without Kashmir on the agenda. (g) Another possible cause of the failure to hold talks may have been attacks on a police station in the Indian Punjab and on a Border Security Force convoy in Indian-administered Kashmir that Indian authorities blamed on cross-border infiltrators. Indian authorities say one of the attackers was arrested and belongs to Lashkar-e-Taiba.

54. Director General Level: BSF & Pakistan Rangers.

(a) After talks between the National Security Advisors of the two countries were called off the talks underwent against the backdrop of escalating tensions between the two countries over comments by its Army chiefs, as well as the Gurdaspur and Udhampur terror attacks and continuous ceasefire violations by Pakistani troops. (b) Instead of giving a prompt and equally bloody response to a ceasefire violation incident, as is the case currently, the two sides agreed that the side at the

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receiving end of a ceasefire violation would wait for one hour and get in touch with the aggressor rather than pummeling the aggressor with counter firing. (c) Another huge takeaway of the DG-level talks is that the two sides agreed to initiate new Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) through regular exchange of sporting and cultural troupes and initiation of coordinated patrolling in specific border areas, apart from keeping in touch with each other through phone, email and fax. (d) What is more, the sides put it on paper and came up with a joint record of discussions. This is what a BSF statement said after the talks a little while ago. "The Joint Record of Discussion charting a future route map for cooperation between the two border guarding forces was signed in the day. It was mutually agreed to hold the next talks in the first half of 2016 in Pakistan." The document was signed by BSF DG DK Pathak and Rangers chief Maj Gen Umar Farooq Burki.

55. Nawaz Sharif‟s Address During General Debate of 69th Session of UN.

(a) Prime Minister of Pakistan, said that extreme weather was disrupting world economies, particularly in developing countries. Recent monsoon floods in his country had killed hundreds of people, displaced millions, and destroyed and damaged homes. He called on the international community to intensify its efforts to move from awareness to commitments on actions addressing climate change. (b) Pakistan had launched its ―Vision 2025‖, which put people first, he said. In the coming decade, it would develop human and social capital through investment in education, health and gender parity. (c) Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif tried to divert the world attention from UN reforms (where India is bidding for a permanent seat) to Jammu and Kashmir. He also stressed on the need to hold a plebiscite in J & K. (d) He also said that, in regard to the reform of the Security Council, there should be no new permanent seats on it; instead, the body should become more representative, equitable, accountable and transparent.

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CHAPTER - 20

INDO - RUSSIA RELATIONS Introduction 1. Resurgent Russia. Under a powerful leader Russia resurgence has taken place in the international arena. Russian President Vladimir Putin adopted a policy of denationalising Russia's oil and gas industries. Mr Putin also re-established Russia's independent role in global affairs. The resurgence of Russia is significant for India as the bilateral relations between the two have been excellent. 2. Rebuilding Ties on a New Basis. Analysts point out that India and Russia have the opportunity and inclination to rebuild their ties on a new basis on the solidly established older foundations. India and Russia share strategic interests, but the challenge lies in cementing these interests with mutually beneficial economic ties. 3. Key Elements of Indo-Russian Relations. Analysts point out that Indo-Russian relationship rests on 5key elements as follows:-

(a) Common Threat from Cross-Border Terrorism. India and Russia face a common threat from cross-border terrorism. International terrorism has shown its hand in Kashmir as well as in Chechnya.

(b) Convergence of Interests in Central Asia and Afghanistan. The shared concern over terrorism has led to a considerable convergence of interests in Central Asia and Afghanistan. India and Russia have similar approaches on regional issues in this region. Terrorism and religious extremism are viewed as threats to peace and security in Central Asia. (c) Defence Cooperation. Russia remains India‘s main source of military hardware and technology. The defence cooperation between India and Russia has acquired a new dimension, covering not only arms sales and manufacture under license but also joint research and development of new hardware. (d) Mutual Trust and Understanding.

(i) Indo-Russian relations are based on a tradition of mutual trust and understanding. (ii) This is reflected in India‘s belief that a renascent Russia can play a positive role in future multi-polar world. (iii) Russia on the other hand believes that an emergent India is a positive force in international relations. Russia has supported India‘s aspirations for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.

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(e) Energy Security. Analysts point out that Indo-Russian ties are now driven by energy security. India benefits from closer relations with the Russia which is the world's largest gas producer and the second largest exporter of oil. Russia is currently restructuring its oil and gas industries, with the Central Government asserting greater control. This is to India's advantage as domination by private companies would have harmed the interests of Indian companies.

Background 4. Cold War.

(a) The term "Cold War" was coined by Americans Bernard Baruch and Walter Lippmann in 1947 to describe the tensions between the US and the Soviet Union. (b) The US and the Soviet Union had been allies against Nazi Germany but differed on how to reconstruct the post war world even before the end of World War II. (c) From the mid-1940s up to early 1990s, the Cold War was marked by tension, conflict and competition between the US and the Soviet Union and their allies. (d) Though there was no direct military confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union, there were a number of crisis that threatened to escalate into world wars. The most notable among these were the Korean War (1950-1953), the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), and the Vietnam War (1964-1975). (e) The Cold War came to an end in the late 1980s after Mikhail Gorbachev launched reform programmes in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was dissolved in 1991.

5. Indo-Russian Treaty. India and the former Soviet Union had signed a Treaty of Peace, Co-operation and Friendship in 1971. In 1993, during the visit of the Russian President, Mr Boris Yeltsin to India, another Treaty was signed to replace the 1971 Treaty. But in the 1993 Treaty the word Peace was missing and also the defence related clauses of the 1971 Treaty. 6. Debt Repayment.

(a) Rupee debt repayment has been the main irritant in Indo-Russian bilateral trade relations. India‘s annual debt repayment was converted into rupees in accordance with the exchange rate of the rouble. (b) India is repaying an annual debt of $1 billion to Russia since 1993. Debt repayment continued till 2005. (c) Part of repayment by India will go for the purchase of Indian commodities which will then be sent to select area. Half of the Indian debt, however, will continue to be auctioned in Russia outside the framework of State control.

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7. Strategic Partnership between India and Russia. Declaration of Strategic Partnership between India and Russia was signed on 03 Oct 2001, by the then Prime Minister of India, Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee, and the visiting Russian President, Mr Vladimir Putin. The salient features of the Declaration are as follows:-

(a) Strategic Partnership. The two sides proclaimed the establishment of relations of strategic partnership between them. Based on mutual understanding and long-term confidence in each other, this envisages the elevation of their multifaceted ties to an even higher and qualitatively new level, while imparting them with a specially close and dynamic character, both in the bilateral field and in the international arena. (b) Partnership Based on Principles of Sovereignty. The strategic partnership between the two sides is based upon the principles of sovereignty, equality and territorial integrity of States, non-interference in their internal affairs, mutual respect and mutual benefits. (c) Enhanced Cooperation. Such a strategic partnership would include enhanced cooperation in the following fields. Political, Trade and Economy, Defence, Science and Technology, Culture and Other Fields. (d) Partnership not Directed Against any Country. The strategic partnership between the two sides is not directed against any other State or group of States, and does not need to create a military-political alliance.

8. Significance of Declaration of Strategic Partnership.

(a) Broadens the Concept of Security. Analysts point out that the significance of the Declaration of Strategic Partnership lies in the fact that both sides include political, economic, cultural and scientific cooperation simultaneously with defence and geostrategic as part of their understanding of a security partnership. This way the concept of security is broadened and the earlier relation that privileged defence related security is balanced. (b) Strives for a Multipolar World. A strategic partnership between India and Russia commits both the sides to strive for a multipolar world by democratising international relations. (c) Model for other Countries. Analysts point out that the Declaration of Strategic Partnership represents a milestone in Indo-Russian relations and is significant for the enormous potential it contains for cementing future relations. It can also emerge as a model for other countries to emulate in adjusting their polity to the realities of the post-Cold War period. (d) Long-Term Geo-Political Interests. There is a coincidence of long-term geo-political interests between India and Russia. There are long-term advantages for both sides in building a strategic partnership. (e) Containment of Religion-Inspired Terrorism. Analysts point out that the Indo-Russian strategic partnership is significant as it lays the foundation for the architecture of containment of religion-inspired terrorism in Afghanistan, Central Asia and Pakistan and the associated narcotics problem. Cooperation in the fight

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against international terrorism and separatism will help the Indian security forces to step up their operations in the proxy war against foreign mercenaries.

9. Indo-Russian Defence Ties.

(a) Defence Agreements. During Mr Putin‘s visit to India four crucial defence agreements were signed between the two sides. The agreements which have taken the existing defence relationship to a more substantial level show that the military technical cooperation constitutes the key aspect of the strategic partnership, according to analysts. (b) Inter-Governmental Commission on Military Technical Cooperation. On 04 Oct 2000, India and Russia signed an agreement to establish an Inter-Ministerial Commission on military-technical cooperation. The Commission will control and coordinate all aspects of military hardware exchanges between the two sides. (c) Admiral Gorshkov Aircraft Carrier Deal.

(I) India and Russia signed the Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier deal after years of dialogue. (ii) The nearly 40,000 tonne ship will help India to protect the vital commercial shipping lanes of the Indian Ocean. (iii) The envisaged presence of Mig-29 planes and the Sea Harriers on board Gorshkov will add to its punch. (iv) With MiG-29s on board the Gorshkov, the Indian navy can more than counter Pakistan‘s P3C Orion aircraft which can be used to target India‘s vital energy assets including Bombay High. (v) The Gorshkov package includes the induction of the Ka-28 and Ka-31 early warning helicopters.

10. TU-22 Backfire Bombers. Russia has agreed to lease out four Tu-22 Backfire

bombers. The Tu-22 is a maritime reconnaissance and strike aircraft which can be fitted with Klub class missiles with a range of around 300 km.

(a) Sukhoi-30 MKI Fighter Jet Deal.

(i) On 28 Dec 2000, India and Russia signed their biggest ever defence deal for licensed production of the Sukhoi-30MKI fighter jets. (ii) The deal worth over $3 billion was signed at the SU manufacturing IAPO plant in Irkutsk, Siberia. It provides for the production of 140 SU-30MKI long-range multi-role jets at the HAL over the next 17 years. The in-depth license envisions full transfer of the SU-30MKI technology, including the world‘s first thrust-vectoring engine. (iii) According to defence analysts the SU-30MKI technology transfer was manifestation of close strategic partnership between India and Russia. The

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deal would herald a new era in the history of Indian Air Force and reinforce the superiority of Russian fighters in Asia.

(b) T-90 Tank Deal.

(i) 310 T-90 Tanks Purchased. On 15 Feb 2001,Indiasigned a deal with Russia for the purchase of 310 T-90 tanks in the presence of the visiting Russian Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Ilya Klebanov and the Indian Defence Minister, Mr. George Fernandes. (ii) Manufacture in India. The deal also caters to the manufacture of T-90 tanks, including key weapons, in India, under a Russian license. About 124 T-90 tanks would be transferred off-the-shelf and the remaining 186 assembled in India. (iii) $650 Million Deal. The $650 million deal has been signed in the backdrop of India‘s doctrinal preference to fight its future wars in deserts rather than the mountains of Kashmir or the riverine terrain of Punjab, according to defence experts. (iv) Counters the Pakistan Y-80UD Tanks. The Indian Army had projected the need for the missile-firing T-90 tanks to counter the threat posed by around 300 Y-80UD tanks acquired by Pakistan from Ukraine. (iv) Core of India‟s Armoured Fleet. The selection of the T-90 tanks as the core of India‘s armoured fleet in the coming decade is driven by technical considerations. The Indian Army has been looking for tanks which can fire missiles, especially on the move. The T-90 has reflects guided missiles with a five-km reach. The main gun capable of rapidly firing 125mm shells on account of automatic loading mechanism further enhances its punch. The laser-guided missiles of the tank can pierce the armour of most contemporary tanks.

(c) The export version of Russia's T-50 fifth-generation fighter aircraft, jointly developed with India and also called the PAK-FA, is likely to compete in a South Korean tender for 60 combat planes with advanced Stealth capability.

11. Nuclear Energy.

(a) Four Additional Reactors at Koodankulam. India and Russia signed a memorandum of intent to construct four additional units to the nuclear power plant under construction at Koodankulam in Tamil Nadu and build an unspecified number of nuclear power reactors at new sites as well. (b) Expanding Civil Nuclear Cooperation. A Joint Statement on cooperation in "peaceful uses of atomic energy" said that both countries committed themselves to further developing international cooperation to promote the use of nuclear energy. The statement stressed that both countries would work together to expand civilian nuclear cooperation aimed at enabling India to realise its goal of promoting nuclear power and energy security in a self-sustaining manner. (c) Reactor & Nuclear Fuel Supplied by Russia Remain Under IAEA Safeguards. The statement said that the reactor facilities and nuclear fuel

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supplied by Russia would remain under the IAEA safeguards during the entire period of their actual use in accordance with the agreement on safeguards, which would be concluded between India and the IAEA. (d) Amend NSG Guidelines. The statement stressed that Russia would continue to work with participating Governments of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in order to create conditions through amendment to its guidelines to facilitate expansion of civilian nuclear energy cooperation with India. (e) Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. India's Department of Atomic Energy and the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency would work out in 2007 a comprehensive programme of cooperation for the peaceful uses of atomic energy, according to the joint statement.

12. Space.

(a) Agreement on access to navigation signals of the Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) for peaceful purposes. (b) Agreement on India becoming part of the GLONASS Radio Frequency Spectrum. (c) Agreement on cooperation in the Joint Satellite project, Youthsat. (d) Significance of Agreement on GLONASS.

(i) Opens Way for India‟s Participation in the Project. India has been invited by Russia to join the GLONASS project to speed up its completion. During the visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Russia both sides signed an agreement on technology safeguards related to the satellite communication system. The agreement has opened the way for joint design and construction of a new-generation communication satellite, GLONASS-K and the launching of navigation satellites by Indian rockets. (ii) GLONASS will End Dependence on US GPS. Analysts point out that the GLONASS system will end India‘s dependence on the US Global Positioning System (GPS) as it will have access to both civilian and military applications of the Russian space-based navigation system. (iii) Defence Interaction Extended to Outer Space. The Indo-Russian agreement on GLONASS is seen as a step to extend their defence interaction to the outer space. (iv) GLONASS Satellites used for both Civil and Military Purpose. The GLONASS agreement will help in the implementation of a 2004 agreement on joint design and launching of GLONASS communication satellites, which will be used by both nations for civil and military purposes. This will help enable Indian military to target its missiles with pinpoint precision, according to defence analysts. (v) GLONASS a Model for Other High-Tech Projects in the Defence Field. According to India's Ambassador to Russia Kanwal Sibal, the

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GLONASS project lends a new quality to Indo-Russian cooperation setting a model for other high-tech projects in the defence field.

(e) India and Russia against Weaponising Space. Russian President Vladimir Putin said that space should be totally free of weapons. He pointed out that China was not the first to conduct the test of a missile destroying a satellite. According, to Mr Putin the first test was conducted in the 1980s. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said India concurred with Russia on the issue of weaponising space. India did not favour such a proposition.

13 Energy & Defence: Core Elements of Partnership.

(a) Analysts point out that energy and defence are the core elements of bilateral strategic partnership between India and Russia. (b) India accounts for more than a third of Russia‘s military-technological cooperation with foreign countries, according to the Russian President. On an average Indo-Russian defence cooperation is worth $1.5 billion per year. (c) The energy sector is also a key area of strategic partnership. India‘s ONGC Videsh has invested $2.7 billion in Sakhalin-I. The Russian President has stressed that Russia was prepared to contribute to energy stability in India which imports 73% of its oil requirements. Russia has welcomed India's interest in picking up a share of Sakhalin-3 oil project but also equity of Russia's State-owned energy giant Rosneft.

14. Irritants in Relations.

(a) India‘s refusal to waive civil liability for units III & IV of the Kundankulam Nuclear Power Plants (b) The cancellation of licences of Russian telecom company Sistema by India‘s Supreme Court (c) The delay in delivery of the Vikramaditya (Admiral Gorshkov) aircraft carrier by Russia.

15. India to Address Russia‟s Concern about the Cancellation of Licence to Sistema.

(a) Russia was concerned at the cancellation of the licences to its telecom company Sistema by the Supreme Court in relation to the 2G scam. (b) The Sistema telecom company invested around $3.1 billion, including government funds of $700 million, in the joint venture Sistema Shyam Teleservices Limited (SSTL). (c) India assured Russia that it was sensitive to Russia‘s concerns about Sistema and was hopeful that the issue would be eventually addressed. (d) The Government pointed out that the Executive could not influence the Court but would make a reference to the Supreme Court.

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16. 14th Annual Bilateral Summit (Moscow, 20-21 Oct 2013).

(a) Focus of Talks. The convergence on strategic issues, including the shared interests in Afghanistan‘s future, and peace and stability in the region.

(b) Civil Nuclear Cooperation – Kundankulam Nuclear Power Project.

(i) India‘s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said that relations with Russia were the highest strategic priority for India. (ii) India‘s commitment to fully implement the road map on civil nuclear cooperation signed by the two countries in 2010. (iii) The civil nuclear agreement envisaged Russia supplying 15 to 18 nuclear reactors to India. (iv) India‘s nuclear liability Act is a concern for Russia in finalising the agreement for Units 3 and 4 of the Kundankulam nuclear power project in Tamil Nadu. (v) The two sides agreed to expeditiously finalise the General Framework Agreement and Techno-Commercial Offer for Units 3 and 4 (vi) Prime Minister Manmohan Singh highlighted the imminent production and power from Units 1and 2 of the Kundankulam nuclear power project would be critical in 2014.

(c) Economic Relations.

(i) Russian President Vladimir Putin said that his talks with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh gave priority to increasing the economic relations. (ii) Bilateral trade between India and Russia is just $11 billion, but both countries stressed that it had increased 25% in 2012 despite adverse global situation. (iii) The quality of Russia‘s trade with India was a matter of satisfaction as it included machinery and equipment (iv) Both sides agreed to study the possibility of an overland gas pipeline. (v) Both countries were also working on increasing ONGC Videsh Limited‘s involvement in oil and gas exploration in Russia, where OVL already has its largest investments. (vi) India has sought Russia‘s support for concluding a Free Trade Agreement with the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, to give economic ties a boost.

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(vii) Both sides agreed to work towards the creation of a Joint Study Group for studying the possibility of signing a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) between India and the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, according to the Joint Statement. (viii) Indian and Russia highlighted the significant potential for cooperation in sectors such as oil and gas, pharmaceutical, infrastructure, mining, automobiles, fertilizers, aviation, as well as modernisation of industrial facilities located in the two countries.

17. Defence Ties.

(a) India and Russia described their defence ties as a crucial element of the strategic partnership and vowed to enhance cooperation in the main areas of rocket, missile and naval technologies. (b) Indo-Russian defence relations were unmatched by any other relationship and Russia would remain a key defence partner for India as both countries move into a stage of joint design, development and production of key defence platforms. (c) Both sides announced plans to enhance cooperation in the fields of rocket, missile and naval technologies and weapon systems. (d) Both countries had already agreed to extend indefinitely their 15-year-old partnership for producing BrahMos supersonic anti-ship missile and to develop a still more potent hypersonic version of the missile. (e) Completion of the trials of the Vikramaditya aircraft carrier, the delivery in 2013 of the Trikant frigate, the sixth stealth frigate built by Russia for the Indian Navy, as well as licensed production of the Su-30MKI fighter plane and T-90S tanks. (f) Progress in the construction of the fifth-generation fighter aircraft and multi-role transport aircraft was also noted.

18. Space Technology.

(a) India and Russia agreed to increase cooperation in space technologies. (b) Both sides decided to set up a new working group for GLONASS. India was offered to become Russia‘s partner in the GLONASS programme and to set up two GLONASS ground control stations in India. (c) India is the only nation to which Russia has agreed to give access to GLONASS military-grade signals which would help the Indian Armed Forces to improve the accuracy of their weapon systems.

19. Terrorism.

(a) India and Russia declared no tolerance for sheltering, arming, training or financing of terrorists.

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(b) Both sides condemned terrorist acts as attacks on the freedom and democratic values and aimed at undermining the territorial integrity of India and Russia. (c) The two countries said that such acts may have international linkages extending across and beyond the borders. (d) States that provide aid, abetment and shelter for such terrorist activities were themselves as guilty as the actual perpetrators of terrorism, according to the Joint Statement. (e) Both sides reaffirmed the obligations of all states to curb terrorism from their territories and areas under their control (f) The Joint Statement stressed that there could be no justification for terrorist acts, such as the Mumbai terror attacks or Beslan terrorist attack.

20. Syria.

(a) The Joint Statement said that Russia would welcome India‘s participation in Geneva-2 international conference on Syria, being jointly hosted by Russia and the US. (b) Both sides expressed the strong belief that the crisis should not be resolved by force, and could be settled only through political means. (c) India applauded Russia‘s role in reaching agreement on the destruction of Syria‘s arsenals of chemical weapons.

21. UNSC, SCO, MTCR and NSG.

(a) Russia reiterated its strong support to India for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council (UNSC) and for full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). (b) Russia agreed to give positive considerations to India‘s bid to join the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and to support its full membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

22. RIC.

(a) Both sides affirmed their commitment to further intensify political interactions in Russia-India-China (RIC) triangular format. (b) Both countries stressed on the importance of the RIC Foreign Ministers meeting in New Delhi in Nov 2013, pointing out that it was essential to continue consultations concerning regional security at the level of High Representatives of China, India and Russia.

23. Russian Deputy Prime Minister‟s Visit to India, 21 Jun 2014.

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(a) Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Rogozin visited India as Russian President‘s envoy. (b) Formation of a Working Group on Strategic Issues that would focus on strategic projects. (c) The construction of a gas pipeline from Russia to India would be one of the largest infrastructure projects that could be conceived. (d) If Russia‘s proposed gas pipeline to China could be extended to India, it would start a triangular energy partnership among the members of BRICS. (e) The move would also mark a strategic shift in Russia‘s policy towards the East. (f) A controversy was generated by the proposed sale of Russian Mi-35 helicopters to Pakistan, however, India made it clear that the ontroversy would hardly impair ties. (g) A Joint Study Group would be formed that would analyse the possibility of India‘s partnership with the Eurasian Economic Union. (h) The Indo-Russian relationship was going beyond a buyer seller relationship and India and Russia were partners in co-developing weapons, which include joint forays in making a fifth generation fighter jet and a multi-role transport aircraft. (j) The negotiations on establishing two more nuclear reactors in Kundankulam were underway, to complete the ambitious plan to set up 14 to 16 Russian designed nuclear power plants in India.

24. Prime Minister‟s Meeting with Russian President on Sidelines of BRICS Summit (Fortaleza, Brazil 16 Jul 2014).

(a) Prime Minister Narendra Modi hailed Russia as India‘s greatest friend and told the Russian President Vladimir Putin that India was committed to deepening ties and cooperation between the two nations. (b) Mr Modi invited Mr. Putin to visit the Kundankulam nuclear power plants in Tamil Nadu. (c) Both leaders discussed major bilateral issues concerning strategic affairs, defence cooperation and economic ties. (d) The discussions explored the possibility of supplying Russian gas to India through pipelines via China or Pakistan. (e) The Russian President offered comprehensive measures to raise bilateral trade to $20 billion. (f) Mr Modi said that he looked forward to Mr. Putin‘s visit to India for Annual Indo-Russia Summit.

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(g) Mr Putin said that he was pleased that India and Russia were in full consensus on working together on the international stage.

25. Visit of Russian President, 11 Dec 14. Our relations with Russia have grown over the yrs to constitute an important foreign policy priority for both countries. There is recognition in both countries to the strategic dimension of our multifaceted ties. The considerable goodwill has been further cemented in the recent years. Analysts point out that Indo-Russian relationship rests on four key elements as follows:- (a) Common threat from cross border terrorism. (b) Convergence of interest in Central Asia and Afghanistan. (c) Defence cooperation. (d) Mutual cooperation. 26. 15th Annual India-Russia summit in New Delhi, 11 Dec 2014.

(a) So far 15 Annual Summit meetings have taken place alternatively in India and Russia with the 15th Annual Summit held in New Delhi during the visit of President Putin to India on 11 Dec 2014 in which both countries signed several crucial agreements under the leadership of PM Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

(b) The agreements signed during the summit included eight agreements between government entities and 12 between private enterprises and covered the fields of nuclear energy, oil and gas, health, investment, mining, media and wind power. These agreement include Russia‘s help in building at least 12 nuclear reactors and a plan to manufacture advanced Russian military helicopters and defence spare parts in India. During the summit, both the countries also vowed to strengthen the special strategic partnership and unveiled Druzhba-Dosti vision statement for the next decade.

27. List of Agreements Signed.

(a) International Relations Protocol for Consultations. The agreement envisages close consultation on as many as 17 issues, ranging from Asia-Pacific to West Asia to West Europe to Latin America as also at various multilateral for a like UN, G20, BRICS, SCO, RIC. (b) Nuclear Energy.

(i) Strategic vision for strengthening cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy envisaging a roadmap of bilateral cooperation in the civil nuclear energy sector for the next two decades. It contains plans to build over 20 nuclear power units in India. (ii) Provisions for the technical data and information non-disclosure in the framework of cooperation in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy to provide an impetus to scientific and technological cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

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(iii) Supplement to the General Framework Agreement (GFA) for Units 3 and 4 of Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project between Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) and ATOMSTROYEXPORT (ASE) to operationlise the General Framework Agreement (GFA) and Technical Commercial Offer (TCO) signed in Apr 2014. (iv) Contract between Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) and ATOMSTORYEXPORT (ASE) for unit 3 and 4 of Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant for supply of some major equipment by ASE.

(c) Oil and Gas.

(i) Cooperation in Oil & Gas. The agreement sets out a concrete programme for cooperation, envisaging projects including joint exploration and production of hydrocarbons, long term LNG supplies and joint study of a hydrocarbon pipeline system connecting Russia with India. (ii) MoU between TATA Power and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) to explore investment opportunities in the energy sector across the Russian Federation. (iii) MoU between Oil India Limite‘ and Zarubezhneft to facilitate technological association on hydrocarbon projects in India. (iv) MoU between ESSAR and ROSNEFT for long-term supply of crude oil envisaging ten year supply and purchase by India of crude oil and feed stocks/products.

(d) Economic Sphere.

(i) MoU on technical cooperation on accreditation: Aims at development of accreditation systems, sharing of information, recognition of test reports, and creation of conditions for the elimination of technical barriers in trade and economic cooperation. (ii) MoU between ACRON of Russia and NMDC of India to implement2 billion US dollars potash mine project of ACRON in Russia. (iii) MoU between Vneshtorgbank (VTB) of Russia and ESSAR Group envisaging finance arrangement of 1 billion US dollar to ESSAR by VTB. (iv) MoU between Infrastructure Development Finance Corporation Ltd (IDFC) and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) on a co-investment opportunity up to 1 billion US dollars. (v) MoU between FICCI and Delovaya Rossiya to broaden and strengthen economic ties and identifying new areas of economic cooperation. (vi) MoU between Electronics and Software Export promotion Council of India (ESEPCI) and Skolkovo Foundation of Russia to enable companies in these sectors to enter new markets by means of joint ventures, strategic alliances and in joint research and development.

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(vii) MoU between Gamesa Wind Turbine Pvt Ltd. of India and ROTEK of Russia to facilitate cooperation between the two companies in wind power equipment. (viii) MoU between news agencies PTI and TASS on exchange of news and the right to use news items.

(e) Health Sector. MoU on cooperation in Health Research, envisages programme of cooperation in specific areas of health research such as oncology, bioinformatics & bioimaging, neurosciences, new generation vaccine research and research in HIV/AIDS. (f) Space. MoU between Eirene Systems and GLONASS Union to contribute to joint development and implementation of projects like Navigation Platform and Geographical Information System in India. (g) Defence. Agreement for training of Indian defence personnel in the defence establishments of the Russia.This will facilitate better understanding between the two defence forces. It is also proposed to construct advanced helicopters in India under ―Make in India‖ projects.

28. President Pranab Mukherjee‟s Visit to Russia, 07-11 May 2015.

(a) India‘s President Pranab Mukherjee visited Russia from 07-11 May 2015, to attend Russia‘s Victory Day parade. Russia‘s Victory Day parade is held on 09 May every year to commemorate the end of the Second World War in 1945. (b) The President‘s visit was the mark of a very special and privileged strategic partnership characterised by trust and people to people ties that exist between India and Russia. President‘s visit for the Victory Day parade was an acknowledgement of 2.5 million Indian soldiers who were part of the British imperial army in the war. (c) A 75-member contingent of the Nine Grenadiers of the Indian Army marched along with the Red Army and China‘s Peoples‘ Liberation Army (PLA) during the Victory Day parade which included 16,000 soldiers. The 75-member Nine Grenadiers contingent was part of the 10 militaries including Russia‘s Red Army, China‘s PLA taking part in the 09 May 2015 Victory Day parade at the Red Square in Moscow. (d) Meeting between the Indian and Russian Presidents. (i) India‘s President Pranab Mukherjee met his Russian counterpart

Vladimir Putin and discussed the full range of India-Russia ties, Both Presidents had a wide-ranging review of bilateral cooperation, including in energy and defence sectors.

(ii) The two Presidents discussed all the initiatives agreed to when

President Putin visited India in Dec 2014, including on-going talks on the Ka-226T helicopters, MoUs with ONGC for Sakhalin oilfields and Arctic explorations, and GAIL for gas pipelines from Russia.

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(iii) Both Presidents agreed that the current trade levels of $10 billion between India and Russia must be increased to $30 billion and investments level to $15 billion apart from developing the North-South trade route at the earliest.

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CHAPTER - 21

INDIA - SOUTH KOREA RELATIONS

1. Introduction.

(a) Security and Defence Relations.

(i) Security and defence relations between India and South Korea have been developing steadily in the recent years. (ii) India and South Korea have posted defence attaches in each other‘s countries. (iii) India is ready to make the first purchase of South Korean military equipment – the minesweepers.

(b) Balance of Trade.

(i) Bilateral trade between India and South Korea stood at $17.3 billion in 2012-13. (ii) The balance of trade is titled in favour of South Korea and hence India is keen on faster entry of its pharmaceuticals and IT Companies in South Korea. (iii) South Korea is very keen on upgrading the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) signed with India in 2009 arguing that Japan was offered a better deal. (iv) India feels that it was too early to revise the CEPA, according to officials.

(c) Civil Nuclear Agreement with South Korea.

(i) India‘s civil nuclear agreement with South Korea was finalised in a very short time after couple of rounds of negotiations. (ii) India has indicated that it would first prefer a technology demonstrator unit as the Department of Atomic Energy was not familiar with the South Korean design of the nuclear power plant.

2. South Korean President‟s Visit to India (16-17 Jan 2014).

(a) Nine Agreements Signed by Both Sides.

(i) India and South Korea signed nine agreements during the South Korean President Park Geun-hye‘s visit to India on 16-17 Jan 2014.

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(ii) Work on the multi-billion-dollar Posco steel plant in Odisha would start in the next few weeks. (iii) Grant of mining concessions to the Posco steel plant. (iv) Both sides signed an Agreement on the Protection of Classified Military Information. (v) India and South Korea would explore the possibility of setting up a Korean Industrial Park in India. (vi) Both sides announced the conclusion of negotiations for revision of the existing Double Taxation Avoidance Convention (vii) Both sides agreed to hold annual interactions between the national security structures of the two countries and also launch a Cyber Affairs Dialogue. (viii) In Science and Technology, both countries signed a MoU on Joint Applied Research and would build on the experience of working on many practical projects financed through a $10 million Joint Fund. (ix) India extended a ‗tourist visa on arrival facility‘ to South Korean citizens.

(b) South Korean President Called for Reopening of the CEPA.

(i) South Korean President Park Geun-hye called for the reopening of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA). (ii) Emphasised on the need to negotiate CEPA with authenticity, pointing out that since its operationalization, trade had increased by 70% in volume but its content did not match that of other Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). (iii) Enough potential to raise the level of trade and investment and suggested liberalisation of the visa regime, which has already been accepted by India in principle. (iv) The environment clearance for the Posco steel plant would encourage other large South Korean conglomerates to channelize investment funds into India

(c) Significance of the South Korean President‟s Visit to India.

(i) The nine agreements signed by India and South Korea during the South Korean President Park Geun-hye‘s visit to India were aimed at imparting forward moment to their bilateral relations that have been intensified over the past few years, according to analysts. (ii) The signing of the Agreement on the Protection of Classified Military Information would boost defence engagement and take it beyond the purchase of South Korean defence equipment to an area where South Korea was strong – maintaining the sanctity of its land and maritime borders.

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(iii) The possibility of setting up a Korean Industrial Park in India was also significant as South Korea was one of the few countries with a trade surplus with China and India intended to provide a new avenue for its industry. (iv) India‘s hope that the Posco project would confirm that economic growth and environmental protection could go hand in hand. (v) More Korean companies would participate in infrastructure building projects in India, such as electricity power plants and railway construction. (vi) To facilitate people-to-people interaction, India extended the visa-on-arrival facility to South Korean nationals. (vii) On South Korea‘s proposal to set up nuclear power plants in India, India conveyed to the South Korean President its intention to take up the proposal in Phase-II of setting up the large nuclear power plants. (viii) India‘s Prime Minister and the South Korean President discussed regional issues, especially the developments in the Korean peninsula and cooperation in the East Asia Summit (EAS) process. (ix) The South Korean President said that the Korean peninsula was facing the threat of nuclear weapons and efforts must be made to ensure peace and stability in the region. (x) The visit to India by the South Korean President enhanced economic as well as the strategic partnership between the two countries.

3. Prime Minister Narendra Modi‟s Visit to South Korea( 18 May 2015).

(a) Final Leg of Prime Minister‘s Three-Nation Tour. (b) Talks with South Korean President Park Geun-Hye.

(i) South Korea offered to provide $10 billion to India for infrastructure, development of smart cities, railways and power generation. (ii) Both countries agreed to upgrade their bilateral relationship to a ―Special Strategic Partnership.‖ (iii) India and South Korea agreed to review the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) by Jun 2016. (iv) South Korea agreed to ensure that India would be a member of all four multilateral export control regimes - Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australian Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement. (v) Both countries agreed to formalise consultations between their National Security Councils.

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(vi) Wide range of issues and stressed on adding new substance, speed and content to take the bilateral relations to a qualitatively higher level. (vii) Korea‘s rapid progress had made the vision of an Asian century stronger and India considered Korea a crucial partner in its economic modernisation. (viii) The relations between the two countries had progressed substantially and the two sides were committed to improving the business environment. (ix) The destinies of India and South Korea were linked with the future of Asia and the Pacific.

(c) Seven Agreements signed including one on Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to taxes on income.

(d) Joint Statement.

(i) India saw Korea as an indispensable partner in its ―Act East‖ strategy. (ii) Both sides recognise the value of bilateral partnership and its contribution to bringing peace, stability and security in the Asia Pacific Region.

(e) Prime Minister Narendra Modi met the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and discussed important global issues with him. (f) Prime Minister Narendra Modi‟s Address to the Indian Diaspora.

(i) Since the last one year, the world was saying that India was an important segment of BRICS and the group could not be imagined without India. (ii) ―Act East Policy‖ was now a key component of the Government‘s foreign policy. (iii) India considered Korea a crucial partner in India‘s economic modernisation. (iv) India was now being seen as the fastest growing economy of the world.

(g) Significance of the Prime Minister‟s Visit to South Korea.

(i) Prime Minister Narendra Modi said that his visit to Republic of Korea had been very satisfying and he thanked the Korean people and the Government for their warm hospitality. (ii) By extending $10 billion for India‘s development in key areas, South Korea has signalled its technological strength and has also underlined its importance as India‘s key partner with major investments in Industry upholding the ‗Make in India‘ policy.

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(iii) Upgrading the bilateral relations to a ―Special Strategic Partnership‖ would be beneficial to India as South Korea‘s strong economic and technological expertise could contribute to India‘s Progress. (iv) In the defence sector, India wants South Korea‘s participation to modernise its military arsenal and the latter is also keen to do so. (v) South Korea‘s participation in India‘s defence modernisation programme would enhance the strategic partnership between the two countries while making South Korea a key partner of India‘s ―Act East Policy‖.

(h) Significance of the Prime Minister‟s Three-Nation Tour.

(i) Prime Minister Narendra Modi‘s three-nation tour to China, Mongolia and South Korea was very significant as he held bilateral talks, wooed investors for the ‗Make in India‘ initiative and signed a number of pacts to bolster India‘s relations with the three countries. (ii) Boost to India‘s ―Act East Policy‖ which was much required to increase India‘s footprint in East Asia. (iii) Huge direct financial commitments in bilateral investments have resulted from the Prime Minister‘s three-nation visit which would go a long way in contributing to India‘s development programme. (iv) The decisions to upgrade India‘s ties with Mongolia to strategic partnership and those with South Korea to Special Strategic Partnership and deepen defence cooperation with both countries were significant for India. (v) The Indian Prime Minister‘s reciprocal visit to China was significant for enhancing the bilateral relations, especially relating to trade and economics.

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CHAPTER - 22

INDO - SRI LANKA RELATIONS

Background. 1. Population of Sri Lanka. The population by ethnic composition in Sri Lanka is Sinhalese- 74%, Sri Lankan Tamils- 12%, Indian Tamils 6%, Muslims 7% and others 1%. 2. Demand for Separate Tamil State (Eelam). The Tamils who formed the largest minority were seeking a separate Tamil-State i.e. Eelam. Most of the Tamils are inhabited in the North-East of Sri Lanka. The Tamil cause was taken up by the militant organisation called the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). 3. Grievances of Tamils.

(a) They were discriminated against the Sinhalese in employment, education and language. (b) Their land was being colonised. (c) Several communal riots were directed against them and their youth were terrorised or tortured.

4. Conflict in the North-East. The conflict in the North-East started in 1983 when the LTTE killed a dozen Sri Lankan soldiers. This sparked off the country‘s worst ethnic riots. 5. Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF).

(a) In 1987, the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement was signed by India‘s then Prime Minister Mr Rajiv Gandhi and the then Sri Lankan President, Mr Jayewardene. The Agreement culminated in a conflict between the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) and the LTTE. (b) In 1989-90 the then Sri Lankan President, Mr Premadasa entered into an understanding with the LTTE which resulted in a 14 month ceasefire. As a result of this the IPKF withdrew from Sri Lanka.

6. Resumption of the Conflict. In 1992, the conflict resumed with widespread killing and devastation in the East. In 1993, there was more killing as over 2,000 deaths occurred in major operations in Elephant Pass and Pooneryn. 7. Peace Initiatives by the Kumaratunga Government.

(a) The New Kumaratunga Government restarted the peace process in October 1994. To get the peace process going the Government lifted the embargo in the North-East and the LTTE‘s demands on the movement of Tamil fishermen were also accommodated.

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(b) After four rounds of talks in eight months the LTTE announced its decision to withdraw from the talks on 19 Apr 1995.

8. Devolution Package.

(a) In Jan 1996, the Sri Lankan Government announced the devolution proposals formulated in Aug 1995. It was released as a draft chapter of a proposed new Constitution. . (b) The package for the devolution of power to the Tamil areas in these reform proposals- while expanding some provisions of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution- modify other provisions which are not acceptable to the Tamils. (c) UNP, the main opposition party, did not agree to the constitutional Package as originally suggested. Therefore, in 1997 it was referred to a select Committee of Parliament.

9. 2002 - Ceasefire Accord. A ceasefire accord was signed by the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE on 22 Feb 2002. Both sides signed letters accepting the terms of the Norway-brokered talks. 10. Direct Talks between Sri Lankan Government & LTTE. Six rounds of talks, starting from 16 Sep 2002, were held between the Sri Lankan delegations led by the Minister for Constitutional Affairs, GL Peiris and the LTTE‘s chief negotiator, Anton Balasingham. 11. LTTE Pulls Out of the Talks. The LTTE pulled out of the peace talks in Apr 2003 citing tardy progress by the Government on implementing the decisions taken at the six rounds of talks between Sep 2002 and Mar 2003 as the reason. 12. Mahinda Rajapakse Elected Fifth Executive President of Sri Lanka. Presidential elections were held in Sri Lanka on 17 Novr 2005. Former Prime Minister and United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA) leader Mahinda Rajapakse was elected as the fifth Executive President of Sri Lanka. He was sworn in as the President of Sri Lanka on 19 Nov 2005. 13. Resumption of Talks (Geneva, Switzerland, 22-23 Feb 2006). The Geneva round of talks between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE concluded with both parties agreeing to respect and uphold the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) and reconfirming their commitment to fully cooperate with the respect and rulings of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). 14. Grievances of Minority Ethnic Groups. The Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse convened an All Party Conference (APC) to work out a consensus on political measures required to redress the grievances of various minority ethnic groups. 15. Panel to Advise on Power Sharing. A 15-member multi-ethnic committee was formed to advise President Mahinda Rajapakse on power sharing in the Tamil dominated North and East in an effort to address the ethnic strife in Sri Lanka.

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16. UNHCR Expects More Tamil Refugees to Return to Sri Lanka.

(a) There are 146,098 Sri Lankan registered refugees in 64 countries including India, France, Canada, Germany, UK, Switzerland, the US, Australia, Malaysia and Italy, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Sri Lanka. (b) The UNHCR assisted about 2, 054 refugees to return to Sri Lanka in 2010. (c) There has been an all-round improvement prompting the refugees mainly from Tamil Nadu in India, to start returning home, according to the UNHCR. (d) There are 70, 354 Sri Lanka refugees living in Tamil Nadu in 112 camps, and another 32,467 living outside the camps, according to the Rehabilitation Commission in Tamil Nadu. (e) Around 195,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) have returned to their homes by Aug 2010. (f) The UNHCR advocated durable solutions for the 212,000 IDPs around Sri Lanka who fled their homes prior to Apr 2008.

17. UNHRC Resolution against Sri Lanka (Geneva, 21 Mar 2013).

(a) Criticising Sri Lanka for not doing enough to curb human rights violations and demanding independent probe into war crime allegations. (b) The resolution was passed with 25 countries including India, voting in favour, 13 countries including Pakistan, voting against and eight abstaining. (c) The resolution calls the Sri Lankan Government to conduct an independent and credible investigation into allegations of human rights violations. (d) The resolution noted the call by the High Commissioner for Human Rights for an independent and credible international investigation into alleged violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law. (e) The resolution noted that the national plan of action by Sri Lanka does not adequately address all the findings and recommendations of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC). (f) Expressed concern that the national plan of action and the LLRC do not adequately address alleged violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law. (g) Expressed concern over the continuing reports of violations of human rights in Sri Lanka. (h) Called on Sri Lanka to fulfil its public commitments, including on devolution of political authority which was integral to reconciliation and full enjoyment of human rights.

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18. Implications of UNHRC Resolution.

(a) DMK, an ally of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) Government, withdrew support to the UPA to push for India to move amendments to the draft resolution. (b) India refrained from moving oral amendments to the US-sponsored UNHRC resolution as the US expressed concern that incorporation of India‘s amendments could lead to the fracture in the alliance of nations favouring the resolution. (c) The DMK expressed dissatisfaction with the UNHRC resolution pointing out that it was too watered down. (d) In 2012 India voted against Sri Lanka to make it clear to the Sri Lankan President that the failure to move towards a settlement of the Tamil minorities in Sri Lanka could no longer be glossed over. (e) India had to vote in favour of the US-sponsored UNHRC resolution in 2013 as well because Sri Lanka has done little since last year to address the problem of UN rights abuses and the reconciliation process. (f) Unless Sri Lanka addresses the problems of its Tamil minorities including devolution of political authority, India would continue to have limited options. (g) India‘s foreign policy and strategic interests should be free of domestic compulsions.

19. Military Court: Clean Chit to Army for HR Violations (10 Apr 2013).

(a) Army Commander Lieutenant-General Jagath Jayasuriya had convened an inquiry to investigate the allegations made by Channel 4 and the observations made by the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC). (b) On 10 Apr 2013, the Sri Lankan Army Commander handed over the first part of the ‗Court of Inquiry Report‘ to the Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa. (c) The report said that the Sri Lankan Army was not responsible for any civilian casualty in the last stage of the military operations. (d) It pointed out that the LTTE had violated international law with impunity by committing various unlawful acts. (e) The report said that the Sri Lankan Army commanders had obeyed the ‗zero civilian casualty‘ directive given by the President. (f) The second part of the report would now look into the allegations made by Channel 4, in regard to summary executions of the captured LTTE members.

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20. Chinese Investments – Not Part of „String of Pearls‟.

(a) Hambantota port was not part of the Chinese ‗string of pearls‘ to Surround India. (b) China‘s alleged ‗string of pearls‘ include the ports of Gwadar in Pakistan, Marao in Maldives, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Chittagong in Bangladesh and Sittwe in Myanmar. (c) China had built a deep-water port on the southern tip of Sri Lanka. With the completion of the first phase, the Hambantota port has been receiving many ships. (d) China‘s investment in Hambantota port was purely an economic one. He pointed out that most of the companies setting up operations in Hambantota port were actually Indian. (e) China was an exponent of economic cooperation and had been a generous and steadfast friend to many countries in the region.

21. India Concerned.

(a) Indian security establishment was concerned over increasing presence of China in Sri Lanka‘s strategic sectors. (b) The China-Sri Lanka collaboration in the area of space has also increased concerns for India. (c) A Sri Lankan firm was set to launch its first communication satellite with China‘s help in 2015.

(d) India‘s National Security Adviser (NSA) discussed the issue in 2012 and the Department of Space was asked to provide assessment of the security implications on India due to Sri Lanka‘s space programme. (e) In May 2012, a Sri Lankan company signed an agreement with the Board of Investment in Sri Lanka to launch the telecommunication satellite in partnership with a state-owned Chinese company. (f) India is looking at options to counter the security threat. (g) Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has suggested that India could offer to build and launch satellites for Sri Lanka. (h) India was likely to initiate discussions with Sri Lanka on bilateral cooperation in space-related activities like building, launching and operating satellites. (i) India may also raise objections at an international level when issues like orbital slot, frequency coordination and down linking of foreign channels come up to safeguard its security and commercial interests.

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22. First Semi-Autonomous Council Elections.

(a) Sri Lanka's main Tamil party won a whopping landslide in the first semi-autonomous council elections in the island's North after decades of ethnic war. (b) The Tamil National Alliance (TNA) swept all five districts in the Northern Provincial Council which went to the polls, the department of Elections results showed. The TNA bagged 30 out of a total of 38 seats in an election held under a system of proportional representation. In the most populous district of Jaffna, the TNA secured more than 84% of the popular vote, exceeding the party's own projections of 66%. (c) President Mahinda Rajapakse's United People's Freedom Alliance was a distant second with just seven seats while a Muslim party picked the other seat. (d) The TNA, which has vowed to press a demand for "self-rule" for Sri Lanka's ethnic Tamils in the majority Sinhalese nation of 20 million, made a clean sweep in the war-affected region despite allegations that the army was trying to discourage TNA voters. (e) The government said 68 percent of the 719,000 electorate in the Northern Province turned out to vote in an election. This is seen as ethnic reconciliation in a country where over 100,000 have been killed in decades of ethnic violence. (f) The poll is also the first local election to be internationally monitored. Dozens of observers from South Asian nations and the Commonwealth were involved along with hundreds of private monitors. The Northern Provincial Council was set up in 1987, but elections were never held and its functioning was controlled directly by the Sri Lankan president because of fighting in the region. (g) Retired Supreme Court judge Kanagasabapathy Wigneswaran is now expected to be the region's first elected chief minister in a council that will have limited powers over the local administration. (h) Wigneswaran has said he wants to work with Colombo on pushing his manifesto, which calls for "self-government" for Tamils Wigneswaran's priorities are payment of war reparations, securing an army pull-out from the former combat zone and taking back land the military still occupies four years after defeating Tamil Tigers who fought for full independence. (i) President Rajapakse has accused the TNA of raising expectations of a separate state that is opposed by the majority Sinhalese. The latest results are a setback to Rajapakse who has won almost every major election since he led the campaign that crushed Tamil Tigers in 2009.

Current Situation in Sri Lanka 23. First Provincial Council Elections (21 Sep 2013).

(a) On 21 Sep 2013, simultaneous elections were held in Sri Lanka‘s Central and Northern Province.

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(b) These were the first provincial council elections in about 25 years in Sri Lanka‘s Northern Province which witnessed a three-decade ethnic war. (c) International monitors representing the Commonwealth and the SAARC nations were in the Sri Lanka‘s Northern Province. (d) The Tamil National Alliance (TNA) – a group of five Tamil political parties - received a massive mandate of 80% of the votes to win 30 out of the 38 seats. (e) The Provincial Council elections in the Northern Province witnessed a voter turnout of 68% and were held after considerable external pressure, especially from India. (f) Retired Supreme Court Judge CV Wigneswaran would assume charge as the first Chief Minister of Sri Lanka‘s Northern Provincial Council. (g) The Chief Minister elect said that it was important for the Provincial Council to constantly engage in a dialogue and work with the Sri Lankan Government.

24. Significance of the Provincial Council Elections.

(a) The Provincial Council elections in Sri Lanka‘s Northern Province were seen as a starting point in the pursuit of a long-term political solution to the Tamil issue. (b) The Provincial Council elections in the Northern Province marked an important milestone towards national reconciliation as it gives the Tamil-majority province its first ever democratic political set up to share governance with the Centre. (c) The TNA said that it was committed to the full implementation of the 13th Amendment of the Constitution and building upon it to bring about meaningful devolution which must result in a political solution that was reasonable, workable and durable. (d) The Government‘s attempts to change the demographic composition of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, land, militarisation and financial autonomy, were among the main issues that the Provincial Council would have to address.

25. US-Backed UNHRC Resolution against Sri Lanka (27 Mar 2014). (a) On 27 Mar 2014, a US-backed resolution against Sri Lanka was passed by the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) by a 23-12 vote. (b) India abstained from voting on the resolution against Sri Lanka at the UNHRC. (c) Twelve countries including Russia, China and Pakistan, opposed the resolution.

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(d) The resolution called upon the UN Human Rights Commissioner to undertake a comprehensive investigation into alleged serious violations and abuses of human rights and related crimes by both parties in Sri Lanka. (e) The resolution stressed that Sri Lanka had failed to achieve reconciliation following the end of the three-decade long civil war.

26. Sri Lanka‟s Stand.

(a) Sri Lanka‘s President Mahinda Rajapaksa rejected the UNHRC resolution stressing that the resolution only hurts the country‘s reconciliation efforts. (b) Sri Lanka would continue with its own reconciliation process. (c) It was encouraging that India did not vote against Sri Lanka. (d) Sri Lanka reiterated its stand that the resolution was unacceptable intrusion and a violation of the country‘s sovereignty. (e) Country‘s own reconciliation process known as the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) had made sweeping recommendations to ensure ethnic unity and he was implementing them. (f) Sri Lanka needs time to implement the recommendations of the LLRC, according to Mr Rajapaksa. (g) Resolution imposed an intrusive approach of international investigative mechanism that was counterproductive apart from being inconsistent and impractical. (h) India‘s abstention from the UNHRC vote could result in Diplomatic gains for India with Sri Lanka appreciating India‘s stand. (i) India‘s leverage with Sri Lanka needs to be preserved and exercised for the betterment of the two countries and to press Sri Lanka to address the problems of the Tamils in that country. (j) India considered early progress on devolution and a political settlement as being crucial to Sri Lanka to tackle the mounting international pressure. (k) Early resumption of dialogue between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) – which runs the Northern Provincial Council – was the key, and the government should create conditions conducive to resumption of dialogue. (l) India has maintained its position on the progress in implementation of the 13th Amendment made to the Sri Lankan Constitution following the Indo-Sri Lank Accord of 1987 which devolves certain powers to the provincial councils. (m) India, in a spirit of partnership and cooperation, would continue to engage with Sri Lanka towards implementation of the 13th Amendment and build upon it, as was promised to India by Sri Lanka.

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(n) The Sep 2013 elections to Sri Lanka‘s Northern Provincial Council were an encouraging Sign. (o) India would like both sides – the Sri Lankan government and the TNA – to work together and find a solution which was in the best interest of all communities in Sri Lanka, including the Tamils. (p) India also thanked Sri Lanka for releasing all Indian fishermen soon after the UNHRC proceedings.

27. China Pledged Support for Sri Lanka (25 Apr 2014).

(a) On 25 Apr 2014, Chinese Vice-President Liu Zhenmin visited Sri Lanka and said that the island nation would always find a friend in China. (b) China would continue to support Sri Lanka in the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and the UN Security Council (UNSC). (c) The Sri Lankan President thanked China for its support in the past decades, particularly to some of the landmark infrastructure projects coming up in Sri Lanka. (d) In the last decade, China invested heavily in Sri Lanka‘s infrastructure. (e) In Aug 2013, a large port built by China at a cost of $500 million, opened in Colombo, about a year after another Chinese built deep-sea port in Hambantota became operational.

28. US: Financial Networks Supporting LTTE were Active.

(a) In May 2014, the US said that the LTTE‘s (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) financial network of support continued to operate throughout 2013. (b) The US Department of State, in its recent report on terrorism, said that the LTTE uses its international contacts and the large Tamil diaspora in North America, Europe and Asia to procure weapons, communications equipment, funding and other needed supplies. (c) The LTTE employed charities as fronts to collect and divert funds for their activities. (d) The US report apparently echoed the Sri Lankan Government‘s position on the possible regrouping of the LTTE. (e) The Sri Lankan government took various measures in the last couple of months to address concerns over the reported attempts to revive the LTTE in Sri Lanka‘s north and east areas. (f) US was the first country to proscribe the LTTE as a foreign terror organisation and continues to list it as a terror organisation. The LTTE was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organisation on October 9, 1997, and was named a Specially Designated Global Terrorist organisation in 2001.

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29. New Sri Lankan President‟s First Visit to India, 15-18 Feb 2015.

(a) President Maithripala Sirisena‘s first visit abroad was to India which is seen as significant in our relations.

(b) India Signed a Civil Nuclear Agreement with Sri Lanka.

(i) Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena and India‘s Prime Minister Narendra Modi concluded a Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement on 17 Feb 2015. (ii) The Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement was an initial one and would not lead to the construction of nuclear power plants immediately. (iii) The agreement would facilitate cooperation in the transfer and exchange of knowledge and expertise, sharing of resources, capacity building and training of personnel in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including use of radioisotopes, nuclear safety, radiation safety, nuclear security, radioactive waste management and nuclear radiological disaster mitigation and environmental protection.

(c) India and Sri Lanka also agreed to expand defence and strategic cooperation, including a trilateral format with the Maldives. (d) India and Sri Lanka signed three agreements as under: -

(i) Agricultural Cooperation. (ii) MoU on Nalanda University. (iii) Agreement on Cultural Cooperation.

(e) Both Countries agreed that fishermen problem must be solved by the Fishermen‘s Associations of both countries.

(f) All aspects of bilateral importance were discussed.

(g) Significance of the New Sri Lankan President‟s Visit to India.

(i) A ―new beginning‖ in Indo-Sri Lankan relations as the ties had dipped under the previous government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa which was seen as tilting more towards China. (ii) The very fact that Mr Sirisena chose India for his first foreign visit underlined the importance attached to India in the new Sri Lankan government‘s foreign policy. (iii) The Sri Lankan President‘s visit to India was mainly to establish a good rapport with India.

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(iv) Both countries were at a moment of unprecedented opportunity to take their bilateral relations to a new level and the visit firmly set them in that direction. (v) Visit to India was a remarkable milestone in taking the Indo-Sri Lankan relations to a greater height. (vii) The singing of the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement was very significant as it imparted a closer strategic partnership between India and Sri Lanka. (viii) India‘s Prime Minister Narendra Modi said that the bilateral Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement was another demonstration of mutual trust between India and Sri Lanka. (ix) Another significant aspect of the visit was that both sides agreed to expand their defence and strategic cooperation, including a trilateral format with Maldives.

30. Conclusion.

(a) Indo-Sri Lankan Relations set for a New Beginning.

(i) India is Sri Lanka‘s closest neighbour with ethnic links to its significant Tamil minority and has a large influence in the island‘s political, social, economic and cultural consciousness. (ii) The recent visit by the new President of Sri Lanka Maithripala Sirisena promised a new beginning in Indo-Sri Lankan ties as both sides are keen on expanding their economic cooperation including Indian investment in Sri Lanka. (iii) India has been pushing for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with Sri Lanka. (iv) Sri Lanka has been seeking Indian Assistance for the Construction of 20,000 houses for workers in the plantation sector, who are Sri Lankan Tamils in the Central Province.

(b) India‟s Broad Engagement with Sri Lanka in the Post-War Period.

(i) In the post-war period, India‘s broad engagement with Sri Lanka is focused on rebuilding the infrastructure in North Sri Lanka and catering to the livelihood concerns of the Sri Lankan Tamils. (ii) India helped in the resettlement of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) by providing four million sheets of roofing and 40,000 tonnes of cement. (iii) India also provided 95,000 family packs of basic agricultural implements valued at $3.2 million distributed through the UNHCR.

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(iv) India supplied 500 tractors for use in the North. About 75 buses were provided to overcome the shortage of vehicles. (v) In imparting skill development India build a vocational training centre in the Muslim-dominated Puttalam. (vi) India also helped in refurbishing teaching hospital in Jaffna and providing medical equipment. (vii) India helped in de-mining in the north with seven Indian teams working to clear the areas. (viii) India is also engaged in building the Northern Railway line. (ix) The Sri Lankan Government approved the handing over of the Kankesanthurai port, to be developed by India. (x) The reconciliation, land rights and rehabilitation issues remain to be addressed. (xi) The long-term solution for the ethnic crisis can be found through a political solution to the aspirations of the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka.

(c) Issues of Concern in Indo-Sri Lankan Relations.

(d) The new Sri Lankan government needs to implementation of the 13th Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution and deliver on devolution of powers. (e) The new Sri Lankan government also has to take action for the repatriation of more than 100,000 Sri Lankan refugees from Tamil Nadu. (f) Address India‘s security concerns about Chinese submarines docking in Sri Lankan ports. (g) India and Sri Lanka have to resolve the problem of fishermen from both sides in an amicable way.

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CHAPTER - 23

INDO - THAILAND RELATIONS

1. India and Thailand: Extradition Treaty After 20 Years of Negotiations.

(a) India and Thailand signed an Extradition Treaty after two decades of negotiations. (b) Both countries also concluded a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to exchange intelligence related to money laundering and terrorism financing. (c) India and Thailand also ratified the Treaty on Transfer of Sentenced Persons, which was concluded between the two sides in Feb 2012. (d) The Extradition Treaty provides the legal framework for seeking extradition of fugitives, including those involved in terrorism, transnational crimes and economic offences. (e) The Extradition Treaty also provides for the extradition of any person wanted for trial or for the imposition or enforcement of a sentence by one Contracting State and is found in the territory of the other. (f) Extradition requires the surrender of an alleged or convicted criminal by one State to the other. (g) The Extradition Treaty would further strengthen the relationship between the two law enforcement agencies by providing a firm legal basis for their bilateral cooperation. (h) The Treaty on Transfer of Sentenced Persons enables foreign nationals convicted of a criminal offence to serve the sentence in their own country. It also facilitates their social rehabilitation in their own country.

2. India, Myanmar, Thailand Trilateral Highway to be Ready by 2016.

(a) India‘s then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Thai counterpart Yingluck Shinawatra expressed hoped that the project to develop a 3,200 km highway linking India, Myanmar and Thailand would be ready by 2016. (b) India has already provided Myanmar a $500 million loan, part of which would be used to fund the trilateral highway project. (c) India welcomed Thailand‘s proposal to host the next India-Myanmar-Thailand Joint Task Force Meeting on the Trilateral Highway Project, and the second meeting of the Thailand-India Joint Working Group on Connectivity and Infrastructure in Jun-Jul 2013, according to the Joint Statement issued at the end of the talks between the two Prime Ministers.

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(d) Thailand proposed to host the third India-Myanmar-Thailand Ministerial Meeting on Transport Linkages to address issues of infrastructure so as to maximise the use of the highway for strengthening regional growth an integration, according to the Joint Statement. (e) Thailand informed India about the progress in the development of the Dawei Special Economic Zone in southern Myanmar. The project would enhance connectivity and open enormous business opportunities in the region after it becomes operational. (f) Thailand invited Indian businesses to invest in the Dawei Special Economic Zone, particularly in steel manufacturing petrochemicals, power and services.

3. Both Prime Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to carry through the talks for a Thailand-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA). 4. Joint Statement.

(a) The Prime Ministers welcomed the signing of the bilateral Extradition Treaty which would provide a legal basis for bilateral cooperation in dealing with elements acting against national interests. (b) Both sides agreed to pursue defence industry collaboration in areas of mutual interest. (c) Both Prime Ministers appreciated the close interactions and regular exchanges between the Armed Forces of Thailand and India including the official visit of the Thai Defence Minister to India in Dec 2012, the conduct of the Defence Dialogue in Feb 2013 and the regular Coordinated Patrol conducted by the Indian Navy and the Royal Thai Navy. (d) The Thailand side welcomed the visit of the Indian Defence Minister to Thailand in Jun 2013.

5. Significance of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh‟s Visit to Thailand.

(a) Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Thailand while returning from Japan after concluding a successful visit. (b) Dr Singh said that the growing security cooperation between India and Thailand received a major boost during his visit to Thailand. (c) The Prime Minister said that the Extradition Treaty, concluded after two decades of negotiations, and a memorandum on cooperation in anti-money laundering sent a major signal of the shared commitment between India and Thailand to combat terrorism, organised crime, drug trafficking and counterfeiting. (d) Both sides also agreed to continue strengthening defence relations, according to Dr. Singh.

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(e) The Extradition Treaty with Thailand, and the progress on finalising the trilateral highway through Myanmar were seen as an important milestone in India‘s relations with its eastern neighbours. (f) India has given Thailand a list of names for extradition and Thailand‘s 6 Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra has promised to expedite the process of extradition. In the past, Thailand had emerged as a haven for Indian criminals. (g) The trilateral highway project between India, Myanmar and Thailand is also very significant as it would connect India with four ASEAN countries – Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. It would also increase border trade with Myanmar, according to analysts.

6. Defence Minister AK Antony‟s Visit to Thailand (06 Jun 2013).

(a) India‘s Defence Minister A.K. Antony visited Thailand on 06 Jun 2013, in the last leg of his three-nation visit that included Australia and Singapore. (b) Mr Antony who met his Thai counterpart Air Chief Marshal Sukhumpol Suwanatat emphasised that India and Thailand had large stakes in peace and stability in their immediate neighbourhood and the wider Asia-Pacific region. (c) The Indian Defence Minister stressed that the security of the sea lanes and freedom of navigation in the region was critical to economic growth and overall security of the region. (d) India supported the resolution of differences and disputes through the process of dialogue and consensus between the parties to such disputes. All countries must exercise restraint and resolve issues diplomatically, according to the principles of international law, according to Mr. Antony. (e) India had, over the years, developed a well-established defence industry, which could meet the varied requirement of the Thai Armed Forces, according to the Indian Defence Minister. (f) Mr. Antony also noted that India would welcome the visit of Thai teams to various Indian defence production facilities.

7. Anti-Government Protests (25 Nov 2013).

(a) In Nov 2013, Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra‘s Puea Thai tried to push through an amnesty bill that would have nullified her brother Thaksin Shinawatra‘s 2008 conviction for corruption. (b) The Prime Minister‘s brother Thaksin Shinawatra was ousted in a military coup in 2006 and currently lives in self-imposed exile in Dubai. (c) On 25 Nov 25, thousands of anti-government demonstrators stormed two key Ministries intensifying their campaign to bring down the government of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra. (d) The anti-government protests are being led by Suthep Thaugsuban, a former Deputy Prime Minister under the previous government.

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(e) The protesters accused Prime Minister Yingluck‘s government of corruption and trying to pass laws to whitewash her brother Thaksin Shinawatra of a graft conviction. (f) The protest rallies turned violent with protesters storming many state buildings in a bid to replace the government with an unelected ―people‘s Council‖.

8. Prime Minister of Thailand Survived the No-Confidence Vote (28 Nov 2103). 9. Prime Minister Called for General Elections in 02 Feb 2014.

(a) Thailand‘s Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra said that she would open every door to find a peaceful solution to a political crisis. (b) Ms Yingluck called for general election on 02 Feb 2014. (c) The Prime Minister‘s call for new elections was aimed at assuaging public anger without succumbing to the demands of the anti-government protesters to suspend the country‘s democratic system. (d) Government was seeking a common ground for the future of the country through political reforms, which would be undertaken after the 02 Feb 2014, general elections.

10. Opposition Quits Parliament.

(a) On 08 Dec 2013, the Democratic Party, Thailand‘s main opposition party resigned from the Parliament to protest what it called ―the illegitimacy‖ of an elected government with which it could no longer work. (b) The Democratic Party which is in minority in the Thai Parliament is closely aligned with the anti-government protesters. (c) On 22 Dec 2013, tens of thousands of protesters came out in the streets of Bangkok and demanded Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra‘s resignation. (d) The opposition Democratic Party decided to boycott the General Elections in Feb 2014,stressing the democratic system was distorted by the Prime Minister‘s brother Thaksin Shinawatra and was failing the citizens of Thailand. (e) The anti-government protest leader Suthep Thaugsuban wanted democracy to be suspended and a ―people‘s council‖ be appointed before any election takes place.

11. Emergency Declared in Bangkok (21 Jan 2014).

(a) On 21 Jan 2014, a 60-day state of emergency was declared in Bangkok and surrounding areas to counter the mass protests aimed at overthrowing the government.

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(b) The declaration of emergency followed weeks of mass demonstrations that disrupted parts to Thailand‘s capital Bangkok and sparked violence, including grenade attacks and shootings. (c) Emergency was imposed in Bangkok in 2010 resulting in the death of dozens of people in a bloody military crackdown.

12. Elections Held Amid Blockade by the Opposition (02 Feb 2014).

(a) General Elections were held in Thailand on 02 Feb 2014. (b) Opposition protesters prevent voting at thousands of polling stations plunging the country into political chaos. (c) Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra was expected to win and extend her billionaire family‘s decade-long winning streak. (d) The disruption of voting by the opposition meant that the results would be delayed and there would not be enough Members of Parliament to convene the Parliament and appoint a new Government until new elections were held in the disrupted areas. (e) The protesters vowed to keep their fight to topple Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, whatever the outcome of the elections.

13. Political Crisis in Thailand Threatens the Country‟s Democratic Setup.

(a) Deadlock after eight years of on-off conflict between the Red Shirts, made up of rural and urban poor supporting the former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and the Yellow Shirts, comprising of the middle class and ruling elite belong to the Democratic Party. (b) Analysts point out the societal polarisation is the critical aspect of the current political crisis in Thailand. (c) Thaksin Shinawatra, a controversial tycoon-turned politician, was ousted as the Prime Minister in a military coup in 2006 and now lives in Dubai to avoid prison for a corruption conviction case. (d) The anti-government protesters accuse the Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra of being a puppet for her brother Thaksin Shinawatra. (e) The protesters wanted to scuttle the election to prevent Ms. Yingluck from renewing her mandate and perpetuating the influence of her brother Thaksin Shinawatra.

14. Thailand‟s Military‟s Centrality in Democratic Politics.

(a) The Thailand Army which carried out 18 coups since 1932, has played a central role in the domestic politics.

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(b) The Thai Army, supported by the monarchy, has played backroom role during times of civilian rule. (c) The Thailand Army has so far kept away from the current political crisis, even though the anti-government protesters openly sought its intervention.

15. Political Crisis in Thailand a Cause for Grave Concern to Neighbours and India.

(a) Thailand Crisis concern to its Neighbours and India.

(i) Thailand‘s Constitutional Court Declared the General Elections Invalid (21 Mar 2014). (ii) Thailand‘s Constitutional Court Dismissed Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra and Several Ministers for Abuse of Power (07 May 2014). (iii) Anti-Government Protesters Demanded that the Government Hand Power to an Unelected Regime (09 May 2014). (iv) Pro-Government Supports, ‗Red Shirts‘, Oppose Moves for an Unelected Regime (10 May 2014). (v) Thailand‘s Army Chief Seized Power in a Military Coup (22 May 2014).

(b) Thailand‘s Army Chief Gen Prayut Chan-O-Cha seized power in a military coup, ordering rival protesters off the street and deposing the government in an attempt to end months of political violence. (c) Army Chief said that the powerful armed forces had to act to restore stability in Thailand. (d) Gen Prayut said that he seized power because of the violence in Bangkok and many parts of the country that resulted in loss of innocent lives and property and was likely to escalate. (e) Thailand has witnessed 19 successful or attempted coups since 1932. (f) The Constitution, except for the chapter on the monarchy, stood suspended. (g) All radio and TV normal programmes were suspended. (h) Night-time curfew was imposed across the country. (j) The former Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, government leaders, political figures, critics and academics were detained.

16. Military Chief Received the King‟s Endorsement to Lead the Country. (a) The military said that the Army Chief had sent a letter to the King regarding his takeover and the King had acknowledged.

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(b) Thailand‘s Monarch commands respect among his subjects and his acknowledgement is traditionally sought to legitimise the recurring military takeovers.

17. Military Junta Disbanded the Senate.

(a) On 24 May 2014, Thailand‘s military junta said that it had disbanded the country‘s Senate and placed all law-making authority in the Army Chief‘s hands. (b) Military regime planned to work towards returning the country of 67 million people to democracy in around 15 months. (c) First phase of around three months would focus on reconciliation in the divided country. (d) In the second year-long phase, a cabinet and new draft constitution would be put in place to enact reforms. (e) The elections could be held after the completion of the two phases.

18. International Condemnation.

(a) Leaders from the US, the UK, France and the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon condemned the military takeover and sought restoration of civilian order. (b) The US warned that it was reconsidering cooperation with its ally. (c) The US Secretary of State John Kerry denounced the coup as having no justification and urged the restoration of a civilian government, respect for press freedom and early elections that reflect the will of the people.

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CHAPTER - 24

INDO - UAE RELATIONS

Prime Minister‟s Visit to UAE (16-17 Aug 2015). 1. Indian Prime Minister‟s Visit after 34 Years.

(a) India‘s Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited the United Arab Emirates on 16-17 Aug 2015. (b) Mr Modi became the first Indian Prime Minister to visit UAE in 34 years. (c) On 16 Aug 2015, the Indian Prime Minister was welcomed by the Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed Bin Zayed Al Nayhan of Abu Dhabi with five of his brothers in rare gesture. (d) Mr Modi held talks with the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi. (e) On 17 Aug 2015, Mr. Modi visited Dubai and held talks with the Dubai ruler and UAE Prime Minister, Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum. (f) Prime Minister Narendra Modi also addressed the Indian community at the Dubai sports city cricket stadium on 17 Aug 2015.

2. Focus of Visit.

(a) Trade.

(b) Investment. (c) Energy.

(d) The Indian community. (e) Cooperation on Terrorism.

3. Joint Statement.

(a) India and the UAE upgraded their bilateral relations to a ‗Comprehensive Strategic Partnership‘. (b) The strategic partnership would entail enhanced cooperation in counter-terrorism operations, intelligence sharing and capacity-building. (c) Both sides agreed to co-ordinate efforts to fight radicalisation and misuse of religion by groups and countries for inciting hatred, perpetrating and justifying terrorism or pursuing political aims.

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(d) Both countries agreed to denounce and oppose terrorism in all forms and manifestations, wherever committed and by whomever, calling on all States to reject and abandon the use of terrorism against other countries, dismantle terrorism infrastructures where they exist, and bring perpetrators of terrorism to justice. (e) India and the UAE agreed to work together to control, regulate and share information on flow of funds that could have a bearing on radicalisation activities. (f) The two countries called on all nations to fully respect and sincerely implement their commitments to resolve disputes bilaterally and peacefully without resorting to violence and terrorism. (g) The National Security Advisors, together with other high level representatives from both nations, would meet every six months. (h) The two sides would establish points of contact between their security agencies to improve operational cooperation. (j) Both sides agreed to conduct joint military exercises. (k) The UAE would encourage the investment institutions of UAE to raise their investments in India, including through the establishment of UAE-India Infrastructure Investment Fund, with the aim of reaching a target of $75 billion to support investment in India‘s plans for rapid expansion of next generation infrastructure.

4. Significance of Prime Minister‟s Visit.

(a) The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is very significant for India as 2.6 million Indians live there, UAE is among the top four suppliers of oil to India and bilateral trade between them is $60 billion. (b) There are many economic benefits in enhancing bilateral relations with the UAE as the investments from UAE could play a significant role in building India‘s infrastructure and giving a boost to the next phase of its economic growth, . (c) Analysts point out that Prime Minister Narendra Modi‘s visit to the UAE was significant as the bilateral relations were upgraded to a ‗comprehensive strategic partnership.‘ (d) The announcement of the strategic partnership during the visit is seen as a significant elevation of bilateral relations and also as a policy shift which would strengthen India‘s relations with the Gulf countries. (e) The elevation of the bilateral relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership would open different sectors of the Indian economy to investment from the UAE. . (f) India could also benefit from the $800 billion UAE sovereign wealth fund (g) Analysts point out that there was a clear shift in India‘s foreign policy with more focus on security and terrorism.

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(h) The Joint Statement issued during the Prime Minister‘s visit indicts Pakistan and state-sponsored terrorism without naming the country. (j) The Joint Statement showed convergence of the two countries on security, trade and terror issues and a departure from the past in bilateral relations, when the UAE used to tilt towards Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. (k) India and UAE need to deepen their relations by enhancing their strategic ties and increase counterterrorism cooperation to tackle the rising extremism in West and South Asia. (l) Prime Minister Narendra Modi‘s visit to the UAE could be the springboard for India‘s ‗Act West Policy‘.

5. Shift in Approach of Gulf with India.

(a) Analysts point out that several factors have contributed to the recent shift in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries shift in their engagement with India. (b) There has been a structural change in the global oil market with the Gulf countries looking towards the South and East Asian markets instead of the Trans-Atlantic markets. (c) The GCC and other West Asian countries want India and other Asian big powers to offer security guarantees to the region, with many GCC countries welcoming defence cooperation agreements with India. (d) In view of the Arab Spring uprising in West Asia and the problems in Iraq and Egypt, the Gulf countries view India and China to be more reliable interlocutors than the West. (e) With the rise of radicalisation and extremism in the region, India‘s policy of seeking and securing regional stability is valued by the GCC and other countries of the region.

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CHAPTER - 25

INDO - UK RELATIONS 1. Introduction.

(a) Britain is one of India's closest strategic partner in Europe. (b) Strong Indo-British bilateral relations. (c) Nearly two million people of Indian origin living in the UK. (d) Britain feels that India has an increasingly important role in global affairs. (e) Importance of India for Britain.

(i) India‘s dynamic economy. (ii) India‘s democracy with three million elected representatives - a beacon to the world. (iii) India‘s tradition of Tolerance where dozens of faiths and hundreds of languages living side by side. (iv) India‘s sense of responsibility toward reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan, peacekeeping in Sierra Leone or providing intellectual leadership in the G-20. (v) India a source of strength for the world.

(f) Importance of Britain for India.

(i) Britain and India are natural partners. (ii) Both countries have deep and close connections among the people. (iii) Nearly two million people of Indian origin living in Britain. (iv) Britain and India are closer culturally. (v) Britain is the world‘s sixth largest manufacturer and the best base for companies wanting to do business in Europe. (vi) Britain is a hub of science and innovation with some of the best universities in the world.

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(a) Irritants in Indo-Britain Relations.

(i) Tax matters concerning British companies in India like Vodafone and Shell. (ii) India‘s serious concerns at charges of corruption in the VVIP helicopter deal with Agusta Westland, and Anglo-Italian conglomerate.

2. Visit by British Foreign Secretary & Chancellor (07 Jul 2014).

(a) Engagement with New Government in India.

(i) British Foreign Secretary William Hague and his colleague Chancellor of Exchequer George Osborne visited India as part of stepping up Britain‘s engagement with the new government under Prime Minister Narendra Modi. (ii) It was a measure of the ambition and drive and pace of the new government of Prime Minister Modi, that this complete turnaround in sentiment about the Indian economy had been achieved in just seven short weeks (iii) Modi government‘s bold programme would allow India and the UK to build a special partnership as envisaged by Prime Minister David Cameroon. (iv) The importance of the Indo-UK relationship could be gauged by the fact that 50 British Ministers had visited India in recent years (v) World was systematically less stable and predictable and India‘s clout should be more strongly felt around the globe.

(b) British Defence Equipment to the Indian Air Force.

(i) A £250 million deal was concluded to supply British defence equipment to the Indian Air Force (IAF). (ii) The Defence Ministry signed a contract of £250 million with MBDA UK for the supply of advanced short-range air-to-air missiles for the IAF‘s Jaguar fleet. (iii) The IAF would call the missile the ―New Generation Close Combat Missile‖ (NGCCM).

3. Significance of the Visit.

(a) Part of the trend of the major powers stepping up their engagement with the new government in India under Prime Minister Narendra Modi. (b) During the visit a contract for the supply of short-range air-to-air missiles for IAF‘s Jaguar fleet was concluded. (c) India‘s terms of engagement with Britain were expanding with Indian companies becoming major investors in Britain.

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(d) During the visit by the British Ministers, India‘s Cipla announced that it would invest $171 million for drugs research in the UK and the Mahindras would invest $34 million to develop electric cars in Britain. (e) India‘s thriving relations with Britain could be leveraged to enhance relations with other major powers of a multi-polar world.

4. Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj‟s Visit to UK.

(a) FM Sushma Swaraj visited London from 13-14 Mar 2015 to unveil the statue of Mahatma Gandhi in Parliament Square. (b) UK FS Philip Hammond visited India from 12-13 Mar 2015 for bilateral consultation. (c) India and the UK have active defence cooperation with dialogue at Defence Secretary and three services level. At the services level, joint exercises and wide ranging exchanges between the three services are conducted on the basis of mutually agreed agenda. The last India-UK Defence Consultative Group Meeting was held on 11-12 Feb 2015 in London.

5. Conclusion.

(a) Strong India-Britain Relations.

(i) Britain is the largest European investor in India. (ii) India is the second largest investor in Britain. (iii) Indian students are the second largest group in Britain. (iv) Both countries have strong historical, linguistic and cultural relations.

(b) Britain Looking Towards Asia to Develop New Partnerships.

(c) New Phase of Indo-British Relations with Britain deciding to Deal with India as a Rising Power with Focus on Economics and Trade. (d) Need for a Stronger, Wider, Deeper Relationship between India and Britain.

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CHAPTER - 26

INDO - US RELATIONS Introduction 1. India values its bilateral relations with the US. As democracies both countries have shared many ideals. US is an important economic partner of India, especially in wake of our economic reforms. However, in pursuing bilateral relations, we sought to present the Independence of our viewpoint and protect our national interest from the pressures of conformity. US accounts for 20% of all Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) approved from Jul 2001. 2. Significance of Indo-US Relations. India‘s policy has to be based on the recognition that given the current power equation in the world, sustaining a practical and cooperative relationship with the US is of importance to India in broad terms. 3. Bilateral Problem. Analysts feel that the bilateral problem, which had ropped up due to India‘s nuclearisation, has to be resolved by realistic mutual accommodation. India can be responsive to the US concerns, without diminishing India‘s strategic autonomy, to ensure its national security in an evolving regional and global security environment. 4. Difference in Approach to Non-Proliferation. Analysts opine that India should recognise that there is a difference in the non-proliferation approaches of both countries. The US approach is based on global strategic concerns; it is not India specific, whereas India‘s approach is country and region specific, with the additional resolve to bring about a non-discriminatory order, non-proliferation and total disarmament. 5. New Approach by the US. The US has acknowledged the irreversibility of Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons programme and the impossibility of making them join the NPT. This has become the basis of a new pragmatic US nuclear diplomacy in the subcontinent. 6. Mutual Interests. Analysts feel that both countries have a mutual interest in improving relations:-

(a) There is a convergence of interests between the two countries as India, like the US, is a liberal democracy with concern for human rights. (b) India has a stake in good relations with a global super power like the US. (c) It is also in the US interest to improve relations with India. The unpredictability of China and the deterioration of Sino-US relations also led to better Indo-US relations. (d) The US has now begun to understand India‘s security concerns.

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(e) Another important area of mutual interest between the two countries is that of containing international terrorism, religious extremism and narcotics trafficking. (f) The US is interested in Indian markets and India can also explore the US markets for Indian software and other skills. (g) Maintenance of peace in the Indian Ocean. (h) Prevention of proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

Indo - US Nuclear Pact 7. Implementation of the India-US Joint Statement.

(a) Separation of Facilities to be in Phases. India‘s nuclear programme is unique as it is the only state with nuclear weapons not to have begun with a dedicated military programme. India‘s strategic programme is an offshoot of research on nuclear power programme and consequently, it is embedded in alarge undifferentiated programme. Identification of purely civilian facilities and programmes that have no strategic implication poses a particular challenge. Facilities identified as civilian in the separation plan will be offered in phases to be decided by India. The nature of the facility concerned, the activities undertaken in it, the national security significance of materials and the location of the facilities, are factors to be taken into account in undertaking the separation process. This Is Solely to be determined by India. (b) Principles Guiding India‟s Approach.

(i) Credible, feasible and implementable in a transparent manner. (ii) Consistent with the understandings of the 18th Jul statement. (iii) Consistent with India‘s national security and R & D requirements as well as not prejudicial to the three stage nuclear programme in India. (iv) Must be cost effective in its implementation. (v) Must be acceptable to the parliament and public opinion.

(c) Criterion for Including Facilities in the Civilian List.

(i) Facilities offered for safeguard that, after separation, will no longer be engaged in activities of strategic significance. (ii) The overreaching criterion would be whether subjecting a facility to IAEA safeguards would impact adversely on India‘s national security. (iii) A facility will be excluded from the civilian list if it is located in a larger hub of strategic significance. (iv) A civilian facility would, therefore be one that India has determined not to be relevant to its strategic programme.

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8. India‟s Separation Plan.

(a) India will identify and offer safeguards at 14 thermal power reactors between 2006 and 2014. This will include the four presently safeguarded reactors (TAPS 1&2, RAPS 1&2) and in addition KK 1 & 2 that are under safeguards and would raise the total installed Thermal Power capacity under safeguards from the present 19% to 65% by 2014. (b) India is not in a position to accept safeguards on the prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) and the Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR), both located at Kalpakkam. The Fast Breeder Programme is at the R & D stage and its technology will take time to mature and reach an advanced stage in development. (c) India has decided to place under safeguards all future civilian thermal power reactors and civilian breeder reactors and the Government of India retains the sole right to determine such reactors as civilian. (d) India will permanently shut down the CIRUS reactor in 2010. It will also be prepared to shift the fuel core of the APSARA reactor that was purchased from France outside BARC (Bhabha Atomic Research Centre) and make the fuel core available to be placed under safeguards in 2010.

9. Safeguards.

(a) The US has conveyed its commitment to the reliable supply of fuel to India. Consistent with the 18 Jul 2005 Joint Statement, the US has also reaffirmed its assurances to create the necessary conditions for India to have assured and full access to fuel for its reactors. (b) The US is willing to incorporate assurances regarding fuel supply in the bilateral US-India agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. (c) The US will join India in seeking to negotiate with the IAEA a specific fuel supply agreement. (d) The US will support an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the life time of India‘s reactors. (e) In case of disruption of fuel supplies, the US and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries such as Russia, France and the UK to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India.

10. Shift in US Policy on Kashmir. Analysts point out that the shift in US policy on Kashmir has been brought about by Pakistan‘s resorting to proxy war to resolve the problem in its favour and the US perception that this can lead to an all-out war degenerating into a nuclear war. 11. Economic Cooperation. Despite differences in political perceptions, the US and India offer a unique economic partnership in the current context that is increasingly being driven by information technology. India can take advantage of the US market while the US interest in India will depend upon India‘s continued high rates of growth and markets for the US goods and services.

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12. Defence Cooperation. US see India as a partner in maintaining ―peace‖ in the Indian Ocean Region. There is a convergence of security interests between the two. Analysts feel that if one looks at the new patterns of defence security relation, the US building an arc of containment against Muslim states and China, is visible. With Turkey, Israel and Saudi Arabia already contained, there is this big vacuum up to Thailand and Singapore. This vacuum is filled most adequately by India, especially now that India has set up an independent naval command on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Thereafter further east, the US has its old US allies, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. 13. Reasons Behind the US Desire to Make India a Major Power.

(a) Relations with India Need to go Beyond NSSP. (b) Recognition of India's Growing Power. (c) Wants a Balance of Power in Favour of Freedom. (d) China Factor.

14. Issues of Divergence.

(a) Civil Nuclear Energy.

(i) The US objected to Sections 17(b) and 46 of India‘s Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act which open the door for legal action against nuclear suppliers if an accident was caused by faulty or defective equipment. (ii) The US felt that these provisions violated the International Atomic Energy Agency‘s (IAEA) Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC). (iii) US companies like GE and Westinghouse insist that they would not be able to supply nuclear equipment to India unless they were fully insulated in the event of an accident. (iv) The Indian Government informed the US that the Act, as passed by the Parliament was final and that no changes in any of its provisions were possible. (v) Lack of progress on award of contracts for construction of nuclear power plants as promised in the Indo-US civil nuclear agreement is seen as a setback for the US companies. (vi) Currently, the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) is conducting commercial talks with Westinghouse and GE-Hitachi for constructing nuclear power plants in Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh respectively.

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(b) The US Immigration Reform.

(i) India is concerned at the new US immigration reform laws imposing stiff visa fee payments for software professionals seeking to work in the US for a short term. (ii) India feels that this is a non-tariff barrier impeding legitimate business activity. (iii) The US emphasises that the proposed immigration law would nearly triple the number of H-1B visas for skilled workers.

(c) Afghanistan.

(i) Indian and the US are at odds over the strategy for ending violence in Afghanistan. (ii) The new Afghan reconciliation process which started with the Taliban opening political office in Doha has raised concern in India. (iii) India is not optimistic about the US talks with the Taliban yielding any positive result. (iv) Concerns about the role of the Taliban and the Haqqani Network which targeted the Indian embassy in Kabul.

(d) Bilateral Investment Protection.

(i) The US wants India to open its economy further for Foreign Investment to improve trade between the two countries. (ii) The US also wants an early bilateral investment protection agreement. (iii) India has said that the agreement is still being formulated by the Finance Ministry.

15. Five Key Areas of Indo-US Relationship.

(a) Indo-US Partnership Indispensable for Global Peace and Security. (b) Energy Security, Food Security and Climate Change would be pursued through Indo-US Green Partnership. (c) Cooperation between India and the US in Public Health. (d) New Obama-Singh 21st Century Knowledge Initiative will Further Strengthen Cooperation in Education. (e) Framework for Cooperation on Trade and Investment would push Technological Innovation and Promote Inclusive Growth and Job Creation.

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Prime Minister Narendra Modi‟s Visit to the US, 27 Sep – 01 Oct 2014. 16. Narendra Modi‟s Speech at Madison Square.

(a) On 28 Sep 2104, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi addressed the Indian diaspora at the Madison Square Garden in New York. (b) The mega public interaction was organised by the Indian American Community Foundation with at around 186 organisations represented. (c) India diaspora from 48 US states and 5 Canadian provinces participated in the event. (d) Indian-American community about 3.2 million and accounts for 1% of the US population. (e) The Indian - American community is the most educated and richest minority, according to a Pew survey in 2013. (f) The Indian - American community is now part of the Democratic and Republican Parties and is also represented in the Government. (g) Indian diaspora is now an important input in the foreign policy initiatives of the NDA Government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. (h) Prime Minister Narendra Modi stressed on development and good governance and pointed out that he wanted to make the people of India a partner in the country‘s development. (j) Mr Modi said that his dream was that by 2022, which would be the 75th anniversary of India‘s Independence, no one in India should be without a home. (k) The Prime Minister announced that every person holding a PIO (Person of Indian Origin) card would get a life-long visa for India.

17. Prime Minister Modi‟s Meeting with CEOs of US Companies, 29 Sep 2014. Pushed for investments with a pledge for a stable tax policy and asserted that he wanted to convert the Supreme Court ruling on coal block allocation into an opportunity to move forward and clean up the past. 18. Narendra Modi‟s Meeting with President Barack Obama, 30 Sep 2014.

(a) India‘s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the US President Barack Obama decided to take the Indo-US relationship to the next level, stressing that the true potential of the relationship had yet to be realised. (b) The discussions with President Barack Obama had confirmed that India and the US were natural global partners. (c) The US President said that he was impressed with the Indian Prime Minister‘s interest in not only addressing poverty in India and revitalising the

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economy there but also his determination that India helped bring about peace and security in the world. (d) Unveiled a roadmap for Indo-US relations by issuing a vision document, wrote a joint editorial in Washington Post and issued a Joint Statement. (e) The vision statement ―Chalein Saath Saath (Forward Together We Go‖) stressed that their strategic partnership would work to combat terror threats and prevent the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). (f) The vision statement said that the Indo-US partnership would be a model for the rest of the world.

19. Joint Statement.

(a) India not to Join Coalition against ISIS. (b) Joint Efforts to Dismantle Pakistan Based Terror Groups. (c) Building Database to Monitor Citizens under Terror Scanner. (d) Increasing Maritime Security Partnership. (e) Renewing Framework Indo-US Defence Relationship. (f) Addressing Problems to Implement the Indo-US Nuclear Deal. (g) $1 Billion Deal to Purchase Clean Energy. (h) US to Help Set up Smart Cities in Ajmer, Allahabad and Visakhapatnam. (j) Concern over Outbreak of Ebola – India Agreed to Spend $12 Million. (k) Shared Interest in Preserving Regional Peace and Stability. (l) Concern over Rising Tensions over Maritime Territorial Disputes, Especially in the South China Sea. (m) Avoid Use Threat in South China Sea.

20. Significance of Prime Minister Narendra Modi‟s Visit to the US.

(a) Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi‘s visit to the US was significant in deepening the bilateral relations as the two countries issued three key documents – the vision statement, joint editorial by the two leaders and a comprehensive joint statement. (b) The US investment companies have signalled their desire to renew investments in India after the assurance given by Prime Minister Narendra Modi that his Government would address the concerns of the business leaders.

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(c) India remained firm on the issue of WTO‘s Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). (d) Prime Minister‘s visit brought the faltering Indo-US relations back on track on all aspects of the Comprehensive Dialogue – energy, health, space, women‘s empowerment, trade, skills, strategy and security. (e) India and the US had commonalities on a wide spectrum of issues including strategic partnership and trade. (f) As global partners, both countries were committed to enhancing their homeland security by sharing intelligence, through counter-terrorism and law-enforcement cooperation, while they jointly work to maintain freedom of navigation and lawful commerce across the seas. (g) The health cooperation between India and the US would help tackle the toughest of challenges, whether combating the spread of Ebola, researching cancer cures or conquering diseases like tuberculosis, malaria and dengue. (h) Both sides intended to expand their recent tradition of working together to empower women, build capacity and improve food security in Afghanistan and Africa. (j) India and the US would expand collaboration in trade, investment and technology that harmonise with India‘s ambitious development agenda, while sustain the US as the global engine of growth. (k) The leaders of both countries discussed ways to boost manufacturing and expand affordable renewable energy, while sustainably securing the future of their common environment. (l) The US would support the ―Clean India‖ campaign, where it would leverage private and civil society innovation, expertise and technology to improve sanitation and hygiene throughout India. (m) Both sides agreed to address the problems in the implementation of the landmark Indo-US nuclear deal. (n) The US agreed to support India‘s bid for membership of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MCTR) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). (o) The US is the world‘s largest arms manufacturer, India wants joint manufacturing of arms with Prime Minister Modi inviting US defence companies to invest in India. (p) Both sides agreed to make joint and concerted efforts to dismantle terror and crime networks like LeT, D-company and al-Qaeda, all of them based in Pakistan. (q) The Joint Statement called on all parties to avoid the use, or threat of use, of force in advancing their claim on South China Sea.

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(r) Advent of a new Government in India was a natural opportunity to broaden and deepen the Indo-US relationship with a reinvigorated level of ambition and greater confidence.

US President Barack Obama‟s Second Visit to India, 25-27 Jan 2015. 21. First US President to be the Chief Guest on India‟s Republic Day. The US President Barack Obama and the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi held a second summit within four months. 22. Breakthrough Understanding on the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal. (a) The second summit between the US President Barack Obama and India‘s Prime Minister Narendra Modi led to a breakthrough in the Indo-US Civil Nuclear deal launched in 2005.

(b) ―Breakthrough understanding‖ on the Indo-US Civil Nuclear deal that would allow nuclear contracts to be signed between the US firms and India. (c) On 30 Aug 2010, India‘s Parliament approved the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill. (d) According to the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill, Nuclear operators to be strictly liable for damages resulting from an accident but their liability would be capped at Rs.1,500 crore. (e) The US objected to Sections 17(b) and 46 of the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act which open the door for legal action against nuclear suppliers if an accident was caused by faulty or defective equipment. (f) The US felt that these provisions violated the International Atomic Energy Agency‘s (IAEA) Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC). (g) US companies like GE and Westinghouse insist that they would not be able to supply nuclear equipment to India unless they were fully insulated in the event of an accident. (h) The Indian Government informed the US that the Act, as passed by the Parliament was final and that no changes in any of its provisions were possible. (j) US had given up its reservations without any assurance from the Indian side on diluting the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act in any way. (k) To address the US concerns over Clause 17 of the Nuclear Liability law, India would set up an insurance pool of Rs. 750 crore. The remaining Rs.750 crore of the total amount of Rs.1,500 crore to offset Liability would be provided by the Government of India, according to media reports.

23. Renewal of Indo-US Defence Cooperation Framework Agreement 2005.

(a) The Indo-US Defence Cooperation Framework Agreement covers all aspects of defence cooperation, including the Defence Trade and Technological Initiative

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(DTTI). (b) Four projects were identified under the DTTI for joint production and development and exploring cooperation for jet engines and aircraft carrier systems. (c) The projects identified under the DTTI include Raven mini-unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), roll-on, roll-off intelligence kits for C-130 transport aircraft and mobile electric hybrid power source. (d) Both sides agreed to increase bilateral anti-terror cooperation, intelligence sharing and maritime security.

24. Three Separate Documents Issued after Talks.

(a) A Declaration of Friendship with a Commitment to Regular Summits. (b) A Joint Statement called “Shared Effort, Progress for All”. (c) A Joint Strategic Vision Statement for the Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region.

25. Joint Statement – “Shared Effort, Progress for All”.

(a) The need for joint and concerted efforts to disrupt terror outfits such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeT), D Company and the Haqqani network. (b) Acknowledged the threat from terror outfits IS and al-Qaeda, and called for elimination of terrorist safe havens and infrastructure, disrupting terrorist networks and their financing, and stopping cross-border terrorism. (c) Enhanced cooperation between the law enforcement and intelligence agencies of the two countries including real-time sharing of actionable intelligence. (d) Strengthening mechanism to combat terror and promise to work out an acceptable agreement to counter cyber threats. (e) Welcomed understandings reached on issues of civil nuclear liability and administrative arrangements for civil nuclear cooperation. (f) Committed themselves to cooperate closely to achieve a successful climate change agreement in Paris in 2015.

26. Joint Strategic Vision Statement for the Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean Region.

(a) Affirmed the importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and over flight throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea. (b) Welcomed the convening of the sixth round of India-US-Japan trilateral discussions on 20 Dec 2014, to deepen regional engagement and to discuss ways to implement projects on the ground.

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(c) Called on all parties to avoid the threat or use of force and pursue resolution of territorial and maritime disputes through all peaceful means, in accordance with universal recognised principles of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. (d) India‘s Act East Policy and the US rebalance to Asia provided opportunities for India, the US and other Asia-Pacific countries to work closely to strengthen regional ties.

27. Indo-US Collaboration on Afghanistan.

(a) US and India would collaborate on Afghanistan in the wake of the withdrawal of US troops and the end of combat operations in Dec 2014. (b) The India-US-Afghanistan trilateral talks would be raised to the Ministerial level.

28. Economic Issues.

(a) India and the US agreed to restart discussions on a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) that aims at protecting investments in the two countries. (b) Agreed to set up mechanisms to work on their differences on Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), the social security agreement or the bilateral ―Totalisation Agreement‖ which was important for hundreds of thousands of Indian professionals working in the US with regard to social security taxes. (c) The US President Barack Obama offered $4 billion loans from US banks. (d) Bilateral trade between India and the US had increased 60% in the last couple of years to a record $100 billion but India‘s exports to the US were still less than 2% of all American imports. (d) The US President welcomed the reforms agenda articulated by the Modi Government for making it easier to do business in India. (e) India‘s Prime Minister Narendra Modi said that the ‗Make in India‘ plan was to improve the ease of doing business in India so as to enable the creation of jobs. (f) In order to improve the purchasing power of Indians, the government would focus on raising the competitiveness of India‘s productive processes on the parameters of skill, scale and speed. (g) India and the US signed three Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) for developing three Smart Cities – Ajmer, Allahabad and Visakhapatnam.

Significance of the US President‟s Visit to India. 29. Significance of Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal.

(a) The Civil Nuclear Agreement was the centre-piece of the transformed relations between India and the US.

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(b) Six years after India and the US signed the bilateral agreement, they were moving towards commercial cooperation, consistent with their law, international legal obligations, and technical and commercial viability. (c) Breakthrough understanding reached on the Indo-US Civil Nuclear deal was seen as a significant diplomatic victory for India‘s stand that it would not dilute its Nuclear Liability law. (d) No changes to the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damages (CLND) Act, 2010, had been made, and no assurances given to the US on its contentious Section 46 that opened suppliers to tort liability. (e) Breakthrough in the nuclear deal was an important step that showed how both countries could work together to elevate their relationship. (f) India had also won US assurances of support for its membership in four nuclear regimes – the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Wassenaar Arrangement, Australian Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

30. Deepening Defence Ties.

(a) India and the US decided to take their growing defence cooperation to a new level and had agreed in principle, to pursue co-development and co-production of specific advanced defence projects. (b) The growing Indo-US defence cooperation would help upgrade India‘s domestic defence industry and expand the manufacturing sector in the country. (c) Both countries had agreed to deepen their defence and security cooperation and in a major step forward for their relationship, defence technology and trade initiative would allow them to jointly develop and produce defence technologies. (d) The four projects identified under the Defence Technology Trade Initiative (DTTI) were pathfinder schemes as they would determine how to go forward in defence co-development. (e) India and the US agreed to set up a working group to explore aircraft carrier technology and design and develop jet engine technology in India. (f) These projects were seen as an attempt to make the DTTI more operational and result oriented. (g) The Indo-US defence cooperation agreements promise to open a new chapter in bilateral military ties and mark an important milestone in the strategic partnership between the two nations. (h) India and the US renewed the Defence Cooperation Framework Agreement for the next 10 years which would support stronger military-to-military engagement, including deeper maritime cooperation and increased opportunities in technology and trade.

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31. Enhanced Counter-Terror Cooperation.

(a) Both countries would deepen their bilateral security cooperation against terrorist groups and would further enhance their counter-terrorism capabilities, including in the area of technology. (b) Reflected enhanced cooperation between the two countries in counter-terrorism to dismantle terrorists safe havens in Pakistan. (c) Emphasised on the need for joint and concerted efforts to disrupt terror outfits like LeT, JeM, D Company and the Haqqani network. All these terror outfits were based in Pakistan.

32. Joint Strategic Vision Statement for Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region: Message to China.

(a) Reaffirmed the concerns of India and the US on maritime disputes in the South China Sea. (b) Recognised that India‘s Act East Policy and the US rebalance provided opportunities for them and other Asia-Pacific countries to work together to safeguard regional ties. (c) Highlighted the close strategic relations between India and the US which could balance the growing strategic presence of China in the greater Indian Ocean region. (d) Focuses on a key area of Indo-US convergence – the threat posed by an increasingly muscular China seeking to alter the territorial status quo by stealthy force and shape a China-centric regional order. (e) Laid out the intent of the US and India to develop a roadmap to address the new challenges in the Asia-Pacific region. (f) The Chinese official media cautioned India not to fall into the trap being laid to pit India against China by the US as part of its ―pivot to Asia‖ doctrine.

33. Enhanced Economic Relations. Significant outcome of the visit of the US President to India was to jointly step up climate action through clean energy, smart cities and improved air quality. 34. The Declaration of Friendship, The Joint Statement and the Strategic Vision Statement for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean region Lay Out a Clear Road Map of Indo-US Relations. US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter‟s Visit to India, 2-3 Jun 2015. 35. India & US Renewed the Defence Framework Agreement for Another 10 Years.

(a) The US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter visited India on 2-3 Jun 2015 and met Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj and National Security Adviser A.K. Doval.

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(b) India and the US renewed the Defence Framework Agreement (DFA) for another 10 years. (c) The 2015 Defence Framework Agreement (DFA) for India-US Defence cooperation was signed between India‘s Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar and the US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter. (d) The Indo-US Defence Framework Agreement covers all aspects of defence cooperation, including the Defence Trade and Technological Initiative (DTTI). (e) The 2015 India-US Defence Framework Agreement (DFA) would open up the relationship on everything from maritime security to aircraft carrier and jet engine technology cooperation (f) Defence agreements were part of a broader India-US engagement to deepen relations.

36. Two Pathfinder Projects Finalised.

(a) Both India and the United States had finalised two projects for joint development of Mobile Electric Hybrid Power Sources and Next Generation Protective Ensembles. (b) These were two of the four ―pathfinder projects‖ identified under the Defence Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI) during the Jan visit of the US President Barack Obama to India. (c) The other two ―pathfinder projects‖ were the next generation Raven Minis UAVs and roll on and roll-off kits for C-130 J Super Hercules. (d) The new revised document provided avenues for high-level strategic discussions, continued exchanges between Armed Forces of both countries and strengthening of defence capabilities. (e) Both officials agreed to expedite discussions to take forward cooperation on jet engines, aircraft carrier design and construction. (f) India wants US assistance in building its largest-ever warship – INS Vishal indigenous 65,000 tons Aircraft Carrier-II.

37. India Raised the Issue of US Arms Sale to Pakistan.

(a) During the visit of the US Defence Secretary, India raised the issue of US arms sale to Pakistan. (b) India had noted the US State Department‘s decision to go ahead with the defence sales, which were announced in Apr 2015. (c) The US arms sales to Pakistan included 15 AH-1Z attack helicopters, 1,000 Hellfire missiles, engines targeting and positioning systems and other equipment worth $952 million.

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(d) The Government had consistently conveyed to the US that it must take into account India-US Relations and the impact on India‘s security in deciding its military assistance to Pakistan. (e) US arms sales to Pakistan was disturbing for India as the US President Barack Obama had announced $1 billion civilian and military aid to Pakistan and six-fold increase in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to $265 million. (f) US has given military hardware, including F-16 fighter planes to Pakistan amounting to $5.4 billion since the 9/11 terror attacks in the US in 2001.

38. The US Stand.

(a) Arms sales to Pakistan were for internal counter-terrorism uses inside Pakistan. (b) Among the objectives of the US aid to Pakistan were fighting terror, economic development, safety of nuclear installations and improving relations with India.

39. India and the US Discussed the Situation in the South China Sea.

(a) The tension in Southeast Asia escalated amid reports of China building artificial islands. (b) The US Defence Secretary stressed on the need for stability in the South China Sea and India emphasised on the freedom of navigation and the right to explore oil in the area. (c) Stability in the Asia-Pacific region is a strategic priority for India and the US in view of the Joint Statement issued during the US President‘s visit to India where regional prosperity was linked to security. (d) India has made it clear that it would continue its exploration in the oil blocks offered by Vietnam off its coast in the South China Sea. (e) China rejected the US criticism of its land reclamation in the South China Sea pointing out that the work was justified, legitimate and reasonable and the projects were for providing international public services.

40. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) (New Delhi, 09 Jul 2015).

(a) India and the US signed a tax information sharing agreement under a new US law, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) which would help in exchange of financial information between the two countries about tax evaders. (b) Under FATCA, foreign financial institutions in the US would have to provide information about Indian account holders to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) of the US Government, which would forward the information to the Indian Government. (c) The Indian Government would provide similar information to the IRS. (d) The automatic exchange of information was scheduled to start from 30 Sep

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2015.

41. Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited USA from 26-30 Sep 2015. The two leaders extolled the broad strategic and global partnership between the United States and India, which will continue to generate greater prosperity and security for their citizens and the world. 42. Prime Minister Modi emphasized the priority India accords to its partnership with the United States, a principal partner in the realization of India's rise as a responsible, influential world power. They endorsed the first "Vision Statement for the Strategic Partnership" as a guide to strengthen and deepen cooperation in every sector for the benefit of global stability and people's livelihoods over the next ten years. Economic Growth 43. US President Obama and Prime Minister Modi committed to facilitate the actions necessary to increase trade another five fold. President Obama and Prime Minister Modi recognized that U.S. and Indian businesses have a critical role to play in sustainable, inclusive, and job-led growth and development. In order to raise investment by institutional investors and corporate entities, the leaders pledged to establish an Indo-U.S. Investment Initiative led by the Ministry of Finance and the Department of Treasury, with special focus on capital market development and financing of infrastructure. Energy and Climate Change 44. The two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to implement fully the US-India civil nuclear cooperation agreement. They established a Contact Group on advancing the implementation of civil nuclear energy cooperation in order to realize early their shared goal of delivering electricity from US - built nuclear power plants in India. 45. Both leaders are committed to working towards a successful outcome in Paris in 2015 of the conference of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), including the creation of a new global agreement on climate change.The leaders welcomed the conclusion of a Memorandum of Understanding between the Export-Import Bank and the Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency, which would make up to $1 billion in financing available to bolster India's efforts to transition to a low-carbon and climate-resilient energy economy, while boosting U.S. renewable energy exports to India. Defense and Homeland Security Cooperation 46. The Prime Minister and the President stated their intention to expand defense cooperation to bolster national, regional, and global security. The President and Prime Minister welcomed cooperation in the area of military education and training, and endorsed plans for the United States to cooperate with India's planned National Defense University. They also decided to expand military-to-military partnerships including expert exchanges, dialogues, and joint training and exercises. They also committed to enhancing exchanges of civilian and military intelligence and consultation. 47. The leaders agreed to intensify cooperation in maritime security to ensure freedom of navigation and unimpeded movement of lawful shipping and commercial activity, in accordance with accepted principles of international law.

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48. The leaders reaffirmed their deep concern over the continued threat posed by terrorism, most recently highlighted by the dangers presented by the ISIS, and underlined the need for continued comprehensive global efforts to combat and defeat terrorism. High Technology, Space and Health Cooperation 49. The two leaders confirmed, and they looked forward to renewing the Science and Technology Agreement in order to expand joint activities in innovative technology. The Prime Minister welcomed the United States as a partner country, for the first time, at India's annual Technology Summit in Nov 2014. The President welcomed India's proposal to establish the Global Initiative of Academic Networks (GIAN, or Knowledge) under which India would invite and host upto 1,000 American academics each year to teach in centrally-recognized Indian Universities, at their convenience.

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CHAPTER - 27

INDO - VIETNAM RELATIONS

Introduction 1. India‟s Growing Relations with Vietnam.

(a) Indo-Vietnam Diplomatic Relations were est in 1972. (b) India wants to expand relations with Vietnam in spheres such as terrorism, piracy and open sea lanes of communication where their views converge. (c) India and Vietnam are cooperating in oil exploration projects in South China Sea since 1988. (d) In the Defence field, Vietnam wants India‘s expertise in servicing equipment and supplying spares as both sides have military hardware of Russian origin.

2. China‟s Claims on South China Sea.

(a) The South China Sea has estimated oil reserves of around 28 million barrels. (b) China claims the entire oil rich region. (c) The other claimants of parts of South China Sea are Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei. (d) In recent years, China and Vietnam have been involved in diplomatic disputes over parts of the South China Sea. (e) Tensions flared up between China and Vietnam over the Spratly and Paracel islands due clashes between Chinese and Vietnamese boats. (f) China wants bilateral negotiations on the disputes. (g) The Philippines has proposed that claimant countries of the South China Sea should first delineate those areas which are undisputed.

3. South China Sea Exploration Projects.

(a) On 15 Sep 2011, China said that it was opposed to any country engaging in oil and gas exploration and development activities in waters under China‘s jurisdiction. (b) China enjoys indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea and its islands. (c) China warned Indian companies from entering into any agreements with

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Vietnam. (d) India‘s then External Affairs Minister SM Krishna visited Vietnam on 16 Sep 2011 and held talks for an agreement for oil and gas exploration by the ONGC Videsh. (e) China claimed that the UN Convention of 1982 did not give any country the right to expand their own exclusive economic zone and continental shelf to other countries‘ territories. (f) China‘s neighbours have blamed an assertive Chinese navy for increasing tensions in the region. (g) China has pointed towards the US for increasing tensions by renewing military alliances in the region and its return to East Asia.

4. India‟s Stand.

(a) India stressed that its cooperation with Vietnam was as per international laws, norms and conventions. (b) Cooperation with Vietnam in the area of energy and to ensure India‘s energy security was very important. (c) India also emphasised on its strong support for the freedom of navigation in international waters, including in the South China Sea. (d) The competing claims on South China Sea were essentially bilateral in nature and had nothing to do with India. (e) India‘s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) is involved in a major joint venture for exploration of oil and gas in Vietnam.

5. External Affairs Minister‟s Visit.

(a) India‘s External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj visited Vietnam from 24-26 Aug 2014. (b) The visit was seen as part of India‘s Look East Policy and to give a fillip to bilateral relations. (c) Ms. Swaraj met her Vietnamese counterpart and the senior leadership in Vietnam. (d) India and Vietnam which shared robust economic ties were looking at enhancing bilateral trade in textile, pharmaceuticals and agriculture produce. (e) Bilateral trade between India and Vietnam stood at $8 billion, of which India exported about $5.4 billion. (f) For techno-commercial reasons, India decided to extend for another year the work on exploration of oil blocks allotted to it in the South China Sea.

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6. Indian President‟s Visit, 14-17 Sep 2014.

(a) Security and Defence were the Key Areas of Cooperation between India and Vietnam. (b) Joint Communique Stressed on Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea. (c) India and Vietnam agreed that freedom of navigation in the East Sea/South China Sea should not be impeded and called the parties concerned to exercise restraint. (d) Vietnam and China have been entangled in a dispute since May 2014 when a Chinese oil rig was stationed in the disputed waters of South China Sea, leading to riots in Vietnam.

7. Agreements Signed.

(a) India signed a $100 million line of credit for defence procurement by Vietnam. (b) A letter of Intent was also signed between India and Vietnam with Petro Vietnam offering two new blocks in the South China Sea to ONGC Videsh Limited for oil and gas exploration and production. (c) Tata Power would be setting up two 66 MW thermal power plants in South Vietnam with an investment of $1.8 billion. This was the biggest investment ever made by India in Vietnam.

8. Significance of the Visit.

(a) Visit of President Pranab Mukherjee to Vietnam was significant as it preceded Chinese President Xi Jinping‘s visit to India. (b) The oil exploration in Vietnam by India has been a point of contention with China and safeguarding India‘s interests in the midst of conflicts in the South China Sea is a major strategic challenge for India. (c) President Pranab Mukherjee said that India‘s oil exploration activities in the South China Sea since 1988 were only commercial actions, and no political angularity should be drawn into it. (d) China had raised concerns about any agreement for oil exploration in what it claimed waters administered by it.

Vietnamese Prime Minister‟s Visit, 27- 28 Oct 2014 9. Talks between two Prime Ministers.

(a) India‘s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Tan Dung held talks to further strengthen the strategic partnership between the two countries.

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(b) Prime Minister Narendra Modi called India‘s defence cooperation with Vietnam ―among the most important‖ and gave a commitment to modernise Vietnam‘s defence and security forces. (c) India and Vietnam signed seven agreements including a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for exploration by ONGC Videsh Limited in two blocks in the South China Sea. (d) A MoU was also signed to strengthen the partnership between India and Vietnam in the energy sector. (e) Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced the operationalisation of the $100 million line of credit to Vietnam for defence purchases. (f) Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung said that Vietnam highly appreciated India‘s position regarding the East Sea (South China Sea) issue and India‘s continued cooperation with Vietnam in oil and gas exploration. (g) Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said that Vietnam was at the forefront of India‘s efforts in the Asia Pacific region, which he said his government had promptly and purposefully intensified since coming to power.

10. Significance of Visit.

(a) Joint Statement issued at the end of the visit reiterated the strategic partnership intended to lead to peace and prosperity in the region. (b) Focus on bilateral defence cooperation which includes exchange of visits, annual security dialogue, service-to-service cooperation, training, capacity building and cooperation at the regional fora. (c) During the visit the operationalisation of the $100 million line of credit for Vietnam‘s defence purchases. (d) India‘s defence agreement with Vietnam underlined the growing ties between the two countries. Under the new agreement, India agreed to boost Vietnam‘s defence capabilities. (e) For the first time, India indicated that it would be willing to sell the BrahMos short-range cruise missiles to Vietnam. (f) By making Vietnam the forefront of India‘s efforts in the Asia Pacific region, the Indian Government sent a clear signal to China that it would actively pursue its interests in the region. (g) Prime Minister Narendra Modi reiterated India‘s stand that territorial disputes in the South China Sea should be resolved according to international law. (h) A large business delegation accompanied the Prime Minister of Vietnam and both sides agreed to enhance bilateral trade from the current $8 billion per annum to $15 billion by 2020.

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(j) The Joint Statement emphasised that India and Vietnam would strengthen their cooperation and coordination in international and regional organisations.

11. China‟s Reaction.

(a) China said that the South China Sea dispute should be resolved by parties directly concerned. (b) Relevant countries should respect the efforts made by parties directly concerned to resolve disputes through negotiations and consultation and to uphold regional peace and stability. (c) India-Vietnam MoUs on oil exploration must not undermine China‘s sovereignty and interests.

12. Conclusion.

(a) China has used ―the 9-dash line‖ to claim the territories and waters in the South China Sea mostly over the Scarborough Shoal and the Paracel and Spratly islands. (b) China has been pursuing the policy of ―string of pearls‖ by investing heavily in countries surrounding India like Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the Maldives to gain strategic defence capabilities. (c) India‘s growing defence cooperation with Vietnam indicates the operationalisation of India‘s Look East Policy to make its own pivot in the area. (d) The energy and defence agreements signed with Vietnam point to the fact that India is raising the stakes by backing China‘s neighbours. (e) Although India has signalled its willingness to back intent with power, it should calibrate it with controlled brinkmanship. (f) As India is increasing its presence in the region, it also needs to improve ties with China so that two Asian giants can work with each other to increase trade and cooperation in international fore.

13. Indias recent comments /n dispartes in South China Sea & Sovenignity of various wantries claims in the region may be incl here.

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CHAPTER - 28

INDIA - JAPAN - US RELATIONS 1. India - Japan - US - First Trilateral Dialogue. India, Japan and the US held their first-ever trilateral dialogue in Washington on 20 Dec 2011. A wide range of regional and global issues of mutual interest were discussed in the meeting.

(a) The meeting was co-chaired by the US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Robert Blake and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell. India was represented by Joint Secretaries Jawed Ashraf and Gautam Bambwale. (b) The discussions marked the beginning of a series of consultations among the three Governments, who share common values and interests across the Asia-Pacific and the globe, according to a Joint Statement issued by the three countries. (c) All sides welcomed the frank and comprehensive nature of the discussions and agreed the talks help advance their shared values and interests. (d) The trilateral dialogue would be held again in Tokyo in 2012 to continue the deliberations.

2. Implications of the Trilateral Dialogue.

(a) The first-ever trilateral dialogue between India, Japan and the US was held against the backdrop of rising Chinese manoeuvres in the Asia-Pacific region. (b) The India-Japan-US trilateral dialogue has given the impression that the US was forging an informal partnership aimed at countering China with reluctant partners like India and Australia, according to analysts.

3. Third India-US-Japan Trilateral Dialogue (New Delhi).

(a) The third India-US-Japan trilateral dialogue was held in New Delhi on 30 Oct 2012 between senior officials from the three countries. (b) The dialogue focused on trilateral cooperation in maritime security and a route through middle or north of Myanmar leading up to Hanoi in Vietnam. (c) The three sides also exchanged proposals on undertaking projects together in Africa apart from cooperating on economic issues in Afghanistan. (d) India and the US gave a strategic overview of the Asia Pacific from the Gulf of Aden to the South China Sea. (e) Japan focused primarily on its dispute with China in the East China Sea over the Senkaku islands.

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(f) The three countries also deliberated on the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)

4. Reactions in China over the Trilateral Dialogue.

(a) The trilateral dialogue between India-US-Japan was aimed at exerting pressure on China over its regional ambitions. (b) Japan – having a dispute with China over the Diaoyu/ Senkaku islands in the East China Sea – was seen as driving the trilateral dialogue and being the most anxious of the three countries about China‘s rise. (c) China‘s relations with India were on a better footing with hopes of carrying out strategic cooperation with India . (d) The US was trying to ensnare China in the Asia-Pacific region.

5. 7th Trilateral Meeting. On 26 Jun 2015, the United States hosted the seventh

trilateral dialogue with India and Japan in Honolulu to exchange views on a broad range of regional and global issues of mutual interest.

(a) The discussion was co-chaired by Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Nisha Biswal, and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel.

(b) The Indian delegation was led by Ministry of External Affairs Joint Secretaries Vinay Kwatra, Pradeep Rawat, and Amandeep Gill. (c) Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director-General of Southeast and Southwest Asian Affairs Takio Yamada headed the delegation from the Government of Japan. (d) The dialogue addressed a variety of issues, including multilateral institutions in the Asia-Pacific, maritime security, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

(e) The deepening of this regular dialogue since 2011 reflects a growing convergence of the regional and global interests as the three countries broaden cooperation to span the region from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific.

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CHAPTER - 29

INDIA‟S LOOK EAST POLICY

Introduction 1. Year 1991: India‟s Economic Reforms and East Asian Neighbours. India‘s ―look east‖ policy was initiated in 1991 by former Prime Minister, Mr Narasimha Rao. It coincided with India‘s economic reforms and stressed on engaging more with its East Asian neighbours. The aim was to get key countries of the region interested in India‘s potential as an investment destination. 2. Redefining Neighbourhood. India is now conceptually redefining its neighbourhood. It now sees South-East Asia as a core part of its neighbourhood. It is also building economic ties with the countries of Bay of Bengal rim under the framework of BIMSTEC (Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand Economic Cooperation). 3. The Importance of ASEAN. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is important to India for security and strategic reasons as well as for commercial, economic and cultural reasons. ASEAN is pivotal to India‘s ―look east‖ policy, according to the former Prime Minister, Mr. Vajpayee. 4. Look-East Policy not restricted to ASEAN but extended to the North-East Asia as well - China, Japan and the Koreas. India‘s former External Affairs Minister, Yashwant Sinha has emphasised that India‘s ―Look East‖ policy was not restricted to ASEAN, but extended to the North-East Asia as well - China, Japan and the Koreas. 5. Engagement with East Asia. Developments in East Asia were of direct consequence to India‘s security and development and the Government was actively pursuing friendship and cooperation with countries of the region, according to the former External Affairs Minister, Natwar Singh. First Phase Of Look East Policy 6. Renewing Contact with the Region. Analysts point out that during the first phase of the Look East Policy launched by the Narasimha Rao Government in 1990s focused on renewing contacts with the East Asian region that India had drifted away during the Cold War period. 7. Neglect of the Region. Analysts point out that India‘s inward looking orientation was responsible for keeping it away from the economic dynamism of East Asia. This led to the marginalisation of India in Asia. 8. Expansion of Trade. After the launch of economic reforms in India in 1991, East and South East Asia became important for India‘s national economic strategy. There was steady expansion of trade and investment links with the region in the first years of the Look East Policy.

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9. Establishing Linkages. During the first phase of the Look East Policy, India established linkages with regional organisations. India joined the ASEAN as a full dialogue partner and a member of its political and security wing, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The two ASEAN-India Summits in Nov 2002 and Oct 2003 capped India‘s successful political engagement of South East Asia. Second Phase Of The Look East Policy 10. Comprehensive Phase. The former External Affairs Minister, Yashwant Sinha, pointed out that Phase-II of India‘s ―Look East‖ policy is both more comprehensive in its coverage, territorially and materially. He also extended this engagement to include New Zealand and Australia. 11. Intensification of Economic Linkages. Mr Yashwant Sinha pointed out that the intensification of economic linkages with ASEAN marked the second phase of the ―Look East‖ policy of India. Phase-II is marked by arrangements for FTA‘s (Free Trade Areas) and establishing institutional economic linkages between the countries of the region and India. 12. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh‟s Visit to Thailand (30 May 2013).

(a) Extradition Treaty.

(i) India and Thailand signed an Extradition Treaty after two decades of negotiations. (ii) Both countries also concluded a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to exchange intelligence related to money laundering and terrorism financing. (iii) India and Thailand also ratified the Treaty on Transfer of Sentenced Persons, which was concluded between the two sides in Feb 2012. (iv) The Extradition Treaty provides the legal framework for seeking extradition of fugitives, including those involved in terrorism, transnational crimes and economic offences. (v) The Extradition Treaty also provides for the extradition of any person wanted for trial or for the imposition or enforcement of a sentence by one Contracting State and is found in the territory of the other. (vi) Extradition requires the surrender of an alleged or convicted criminal by one State to the other. (vii) The Extradition Treaty would further strengthen the relationship between the two law enforcement agencies by providing a firm legal basis for their bilateral cooperation. (viii) The Treaty on Transfer of Sentenced Persons enables foreign nationals convicted of a criminal offence to serve the sentence in their own country. It also facilitates their social rehabilitation in their own country.

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(b) India, Myanmar, Thailand Trilateral Highway to be ready by 2016.

(i) India‘s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Thai counterpart Yingluck Shinawatra expressed hoped that the project to develop a 3,200 km highway linking India, Myanmar and Thailand would be ready by 2016. (ii) India has already provided Myanmar a $500 million loan, part of which would be used to fund the trilateral highway project. (iii) India welcomed Thailand‘s proposal to host the next India-Myanmar-Thailand Joint Task Force Meeting on the Trilateral Highway Project, and the second meeting of the Thailand-India Joint Working Group on Connectivity and Infrastructure in Jun-Jul 2013, according to the Joint Statement issued at the end of the talks between the two Prime Ministers. (iv) Thailand proposed to host the third India-Myanmar-Thailand Ministerial Meeting on Transport Linkages to address issues of infrastructure so as to maximise the use of the highway for strengthening regional growth anintegration, according to the Joint Statement. (v) Thailand informed India about the progress in the development of the Dawei Special Economic Zone in southern Myanmar. The project would enhance connectivity and open enormous business opportunities in the region after it becomes operational. (vi) Thailand invited Indian businesses to invest in the Dawei Special Economic Zone, particularly in steel manufacturing, petrochemicals, power and services.

(c) Both Prime Ministers Reaffirmed their commitment to carry through the talks for a Thailand-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA). (d) Joint Statement.

(i) The Prime Ministers welcomed the signing of the bilateral Extradition Treaty which would provide a legal basis for bilateral cooperation in dealing with elements acting against national interests. (ii) Both sides agreed to pursue defence industry collaboration in areas of mutual interest. (iii) Both Prime Ministers appreciated the close interactions and regular exchanges between the Armed Forces of Thailand and India including the official visit of the Thai Defence Minister to India in Dec 2012, the conduct of the Defence Dialogue in Feb 2013 and the regular Coordinated Patrol conducted by the Indian Navy and the Royal Thai Navy. (iv) The Thailand side welcomed the visit of the Indian Defence Minister to Thailand in Jun 2013.

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(e) Significance of Visit.

(i) Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Thailand while returning from Japan after concluding a successful visit. (ii) Dr. Singh said that the growing security cooperation between India and Thailand received a major boost during his visit to Thailand. (iii) The Prime Minister said that the Extradition Treaty, concluded after two decades of negotiations, and a memorandum on cooperation in anti-money laundering sent a major signal of the shared commitment between India and Thailand to combat terrorism, organised crime, drug trafficking and counterfeiting. (iv) Both sides also agreed to continue strengthening defence relations, according to Dr Singh. (v) The Extradition Treaty with Thailand, and the progress on finalising the trilateral highway through Myanmar were seen as an important milestone in India‘s relations with its eastern neighbours. (vi) India has given Thailand a list of names for extradition and Thailand‘s Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra has promised to expedite the process of extradition. In the past, Thailand had emerged as a haven for Indian criminals. (vii) The trilateral highway project between India, Myanmar and Thailand is also very significant as it would connect India with four ASEAN countries – Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. It would also increase border trade with Myanmar, according to analysts.

13. Prime Minister‟s Three-Nation Tour (14- 19 May).

(a) Prime Minister Narendra Modi‘s three-nation tour to China, Mongolia and South Korea was very significant as he held bilateral talks, wooed investors for the ‗Make in India‘ initiative and signed a number of pacts to bolster India‘s relations with the three countries. (b) Boost to India‘s ―Act East Policy‖ which was much required to increase India‘s footprint in East Asia. (c) Huge direct financial commitments in bilateral investments have resulted from the Prime Minister‘s three-nation visit which would go a long way in contributing to India‘s development programme. (d) The decisions to upgrade India‘s ties with Mongolia to strategic partnership and those with South Korea to Special Strategic Partnership and deepen defence cooperation with both countries were significant for India. (e) The Indian Prime Minister‘s reciprocal visit to China was significant for enhancing the bilateral relations, especially relating to trade and economics.

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Conclusion 14. Emerging Asian Balance of Power. Analysts point out that India‘s productive engagement with all great powers and an intensified interaction with the sub-regions of Asia will make it a key player in the emerging Asian balance of power. 15. India‟s Largest Trading Partner. India is fast emerging as the regional powerhouse that is defining business flows in its part of the world. Analysts point out that the Look East Policy of India has led to Asia becoming India‘s largest trading partner surpassing both the US and EU. 16. Sustaining the Look East Policy. Analysts opine that for effectively sustaining the Look East Policy, India will have to increase the pace of economic reforms and also better integrate its foreign and trade policies.

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CHAPTER - 30

PM‟S 3 NATION TOUR (SEYCHELLES, MAURITIUS & SRI LANKA)

Introduction 1. Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Seychelles, Mauritius and Sri Lanka during his three-nation tour of the Indian Ocean countries from 11-14 Mar 2015. The two common overreaching themes of the three-nation tour were security cooperation and bolstering the Blue Economy. 2. Common Thread. There was a ―common thread‖ to the Prime Minister‘s outreach to all three countries vis-à-vis India‘s maritime influence. This has come in wake of China trying to influence its presence along the Indian Ocean Region as part of its Maritime Silk Road (MSR). China is keen to safeguard the sea lanes which are vital for its trade amid growing incidents of piracy and Seychelles is seen as a possible replenishment port for ships participating in anti-piracy operations in the region. India has a strong, multifaceted and important relationship with each of the three countries and they all occupy a very important place in its foreign policy.

Visit to Seychelles 3. Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Seychelles on 11 Mar 2015. It was the first visit to Seychelles by an Indian Prime Minister in 34 Years. The visit by the Indian PM to Seychelles has opened up new avenues for both the nations in bilateral issues. 4. Partner in Maratime Security. India hopes that Seychelles would soon be a full partner in the Maritime Security cooperation presently existing between India, Maldives and Sri Lanka. This would further bolster the dominance of India over the Indian Ocean Region. 5. Four Agreements. India and Seychelles signed four agreements for cooperation in hydrography, renewable energy, infrastructure development and hydro-graphic survey. Agreement on hydrographic survey has added a new dimension to Indo-Seychelles maritime cooperation. 6. Coastal Surveillance Radar Systems. Prime Minister Narendra Modi inaugurated the first of the eight Coastal Surveillance Radar systems (CSR) being set up by India in Seychelles. The first CSR was based on Mahe Island, capital of Seychelles. Of the 8 CSRs being set up India, five would be on the mainland and three on the outlying islands, which would be manned by the Seychelles Coast Guards. The CSRs would be based on Indian band and would have electro-optic system besides Automatic Identification Systems (AIS). The CSRs would provide full information about the maritime waters of Seychelles. The AIS would help the island nation to know the identity of all ships weighing 300 tonnes and more. 7. Indo-Seychelles Security Cooperation. India and Seychelles emphasised on the need for a comprehensive cooperation in the region. India‘s security cooperation with Seychelles was strong and had enabled both countries to fulfil their shared responsibilities to advance maritime security in the region. India also hoped that Seychelles would soon be

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a full partner in the maritime security cooperation between India, Maldives and Sri Lanka. The Indian Prime Minister met the Seychelles President James Alix Michel. 8. Dornier Aircraft To Seychelles. India would give a second Dornier aircraft to Seychelles for coastal surveillance and called it a privilege to be a partner of Seychelles in the development of its security capabilities. 9. Economic and Development Cooperation. Seychelles was one of the largest recipients of Indian assistance in economic and development cooperation and India intended to expand that further.

10. Significance of Partnership with Seychelles.

(a) Agreement on hydrographic survey added a new dimension to Indo-Seychelles maritime cooperation. (b) Decision by Seychelles to lease Assumption Island, one of the 115 Islands, to India for infrastructure development pointed to the growing strategic partnership between India and Seychelles. Although the Assumption Island would be leased for island development for tourism purposes, it could also be used as a surveillance post. (c) China has been active in the Indian Ocean trying to expand its influence as part of its Maritime Silk Road (MSR). China is keen to safeguard the sea lanes which are vital for its trade amid growing incidents of piracy. Seychelles is seen by China as a possible replenishment port for ships participating in anti-piracy operations in the region, according to analysts.

Visit to Mauritius 11. Prime Minister Narendra‟s Modi Visit. Indian PM visited Mauritius on 12 Mar 2015. The visit has been of great importance in building strong relationship between the nations. Indian Prime Minister was the Chief Guest at Mauritius Independence Day. 12. Mauritius celebrates it National Day on 12 Mar as a mark of respect for Mahatma Gandhi, who began his Dandi march on this day in 1915. The day was not only significant in the history of the political struggle for freedom of both countries but also symbolised how both India and Mauritius upheld the values of democracy. 13. Indian Built Patrol Vessel, MCGS Barracuda. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi commissioned a 1,300 tonne, Indian built patrol vessel, MCGS Barracuda during his vis. MCGSA Barracuda showcased India‘s commitment on maritime security, especially along the African coast which faced the threat of piracy. 14. Indian Warships Arrive Ahead Of Prime Minister‟s Visit. Two Indian warships, INS Delhi, the destroyer and INS Sarvekshak, the hydrographic survey ship arrived off the coast of Port Louis in Mauritius ahead of the Prime Minister‘s visit as evidence of Indian presence and assistance in the region. 15. Five Agreements Signed. Five Agreements were signed between by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Mauritian counterpart Aneerood Jugnauth during this historic visit.

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(a) Opening up the ―Ocean Economy‖ or ―Blue Economy.‖ (b) Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for India to take over responsibility to build transport infrastructure (air and sea links) for the Agalega Islands. The agreement was seen as significant as it would give India a strategic advantage in the Indian Ocean region, working closely with the Defence Forces of Mauritius guarding the outer islands. (c) India also extended a $500 million Line of Credit for development of security projects that Mauritius would decide on.

16. Prime Minister Address the Mauritian National Assembly. India‘s goal was to seek a climate of trust and transparency; respect for international maritime rules and norms by all countries; sensitivity to each other‘s interests; peaceful resolution of maritime security issues; and increase in maritime cooperation. Visit to Sri Lankan 17. Prime Minister Narendra‟s Modi Visit. Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Sri Lanka on 13 & 14 Mar 2015 as part of three nation visit which was first visit by an Indian Prime Minister after 28 Years. 18. The PM‘s visit to Sri Lanka signaled a fresh start to Indo - Sri Lankan relations. This was the fourth high-level visit between the two countries since the new Government took charge in Sri Lanka in Jan 2015. 19. Strengthening India‟s Historical Links. The focus of the Prime Minister‘s visit was on strengthening India‘s historical links with Sri Lanka – ancient ethnic, linguistic and religious ties that bind the two countries. 20. Address to Sri Lankan Parliament. Addressing the Sri Lankan Parliament, Mr Modi said that India-Sri Lanka security was indivisible and that India deeply valued security cooperation with Sri Lanka. The Indian Prime Minister‘s stress on India‘s support for a united Sri Lanka was highly appreciated by Sri Lanka, as there was always mistrust about the perceived intrusiveness of India due to the Tamil concerns.

(a) The Indian Prime Minister lauded the efforts of the new Sri Lankan President and assured him of all help from India. (b) India stood for a united Sri Lanka, but wanted an early and full implementation of the 13th Amendment that provides devolution in the Tamil majority Northern and Eastern provinces. (c) The Indian Prime Minister referred to going beyond the 13th Amendment that would contribute to the process of building a future that accommodated the aspirations of all sections of society, including the Sri Lankan Tamil community.

21. Visit to Jaffna. Mr Modi‘s visit to Jaffna in the Tamil-majority Northern Province of Sri Lanka was also very significant and the first by an Indian Prime Minister to that region. The Indian Prime Minister also laid emphasis on going beyond the 13th Amendment to politically empower the Tamil community in Sri Lanka.

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22. Bilateral and Regional Issues. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi held talks with the Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena and discussed bilateral and regional issues. 23. Four Agreements. India and Sri Lanka signed four agreements pertaining to customs cooperation, youth development, visa exemptions for diplomatic passport holders and the construction of an auditorium named after Rabindranath Tagore in the southern Sinhala – majority Matara district. 24. Meeting with Mr Sirisena had been very productive and it gave him confidence and optimism about the future of Indo-Sri Lankan relations. The progress made by the two countries reflected their shared commitment to stronger economic cooperation. 25. Bilateral trade had seen impressive growth over the past decade and stressed that he was aware of Sri Lanka‘s concerns about trade with India and would try to address them. 26. India stands to help Trincomalee become a petroleum hub and would provide a fresh Line of Credit of up to $318 million for the railways sector in Sri Lanka. That would be used to procure rolling stock, and to restore and upgrade existing railway track. 27. New Homes to Tamils. Mr Modi handed over 27,000 new homes to Tamils who had become homeless during the civil war. The houses were built with Indian assistance as part of India‘s reconciliation process. 28. Foundation Stone of Cultural Centre. The Indian Prime Minister laid the foundation stone for a Jaffna-based cultural centre being built with Indian assistance. Sri Lanka should also progress stressing that unity, peace and amity were essential ingredients for equitable development where there was respect for all citizens. 29. Railway Line in the North. He flagged off the final leg of Sri Lanka‘s restored railway line in the North built by India‘s IRCON. Mr Modi also visited Anuradhapura to see religious sites. The Chief Minister of Sri Lanka‘s Northern Province, CV Wigneswaran expressed his gratitude to Indian Prime Minister for meeting the people of Jaffna. Significance of Prime Minister‟s Three-Nation Tour 30. Indian Ocean region is of strategic and economic significance to India as the two-thirds of world‘s oil shipments, a third of the bulk cargo and half of all container traffic pass through the region. 31. Seychelles and Mauritius are strategically important as India‘s security is linked with the security of the Indian Ocean. 32. India has centuries-old cultural links with these island nations and Mauritius is seen as a gateway for India to the African continent. 33. Efforts by countries like China to build defence posts around India can only be countered by strengthening the political and economic ties with the island States in the Indian Ocean.

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34. Countries in the region expect India to play a key role in keeping the Indian Ocean safe for shipping, making it obligatory for India to have stations in the region from where it could intervene in an effective way in a short time. 35. India‘s security cooperation agreements with Seychelles set the course for the Modi Government‘s foreign policy initiative of making India a net security provider in the Indian Ocean region. 36. Another significant aspect was the decision by Seychelles to lease Assumption Island to India for infrastructure development which would go a long way in securing India‘s interests in the region. 37. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Mauritius for India to take over responsibility to build transport infrastructure (air and sea links) for the Agalega Islands was significant as it would give India a strategic advantage in the Indian Ocean region. 38. It was significant in helping the Indian Ocean countries in strengthening their maritime domain and awareness facilities. 39. The tour signalled the start of a bold policy with a more robust approach of projecting India as a force for stability and development. 40. The Prime Minister‘s three-nation tour signified that India was not shying away from global realities and was ready to leverage its economic and soft power in the Indian Ocean region to further its strategic interests.

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CHAPTER - 31

INDO AFRICA SUMMIT 2015

1. The India–Africa Forum Summit is the official platform for the African-Indian relations. 1st Summit 2. The first such summit was held from 4 to 8 Apr 2008 in New Delhi, India. It was the first such meeting between the heads of state and government of India and 14 countries of Africa chosen by the African Union. Libya and Egypt's heads of state did not attend. 2nd Summit 3. The second summit was held at the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa, with India and 15 African Countries participating. The leaders discussed significant aspects of the India-Africa partnership with the objective of enhancing and widening its ambit for mutual benefit. 3rd Summit 4. The third summit on a rotation basis was scheduled to be held in New Delhi, India in 2014 but was later postponed and was conducted finally from 26-30 Oct 2015. 5. The 5 day summit started with consultations on official level followed by the Head of States/governments level summit on 29 Oct 2015 with scheduled bilateral meetings on 30 Oct 2015. 6. This was Modi government's biggest diplomatic outreach involving delegates from a large number of African nations. 7. Earlier the summit in a rotation basis was scheduled to be held in New Delhi, India in Dec 2014. But Syed Akbaruddin, the official spokesperson of Indian Foreign Ministry informed that the scheduled summit was postponed to 2015 and to include more no. of African leaders unlike previous two occasions where the event was restricted to only 10-15 African countries. 8. In the largest-ever turnout of African leaders in India, at least 41 leaders-including South African president Jacob Zuma, Egyptian president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Zimbabwe president Robert Mugabe and Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari-have confirmed their presence in New Delhi for the India-Africa forum summit on 29-30 Oct. 9. The agenda of the summit was rising oil and food prices were the top concerns for the African and Indian leaders during the summit. 10. The topics discussed during the summit are as follows:-

(a) Agricultural sector. (b) Trade.

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(c) Industry and investment. (d) Peace and security. (e) Promotion of good governance and civil society. (f) Information and communication technology.

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PART - III: INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

CHAPTER - 32

AFGHANISTAN Background 1. Location. Afghanistan is located in Southern Central Asia, sharing borders with North West Pakistan, Eastern Iran, and Southern Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. It also shares a short border with Western China. It is a landlocked country with rugged terrain and arid conditions. 2. Ethnic Groups. Pashtuns (38%), Tajiks (25%), Hazaras(19%) Uzbeks(6%).

3. Centre of Transport Routes. Afghanistan‘s geographic position has positioned it as the centre of transport routes of global importance. Afghanistan was once a bustling Central Asian trade hub.

4. Early History.

(a) 1919. Afghan Monarchy was established with British support. (b) 1933. Mohammed Zahir Shah becomes the king at the age of 18. (c) 1973. Afghan king Zahir Shah overthrown by his cousin Mohammed Daoud in a coup. The coup set in motion the events which culminated in the revolution of communist army officers in 1978.

5. Soviet Occupation (1979- 1989).

(a) 1979. The Soviets invaded Afghanistan to support the government against the Mujahideen, who unite disparate local factions under the banner of Islam and anti-Soviet nationalism. (b) The Mujahideen received large financial, military and intelligence support from the US, channelled through Pakistan and funded largely by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab States. (c) 1985-86. The Soviet army of 100,000 soldiers failed to subdue the Mujahideen factions that received US arms. Najibullah was installed by the Soviet Union. (d) 1989. The Soviets had to withdraw under intense pressure and resistance by the Afghan Mujahideen.

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6. Civil War (1989-96).

(a) 1992. The pro-Soviet Government of Najibullah fell in 1992. The Mujahideen factions seized Kabul but started fighting among themselves. (b) 1994.

(i) The UN withdrew from Afghanistan on grounds of security. (ii) Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of the Hezb-e-Islami faction launched an attack to oust interim President Burhanuddin Rabbani. (iii) Since the Mujahideen took control of Afghanistan in 1992, there has been anarchy in many parts of the country.

7. Taliban (1996- 2001).

(a) Identity.

(i) The Taliban (students), a non-Mujahideen Pushtun dominated force came into being from 1994-95. (ii) Despite denials by both Pakistan and the US, it is suspected that Pakistan has blessed and fostered the Taliban with strategic help from the US.

(b) Sep 1994.

(i) The Taliban militia backed by Pakistan entered the fray, swiftly capturing the southern province of Kandahar. (ii) In the following two years the Taliban captured many parts of the Southern, Western and Eastern Afghanistan.

(c) Sep 1996.

(i) The Taliban militia captured Kabul from the forces of the Rabbani Government. (ii) Proclaimed the conversion of Afghanistan into a full-fledged Islamic State. (iii) Announced the formation of an interim Administration.

(d) Shura. The six-man Council (Shura) was constituted by the Taliban‘s supreme leader Mullah Mohammed Omar.

(e) Leadership.

(i) The Taliban is a ‗Sunni fundamentalist organisation‘ headed by Mullah Mohammed Omar who was educated in one of the religious schools run in Pakistan by the Jamait Ulema-e-Islam (JUI).

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(ii) He participated in the Jihad (holy war) fought by the Afghans in 1980s against the Soviet occupation as a member of the Harkat-e-Inquilab-e-Islami (HII) or Movement for Islamic Revolution.

(f) Principles.

(i) Strict enforcement of a narrow interpretation of Islamic law. (ii) Forbids women from working represses minorities, condemns television, film, singing and dancing. (iii) Imposed capital punishment for a wide array of crimes.

8. Afghanistan's Democratic Set-up.

(a) Executive.

(i) President. (ii) Two Vice-Presidents. (iii) 27-Member Cabinet.

(b) Legislature - National Assembly.

(i) Wolesi Jigra (Lower House - House of the People). 249 seats, elected by constituencies based on provinces. (ii) Meshrano Jigra (Upper House - House of Elders). 102 seats, drawn from provincial councils, district councils, plus presidential appointees.

(c) Judiciary (Supreme Court). Nine judges appointed for a 10-year term approved by Wolesi Jigra.

9. Parliamentary Elections. On 18 Sep 2005, UN-organised elections were held for the first time in 30 years for the Lower House and 34 Provincial Councils. The elections were held on non-party basis with 5,800 candidates running as independents. 10. India's Stakes in Afghanistan.

(a) Gateway to the West. India looked upon Afghanistan not only as a valued member of the South Asian fraternity but also as its gateway to the West. (b) Strategic & Economic Stakes. Analysts observe that the murder of the Indian engineer in Afghanistan underlined the high strategic and economic stakes for India in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. (c) Regained Influence in Afghanistan.

(i) The brutal killing of the engineer raised questions of exposing the Indians working in Afghanistan to potential terrorist attacks by the Taliban.

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(ii) India's resolve to continue providing assistance to the people of Afghanistan is related to Afghanistan's importance in terms of strategic location and history and the influence India has regained in that country after September 11, 2001, according to analysts.

(d) India's Growing Profile. India's profile in Afghanistan is growing and covers diverse sectors such as economy, technology and education. This situation is in contrast to the one before the rout of Taliban where it had no contact with the Government. (e) Engagement Vital for Fight Against Terrorism.

(i) Analysts point out that India's engagement with Afgthe ongoing fight against terrorism in the region that derives material and moral support from the Taliban and the Afghan opium lords. (ii) During the Afghan President's visit to India both countries pledged to deepen their cooperation in fighting terrorism and asked Pakistan to join hands to defeat the menace.

(f) Afghanistan's Reconstruction. India has pledged $650 million for Afghanistan's reconstruction in a number of projects ranging from road construction, infrastructure and grassroots development. (g) Trade & Investment.

(i) Analysts feel that there are bright prospects of enhanced trade and investment between India and Afghanistan. (ii) This is evident from the interest shown by foreign investors in Afghanistan and the Afghan economy showing signs of recovery.

(h) Neutralise Pakistan's Clout in the Region.

(i) Analysts point out that India's close relationship with Afghanistan helps to neutralise Pakistan's clout in the region. (ii) The Taliban has been used as a weapon against India by sections within the Pakistan establishment. (iii) Thus, a committed relationship with Afghanistan has strategic advantages.

(j) People-to-People Contact. Finally, analysts feel that India needs to enhance its stake in the long-term development of Afghanistan and strengthen people-to-people contacts.

11. Challenges Facing Afganistan National Security Force (ANSF). Analysts are under no illusions about the war ending in foreseeable future & despite efforts of so many years the optimal results will not be pretty. The challenges facing ANSF are as under:-

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(a) Maintain ANSF at its current strength of 3,34,000 or higher rather than proposed cutting down to 2,30,000. (b) ANSF expected to have a financial gap of $ 70 billion during the transformation decade of 2015-24. (c) Substantial aid & Military support much after 2014. (d) ANSF need air support, Counter ICD support, logistics support as the forces are yet in their adolescence. (e) Major problems in effective leadership, Command & control & medical evacuation & integration of warfare strategy with Police & government agencies. (f) Deficiencies likely to continue long after 2014. (g) Presently can aim only after at ‗a stable instability‘.

12. Opposition to Taliban‟s Office in Doha.

(a) India supported the Afghanistan government‘s opposition to the opening of a political office by the Taliban in Doha. (b) The reconciliation process should not seek to create equivalence between an internationally recognised Afghan government and insurgent groups, confer legitimacy to these groups or convey the impression of two competing state authorities for Afghanistan, which could undermine the legitimate Afghan State.

13. India‟s Stand on Reconciliation Process.

(a) India supported a broad based Afghan-led Afghan owned, reconciliation process, within the framework of the Afghan Constitution and internationally accepted red lines. (b) The dialogue must involve all sections of the Afghan society and armed opposition groups, including the Taliban. (c) The reconciliation process must not undermine the legitimacy of the Afghan state and government and the political, social and economic progress witnessed in Afghanistan over the past decade, to which members of the international community had contributed in great measure (d) India‘s Afghanistan policy did not have an exit policy. India had played an important role in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Afghanistan. (e) India had always maintained that it had strong reservations about talks with the Taliban, maintaining that there cannot be any good Taliban, until Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told the Afghan Parliament in 2011 that India supported the reconciliation process in Afghanistan

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14. India‟s Concerns. India is prepared to increase bilateral contribution to institution building, training and equipment with an aim to broaden & deepen strategic ties with Afghanistan. But certain challenges for India are as under:-

(a) Extent of Pakistan‘s role post withdrawal of ISAF. (b) Possibility of a greater Chinese involvement subsequent to US Pullout. (c) Ethnic configuration of Afghanistan in near future.

Current Situation in Afghanistan. 16. Power-Sharing Deal.

(a) On 21 Sep 2014, former World Bank Executive and Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani was declared as the next President of Afghanistan after a power-sharing deal was signed with his political rival Abdullah Abdullah ending a prolonged stand-off over the disputed Presidential election result. (b) Mr Ghani is Pashtun while Mr Abdullah Abdullah is a Tajik. (c) Allegations of massive fraud in the second round of Presidential election on 14 Jun 2014, led to a political crisis as both candidates claimed victory at a very crucial juncture in Afghanistan where the US-led troops will be withdrawing after 13 years. (d) In the ―Unity Government‖ deal Mr. Abdullah Abdullah would nominate his choice for the new post of Chief Executive Officer (CEO), which would be similar to the Prime Minister. (e) The CEO could become the official executive Prime Minister in two years. (f) The US welcomed the power-sharing deal and said that it would help in brining closure to Afghanistan‘s political crisis.

17. Ashraf Ghani Sworn in as President.

(a) On 29 Aug 2014, Mr Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai was sworn in as the new President of Afghanistan in the country‘s first democratic transfer of power as Mr Hamid Karzai stepped down. (b) Mr Ghani‘s first major policy move would be the signing of the long-delayed agreement allowing 12,500 US-led troops to remain in Afghanistan into 2015 to support and train the country‘s national army and police. (c) The Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) was the source of friction between the US and the former Afghan President Hamid Karzai who had refused to sign the deal. (d) Mr Abdullah Abdullah was also sworn in as the CEO, a role similar to the Prime Minister, as part of the power-sharing deal.

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(e) The New President called upon the opponents of the Government, especially the Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami to enter political talks.

18. Bilateral Security Agreement with US.

(a) On 30 Sep 2014, Afghanistan and the US signed the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) which would allow the US forces to stay in Afghanistan beyond 2014. (b) The signing of the BSA ended uncertainty over the fate of foreign troops in Afghanistan supporting Afghan forces to take over responsibility of their country‘s security. (c) The BSA allows about 10,000 US troops to stay in Afghanistan after the international combat mission ends in 31 Dec 2014. (d) A second agreement allowing NATO troops to stay in Afghanistan was also signed during the same ceremony. (e) NATO‘s follow-up mission named as ‗Resolute Support‘ would take over from 01 Jan 2015 and would comprise of 9,800 US troops and about 3,000 troops from Germany, Italy and other member countries. (f) NATO‘s new mission would focus on training and assisting Afghan forces to take on the Taliban in parallel with the US counter-terrorism operations.

19. Significance of BSA.

(a) The signing of the Bilateral Security Agreement between the US and Afghanistan was welcomed by the leaders of Afghanistan, NATO and the US. (b) Former Afghan President Hamid Karzai had refused to sign the BSA despite threats from the US that in the absence of legal protections for the US troops the US would go in for a complete withdrawal from Afghanistan. (c) The agreement was only for Afghan security and stability and would pave the ground for Afghanistan to take control. (d) The deal had been signed after careful considerations and was not a threat to Afghanistan‘s neighbours and would only help strengthen peace and stability in the region. (e) NATO Secretary General Fogh Rasmussen welcomed the agreement, stressing that it outlined NATO‘s new mission to train, advise and assist Afghan forces. (f) International aid pledges were dependent on the BSA being signed to strengthen security in Afghanistan. (g) The Taliban insurgents still pose a major threat despite NATO‘s US-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) providing security for more than a decade, according to analysts.

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20. Lower House of Afghanistan‘s Parliament Approved the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the US (23 Nov 2014) 21. US, NATO Ended Combat Operations (Dec 2014).

(a) On 08 Dec 2014, the US and NATO closed their combat command in Afghanistan, 13 years after they had landed in Afghanistan in the wake of the Sep 2011 terror attacks. (b) The Joint Command of NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) which was in-charge of the combat operations in Afghanistan formally ended its deployment. (c) From 01 Jan 2015, ISAF would be replaced by NATO‘s ‗Resolute Support‘ mission with focus on training and assisting Afghan forces to take on the Taliban in parallel with the US counter-terrorism operations. (d) The coalition would maintain a force of around 13,000 troops in Afghanistan from a peak of around 130,000 in 2011 when 50 nations were part of the NATO military alliance. (e) By the end of 2015, the US troop total would decrease to 5,500, and to zero by 2016. (f) NATO-led ISAF completed the gradual handover of responsibility to the 350,000 strong Afghan national forces, who have been in-charge of the country‘s security since mid-2013. (g) The recent attacks and bloodshed in Afghanistan has increased concerns that international intervention had failed and the country could face increasing violence

22. Afghanistan‟s President‟s Visit to Pakistan (13-15 Nov 2014).

(a) Mr Ghani‘s first state visit to Pakistan. (b) Both leaders promised to enhance security and trade ties in order to overcome years of mistrust and hostility between the two countries. (c) In the past both countries had accused each other of harbouring Taliban insurgents across their shared border and relations had taken a dip during the previous Afghan President Hamid Karzai‘s term. (d) The two countries signed agreements to improve train and explore defence, border and energy cooperation. (e) The Pakistan Prime Minister assured his country‘s support for the intra-Afghan reconciliation process that the new Afghan Government was initiating. (f) The Afghanistan Government was pursuing peace talks with the Taliban. (g) Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed to work together to complete the $7.6 billion

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Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline. (h) Afghanistan agreed to target militants attacking Pakistan from alleged sanctuaries from its soil. (j) The move pointed towards a thaw in their relations and anti-terror cooperation between them

23. Afghanistan Needs Support.

(a) New President of Afghanistan Ashraf Ghani and the new Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Abdullah Abdullah face challenges of ensuring peace in the country with rising Taliban insurgency, reviving the economy, and drafting a foreign policy that takes care of the demands of regional powers, including Pakistan. (b) India needs to encourage and support the new leadership in Afghanistan to help the country achieve long-term peace and stability (c) Pakistan which continues to provide a lifeline to the Taliban would play a key role in stability and survival of the new government in Afghanistan. (d) Pakistan needs to draw lessons from its own unstable internal security situation and realise that an unstable Afghanistan would be a threat to its own interests.

24. Afghan Civilian Casualties: UN Report.

(a) The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan in its annual report pointed out that in 2014 there was an increase of 22% in the number of civilians killed or wounded in fighting in Afghanistan. (b) The civilian casualties reached the highest-level in five years as the foreign troops ended their combat operations in Afghanistan in Dec 2014. (c) Taliban and other insurgents were responsible for 72% of all civilian casualties, and the government forces and foreign troops responsible for just 14%. (d) Increase in casualties was due to intensified ground fighting, in which weapons liker mortars, rockets and grenades were used in populated areas, sometimes indiscriminately.

25. Implications of US Troop Withdrawal.

(a) The US forces would complete their withdrawal from Afghanistan 13 years after they came to Afghanistan to oust the Taliban regime and hunt its ally Osama bin Laden, the leader of the al-Qaeda, the author of the September 2001 terror attacks in the US. (b) The Taliban crumbled in face of the US offensive in 2001, but later regrouped to launch an insurgency drawing the US in its longest war. (c) The withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan would be risky as the effort

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to transfer responsibility for security to Afghan forces remains elusive as the Afghan troops were proving to be unprepared for the job. (d) The resolve of the Afghan forces would be tested with the Taliban accelerating the fighting with the killing of a number of high-prolife government functionaries. (e) Taliban could take over the southern parts of the country with increasing terrorism and insecurity threatening a weak government in Afghanistan, according to analysts. (f) Pakistan could take advantage of the situation to increase its influence in Afghanistan for its so called ‗Strategic Depth‘. (g) Afghanistan could then become a training ground for terrorists to launch attacks on India. (h) China could also try to gain a foothold in Afghanistan placing India‘s strategic interests, aid projects and investments at risk. (j) With after the withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan, the US interest in Pakistan would also decline along with its tolerance of Pakistan‘s use of terrorism as a proxy weapon. (k) Complete withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan would lead to the loss of US air bases used for drone attacks against al-Qaeda in Pakistan and for responding to a nuclear crisis in the region. (l) The Taliban denounced US plans to have its troops in Afghanistan till 2016 and threatened to wage war against the occupation until the very last foreign soldier pulled out. (m) India would be little relieved that the US is not completely withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan but it would also be compelled to engage more of its resources in the fight in Afghanistan to keep the Taliban at bay. (n) With Pakistan likely to revive its influence over the Taliban in Afghanistan. (o) With the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, there needs to be a regional arrangement in place involving countries like Russia, China, India and Pakistan

26. Increase in Taliban Attacks.

(a) On 22 Jun 2015, the Taliban attacked the Parliament of Afghanistan with a suicide bomber striking the entrance to the Parliament and gunmen trying to storm the compound. (b) The security forces of Afghanistan repelled the Taliban attack, killing all seven gunmen and ensured that no members of the Parliament were harmed. (c) The President of Afghanistan Ashraf Ghani strongly condemned the attack stressing that targeting innocent people in the holy month of Ramadan was a clear

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act of hostility against the religion of Islam. (d) India‘s Prime Minister Narendra Modi condemned the terror attack saying that the attack on Afghanistan Parliament was a despicable and cowardly act. (e) In Jun 2015, the Taliban seized control of two districts in the northern Kunduz province. (f) Afghan security forces have struggled to stop Taliban advances since the end of the US and NATO combat mission in Dec 2014. (g) Since the beginning of 2015, more than 2,300 Afghan soldiers, police and pro-government fighters had been killed. This is more than the total number of US troops killed since the 2001 invasion.

27. Peace Talks between Government & Taliban (Pakistan, 8 Jul 2015).

(a) On 08 Jul 2015, the first official peace talks between the Government of Afghanistan and the Taliban were held in Pakistan. (b) The meeting was hosted by Pakistan as a tentative step towards ending the conflict in Afghanistan where the Taliban have been trying to re-establish their radical Islamic regime which was toppled by the US in 2001. (c) The peace talks were hailed by the Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif as breakthrough. (d) It is very doubtful if the peace talks could end the escalating violence in Afghanistan. (e) The next round of peace talks would be held in Doha on 15-16 Aug 2015. (f) There are divisions within the Taliban over the peace talks. (g) A US drone attack killed a former Taliban commander who pledged loyalty to the Islamic State (IS) and seized territory in Afghanistan‘s eastern province of Nangarhar.

28. Death of Mullah Omar.

(a) On 29 Jul 2015, the Afghan Government said that the Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar died two years ago in Karachi. (b) The Taliban also confirmed that their chief Mullah Omar had died some time back. (c) Mullah Omar formed the Taliban movement in 1994 amid civil war following the withdrawal of Soviet troops. (d) In 1996, the Taliban swept to power capturing the capital Kabul and Mullah Omar became the supreme leader of Taliban‘s self-declared Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

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(e) In Oct 2001, the alliance between Mullah Omar and the al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden prompted the US to invade Afghanistan in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. (f) In Dec 2001, Kandahar fell to the US-led forces and Mullah Omar went into hiding, with a $10 million US State Department award on his head.

29. Implications of Mullah Omar‟s Death.

(a) News of death of the Taliban leader Mullah Omar could raise questions about the future of the peace talks in Afghanistan as the Taliban today was not a united force with one section talking to the Afghan government and the other disowning the process. (b) Concerns have been expressed that Mullah Omar‘s death could lead to a huge recruitment by the Islamic State (IS) in the region. (c) The IS already has the support of disaffected Taliban fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan who have been frustrated by the long absence of their leader, according to analysts.

30. New Taliban Leader Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour.

(a) On 01 Aug 2015, the new Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour who was deputy for several years to Mullah Omar appealed for unity in the insurgency. (b) Mansour said that in the name of jihad, the killing of innocent people was not Islamic. He said that the Taliban should win the hearts of the people, then they could rule their hearts. (c) The new Taliban leader is seen as a pragmatist and a proponent of peace talks, increasing hopes that the power transition in Taliban could lead to an end to the bloody war in Afghanistan.

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CHAPTER - 33

BANGLADESH Current Situation 1. War Crimes Tribunal.

(a) Death penalty to the Jamaat-e-Islami Chief Motiur Rahman Nizami for crimes including the killings of nation‘s leading intellectuals during the country‘s war of Liberation in 1971. (b) Bangladesh Supreme Court held the death penalty to Jamaat-e-Islami leader Mohammed Kamaruzzaman for war crimes that included mass murder and rape in 1971. (c) On 11 Apr 2014, the Jamaat-e-Islami leader Mohammed Kamaruzzaman was hanged at the Dhaka Central Jail.

2. Opposition Called for Indefinite Blockade.

(a) The leader of the BNP Khaleda Zia called for an indefinite national blockade. (b) Blockade of roads, railways and waterways across Bangladesh would continue till the demand for a dialogue on a snap general election under a neutral government was met. (c) Bangladesh headed for a new political crisis with violent clashes between the BNP supporters and the police with former resorting to arson and vandalism. (d) The police filed cases against the BNP leader Khaleda Zia for ordering violence. (e) Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina ruled out declaring a state of emergency to tackle the violent blockade by the BNP-Jamaat alliance stressing that the law-enforcing agencies would ―tackle the terrorism.‖

3. Political Crisis Could Destabilise the Country.

(a) The International Crisis Group (ICG) observed that the Bangladesh political crisis was approaching the ―point of no return‖ which could ―gravely destabilise‖ the country. (b) The ICG undertakes field research in areas of violent conflict and advances policies to prevent, mitigate or resolve conflict. (c) Protracted and violent political crisis could leave both the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and the Opposition BNP leader Khaleda Zia the ultimate losers, if a major breakdown of the law and order would force the military to intervene.

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(d) Extremists and criminal networks could exploit the political void as the two mainstream parties were unwilling to work toward a new political compact that respects the rights of both opposition and victor to govern within the rule of law. (e) The Government needs to respect the democratic right to dissent and the Opposition BNP should revive its political fortunes through compromise with the ruling party rather than violent street politics. (f) The BNP, which had not accepted any responsibility for the election-related violence in 2014.

4. Armed Forces Affirmed the Constitution.

(a) The Inter Service Public Relations Directorate (ISPR) emphasised that the Armed Forces were a loyal to the Constitution and the law of the country. (b) The clarification from the ISPR came after concerns were expressed that the military could seize power as the country was suffering due to violence.

(c) The 15th

Amendment to the Constitution made by the Sheikh Hasina Government, makes it impossible for anyone to occupy power in an unconstitutional manner, according to analysts.

5. UNSC Called for Stability. On 20 Feb 15, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called for long-term stability to ensure development in Bangladesh and to find a tangible way for de-escalating the ongoing political situation in that country.

6. Indian Insurgent Leaders Arrested.

(a) Over the last five years, 17 top leaders of insurgent groups banned in India were arrested by the Bangladesh security forces. (b) Several top leaders, including those from Meghalaya, Tripura and Assam, had taken shelter in Bangladesh. (c) Through proactive action, the Bangladesh Government has been extending full cooperation to India in the fight against such groups. (d) During 2009-14, at least 17 top leaders of various groups were arrested, and eight suspects surrendered. (e) ULFA chairman Arbinda Rajkhowa and leaders Ranju Chowdhury and Pradip Marak, were among those arrested. (f) The MHA believes that the insurgents had set up bases along the India-Bangladesh border. (g) The issue was taken up at bilateral forums and intelligence agencies of both countries have been regularly sharing information on camps, hideouts or activities of the Indian insurgent groups.

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(h) Joint operations are carried out on a regular basis to stop infiltration and confiscate fake currency notes and weapons smuggled for use by the insurgents. (j) In order to prevent infiltration, the Government of India has sanctioned fencing, in two phases, for a stretch of 3,326 km along the border. (k) The first phase of 854 km was completed by 2000, but the second phase of 1,974 km has been delayed.

Conclusion 7. War Crimes Trial Key to Healing Deep National Wound.

(a) The on-going War Crimes trial of the perpetrators of crimes against humanity in the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971 would be the key in healing the deep national wound in the country. (b) The War Crimes trial was significant not only for Bangladesh but also for the neighbouring countries as the stalling of the trial could lead to the resurgence of religious extremism in Bangladesh. (c) The Jamaat-e-Islami, a radical right wing organisation, was banned from contesting elections by Bangladesh‘s High Court in Aug 2013. (d) The Jamaat-e-Islami has allegedly supported anti-India activities and terror groups.

8. Strengthen Democratic System.

(a) Crux of the current political imbroglio is the culture of mistrust and violence that has become part of Bangladesh polity. (b) Even 42 years after independence, Bangladesh is yet to overcome its violent past which has resulted in weakened democratic institutions in the country. (c) The unending political and civil strife in Bangladesh has undermined the gains of the last few years where the country had worked hard to build the best social indicators in South Asia. (d) The two main political parties the Awami League and the BNP need to rise above their narrow interests to strengthen democracy and resolve the current political crisis peacefully.

9. India‟s Role.

(a) India was witnessing turmoil all around in its neighbourhood and hence a stable, moderate Bangladesh is in its long-term interests. (b) As the forces of moderation and extremism clash in Bangladesh, India has a crucial stake in the outcome. (c) India can help the progressive and liberal forces in Bangladesh by using its

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cordial relations with the Awami League to work at breaking the political impasse in that country.

(d) Building the foundation of political stability in Bangladesh would accrue irreversible benefits for Indo-Bangla relations which would be a major stabilising factor for the whole south Asian region.

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CHAPTER - 34

CHINA 1. China‟s Economy.

(a) China‘s economy grew by 7.7% in 2013, the slowest growth since 1999. (b) The slow growth of the Chinese economy underlined the challenges faced by the world‘s second largest economy as it struggled with rebalancing and reviving an economic slowdown. (c) The slow growth of the Chinese economy in 2013 highlighted the continuing shift to a period of slower growth as the government reforms intend to shift away from State investment-led model. (d) The Chinese government is currently focused on achieving a balanced and sustainable growth driven by domestic demand rather than concentrating on higher growth rates. (e) In Oct 2013, Chinese currency, Yuan had overtaken the euro to become the second-most used currency in trade finance. (f) Yuan is also known as renminbi and is currently ranked behind the US dollar, which remains the leading global currency with a share of 81-08%.

2. Violence in Xinjiang Province.

(a) On 17 Nov 2013, nine persons armed with axes and knives were shot dead by police after they attacked a township police station in China‘s Xingjian region. (b) Southern Xinjiang prefecture of Kashgar has been witnessing intermittent violence since 2011. (c) The region has witnessed increasing ethnic tensions between Uighurs and the growing number of Han Chinese migrants. (d) The Xinjiang government blamed the incidents on separatist groups, and vowed to crackdown on instability and boost security measures in the region. (e) On 24 Nov 2013, the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), a terrorist group linked to Pakistan-based outfits and blamed for the violence in Xinjiang, released a video describing the October 28, 2013, incident in Tiananmen Square as a jihadi operation. (f) On 26 Nov 2013, China said that it would take steps to crack down on the TIP and called for international cooperation in this regard.

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(g) The Chinese officials had blamed the Tiananmen Square attack on the separatist East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) – another name used by TIP. (h) According to reports several ETIM members were hiding out in Pakistan or Afghanistan. (j) On 16 Dec at least 14 people were shot dead by police in the Xinjiang region as unrest flared up in the troubled part of the region close to the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) border. (k) On 25 Jan 2014, at least 12 people were killed in violence in the Xinjiang province following three bomb attacks (l) On 17 Jan 2014, China‘s central bank announced new measures to enable authorities to freeze assets of domestic terrorist groups and their overseas affiliates. (m) The move by the People‘s Bank of China (PBOC) pointed to China‘s continued concern over terror outfits believed to be operating out of Pakistan

3. China‟s Navy Conducted Exercises in Indian Ocean.

(a) Chinese Navy – People‘s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) conducted a five-day military exercise from 29 Jan 2014, in the Lumbok Strait in the Indian Ocean near Indonesia. (b) A three-ship flotilla of the South Sea fleet, including the large amphibious aircraft ―Changbaishan‖ and two destroyers, conducted exercises including anti-piracy, search and rescue, and damage control drills. (c) The drills also included simulations for warfare to test the response of command systems and soldiers combat skills. (d) It was the first drill of this type in the Lombok Strait, and was also the first time that PLAN had conducted its drill on a new route from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean. (e) The drill also marked the first time the Changbaishan, China‘s largest landing ship with advanced weapon systems was deployed (f) Military exercise highlighted China‘s expanding capabilities in carrying out operations in waters far beyond its borders. (g) The drill could have been a signal from China about the South China Sea dispute – where the maritime boundaries and islands are contested by a number of countries (h) The drill could also be a signal related to the Malacca Straits, which is a significant route for China‘s energy imports (j) The drill could also have sent a message to India that the Chinese could come closer to the Andaman & Nicobar Joint Command through Lombok, and not just through Malacca.

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4. Implications of Reform Announced. (a) The government of China hopes that the reform measures announced by the Communist Party of China (CPC) at the third plenum in Nov 2013 would help revive the slowing economy, rebalancing the State investment-driven, export-led economic model, and boosting innovation industries and domestic consumption. (b) The CPC Communique stressed that the reform measures would give the market a decisive role in allocating resources, and also reform the inefficient and corrupt State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). (c) The reform measures announced by the CPC were aimed to enhance China‘s status and military power. (d) On political reforms, the CPC made it clear that it would not dilute its authority and would not change China into a country with multiple parties in power. (e) The announcement to set up a first-ever National Security Commission to oversee domestic and external issues was seen as a move to centralise power within the top leadership. (f) Vested interests could pose some difficulties to the newly announced reform measures, with the SOEs and local governments likely to push back against measures to limit their power. (g) In the absence of checks and balances on the ruling party, like an independent judiciary, corruption had increased within its ranks. (h) The challenge facing the CPC was to improve oversight on its power, even as it remained wary of giving away its political authority. 5. Biggest Increase in Defence Spending in Three Years.

(a) On 06 Mar 2014, China announced its biggest increase in defence spending in three years with the defence budget crossing $130 billion. (b) A draft budget report proposed a 12.2% increase in defence spending to 808 billion Yuan or $132 billion. (c) The increase was in keeping with the size of China‘s growing economy and in line with what most countries spend in terms of percentage of GDP. (d) 12.2% increase in defence spending was primarily to counter a high risk security environment in the region, marked by rising territorial tensions with many neighbours. (e) China‘s Premier Li Keqiang vowed to carry out coordinated planning for military preparedness in all scenarios and to push the development of new and high technology weapons and equipment. (f) China would also enhance border, coastal and air defences and place war preparations on a regular footing.

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(g) China would advance neighbourhood diplomacy and speed up infrastructure links with neighbours. (h) Highlighted as priorities China‘s on-going plans to build a Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar economic corridor, a maritime silk road linking Asia and the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and a corridor linking China and Pakistan.

6. Implications of Hike in Defence Spending.

(a) China‘s hike of 12.2% in its defence expenditure would attract the attention of the region, particularly the neighbours. (b) China‘s defence spending is the highest in the region and second only to the US whose defence spending is more than $600 billion. (c) India‘s effective defence spending in dollar terms decreased from $37.5 billion last year to $36.2 billion this year. (d) There was a huge gap emerging in the conventional capabilities between China and India. (e) The asymmetry was increasing by the day and the fundamental point was that the Chinese, because of a strong economic position and a very definite plan, were focused on military modernisation.

7. Maritime Silk Road.

(a) On 19 Apr 2014, China for the first time released details of its ―Maritime Silk Road‖ plan. The plan was unveiled in October 2013. (b) ―Maritime Silk Road‖, which is an Indian Ocean-focused initiative, would prioritise building ports and improving infrastructure in littoral countries like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. (c) Plans to establish free trade zones in Indian Ocean countries as part of the plan – which would reinforce China‘s deepening economic presence in the Indian Ocean Region and in India‘s neighbourhood. (d) Countries from Malaysia and Singapore to India, Sri Lanka and the Gulf nations were all informed about the plan. (e) The plan was expected to focus on infrastructure construction of countries along the route, including ports of Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. (f) China set up a 10 billion Yuan or $1.6 billion fund to take forward the ―Maritime Silk Road‖ plan to build ports and boost maritime connectivity with Southeast Asian and Indian Ocean littoral countries. (g) The ―Maritime Silk Road‖ plan had become a key initiative of Chinese President Xi Jinping‘s government.

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8. Implications of Maritime Silk Road. (a) China‘s ―Maritime Silk Road‖ plan would deepen the country‘s economic and maritime links with both Southeast Asia and Indian Ocean Region (IOR) countries. (b) The plan is seen by analysts as a means of assuaging regional anxieties about China‘s growing military and naval presence and a number of territorial disputes. (c) ―Maritime Silk Road‖ could be a response to the ―string of pearls‖ theory – a suggestion that China intends to build military bases in littoral nations, from Sri Lanka to Pakistan and Bangladesh. (d) India indicated its intentions of joining China‘s ―Maritime Silk Road‖ plan by participating in the nine-nation naval show organised in China‘s eastern city of Qingdao. (e) India‘s INS Shivalik attended the event which was boycotted by the US.

9. Terror Attacks in Xinjiang Region.

(a) Chinese Government‟s Response.

(i) Members of a terrorist group believed to be hiding in Pakistan or Afghanistan were behind the April 30 attack on a railway station in the Xinjiang region. (ii) The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a banned separatist group known to have its top members operating from Pakistan, had planned the attack on the railway station in Urumqi, the provincial capital of Xinjiang (iii) The ETIM was demanding independence for the native Uighur ethnic group in the Xinjiang region. (iv) Xinjiang has witnessed intermittent ethnic clashes between the Uighurs and the increasing number of majority Hans Chinese migrants in the region. (v) Chinese President Xi Jinping said that his government would deploy a ‗strike-first strategy‘ against terrorist groups. (vi) Chinese authorities said five assailants behind the 22 May market blast in the capital of the Xinjiang region had been identified (vii) The five suspects were all Uighurs and may have been influenced by overseas Uighur groups with members of the separatist ETIM, which claimed responsibility for the earlier attacks, believed to be in Pakistan or Afghanistan. (viii) The government announced a year-long ―campaign against terror‖ in Xinjiang involving armed police and the People‘s Liberation Army (PLA). (ix) The campaign would focus on terrorist and religious extremist groups, gun and explosive manufacturing dens and terrorist training camps

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(x) On 28 May 2014, in a rare mass trial held in front of 7,000 people in a sports stadium, the Chinese authorities sentenced 55 people on terrorism charges in the Xinjiang region.

(b) 25th Anniversary of Tiananmen Square Crackdown.

(i) On 03 Jun 1989, hundreds of pro-democracy protesters were killed at the Tiananmen Square in Beijing when the Communist Party of China (CPC) under Deng Xiaoping crushed the student protests by declaring martial law and sending the People‘s Liberation Army (PLA) to clear the Tiananmen Square. (ii) Hundreds of civilians in Beijing, who had come out to support the calls for democracy and against corruption of leaders, were killed as the PLA troops fired at them. (iii) On the 25th Anniversary of the Tiananmen Square crackdown Chinese authorities detained several activists and scholars, imposed restrictions on universities, tightened censorship restrictions and increased security deployments (iv) The current Chinese government said that the ―political turmoil‖ of 1989 was no longer relevant to today‘s China. (v) In the last three decades of reform and opening up, China‘s enormous achievements in social and economic development had received worldwide attention. The building of democracy and the rule of law had continued to be perfected China‘s socialism with Chinese characteristics model was suited to China‘s national conditions and the basic interests of the vast majority

Current Situation in China

10. Corruption in PLA.

(a) On 01 Aug 2014, the People‘s Liberation Army (PLA) celebrated its 87th

anniversary with the issue of rampant corruption within its ranks as the key issue. (b) Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged a harsh strike against military corruption and called on troops to avoid undesirable work styles such as formalism, bureaucracy, hedonism and extravagance. (c) In Jun 2014, PLA‘s senior most ranking General, Xu Caihou, a former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission was expelled from the Communist Party on charges of accepting bribes. (d) Weeding out corruption was significant for the army because corruption, if it goes unchecked, would destroy the PLA‘s combat capability. (e) In Jan 2015, there were changes in the top brass of the PLA as part of the Chinese President Xi Jinping‘s anti-corruption drive to reinforce the legitimacy of the

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Communist Party. (f) Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), which is in-charge of the anti-corruption campaign said in a statement that it was adopting new measures to catch high-ranging ―tigers‖ and low-ranking ―flies‖. (g) China‘s President Xi Jinping demanded absolute loyalty from the PLA‘s top brass and asked them to repose firm faith in the ruling Communist Party, guarantee a smooth chain of command and make sure all decisions were executed.

11. China‟s Defence Expansion:

(a) On 03 Aug 2014, China unveiled its new generation Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Dongfeng-41 (DF-41) with a range of 12,000 km, which would be among the world‘s longest range missiles. (b) DF-41 missiles which would give the international community, including the US, a new understanding of China‘s nuclear power. (c) China pursued a defensive national defence policy and four aircraft carriers were appropriate. (d) China, which has only one aircraft carrier – Liaoning, could induct three more aircraft carriers to counter the increasing forces in the Asia-Pacific under the US policy of ―Pivot to Asia‖ and the disputes on the South China Sea. (e) 3,60,000 personnel were deployed under the US Pacific Command in the Asia-Pacific theatre. (f) In Dec 2014, China tested a hypersonic strike vehicle Wu-14, a hypersonic glide vehicle. (g) The test which was part of China‘s strategic nuclear programme was not directed against any specific country or target. (h) The testing of the hypersonic vehicle proved China‘s enhanced capability to overcome the missile defence system of the US. (j) The Wu-14 was launched by an intercontinental ballistic missile, it separated from the missile in the upper atmosphere and then glided and dived towards the Earth at a speed of 12,800 km/hr, enough to breach the anti-missile defences. (k) Testing of hypersonic vehicle is in line with China‘s concern at the ―Asia Pivot‖ policy of the US which would deploy 60% of its naval and air forces in the Asia-Pacific region.

New Silk Road to Boost Maritime & Road Links 12. Plan for the “New Silk Road”.

(a) In Oct 2013, China‘s President Xi Jinping announced unveiled the ―Maritime Silk Road‖ plan when he visited Southeast Asia.

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(b) On 19 Apr 2014, China for the first time released details of its ―Maritime Silk Road‖ plan. (c) ―Maritime Silk Road‖, which is an Indian Ocean-focused initiative, would priorities building ports and improving infrastructure in littoral countries like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. (d) Plans to establish free trade zones in Indian Ocean countries as part of the plan – which would reinforce China‘s deepening economic presence in the Indian Ocean Region and in India‘s neighbourhood. (e) Countries from Malaysia and Singapore to India, Sri Lanka and the Gulf nations were all informed about the plan. (f) The plan was expected to focus on infrastructure construction of countries along the route, including ports of Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. (g) China set up a 10 billion Yuan or $1.6 billion fund to take forward the ―Maritime Silk Road‖ plan to build ports and boost maritime connectivity with Southeast Asian and Indian Ocean littoral countries. (h) The ―Maritime Silk Road‖ plan had become a key initiative of Chinese President Xi Jinping‘s government. (j) On 10 Aug 2014, Gao Zhenting, Counsellor, Department of International Economic Affairs of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, outlined China‘s ―New Silk Road‖ plan. (k) The plan envisaged renewing the Old Silk Road linkages connecting China to South Asia, CentralAsia and Europe. (l) The ―New Silk Road‖ plan was expected to emphasise infrastructure projects aimed at increasing regional connectivity, apart from a range of initiatives like maritime connectivity and ecological cooperation. (m) On maritime cooperation, China would like the participation of all ports along the Maritime Silk Road, and priority would be given to establishing Special Economic Zones and industrial parksin these areas.

13. China wants India to Play Role in New Silk Road. (a) China wants India to play a key role in the ―New Silk Road‖ initiative. (b) An important segment of the ―Silk Road economic belt‖ is an economic corridor linking south-western Yunnan province through Myanmar to Kolkata, according to media reports. (c) China was also planning to link port cities like Chennai through the ―Maritime Silk Road‖ beginning from south-eastern Fujian province and linking littoral countries in the region.

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(d) From a historical point of view, India was the converging point of the ―Maritime Silk Road‖ and the ―Silk Road on Land‖. (e) More than 2000 years ago, India through the passage of the southern Silk Road, had very good exchanges with ancient China. (f) The proposed Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) road from Kunming to Kolkata would play a significant role in the economic belt.

14. Include Nepal & Africa in New Silk Road. (a) In January 2015, China worked out a blueprint to connect Nepal with the Eurasian transport corridor. (b) In Dec 2014, Nepal formally signed a four-point document endorsing the Silk Road Economic Belt. (c) China is keen on connecting Nepal and South Asia through an extension of the Qinghai-Tibet railway. (d) Keeping in view India‘s sensitivities regarding the perceived expansion of China‘s influence, China proposed a Beijing-Kathmandu-New Delhi trilateral development partnership as a confidence building step. (e) Nepal‘s economy would benefit from connectivity with China as the Nepalese goods can be transported to international markets through the Eurasian transportation network. (f) China has also trying to integrate Africa into the ―Maritime Silk Road‖ with the Chinese Foreign Ministry Wang Yi visiting the continent in Jan 2015. (g) During his five-nation visit to Africa, the Chinese Foreign Minister pushed for faster construction of a modern rail-link between Nairobi and Mombasa. (h) Africa is seen as one of the pillars of the ―Maritime Silk Road‖ project as China was developing 12 deep water ports, seven of which were along the coastline of Africa

15. $40 Billion Silk Road Fund. (a) On 16 Feb 2015, China operationalised its $40 billion infrastructure fund for the ―New Silk Road‖ project. (b) The Silk Road Fund was meant to finance development of roads, rail tracks, fibre optic highways, and more that could connect South Asia, Southeast Asia, Central Asia and Europe along an integrated land corridor. (c) Funds would also be allocated to the ―Maritime Silk Road‖ (MSR), for development of ports and facilities, primarily in the Indian Ocean. (d) The ports would be connected to the hinterland by a string of land arteries, which would link with the main Silk Road Economic Belt at specific junctions.

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(e) The purpose of the fund was to break the connectivity bottleneck in Asia. (f) The $40 billion Silk Road fund was in addition to the $50 billion Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which was also aimed to help finance construction in the region.

16. Implications of Maritime Silk Road. (a) China‘s ―Maritime Silk Road‖ plan would deepen the country‘s economic and maritime links with both Southeast Asia and Indian Ocean Region (IOR) countries. (b) Means of assuaging regional anxieties about China‘s growing military and naval presence and a number of territorial disputes. (c) ―Maritime Silk Road‖ could be a response to the ―string of pearls‖ theory – a suggestion that China intends to build military bases in littoral nations, from Sri Lanka to Pakistan and Bangladesh. (d) India indicated its intentions of joining China‘s ―Maritime Silk Road‖ plan by participating in the nine-nation naval show organized in China‘s eastern city of Qingdao. (e) India‘s INS Shivalik attended the event which was boycotted by the US. (f) As China‘s economy was slowing down, it had developed overcapacity in construction material and the ‗One Road, One Belt‘ strategy was meant to establish new growth engines along the Eurasian corridor, to absorb this surplus. (g) China was building rail corridors from Kunming to Myanmar and Thailand through Laos to avoid the vulnerable Malacca Strait. (h) Revival of the ―Maritime Silk Road‖ project has geopolitical implications with China trying to develop deep links with the littoral countries in South Asia and Southeast Asia to counter theUS-led Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) initiative which seeks to forge a regional Free Trade Agreement among 12 Asia-Pacific countries excluding China. (j) China appears to interpret the US ―Pivot to Asia‖ policy, which concentrates additional troops in the Asia-Pacific region,that runs parallel to the TPP, as part of the ―China containment‖ strategy of the US and its allies.

17. China Scales Down Economic Growth Rate Target in 2015. (a) In Mar 2015, China decided to scale down its economic growth rate target to 7% in 2015 in an effort to reset its economy along a sustainable, eco-friendly and corruption free path. (b) China‘s economic development had entered a new normal. (c) Systematic, institutional and structural problems had become ‗tigers in the road‘ holding up development.

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(d) If China‘s economy could grow at 7% for a relatively long time, China would secure a solid material foundation for modernisation. (e) In 2014, China‘s economy grew at 7.4% the slowest in 24 years. (f) The 7% growth was in line with China‘s long-term target of building a moderately prosperous society. (g) The Chinese President Xi Jinping's ‗four comprehensives‘ – building a moderately prosperous society, based on deeper reforms, rule of law and party discipline – are the basis for steering China‘s transition towards an advanced economy and society. (h) The Chinese Government‘s 7% growth projection is aimed at balancing high employment with structural change during the economic transition. (j) The Government wants to create more than 10 million urban jobs, to ensure that the unemployment rate does not go above 4.5% in 2015. (k) The Government spending would be increased to $2.74 billion in 2015, an increase of 10.6% over 2014. (l) The Budget Deficit for 2015 would be around 2.3% of the GDP compared to 2.1% of the GDP in 2014. (m) The Government would implement the ‗Made in China 2025‘ strategy, seek innovation-driven development, apply smart technology, strengthen foundations, pursue green development and redouble its efforts to upgrade China from a manufacturer of quantity to one of quality. (n) The fight against corruption was there to stay and tolerance for corruption was zero.

18. Defence Spending.

(a) In Mar 2015, China was set to increase its defence budget by 10 per cent to enhance its submarine based military deterrent and advance the development of stealth fighter jets. (b) Compared with great powers, the road of China‘s defence modernisation was more difficult. (c) Fundamentally, China‘s defence policy was defensive in nature, in tune with the ChineseConstitution. (d) Defence experts in the US have criticised China for its large military spending - $130 billion in 2014. (e) Chinese authorities defended their defence spending pointing out that it was four-and-half times lower than the US military expenditure of $581 billion in 2014. (f) China was stepping up its nuclear and conventional deterrence to counter the

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US ―Asia Pivot‖ policy which visualises the US Pacific Command to deploy 60% of the country‘s armed forces. (g) China‘s response to the US military build-up in its neighbourhood is focused on forming a stable nuclear deterrent based on a series of atomic powered submarines that would impart a second-strike capability to it. (h) The JIN class of Chinese Submarines have mounted JL-2 nuclear missiles with a range of 7,350 km. (j) The second strike capability of China was also being reinforced with the development of the 11,000 km range missiles, which would be mounted on the 096 Tang class nuclear submarines (k) In order to neutralise the US advantage in aircraft carriers, which is the key to the US control over sea lanes in the Malacca Straits, China was developing anti-ship missiles including the 1500 km range DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile. (l) China is also developing the J-20 stealth aircraft with the maiden test flight conducted in 2011. (m) Under President Xi Jinping, China has re-engineered many of its long-range ballistic missiles to carry multiple warheads after years of a minimal nuclear forces, according to a US media report.

19. Details of Silk Road Plan. (a) On 30 Mar 2015, China released a vision document that revealed the geographic parameters of the ―One belt One Road‖ initiative. (b) There are two components of the ―belt and road‖ initiative – the Silk Road

Economic Belt (SREB) and the 21st century Maritime Silk Road (MSR).

(c) The ―belt and road‖ run through the continents of Asia, Europe and Africa, connecting the vibrant East Asia economic circle at one end and developed European economic circle at the other. (d) The Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) focuses on bringing together China, Central Asia, Russia and Europe.

(e) The 21stcentury Maritime Silk Road (MSR) was designed to go from China‘s

coast to Europe through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean in one route, and through the South China Sea to South Pacific in the other. (f) The Silk Road focused on bringing together China, Central Asia, Russia and Europe, linking China with the Persian Gulf and Mediterranean Sea through Central and West Asia; and connecting it with South Asia and the Indian Ocean.

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(g) The ―belt and road‖ initiative which is backed by an extensive China-led infrastructure, could shift the centre of geo-economic power towards Eurasia, and could undermine the ―Asia Pivot‖ policy of the US and its allies. (h) The Chinese President Xi Jinping hoped that the trade volumes among the Silk Road economies would reach $2.5 trillion over the next 10 years.

20. China Ready to Merge Its Silk Road Programme with India‟s „Mausam‟. (a) China indicated that it was ready to merge its Silk Road Programme with India‘s ‗Mausam‘ and other plans to increase connectivity with South Asia. (b) China changed its earlier stance that the road connectivity in South Asia should be part of its Silk Road programme. (c) China was now convinced that the South Asian plans were closely related to the Chinese Programme. (d) The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) economic corridor were closely related to the ―Belt and Road‖ initiative and therefore required closer cooperation and greater progress, according to the Chinese Government. (e) India had made it clear that it wanted to go ahead with its own plans to enhance connectivity with South Asian countries.

White Paper on Military Strategy Released.

21. White Paper on Military Strategy. (a) On 26 May 2015, China‘s Ministry of National Defence released the first White Paper on the country‘s military strategy. (b) The White Paper lays out a roadmap for building of a moderately prosperous society by 2021 and modern socialist China by 2049. (c) The White Paper has Sections on the National Security Situation, Tasks of China‘s Armed Forces, Active Defence, Development of China‘s Armed Forces, Military Force Building Measures, Preparation for Military Struggle and Security Cooperation.

22. National Security Situation. (a) China is comfortably placed internally and externally. (b) China faces multiple and complex security threats, as well as increasing external impediments and challenges. (c) The external challenges referred to include, the US ―rebalancing‖ towards Asia, Japan‘s revision of its military and security policies, provocative actions by China‘s offshore neighbours with regards to its islands and reefs, and smouldering land territorial disputes.

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(d) The White Paper expressed concern about Taiwan independence separatist forces, separatist forces working for East Turkistan independence and Tibet independence, apart from those seeking a colour revolution.

23. Tasks of China‟s Armed Forces. (a) Achieving the great rejuvenation of the country by making it strong and making the military strong as without a strong military a country could neither be safe nor strong. (b) More emphasis on the employment of military forces and means. (c) The Chinese military would constantly innovate strategic guidance and operational thoughts so as to ensure the capabilities of fighting and winning, pay close attention to the challenges in new security domains in view of the revolution in military affairs, and also actively participate in China‘s economic and social construction, and firmly maintain social stability.

24. Active Defence. (a) Concept of Active Defence was developed in 1949 and modified over the years. (b) Adherence to the unity of strategic defence and operational and tactical offense. (c) Modified Active Defence envisaged winning local wars in conditions of modern technology and in conditions of informatisation. (d) Chinese military would adhere to the principles of flexibility, mobility and self-dependence. (e) Integrated combat forces would be employed to prevail in system-vs-system operations featuring information dominance, precision strikes and joint operations.

25. Development of China‟s Armed Forces. (a) Army. Multidimensional defence and offensive capability including multi-dimensional trans-theatre, multi-functional and sustainable operations. (b) Air Force.

(i) The People‘s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force would shift its focus from territorial air defence to both defence and offense. (ii) Build air-space defence force structure and boost its capabilities for strategic early warning, air strike, air and missile defence, information countermeasures, airborne operations, strategic projection and comprehensive support.

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(c) Navy.

(i) The PLA Navy would shift its focus from offshore waters defence to the combination of offshore waters defence with open seas protection. (ii) Build a combined, multi-functional and efficient marine combat force structure. (iii) China must develop a modern maritime military force structure commensurate with its national security and development interests, safeguard its national sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, protect the security of strategic and overseas interests, and participate in international maritime cooperation, so as to provide strategic support for building itself into a maritime power.

(d) Nuclear Weapons – Second Artillery Force.

(i) The PLA‘s Second Artillery Force which handles nuclear weapons would strengthen its capabilities for strategic deterrence and nuclear counter attack, and medium and long range precision strikes. (ii) Its force structure would feature a combination of both nuclear and conventional capabilities. (iii) Reiterated China‘s no first use policy for nuclear weapons but made it clear that nuclear weapons were a strategic cornerstone for safeguarding national sovereignty and security.

(e) Cyber Defence.

(i) Expedite the development of a cyber-force with enhanced capabilities of cyberspace situation awareness and cyber defence. (ii) Cyber force to support for China‘s endeavours in cyberspace. (iii) Cyber force to participate in international cyber cooperation.

26. International Role for Chinese Armed Forces.

(a) Active participation in regional and international security cooperation and securing China‘s interests overseas. (b) Safeguarding China‘s security and interests in new domains. (c) Maintaining strategic deterrence and carrying out nuclear counter-attack.

27. Strengthening Military-Civil Integration.

(a) China would work to est uniform military and civilian standards for infrastructure, key technological areas and major industries, explore the ways and means for training military personnel in civilian educational institutions, developing weaponry and equipment by national defence industries, and outsourcing logistics

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support to civilian support systems. (b) Encouraging joint building and utilisation of military and civilian infrastructure, joint exploration, and shared use of resources. (c) Enhancing reserves of Forces.

China‟s Stock Market Crash. 29. Chinese Shares Prices Plunged.

(a) On 08 Jul 2015, China‘s share markets crashed to 30% lower than their peak in Jun 2015. (b) The share prices plunged in China with $3.5 trillion lost in three weeks which was more than the size of India‘s $2 trillion economy and 20 times the Greek debt. (c) About 1,331 companies halted trading in China‘s stock exchanges, freezing shares worth $2.6 trillion, or about 40% of its market value. (d) The Shanghai Composite Index fell by 5.9%, down by 32% since 12 Jun 2015.

30. Reasons Behind Stock Market Crash.

(a) The surge in Chinese stock markets was due to investments by retail investors, attracted by quick returns. (b) The investors pumped in large amounts of borrowed money as China eased restrictions on borrowed money since 2010. (c) The retail investors, accounting for 85 per cent of trade in China, made risky investments ignoring rules. (d) Since Jun 2014, the Chinese stock market increased by 150% mainly due to borrowed money. (e) There was a five-fold increase in margin debt, the amount borrowed by investors to buy stocks in one year. (f) The authorities in China imposed curbs on margin trading (investment in stocks using borrowed funds). (g) On 12 Jun 2015, the China‘s security regulator announced a new limit on the total amount of margin lending stock brokers could do, while banning illicit margin trading. (h) Chinese stocks have been falling since 12 Jun 2015. (j) The reasons for the fall in Chinese stocks can be summed up as due to:

(i) China‘s slowing economic growth.

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(ii) Overvaluation of Chinese stocks. (iii) New restrictions on margin trading. (iv) Panic selling of stocks.

31. Global Impact of Stock Market Crash.

(a) The crash of Chinese stock market had a global impact with stock prices falling across the world. (b) The US stock prices were down by 1% and the New York Stock Exchange stopped trading on 08 Jul 2015. (c) Economists felt that the spillover of the Chinese stock market crash into the broader economy was unlikely for the present. (d) The main worry was the slowdown in the China‘s economy, according to experts. (e) China is the second-largest economy in the world with large global and financial linkages and the spill over effect of the Chinese stock market crash would have an adverse impact on the global economy. (f) China‘s economic slowdown would be a risk for the global economy, according to experts. (g) Chinese stock markets have been opened for overseas investors recently with an estimated 4% of overseas investments which have been concentrated in large companies which are not volatile. (h) Global oil prices fell to due to the Chinese stock market crash.

32. Impact of Chinese Stock Market Crash on India.

(a) Indian Stock Market Prices Fell.

(i) The crash of the Chinese stock market had its impact on Indian stock markets with the Sensex falling by 1.72% and Nifty fell by 1.74%, their biggest percentage fall since 11 Jun 2015. (ii) Gold prices in India fell to a three-month low due to the crash of the Chinese stock market.

(b) Positive Impact on India.

(i) Lower oil prices would have a positive impact on India‘s import bill. (ii) India‘s macroeconomic growth numbers could improve due to the fall in the prices of oil, gold and copper.

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(iii) The foreign investors who preferred China would be attracted towards India. (iv) Petrochemicals, oil marketing companies and chemicals are the other sectors of the Indian economy that would benefit from Chinese slowdown. (v) Fall in commodity prices linked to China‘s slow demand was a positive for India. (vi) The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) could cut interest rates as inflation decreases in India.

(c) Negative Impact on India.

(i) The global stock market volatility due to the crash of the Chinese stock markets in the short term could panic retail investors in India. (ii) A crash in the commodity prices could have a negative impact on India‘s exports and price realization. (iii) As China is a manufacturing hub, excess capacity could delay the revival of manufacturing globally. (iv) China could dump more products, harming local producers in India. (v) China could make global fund managers more risk-averse. (vi) China is number one merchandise trader in the world with over $4.16 trillion worth of trade and if there was a shakeout, a number of sectors in the global markets, which get their sizeable chunk of revenues from China – tourism, hotels, education, health, and others– would feel the immediate impact. (vii) If a bubble-like situation erupts from China, the impact would be seen all around the world to which the Indian economy is to well entrenched into. (viii) India runs a large trade imbalance with China with $94 billion in imports and only $12 billion exports.

33. Steps to Stem the Stock Market Crash.

(a) On 09 Jul 2015, the Chinese securities regulator banned shareholders with large stakes in listed firms from selling stocks. (b) The Chinese banking regulator said that it would allow low lenders to roll over loans backed by stocks. (c) The steps taken by the Chinese authorities resulted in the Chinese shares bouncing back by 6%.

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(d) However, China‘s stock markets remained semi-frozen, with the shares of around 1,500 listed companies worth around $2.8 trillion (half the market) suspended. (d) China‘s Government which had given a decisive role to the stock markets as part of its economic reforms, responded with a number of support measures, including interest rate cut, suspension of initial public offerings and enlisting brokerages to buy stocks, backed by cash from the central bank.

34. Impact on Indo – Nepal.

(a) New constitutaion in Nepal & subsequent oil blockade on trade route with India. (b) Restening of Tatopani – Dry post link with China post Nepal earthquake.

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CHAPTER - 35

SOUTH CHINA SEA

1. Geographical Location.

(a) The South China sea is located on the western edge of the Pacific Ocean. (b) South China Sea covers an area of more than 3,000,000 square kilometres. (c) South China Sea includes hundreds of islets and rocks in the Paracel and Spratly islands.

2. Importance.

(a) Half of the world‘s oil and gas and more than one-third of global seaborne trade pass through the South China Sea. (b) The South China Sea contains unexploited oil and gas believed to lie underneath the seabed. (c) The South China Sea has estimated oil reserves of around 28 million barrels.

3. Claims on South China Sea.

(a) China and Taiwan claim the whole of the South China Sea. (b) The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei have overlapping claims on parts of the South China Sea. (c) The Paracel Islands Dispute - claimed by both China and Vietnam. (d) The Spratly Islands Dispute - claimed by China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Taiwan. (e) UNCLOS. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is a 1982 agreement which sets out rights and responsibilities of nations in their use of the world‘s oceans. (f) Although China has signed the UNCLOS, it claims that the Paracel and Spratly islands belong to it since ancient times. (g) Malaysia lays its claims based on a 1979 map defining its continental shelf boundaries. (h) The Philippines occupies several Spratly islands and issued a decree in 1978 asserting its claim to the region.

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(j) Taiwan claims Paracel, Pratas and Spratly islands and has built an airport on ltu Aba in Spratly islands. (k) Vietnam has ratified the UNCLOS but occupies dozens of Spratly islands, some with military bases. (l) Brunei claims parts of the South China Sea as its EEZ, including the Louisa Reef in the Spratly islands.

4. India‟s Role.

(a) India‟s Stand.

(i) The South China Sea was the property of the world and those trade ways must be free from any national interference. (ii) The area should be used for increasing trade-related activities among nations that fall within the rim of the South China Sea

(b) China Warned India.

(i) In Apr 2012, Chinese officials said that China would not stand any joint cooperation in its claimed maritime areas. (ii) The warning was in reference to the joint oil exploration project by India‘s OVL and a Vietnamese company in the South China Sea. (iii) Indian would face political and economic risks if its companies continue exploring for oil in blocks off the coast of Vietnam in the disputed South China Sea

(c) India Suspends Oil Exploration.

(i) In May 2012, India withdrew from an oil exploration block in the South China Sea in Vietnam‘s EEZ. (ii) India said that it suspended operations from Block 128, three years after it surrendered the adjacent Block 127 because there was not enough oil to justify investment in the infrastructure for bringing it to the surface. (iii) The diplomatic benefits that would come from suspension of drilling operations in the Phu Kanh basin would far outweigh the commercial considerations. (iv) India and China have agreed to cooperate in maritime security and oceanography research

5. Collision of Ships(May 2014).

(a) China‘s relations with Vietnam and the Philippines were strained after a mid-sea collision between ships and seizure of a Chinese vessel near disputed islands off the Philippine coast.

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(b) There was a collision between Vietnam‘s naval ships and Chinese vessels in the South China Sea after China‘s attempt to establish an oil rig in an area claimed by both countries. (c) This was the first time that China tried to establish an oil rig and start drilling in the disputed area 193 km from Vietnam‘s coast. (d) China justified its drilling in the disputed area by claiming that the disputed Paracel or Xisha islands, and stressing that the waters fall within the islands Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). (e) The disputed area is seen by Vietnam as falling in its Exclusive Economic Zone, with a location of about 200 nautical miles from its own coast. (f) On 14 May 2014, hundreds of Vietnamese torched and ransacked several Chinese factories in Vietnam. (g) The anti-China riots in Vietnam resulted in the death of two people and injury to more than a 100 people. (h) China sent five ships to evacuate its citizens caught in riots in Vietnam and accused Vietnam of conniving with the rioters who attacked and torched Chinese factories. (j) China criticised the ASEAN for backing Vietnam over the tensions in the South China Sea and stressed that ASEAN should not take sides in the South China Sea dispute.

6. India Concerned at the Developments.

(a) India expressed concern over the recent developments in the South China Sea. (b) India would like to see resolution of the issue through peaceful means in accordance with universally recognised principles of International law. (c) India called for cooperation in ensuring security of sea-lanes and strengthening of maritime security. (d) India reiterated that freedom of navigation in the South China Sea should not be impeded.

7. ASEAN Warned against Reclamation Work (27 Apr 2015).

(a) ASEAN leaders at a one-day summit in Malaysia issued a statement that reclamation work in the disputed South China Sea, where China had constructed an airstrip and other structures on coral reefs, threatened to undermine peace, security and stability in the region. (b) The ASEAN statement instructed the region‘s Foreign Ministers to urgently address the matter under dialogue mechanisms set up between the ASEAN and China.

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8. China‟s Response.

(a) For a long time, the Philippines, Vietnam and other countries had been carrying out reclamations on Chinese islands they were illegally occupying in the Nansha Islands, building airports and other fixed infrastructure even developing missiles and other military equipment. (b) The Spratly Islands are called as Nansha Islands by China. (c) Vietnam had been building docks, runways, missile positions, office buildings, barracks, hotels, lighthouses and helicopter pads on more than 20 islands and shoals. (d) China was resolutely opposed to those illegal activities and demanded the relevant countries to immediately stop their infringements on China‘s sovereignty and rights. (e) China‘s construction in the Nansha Islands was totally within the scope of its sovereignty; it was reasonable, fair and lawful.

9. China and Russia‟s Enhanced Cooperation.

(a) Strengthening of the US-led ‗Asia Pivot‘ which is a doctrine which allegedly targets China, increased tensions over the disputed islands in South China Sea. (b) China was concerned at the increased US activism in the South China Sea. (c) In Jul 2015, the Chinese Defence Ministry criticised the surveillance mission undertaken by the US Pacific Fleet commander, Admiral Scott Swift, who flew for seven hours on a reconnaissance mission abroad a P-8A plane in the South China Sea. (d) The Philippines welcomed the US Admiral‘s flight stressing that it was a demonstration of the political will of the US to stand by its allies who had territorial disputes with China. (e) Russia was concerned by US policies in the region, especially since every single day it became increasingly focused on a systematic containment of Russia and China. (f) Russia planned to join its Asia-pacific allies in May 2016, in counter-terrorism naval exercises in the South China Sea. (g) Russia also announced increasing its military presence in Kuril Islands, raising tensions in its dispute in the area with Japan, an ally of the US in the Pacific.

10. Russia‟s New Naval Doctrine.

(a) Russia released a new Naval Doctrine which marked out China as its core partner in the Pacific, underlining Sino-Russian stand towards countering the ‗Asia Pivot‘ of the US.

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(b) Russia‘s new Naval Doctrine which would be valid till 2020, emphasised that friendly relations with China in the Pacific were one of the essential elements of the new policy. (c) Cooperation with China and other countries in the region was a crucial part of carrying out the nation‘s maritime policy. (d) The response of Russia and China to Japan‘s new shift from its post-World War II pacifist constitution, which would allow it to deploy armed forces overseas. (e) Russia and China announced on 07Jul 2015, that they would conduct joint military exercises in the Sea of Japan in August 2015. (f) The Russian Navy‘s Pacific fleet would deploy 20 warships as well as aircraft and helicopters, in the joint military exercises with China in Aug 2015. (g) Main tensions in the Pacific were the South China Sea maritime disputes between China and many of the ASEAN countries.

11. India recent statement. (a) UNCLOS. (b) Victrum sovereignty rights. (c) Own – oil inplantation in future despite Chinas.

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CHAPTER - 36

SINO - JAPANESE RELATIONS

Introduction 1. Sino-Japanese Relations Key to the Region's Stability, Security and Economic Growth. 2. Unresolved Disputes.

(a) Japan's failure to truly repent for its wartime crimes. (b) Disputed territory in the East China Sea known as Diaoyu Islands in China and Shenkaku Islands in Japan. (c) China's opposition to Japan's bid for a permanent UN Security Council seat.

3. Deeply integrated economies give both sides a stake in ensuring smooth bilateral relations. The bilateral ties are characterised by duality. 4. Japan's Robust Foreign Policy.

(a) Japan's commitment to its alliance with the US. (b) Japan building a new partnership with India. (c) Japan has also sought to build stronger economic and security ties with ASEAN. (d) Japan signed a security pact with Australia. (e) Japan wants faster deployment of missile defence systems. (f) Japan is seeking to revise the pacifist Article Nine of Japan's Constitution. (g) Japan casts aspirations on China's military modernisation programme.

6. China's View.

(a) China is desirous of a rapprochement with Japan to safeguard its economic interests. (b) Fierce nationalism anchored in anti-Japanese feelings is present in China. (c) China is deeply wary of Japan's security alliance with the US.

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7. Japan‟s Proactive Security Role.

(a) On 30 May 2014, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe offered to supply Vietnam and the Philippines with naval patrol vessels. (b) The Japanese Prime Minister was speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, a regional security meet attended by Defence Ministers and Military officials of the region as well as the US. (c) Mr Abe outlined a new ambitious vision for Japan to play a greater and more proactive role than it has until now in Asia. (d) Conveyed a clear message that his country was willing to play a more active role amid rising maritime disputes between China and ASEAN countries like Vietnam and the Philippines. (e) In a reference to China, Mr Abe criticised attempts to change the status quo through force or coercion and stressed that there clearly exist elements that spawn instability. (f) The Japanese Prime Minister highlighted his country‘s close security relations with the US and Australia. (g) Eager to build both bilateral cooperation with India and closer three-way ties with India and the US when he welcomes Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Tokyo. China‘s official Xinhua news agency accused the Japanese Prime Minister of trying to divide Asian countries and stoke flare-ups in the region.

8. Thaw in Relations.

(a) China and Japan agreed to gradually resume political, diplomatic and security dialogues. (b) China had frozen high-level contacts more than two years ago amid a dispute over the Senkaku or Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea and other contentious issues. (c) Both sides acknowledged their different positions on the disputed islands in the East China Sea. (d) The acknowledgement pointed to a compromise by both sides. Japan had earlier refused China‘s demand that the islands sovereignty was in dispute. (e) The dispute over the islands in the East China Sea was seen as the reason behind the reduction by almost 50% in Japanese investments in China.

9. Meeting of Chinese President & Japanese Prime Minister.

(a) China‘s President and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe met on the side-lines of the APEC summit in Beijing on 10 Nov 2104. (b) Meeting was the first step towards improving bilateral relations, returning to the core of a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests.

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(c) The two leaders exchange frank views and there was big progress in freshly improving the economic and various relationships between Japan and China (d) Both leaders agreed to work towards preventing clashes as patrol ships and fighter jets from both countries confront each other regularly near the disputed islands in the East China Sea. (e) The landmark talks between the two leaders was of historic significance to the future interaction between the world‘s second and third largest economies, which were also major stake holders in regional stability and development (f) The normalisation of Sino-Japanese relationship would be a time-consuming exercise (g) The talks between the Chinese President and Japanese Prime Minister were held after both sides softened their respective stands on the disputed islands.

10. Tension Despite Strong Trading Ties.

(a) The visits to the Yasukuni war shrine by Japanese Prime Minister and a Cabinet Minister have further strained Japan‘s relations with China amid rising maritime tensions. (b) The row over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea has renewed tensions in Sino-Japanese relations despite both countries having strong trade ties. (c) China has laid claims to the islands far from its coast more emphatically over the last few years as its economic and military might has increased. (d) Japan is disturbed by the increased movement of China‘s navy on the East China Sea and regards it as intrusions in the Japanese territory.

11. Dilemma in Relations. There is a deepening economic interdependence; however, it is along with a sense of nationalism in the form of negative attitudes towards each other. Also, there is a tussle to attain ascendance on the international stage.

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SINO - PAK RELATIONS 1. Relations between China & Pakistan.

(a) Nuclear Cooperation.

(i) China indicated that it would continue its support for civilian nuclear energy projects in Pakistan, despite concerns voiced by some countries that the recent agreements had violated international guidelines governing nuclear trade. (ii) Relevant cooperation between China and Pakistan helped alleviate power shortage in Pakistan and served the interests of local people. (iii) In November 2013, Pakistan inaugurated two 1,100 MW projects at the second and third phases of the Karachi nuclear power project. (iv) China has also supported the nuclear complex at Chashma, where two nuclear reactors have been constructed with its help. (v) The agreements for the third and fourth nuclear reactors in Chashma, signed in 2009, led to a controversy as they were signed after China joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). (vi) China defended the Chashma deal by pointing out that the earlier Chashma agreement had predated China‘s membership of the NSG. (vii) China would find it more difficult to defend the Karachi nuclear power plant agreements. (viii) China defended the Karachi deals by pointing out that the two countries relevant cooperation, which was totally for peaceful purposes, met their respective international obligations and was subject to the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

(b) Economic Corridor.

(i) China stated that the economic corridor that it was planning to construct to link its western Xinjiang region to Pakistan through the disputed Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), was not directed at a third party and would not pose any detriment to India‘s concern on the Kashmir issue. (ii) The economic corridor envisages expanding road links along the Karakoram highway and building energy pipelines.

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(iii) Parts of the economic corridor would run through PoK, which borders the Xinjiang region and provides the only possible land link between China and Pakistan. (iv) India had raised concern over the economic corridor, citing China‘s stated position of not interfering in the Kashmir dispute. (v) China has maintained that its investments were only on a commercial basis without prejudice to the dispute. (vi) China and Pakistan discussed taking forward the economic corridor plan during the visit to China by Pakistan‘s President Mamnoon Hussain in Feb 2014. (vii) Both countries signed an agreement for upgrading the Karakoram highway from the China border to Islamabad. (viii) In reference to India‘s concern about the economic corridor passing through PoK, China said that its cooperation with Pakistan on the project was to improve wellbeing. (ix) China stressed that the project was not directed at a third party, and would have no detriment to the relevant parties position on the Kashmir issue

Chinese President Xi Jinping‟s Visit to Pakistan (20-21 Apr 2015). 2. Maiden Visit to Pakistan by Chinese President in a Decade.

3. $46 Billion Investment Plan.

(a) Aim of creating direct links between China and the Arabian Sea and giving a boost to Pakistan‘s economy. (b) $11 billion was set aside for infrastructure work, while the remaining $35 billion would go on energy projects. (c) Much of the Chinese investment would be in the form of concessional loans. (d) The Chinese President Xi Jinping and Pakistan‘s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif signed agreements worth $28 billion, which nearly equalled the amount received by Pakistan in a decade from the US in support of its war in Afghanistan. (e) The bulk of the amount would be spent on the development of the 3,000 km China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) from China‘s western city of Kashgar to the Gwadar port in Pakistan. (f) China would invest around $35 billion in energy projects that would generate 16,400 MW of electricity. (g) The Chinese President and the Pakistani Prime Minister launched five renewable energy projects around the country. (h) Both countries signed 51 agreements in different sectors, including

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infrastructure projects, energy generation, agriculture, education, telecommunications and research. (j) Pakistan and China have had close diplomatic and military relations for decades, but the economic ties have increased only recently. (k) China-Pakistan bilateral trade crossed $12 billion in 2014. (l) China was ready to support Pakistan‘s economic and social development. (m) Pakistan‘s Prime Minister said that he assured the Chinese President, that China‘s security was as important to Pakistan as its own. (n) Friendship with China was the cornerstone of Pakistan‘s foreign policy.

4. Agreements Linked to the Strategic Economic Corridor.

(a) Of the 51 agreements signed between China and Pakistan, 30 were linked to the strategic China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). (b) The CPEC would host roads, railways, energy pipelines and industrial parks. (c) The CPEC would shorten the route for China‘s energy imports from the Middle East by around 12,000 km as the road, rail and pipeline links would connect China to the Arabian Sea. (d) China is keen on developing the CPEC as one links from the restive Xinjiang province which could then access markets of South Asia, West Asia and Africa. (e) The link would be possible as the Pakistani deep-sea port Gwadar is located on the Arabian Sea at the tri junction of these geographic zones. (f) The CPEC is also part of China‘s Silk Road Economic Belt (SERB), President Xi‘s ―belt and road‖ initiative to expand trade and transport footprint across Central Asia and South Asia. (g) The CPEC would pass through an insurgency prone and lawless zone, but Pakistan has promised to safeguard it by deploying a Special Security Division. (h) The CPEC is expected to be ready in three years and provide about 10,400 MW of electricity. (j) The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) would give China direct access to the Indian Ocean and beyond from Pakistan‘s Arabian Sea port of Gwadar. (k) China and Pakistan expect the CPEC to transform Pakistan into a regional economic hub and bring growth to the restive Xinjiang province of China. (l) The CPEC would also enable China to create a shorter and cheaper route for trade and investment with south, central and west Asia and Middle East and Africa.

5. Chinese President conferred with Pakistan‘s Highest Civilian Award – ‗Nishan-e-Pakistan‘.

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Implications for India. 6. Sale of 8 Diesel Electric Submarines.

(a) During the visit of the Chinese President Xi Jinping, China and Pakistan were expected to finalise a $6 billion deal on the sale of eight diesel electric submarines. (b) If the proposed deal is finalised, India‘s security interests could be adversely impacted if Pakistan turns the submarines into platforms for second nuclear strike capability. (c) Pakistan could follow Israel‘s example of equipping conventional submarines with nuclear-tipped missiles. (d) In 2012, Pakistan formed the Naval Strategic Force Command Headquarters, which would be in-charge of the country‘s second-strike capability. (e) India had the capability to match the proposed acquisitions by Pakistan.

7. CPEC.

(a) Strategic significance as it provides China direct access to the Indian Ocean through the Pakistani port of Gwadar in the Arabian Sea. (b) India has voiced concern over the economic corridor project which envisages rail and road links that pass through PoK. (c) China‘s policy of encircling India through its ―string of pearls‖ strategy would have significant implications for India‘s security. India could find itself considerably constrained. (d) To counter China‘s ―string of pearls‖ strategy, India has been strengthening its relations with Oman through considerable naval cooperation and has also been pushing to develop Iran‘s Chahbahar port. (e) 70 percent of India‘s oil imports come from the Gulf countries passing through the Strait of Hormuz. (f) The oil tankers from Gulf arriving in the Gulf of Kutch have to pass around 40 nautical miles south of Gwadar port and hence would be at risk of interdiction by Chinese or Pakistani units based at Gwadar. (g) As the oil imports of India and China rise, there could be a possibility of conflict between these two large consumers of oil. (h) India needs to closely monitor the activities of Chinese navy to safeguard its security interests. (j) India needs to strengthen its naval presence in the Indian Ocean apart from having allies among the like-minded countries of the Indo-Pacific region.

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(k) Development of CPEC would give meaningful employment to the youth in Pakistan luring them away from extremism which would curtail terrorism in Pakistan. (l) India could welcome the joint initiative by China and Pakistan to curtail terror groups around the corridor. (m) China has clarified that the CPEC would not stand in the way of strengthening India-China relations. (n) Enough potential for development of trade and economic relations between China and India.

8. Conclusion.

(a) The Chinese President Xi Jinping‘s visit to Pakistan was seen as a game changer with both sides signing infrastructure and energy deals worth $46 billion. (b) By committing billions of dollars into infrastructure development like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), China overtook the US and has emerged as Pakistan‘s biggest external partner. (c) The economic corridor plan from Xinjiang to Gwadar port faces challenges in the form of difficult terrain and intermittent instability in the region. (d) China is very keen to pursue the economic corridor project as it would provide an alternate route for its energy imports from West Asia. (e) China has been upgrading the Karakoram Highway which runs westward from Xinjiang, and is also carrying out development projects in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK).

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CHAPTER - 38

SINO - RUSSIAN RELATIONS

1. Russia-China Naval War Games.

(a) On 25 Jan 2014, Russia and China began their first naval war games in the Mediterranean. (b) In the naval war games, the warships from both countries performed joint manoeuvring and conducted air-defence training, using their helicopters as mock targets. (c) It was for the first time that the two countries were holding such training for operational teamwork of their navies. (d) The main purpose of the drill was to enhance the interoperability of Russian and Chinese combat ships for joint operation in the Eastern Mediterranean. (e) In early Jan 2014, the first consignment of Syrian chemical weapons materials transferred on a Danish ship was escorted by Russian and Chinese warships. (f) Russian and Chinese militaries have been training for possible big-scale joint action. (g) Joint naval operations may be needed to defend the interests of Russia and China and those of their allies in different parts of the world. (h) In Jul 2013, Russia and China had held their largest joint naval exercise in the Sea of Japan.

2. Russian President‟s Visit to China (21 May 2014).

(a) Russian President‘s State Visit and Participation in a Regional Security Summit.

(b) 40 Agreements.

(i) Eight strategic projects in space, rocket engines, aviation and infrastructure would be undertaken by Russia and China. (ii) The Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping would oversee the start of joint war games in the East China Sea.

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(c) Over $400 Billion Gas Deal.

(i) Russia and China signed a landmark gas deal valued at more than $400 billion for the annual supply of 38 billion cubic metres of natural gas by Russia to China. (ii) The signing of the gas deal ended more than a decade-long negotiation (iii) Under the gas agreement, China would receive 38 billion cubic metres of natural gas annually through a pipeline from Siberia‘s gas fields. (iv) The Russian President Vladimir Putin described the gas deal with China as the biggest in history for his country. (v) China also pledged $20 billion investment in infrastructure and gas development in eastern Russia. (vi) The Russia-China gas deal was hailed by the Presidents of both countries as underlining their expanding closer relations. (vii) The gas deal would provide a key source of clean energy for China as it tries to sustain growth even while reducing its dependence on coal. (viii) The gas deal marked a strategic shift for Russia‘s gas exports to Asia reducing its dependence on Europe.

3. Implementation of Gas Project.

(a) In Oct 2014, China and Russia started implementing their $400 billion strategic gas project signed in May 2014 during the visit of the Russian President Vladimir Putin to China. (b) Under the strategic gas project, Russia would supply China 38 billion cubic metres of gas (BCM) every year for 30 years with the supply commencing from 2018. (c) The project allows Russia to lessen its dependence on Europe and opens options for tapping the energy demand in Asia-Pacific with China being the main consumer. (d) Russian President Vladimir Putin pointed out that Russia and China were now launching a large-scale strategic project on the global level. (e)New gas pipeline would significantly strengthen Russia‘s economic cooperation with the governments of Asia-Pacific region and, first and foremost with its key partner China. (f) Russia was planning to invest $55 billion in building infrastructure and further exploring Siberia‘s energy resources, to consolidate their outreach to Asia through China.

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4. Fifth Meeting.

(a) The Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin held their fifth meeting in 2014 on the side-lines of the APEC summit in Beijing on 09 Nov 2014. (b) Both sides signed mega-gas agreement under which China would receive 30 billion cubic metres (BCM) of gas every year along the ―western‖ or ―Altay‖ route. (c) This agreement would supplement the other strategic gas project of supply of 38 BCM of gas to China every year through the Power of Siberia pipeline, passing through the ―eastern route‖. (d) The agreement to supply 30 BCM of gas through the ―western‖ route signed on 09 Nov 2014 was meant to lay the groundwork for a full-fledged contract later. (e) With signing of two agreements for supply gas through the eastern and western routes, China was set to replace Europe as the largest consumer of Russian gas after the completion of the projects. (f) The gas agreements between China and Russia were seen as sending a message to Europe which had imposed sanctions on Russia following the Ukraine crisis.

5. China‟s Support during Economic Difficulty.

(a) China was firmly supporting Russia during its economic difficulty triggered by the steep drop in global oil prices and the decrease in the value of the Russian currency Rouble. . (b) Russia could surmount its current temporary difficulty, given Russia‘s abundant reserve of foreign exchanges and a low ratio of public debt to the GDP among the G20 members, not to mention its rich resources and good industrial foundation. (c) China‘s $24 billion currency swap programme to help Russia was seen as a sign of strengthening relations between the two countries.

Putin‟s Visit to China 6. Agenda. Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to China produced a clutch of new deals, but failed to secure funding for vital infrastructure projects. The visit resulted in a flurry of new agreements in sectors from banking to telecoms. 7. Silk Road. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping signed a decree on cooperation in tying the development of the Eurasian Economic Union with the "Silk Road‖ economic project. 8. Moscow-Kazan High Speed Railway.

(a) China will also invest $5.8 billion in the construction of the Moscow-Kazan High Speed Railway, the Russian President said.

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(b) The railway is to be extended to China, connecting the two countries through Kazakhstan. It can become part of the route of the new Silk Road project, which is aimed at connecting China with European and Middle Eastern markets. (c) The total cost of the Moscow-Kazan high speed railroad project is $21.4 billion.

9. An agreement to create a leasing company which will promote the sale of the Russian Sukhoi Superjet-100 passenger planes to the Chinese and South-East Asian markets over the next three years has been set up. 10. Russia and China will also develop a new heavy helicopter, called the Advanced Heavy Lift. The helicopter will be able to lift 38 tons and operate in mountain areas, performing a variety of missions in any weather conditions. 11. Agricultural Projects. Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), the Russia-China Investment Fund (RCIF) and the People‘s Government of Heilongjiang Province agreed to launch a $2 billion fund targeting investment in agricultural projects in both countries. 12. Gas Deal. Main prize remains ratifying the historic $400 billion gas deal the two countries signed last May. Under the agreement, Russia is to deliver 38 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas to China annually over 30 years starting 2018. China has already started construction of its section of the Eastern gas pipeline route known as the Power of Siberia. 13. Implications of Closer Relations.

(a) China, the world's second largest consumer of oil and Russia, the world's second largest exporter of oil, have been deepening their relationship in recent years. (b) Security and energy cooperation have been the driving forces behind the rapprochement. (c) China and Russia have also allied with each other on international issues, generally in opposition to the US. . (d) Russia has been focusing on enhancing relations with China after the Ukraine crisis and sanctions imposed by the US and EU. (e) China did not condemn Crimea‘s reunification with Russia and adopted positive neutrality over Ukrainian crisis (f) The sanctions imposed by the West on Russia over Ukraine were pushing Russia towards a military alliance with China (g) While a military alliance between Russia and China was unlikely, elements of such an alliance were shaping up. (h) Russian President Vladimir Putin said that relations between Russia and China were at their all-time best (j) With the signing of the gas deal the two countries were steadily moving towards building a strategic energy alliance.

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(k) Russia-China alliance underlines a major change in the global balance of power challenging the post-Cold War unipolar world dominated by the US. (l) Enhanced partnership between Russia and China marked the emergence of a global coalition against US hegemony in the post-Cold War era.

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CHAPTER - 39

IRAQ Background 1. Operation Desert Storm.

(a) On January 16, 1991, Operation Desert Storm began after Iraq Invaded Kuwait. (b) The US launched massive air and missile attacks on Iraq.

2. Ceasefire.

(a) Operation Desert Storm concluded after 38 days on February 22, 1991. (b) Under the ceasefire that ended the Gulf War, Iraq was to destroy its existing stock of WMD stockpiles and missiles with a range greater than 150 kms. (c) The Resolution also created the UN Special Commission to carry out inspections and verify compliance.

3. UNSCOM. The UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) was created out of the 1991 Security Council Resolution 687. It was set up to investigate Iraq‘s chemical and biological weapons programme as well as its ballistic missile capability. 4. Execution of Saddam Hussein.

(a) Sentence to Saddam.

(i) On November 5, 2006, the former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was sentenced to death by an Iraqi court following a controversial yearlong trial over the killings of 148 Shias in the town of Dujail in 1982. (ii) Mr. Hussein was hanged on December 30, 2006.

(b) President of Iraq. In 1968, Saddam Hussein organised a coup that brought the Ba‘ath party to power. He became the President of Iraq in 1979, and was involved in three wars – one with Iran, and two the US in 1991 and 2003.

(c) Protests against Execution.

(i) Hundreds of angry demonstrators condemned the US and Iraq‘s Government over the execution of the former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. (ii) Protests were also held in the US where groups of Americans opposed to the Iraq war and death penalty decried Mr. Hussein‘s execution.

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(d) India Disappointed over Execution.

(i) India described the execution of the former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, as ―unfortunate‖ and hoped that it would not affect the stability of Iraq. (ii) India had expressed the hope that the execution would not be carried out. Hence, it was disappointed that it was carried out.

(e) Execution Shown on Television.

(i) Foreign affairs experts felt that the execution of Saddam Hussein carried out in the presence of foreign troops would widen the sectarian divide between the Shias and the Sunnis, which already exists in Iraq and West Asia. (ii) A Shia television station showed the sharp exchange of words between Saddam Hussein and his executioners, and graphic images of the hanging that followed. Analysts fee that this would deepen sectarian strife in West Asia.

5. Stabilisation of Iraq.

(a) Analysts opine that the international community has a stake in the stabilisation of Iraq, in the defeat of terrorism and in the democratisation of West Asian region. (b) The international community needs to tackle the unilateralist US patiently to win the war against terrorism.

6. Political Solution.

(a) Analysts suggest that the chaos in Iraq could be resolved by political means. (b) The political and religious leaders of Shia‘s and Sunnis could still reach a national consensus through dialogue and compromise. (c) Observers feel that only political and religious leaders of the two communities have the ability to control their own militias and end the violence.

7. Sectarian Violence to Balkanise Iraq.

(a) There has been a surge in sectarian violence in Iraq after Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki sought to enhance power after the political vacuum created by the departure of the US troops. (b) The sectarian violence has increased the pressure on the Government which is at the centre of a deep domestic political crisis. (c) The surge in sectarian violence is seen by the Government of Iraq as a plot to balkanise the country.

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(d) The deepened mutual distrust and suspicion between the Shias, Sunnis and Kurds has been enhanced by the allegations that the Shia -dominated Government was denying the Sunni politicians ministerial posts or was obstructing those who hold them, according to analysts. (e) In January 2012, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan warned the Iraqi authorities that Turkey would not remain silent if they start a sectarian conflict in Iraq. (f) He criticised the Iraqi Prime Minister for his accusation that Turkey was intervening in Iraq‘s affairs.

8. ISIS Seize Cities in Northern Iraq.

(a) On June 10, 2014, the jihadist Sunni militant group called the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (al-Sham, Syria) (ISIL), seized Iraq‘s second largest city of Mosul. (b) The ISIS and its allies, included loyalists of Saddam Hussein, captured a large swathe of northern and north-central Iraq within days resulting in more than half a million people fleeing their homes. (c) The ISIS captured mainly Sunni Arab towns where resentment against the Shia-led government is high. (d) The ISIS offensive led to the death of more than 1,000 people, according to the UN.

9. ISIS or ISIL.

(a) The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (refers to Syria) ISIL is an armed militant group active in Iraq and Syria seeking to establish an Islamic caliphate. (b) Origin – the group was formed in early years of Iraq war under the name of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). (c) On June 30, 2014, the ISIS declared an Islamic caliphate and asked Muslims worldwide to pledge their allegiance to the chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the caliph and leader of Muslims everywhere. (d) The emergence of ISIS with thousands of Arab and foreign fighters under its wing is seen as a challenge to the al-Qaeda for the control of the global jihadist movement, according to analysts. (e) The ISIS has live-tweeted amputations and carried out public crucifixions of its perceived enemies. (f) The ISIS is believed to be the richest terrorist group with funds of around $12 million per month on account of extortion, ransom payments and corruption in Mosul.

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(g) The main sources of income for the ISIS are believed to be from kidnapping and other criminal activity as well as from private wealthy individuals in the Gulf. (a) The military equipment and vehicles abandoned by the Iraqi soldiers were used by the ISIS. (j) Ability of the ISIS to generate funds directly without depending on sponsors makes it difficult for the authorities to cut the flow of funds to them.

10. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

(a) The ISIS chief was born in 1971 in Samara in Iraq and named Awwad Ibrahim al-Badri al Samarri. (b) In 2003, he joined the rebel fighters during the US invasion of Iraq. (c) In 2006, he was captured by US forces and kept in the US-run prison in Iraq Camp Bucca. He is believed to have joined forces with the al-Qaeda here. (d) On release from prison he joined ISIS and became its chief in 2010 with the name Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. (e) In late June the ISIS declared Islamic caliphate and released an audio recording online declaring its chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi the caliph and leader of Muslims everywhere.

11. Iraqi Kurds Take Control of Disputed Territory.

(a) The ISIS offensive in northern Iraq has thus allowed the Iraqi Kurds to take control of disputed territory which they want to add to their autonomous northern region, a move long opposed by the government of Iraq.

12. Iraqi Government‟s Response.

(a) On June 12, 2014, Iraqi forces launched air strikes on ISIS militants occupying the former dictator Saddam Hussein‘s palace compound in the city of Tikrit. (b) On June 13, 2014, the Shia Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani urged the people to defend the country against the offensive by the ISIS. (c) The call by the Grand Ayatollah led to thousands of volunteers joining the Iraqi army. (d) The Iraqi forces retook areas North of the capital Baghdad and along with the volunteers prepared to defend the capital. (e) The Iraqi security forces who had performed poorly in the initial onslaught by the ISIS militants started recovering and regaining ground by repel the militants and recapturing towns north of Baghdad.

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(f) Iraq officially asked the US to help under the security agreement between the two countries, and to conduct air strikes against terrorist groups (g) Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki vowed to face terrorism and bring down the conspiracy. (h) On June 19, 2014, the Iraqi security forces gained full control of the Baiji oil refinery in Salaheddin province. (j) On June 24, 2014, Iraqi forces recaptured from the ISIS a border crossing with Syria. The capture was marred by air strikes that killed civilians. (k) Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said that political measures were needed along with military offensive to repel the ISIS (l) The Iraqi military has overwhelming superiority over the ISIS (m) On June 29, 2014, the Iraqi warplanes bombed Tikrit as Russia delivered the first batch of Su-25warplanes designed for ground attack to aid the Iraqi government in the crisis. (n) On July 04, 2014, the Iraqi forces retook Saddam Hussein‘s home village of Awia after an hour-long battle with the ISIS militants. (o) On July 1, 2014, the first sitting of the Iraqi Parliament ended in chaos with Parliamentarians threatening each other and walking out despite calls by the international community to form a government to face the ISIS onslaught. (p) The members of the Parliament were elected in April 2014 and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is bidding for a third-term. (q) The reconvening of the Parliament was postponed. (r) On July 24, 2014, Kurdish politician Fuad Masum was elected as the new President of Iraq by the Parliament by an overwhelming majority of 211 votes to 17. (s) Under the unofficial power-sharing deal, Iraq‘s Kurds get the post of President. (t) The move could pave the way for a deal on the post of the Prime Minister and the formation of a new Government which needs to be inclusive for the country to survive

13. US Stand.

(a) On June 13, 2014, the US President Barack Obama ruled out sending US troops back into combat in Iraq, but asked his national security team to prepare a range of other options that could help support Iraqi forces. (b) The US would not involve itself in military action in the absence of a political plan by the Iraqi‘s that gives it some assurance that they were prepared to work together

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(c) The US spent billions of dollars in training and providing equipment for the Iraqi forces and around 4,500 US soldiers died between the US-led invasion in 2003 and the withdrawal in 2011. (d) 300 military advisers to Iraq to take targeted, precise, military actions in future. (e) The military advisers would be sent to Iraq to examine how to train and equip Iraqi forces (f) The US increased its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations to better understand the situation in Iraq. (g) The key priorities for the US in Iraq were to create joint operation centres in Baghdad and northern Iraq, which would share intelligence and coordinate planning to confront the terrorist threat of ISIS, according to the US President. (h) The US hoped that success would be achieved through diplomatic efforts with Iraqi leadership and countries in the region (j) The US Secretary of State John Kerry departed to the Middle East and Europe to consult the US allies and partners. (k) Iraq‘s neighbours should respect Iraq‘s territorial integrity and all of them have a vital interest in ensuring that Iraq does not descend into civil war or become a safe haven for terrorists. (l) Both Syria and Iraq was going to be a combination of what happens inside the country, working with moderate Syrian opposition, working with an Iraqi government that is inclusive, and the US laying down a more effective counterterrorism platform that gets all the countries in the region pulling in the same direction. (m) To tackle terrorists organisations like the ISIS, the focus had to remain on building effective partnerships (n) Urged the Iraqi leaders to rise above sectarian motivations and form a government that was united in its determination to meet the needs and speak to the demands of all their people. (o) The US had shed blood and worked hard for years to provide Iraqi‘s with the opportunity to have their own governance but the ISIL crossed the line from Syria, began plotting internally, and they have attacked communities (p) The US military was flying a few armed drones over Baghdad to defend American troops and diplomats in the Iraqi capital if necessary (q) The armed robotic planes were in addition to other manned and unmanned US aircraft that were conducting surveillance to gain a better understanding of events on the ground.

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14. Iran‟s Stand.

(a) Offered to work with the US if took the lead in helping push back Sunni ISIS militants who seized a number of cities and towns in northern Iraq. (b) Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said that Iran would do everything to protect Shia shrines in Iraqi cities against the ISIS militant assault. (c) Iran flew surveillance drones over Iraq and was sending military equipment to help the government of Iraq fight the Sunni insurgents in late June 2014, according to western media reports. (d) On July 16, 2014, the US Secretary of State said that the US was open to discussions with Iran if that could help end the violence.

15. Saudi Arabia‟s Stand.

(a) On July 18, 2014, Saudi Arabia warned of the risks of a civil war in Iraq with unpredictable consequences for the region. (b) Saudi Arabia also insisted on the formation of an inclusive government in Iraq.

16. Syria. On June 24, 2014, Syrian warplanes bombed positions of the ISIS militants near the border crossing in the town of Qaim. The airstrikes by Syria came after the ISIS insurgents took control of town of Al-Qaim on the Iraqi side of the border, providing them a strategic route to Syria. 17. India‟s Stand.

(a) India backed the government of Iraq in maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq and expressed deep concern over the takeover of Mosul and Tikrit by the ―terrorist outfits‖. (b) About 46 Indian nurses were stranded in Tikrit in Iraq. (c) Around 40 Indian construction workers in the Iraqi city of Mosul were kidnapped by the ISIS militants when they were being evacuated from the area. (d) The government of India began planning for the possible evacuation of 10,000 or more Indians from Iraq. (e) The Indian Navy put two warships on standby for possible evacuation of Indians stranded in Iraq. (f) The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) coordinated with the Gulf countries – Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and UAE. (g) On July 04, 2014, the efforts of the Indian government to rescue its nationals from Iraq met with success with the release of 46 Indian nurses from captivity in Tikrit.

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(h) Safe return of the Indian nurses from Iraq was the result of India‘s diplomatic outreach by multiple agencies of the government. (j) The External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj spoke to her counterparts in West Asia, including the Gulf countries and adequate ground work was also done by the National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh. (k) The Indian government is also making efforts for the release of 40 Indian construction workers kidnapped by the ISIS.

18. India to Build Intervention Capabilities to Secure Citizens.

(a) Kidnapping of around 40 Indian construction workers in Mosul by the ISIS is a reminder that India needs to urgently build strategic intervention capabilities to secure its citizens in foreign nations. (b) India‘s strategy has to be innovative without putting to risk the lives of its citizens. (c) India needs to build up special operations squads to intervene in vulnerable areas worldwide where the Indian immigrants are in larger numbers. (d) Elite commando units need to be trained to specialise in those areas and kept as standby for rapid deployment during contingencies. (e) India has enormous goodwill in the region and the people-to-people diplomacy has given the country valuable influence which has yielded success as seen by the successful evacuation of the Indian nurses from Iraq. (f) India demonstrated its capacity to deploy warships and aircraft to evacuate Indians and other nationals from South Asia during the Asian tsunami in 2004 and the evacuations in Beirut in the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah. (g) India needs to refocus its policy on pre-positioning and deployment overseas of civil and military assets for mass evacuations whenever required.

19. Implications on India.

(a) India was monitoring the overall situation in Iraq and there was no cause for alarm. (b) India‘s Finance Secretary said that there were reasons to hope that the Iraq crisis would blow over. (c) Iraq is India‘s second largest oil supplier, meeting 20% of its demand. (d) Fighting has not reached the southern energy hub, which produced two-thirds of Iraq‘s oil is a Shia majority area with close ties to Iran. (e) India is among the targets of ISIS with the group‘s chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi vowing to wage war against several countries including India.

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(f) India‘s primary interest in Iraq is in its oil which is in areas controlled by the Shia‘s and Kurds. (g) Military intervention by the US or Iran would be harmful to the long-term interests in Iraq as it would divide the people of Iraq permanently on sectarian lines. (h) India can play a key role in bringing about peace in Iraq by urging both the US and Iran not to intervene military and allow the government of Iraq to defeat the ISIS on its own. (j) India also needs to influence Saudi Arabia not to increase their support for the tribes in Iraq to a point that the government of Iraq and Iran perceive it as a threat. (k) India should also try to influence the Iraqi Prime Minister to rise above sectarian differences and include the Sunni leadership in an inclusive government. (l) The Kurdish Democratic Party hopes to deepen political and economic ties with India and looks at India as an important partner.

20. Economic Implications.

(a) In mid-June global crude oil prices rose to a nine-month high over concerns that the ISIS attacks could disrupt oil exports from Iraq, the second-largest OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries) oil producer. (b) The major concern driving the crude oil prices was the possibility of the ISIS taking control of the south later this year when the demand of oil peaks in Europe and the US. (c) Currently, Iraq‘s oil fields located in the south are safe and the northern oil field are safe under the Kurds. (d) The International Energy Agency (IEA) said that OPEC would need to produce 1 million barrels per day (bpd) more oil on average in the second half of 2014 to balance the global market, which would see a sharp seasonal increase in demand. (e) The Iraqi crisis also caused concerns among the international airlines as the rising crude oil prices could hurt the airlines in the second quarter in terms of travel demand. (f) Crude oil prices could ease with international intervention in the Iraq crisis. (g) The Iraq crisis also adversely impacted the global markets with the stocks dropping to a four months low and the Indian rupee depreciating against the US dollar.

21. Implications for the Region and the World.

(a) Division of Iraq on Sectarian Lines.

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(b) Conflicts in Iraq and Syria could continue but National Borders are Unlikely to be Changed. (c) A Unity Government in Iraq Based on Broad Consensus is the Way Forward from the Current Crisis. (d) The US and Iran are Unlikely to Intervene Militarily in Iraq unless Baghdad is in threat of being Overrun by ISIS. (e) Saudi Arabia and Iran Need to Give Up their Sectarian Approach to Regional Affairs and Address the Regional Security through Dialogue. India and other Asian Countries who have a Stake in the Regional Stability Need to Consult and Promote Dialogue and CBMs in the Gulf Region

Situation 2014-15 22. On 08 Aug 2014, US started Air Strikes against IS in Iraq. 23. Barak Obama‟s address to UN General Assembly (24 Sep 2014).

(a) US would work with a broad coalition to ―dismantle the IS network of death‖. (b) Asked the world to join in this effort, pointing out that the only language understood by the killers was the language of force. (c) The US President called on the Muslim countries to reject the ideology of radical Islam, but cutting off funding to extremists and taking aim at militant propaganda on the Internet.

24. Global Coalition (Paris, 15 Sep 2014).

(a) Representatives from 30 countries and international organisations, including the US, Russia and China held a meeting in Paris and pledged to support Iraq in its fight against the Islamic State (IS) militants by any means necessary, including appropriate military assistance. (b) IS extremists were a threat not only to Iraq but also to the entire international community. (c) Urgent need to remove the IS from Iraq, where they control around 40% of its territory. (d) Saudi Arabia and nine other Arab countries were among the countries backing the coalition, but Iran, which was not invited to the conference rejected US overtures to help in the fight against the IS militants.

25. China & Russia Against US Coalition.

(a) China termed as ―futile‖ the effort by the US to counter the IS outside the mandate of the UN Security Council. (b) From Afghanistan to Iraq, US-led military coalitions had emerged one after

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another, yet their ultimate goal of uprooting terrorism was still far from being achieved. (c) Not only a recognition of the symptoms but the root causes of terrorism must be addressed, through an integrated approach that included measures taken in political, security, economic, financial, intelligence and ideological fields. (d) China wants Iraq and Syria to play a central role in countering IS. (e) Russian Foreign Sergei Lavrov told the UN General Assembly that the US had openly declared its right to unilateral use of force anywhere to uphold its own interests. (f) Military interference had become a norm– even despite the dismal outcome of all power operations that the US had carried out over the recent years. (g) NATO air campaign in Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan were examples of US-led military actions that had led to ―chaos and instability.‖ (h) Mr. Lavrov called for restoring global priorities and avoid making them hostages of a unilateral agenda.

27. Foreign Hostages Killed by IS.

(a) On 20 Aug 20, 2014, the IS released a video showing the beheading of a US journalist James Foley in Syria in retaliation against US airstrikes in Iraq. (b) On 02 Sep, the IS released a video showing the beheading of a US reporter Steven Sotloff. (c) On 14 Sep 2014, the IS released a video showing the beheading of UK aid worker David Haines who was kidnapped in 2013. (d) On February 02, 2015, the IS beheaded two Japanese hostages after the Japanese Government under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe refused to give the ransom of $200 million demanded by the terrorist group. (e) On February 03, 2015, the IS released a video showing the burning of Jordanian pilot captured by them in December 2014 when his warplane was shot down during airstrikes over Syria. (f) Jordan executed two Iraqi jihadists in response to the burning alive of one of its fighter pilot. (g) On February 16, 2015, the IS released a video showing the beheading of 21 Egyptian Christians in Libya. (h) Egypt bombed IS targets in Libya where some Islamist groups have declared ties to IS.

28. UN‟s Stand.

(a) IS Committing Crimes Against Humanity.

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(b) UN Security Council Adopted a Resolution to Choke the Funding to the IS and the Flow of Foreign Fighters (August 17, 2014). (c) Resolution aimed at weakening the IS with measures to choke off funding and the flow of foreign fighters. (d) Placed six Islamist leaders from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other countries on the al-Qaeda sanctions list, which provides for travel ban and assets freeze. (e) Demanded that IS fighters in Iraq and Syria, rebels from the Al-Nusra Front in Syria and other al-Qaeda-linked groups disarm and disband with immediate effect. (f) Called on all member states to take national measures to suppress the flow of foreign terrorist fighters.

29. UNSC Adopts Resolution.

(a) On 12 Feb 15, resolution to choke funding to the IS from oil smuggling, antiquities trafficking and ransom payments to the Islamic State (IS) terror group. (b) In a show of resolve by the international community against the threat posed by the IS, the UNSC resolution was adopted by more than 35 countries. (c) Called for sanctions against individuals and entities that trade in oil with IS and Al-Qaeda affiliates such as Al-Nusra Front in Syria. (d) Urged all the 193 UN members to take appropriate steps to prevent the trade in culture property from Iraq and Syria. (e) It reminded governments that they must prevent terrorists from benefitting directly or indirectly from ransom payments or political concessions to secure the release of hostages. (f) The UNSC resolution was drafted under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter and could be enforced through sanctions or use of force. (g) UNSC resolution put pressure on Turkey which is seen as a transit point for delivering oil.

30. Kurdish Forces Recaptured Towns from the IS. 31. Threat from IS.

(a) On June 29, 2014, Islamic State (IS), the terrorist group, declared an Islamic caliphate and asked Muslims worldwide to pledge their allegiance to the chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the caliph and leader of Muslims everywhere. (b) On June 29, 2015, the IS caliphate entered its second year with the extremist group expanding its territory in Iraq and Syria and increasing their reach globally by claiming attacks in Tunisia and Kuwait.

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(c) In one year, the IS had gained more territory in Syria and Iraq despite the fightback by the Iraqi and Syrian security forces supported by a US-led coalition air campaign. (d) The IS has also started affiliations in countries like Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Pakistan and others raising international concern. (e) The IS rule in territories it controls in Iraq and Syria has been marked by brutal executions and mass killings. (f) IS controls about a third of Iraq and about 50% of Syrian territory although much of it is uninhabited.

32. US for a Long-Term Campaign.

(a) In July 2015, the US President Barack Obama announced that the US-led coalition was intensifying its efforts against the Islamic State (IS) in Syria. (b) Mr Obama cautioned that it would be a long-term campaign and it would take time to root out the IS. (c) The US President held a meeting with the national security team at the Pentagon on the challenges being posed by the IS. (d) As was the case with any military effort, there would be periods of progress, but there were also going to be some setbacks – as seen with the IS gains in Ramadi in Iraq and central and southern Syria. (e) The IS‘s recent losses in both Syria and Iraq proved that it can and will be defeated. (f) The US-led coalition was intensifying its efforts against the IS base in Syria and the air strikes would continue to target the oil and gas facilities that fund so much of their operations. (g) The US strategy recognised that no amount of military force would end the terror posed by IS unless it was matched by a broader effort, political and economic, that addressed the underlying conditions that had allowed it to gain traction. (h) The IS had filled a void and the US-led coalition had to make sure that, as they push them out, that void was filled

33. India to formulate National Policy to Counter IS Threat.

(a) India is concerned over the threat posed by the IS as it seeks to expand its global reach and enrol fighters from different countries in the world. (b) In July 2015, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), decided to formulate a ‗coherent national strategy‘ on the IS after seeking a report from 10 States. (c) The Union Home Secretary L.C. Goyal was expected to hold a meeting of Home Secretaries of the 10 States in late July.

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(d) The Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) would give a presentation on the impact of the IS in India, according to media reports. (e) The 10 States that sent their reports to the Centre were Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Telangana, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. (f) At least 11 Indians had joined the IS in the past one year, according to media reports. (g) In June 2015, the Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh gave his approval for the creation of arevamped cyber security architecture within the Intelligence Bureau comprising of 500 officials. (h) It was realised that a specialised wing was required to counter the growing threat of radicalisation of youngsters through cyber means, according to analysts.

Conclusion 34. Threat from IS to the Region.

(a) Western Intelligence services were worried that the IS has been using social media to spread its message. (b) The US State Department‘s Centre for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications has increased its efforts to counter IS propaganda by publishing steady stream of IS horror tales on Facebook and Twitter. (c) The most worrisome threat was the thousands of foreign fighters training with the Islamic State (IS). (d) The IS was a threat because of its strategic operations, formation of alliances and careful planning of its operations. (e) The leader of the IS showed glimpses of careful planning by forming alliances with Sunni tribal leaders and former members of the Baath Party. (f) The IS militants currently have about 20,000 to 31,500 fighters on ground, according to the CIA. Half of the fighters of the IS were foreigners from different countries like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Europe and even the US. (g) The IS is currently confined to Iraq and Syria but is likely to spread to other countries of the region and could also threaten Europe and the US if left unchecked. (h) The countries of the region allied against the IS met in Jeddah in Saudi Arabia on September 11, 2014. (j) The meeting in Jeddah agreed that in the war against the IS. (k) The US would undertake the air strikes.

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(l) The GCC countries would fund the conflict and provide airbases. (m) The Iraqi army would be trained and armed by the US advisers to fight the IS in al iance with Kurdish Peshmerga and moderate Sunnis in Iraq. (n) US military role in West Asia has led to strategic realignments in the region. Saudi Arabia and the US have opposed the inclusion of Syria in the war against the IS. (o) There are doubts over the Saudi-Iran ties moving in a positive direction with Saudi Arabia giving priority to regime change in Syria. (p) The US and Iran have been reported to be open to discussions on Iran‘s role against the IS. (q) Jeddah conference marked the renewal of US-Saudi ties which had been on a low due to the US-Iran thaw in relations to Iran‘s nuclear programme. (r) For stability in West Asia a Saudi-Iran engagement is a must as Iran has to engage the Shia regimes in Iraq and Syria to form accommodative and inclusive governments and Saudi Arabia has to wean moderate Sunnis away from the IS. (s) Fears were expressed that the US air strikes could exacerbate anti-West sentiment in the region, especially among the youth who could be attracted towards the IS if the bombing affects their families. (t) The root causes of the extremism in region were due to the absence of social justice, vigorous public space and effective domestic security capabilities. (u) Political reforms and an alternative to the economic policy pursued in both Iraq and Syria need to be in place to defeat the Islamic State (IS).

35. Threat from IS to India.

(a) India is among the targets of ISIS with the group‘s chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi vowing to wage war against several countries including India. (b) On February 13, 2015, Indian intelligence agencies with help from Britain arrested 24-year-old Mehdi Masroor Biswas, the alleged owner of the pro-IS Twitter account, in Bengaluru. (c) The police booked cases against Biswas, an engineering graduate from Kolkata working as a manufacturing executive in ITC Foods in Bengaluru, under Section 125 of IPC for waging war against an Asian power (Syria) that is in alliance with India and under the IT Act of cyber terrorism. (d) Earlier, the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) arrested a youth in Maharashtra who had left for Iraq with three others to join the IS, he was arrested when returned to India. (e) The arrests by the intelligence agencies point to the urgent need for security agencies to stop IS from making any inroads to influence Indian Muslim youth through social networks.

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(f) The US Department of Defence does not have any records or intelligence available on the presence of Indian nationals among the ranks of IS.

36. India Needs to Build Strategic Intervention Capabilities to Secure Its Citizens in Foreign Nations.

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CHAPTER - 40

ISRAEL - PALESTINE PROBLEM

1. Elections in Israel.

(a) On 18 Mar 2015, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu won a stunning victory in the Parliamentary elections securing a third consecutive term. (b) On 07 May 2015, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu managed to forge a government, just an hour before a legal deadline. (c) Mr. Netanyahu signed an agreement giving a key role to the far-right Jewish Home that firmly opposes a Palestinian State. (d) The inclusion of the far-right Jewish party could complicate Israel‘s already strained relations with Palestinians and the international community.

2. Palestine Joins International Criminal Court.

(a) On 01 Apr 2015, Palestine formally joined the International Criminal Court (ICC) and hoped that it could open the way for a possible prosecution of Israelis for alleged war crimes. (b) The Palestinians called upon Israel to join the ICC, which was set up in 2002 to try crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide. (c) After decades of failed negotiations with Israel, the Palestinians have been trying for recognition at international bodies including the ICC.

3. Vatican Recognized Palestine.

(a) On 26 Jun 2015, the Vatican signed a treaty with the State of Palestine and hoped that it would lead to improved relations between Israel and the Palestinians. (b) The accord, the result of 15 years of negotiations, covered essential aspects of the life and activity of the Catholic Church in the State of Palestine. (c) The agreement could be a stimulus to bringing a definitive end to the longstanding Israeli-Palestine conflict, which continued to cause suffering for both parties. (d) The Vatican called for Israel and the State of Palestine to take courageous decisions so that the much desired two-State solution may become a reality as soon as possible. (e) Israel‘s Foreign Ministry expressed its disappointment and called the signing of the treaty between Vatican and the State of Palestine a hasty step that hurt the prospects of peace.

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(f) The hasty step damaged the prospects for advancing a peace agreement, and harmed the international effort to convince the Palestinian Authority (PA) to return to direct negotiations with Israel. (g) Israel cannot accept the unilateral determinations in the agreement which do not take into account Israel‘s essential interests and the special historic status of the Jewish people in Jerusalem.

4. UN Report Accused Israel & Hamas of War Crimes.

(a) The UN Commission of Inquiry on the 2014 Gaza Conflict announced that both Israel and HAMAS might have committed war crimes during the 2014 Gaza war. (b) The UN Commission of Inquiry said that it had gathered substantial information and credible allegations that both sides had committed war crimes during the conflict. (c) The extent of the devastation and human suffering in Gaza was unprecedented and would impact generations to come. (d) The Commission voiced concern that a sense of impunity prevailed across the board for violations allegedly committed by the Israeli forces, whether it be in the context of active hostilities in Gaza or killings, torture and ill-treatment in the West Bank. (e) The report criticised both sides, but specifically decried the huge firepower used by Israel in Gaza – 6,000 airstrikes and 50,000 artillery shells fired during the 51-day operation. (f) Israel termed the report of the UN Commission of Inquiry as biased and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that his country does not commit war crimes. (g) Israel defended itself against a terror organisation which called for its destruction and that itself carried out war crimes. (h) Hamas welcomed the UN report‘s condemnation of Israel for its war crimes. (j) The UN report reinforced the will of the Palestinians to go to the ICC

5. India Abstained from Voting.

(a) On 03 Jul 2015, India abstained from a vote against Israel at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva. (b) The UNHRC resolution welcomed the UN Human Rights Council report, which found evidences of alleged war crimes committed by both Israel and Hamas during the Gaza conflict in 2014, especially calling for accountability of Israeli officials.

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(c) Forty One countries voted in favour of the UNHRC resolution against Israel and only one country, the US voted against. (d) Earlier in July 2014, India had voted against Israel and in favour of the UNHRC resolution that instituted the Commission of inquiry into the Gaza conflict. (e) The Government of India denied any shift in India‘s policy towards Israel stressing that India had abstained because the UNHRC resolution had included a reference to taking Israel to the ICC, which India considers ―intrusive.‖ (f) Even in the past, whenever a UNHRC resolution had made a direct reference to the ICC, India‘s general approach had been to abstain. (g) Israeli Ambassador to India Daniel Carmon appreciated India‘s stand and thanked it. (h) India‘s Prime Minister Narendra Modi is expected to visit Israel, Palestine and Jordan by the end of this year.

Conclusion. 6. Destinies of the People of Israel and Palestine are inextricably linked - peaceful co-existence is the only solution to the conflict

7. Time for a Full and Comprehensive Peace between Israel and its Arab Neighbours:-

(a) The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appealed to the international community to work for a full and comprehensive peace between Israel and its Arab neighbours. (b) The UN Chief urged the international community to tirelessly pursue the goal of ending the occupation that began in 1967, the establishment of a State of Palestine in Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, to co-exist alongside Israel in peace and security

8. India Supports Peaceful Resolution.

(a) India supports the peaceful resolution of the West Asian conflict and believes that it is political in nature and cannot be resolved by force. (a) Since 1947, India has been involved in the Palestinian problem. (c) In 1974, India recognised the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. (d) In 1988, India became the first non-Arab nation to recognise the State of Palestine. (e) The Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas visited India in Feb 2010. (f) The current NDA Government has also stressed that there was no change in India‘s long-standing position on support to the Palestinian cause.

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CHAPTER - 41

JAPAN

1. End of 69 Year Old Policy of Pacifist Defence.

(a) On 01 Jul 2014, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his Cabinet approved amendment to Japan‘s Pacifist Constitution giving more powers to the military. (b) After World War II, Japan embraced a Pacifist Constitution which renounced war and possession of war potential. Japan‘s protection was secured under a US military umbrella. (c) Japan also set up a Self-Defence Force (SDF) to defend its home islands (d) Under the new definition, Japanese troops would be able to come to the aid of allies if they come under attack from a common enemy, even if Japan is not the object of the attack. (e) The move to allow the ―Collective Self-Defence‖ has to be approved by the Parliament

2. US & Japan Agreed on New Rules for Defence Cooperation.

(a) On 27 Apr 2015, the US and Japan agreed on new rules for defence cooperation that would give Japanese armed forces ambitious global role. (b) Concern over the increasing power of China was the main reason behind the agreement on new rules for US-Japan defence cooperation. (c) Under the amended guidelines, Japan could come to the aid of US forces threatened by a third country. (d) The current guidelines were unrestricted with respect to geography. It was a very big change – from being locally focused to globally focused. (e) Officials said that the new doctrine was not aimed at China but mentioned North Korea as a source of tension in the region. (f) The US saw the disputed Senkaku islands in East China Sea, known as Diaoyu in Chinese, as firmly under Japan‘s control. (g) The US commitment to Japan‘s security remained ironclad and covered all territories under Japan‘s administration, including the Senkaku islands. (h) The sovereignty of the islands in the East China Sea has been disputed by Japan and China for decades.

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(j) Under the previous rules for US-Japan defence cooperation, Japanese forces could assist US troops only if they were operating in the direct defence of Japan. (k) The revised guidelines reflect a reinterpretation of Japan‘s Constitution by the Shinzo Abe Government in 2014, which allows for collective defence. (l) Revised guidelines for US-Japan defence cooperation were part of the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe‘s bid to soften his country‘s constitutional commitment to pacifism. (m) Japan‘s willingness to embrace ―proactive pacifism‖ came amid increasing concerns in Japan and other nations of Asia over China‘s rising military and economic might. (n) The revised guidelines injects more substance to the US President Barack Obama‘s ―Pivot to Asia‖ doctrine, which the Chinese feel lays the military groundwork for containing China‘s peaceful rise.

3. China Slammed US-Japan Defence Cooperation.

(a) The revised guidelines for US-Japan defence cooperation were slammed by China as an attempt to undermine it, as well as the geopolitical architecture of the Asia-Pacific. (b) The new guidelines had struck a threatening pose toward China, which was the strongest driver for East Asia‘s development. It had also sent a dangerous signal for regional stability. (c) Concerned at the joint decision taken by the US and Japan to include the disputed Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea, in the ambit of the new guidelines on defence cooperation. (d) Since the Cold War‘s end, the US-Japan alliance had never been so military-oriented as now. They no longer made efforts to hide their intention of containing China‘s rise

4. Security Bills.

(a) On Jul 16, 2015, the Lower House of Japan‘s Parliament passed security bills proposed by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe‘s administration. (b) Japan‘s post-World War II Constitution bars it from using force to resolve conflicts except for self-defence. (c) The security bills allow Japan‘s military to be mobilised overseas under three conditions as follows:

(i) When Japan is attacked, or when a close ally is attacked, and the result threatens the survival of Japan and poses a danger to the people. (ii) When no other appropriate means is available to repel the attack and ensure Japan‘s survival and protect its citizens.

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(iii) The use of force would be restricted to a necessary minimum.

(d) The bills also allow Japan‘s military to take part in non-UN peacekeeping missions. (e) The bills which seek to replace Japan‘s self-defence doctrine with ―collective self-defence‖ would become law when approved by the Upper House of the Parliament. (f) The bills have been severely opposed with opponents pointing out that they undermine seven decades of pacifism and could lead to the Japanese military fighting abroad for the first time Since World War-II. (g) Opponents pointed out that the two security bills could draw Japan into US-led conflicts around the world, and could violate Article 9 of its Constitution. (h) The main Opposition parties walked out of the Lower House in protest against the security bills reflecting public disapproval of the legislation. (j) Approval of the security bills by the Lower House marked a victory for Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his ruling coalition who ignored popular anger in a bid to break the shackles of the US-imposed post World War-II Constitution.

5. Factors for change in Constitution.

(a) Japan has been under pressure from the US to revise its pacifist security doctrine. (b) In Apr 2015, the US and Japan announced new security guidelines which urged Japan to take more responsibility in their bilateral security arrangement. (c) Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe wants to have an outward-looking security policy to contain the rise of China. (d) Mr. Abe had also proposed a ―strategic diamond‖ of four maritime countries – The US, Japan, Australia and India – to counter China‘s influence in the Pacific. (e) The Japanese Prime Minister has criticised China‘s territorial claims in the South China Sea, and Japan and China have a dispute over the islands held by Japan in the East China Sea.

6. China‟s Criticism.

(a) China voiced concern over the passage of the two security bills by the Lower House of Japan‘s Parliament. (b) The move cannot but raise concern and questions from neighbouring countries and the rest of the international community on whether Japan would abolish its pacifist posture. (c) China has been concerned as Sino-Japanese tensions had been increasing in the Pacific.

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(d) Japan is the top ally in enforcing the ―Asia Pivot‖ of the US wherein 60% of the US troops have been deployed under the Pacific Command with China as the focus. (e) China urged Japan to avoid crippling regional peace and security.

7. Implications of Change in Pacifist Security Doctrine.

(a) The passage of two security bills to re-orient Japan‘s post-World War-II pacifist Constitution has some implications for the region. (b) Japan‘s pacifist Constitution had ensured peace over the last 70 years helping Japan to become an economic power. (c) The main concern over the change of Japan‘s pacifist security doctrine was over whether it would help Japan address its security challenges, or lead to an increase in tensions in the volatile East Asian region. (d) If the change in Japan‘s security doctrine results in tensions in the East Asian region it would make the region unstable due to the rivalry between China and Japan. (e) Instability in the East Asia region would not be in the interest of either Japan or Asia and hence Japan should desist from joining the Sino-US rivalry in the Pacific. (f) Japan needs to concentrate on resolving its problems with China on a bilateral basis and also work towards establishing regional stability by continuing its pacifist security doctrine.

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CHAPTER - 42

KENYA

Terrorist Attacks in Kenya 1. Kenyan University Attacked.

(a) On 02 Apr 15 Somalia‘s Al-Shabab militant Islamist group attacked a Kenyan University killing 147 students. (b) Setting Muslims free and holding Christians and others hostage. (c) The siege lasted for around 13 hours before Kenyan troops launched an assault on the building killing four gunmen. (d) This was the deadliest terror attack in Kenya since the 1998 bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi by Al-Qaeda terrorist which resulted in the death of 213 people. (e) The attack on Kenyan university was claimed by the al-Qaeda-linked Al-Shabab militants. (f) Mission was to kill those who were against their group.. (g) Kenya was at war with Somalia, in reference to the thousands of Kenyan troops in Somalia as part of the African Union Military mission.

2. Kenyan Vowed to End Terrorism.

(a) Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta in a nationwide address warned that the planners and financiers of attacks like the Kenyan university in Garissa were deeply embedded in the countries communities. (b) Vowed to fight terrorism to the end and stressed that the security forces were pursuing the remaining accomplices who would be brought to justice. (c) The Kenyan government offered a reward of $215,000 for the capture of alleged commander of Al-Shabab Mohamed Mohamud, a former teacher at a Kenyan Madrassa Islamic school, who coordinated the attack. (d) Kenyan security forces arrested three people trying to cross into Somalia and two other suspects were arrested at Garissa University College.

3. Kenya Bombed Al-Shabab Camps in Somalia.

(a) On 06 Apr 2015, Kenyan fighter jets bombed two camps of the al-Qaeda-linked Al-Shabab militants in Southern Somalia

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(b) Since 2011, when the Kenyan troops crossed to Somalia, Kenyan fighter jets have repeatedly bombed the Al-Shabab bases in southern Somalia. (c) Kenya has joined the African Union force fighting the Al-Shabab in Somalia. (d) The bombings were part of the continued process and engagement against Al-Shabab, which would go on. (e) The Al-Shabab fled from Somalia‘s capital Mogadishu in 2011, and continues to fight against the African Union force – African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), sent to drive them out of Somalia. (f) The AMISOM force includes troops from Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. (g) Since then, the Al-Shabab carried out a series of attacks in neighbouring countries like Kenya and Uganda in response to their participation in the AU force.

Conclusion 4. The terrorist attack by the Al-Shabab on the Garissa University campus in Eastern

Kenya on 02 Apr 2015, was the 17th

attack in the last three years in Kenya. 5. The deliberate targeting of non-Muslims in the attack was seen either as a ploy to foment religious strife in Kenya or to assert its strength as a jihadi outfit affiliated to the al-Qaeda. 6. The Government of Kenya nullified the Al-Shabab ploy by projecting a face of unity and not allowing the attacks to descend into sectarian violence. 7. Actions of Al-Shabab are reflection of the situation in Somalia which has become a breeding ground for militant groups like Al-Shabab which originated from sections of radical Islamic organisations like the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). 8. In 2007 Ethiopia invaded Somalia and defeated the ICU which resulted in the formation of guerrilla forces like the Al-Shabab. 9. The Al-Shabab control parts of central and southern Somalia have imposed harsh laws. 10. In 2012, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) helped in taking on the Al-Shabab, but the guerrilla group started indiscriminate violence both within Somalia and in neighbouring countries. 11. Currently the AMISOM succeeded in driving out the Al-Shabab from its strongholds in Somalia which points to the guerrilla group‘s desperate attacks in Kenya and Uganda which are part of the AMISOM. 12. Kenya should continue to be part of the AMISOM and at the same time strive to avoid sectarian turmoil in the face of the provocation by the Al-Shabab.

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CHAPTER - 43

MYANMAR Rohingya Problem 1. Talks between Bangladesh & Myanmar on Rohingyas.

(a) On 31 Aug 14, Myanmar agreed to take back Rohingyas living in refugee camps in Bangladesh‘s Cox‘s Bazar district, in the next two months. (b) Initially Myanmar would take back 2,415 people, who had already been verified by Myanmar authorities as its nationals. (c) Bangladesh authorities said that 32,000 Rohingya refugees were living in the two camps in Cox‘s Bazar, from where the initial repatriation would begin. (d) In addition to the refugees in the camps in Bangladesh, and estimated 3-5 lakh undocumented Rohingyas were living in the bordering areas adjoining Myanmar. (e) Bangladesh and Myanmar share a 300 km border and have agreed to control it jointly to tackle the problems of drug and human trafficking, arms smuggling and illegal movement of people.

2. Citizenship to Rohingyas.

(a) Most of Myanmar‘s Muslim Rohingyas estimated to be 1.1 million are stateless and live in apartheid-like conditions in Rakhine State on the western coast of Myanmar. (b) Around 140,000 Rohingyas were displaced after clashes with the ethnic Rakhine Buddhists in 2012. (c) On 22 Sep 2014, Myanmar gave citizenship to 209 Muslim Rohingyas displaced by sectarian violence, after the first phase of a project aimed at determining the status of the 1.1 million Rohingyas. (d) The Rakhine State Action Plan outlined project plans which included rehabilitation and promoting reconciliation. (e) According to the Action Plan Rohingyas would be required to register their identities as ‗Bengali‘, a term rejected by most Rohingyas as it implied they were illegal immigrants from Bangladesh despite having lived in the area for generations. (f) The Action Plan proposes that the Myanmar authorities construct camps in required numbers for those who refuse to be registered and those without adequate documents.

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(g) The Action Plan pointed out that the Myanmar government would ask the UN Refugee Agency, the UNHCR, to help in resettling overseas those who fail to obtain citizenship. (h) It would be impossible for the UN agency to resettle the Rohingyas overseas as they would not be recognised refugees who have fled persecution and conflict across international borders.

3. Migrant Crisis.

(a) In late May 2015, more than 3,500 migrants mainly Rohingyas from Myanmar or economic migrants from Bangladesh had come ashore in Southeast Asia. (b) On 29 May 2015, the UN called for a comprehensive response to the large scale humanitarian crisis of migrants from Myanmar and Bangladesh. (c) On 02 Jun 2015, Myanmar‘s navy escorted a boatload of more than 700 migrants towards its Rakhine state. (d) Around 2,000 more migrants were believed to be still trapped in the sea across the Bay of Bengal. (e) International pressure mounted on Myanmar and Bangladesh to take back the migrants and improve their living conditions to stem the outflow.

4. US wants Myanmar to End Discrimination.

(a) The US President Barack Obama stressed that Myanmar needed to end discrimination against the Rohingyas if it was to succeed in its transition to democracy. (b) The US increased pressure on Myanmar to tackle the Rohingya problem which it saw as one of the root causes of migration in the region. (c) A senior US diplomat urged Myanmar to extend citizenship to the oppressed Rohingya minority to address the ongoing migrant crisis in Southeast Asia that left thousands stranded in the sea. (d) Myanmar said that discrimination and persecution of Rohingyas was not the cause of the migrant crisis in Southeast Asia pointing out that it was a regional problem linked to human trafficking.

5. Concerns in India.

(a) In Jun 2015, the Centre expressed concern over the increasing number of Rohingya Muslims settling in India. (b) The Union Home Ministry was asked to call a meeting of States to ask them to monitor the activities of the Rohingyas in India.

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(c) A high-level meeting was held in Jun 2015 by the Deputy National Security Advisor Arvind Gupta on the issue of increasing infiltration of Rohingya Muslims into India from Myanmar. (d) According to Government agencies the number of Rohingyas in India was estimated to be between 15,000 and 40,000. (e) The intelligence agencies and Home Ministry expressed concern to the deputy NSA that Rohingya Muslims could be cannon fodder for jihadist organisations giver the persecution they had faced at home and were forced to flee Myanmar, according a government official.

Ethnic Problems in Myanmar 6. Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement.

(a) On 31 Mar 2015, a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) was finalised between the representatives from 16 ethnic armed organisations (EAOs), the Myanmar Army, and the Government of Myanmar. (b) The draft NCA set out a framework for a countrywide cessation of armed conflicts. (c) The draft NCA was welcomed by the UN, has been playing the role of an observer to the peace talks. (d) For the government of Myanmar and 16 ethnic armed groups to reach a ceasefire agreement after more than 60 years of conflict was a historic and significant achievement. (e) The President of Myanmar Thein Sein welcomed the draft NCA and stressed that the people need peace, they desire peace and they expect peace. (f) The goal of the NCA was to make way for political dialogue to resolve the ethno-political problems in Myanmar, including the demand by ethnic minorities for autonomy under a federal structure.

7. Military Retains Legislative Veto.

(a) On 25 Jun 2015, a move to amend Myanmar‘s Constitution to remove the military‘s legislative veto on important decisions failed to get the required 75% support in the Parliament. (b) The Military would now preserve its powerful political role in Myanmar. A quarter of the seats in the Parliament are held by the military by law. (c) The proposed amendment aimed to reduce the share of the House votes needed to amend the Constitution to 70%. (d) Another vote on a clause that effectively bars Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi from becoming President of Myanmar also failed.

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(e) Aung San Suu Kyi of the National Democratic League (NDL) cannot become President of Myanmar because her two children are British citizens, as was her late husband. (f) NLD said that the military‘s ability to shoot down changes to the Constitution puts a limit on democratic reforms in Myanmar. (g) Ms. Suu Kyi said that the outcome was not surprising as it was obvious the military would not support amendments. (h) The failure to amend the Constitution was seen by critics as an enshrined safeguard to protect the military‘s sizeable economic and political interests.

8. Importance of Myanmar.

(a) Location of Myanmar - Gateway to ASEAN, Important for India's Look East Policy. (b) Myanmar's Support is Crucial to Curb Insurgency in the Northeast. (c) Myanmar's Oil and Gas Reserves Significant for India's Energy Security. (d) Engaging the Military Regime in Myanmar to Balance the Influence of China.

9. Need to Balance Short-term & Long-Term Interests.

(a) Myanmar presents a challenge for India's foreign policy. (b) The establishment of a stable, peaceful and secure State that meets the aspirations of the people of Myanmar would be in the long-term interests of India. (c) India now has the task of rebuilding relations with the pro-democratic forces in Myanmar led by Aung San Suu Kyi.

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CHAPTER - 44

NIGERIA

1. Background.

(a) Boko Haram.

(i) Founded in 2002. (ii) 2009: Founder Yusuf Killed by Nigerian Police. (iii) Current Leader: Abubakar Shekau. (iv) Boko Haram‘s Terror Campaign under Shekau. (v) Philosophy – Salafist-Jihadi. (vi) 2013 – Emergency Declared in Three States by Nigerian President and Military Offensive Proves Ineffective Against Boko Haram‘s guerrilla tactics. (vii) The US government has offered a reward of $7 million for information leading to the arrest of Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau.

(b) Boko Haram‟s Series of Attacks.

(i) Attack on Sleeping School Children Killed 43 (25 Feb 2014). (ii) Bombing at a Bus Station Outside the Capital (13 Apr 2014). (iii) Abduction of 276 School Girls from Government Secondary School in Northeast Nigeria (14 Apr 2014). (iv) Boko Haram‘s Leader Demands the Release of Prisoners for Freeing the Girls. (v) Hundreds Killed in Boko Haram Attack in Northeast Nigeria (07 May 2014). (vi) Boko Haram Destroyed 16 Towns in North-Eastern Nigeria (09 Jan 2015). (vii) Boko Haram Pledged Allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) Group (08 Mar 2015).

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(c) US Military Experts to Help.

(i) The US President Barack Obama described the abduction of school girls by Boko Haram as ―heartbreaking‖ and ―outrageous‖ and sent a team of military experts to help Nigeria‘s rescue mission. (ii) The head of US Africa Command, General David Rodriguez was in the Nigerian capital Abuja to discuss US assistance for the search as well as overall cooperation, according to US officials. (iii) The US confirmed that it was flying manned aircraft over Nigeria and sharing commercial satellite imagery to help find the kidnapped girls. (iv) Specialists from the US, the UK, France and Israel were sent to Abuja to provide specialist assistance to Nigeria. (v) China also offered help to the Nigerian government.

(d) Factors Impeding Countering of Boko Haram.

(i) Nigeria‘s unity has been put to test by the activities of the extremist group Boko Haram. (ii) Nigeria lacks the capacity to end the Boko Haram insurgency as severe poverty, illiteracy and official corruption continue to fuel the violence. (iii) Corruption has weakened most public institutions in Nigeria making the country an easy target for the determined terrorist group. (iv) Widening inequality, with severe poverty especially in the Muslim-majority North, alienates the population and gives the extremists a chance to exploit the situation.

Current Situation 2. Five-Nation Force against Boko Haram.

(a) On 30 Jan 2015, the African Union (AU) proposed a regional five-nation force of 7,500 troops to defeat the ―horrendous‖ rise of Boko Haram militants in Nigeria. (b) The proposed regional force would have the backing of the AU, and would ask for expected UN Security Council approval, pus a Trust Fund to pay for it. (c) Terrorism, in particular the brutality of Boko Haram against the African people, was a threat to Africa‘s, collective safety, security and development. It had spread to the region beyond Nigeria and required collective, effective and decisive response.

3. Nigerian Military Recaptured Gwoza.

(a) On 27 Mar 2015, Nigeria‘s military announced that the troops had recaptured the town of Gwoza the Headquarters of Boko Haram.

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(b) The recapture came after concerted and well-coordinated land and air operations. (c) On 24 Aug 2015, Boko Haram‘s leader Abubakar Shekau declared that Gwoza was part of the Islamic caliphate. (d) The four-nation coalition of Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon has met with a number of successes since Jan 2015 to end the Boko Haram insurgency.

4. Presidential Elections.

(a) Presidential Elections were held in Nigeria on 28 Mar 2015 under the gaze of heavily armed troops. (b) In the northeast thousands of Nigerians cast their votes despite the threats by Boko Haram to bomb polling stations and shoot voters. (c) The Presidential election was won by the Opposition candidate Mohammadu Buhari. (d) The outgoing President Goodluck Jonathan conceded defeat and urged his supporters to accept the result which was seen as a sign of deepening democracy in Nigeria. (e) The new President Muhammadu Buhari, the 72-year-old general, who headed a military regime in the 1980s, had campaigned for cleaning up Nigeria‘s corrupt politics. (f) This was the first democratic change of power in the history of Nigeria, Africa‘s most populous nation and the biggest economy. (g) The US President Barack Obama said that the outgoing President Jonathan had placed his country‘s interests first by conceding the election. (h) The UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon described the Presidential election as testament to the maturity of Nigeria‘s democracy.

5. Attacks by Boko Haram.

(a) Boko Haram insurgents stepped up attacks including raids, explosions and suicide bombingsagainst civilians since the new President Muhammadu Buhari took over on 29 May 2015. (b) In early Jul 2015, Boko Haram killed around 200 people in Nigeria targeting mosques, a church and a restaurant. (c) Attacks sent a message to the Nigerian government and the International community that despite the military setbacks, Boko Haram remained capable of carrying out large-scale strikes. (d) The Boko Haram which swore allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) is one of Africa‘s deadliest terror groups.

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6. Top Military Brass Sacked.

(a) On 13 Jul 2015, Nigerian President Mohammadu Buhari sacked his military top brass. (b) The President had relieved the service chiefs, including the heads of the Army, Air Force and Navy of their appointments and their replacements would be announced soon. (c) Nigeria‘s military command had come under severe criticism for its handling of the six-year-old Boko Haram insurgency that lead to the killing of 15,000 people and had also forces 1.5 million to leave their homes. (d) Nigerian President Mohammadu Buhari has vowed to crush the Boko Haram insurgency and also made some initial gains with the Army recapturing most of the territories from the insurgents. (e) The recent attacks by the Boko Haram have pointed to the fact that the Nigerian President faces huge challenges of completely defeating the insurgents.

(f) Supporters of Mr. Buhari point out that the dictator-turned-democrat President has command over his generals and could take up the challenge of defeating the insurgents.

Conclusion

7. Threat to West African Stability.

(a) Nigeria, Africa‘s most populous country and biggest economy, which returned to democratic rule in 1999 after 16 years of military rule, has been besieged by the Boko Haram insurgency over the past five years. (b) The failure of the Nigerian government to counter the extremist Boko Haram group has placed West Africa‘s regional stability at risk. (c) The lack of justice for years of violence had created a combustible situation. The government of Nigeria should ensure full criminal investigation and provide justice for the victims and their families. (d) Nigerian government needs to address the concerns of the country‘s north-eastern regions which have been badly neglected to stop the Boko Haram from exploiting the situation there. (e) On 02 May 2015, Nigerian troops rescued 700 women and children from Boko Haram‘s Sambisa forest stronghold. (f) Number of hostages freed pointed to the scale of the tactic of mass abduction used by the Boko Haram militants, who had seized about 2,000 women and girls since 2014.

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8. Islamist Extremists in Africa. Proliferation of Islamist extremists in Africa was due to the following factors:-

(a) Breakdown of law and order in Somalia and Libya. (b) The ability of the militants to exploit the local grievances. (c) The lack of State authority in major parts of Africa.

9. Implications for India.

(a) The proliferation of extremism in Africa has implications for India as it has large investments in the modernisation and development of Africa. (b) For India, Africa is significant for its long-term energy security, economic partnership and political ally in a new global order in which Asia and Africa would

emerge as key players in the 21st century.

(c) India needs to play an active role in addressing the challenges of extremism in Africa as they also pose a direct threat to India‘s security. (d) India could increase its participation in the socio-economic and political development of the extremism-affected region of Africa apart from engaging in the development of security capabilities of the region. (e) The successful elections in Nigeria point to the fact that the establishment of a credible political system in the region is the best long-term solution to the menace of extremism.

10. Apart from military action against Boko Haram, Nigeria also needs to end corruption, poverty and religious extremism in the north and northeast. 11. The strategy to counter Boko Haram should also be supported by a roadmap to end Nigeria‘s structural problems

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CHAPTER - 45

PAKISTAN

1. Political Turmoil (Aug-Sep 2014).

(a) Protestors under the leadership of cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan of the Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party and cleric Tahir ul Qadri, a Canadian of Pakistani origin held the country hostage and refused to call off their agitation until the Government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif resigned. (b) Imran Khan leader of PTI sought the resignation of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on grounds of alleged role in poll fraud in 2013. (c) The cleric Tahir ul Qadri of the Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT) presented a charter of demands including the resignation of the Prime Minister, dissolution of the unconstitutional national and provincial assemblies and the formation of a national government for reforms. (d) Pakistan army issued a statement saying that it categorically rejected the assertions that the army and ISI were backing the PTI and PAT in any way in the current political standoff. (e) The army was an apolitical institution and had expressed its unequivocal support for democracy on numerous occasions. It was unfortunate that the army was being dragged into such controversies. (f) Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif turned to the Parliament for support by terming the protests as a ―mutiny against Pakistan‖. (g) Emergency joint session of the Parliament convened to support the Prime Minister and discuss the current impasse, Parliamentarians across the spectrum backed the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. (h) US stated that it opposed any efforts to impose extra-constitutional change to Pakistan‘s democratic system and supported the Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif as the elected leader of the country.

2. New ISI Chief (22 Sep 2014).

(a) Pakistan named Lt General Rizwan Akhtar, a close aid of the army chief Raheel Shariff as the next head of its main intelligence agency Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the second most powerful official in the military after the army chief. (b) The new ISI chief had said in a publication in 2008 during his stint at the Army War College, that Pakistan must aggressively pursue rapprochement with India.

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3. Suicide Attack at Wagah.

(a) 55 people were killed and 200 injured in a suicide bomb attack at Wagah on 02 Nov 14, in Pakistan, minutes after the flag-lowering ceremony at the main Indo-Pak land border crossing. (b) The al-Qaeda affiliated Jundullah group claimed responsibility for the attack. (c) Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi strongly condemned the dastardly act of terrorism and offered condolences to the families of the deceased. (d) India believed that the firmest and most comprehensive action against all terror groups without any distinction was the only way to defeat the evil scourge. (e) India assessed the situation to look at the security and operational implications. (f) Wagah border was a single point of entry for both immigration as well as trade and any attack on that single point could shut down those processes. (g) Pakistan Rangers had set up extra barricades on 15 Oct 2014 after receiving intelligence about possible threat to the Wagah closing ceremony which prevented the suicide bomber from reaching the main parade venue.

4. Pakistan‟s Defence Agreement with Russia (20 Nov 2014).

(a) On 20 Nov 2014, Pakistan signed a military cooperation agreement with Russia and both sides vowed to translate their relationship in tangible terms during the first visit by a Russian Minister in 45 years. (b) In 1969, the then USSR Defence Minister Andrey Grechko visited Pakistan. (c) Russia‘s Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu‘s visited Pakistan at a time when the US-led NATO forces were withdrawing from Afghanistan at the end of 2014. (d) The signing of the military cooperation agreement between the two significant countries of the region was a milestone and both sides would translate their relationship in tangible terms and further strengthen military-to-military relations. (e) Russian Defence Minister‘s first visit to Pakistan came in the backdrop of reports that Russia would be going ahead with the sale of MI-35 helicopters to Pakistan, which wanted to purchase up to 20 helicopters.

5. Drone Strikes Senior al-Qaeda Members.

(a) On 06-07 Dec 14, US drone attack in North Waziristan, a mountainous region bordering Afghanistan, killed a senior member of al-Qaeda and three other suspected militants. (b) Pakistani forces killed a top al-Qaeda leader, Adnan Shukrijumah for whose capture the FBI had offered $5 million in connection with a plot to bomb the New York subway system.

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(c) A drone attack by Pakistan also killed a senior member of the al-Qaeda, Omar Farooq who operated in Afghanistan and Pakistan. (d) Drone strikes in Pakistan had stopped for the first six months of 2014 as the government held peace talks with the TTP, but as the talks failed the strikes resumed.

6. Attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar.

(a) On 06 Dec 14, Six militants of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) stormed the premises of the Army Public School in Peshawar and shot dead 141 people including 132 students. (b) One of the six TTP militants below himself up while the other five were shot dead. (c) The TTP in a statement sent to the media said that the Taliban were forced to attack the school because of Operation Zarb-e-Azb and Operation Khyber-I. (d) Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif vowed to continue the fight against terror stressing that his country would work with Afghanistan towards ending militancy. (e) The Pakistan army chief General Rasheed Sharif called the terror attack a ghastly act of cowardice and stressed that the militants had hit at the heart of the nation. (f) The army‘s resolve had taken a new height and they would continue to go after the inhuman beasts, their facilitators till their final elimination.

7. Pakistan‟s Response.

(a) The Pakistan Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Rasheed Sharif met the Afghan leaders in Afghanistan and informed them that either they help in extraditing the TTP chief Mullah Fazlullah or allow Pakistan to go after him. (b) The Pakistan army chief‘s Afghan counterpart and the Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and ISAF commander General Joseph Dunford, shared essential intelligence with the Gen Rasheed Sharif. (c) Pakistan security forces killed at least 67 militants in a country wide operations with the number of militants killed going up to 124 after the Peshawar school attack. (d) The Pakistan army and the US-led forces in Afghanistan decided to target TTP chief Mullah Fazlullah using drones in the areas where he was believe to be taking sanctuary. (e) Pakistan also planned to execute 500 militants after the government lifted the moratorium on the death penalty in terror cases following the TTP school massacre. (f) Six militants were hanged up to 22 Dec 2014.

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(g) Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced a 17-point plan of action which included the establishment of military courts. (h) The anti-terror plan of action included cutting financial aid to terrorists and preventing banned organisations from operating with new names. (j) The formation of special anti-terrorism force and regularisation of religious madrassas was also announced. (k) The plan also included measures like Constitutional amendments, banning space for terrorists in electronic media and print media, eliminating their communication systems, and repatriation of refugees from Afghanistan.

(l) On 06 Jan 2015, the lower house of Pakistan‘s Parliament approved the establishment of military courts to tackle terrorism-related cases. (m) The proposal to set up military courts was criticised by religious parties, some moderate political parties and members of the intelligentsia. (n) On 22 Jan 2015, the government of Pakistan froze the accounts of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) front Jamaat-ud-Dawa and movement of its members following a UN resolution.

8. Lakhvi Granted Bail.

(a) On 18 Dec 14, Anti-Terrorism Court in Islamabad granted bail to Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, the mastermind behind the 26 Nov 2008 Mumbai terror attacks in which 166 people were killed. (b) The bail was granted to Lakhvi despite evidence against him. (c) Lakhvi, the operational commander of the LeT, was charged with six others in the 2009 Mumbai terror attacks case. (d) On 30 Dec 2014, Lakhvi was arrested in Islamabad for kidnapping a man six years ago. (e) On 01 Jan 2015, Lakhvi was sent back to a Rawalpindi jail. (f) On January 03, the government of Pakistan challenged the bail granted to Lakhvi in the Islamabad High Court.

9. Implications for India.

(a) India‘s focus has been on anti-India terror groups in Pakistan, however, they are all part of Pakistan‘s larger terror conglomerate which cannot be ignored as the adverse effects could be felt in India as neighbouring country. (b) Pakistan‘s success or failure to control terrorism would impact not only its own future but would also have a major impact on the stability and security of the region.

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(c) The Pakistan establishment needs to take decisive action across-the-board against militants. (d) In the current scenario of increasing instability in Pakistan, India needs to keep its counter-terror machinery on full alert. (e) Growing section of people in Pakistan who are in favour of a constructive engagement with India to take advantage of the increasing trade and economic links. (f) India needs to engage constructively with this segment of people in Pakistan while been fully alert to counter the dangers of terrorism emanating from Pakistan‘s soil.

10. Pakistan‟s National Internal Security Policy (NISP).

(a) Pakistan‘s first ever National Internal Security Policy (NISP) tabled by Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan in the National Assembly is aimed at protecting the national interests of Pakistan. (b) The NISP includes three key aspects – dialogue with all stakeholders, isolation of terrorists from their support systems and enhancing deterrence and capacity of the security apparatus. (c) Apart from addressing the critical issues related to threat perceptions ranging from street crimes to nuclear terrorism, the NISP envisaged a de-radicalization program which involved bringing madrassas into mainstream education. (d) The National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), which would coordinate counter terrorism efforts in Pakistan in consultation with other institutions supporting NISP, would develop and coordinate a National De-Radicalization Program Design. (e) The NISP envisaged the integration of mosques and madrassas in the national and provincial educational establishment by mapping and integrating the existing and new madrassas and private sector educational institutions. (f) Controlling the funding of terrorists was a major challenge.

11. Comn with Afghanistan & ISAF. On 17 Dec 2014, Pak COAS Gen Raheel Sharif, accompanied by the DG of the ISI, went on a visit to Kabul to meet with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and Gen John Campbell, the cdr of ISAF. Gen Raheel asked for the handovers of TTP leadership and asked the Afghan government to act against hideouts of the Taliban trts in its territory. At the meeting with Afghan officials, General Raheel delivered a message "to take decisive action against sanctuaries of the TTP or else Pakistan would go for a hot pursuit." One intelligence official confirmed the message relayed to the Afghan president and reportedly cautioned that "if Afghan authorities fail to act this time, we will explore all options, including hot pursuit." President Ashraf Ghani assured General Raheel that his country would take all the necessary steps to root out the terrorists. A joint operation against the Taliban was also discussed with the Afghan leadership. In a media report published in the ―The Nation‖ Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif released a separate statement to Afghan president on a "hot pursuit" and has sent a message to Kabul reportedly stressing: "Wipe out Taliban or we will".

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12. 21st Constitutional Amendment. On 06 Jan 2015, both houses of the Parliament of Pak unanimously passed the Constitution (Twenty-First Amendment) Oct 2015, which was signed into law by the President on 07 Jan 2015. The Amendment provides a constitutional cover to the mil courts that were established in the country for speedy trials of the terrorists. The Amendment contains a "sunset" clause and will cease to be part of the Constitution after two years on 07 Jan 2017.

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CHAPTER - 46

PAK - US RELATIONS

1. US Secretary of State‟s Visit.

(a) The US Secretary of State John Kerry visited Pakistan on 12-13 Jan 2015, for the US-Pakistan strategic dialogue. (b) Mr Kerry visited Pakistan after attending the Vibrant Gujarat summit in India. (c) Discussed the US-Pak strategic dialogue with Pakistani leadership, including the army Chief, on issues such as security in Afghanistan after the US withdrawal of troops and future civilian and military aid requirements of Pakistan. (d) Pakistan must fight all militant terror groups that threaten Afghan, Indian and the US interests. (e) Terror groups like the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and other groups continued to pose a threat to Pakistan, to its neighbours and to the US. (f) The West suspects Pakistan of playing double games, fighting some militants while supporting those militants whom the army regards as strategic assets to be used against India and Afghanistan. (g) Pakistan‘s foreign adviser Sartaj Aziz reassured the US Secretary of State John Kerry that action would be taken without discrimination against all groups.

2. US Designated TTP Chief as Global Terrorist.

(a) On 13 Jan 15 the US Department of State designated Mullah Fazlullah, commander of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) as a specially designated Global Terrorist. (b) Fazlullah took charge as the commander of the TTP in Nov 2013 has been held responsible for killing a Pakistani Army Major General and for beheading 17 Pakistani soldiers. (c) TTP which was designated a foreign terrorist organisation in 2010, had claimed responsibility for the 16 Dec 2014, attack on the Peshawar school killing at least 148 persons, mostly students.

3. Proposed $1 Billion Aid to Pakistan.

(a) On 03 Feb 15, US President Barack Obama proposed over $1 billion in civilian and military aid to ―strategically important‖ Pakistan for fighting terror, economic development, safety of nuclear installations & improving relations with India among other objectives.

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(b) The budgetary proposals showed more than six-fold increase in foreign military financing to Pakistan from $42.2 million in 2014 to $265 million in 2016. (c) Mr Obama also proposed $334.9 million for economic support fund and $143.1 million for counter-terrorism and non-proliferation efforts. (d) Pakistan is seen as the key element of the US counter-terrorism strategy, the peace process in Afghanistan, nuclear non-proliferation efforts, and economic integration in South and Central Asia. (e) For Pakistan, the budget proposals demonstrate US commitment to fostering stability and prosperity, and providing security assistance that promoted counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency capabilities.

4. Need for US-Pak Engagement.

(a) Pakistan and the US are dependent on each other. While Pakistan needs the US aid, the US needs Pakistan to bring some semblance of normalcy to Afghanistan. (b) The US must stay engaged with Pakistan because while Pakistan is part of the problem in the region, it must also be part of the solution. (c) A flawed and strained engagement with Pakistan was better than disengagement. (d) Long-term - US dependence on Pakistan was shrinking and would lead to containment of Pakistan.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif Visit to US 5. Nawaz Sharif‟s Visit to US(20-23 Oct 15). Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif visited US to talk on a host of issues with President Barack Obama. During the visit, the Pakistani Prime Minister besides regional situation discussed, matters relating to defence, counter-terrorism, economic, trade, education, health and climatic change. 6. ISI Chief. ISI chief Lt Gen Rizwan Akhtar was already in the US where he met officials and helped in preparing grounds for the visit with the prime minister with help of Pakistan embassy. 7. Limit Nuclear Programme. US wants Pakistan to limit its nuclear programme by keeping it India-specific and avoid building long-range missiles. Pakistan is not ready to accept any curb or limits on its nuclear program but ready to give commitment to keep its programme focused on doctrine of "full-spectrum deterrence". 8. Bilateral Relations with India. President Obama and Prime Minister Sharif stressed that improvement in Pakistan-India bilateral relations would greatly enhance prospects for lasting peace, stability, and prosperity in the region. 9. Violence Along Line of Control. The two leaders expressed concern over violence along the Line of Control, and noted their support for confidence-building measures and effective mechanisms that are acceptable to both parties. The leaders emphasized the

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importance of a sustained and resilient dialogue process between the two neighbours aimed at resolving all outstanding territorial and other disputes, including Kashmir, through peaceful means and working together to address mutual concerns of India and Pakistan regarding terrorism. 10. Talks between Afghan Government & Taliban. President Obama commended Pakistan for hosting and facilitating the first public talks between the Afghan government and Taliban in Jul 2015 and highlighted the opportunity presented by Pakistan‘s willingness to facilitate a reconciliation process that would help end insurgent violence in Afghanistan. 11. India‟s View.

(a) The joint statement that says that Pakistan will act against terrorism including, against, TTP, Haqqani Netwrok & Lashker-e-Toiba is seen by India as Pakistan‘s acceptance to its support to terrorism. (b) Pro Blouch slogans during Nawaz Sharif‘s press conference indicate the atrocities by Pakistan Army in Baluchistan. (c) Lack of acknowledgement by US with respect to Dossiers handed over by Pakistan against India is seen positively by the Indian Media. (d) As per media reports, Pakistan was hoping for Civil Nuclear Deal, similar to India, which was denied by the US.

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CHAPTER - 47

SCOTLAND REFERENDUM

1. Referendum on Scotland‟s Independence.

(a) A referendum on Scotland‘s independence from United Kingdom (UK) was held in Scotland on 18 Sep 2014 with 85% (3.6 million) of the eligible voters casting their vote. (b) The people of Scotland voted against independence from UK with 55 percent of the voters saying ―No‖ to independence and 45 percent saying ―Yes‖. (c) The pro-independence leader of Scotland Alex Salmond resigned as the first Minister and leader of the Scottish National Party (SNP).

2. Promise of Political Overhaul.

(a) Britain‘s Prime Minister David Cameron responded to Scotland‘s rejection of Independence from UK by promising more new powers to the regions in UK. (b) Mr Cameron promised Scotland new powers over tax, spending and welfare. (c) Lord Smith of Kelvin was appointed to lead a Scotland Devolution Commission that would report recommendations by Nov 2014 on what responsibilities and powers should be transferred to Scotland. (d) The draft legislation would be published by Jan 2015 and passed before the May 2015 general elections. (e) The British Prime Minister called for similar reforms in other regions of UK with the people of England, Wales and Northern Ireland having a greater say in the way they are governed.

3. Implications of Referendum.

(a) Preserved Scotland‘s 307-year-old union with England, Wales and Northern Ireland bringing a relief to Britain‘s economic and political establishment. (b) Referendum resulted in Britain retaining its name and union and its nuclear submarines would continue to operate from Scotland‘s bases. (c) Britain would retain its global power and its chances of remaining within the European Union (EU) will increase as the pro-European Scots would vote against Britain leaving the EU when the referendum is held in 2017, according to analysts. (d) 45% (more than 1.6 million) of Scotland‘s voters voted for independence from UK and all the three main political parties in UK promised more devolution of powers to Scotland which would culminate in a substantial transfer of powers.

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(e) The economic implications for Scotland would have been adverse had it opted for independence from UK with declining North Sea oil reserves and the search for a new unpredictable currency. (f) UK would now become more federal and decentralised than it is today. (g) Future set up of Scotland would have implications for the rest of the regions and also the nature of the union in UK. (h) A ―Yes‖ vote in Scotland‘s referendum would have encouraged secessionism in the rest of the world. (j) Globalisation and closer regional integration like the European Union (EU) have led to a resurgence of nationalism. The counter to this politically would lie in an inclusive order which would accommodate diversity.

4. Other Secessionists Regions. Catalonia (Spain), Quebec (Canada), Flanders (Belgium), Donetsk(Ukraine),Xinjiang, Tibet (China), Balochistan (Pakistan).

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CHAPTER - 48

SOMALIA

1. Al-Shabab Militant Group.

(a) Origin - Emerged after the Ethiopian Troops Defeated the ICU. (b) Non-Homogenous - Made up of a Variety of Islamic Groups. (c) Funds - Wide-Reaching Tax Collection System. (d) Goal - More Ideological than Political. (e) Internet Used Extensively to Advance their Goals. (f) Al-Shabab Withdrew from Mogadishu in Aug 2011. (g) Strategic Disagreements within the Al-Shabab Leadership.

2. US Air Strikes Kill Al-Shabab Chief.

(a) On 02 Sep 2014, the US forces carried out a major air strike targeting a gathering by senior Al-Shabab officials, including their leader Abu-Zubayr. (b) Abu-Zubayr was the name used for the Al-Shabab chief Ahmed Abdi Godane who was listed by the US State Department as one of the world‘s eight top terror fugitives. (c) The US confirmed the death of the Al-Shabab chief pointing out that the death of Ahmed Abdi Godane was a major symbolic and operational loss to the largest al-Qaeda affiliate in Africa and reflected years of painstaking work by its intelligence, military and law enforcement professionals.

3. Education Ministry Attacked.

(a) On 14 Apr 2015, the Al-Shabab carried out a car bomb attack on the Education Ministry in Somalia‘s capital Mogadishu before storming the building and killing 15 persons. (b) The Al-Shabab militants have been staging regular attacks in the Somali capital as part of their fight against the country‘s internationally-backed Government and African Union forces supporting it. (c) Somalia‘s new Government has been supported by a 22,000-strong African Union force which includes troops from Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. (d) The Al-Shabab has also carried out attacks on neighbouring countries like

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Kenya and Uganda, in response to their participation in the AU force. (e) The Somalia Government offered a reward of $250,000 for the current Al-Shabab chief, Ahmad Umar.

4. John Kerry‟s Visit to Somalia.

(a) On 05 May 2015, the US Secretary of State John Kerry visited Somalia and met the President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. (b) It was the first visit by a US Secretary of State to Somalia which is battling Al-Shabab insurgency and two decades of civil war. (c) The US and other Western countries have provided aid to Somalia to help in reconstruction and prevent it from sliding back into the hands of Al-Shabab.

Conclusion 5. Somalia a lawless country has become a haven for pirates and international terrorists. A Third of Somalia‘s population need emergency aid. 6. The Al-Shabab militants are fighting Kenyan forces in southern Somalia and the peacekeepers of the African Union (AU) in the capital Mogadishu. Many Somalis say that they would welcome anyone who can get the Al-Shabab militants out. The Al-Shabab have terrorised the Somalis for years and have instituted a harsh form of Islamic law in the territory they control. The Al-Shabab were facing the heat from the AU peacekeepers in three of their strongholds.

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CHAPTER - 49

SYRIA

Background. 1. Protests in Syria.

(a) Protesters in Syria, inspired by the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt were demanding freedom and an end to the 48-year emergency laws under President Bashar al-Assad and his father Hafez. (b) On March 26, 2011, President Bashar al-Assad pulled back troops from Daraa and released hundreds of political prisoners in an attempt to appease the protesters. (c) The protests spread throughout Syria and the government crackdown led to the killing of scores of people. (d) On April 19, 2011, Syria lifted an emergency law that had been in force for 48 years. The Government also abolished the state security court an unpopular institution where prisoners were tried. A new law was passed which allowed the right to peaceful protests. (e) Analysts felt that the concessions by the Syrian President were too late as he confronts an unprecedented type of pressure in deep popular grievances. (f) The protests in Syria were intensifying after a relentless crackdown by the government which resulted in the death of 400 people across Syria in March 2011. (g) In May 2011, the anti-government protesters pledged to press ahead with their ―revolution‖ despite arrests by the government. (h) The UN Rights body unequivocally condemned the use of lethal violence against peaceful protesters by the authorities and the hindrance to access of medical treatment in Syria. (j) Nations agreed to launch a UN-led investigation of the bloody crackdown by the Syrian Government on the uprising, demanding that the Government immediately stop the violence, release political prisoners and lift restrictions on the news media and access to internet. (k) Russia has warned that it would oppose any UN resolution on Syria that would open the way for Libya-type interference in the country‘s internal affairs. (l) Russia insisted that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad must be given a chance to fulfil his reform promises, instead of pressuring him by adopting resolutions that are open to free interpretation.

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(m) On June 19, 2011, the Syrian Opposition activists set up a National Council to lead the Syrian revolution, comprising all communities and representatives of national political forces inside and outside Syria. (n) On June 20, 2011, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad proposed to hold a national dialogue that would recommend sweeping reforms aimed at transforming the political landscape. He pledged his total commitment to reforms, including the drafting of a new Constitution. (o) The Syrian President said that his government would continue to confront those who carried weapons but would engage those seeking reforms without pursuing a subversive agenda. (p) Mr Assad said that corruption needed to be rooted out, and simultaneously, an extraordinary effort was required to prevent the economy from collapsing. (q) Despite the Syrian President‘s promise protests have continued in Syria with the government launching heavy attacks on the protestors in certain regions. (r) Tensions between Syria and Turkey increased as thousands of refugees from Syria fled across the border into Turkey. Turkey criticised the repression by Syrian authorities as ―savagery‖ and urged President Assad to implement genuine reforms in the spirit of the ―Arab Spring‖.

2. UNSC Resolution Against Syria.

(a) On February 4, 2012, Russia and China vetoed an Arab League-backed UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution. (b) The resolution, which called on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to step down and delegation of full authority to his deputy, leading to the formation of an interim national unity government within 15 days, was backed by India, the US, France, Britain, Pakistan and all other members except Russia and China.

3. Turkey-Syria Border Tensions.

(a) On October 4, 2012, Turkey shelled Syria after cross-border mortar fire from Syria killed five civilians in Turkey. (b) The Turkey-Syria border shelling was seen as step that would threaten the widening of the conflict by bringing in NATO as Turkey was a member of NATO.

4. National Coalition for Opposition & Revolutionary Forces.

(a) On November 11, 2012, a 60-member National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces was formed in Doha, Qatar. (b) France and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) recognised the Syrian National Coalition as a transitional government.

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5. Geneva Plan Basis for Resolving Conflict.

(a) On 29 Dec 12, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that the Geneva Communique should be the basis for any plan to resolve the Syrian crisis. (b) The Geneva agreement, signed in June 2012, called for the end of violence and dialogue among all parties.

6. Rebels Seize Dam & an Air Base.

(a) On February 11, 2013, the Syrian rebels captured the country‘s biggest hydro-electric dam and battled army tank units near the centre of Damascus. (b) On February 12, 2013, the Syrian rebels seized a military air base in Aleppo.

7. Root Cause of Pro-Democracy Movement in Syria.

(a) The Syrian population comprises of the Sunni, Christian, Druse and Alawite Sects. (b) The root-cause of the pro-democracy movement in Syria is linked to the concentration of power in the minority Alawite sect to which the President Bashar-al-Assad belongs, according to analysts.

8. Ramifications for the Region.

(a) The revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen were largely internal with ramifications limited to the examples they set in the Arab countries. (b) The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria and the ensuing civil war could lead to external ramifications that would have an impact on the countries of the region including Iran, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan and Iraq. (c) Currently the world is divided on the Syrian conflict with West, Turkey and the Gulf Arab countries calling for the exit of the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. (d) The Arab countries of the Gulf have supported the opposition in Syria. (e) The West has stayed away from a full-fledged intervention in Syria. (f) The deployment of NATO‘s Patriot missiles by Turkey along its border with Syria has driven a wedge between Turkey and Iran. (g) Russia, Iran and Iraq are against any regime change in Syria and support the role of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad‘s in any future political arrangement. (h) Russia has an old relationship with Syria and has provided the Syrian President with weaponry and diplomatic cover. (j) For Iran, Syria is an important part of the ―axis of resistance against Israel‖ which includes the Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Hamas in Palestine.

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(k) Iran and Russia were developing closer ties as the militarisation of the Turkey-Syria border posed a threat to Syria and Iran, according to analysts. It is pointed out that the long pending transfer of S-300 missiles by Russia to Iran would be a yardstick to measure the establishment of closer strategic relations between Russia and Iran. (l) Russia has opposed to the deployment of the state-of-the-art Iskander missiles, which cannot be destroyed by any known anti-missile system. (m) The Kurdish minority in Turkey, which is supported by Syria, could try to cause instability in Turkey leading to a direct confrontation between Turkey & Syria. (n) Analysts point out that Israel‘s airstrikes deep inside Syria on a convoy carrying anti-aircraft weaponry demonstrated its determination to ensure that Hezbollah in Lebanon is not able to take advantage of the crisis in Syria to increase its arsenal. (o) Israel has said that it might have to intervene to prevent Syrian chemical or advanced weapons falling in the hands of militant groups like Hezbollah.

9. Chemical Attack.

(a) On 21 Aug 2013, hundreds of people were killed in a chemical attack on the Damascus suburb of Ghouta in Syria. (b) The chemical attack was seen as the world‘s worst chemical weapons attack

10. Threat of Strikes by the West.

(a) The US, U.K. and France called for armed intervention in Syria in retaliation for the 21 Aug 2013, chemical weapons attack. (b) The British House of Commons favoured exploring the diplomatic option before rushing into military engagement. (c) The US moved warships and other military assets closer to Syria in preparation for a possible attack. (d) France despatched one of its most modern frigates the Chevalier Paul from the southern naval base of Toulon to the waters of Syria. (e) Russia also despatched more warships to east Mediterranean in an apparent response to the build of US and British forces near Syria.

11. India‟s Stand.

(a) India cautioned against military intervention by stressing that it had consistently called upon all sides to abjure violence, so that conditions could be created for an inclusive political dialogue leading to a comprehensive political solution

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(b) India said that there could be no military solution to the conflict. (c) India consistently supported elimination of chemical weapons worldwide. (d) India‘s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said that any action against Syria had to be under the auspices of the UN Security Council.

12. Infighting between Rebels.

(a) The al-Qaeda affiliated Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) routed the western-backed Free Syrian Army (FSN) in a Syrian town near the Turkish border. (b) On September 25, 2013, 13 rebel groups led by the al-Qaeda linked Nusra Front in a joint statement rejected the authority of the Turkey-based Syrian National Coalition (SNC) pointing out that it no longer represented their interests.

13. UN Resolution on Destruction of Chemical Weapons.

(a) On September 27, 2013, the UN Security Council unanimously passed a Resolution 2118 ordering the destruction of Syria‘s chemical weapons and condemning a murderous poison gas attack in the suburbs of Damascus. (b) The UN Resolution gave international binding force to the US-Russia agreement to eliminate Syria‘s chemical weapons.

14. Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons.

(a) Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) declared in a statement that Syrian Arab Republic had completed the functional destruction of critical equipment for all of its declared chemical weapons production facilities and mixing/filling plants, rendering theminoperable. (b) After the destruction of the infrastructure to build chemical weapons the focus was on completing the chemical disarmament of Syria‘s existing stockpiles by mid-2014.

15. International Conference to Resolve Syrian Crisis.

(a) Geneva-2 (within Framework of Geneva Communiqué of Jun 12).

(i) The Geneva-2 international conference to resolve the Syrian crisis started from January 22, 2014. (iv) The Geneva Communique was an agreement for the establishment, based on mutual consent, of a transitional governing body in Syria that would be armed with full executive powers, covering all government institutions, including the military and security agencies.

(b) Deadlock over Transfer of Power.

(i) Deadlocked over the issue of transferring power from the President Bashar al-Assad‘s government to a transitional government.

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(ii) The opposition rejected the government‘s statement, stressing that the talks needed to be focused on a political transition.

(c) India‟s Role at Geneva-2.

(i) Syria sought India‘s deeper involvement in Geneva-2 conference to address the political crisis in the country. (ii) India was invited to participate in the Geneva-2 international conference to resolve the Syrian crisis. (iii) Geneva-2 is viewed by India as a convergence of the evolved positions of global and regional powers with India‘s own stated position on supporting a comprehensive political settlement of the crisis involving all parties to the conflict, according to officials.

16. US Plan to Arm Syrian Rebels.

(a) On June 27, 2014, the US put forward plans to help Syrian opposition with $500 million in arms and training.

17. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad Sworn in for a New Seven-Year Term (July 16, 2014). 18. Ban Ki-moon‟s Six Point Suggestion.

(a) Ending the Violence – UNSC Urged to Impose an Arms Embargo. (b) Protecting People – Unfettered Access for Humanitarian Relief Effort. (c) Starting a Serious Political Process. (d) Ensuring Accountability of Serious Crimes. (e) Completing the Destruction of Chemical Weapons in Syria. (f) Addressing the Regional Dimensions of the Conflict in Syria Including the Extremist Threat Sectarian tensions, massive movements of refugees, daily atrocities and spreading instability make the civil war in Syria a global threat.

19. On 11 Sep 2014, US President Obama Announced Air Strikes in Syria against the IS. 20. Global Coalition (Paris, 15 Sep 2014).

(a) Representatives from 30 countries and international organisations, including the US, Russia and China held a meeting in Paris and pledged to support Iraq in its fight against the Islamic State (IS) militants by any means necessary, including appropriate military assistance. (b) Saudi Arabia and nine other Arab countries were among the countries backing the coalition, but Iran, which was not invited to the conference rejected US

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overtures to help in the fight against the IS militants. 21. UNSC Adopts Resolution.

(a) On 12 Feb 15, resolution to choke funding to the IS from oil smuggling, antiquities trafficking and ransom payments to the Islamic State (IS) terror group. (b) In a show of resolve by the international community against the threat posed by the IS, the UNSC resolution was adopted by more than 35 countries. (c) Called for sanctions against individuals and entities that trade in oil with IS and Al-Qaeda affiliates such as Al-Nusra Front in Syria. (d) Urged all the 193 UN members to take appropriate steps to prevent the trade in culture property from Iraq and Syria. (e) It reminded governments that they must prevent terrorists from benefitting directly or indirectly from ransom payments or political concessions to secure the release of hostages. (f) The UNSC resolution was drafted under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter and could be enforced through sanctions or use of force. (g) UNSC resolution put pressure on Turkey which is seen as a transit point for delivering oil.

22. Threat from IS.

(a) On June 29, 2014, Islamic State (IS), the terrorist group, declared an Islamic caliphate and asked Muslims worldwide to pledge their allegiance to the chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the caliph and leader of Muslims everywhere. (b) On June 29, 2015, the IS caliphate entered its second year with the extremist group expanding its territory in Iraq and Syria and increasing their reach globally by claiming attacks in Tunisia and Kuwait. (c) In one year, the IS had gained more territory in Syria and Iraq despite the fightback by the Iraqi and Syrian security forces supported by a US-led coalition air campaign. (d) The IS has also started affiliations in countries like Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Pakistan and others raising international concern. (e) The IS rule in territories it controls in Iraq and Syria has been marked by brutal executions and mass killings. (f) IS controls about a third of Iraq and about 50% of Syrian territory although much of it is uninhabited.

23. US for a Long-Term Campaign. (a) In July 2015, the US President Barack Obama announced that the US-led

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coalition was intensifying its efforts against the Islamic State (IS) in Syria. (b) Mr. Obama cautioned that it would be a long-term campaign and it would take time to root out the IS.

24. India to formulate National Policy to Counter IS Threat. (a) India is concerned over the threat posed by the IS as it seeks to expand its global reach and enrol fighters from different countries in the world. (b) In July 2015, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), decided to formulate a ‗coherent national strategy‘ on the IS after seeking a report from 10 States. (c) The Union Home Secretary L.C. Goyal was expected to hold a meeting of Home Secretaries of the 10 States in late July. (d) The Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) would give a presentation on the impact of the IS in India, according to media reports. (e) The 10 States that sent their reports to the Centre were Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Telangana, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. (f) At least 11 Indians had joined the IS in the past one year, according to media reports. (g) In June 2015, the Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh gave his approval for the creation of revamped cyber security architecture within the Intelligence Bureau comprising of 500 officials. (h) It was realised that a specialised wing was required to counter the growing threat of radicalisation of youngsters through cyber means, according to analysts.

Current Situation 25. On 7 Oct, the Syrian Army backed by the National Defence Forces and Russian airstrikes launched the offensive against the rebel-held towns of Kafr Nabouda, Qala‘at Al-Madayq, Lahaya, Al-Mughayr, Latmin, Al-Lataminah, Kafr Zita and Markabah. According to the SOHR, eight vehicles and tanks of the Army were destroyed by the rebels in the initial phase of the offensive, while it also stated that rebel bases and vehicles were bombed at the same time. 26. Strong Counter Attack. The Army advanced in Latmin, while the rebels reportedly detroyed three new tanks on the shifting frontline. Meanwhile, rebels launched a counter-attack on Morek and reportedly captured a hill. The Russian Air Force conducted at least 40 airstrikes that day. Conversely, pro-government sources listed the destruction of 10 tanks and BMPs. The Army captured Al-Mughayr, Markabah, Al-Haweez, Tal Sakhar and Tal Uthman that day, while it was also claimed that the town of Kafr Nabouda was temporally held before a strong rebel counter-attack allegedly pushed them back to Latmin.

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27. On 8 Oct 15, rebels downed a Syrian or Russian helicopter near Kafr Nabouda with a possible second one nearby. The SOHR reported that the rebels regained some ground in the area of Kafr Nabouda and destroyed an APC in the progress. 28. On 9 Oct 15, the military captured most of the hilly Jeb al-Ahmar region.] The SOHR also reported that the Army was still trying to capture Atshan (previously reported as captured), while the rebels destroyed and damaged six new tanks that day. 29. On 10 Oct 15, the Syrian Army captured the strategically important villages of Atshan and Om Hartein and the Sukayk hill, while also making attempts to push onwards to capture Khan Shaykhun in southern Idlib province. A number of government tanks and APC's were targeted during the clashes. Hezbollah senior leader Hassan Hussein al-Haj and a rebel commander were killed that day during the takeover of Tal Sukayk. 30. On 11 Oct 15, Hezbollah backed by the Army captured al-Bahsa in the al-Ghab plains, while rebels destroyed a tank. In addition, the Army also advanced from Morek and Atshan. The pro-government al-Masdar news also reported that the Army entered Salma, in Latakia province, and fighting for the town was ongoing. 31. On the morning of 12 Oct 15, the Army captured the southern part of Kafr Nabuda, which coincided with 30 Russian airstrikes and hundreds of shells and rockets fired by government forces. Soon after, the military secured the town and also seized the village of Mansoura, in the al-Ghab plain, and Sukayk, just inside Idlib province. However, a subsequent rebel counter-attack later in the day recaptured Kafr Nabuda. This came after jihadist rebel reinforcements arrived. In addition, there were conflicting reports on the situation in Latakia, with the SOHR reporting the rebels advanced in Dorin, but the military stated they themselves made advances in Latakia. Later, it was confirmed the rebels withdrew from Dorin. At least 25 pro-government fighters, including 7 Hezbollah militiamen, had been killed since the assault on Kafr Nabuda started. Another 20 Hezbollah fighters had also been wounded. 32. On 13 Oct 15, government forces captured Lahaya, while clashes continued in the outskirts of Kafr Nabuda. Meanwhile, military sources reported that the Army entered the town of Tartiyah and made progress in Salma, in Latakia, after reportedly repelling the rebel counter-attack against Dorin. That day, two Iranian generals were killed on the Hama frontline. Beside the reinforcements, the rebels were deploying an "extensive ammount" of BGM-71 TOW's along the frontline and announced a counter-offensive to "retake Hama". It was also reported that Hezbollah had concentrated all its fighters in the northwest of Syria for the offensive. 33. On 14 Oct, government forces captured the villages of Fawru and Sirmaniyah in the al-Ghab plain. By this point, in the opinion of the ISW, the Syrian government achieved limited success in the offensive's first week, capturing 6 villages while suffering heavy casualties. 34. On 15 Oct, government forces captured the village of al-Safsafah in the Ghab plains. In response to the Russian-backed offensive by the Syrian Army, the jihadist Turkistan Islamic Party sent fighters to the Ghab Plain to support rebels in fighting against the Syrian Army, Iranian, and Hezbollah forces. 35. On 19 Oct, the military restarted operations, after the offensive was paused for the weekend. Government fighters temporally captured parts of the Mansoura grain silos before

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a rebel counter-attack reversed their gains. A rebel brigade commander was killed at the silos. By the next day, 16 government fighters were killed. 36. On 20 Oct, Russian air strikes in Syria's Latakia province killed, Basil Zamo, the commander of the rebel 1st Coastal Division, along with four other fighters. 37. On 23 Oct, rebels captured al-Dil and also launched attacks on Sukayk hill and village. That day, rebels continued to advance while Russian airplanes bombed a rebel headquarters. The losses of the SAA reached 57 armoured vehicles during the course of the Hama (Northwestern) Offensive. At the end of the day, rebels recaptured the villages of Markabah and Layaha. 38. Threat from IS to India.

(a) India is among the targets of ISIS with the group‘s chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi vowing to wage war against several countries including India. (b) On February 13, 2015, Indian intelligence agencies with help from Britain arrested 24-year-old Mehdi Masroor Biswas, the alleged owner of the pro-IS Twitter account, in Bengaluru. (c) The police booked cases against Biswas, an engineering graduate from Kolkata working as a manufacturing executive in ITC Foods in Bengaluru, under Section 125 of IPC for waging war against an Asian power (Syria) that is in alliance with India and under the IT Act of cyber terrorism. (d) Earlier, the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) arrested a youth in Maharashtra who had left for Iraq with three others to join the IS, he was arrested when returned to India. (e) The arrests by the intelligence agencies point to the urgent need for security agencies to stop IS from making any inroads to influence Indian Muslim youth through social networks. (f) The US Department of Defence does not have any records or intelligence available on the presence of Indian nationals among the ranks of IS.

39. India Needs to Build Strategic Intervention Capabilities to Secure Its Citizens in Foreign Nations.

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CHAPTER - 50

TIBET 1. China‟s Military Infrastructure in Tibet.

(a) China has nuclear missile bases in Qinghai province, which could target India. (b) China has built five fully-operational airbases, an extensive rail network and over 58,000 km of roads in its Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR). (c) China is also upgrading other airstrips in Tibet and South China. (d) The extensive rail-road links would help China in arranging 30,000 soldiers at their launch pads along the border in 20 days compared to over 90 days earlier.

2. Large-scale Infrastructure in Tibet by 2020.

(a) A 251-km rail link from Tibet‘s capital Lhasa to Shigatse, that runs close to Indian border in Sikkim was inaugurated in Aug 2014 ahead of schedule. (b) The rail link was an extension of the Qinghai-Tibet railway and would have an annual freight capacity of 8.3 million tonnes. (c) India, Nepal and China should cooperate on letting railways cross over borders as they did in Europe. (d) China would abide by the Panchsheel principles of coexistence in building many railway lines. (e) The railway lines were part of China‘s mission to build infrastructure on a large-scale in Tibet by 2020, including 1,300 km of railway tracks, 1,10,000 km of roadways and several airports, with an investment of more than $13 billion. (f) The railway lines are viewed as a triangular defence for China, allowing it to send troops and military hardware to its southern borders with India in a short time. (g) Defence analysts feel that the infrastructure investment was aimed at increasing China‘s military mobilisation capabilities. (h) The projects would widen the infrastructure asymmetry across the border. (j) Environmentalists have raised concerns that tunnelling through mountains would lead to soil erosion and have other ecological impacts. (k) Government study published in Jun 2014, which said that glaciers in Tibet had shrunk 15% since 1980, that is about 8,000 sq. km in three decades.

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(l) China said that the construction process goes through strict environmental checks.

3. India‟s Concerns.

(a) India was concerned over the construction of new railway lines in Tibet, which would run closer to Sikkim on the western line to Shigatse and closer to the Arunachal border on the eastern line to Nyngchi. (b) High-speed trains would help in faster movement of troops and military hardware to the Chinese side of the border with India. (c) Necessary steps were being taken in consonance with India‘s national security concerns. (d) Military capacity enhancement and modernisation of Armed Forces was a dynamic process, which took into account the cumulative challenges envisaged by the nation.

4. White Paper on Tibet.

(a) On15 Apr 2015, China issued a White Paper on Tibet titled ―Tibet‘s Path of Development Is Driven by an Irresistible Historical Tide‖. (b) Improvement of relations between China and the US in late 1970s, Dalai Lama‘s group shifted its attempts from achieving open independence to achieving disguised independence by cloaking them with the ―middle way.‖ (c) Only sensible alternative was for the Dalai Lama and his supporters to accept that Tibet had been part of China since antiquity, to abandon their goals of dividing China and seeking independence for Tibet, and to begin to act in the interests of Tibet and the country at large. (d) The Dalai Lama and his supporters had little understanding of modern Tibet and instead, held a sentimental attachment to the old theocratic feudal serfdom. (e) The Central Government hoped that Dalai Lama would put aside his illusions in his remaining years and face up to the reality, according to the White Paper.

5. Dalai Lama‟s Response. The middle way policy sought genuine autonomy within the framework of the Constitution of the People‘s Republic of China which was a win-win proposition from all parties and one lauded throughout the world including various governments. Conclusion 6. Demands of the Dalai Lama.

(a) The Dalai Lama wants maximum autonomy for Tibet in line with 'one country, two systems' principle. (b) Demand for Greater Tibet or One Administrative Entity for All Ethnic Tibetans.

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7. India can Help in Finding Solution.

(a) India can use its leverage with Dalai Lama and his followers by persuading them to continue to engage the Chinese Government in dialogue to find a reasonable, just, and sustainable solution for Tibet within the framework of China‘s Constitution. (b) Good communication between China and India would be helpful in addressing the on-going unrest in Tibetan areas.

8. Chinese officials have said that they put in place measures to ―resolutely crush‖ any activities that destabilise Tibetan areas in Western China. 9. Bolder and creative response from China to withdraw patriotic education campaigns and give some indication to respect the legitimate wishes of the Tibetan minorities would go a long way in addressing the unrest in the region.

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CHAPTER - 51

UKRAINE

1. Crisis in Ukraine.

(a) Trade Pact with EU Abandoned.

(i) On 21 Nov 2103, Ukraine‘s President Viktor Yanukovych decided to abandon a trade-and-political agreement with the European Union (EU) and sought closer economic relations with Russia. (ii) Russian President agreed to buy $15 billion of Ukraine‘s debt in Eurobonds and slash the bill for Russian gas imports by a third. (iii) Russia also agreed to remove trade barriers it had imposed in 2013 when Ukraine was on the verge of signing a trade and political association agreement with EU. (iv) The agreement with Russia would help Ukraine to ward off the threat of a balance of payment crisis and possible default amid an economic recession.

(b) Protests against Early Elections.

(i) 100,000 protesters called for early elections to punish the Ukrainian Government for rejecting a trade pact with the European Union (EU). (ii) The peaceful anti-government protests escalated into fierce street battles between radical nationalists and security forces leaving hundreds injured and warnings of a civil war.

(c) President‟s Response.

(i) Ukrainian President Viktor Yanucovych signed a series of anti-protest bills similar to the anti-opposition legislation enacted in Russia. (ii) The anti-protest bills passed by the Parliament introduced fines, arrests and prison terms for those who blockade and occupy public buildings. (iii) Mr. Yanukovych signed into law repeal of anti-protest laws and amnesty for protesters.

(d) Opposition Rejects the Amnesty Bill.

(i) The Ukrainian opposition supported the bill to repeal the harsh anti-protest laws but rejected the amnesty bill as it was conditional to the protesters vacating government offices seized by them in the capital and other cities.

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(ii) The opposition protesters refused to vacate the government buildings and vowed to continue their vigil till the President agreed to curbs on his sweeping powers and called early elections.

(e) Ukraine‘s Opposition Formed a Parallel Government (16 Feb 2014)

(f) Violent Clashes Erupted in the Ukraine‘s Capital (20 Feb 2014) (g) President & Opposition Reached a Deal.

(i) On 21 Feb 2014, the President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych reached a deal with the opposition and agreed to call early Presidential elections, cede powers to Parliament and for a coalition caretaker government. (ii) The deal was reached after talks with the opposition leaders brokered by Foreign Ministers of Germany, France and Poland.

(h) Ukraine‟s President Fled to Russia.

(i) On 22 Feb 2014, Ukraine‘s Parliament voted to remove President Viktor Yanukovych from power.

(ii) Mr. Yanuckovych fled to Russia and accused the opposition of a coup.

(j) Interim President Appointed.

(i) On 23 Feb 2014, newly elected Parliament Speaker Oleksandr Turchynov was appointed as the Interim President. (ii) On 24 Feb 2014, Ukraine‘s new authorities issued an arrest warrant against the ousted President Viktor Yanukovych over mass murder.

2. Eastern Provinces & Crimea Threatens to Split.

(a) The Pro-Russian Crimea Peninsula has Russia‘s major naval base in Sevastopol. (b) Eastern Provinces & Crimea Refused to Recognise new Authorities.

(i) On 24 Feb 2014, an Assembly of Ukraine‘s Eastern Provinces refused to recognise the legitimacy of the new authorities in Ukraine. (ii) A 20,000-strong rally in Sevastopol voted to replace a mayor appointed by Ukraine with Russian businessman Alexei Chaly and to stop sending their taxes to the Ukraine authorities.

(c) Russian Strengthened Grip on Crimea.

(i) On 26 Feb 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a snap military drill in Russia‘s western region bordering Ukraine.

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(ii) Russia had taken operational control of Crimea. (iii) On 04 Mar 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin said there was no need ―for now‖ to send troops to Ukraine and ordered Russian armed forces to be pulled back from Ukraine‘s border.

(d) Crimea Sought to Join Russia.

(i) On 06 Mar 2014, the Parliament in Crimea decided to ask Russia to allow the region to accede to Russia and move forward the date of a referendum on the region‘s status form 30 Mar 2014,to 16 Mar 2014. (ii) In the 16 Mar 2014, referendum, voters in Crimea would be asked to choose between two options – Stay in Ukraine or Join Russia.

(e) Russia‟s Stand.

(i) On 01 Mar Russia‘s Parliament approved the use of armed force in Ukraine. (ii) The Russian Parliament‘s move came in response to a request of help to secure peace and calm in Crimea from the newly appointed pro-Russian Prime Minister of the region Sergei Aksyonov. (iii) The current stand-off in Ukraine was the result of the Western powers failure to get opposition leaders implement the peace accord they signed with ousted President Viktor Yanukovych on 21 Feb 2014.

(f) US & EU Stand.

(i) Condemned the mobilisation of forces by Russia near the Ukrainian border as an ―incredible act of aggression‖ and threatened very serious repercussions from the US and other countries, including sanctions to isolate Russia economically. (ii) The US President Barack Obama warned his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin against violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and asked him to pull his forces back to their bases in Crimea. (iii) The US also sent 12 F-16 fighter jets and 300 service personnel to Poland for a training exercise next week in response to the Ukraine crisis. (iv) The US also deployed six F-15 fighter jets in Lithuania in response to Russian aggression in Ukraine.

(g) Diplomatic Efforts by US & Russia.

(i) On 06 Mar 2014, the US and Russia stepped up diplomatic efforts to defuse the Ukrainian crisis heightened by the tensions in Crimea.

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(ii) Despite persisting differences in their views on the Ukrainian developments, the leaders expressed shared interest in de-escalation of tensions and early normalisation of the situation.

3. Crimea.

(a) Crimea Reunited with Russia (16 Mar 2014).

(i) 97% of the voters wanted Crimea to revert back to Russia from which it had been separated when the Soviet Union broke up. (ii) The voter turnout for the referendum was a record-breaking 83% of the 1.5 million eligible voters in Crimea. (iii) The Parliament of Crimea adopted a declaration of independence and a formal request to accede to Russia.

(b) Accession Pact.

(i) On 18 Mar 2014, the President of Russia Vladimir Putin signed a treaty on Crimea‘s accession to Russia. (ii) The treaty was also signed by the leaders of Crimea who attended a special joint session of the Russian Parliament.

(c) Russian Parliament Approved Treaty on Crimea (20 Mar 2014).

(d) Crimea‟s Accession Law.

(i) On 21 Mar 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed into law Crimea‘s accession to Russia. (ii) Mr Putin signed the ratification Act and a law creating two new administrative units in Russia –Crimea separately, the city of Sevastopol where Russia‘s Black Sea Fleet is based.

(e) Ukraine‟s Reaction.

(i) The Ukrainian Parliament adopted a declaration stating that the Ukrainian people would never, under any circumstances, stop fighting for the liberation of Crimea from the occupants.

(f) Ukraine Withdrew Troops from Crimea (24 Mar 2104).

(g) Russian Control of Ukrainian Military Facilities.

(i) On 26 Mar Russia reported that it had taken control of all Ukrainian military facilities in Crimea and announced plans to increase its military presence on the strategically significant peninsula. (ii) All 193 military garrisons of the Ukrainian armed forces in Crimea had raised Russian flags.

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(h) Scrapping of Gas Discount.

(i) On 03 Apr 2014, Russia‘s Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said that he had scrapped the last discount on gas price granted by Russia to Ukraine thereby raising the gas price by $100 to $485 for every 1000 cubic metres. (ii) Russia had granted the gas discount to Ukraine in 2010 in exchange for keeping its Black Sea Fleet facilities in Crimea‘s port of Sevastopol.

4. Eastern Ukraine.

(a) Pro-Russian Activists Proclaim Independence.

(i) On 07 Apr 2014, pro-Russian activists seized a provincial building in the eastern Ukrainian city of Donetsk proclaimed independence from Ukraine. (ii) The protesters who occupied regional government headquarters in Donetsk set up a People‘s Council of Donetsk and voted unanimously to split from Ukraine and form the ―sovereign state of the People‘s Republic of Donetsk‖.

(b) Ukraine Launched an Anti-Terror Operation to Quell the Pro-Russian Protests in the Eastern Region. (c) Geneva Accord. On 17 Apr 2014, the US, the EU, Russia and Ukraine agreed on a plan to resolve the Ukraine crisis through a constitutional reform that would grant more powers to Russian-speaking regions.

(d) Ukraine Unveiled Reform Roadmap.

(i) The Ukrainian Government was ready for full-fledged constitutional reform. (ii) The amended Constitution would also accord special status to the Russian language in the Russian-speaking regions. (iii) The Prime Minister called for a nation-wide discussion on the constitutional reform by 01 Oct 2014.

(e) Four-Point Peace Plan.

(i) On 07 May 2014, Russia and Europe agreed on a roadmap for ending the standoff between the government of Ukraine and the rebellious Russian-speaking south-eastern regions. (ii) Four-point peace roadmap for Ukraine which called for ceasefire, de-escalation of tension, the launching of dialogue and elections in Ukraine.

(f) Eastern Ukraine Referendum.

(i) The rebels in eastern Ukraine refused to postpone the referendum on state sovereignty despite a call from Russian President Vladimir Putin.

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(ii) On 11 May 2014, the eastern regions of Ukraine voted on Sunday in a referendum on self-rule. (iii) Around 90 percent of voters in Donetsk region and 96 percent in the neighbouring Luhansk region supported ―state sovereignty‖.

(g) Ukraine Descending into Civil War.

(i) In late May 2014, there was sharp escalation in fighting in eastern Ukraine. There were heavy casualties as Ukraine‘s government stepped up military operations in the east. (ii) Several Ukrainian soldiers and self-defence activists were killed in fierce fighting in eastern Ukraine.

(h) Rebels form New Independent State of Novorossiya.

(i) On 24 May 2014, a meeting of the pro-independent activists from Ukraine‘s eight South-East provinces in Donetsk decided to form a new independent state of Novorossiya or New Russia. (ii) Initially, Novorossiya would be made up of the People‘s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, which had declared their independence after the referendum.

5. Presidential Elections in Ukraine.

(a) Presidential elections were held in Ukraine on 25 May 2014 with a turnout of over 60%. (b) In the eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk the vote was largely disrupted with only 5% of voters in the two rebellious provinces casting their votes. (d) Chocolate tycoon Petro Poroshenko won the Presidential election in Ukraine with over 54% of votes.

6. Ukraine Launches Attack on Rebels.

(a) Within hours of the election of the new President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko, the Ukrainian government forces launched a fierce attack on the eastern city of Donetsk. (b) The attack resulted in the death of over 100 pro-independence rebels and civilians. (d) India made arrangements to evacuate around 1000 Indian nationals from the violence-hit Ukrainian city of Luhansk in the east.

7. Ukraine Recaptures Port City of Mariupol.

(a) On 13 Jun 2014, the Ukrainian forces said that they had hoisted the national flag over the strategic rebel-held port city of Mariupol in eastern Ukraine.

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(b) The new Ukrainian leaders were keen to prove that the separatist insurgency was being controlled by Russia and had only limited support among ethnic Russians.

8. Ukrainian Military Plane Down.

(a) On 14 Jun 2014, pro-Russian rebels brought down a Ukrainian military plane near Luhansk in eastern Ukraine killing 49 troops. (b) Gas Cuts of Ukraine. On 16 Jun 2014, Russia cut the flow of gas to Ukraine after the talks failed to resolve a price dispute threatened to disrupt supplies to Europe for the third time in a decade.

(c) Ukraine-EU Deal (Brussels, 27 Jun 2014).

(i) The EU said that the deal would boost Ukraine‘s exports to the 28-member bloc by $1.35 billion per annum and save Ukraine approximately half the amount in revoked customs duties. (ii) Ukraine‘s Association Agreement with the EU is seen as a setback to Russia‘s plan of including Ukraine in a Russian-led alliance – Eurasian Union - that rivals the European Union and NATO. (iii) The agreement, coupled with Ukraine‘s IMF ($17 billion) deal should act as an anchor for much-needed economic and political reforms, according to London‘s Capital Economics consultancy.

(d) Ukraine Resumes Offensive.

(i) On 01 Jul 2014, Ukraine launched attacks with tanks and fighter bombers against pro-Russian rebels in eastern Ukraine. (ii) Ukraine dismissed European pressure to save the 10-day unilateral ceasefire.

(e) Malaysian Airliner Shot Down Over Eastern Ukraine.

(i) Ukraine accused the rebels for shooting down the MH 17 Malaysian Airlines Boeing 777 with a heavy SA-11 ground-to-air missile as it was flying from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur. (ii) The rebels denied any involvement and handed over the bodies and the black boxes to the International Civil Aviation Organisation on 21 Jul 2014. (iii) Ukrainian Prime Minister Resigned Paving the Way for Early Elections.

9. Parliamentary Elections in Ukraine (26 Oct 2014).

(a) Pro-Western and moderate nationalist parties backing President Petro Poroshenko scored a big win the Parliamentary elections. (b) Russia welcomed the outcome of the Parliamentary elections in Ukraine as

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backing for a peaceful resolution of the separatist war.

10. Ukrainian Parliament Voted in Favour of NATO Membership.

(a) Ukraine‘s new Parliament overwhelmingly voted in favour of the country opting for the membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). (b) Ukraine‘s entry into NATO would still take some years as it has to overcome its military setbacks in the war with separatists in eastern Ukraine and bring its economy back on track to achieve the stability that NATO seeks in its members.

11. Ceasefire Deal.

(a) A peace summit aimed at ending the war between Ukraine and pro-Russian separatists was held on 11-12 Feb 2015 in Minsk, Belarus. (b) The four-way peace summit, held between Presidents of Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France was seen as a European diplomatic initiative to end the worst East-West crisis since the end of the Cold War. (c) The new heavy weapons-free zone would be 50 to 70 km wide, double the width of the buffer zone agreed to in the failed September truce. (d) A pervious ceasefire deal signed in Minsk in Sep 2014 had collapsed very quickly.

12. Implications Ukrainian Crisis.

(a) Humanitarian Crisis.

(i) The conflict in eastern Ukraine has led to the death of 5,300 people and a million people being displaced from their homes. (ii) Need for swift diplomatic initiatives to end the large-scale humanitarian crisis in the region which otherwise runs the risk of prolonged instability.

(b) Threat of Cold War.

(i) The Ukrainian crisis has led to a confrontation between the West and Russia. (ii) The Russian Parliament approved the use of military force in Ukraine while the US said that Russia‘s interference in Ukraine exposed Eastern Europe to some significant risk and the US would respond if its allies were threatened. (iii) The crisis in Ukraine has drawn the US and EU to the region and if war breaks out between Russia and Ukraine it would endanger the security of Europe and could change the global balance of power. (iv) In recent times Russia has asserted itself as a check against US unipolar influence, projecting itself as an alternate power, which has

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indication that there was some continuity in the Cold War rivalry. (v) The crisis in Ukraine has shown that the US and Russia were again moving towards a Cold War mindset and return to the fierce old rivalry between them. (vi) The diplomatic efforts between the US and Russia needed to be stepped up to resolve the Ukrainian crisis at the earliest and save the region and the world from a return to the Cold War era. (vii) Reunification of Crimea with Russia and the independence declared by the eastern regions Donetsk and Luhansk in Ukraine has led to a face-off between Russia and the West leading to the start of a new Cold War. (viii) The US and EU have started imposing targeted sanctions against Russia. (ix) If the US and EU follow with further sanctions targeting Russia‘s energy sector, the consequences would be adverse for the region. (x) Russia has responded with its own counter sanctions against US individuals. (xi) NATO and NASA have suspended cooperation with Russia until Russia changes course on its dealing with the Ukraine crisis. (xii) Russia‘s aim would be to prevent a unified anti-Russia Ukraine joining the NATO fold. (xiii) The US and EU want to block Russia‘s plan to redraw Ukraine‘s eastern border. (xiv) The US was considering rotating US forces to the Baltic region to protect NATO allies against Russian aggression.

13. Implications for India. (a) India called for elections and a dialogue between Ukraine and other countries involved in the crisis.

(b) As a result of the crisis in Ukraine, India was concerned over the Ukrainian government‘s control of the military industrial complex, with which India has developed close ties. (c) India‘s immediate concern was the fate of some military equipment factories from where India was getting its entire fleet of medium military transport aircraft modernised. (d) Another military facility in Ukraine provides India with engines for military helicopters of Russian origin. (e) India has also contract with Ukraine for sourcing naval engines.

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(f) India signed a defence cooperation agreement with Ukraine during the visit of the ousted Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych‘s visit to India in Dec 2012. (g) Indian embassy in Ukraine has two military officers of First Secretary rank and one of Second Secretary rank, pointing to Ukraine‘s importance to India‘s military modernisation. (h) India is keen on the resolution of the crisis in Ukraine and a stable government capable of controlling the military-industrial complexes

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CHAPTER - 52

US - CUBA RELATIONS

1. Re-Establishing Diplomatic Relations.

(a) On 17 Dec 14, Cold War foes the US and Cuba agreed to re-establish diplomatic relations and launch measures to end the US trade embargo on Cuba imposed in 1960. (b) The breakthrough came in the wake of a prisoner exchange. (c) The US President Barack Obama said the US was ready to review trade ties and re-open its embassy in Cuba that had been closed since 1961. (d) The Cuban President Raul Castro confirmed that both countries had agreed to re-establish diplomatic ties after more than five decades. (e) The Cuban President cautioned that the issue of US embargo against Cuba remained unresolved. (f) The US President acknowledged that the US trade embargo had failed and he would approach the US Congress to discuss the lifting of the embargo along with the revival of diplomatic and travel links. (g) Mr. Obama praised the support of Pope Francis of Argentina, and the Catholic Church in bringing about the breakthrough. (h) The Vatican said that the Pope had appealed to the US President Barack Obama and the Cuban President Raul Castro to end the standoff, offering negotiators his offices in Oct 2014, making way for solutions acceptable to both parties. (j) The US would end an out-dated approach that for decades had failed to advance its interests and instead it would begin to normalise relations between the two countries, according to Mr. Obama. (k) Through these changes, the US intended to create more opportunities for the American and Cuban people and begin a new chapter among the nations of the Americas. (l) Cuba was a sovereign state that would not bow to pressure to change its political or economic system.

2. Breakthrough Hailed by International Community.

(a) The Pope, who played a key role in bringing the breakthrough in US-Cuban relations, sent warm congratulations to both countries for overcoming the difficulties which had marked their recent history.

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(b) The Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper pointed out that his country, which never broke diplomatic relations with Cuba, had also played its part by hosting the first secret talks in 2013, and welcomed the overdue development. (c) The European Union (EU) hailed the historic breakthrough in US-Cuban relations as a ―historical turning point‖. The EU also wants to normalise relations with Cuba. (d) The breakthrough in US-Cuban relations was also hailed in South America with leaders from the five-nation Mercosur bloc meeting in Argentina, applauding the move. (e) In Cuba, people came out in the streets to celebrate the news and hoped that the breakthrough in ties with the US would lead to the revival of the Cuban economy. (f) India extended its greetings to both the US and Cuba for achieving the breakthrough in their diplomatic relations.

3. US-Cuba Talks.

(a) The US and Cuban officials held landmark talks in the Cuban capital Havana on 22 Jan 2015, on reopening embassies. (b) The negotiations were aimed at lifting restrictions on diplomats in the US and Cuba and make way for the return of Ambassadors, more than half century after the relations broke in 1961. (c) The US Secretary of State John Kerry cautioned that the two sides still had much to negotiate before they could normalise relations. (d) Both sides agreed that re-establishing relations must be based on the Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations, but cautioned against expecting any breakthroughs in the first round of talks.

4. US & Cuban Presidents Meet.

(a) A new era in US-Cuba relations was heralded with the meeting of the US President Barack Obama with his Cuban counterpart Raul Castro at the Summit of the Americas in Panama City in Apr 2015. (b) Cuba was taking part in the 21-year-old Summit for the first time. (c) The face-to-face talks between the US and Cuban Presidents were the first since 1956. (d) The shift in US policy represented a turning point for the entire region. (e) The fact that both the Presidents of US and Cuba were sitting across the table in the Summit of the Americas marked a historic occasion. (f) The two Presidents acknowledged that the US and Cuba would continue to

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have disagreements as they negotiate to restore diplomatic relations that broke off in 1961. (g) The human rights situation in Cuba was cited by the US President, while the Cuban President renewed calls for the US Congress to lift a decades-old embargo. (h) Both leaders vowed to pursue their historic effort to bury the Cold War-era enmity.

5. Cuba out of List of Nations Sponsoring Terrorism.

(a) On 15 Apr 15, on a directive from President Barack Obama to review Cuba‘s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, the US State Department submitted a report recommending, based on the facts, and the statutory standards, that the President rescind Cuba‘s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. (b) Although the US has had, and continues to have, significant concerns and disagreements with the wide range of Cuba‘s policies and actions, these concerns and disagreements fell outside of the criteria for designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. (c) The review focused on the narrow questions of whether Cuba provided any support for international terrorism during the previous six months, and whether Cuba has provided assurances that would not support acts of international terrorism in the future, consistent with the statutory standard of rescission. (d) The US lawmakers had 45 days to oppose the move, which would otherwise go ahead and remove a key irritant in US-Cuba relations.

7. Diplomatic Relations Restored.

(a) On 20 Jul 2015, the US and Cuba officially resumed their diplomatic relations after a gap of 54 years by reopening their embassies. (b) The Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez raised his country‘s flag at a newly designated embassy in Washington. (c) Talks were held for the first time between the US Secretary of State John Kerry and the Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez in Washington on 20 Jul 2015. (d) Mr Kerry visited Cuba on 14 Aug 2015 and became the first US Secretary of State to visit Cuba since 1945. (e) The restoration of US-Cuba diplomatic ties started on 17 Dec 2014, when the US President Barack Obama and his Cuban counterpart Raul Castro agreed to normalise ties. (f) The Cuban Foreign Minister said that the challenge was great but Cuba was willing to move forward in a constructive spirit. (g) Mr Rodriguez called for the removal of the US economic blockade on Cuba which had caused so much deprivation and damage to the Cuban people.

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8. Significance of Restoration Ties.

(a) Restoration of diplomatic ties with Cuba has been a major foreign policy legacy of the US President Barack Obama‘s eight-year term. (b) Restoration of US-Cuba relations pointed to President Barack Obama‘s policy of engaging with countries with which the US had hostile relations. (c) The US President‘s policy of engaging with countries like Cuba and Iran showed that creative diplomacy and patience could resolve complex problems with historical and ideological hostilities. (d) Mr Obama agreed that the US had been clinging to a policy that was not working. (e) The restoration of diplomatic ties with the US is significant for Cuba at a time when the country is battling economic troubles and is moving towards removing state controls over the economy and allowing a greater role for private capital. (f) Cooperation with the US and the removal of economic blockade would be beneficial for the Cuban economy. (g) The restoration of diplomatic relations with the US also gives Cuba an opportunity to deepen democracy.

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CHAPTER - 53

YEMEN

Background 1. Yemen is located on the Southern edge of the Arabian Peninsula. Most of which is desert with copious reserves of oil and gas underneath. In 1990, North and South Yemen merged together to form one country. Yemen is one of the poorest countries in the Middle East with a population of 23.8 million. The region has long been a locus of militant Islamic ideologies and a source of militant Islamic fighters. In the 1980s thousands of Yemenis travelled to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets. 2. Al-Qaeda. In Oct 2000, Al-Qaeda bombed the USS Cole killing 17 US sailors. In Nov 2002, the AI – Queda mastermind the USS Cole Bombing. In Jan 2009, the AL-Qaeda Militants in Saudi Arabia and Yemen merge to from AL-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). 3. Conflict. In conflict in the Northern Saada Mountains, government forces fighting the Shia rebels called Houthis. In Secessionist Movement in the South, government forces battling Secessionist forces under the banner of Southern Mobility Movement. The Al-Qaeda has regrouped in Yemen and is using the country as a base for attacks throughout the region. 4. Revolution in Yemen.

(a) President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who has ruled Yemen for 33 years resisted all demands by the Opposition collation, the joint meeting Parties (JMP) to step down immediately. (b) President Saleh imposed a 30 day state of emergency in end-March 2011 following the death of 52 people in shooting by government loyalists in the capital Sana‘a. Several ministers, provincial Governors and diplomats resigned from the government. (c) In late April 2011, the protests against President Saleh spread to 14 provinces with hundreds of thousands protesting on the streets of capital Sana‘a. The youth movement, one of the key organisers of street protests, wanted to hold Mr Saleh accountable for the shooting spree. (d) On 3 Jun 2011, Yemen‘s President Ali Abdullah Saleh was injured in a rocket attack at the Presidential palace. The threat of civil war looms over Yemen as the opposition backed by tribes and breakaway military units takes on government forces loyal to the President Saleh.

5. Agreement to Quit Power. On 23 Nov 2011, President Ali Abdullah Saleh signed an UN - brokered Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) deal to hand over his powers after 33 years in office to end the 10 month- old violence. Under the Agreement, President Saleh

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would Transfer power to the Vice-President Abd-Rabbu Monsour Hadi in exchange for immunity from prosecution. 6. Shortcomings of Agreement. Violent street protests were witnessed in Yemen against the immunity from prosecution granted to President. The GCC-backed Agreement appeared to be groundbreaking, but did not lead any large scale celebrations. The lukewarm response to the agreement was attributed to its inability to bring on board significant stakeholders in Yemeni society including the youth, the Houthis in Northern Yemen and representatives of the Southern Separatist Movement. The GCC – backed agreement faces challenges as it has not satisfied thousands of youthful demonstrators who demanded trails for President Saleh and members of his government for the death of many demonstrators. 7. Transition of Power.

(a) National Unity Government Formed. On 10 Dec 2011, a National Unity Government was formed to lead a three-month transition period until elections are held. The new government headed by Prime Minister Mohammed Basindawa would be in office until Feb 2012 elections. (b) Immunity to Outgoing President Saleh. On 21 Jan 2012, Yemen‘s Parliament approved a law to grant immunity from prosecution to the outgoing President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The immunity law was amended to say that the immunity would only be for politically motivated crimes committed carrying out official duties, not for those considered terrorist acts. (c) Outgoing President Saleh Bid Farewell. On 22 Jan 2012, outgoing President Ali Abdullah Saleh bid farewell as he left for the US for medical treatment. He apologised to the people of Yemen for any shortcomings during his 33 year rule. The departure made Mr Saleh, the fourth Arab autocrat to be removed from power in more than a year of uprising that has redrawn the political map of the Middle East region. (d) New President. On 25 Feb 2012, Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi was sworn-in as the new President of Yemen. He was elected after more than 60 percent of voters cast their votes in the election. Mr Hadi, a former Army General, was the sole candidate to replace Mr Saleh in the GCC-backed deal for the transfer of power.

8. Conflict in Sadda Moutains.

(a) Conflict with Shia Rebels.

(i) The Houthis, who follow the Zaydi sect of Shia Islam, make up 30% of Yemen‘s population, but from a majority in the Northern highlands including the Sadda province. (ii) The conflict in the Northern Saada mountains of Yemen started in 2004, when the Sunni-dominated Yemeni government killed a Shia Houthi leader leading to fears that they were being targeted for eradication by the Government and Sunni extremists

(b) Saudi Arabia bombs Saada Mountains. In Nov 2009, Saudi Arabia became directly involved in the conflict in Northern Yemen, when Saudi Arabian

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forces began their air and ground assault after the Houthis killed a Saudi Arabian security officer in a cross-border raid in the kingdom.

9. Houthis Took Over Yemen.

(a) In Sep 2014, the Houthis seized government headquarters and the Prime Minister Basindawa resigned. (b) In Sep 2014, the UN announced a power-sharing peace agreement aimed at ending the deadly fighting between the Shia rebels and Government forces. (c) In early Oct 2014, the Houthis took control of all state buildings, the airport and the central bank and defence ministry in the capital Sanaa. (d) The Houthis, who are from Northern Yemen and are the followers of the Zaydi sect of Shia Islam, make up 30% of Yemen‘s population and are seeking to revive the Zaydi identity. (e) The Houthis, led by 33-year old Abdul-Malik, fought series of civil wars since 2004 from the northern Saada mountains and took control of the Saada province in 2011. (f) The Houthis claim that their aim is to achieve the goals of 2011 Arab Spring revolution that led to the overthrow of the then President Abdullah Saleh. (g) The Houthis, who call themselves Ansar Allah (Supporters of Allah) are known to be anti-American and they pasted the capital Sanaa with anti-American slogans. (h) On January 21, 2015, the Houthi Shia rebels captured a military base, housing ballistic missiles and posted guards outside the Yemen President‘s palace. (j) On January 23, 2015, Yemen‘s President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi resigned and blamed the Houthis control of the capital Sanaa for impeding his attempt to take the country towards stability. (k) On February 06, 2015, the Houthi Shia rebels announced that they had taken over the country and dissolved Yemen‘s Parliament. (l) The Houthis said that they were forming a five-member presidential council that would replace the President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi for an interim period of two years.

10. Airstrikes on Houthi Rebel (26 Mar 2015).

(a) Yemeni President Hadi appealed to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to intervene. (b) The coalition of 10 countries led by Saudi Arabia and including Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Sudan, launched airstrikes on Houthi rebel positions – with the specific goal of protecting Yemen‘s legitimate government.

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(f) The coalition airstrikes targeted weapons storage sites used by soldiers loyal to former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, a supporter of the Shia Houthi rebels.

11. Arab Summit (Sharm El-Sheikh, 28-29 Mar 2015).

(a) Arab leaders agreed to form a Joint Military Force. (b) The decision was mostly aimed at fighting jihadists who have overrun swathes of Iraq and Syria and secured a foothold in Libya.

12. Arms Embargo on Houthi Rebels (14 Apr 2015).

(a) UN Security Council adopted a resolution that imposed arms embargo on the Houthi Shia rebels of Yemen and demanded they relinquish territory seized. (b) The UNSC vote came after Iran, an ally of the Shia Houthi rebels proposed a peace plan for Yemen which called for a ceasefire followed by foreign mediated talks by all sides.

13. Humanitarian Crisis.

(a) More than 1,500 people have been killed in the airstrikes and the fighting between the rebels and loyalists of the current President Hadi. (b) Aid agencies warned of a growing humanitarian crisis including food shortages in Yemen as the war continued in Yemen.

14. Implications of Conflict.

(a) The Saudi-led coalition‘s airstrikes on Yemen could go on for months with implications for region as the conflict pits Sunni Arab nations against Shia Iran. (b) Saudi Arabia has accused its regional rival Iran of funding and arming the Shia Houthi rebels, however, Iran has denied the charge. (c) The Houthi rebels, allied with army units of the former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, have taken control of large parts of Yemen including the capital Sana‘a. (d) Conflict in Yemen is symptomatic of a much bigger problem facing the Middle East – a sectarian war. (e) Saudi Arabia and its Sunni allies were concerned at the advance of the Shia Houthi rebels in Yemen as they believe that Iran is backing the rebels. (f) Yemen appears to be moving in the direction of where Syria is today a country divided into enclaves controlled by sectarian and fundamentalist groups which are constantly at war with each other. (g) The sectarian fissures in the Middle East were kept under control by the autocratic rulers of the region but they have resurfaced after the Arab Spring.

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(h) Crisis in the Middle East could be resolved by reconciliation between the region‘s Sunnis and Shias and is the only way to fight extremism and ensuring peace in the region. (j) The escalating conflict in Yemen is seen as a threat to international shipping and oil transport as the country shares border with Saudi Arabia, and is also located in a shipping route used by oil tankers heading West from the Persian Gulf. (k) Oil prices increased by more than 5% after the Saudi-led coalition launched airstrikes on rebel positions in Yemen.

15. Operation Raahat by India.

(a) On March 31, 2015, India launched ‗Operation Raahat‘ to evacuate its citizens and some foreign nationals from Yemen. (e) Operation Raahat was a composite evacuation effort with the deployment of three naval ships and four aircrafts, including two IAF C-17 Globemasters and two Air India flights stationed in Muscat. (f) Naval Ship INS Sumitra was diverted from anti-piracy duty in the Gulf of Aden and anchored just off the coast of Yemen to assist the evacuation operation. (g) Two more ships, the destroyer INS Mumbai and the frigate INS Tarkash were also sent to Yemen for the evacuation operation.

16. Significance of Operation Raahat.

(a) Demonstrated the efficiency of India‘s response system in testing conditions. (b) The evacuation was undertaken under testing conditions including navigating around Saudi Arabian airstrikes while negotiating clearances with all the groups. (c) Operation Raahat showed the benefits of India‘s diplomacy and the goodwill enjoyed by the country in the region. (d) India won appreciation from the world for rescuing foreign nationals from 48 countries. (e) Operation Raahat highlighted the importance of Indian military in protecting India‘s overseas interests as well as being a force for creative diplomacy and larger force projection. (f) Indian Armed Forces executed successful rescue operations in Iraq and Ukraine in the past one year. (g) India could systematically align its military prowess with its long-time strategic goals and funding priorities.

17. Current Situation.

(a) On 21 Jul 2015, Pro-government fighters have fully recaptured Aden from the

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rebel Houthi fighters in Operation Golden Arrow after months of fighting, now the pro-government fighters have recaptured more than 90% of the Provence of Aden. (b) On 21 July a UAE technical team had arrived to repair the tower and passenger terminal at Aden international airport, heavily damaged in clashes. A UN ship docked in Aden carrying much-needed relief supplies, the first UN vessel to reach the city in four months. Another ship sent by the UAE also delivered medical aid. (c) On 22 Jul a Saudi military plane landed in Aden international airport filled with relief aid. .(d) On 24 Jul a military plane from the UAE arrived filled with relief aid. (e) On 04 Aug Houthi rebels were pushed back from the Al-Anad airbase, by Pro-Hadi forces. (f) On 07 Oct Islamic State takes responsibility for number of bombings in Yemen's two biggest cities that killed at least 25 people; military headquarters in Arden is among targets. (h) On 08 Oct, Airstrike by Saudi Arabia-led military coalition to halt insurrection in Yemen kills 23 people attending wedding celebration in Dhamar Province; second fatal airstrike on wedding party in 10 days adds to growing criticism of coalition United Nations says is responsible for over 1,100 civilian deaths in past six months. (j) On 14 Oct, Saada, Yemen, stronghold of Houthi rebel forces in country's war, has come under intense attack by Saudi-led coalition; Houthis have endorsed United Nations peace plan, but months of combat have hardened tensions in Northern province. (k) On 16 Oct, United Nations official predicts negotiations on resolution to seven-month-long war in Yemen between Saudi-led coalition & Houthi rebels will start by end of October 2015. (l) On 17 Oct, Saudi Arabia confirmed the arrival of Sudanese troops into Aden for the purpose of bolstering the Saudi-led coalition.

.

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CHAPTER - 54

EUROPEAN REFUGEE CRISIS

1. Background. European Refugee Crisis arose through the rising number of refugees and migrants coming to the European Union, across the Mediterranean Sea or through Southeast Europe and applying for asylum. They come from areas such as the Middle East (Syria, Iraq), Africa (Eritrea, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Gambia), South Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh), and the Western Balkans (Kosova, Albania). As of Oct 2015, the top three nationalities of the over half a million Mediterranean Sea arrivals since the beginning of the year are Syria (54%), Afghanistan (15%) and Eritrea (6%). Most of the refugees and migrants are adult men (68%). 2. Preventive Measures. Between 2007 and 2011, large numbers of undocumented migrants from the Middle East and Africa crossed between Turkey and Greece, leading Greece and the European Border Protection agency Frontex to upgrade border controls. In 2012, immigrant influx into Greece by land decreased by 95% after the construction of a fence on that part of the Greek–Turkish frontier which does not follow the course of the Maritsa River. In 2015, Bulgaria followed by upgrading a border fence to prevent migrant flows through Turkey. 3. Major Routes Being Used. As of Aug 2015, Frontex recognizes the following general routes on sea and on land used by irregular migrants to enter the EU:-

(a) The Western Mediterranean Route. (b) The Central Mediterranean Route. (c) The Apulia and Calabria Route. (d) The Circular Route from Albania to Greece. (e) The Western Balkan Route (From Greece through Macedonia and Serbia to Hungary or Croatia). (f) The Eastern Mediterranean Route. (g) The Eastern Borders Route. (h) The Western African Route. (j) In addition, an Arctic route had emerged by Sep 2015.

4. Summer 2015 Crisis. Factors cited as immediate triggers or causes of the sudden and massive increase in migrant numbers in the summer of 2015 along the Eastern Mediterranean and Western Balkan route (Turkey-Greece-Macedonia-Serbia-Hungary) include:-

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(a) Temporary Asylum Permits. Inmid- Jun 2015 the government of Macedonia announced that it was changing its policy on migrants entering the country illegally. Previously, migrants were forbidden from transiting Macedonia, causing those who chose to do so to take perilous, clandestine modes of transit, such as walking along railroad tracks at night. Beginning in June, migrants were given three-day, temporary asylum permits, enabling them to travel by train and road. (b) Opening of the Macedonia Route. The opening of the Macedonia route enabled migrants from the Middle East to take very short, inexpensive voyages from the coast of Turkey to the Greek Islands, instead of the far longer, more perilous, and far more expensive voyage from Libya to Italy. In addition to reducing danger, this lowered the cost from around $5–6,000 to $2–3,000. (c) Temporary Residency to Refugees. German Chancellor Angela Merkel's public pledged that Germany would offer temporary residency to refugees, combined with television footage of cheering Germans welcoming refugees and migrants arriving in Munich, persuaded large numbers of people to move from Turkey up the Balkan route. (d) Increased Military Conscription. The Syrian government under Bashar al-Assad announced increased military conscription, and simultaneously made it easier for Syrians to obtain passports, leading Middle East policy experts to speculate that he was implementing a policy to encourage opponents of his regime to leave the country.

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CHAPTER - 55

ARCTIC REGION CONTROVERSY

1. Introduction.

(a) Territorial Disagreement between Five Arctic Countries. Russia, the US, Canada, Denmark and Norway. (b) Significance of Arctic Region.

(i) Arctic Circle covers 21 million square kilometres of land and 13 million sq km of ice-bound seas. (ii) Arctic's Rich Energy Resources. Estimated Reserves of 13% of Current Global Reserves of Undiscovered Oil and 30% of Global Gas Reserves. (iii) Arctic's Mineral Resources and Fish Stocks. (iv) Commercial Shipping Taking Place in the Region. (v) The Arctic Region Becoming a Tourist Destination. (vi) Arctic Region Plays a Significant Role in Slowing the Pace of Global Warming. (vii) Shrinking of the Arctic Ice Sea has made Accessible the Region‘s Abundant Oil, Gas and Mineral Deposits.

(b) Main Contentious Issues.

(i) Lomonosov Ridge. (ii) Commercial Shipping - North-West Passage.

2. Claims by Arctic Countries.

(a) Extension of the Continental Shelf to the Disputed Spots is the Key Issue.

(b) Russia.

(i) Russia Claims 1.2 Million Sq Km of the Arctic Seabed. (ii) Russia sends two scientific expeditions to the North Pole to gather data to support its claim. (iii) Russia wants the UN to decide the arctic claim.

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(iv) Russia to increase naval strength in the Arctic Zone. (v) Russia plans to claim 150 mile additional territory. (vi) Russia's claim disputed by other arctic countries.

(c) Canada.

(i) Canada claims sovereignty over the Arctic. (ii) Canada to build new patrol ships. (iii) Announced the construction of the first Arctic Port to underpin its sovereignty. (iv) Canada holds military exercises in the Arctic. (v) Canada claims the North-West passage.

(d) The US pushing for internationalisation of the Arctic ocean. (e) Denmark sends scientific expedition to the Arctic to stake its claim.

3. First Arctic Summit (Oslo, Norway, Mar 2013).

(a) The first Arctic Summit was held in Oslo, the capital of Norway in Mar 2013. (b) The Summit discussed issues ranging from climate change to the regions natural resources. (c) There were differences on the need to conserve the Arctic as a unique ecosystem or opening it up for exploration. (d) Environmentalists for better regulation and for studying the possible impacts on the region before opening it up for exploration. (e) There are 40 different communities including in the Arctic region and they were feeling the impact of the climate change in region. (f) The ecological balance of the region was also changing posing a chal enge to the survival of the indigenous people there.

4. India: Observer Status in Arctic Council (May 2013).

(a) Eight-Nation Arctic Council. (i) Formed in 1996: The main forum to discuss issues related to the governance of the Arctic region. The issues relate to climate protection, scientific research and access to resources. (ii) Members: Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, the US and Russia.

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(iii) Permanent Observers: Six European Countries, India, China, Italy, Japan, South Korea and Singapore.

(b) New Permanent Observers (Kiruna, Sweden, May 2013).

(i) India became a permanent observer of the Arctic Council, along with China, Italy, Japan, South Korea and Singapore at a meeting of the Arctic Council held in Kiruna, Sweden in May 2013. (ii) The permanent observes would not be able to raise issues directly but could bring them forward through one of the eight core members.

(c) India‟s Interests in the Arctic Region.

(i) India welcomed its inclusion as a permanent observer of the Arctic Council stressing that it would contribute its scientific expertise to the work of the Arctic Council to support its objectives. (ii) In 2008 India opened its permanent research station Himadri in the Arctic region. (iii) The climatic conditions of the Arctic have an impact on the monsoons in India. (iv) The melting of the Arctic sea ice has opened new sea routes which would be of significance to India. (v) India could also look for opportunities for oil and gas exploration in the Arctic region by cooperating with one of the five Arctic countries controlling the economic zone in the region. (vi) India‘s interests have also to be seen from the angle of China‘s aggressive navigation of the region.

5. Current Situation

(a) Russia to Reopen a Naval Base in Arctic Region.

(i) Russian President Vladimir Putin said that Russia was going to rebuild a major naval base off its Arctic coast that was abandoned 20 years ago. (ii) Russia‘s decision to rebuild the naval base came a month after it submitted to the UN a claim to extend its 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone by another 150 miles or 1.2 million square kilometres. (iii) Russia based its claim by pointing out that scientific evidence had proved beyond doubt that the seabed it claims was continuation of its continental shelf. (iv) Melting ice in the Arctic region has increased commercial shipping along the Northern Sea Route which skirts Russia‘s Arctic coastline.

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(b) Russia Increases Presence in Response to Canada‟s Claim.

(i) Russia completed the formation of new large units of military divisions in the Arctic that remain on constant combat alert. (ii) Russia must possess all the levers necessary for protecting its security and national interests. (iii) Russia‘s response came after Canada filed a claim with the UN Commission on the Limits of Continental Shelf concerning the outer limits of its continental shelf in the Atlantic Ocean. (iv) Russia has overlapping claim to both the North Pole and swathes of the Arctic which is estimated to hold 13% of the global undiscovered oil and up to 30% of its hidden natural gas reserves.

(c) Russia Announced Offshore Oil Production in the Arctic.

(i) Russia‘s natural gas monopoly Gazprom said that it had started pumping oil at its first Arctic offshore platform at the Prirazlomnoye field in the Pechora Sea. (ii) Russia‘s Gazprom, became the first company in the world to start commercial production of oil from the Arctic region. (iii) The Prirazlomnoye is a small field containing 72 million tonnes of oil. Gazprom said that it was just a pilot project in its large scale plans to create a major hydrocarbons production centre in the region.

6. Conclusion.

(a) Scramble for Arctic Resources Could Lead to an Environment Disaster. (b) A Treaty similar to the Antarctic Treaty System Can Protect the Arctic Region from Environmental Disaster. (c) India‟s Interest in Russia‟s Arctic Oil Reserves.

(i) Russian President Vladimir Putin described the Arctic Region as essential for Russia‘s economic and security interests. (ii) A Joint Statement issued during the visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Russia in Oct 2013 reiterated ONGC-OVL‘s interest in participating along with Russian companies in exploring for hydrocarbons in the Arctic region.

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CHAPTER - 56

GREECE CRISIS

Eurozone Crisis. 1. Eurozone.

(a) Founded – 1999. (b) Current Members – 19. (c) Membership - members adopt the euro as their sole currency.

2. €130 Billion Bailout Package for Greece Approved (Brussels, 21 Feb 2012). 3. Bailout for Spain‘s Ailing Banks (21 Jul 2102). 4. Bailout Package for Cyprus (25 Mar 2013). 5. EU Growth Forecasts Down.

(a) EU cut its 2014 growth forecast for the Eurozone to just 0.8% from the previous 1.2% and for 2015 to 1.1% from 1.7%. (b) The growth cut was related to the threat of deflation, recession and high unemployment. (c) The economic and employment situation was not improving fast enough. (d) The European Commission said inflation would remain very low and also drag on growth. (e) France and Italy stood out as the biggest problems for a struggling European economy.

6. Anti-Bailout Coalition Formed Government.

(a) On 26 Jan 15, Alexis Tsipras, the left-wing leader, was sworn in as the Prime Minister of Greece leading a new anti-bailout coalition government determined to end five years of tough economic measures. (b) The victory of the left-wing Syriza Party raised fears of financial problems in Greece that had set off the regional crisis in 2009.

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(c) It was the first time that a member of the 19-nation Eurozone would be led by a government that rejects austerity measures. (d) The success of left-wing party in Greece could inspire other fringe parties in Europe, including the anti-austerity movements in the region‘s economically backward south. (e) A series of announcements by the left-wing government in Greece showed that it would stand by its anti-austerity pledges leading to a clash with the European partners. (f) The Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras halted privatisation plans agreed under the country‘s bailout deal.

7. Extended Bailout Package (Brussels, 24 Feb 2015).

(a) Greece was given a four-month extension of its financial bailout package when the Eurozone approved a reform plan of the Greek Government that backed down on key leftist measures and promised that spending to alleviate social distress would not derail its budget. (b) The 19-member Eurozone urged Greece to develop and broaden the list of reform measures. (c) The letter from Greek Government to the Eurozone pledged not to reverse on-going or completed privatisations and to ensure that the fight against humanitarian crisis caused by austerity had no negative fiscal effects. (d) The six-page document sent by the Greek Government promised to improve tax enforcement, fight corruption and review and control spending in every area of government spending.

8. Structural Weakness of EU Economy.

(a) Recent debt crisis faced by countries like Greece and Ireland have

highlighted the structural weakness of the European economy. (b) Currently 24 of the 28 members of EU have running deficits substantially

above the EU limits pointing to the lack of competitiveness of a number of European economies.

(c) The bailout measures are put into effect to avoid the risk of contagion.

9. Financial Problems Due to Policy Mistakes.

(a) Rescue packages for Europe‘s troubled economies have involved insistence on drastic cuts in public services and living standards. (b) The policy of austerity has been counterproductive because austerity tends to depress economic growth.

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(c) There is also suspicion about the lack of viability of the shared currency, euro. (d) The problems seen in Europe are mainly due to policy mistakes: (e) Punishments for bad sequencing (currency unit first, political unity later). (f) Bad economic reasoning (neglecting the importance of public services to European people). (g) For authoritarian decision-making. (h) For persistent intellectual confusion between reform and austerity.

10. Implications of Crisis for India.

(a) The situation in Europe was of particular concern as it accounts for a significant share of the global economy and is also India‘s major trade and investment partner. (b) Solving the Eurozone crisis would encourage investors to shift to the emerging markets like India. (c) The debt problems and austerity measures in Europe would have an adverse impact on Asia and many other emerging economies by undermining demand for exports.

11. EU can survive the Debt Crisis.

(a) The debt crisis affecting some of the EU economies cannot undermine the EU as a bloc because it is founded sound basics. (b) EU has rendered narrow nationalism obsolete by providing a supranational identity which in turn lowered the threat of war. (c) The EU has already proven itself by showing that it was the only body capable of incorporating and rehabilitating former Soviet bloc states. (d) The current financial crisis faced by some EU members reinforces need for the EU as only a united Europe can generate the large bailouts.

Greece Debt Crisis 12. Crisis.

(a) Greece is the European Union‘s (EUs) most indebted country where the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) decreased by a quarter since 2007. (b) Successive governments in Greece followed loose fiscal policies due to higher pension outgo. (c) The gap between the Greek government‘s earnings and expenditure widened and was filled up with heavy borrowings.

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(d) On 03 May 2010, the EU and IMF announced a 110-billion euro ($147 billion) bailout package for Greece. (e) Greece pledged to push through 30 billion euros ($40 billion) of budget cuts, equivalent to 13% of GDP, in return for loans at a rate of around 5% for three years. (f) On 21 Feb 2012, the Eurozone Finance Ministers approved a €130 billion bailout package for Greece to avert a default in Mar 2012. (g) Currently the total debt of Greece is €320 billion including €240 billion EU bailout package and €56 billion it owes to Germany. (h) There has been a 25% fall in the GDP of Greece since 2010 and the unemployment rate is 26%. (j) Currently, the debt-to-GDP ratio of Greece is 177%. (k) The international creditors of Greece – the IMF, European Central Bank and European Commission – have asked Greece to cut pensions, raise sales tax, maintain positive budget deficit to be eligible for credit. (l) The EU‘s €240 billion bailout to Greece was to expire on 30 Jun 2015. (m) Greece also faced €1.5 billion to the IMF by the end of Jun.

13. Referendum on Bailout Demands.

(a) On 27 Jun 2015, the Prime Minister of Greece Alexis Tsipras called for a referendum on the EU and IMF bailout demands of Greece carrying out economic reforms. (b) The Eurozone Ministers agreed that the bailout programme of Greece should expire on 30 Jun 2015, after Greece called for the referendum on the reform plans. (c) The referendum was held on 05 Jul 2015 and a majority of voters in Greece said ‗No‘ to the bailout demands of economic reforms.

14 Global Impact of Rejection.

(a) The shares in the global stock markets fell and the € (euro) also fell. (b) However, the stock indices in India ended on a positive note with the Sensex gaining and along with the Indian rupee. (c) Global oil prices fell due to the implications of the rejection of reforms by Greece. (d) Greece constitutes only 2% of the GDP of EU but its exit from the EU could spread panic although there could be no direct impact, according to economic experts. (e) If Greece exits (Grexit) from EU, other countries like Spain, Italy and France

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would question the virtues of austerity and economic reform which could impact markets and larger institutions.

15. Implications for India.

(a) Greece was an evolving situation and direct exposure to Greece for India was very, very limited as indicated by a few studies done by the RBI to evaluate the impact on finance and trade. (b) India had enough buffers, including foreign exchange reserves, to protect against any possible adverse impact due to the Greece crisis. (c) Although India was well-insulated from the Greece situation but since it was likely to impact on the US Fed‘s impending decision on a rate increase, it could cause outflow of foreign investments which would affect the rupee. (d) As the Greece crisis unfolds, financial markets were going to be volatile and both the European Central Bank and the US Fed would take that into account. (e) India was well protected in at least three ways – the macroeconomic situation was more stable, there was a buffer of foreign exchange reserves and the economy was still a very attractive destination. (f) India‘s foreign exchange (FOREX) reserves reached a record high of $355.45 billion in Jun 2015.

16. Austerity Measures & Reform Proposals.

(a) On 10 Jul 15, Prime Minister of Greece Alexis Tsipras submitted a comprehensive reform proposal to the Eurozone creditors to seek a third bailout package to avert bankruptcy. (b) The package of reform proposals included increasing the Value Added Tax (VAT), cutting salaries by 2019, pension reforms, tax reforms, cutting military spending, streamlining tax collection and privatisation of government assets.

17. Stringent Conditions for Bailout.

(a) Greece reached a bailout deal with the Eurozone to prevent the country from exiting the European single currency. (b) The Prime Minister of Greece Alexis Tsipras agreed to stringent reform conditions in return for a three-year bailout programme worth €86 billion ($96 billion). (c) This would be the third bailout package for Greece in five years. (d) Under the bailout deal, Greece must enact six key measures, including spending tax cuts, tax increase and pension reforms, by the night of 15 Jul 2015 and get the entire package endorsed by the Parliament. (e) Greece agreed to sell off government assets worth €50 billion, with proceeds

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set aside for a trust fund supervised by its creditors. Half the fund would be used to recapitalise banks in Greece and the rest to pay the debts.

18. Greece Approves Bailout Package.

(a) On 16 Jul 15, Greek Parliament approved the tough bailout package with stringent reform measures demanded by the creditors. (b) The vote in the Parliament left the government without a majority as 32 of the 149 lawmakers left the Syriza party and voted against the plan and the government had to rely on the Opposition votes. (c) The new bailout package for Greece demands austerity measures and liberal economic reforms tougher than those rejected by the voters in the 05 Jul 2015 referendum.

19. €7.16 Billion Emergency Loan.

(a) The EU confirmed on 20 Jul 2015, that it had paid out a €7.16 billion emergency loan to Greece to meet its debts of €4.2 billion due to the European Central Bank (ECB) and outstanding debt owed to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). (b) The Greece would now negotiate the terms of the new three-year bailout deal of €86 billion.

Current Situation. 20. Seven months after he was elected on a promise to overturn austerity, the Greek prime minister, Alexis Tsipras, has announced he is stepping down to pave the way for snap elections next month. 21. The prime minister was replaced for the duration of the short campaign by the President of Greece‘s Supreme Court, Vassiliki Thanou-Christophilou – a vocal bailout opponent – as head of a caretaker government. 22. If a government resigns within a year of election, the constitution requires the President to ask the second-largest party - in this case the conservative New Democracy - to try to form an administration. 23. If this fails, the next largest party must be given a chance. But both parties can waive this and allow the president to approve the snap election. Re-Elections. 24. Greece‘s leftwing leader Alexis Tsipras has emerged triumphant from a snap general election after securing a dramatic victory over his conservative rival, despite a turbulent first term in office. With 99.5% of votes counted, Syriza had claimed 35.5% of the vote, easily seeing off the main conservative challengers New Democracy on 28.1%. 25. The interior ministry said that gave Syriza 145 seats in the 300-seat parliament, just four fewer than when Tsipras first stormed to power early this year. The 41-year-old leader

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went to the polls in January promising to roll back austerity measures imposed by the so-called Troika of international lenders – the European Commission, International Monetary Fund and European Central Bank – but was instead forced to accept even harsher terms in Jul after Greece teetered on the brink of bankruptcy and a Eurozone exit. Conclusion. 26. Greece crisis has exposed the cracks in the European Union (EU). 27. The EU was aimed to integrate Europe economically and politically but has so far failed to do so because of faulty and unbalanced economic union. 28. Although the EU has managed to make Greece fall in line with the austerity measures and reforms programme, the challenge is to sustain the Eurozone in the long run.

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CHAPTER - 57

ARMS TRADE TREATY (ATT)

1. Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

(a) The Arms Trade Treaty aims to establish the highest possible international standards to regulate international trade in conventional weapons and to prevent illicit trade. (b) The ATT covers eight categories of conventional weapons and their ammunition, parts and components. The eight categories include tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles and launchers and small and light weapons. (c) The Treaty does not explicitly cover predator drones and grenades. (d) The nations ratifying the ATT are required to establish a control system including a national control list of items, governing their exports of conventional weapons. (e) The ATT prohibits the ratifying nations from transferring the eight categories of conventional weapons if the same violates the UN sanctions under Chapter VII of its Charter. (f) The ATT calls on each ratifying nation to refrain from export of the conventional weapons if in its assessment there was an over-riding risk that these could undermine peace and security or be used to commit human rights offences related to terrorism and organised crime under international conventions to which it is a party. (g) The ATT aims at regulating $70 billion worth of annual trade in arms. (h) The ATT is expected to be more effective than the voluntary UN register for conventional arms.

2. India‟s Objections to the ATT.

(a) As the largest importer of arms in the world, India was concerned at the imbalances in the final draft of the ATT. (b) The ATT final draft allowed conventional weapons exporters to unilaterally cancel contracts without consequences. (c) There were no provisions to prevent the flow of arms to terrorists and non-state actors. (d) The ATT would help surreptitious transfer of arms by excluding gifts and loans from it.

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3. UN General Assembly Passed the ATT (02 Apr 2013).

(a) The ATT was passed with 153 members voting in favour, three – Iran, North Korea and Syria –voting against and 23 including India, Russia, China, Sri Lanka and Saudi Arabia, abstaining. Pakistan voted in favour of the ATT. (b) The ATT opened for signature on 03 Jun 2013.

4. Reasons behind India Abstaining from the Vote.

(a) The Treaty text falls short of India‘s expectations and a number of other key stakeholders in producing a text that is clear, balanced and implementable and able to attract universal adherence. (b) India had maintained that the ATT should make a real impact on illicit trafficking in conventional arms and their illicit use especially by terrorists and other unauthorised and unlawful non-state actors. (c) India had also consistently emphasised that the ATT should ensure a balance of obligations between exporting and importing states. (d) The draft treaty was weak on terrorism and non-state actors and those concerns found no mention in the specific prohibitions of the ATT. (e) India cannot expect that the ATT be used as an instrument in the hands of exporting states to take unilateral force majeure measures against importing states parties without consequences. (f) The relevant provisions in the final text do not meet India‘s requirements. (g) India‘s participation in the extended negotiations was based on the principle that member states have a legitimate right to self-defence and its belief that there was no conflict between the pursuit of national security objectives and the aspiration that the ATT be strong, balanced and effective. (h) This was consistent with the strong and effective national export controls that India already had in place with respect to export of defence items. (j) India would undertake a full and thorough assessment of the ATT from the perspective of its defence, security and foreign policy interests.

5. Drawbacks of the ATT.

(a) The ATT has been criticised as a treaty that merely legitimises arms trade as it is neither a disarmament treaty nor a weapons ban treaty but a conventional weapon transfer and licensing regime. (b) The absence of any specific and mandatory prohibition on transfer of conventional weapons to terrorists and non-state actors makes the ATT weak on terrorism and unlawful non-state actors hindering it from effectively plugging the illicit trafficking of conventional weapons.

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(c) The ATT will not stop Pakistan from supplying arms to terrorists or non-state actors. (d) There is also an imbalance in the ATT on the obligations of exporters and importers of conventional weapons as the former can withhold the exports at any stage based on their own judgement which could be subjective.

6. ATT Came into Force (United Nations, 24 Dec 2014).

(a) For the ATT to come into force at least 50 countries need to ratify it. (b) On 24 Dec 2014, the landmark Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) came into force after 60 countries ratified the treaty. (c) ATT would help prevent transfer of weapons to terrorists and human rights abusers and asked major arms exporters and importers to join the treaty. (d) The ATT is the first legally-binding multilateral agreement that prohibits countries from exporting conventional weapons to countries when they know those weapons would be used for genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. (e) The ATT marked the opening of a new chapter in the international community‘s efforts to bring responsibility, accountability and transparency to the global arms trade. (f) Major arms producers like Russia, China, India and Pakistan have not signed the ATT. (g) Britain, France and Germany are among the top arms exporters who have signed the ATT. (h) The US, the top arms exporter of the world, signed the ATT in Sep 2013, but the US Senate has so far not ratified it.

Conclusion. 7. India should obtain legal assurances from conventional arms exporting countries to ensure the predictability of supply. 8. Russia and France have already assured India of keeping the ATT out in all future defence contracts. 9. India needs to chalk out a long-term plan to decrease its dependence on arms imports through increased indigenisation of defence production.

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CHAPTER - 58

INDIAN OCEAN

Introduction

1. A region of growing strategic significance, accounting for a third of the world‘s population and 40% of the world's energy sources.

2. Sea lanes of the region are one of the most important lines of communication with 40% of global trade passing through the region.

3. High level of trade and economic growth dictated the need to ensure security of the sea lanes.

4. Cooperation among the navies of the region in preventing trans-national crimes is of paramount importance.

(a) There was a rise in crimes such as terrorism, piracy and smuggling of narcotics and arms in the Indian Ocean region. (b) The need for cooperation among the navies of the region in preventing such trans-national crimes was of paramount importance.

5. Naval cooperation necessary for disaster mitigation.

6. Consensus-based approach for developing a comprehensive cooperative framework of maritime security.

7. Multidimensional Discussions on Indian Ocean.

(a) The discussion of the Ocean should be reflective of four aspects, the security paradigm, disaster management, oceanic resources & environmental question. (b) The solutions also should be comprehensive and balanced rather than slanted in favour of one aspect, however weighty.

8. Maritime security must be considered at three levels - Creating Transparency, Building Confidence and Building Security.

9. The Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation was established by India and 13 other countries in 1997.

(a) Member Countries – 20. (b) Dialogue Partners –US, China, Japan, Britain, France and Egypt.

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India‟s Approach Towards the Indian Ocean Region

10. Security Threats for India.

(a) Piracy. (b) Terrorism. (c) Chinese Navy‘s increasing presence in the region.

11. India‟s Three-Pronged Approach to Protect Sea Lanes.

(a) Indian Ocean Critical to International Commerce and Energy Security. (b) India Ocean Littoral Countries Need to Tackle Three Issues - Humanitarian Disasters, Protection of the Environment and the Scourge of Piracy. (c) Proposal to Conduct a Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) Exercise. (d) Protection of Environment - suggestion for the formation of a working group to propose measures to reduce carbon footprints. (e) Piracy - Limitations could be overcome through a well-Coordinated and Secure Information Exchange Network.

12. IN Expanding Operations in Indian Ocean.

(a) The Navy needed to maintain a high state of preparedness in view of the ever-increasing demands of maritime security in the littoral areas and high seas. (b) The Indian Navy maintained a continuous patrol in the Gulf of Aden with 17 ships on duty.

13. Stability & Cooperation in the Region.

(a) India wants stability and cooperation in the Indian Ocean region, with maritime security for all and a collective resolve to deal with sources of non-traditional security threats. (b) India is trying to strengthen the defence cooperation with island States in the western region of the Indian Ocean. The island States include Maldives, Mauritius, Madagascar and Seychelles.

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(c) The India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Forum has started cooperation among the three navies of the member States through joint naval exercises, training and strategizing. (d) In the eastern sector of the Indian Ocean India wants to enhance cooperation through the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC). (e) India is also strengthening bilateral strategic dialogue with the countries of the east including Japan, South Korea, Myanmar, Vietnam, Indonesia, Singapore and Australia. (f) For a collective approach towards stability and cooperation in the Indian Ocean region India is utilising the existing security-related institutions like ASEAN, East Asia Summit (EAS) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). (g) India and China agreed to establish and institutionalise maritime dialogue, aimed at promoting cooperation and coordination between the navies of the two nations.

14. Galle Dialogue 2014.

(a) The ‗Galle Dialogue 2014‘ was held in the Southern coastal town of Galle in Sri Lanka on 01 Dec 2014. (b) More than 100 representatives from 36 countries participated in the event which was organised by the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence and Urban Development. (c) The theme of the Dialogue was ‗Cooperation & Collaboration for Maritime Prosperity‘. (d) The Indian Ocean had to necessarily remain a zone of peace, if it had to contribute to the prosperity of different nations. (e) It was important to revisit the 1971 UNGA resolution, on the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. (f) The resolution then mooted by Sri Lanka, called upon great powers not to allow escalation and expansion of military presence in the Indian Ocean. (g) India has been a status-quoist power in the region for 5,000 years, but had no aggressive design or strategic reason for dominance detrimental to any other country. (h) India‘s National Security Adviser called for cooperation between countries to tackle challenges such as piracy, drug smuggling and human trafficking.

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CHAPTER - 59

ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ & SYRIA

1. Wahhabi Jihadist Militant Group. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or the Islamic State of Iraq & ash-Sham,Islamic State(IS) or Daesh is a Wahhabi/Salafi jihadist extremist militant group and self-proclaimed Islamic state and caliphate, which is led by and mainly composed of Sunni Arabs from Iraq & Syria. 2. Proclaimed to be a Worldwide Caliphate. On 29 Jun 2014, the group proclaimed itself to be a worldwide caliphate, with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi being named its caliph and renamed itself ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah, "Islamic State" (IS). As a caliphate, it claims religious, political and military authority over all Muslims worldwide and that "the legality of all emirates, groups, states and organisations, becomes null by the expansion of the khilāfah's (caliphate's) authority and arrival of its troops to their areas". 3. Human Rights Abuses & War Crimes. The UN has held ISIL responsible for human rights abuses and war crimes and Amnesty International have reported ethnic cleansing by the group on a "historic scale". The group has been designated a terrorist organisation by the United Nations, the European Union and member states, the United States, India, Indonesia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria and other governments. Over 60 countries are directly or indirectly waging war against ISIL. 4. Etymology. The group has had various names since it began.

(a) The group was founded in 1999 by Jordanian radical Abu Musab al- Zarqawi as Jamāʻat al-Tawḥīd wa-al-Jihād. (b) In Oct 2004, al-Zarqawi swore loyalty to Osama bin Laden and changed the group's name to Tanẓīm Qāʻidat al-Jihād fī Bilād al-Rāfidayn. (c) In Jan 2006, AQI merged with several other Iraqi insurgent groups to form the Mujahideen Shura Council. Al-Zarqawi was killed in Jun 2006. (d) On 12 Oct 2006, the Mujahideen Shura Council merged with several more insurgent factions and on 13 Oct the establishment of the ad-Dawlah al-ʻIraq al-Islāmiyah, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), was announced. (e) On 8 Apr 2013, having expanded into Syria, the group adopted the name Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, which more fully translates as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. The translated names are commonly abbreviated as ISIL or ISIS, with a debate over which of these acronyms should be used. (f) On 14 May 2014, the United States Department of State announced its decision to use "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL) as the group's primary name. However, in late 2014, top US officials shifted toward Daesh, since it was the preferred term used by their Arab allies.

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(g) On 29 Jun 2014, the group renamed itself ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah "Islamic State" (IS) and declared it a worldwide caliphate. The name "Islamic State" and the claim of a caliphate have been widely criticized, with the UN, various governments and mainstream Muslim groups refusing to use it.

5. History.

(a) Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Jordanian Salafi jihadist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his militant group Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, founded in 1999, achieved notoriety in the early stages of the Iraqi insurgency for the suicide attacks on Shia Islamic mosques, civilians, Iraqi government institutions and Italian soldiers partaking in the US-led 'Multi-National Force'. Al-Zarqawi's group officially pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network in Oct 2004. In a letter to al-Zarqawi in Jul 2005, al-Qaeda's then deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri outlined a four-stage plan to expand the Iraq War. The plan included expelling US forces from Iraq, establishing an Islamic authority as a caliphate, spreading the conflict to Iraq's secular neighbours and clashing with Israel, which the letter says "was established only to challenge any new Islamic entity.

(b) In Jan 2006, AQI joined with several smaller Iraqi insurgent groups under an umbrella organisation called the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC). On 7 Jun 2006, a US airstrike killed al-Zarqawi, who was succeeded as leader of the group by the Egyptian militant Abu Ayyub al-Masri. (c) On 12 Oct 2006, the MSC united with three smaller groups and six Sunni Islamic tribes to form the "Mutayibeen Coalition". It swore by Allah "to rid Sunnis from the oppression of the rejectionists (Shi'ite Muslims) and the crusader occupiers.

6. Goals.

(a) Sunni Islamic State. Since at least 2004, a significant goal of the group has been the foundation of a Sunni Islamic state. Specifically, ISIL has sought to establish itself as a caliphate, an Islamic state led by a group of religious authorities under a supreme leader (the caliph) who is believed to be the successor to Prophet Muhammad. (b) Lineage of al-Baghdadi to Prophet Muhammad. In Jun 2014, ISIL published a document in which it claimed to have traced the lineage of its leader al-Baghdadi back to Muhammad and upon proclaiming a new caliphate on 29 Jun, the group appointed al-Baghdadi as its caliph. As caliph, he demands the allegiance of all devout Muslims worldwide, according to Islamic jurisprudence. (c) Take Over Entire Earth. ISIL has detailed its goals in its Dabiq magazine, saying it will continue to seize land and take over the entire Earth: ―blessed flag covers all Eastern and Western extents of the Earth, filling the world with the truth and justice of Islam and putting an end to the falsehood and tyranny of jahiliyyah (state of ignorance), even if American and its coalition despise such.‖ (d) Legality of all Emirates, Groups, States & Organisations is Null. When the caliphate was proclaimed, ISIL stated: "The legality of all emirates, groups, states and organisations becomes null by the expansion of the khilafah's

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(caliphate's) authority and arrival of its troops to their areas." This was a rejection of the political divisions in the Middle East that were established by European countries during World War I in the Sykes–Picot Agreement.

7. Ideology & Beliefs.

(a) ISIL is a Salafi or Wahhabi group. (b) It follows an extremist interpretation of Islam, promotes religious violence and regards Muslims who do not agree with its interpretations as infidels or apostates. (c) According to Hayder al Khoei, ISIL's philosophy is represented by the symbolism in the Black Standard variant of the legendary battle flag of Prophet Muhammad that it has adopted. The flag shows the Seal of Muhammad within a white circle, with the phrase above it, "There is no God but Allah". Such symbolism has been said to point to ISIL's belief that it represents the restoration of the caliphate of early Islam, with all the political, religious and eschatological ramifications that this would imply.

8. Territorial Claims.

(a) In Iraq and Syria, ISIL uses many of those countries' existing Governorate boundaries to subdivide its claimed territory; it calls these divisions wilayah or provinces. (b) As of Jun 2015, it had established official branches in Libya, Egypt (Sinai Peninsula), Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Algeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and the North Caucasus. (c) Outside Iraq and Syria, it controls territory in only Sinai, Afghanistan and Libya. ISIL also has members in Morocco, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Israel & Palestine, but does not have official branches in those areas.

9. Monetary System. (a) On 11 Nov 2014, ISIL announced its intent to mint its own gold, silver and copper coins, based on the coinage used by the Umayyad Caliphate in the 7th century. (b) The group began buying up gold, silver and copper in markets throughout Northern and Western Iraq, according to precious metal traders in the area. (c) Members of the group also reportedly began stripping the insulation off electrical power cables to obtain the copper wiring. (d) The announcement included designs of the proposed coins, which displayed imagery including a map of the world, a sword and shield, the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem and a crescent moon.

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10. International Criticism.

(a) The group has attracted widespread criticism internationally for its extremism, from governments and international bodies such as the United Nations and Amnesty International. (b) On 24 Sept 2014, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon stated: "As Muslim leaders around the world have said, groups like ISIL – or Da‘ish – have nothing to do with Islam and they certainly do not represent a state. They should more fittingly be called the 'Un-Islamic Non-State'." (c) The group was described as a cult in a Huffington Post column by notable cult authority Steven Hassan.

11. Weapons.

(a) ISIL relies mostly on captured weapons. Major sources are Saddam Hussein's Iraqi stockpiles from the 2003–11, Iraq insurgency and weapons from government and opposition forces fighting in the Syrian Civil War and during the post-US withdrawal Iraqi insurgency. The captured weapons, including armour, guns, surface-to-air missiles and even some aircraft, enabled rapid territorial growth and facilitated the capture of additional equipment. (b) The group has a long history of using truck and car bombs, suicide bombers and IEDs and has used chemical weapons in Iraq and Syria. ISIL captured nuclear materials from Mosul University in Jul 2014, but is unlikely to be able to turn them into weapons. (c) In ISIL's monthly magazine Dabiq, John Cantlie wrote of a hypothetical scenario where ISIL might be able to buy a nuclear weapon from corrupt officials in Pakistan, to which India's Minister of State for Defence said, "With the rise of ISIS in West Asia, one is afraid to an extent that perhaps they might get access to a nuclear arsenal from states like Pakistan". (d) In Sep 2015 a US official stated that ISIL was manufacturing & using mustard agent in Syria and Iraq and had an active chemical weapons research team.

12. Threat to India.

(a) Global Ambitions. The group only seems keen on carving out a caliphate along the Iraqi-Syrian border and in the Middle East. A closer look, however, reveals that the threat is a more imminent one. ISIS has global ambitions which include carving out an Islamic World Dominion. India will be a prime threat in the achievement of these ambitions.

(b) Fight for Muslims Rights. After the declaration of the caliphate, the newly-named Caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi addressed jihadists the world over and said, ―Muslims‘ rights are forcibly seized in China, India, Palestine, Somalia, the Arabian Peninsula, the Caucasus, Sham (the Levant), Egypt, Iraq, Indonesia, Afghanistan, the Philippines, Ahvaz, Iran, Pakistan, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria and Morocco, in the East and in the West‖.

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(c) Parts of India on Target List. In its recently released world map of the planned dominion areas, ISIS also marks out parts of North-West India. The outfit plan to include many North-Western provinces of our country including parts of Gujarat in the planned Islamic caliphate of Khorasan that ISIS aims to achieve. (c) Indian Jihadists. The ISIS caliph‘s call for all jihadists from across the world to join them does not bode well for our nation. India‘s threat could well be greatest from the Indian jihadists fighting alongside the ISIS.