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INTERNATIONAL

AFFAIRS

Jindal Journal of

DECEMBER 2020 ISSUE 4 VOLUME 2

ISSN 2249-8095

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Jindal Journal of International Affairs

December 2020 Issue 4 Volume 2

Editor-in-Chief Pankaj K Jha

Assistant Editor Shreya Mishra

Editorial Team Arjun, Zeus Hans Mendez, Kritika Karmakar, Lalit Kumar

International Editorial Advisory Board

Professor Toshiya Hoshino, Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University, Japan.

Dr. Daniel Green, University of Delaware, USA.

Prof. Kosuke Shimizu, Ryukoku University, Japan.

Dr. Hugo Slim, Centre for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict, University of Oxford.

Dr. Walter Andersen, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

ISSN 2249-8095

Published by Jindal School of International Affairs O.P. Jindal Global University Sonipat-Narela Road, Sonipat, Haryana-131001, NCR of Delhi, India Tel.: +91-130-

4091800/801/802; Fax: +91-130-4091888. Email: info@jgu.edu.in Website: www.jsia.edu.in; www.jgu.edu.in

All Rights Reserved. Copyright 2018 @ JSIA,

O.P. Jindal Global University

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About the Journal

Jindal School of International Affairs (JSIA) publishes the Jindal Journal of International Affairs (JJIA) semi-annually, which serves as a hallmark of quality research and analysis on the world’s most pressing issues. This journal bears testament to the strong culture of research on international issues that is being promoted along with world class teaching at JSIA. The journal features contributions of serious scholars as well as practitioners who wish to make crucial interventions about international current affairs, float new ideas, and provide solutions to burning contemporary problems. It brings critical insights to major issue areas such as war and peace, diplomatic practice, foreign policy analysis, comparative politics, international political economy, international organizations, humanitarian practice, human rights and contemporary world history.

The unique aspect of JJIA is its global coverage of issues and events. Although JSIA is located in India, the breadth of its academic interests and knowledge-dissemination is global. The articles in this journal cover the most pressing international problems from various regions of the world, including North Africa, Central Asia, Europe, Southeast Asia and the wider Middle East.

JJIA enjoys endorsement from some of the world’s most renowned scholars and practitioners of international politics. JJIA will enter the must-read category for post-graduate students of international affairs schools, personnel of international organizations, diplomats, business analysts, strategic affairs think tanks, and governmental foreign policy brains trusts.

For article and book review submission kindly refer to the guidelines on the back leaf of the Journal.

All queries related to the journal may be addressed to editorjjia@gmail.com or submissionsjjia@gmail.com

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O.P. Jindal Global University (JGU)

JGU is a non-profit global university established by the Government of Haryana and recognised by the University Grants Commission, India. Recently, the O.P. Jindal Global University has been awarded the highest grade ‘A’ by the National Accreditation & Assessment Council (NAAC). The vision of JGU is to promote global courses, global programmes, global curriculum, global research, global collaborations, and global interaction through a global faculty. JGU is situated on an 80-acre state of the art residential campus. JGU is one of the few universities in Asia that maintains a 1:13 faculty-student ratio and appoints faculty members from different parts of the world with outstanding academic qualifications and experience. JGU is a research-intensive University, which has established several research centres. JGU has established ten schools: Jindal Global Law School (JGLS), Jindal Global Business School (JGBS), Jindal School of International Affairs (JSIA), Jindal School of Government and Public Policy (JSGP), Jindal School of Liberal Arts and Humanities (JSLH), Jindal School of Journalism and Communication (JSJC), Jindal School of Arts and Architecture (JSAA), Jindal School of Banking and Finance (JSBF), Jindal School of Environment and Sustainability (JSES), and the Jindal School of Psychology and Counselling (JSPC). JGU has built international collaborations with over 160 institutions spread across 40 countries. JGU has been widely recognized by many institutions around the world. It has enabled it to develop international collaborations with Harvard University, Yale University, Brown University, Columbia University, Indiana University, University of Michigan, Cornell University, University of Texas at Dallas, Texas A & M University-Commerce, Temple University, University of Baltimore, New York University, University of California-Berkeley, University of California-Davis, American University in the USA; Queen’s University, Carleton University, Ryerson University and York University in Canada; and University of Cambridge in the UK; United Nations University and Tokiwa University in Japan; University of St. Thomas in Mozambique; International University College, Turin in Italy; National Tsing Hua University in Taiwan; City University of Hong Kong in Hong Kong; Australian National University, University of Sydney and Griffith University in Australia and many other reputed universities.

Kindly refer to website for further details -https://www.jgu.edu.in/

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Jindal School of International Affairs (JSIA) JSIA is a response to numerous calls to action for improving the human resources India possesses in its journey of global ascendancy. It is unbecoming of an aspirant to great power status in the international system to not possess institutions that can produce knowledge which can form the basis for resolving the most pressing global problems of our time. India’s rising economic and military might must be complemented with a world class international affairs social science base that will generate and test theories and peddle a special Indian variant or brand of global studies. JSIA has become the locus of such an ambitious vision by situating India as a vibrant ground for social science ideas and debates and giving India a leadership role on the world stage. JSIA aims to place India on the global map as a provider of knowledge that is internationally relevant and of the highest standards. The by-line for JSIA reads, ‘India’s First Global Policy School’. We are the first Masters (MA) degree-awarding graduate school in any Indian university to date which explicitly combine the scholarly weights of three inter-related disciplines, viz. International Relations, International Law and International Business. This holistic ‘Global Policy’ approach stands apart from traditional approaches to studying world affairs, which were largely confined to the sub-field of Political Science known as International Relations. JSIA offers world class inter-disciplinary education that connects a completely new mega-discipline that can be labelled as ‘global policy studies’ or ‘world affairs studies. From the fall of 2015, JSIA has been offering a three-year B.A. in Global Affairs degree designed for (10+2) grade students who are interested in international policies and the global processes that affect all societies. It is also offering a B.A. in Political Science. Also, from academic year i.e. 2016-17, JSIA has launched ‘Ph.D. in International Affairs’. Thirty PhD scholars are now enrolled with JSIA.

For further details about admission and courses kindly refer to website-https://www.jgu.edu.in/JSIA

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Jindal Journal of International Affairs

December 2020 Issue 4 Volume 2

Contents Author

1. China: An Expansionist Force in the Pacific Region Saber Salem

2. China’s Expanding National Interests in the broader Red SeaArena

Femi Rachma Pertiwi and

Anak Agung Banyu Perwita

3. Is Vietnam-the US heading for a Strategic Partnership?

Gitanjali Sinha Roy

4. Outlining Policy and Evaluating the Success of Policy

Dinh The Toan

5. Bilingual Policy of Singapore and Policy Implications for Vietnam In the Context of Integration

Nguyen Thi Hai Anh and

Nguyen Thi Bich Hanh

6. Strengthening Corporate Governance of Vietnamese SOEs: with reference to Chinese and Korean experience

Nam Sang-Woo and

Phan Thi Song Thuong

Book Reviews

7. Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy by Shivshankar Menon

Arjun

8. Sexualities in World Politics: How LGBTQ claims shape International Relations by Manuela Lavinas Picq and Markus Thiel(Eds)

Deepika Mann

9. Niall Ferguson, The Square and the Tower: Networks and Power, From the Freemasons to Facebook,

Ankit Malhotra

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Editor’s Note

The year 2020 has been catastrophic for human lives, global economy and geo-politics. Not only many changes have happened over the year but issues related to health, unemployment and international tourism industry have also hogged the limelight. The last issue for the year 2020 of the JSIA journal starts with two articles on how China has been expanding its footprints and exploring its options in far away areas such as the South Pacific and the Red Sea. These two regions fall within the catchment area of its Maritime Silk Road and also the Silk Road. The objective for China is to develop investment and improve trade linkages with these regions. While one region is fraught with tensions owing to the recognition of Taiwan by select island nations, in the Red Sea the problem of instability and growing radicalisation has created unrest and laggard economic growth. The Red Sea is critical for global trade especially the cargo going to EU and Scandinavian countries.

China has been procuring berthing rights and also building infrastructure in Europe and West Asia/ Middle East. While these may be meant to consolidate its markets and secure better trade management options, Chinese encroachments in these strategic spaces are sure to create tensions and complicate the equations with many European countries and the US. Chinese inroads in select markets and also in continents such as South America and Africa have created new destinations for Chinese investment and also helped many countries in upgrading their infrastructure. However, there have been narratives which have stated that China is ushering in a new imperialist order which would help China in consolidating its control over the global economy. Nevertheless, with the Chinese economy still recovering from the COVID-19 impact there are speculations that China would have to face internal dissent and also a recessionary phase in the coming years. The year 2020 has not been very kind to the Chinese economic supremacy and with China denying access to World Health Organisation officials, the road to recovery through trade might be a difficult one. China’s assertive moves in its periphery have also created new permutations and combinations with many of its neighbours such as the Philippines and Vietnam recalibrating their approach towards the US and its Indo-Pacific construct. The Quad Security Dialogue Initiative and the official interactions among the four Quad members are seen as a necessary precursor for an effective regional security edifice.

Chinese assertion has opened new vistas of cooperation between Vietnam and the US. The two countries have been comprehensive patterns in various fields such as trade and developing political ties, but in terms of defence and economic ties there is much to be achieved. However, this is likely to change with US ships visiting Vietnamese ports and also the US presidents looking for an alternate investment destination after the COVID-19 pandemic. Vietnam is also looking for a new agenda and blueprint for its 13th party congress. Its ties with the European Union is on the upswing and also the trade with the US has been growing. How and when the two countries would enter into a strategic partnership would change the dynamics of the region. Given the fact that the Code of Conduct in South China Sea has met with the Chinese wall therefore all the claimant countries to the South China Sea islands are coming together to put across reasonable

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demands for standard operating procedures and cajoling China to adhere to the international norms related to the UNCLOS.

Economics has been the major element of strategic calculations apart from defence ties. Countries like Vietnam have been looking for better integration among society to be able to emerge as a potential destination. The issue of bilingual language promotion and accepting the legacy of a divided country, Vietnam is drawing lessons from other countries particularly Singapore to adopt a bilingual policy which would help it to emerge as a potent economy and help its enterprises to subscribe to the requirements of its ASEAN trade partners as well as the larger global arena. Vietnam has been making tectonic changes in its policy and assimilating minorities and different linguistic strains in the larger national discourse would be instrumental in its integration and development as a society.

Within the East and South East Asian region, the role of State-Owned enterprises has been analysed and debated in major conferences. One of the articles in the issue highlights the structural complexities as well as similarities in the governance systems and the management of the SOEs. Not only has the Chinese template given full control of the state apparatus in economic matters but Vietnam is also looking into Korean Chaebols and related systems to draw inspiration from the two different industrial management systems. Vietnam, which is looking for liberalising its economy and developing equity markets would look to leapfrog from being a majority Small and Medium enterprises economy to a developing economy dotted with large industries and conglomerates.

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Article - I

China: An Expansionist Force in the Pacific Region

Saber Salem1

Abstract

In recent years, China has been steadily expanding its non-military footprint in the Pacific region in an unprecedented manner. The multi-dimensional expansion of Chinese presence in the Pacific has arguably, made the region a microcosm of power politics amongst regional and established powers. Part of the explanation for the Chinese fast-pace growth in the Blue Pacific is the presence of the Taiwanese who have been one of the biggest providers of aid for diplomatic recognition. The aid-dependent Pacific Island Countries (PICs) by being active creators of the Sino-Taiwan chequebook diplomacy have time and again switched their diplomatic allegiance in order to secure more foreign aid for their social development and economic growth. Despite such an “unreliable” behaviour, Beijing has widened and deepened its presence in the region by providing concessional loans with “no strings attached.” The latter element has been conveniently alluring to all the PICs so much so that they have borrowed more than 50 percent of their GDP from China. This has alarmed the traditional donors such as US, Japan and Australia which are revisiting their policies and re-engaging in the Pacific politics actively, all aimed at preventing the Island nations sinking in Chinese debt and consequently losing their strategic leverage to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). As for Taipei, it had managed to ally itself with six PICs in return for provision of foreign aid and foreign direct investments. However, in September 2019, two of its diplomatic allies ditched it in favour of Beijing. There has also been a paradigm shift in Beijing’s earlier policy vis-à-vis the PICs. In the past, PRC would not allocate aid to Taiwan’s (ROC) allies, however, after a shift in policy, ROC’s diplomatic allies currently get more aid from Beijing than from Taipei. The other worrying factor for the local population is a steady growth of the Chinese diaspora. Despite anti-Chinese riots in many countries, the new wave of Chinese immigrants do not seem deterred by the negative repercussion of their presence in the region. These Chinese new arrivals invest heavily in real estate in a bid to legitimise their presence in the island nations. This development has caused massive trepidation among regional powers, as they believe, would pave the way for Chinese military presence in the region under a legitimate claim to protect its overseas nationals.

Key Words: Chinese expansion; Aid competition; Debt trap; Chinese migration to Pacific.

1 Saber Salem has received his PhD from the Jindal School of International Affairs. Previously, he worked for the United Nations (UN) in different roles and capacities as well as the Canadian International Development Agency as a Policy Analyst. He has conducted extensive research in the Pacific region.

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Introduction

Over the past three decades Chinese diplomatic influence, economic interests and geographical reach have witnessed a disproportionate leap in the Pacific region. It is because, as many analysts argue, Chinese leaders have grand global strategies (Cabestan 2010). Thus, they are relentlessly building their economy, military, technology and ‘ideational power’ (Zhengyi 2010). For them, the next twenty years or more will provide strategic opportunities, which they are aiming to harness fully. “At the end of this period China will be able to defend and advance its interests (globally)” (Lampton 2008, 2) without being deterred by any global powers. The past decades of continued, uninterrupted and high-speed economic growth have allowed China to claim global power status (Lampton 2008). With unprecedented fast paced economic growth, China’s demand for raw material from other parts of the world will also keep growing (Thomas 2010). At the moment, China is using foreign aid as a tool to gain direct access to the resources of other nations (Salem 2019). However, there are predictions that this benign and peaceful Chinese behaviour may not last long before they resort to the use of military might in order to secure the free flow of resources into China. Deterring of weaker nations in the South China Sea region by the Chinese Coast Guards is a clear manifestation of use of military force to subdue smaller and weaker nations in the region (Connolly 2016).

Furthermore, China’s rise as a global power over the last three decades means that “Chinese behaviour can make or break international cooperation in a given issue area” (Kastner, Pearson and Rector 2019, 1). It is now pretty obvious that Chinese clout in every sphere of international politics is tangibly palpable and has “prompted heightened interest within academic, public and policymaking circles” (Brant 2013, 158). Without a strong and committed Chinese participation in major global issues such as combating climate change, building and maintaining effective institutions is hard to imagine. In some cases, “Chinese actions have helped consolidate and expand international cooperation….China’s recent increasing willingness to reach international agreements on climate is among the most significant global developments” (Kastner, Pearson and Rector 2019, 1). This behaviour depicts China as a responsible ‘global power’ willing to invest in blood and treasure to uphold international law and expand international cooperation. In the meantime, there have also been instances where China has grossly violated international law and more importantly international maritime law in the South China Sea by illegally building artificial islands and converting them into military bases (Pant 2011).

At the multilateral level, analysts argue that Beijing has shown a willingness to play the role of spoiler, to use its economic and political bargaining power to restructure international institutions in an attempt to better serve China’s trans border interests. China’s willingness to stand firm in pressing for revisions to the “institutional architecture of international financial regulations…by demanding greater representation in IMF decision-making serves as a clear example” (Kastner, Pearson and Rector 2019, 2). In most other cases, China has been content to have an observer role and allow other countries to pay the costs of sustaining and deepening international cooperation.

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In the case of the Pacific region, Chinese economic, diplomatic and development activities have been steadily growing since the turn of the 21st century (Thomas 2010). The major factors that brought China into the equation were waning US interests after the end of the Cold War and growth in Taiwan’s relentless provision of foreign aid to the aid dependent small island nations in return for diplomatic recognition as well as buying votes at the United Nations (Wallis 2012). The Chinese presumed these developments as a direct challenge to one of its ‘core interests’ of the ‘One China Policy’ and its sustainability. In a retaliatory measure, Beijing reacted with great political, diplomatic and economic power. Foreign aid and foreign direct investments obviously appeared as the most effective tools to buy diplomatic allegiance (Dornan and Brant 2014). Although the region as a whole is considered as backward and remote, Chinese looked at it through a different lens – preventing Taiwan’s quest for diplomatic recognition. Thus, China’s relations with the island nations have witnessed a rapid growth since the late 1990s (Shie 2007).

Of the 14 island countries, 10 of them have strong diplomatic, economic and cultural relations with China “With an increasing number of official visits and various financial assistance packages aimed at enhancing trade, building infrastructure, equipping government and military assets, and developing natural resources” (Shie 2007, 309). As the US and its European allies are scaling back their presence in the region, China is making sure to fill the gap immediately (Wallis 2012). Until September 2019, Taiwan had diplomatic relations with six Pacific island countries. However, the Solomon Islands and Kiribati switched allegiance to China after receiving generous aid packages from Beijing (Zhang 2019). This is not the first time that the aid dependent island nations have switched sides. These cash-starved developing island countries play one donor against the other in order to secure friendly concessional loans and foreign aid (Dornan and Brant 2014).

Traditional donors such as Australia, New Zealand and Japan are facing with increasingly strong Chinese presence in the region, which they have been unable to hedge against (Cave 2019). In the past, Australia was the biggest donor to the region. This dominant role has been eroding fast and shifting to China. “Over the past decade Beijing has become one of the biggest aid donors in the Pacific, funnelling USD $ 6 billion in grants and concessional loans into roads, ports and other projects” (Smyth 2019). Linked to its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Beijing is aiming to implement its Maritime Silk Road Initiative in the Pacific region (Duchâtel and Duplaix 2018). Although the region in its entirety is not so rich in natural resources to suffice Beijing’s thirst for energy, the emerging donor from the global south is investing in timber, fishing, nickel and gas (Brant 2013). So far, it does not seem that the local population is benefiting from Chinese investment in these areas because all the machineries, labour force and equipment come from China. This practice has infuriated the local population who time and again expressed their disenchantment through riots and violence directed towards Chinese nationals (Smyth 2019; Cave 2019).

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This article analyses the possible implications of Chinese economic, political and diplomatic engagements in the region. It also analyses the possibility of the region becoming a new theatre of power politics among rising and established powers and its negative repercussions.

Economic Interests

In recent years, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has widened and deepened its economic engagement with the Pacific island nations – encompassing multiple sectors such as trade, aid, fishing and mining (Thomas 2010). China is the largest trading partner and foreign aid donor to the aid dependent island nations of the Pacific, surpassing the US and other traditional donors (Zhang and Lawson 2017). There are predictions that it will not be long before China’s aid volume surpasses that of Australia and become the largest foreign aid donor to the island nations of the Pacific (Dornan and Pryke 2017). China’s economic interests in the South Pacific region have been steadily rising for the past two decades. The unprecedented rising of Chinese footprint in the region, has alarmed the US and its regional allies Australia, New Zealand and Japan (Wallis 2012). Australia in particular has always considered the Pacific region as its ‘backyard’. Hence, it furnished the island nations with astronomical sums of foreign aid with an aim to address the burgeoning economic and social development demands (Shie 2007). However, in recent years, Beijing is making great strides in every sphere of life in the region in an attempt to marginalise the erstwhile regional powers. Over the past many years, Chinese juggernaut has grown uncontrollably – so much so that the regional powers seemingly have been unable to ‘bandwagon’ against it. Realists have different views on China’s ‘hegemonic’ expansions. For offensive realists, “war is virtually inevitable, with China’s rise seen as a major threat to the hitherto US-dominated world order. Defensive realists suggest that China could be ‘contained’ or deterred by new alliances'' (Hameiri and Jones 2016, 75). Regardless of the debates posited by the realists, one thing clear is that “China is now a global power” (Cabestan 2010, 1) and it cannot be deterred by any power in its expansionist mission. Beijing is using its economic might to conquer the world ‘peacefully’.

Against that backdrop, China is relentlessly investing in the natural resources of the Pacific region. Despite its small size, the region has vast natural resources and raw materials such as minerals, timber, fish and natural gas (Thomas 2010). With that in mind, Beijing’s trade and investments is mostly focused on Papua New Guinea (PNG) – the biggest economy and ‘home’ to huge deposits of gold, natural gas, nickel, timber and fish. Funded by the EXIM Bank, state-owned enterprises and firms such as China Metallurgical Construction (MCC) have invested in PNG’s nickel and cobalt mine (Cave 2019). Other Chinese firms are investing in logging, fishing and mining sectors of the Pacific. The aid dependent Pacific island nations have welcomed Chinese investments in various sectors and consider it as a ‘win-win’ situation because these investments are believed to generate wealth to the government and the possibility of employment for the poverty-stricken nations, rising young population.

However, realities on the ground suggest otherwise. All Chinese companies operating in the region import their machineries and labour force from China, which leaves no employment space for the local population (Interview SP005, 21 March 2019). This

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practice has infuriated the locals, which has led to social unrest in many countries (Smyth 2019). In 2006 the locals in Solomon Islands and Tonga staged widespread anti-Chinese riots, which resulted in the death of many people and burning down of Chinese properties and businesses (Dornan and Pryke 2017). In the same manner, in 2009 the locals in PNG demonstrated against the rising number of Chinese workers. In each of these violent strikes, Beijing sent chartered flights to these countries to evacuate its overseas citizens (Connolly 2016).

Moreover, questions are arising on the financial sustainability of Chinese loan and infrastructure development, a case in point being the construction of a national conference centre in Vanuatu. Built at a cost of about USD 28.5 million the maintenance of the ‘biggest such structure in the Pacific’ completed and handed over by China in 2016 has proved a monumental task for the government so much so that Prime Minister Charlot Salwai said it was beyond their budget (Daily Post 2019). Cited as a “monument to poor lending and construction processes”, the centre’s maintenance has been handed over to a Chinese company in partnership with the government. The company now runs a takeaway and restaurant within the facility (Citowicki 2020; Daily Post 2019).

Despite all such issues that Chinese nationals have faced in the region, trade and commerce with China has skyrocketed. In 2017, “China’s total goods trade with these countries reached USD 8.2 billion, slightly ahead of South Korea (USD 8 billion) and far surpassing Australia (USD 5 billion) and the United States (USD 1.6 billion)” (Meick, Ker and Chan 2018, 7). The volume of trade and commerce between China and the Pacific region is growing rapidly – from a non-existent level a couple of decades ago to billions of dollars today. There is also a growing level of optimism about the blossoming of relations between China and the Pacific Island nations at the expense of traditional donors whose influence is dwindling. Today China is a major trading partner of Solomon Islands, the Marshall Islands and Tuvalu with a trade volume of USD 657 million, USD 3 billion and USD 8 million respectively (Thomas 2010). Every year the Sino-Pacific trade and commerce grows. Notably, Beijing is engaging more with countries that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The reason behind this overture is to entice Taiwanese allies to recognise the “One China Policy” and cut ties with the Republic of China (Taiwan). Comparatively, in 2017 the volume of trade and commerce between China and its Pacific allies stood at USD 3.5 billion. However, during the same year the volume of trade between PRC and Taiwan’s diplomatic allies was USD 3.8 billion. This is a testimony to Beijing’s encroachment into other territories (Smyth 2019).

In 2014 Chinese President Xi Jinping visited the Pacific region and made a number of promises to the island nations. This high-level visit by a Chinese president not only led to the deepening of diplomatic relations and commitment to the One China Policy, but also resulted in an unprecedented increase in the volume of trade and commerce. In 2017 the volume of trade between China and the region jumped to USD 4.7 billion up from USD 2.7 billion in 2014. During the same period China’s imports from the island nations reached USD 3.7 billion up from USD 2.3 billion in 2014 (Zhang 2019). China’s imports constitute raw materials such as petroleum, natural gas, nickel and timber from Papua New Guinea, ferroalloys and nickel from New Caledonia and timber

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from Solomon Islands (Brant 2013). China’s major export destinations in the region are Fiji (hub of the South Pacific), Marshall Islands, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands. These countries import passenger and cargo ships, electronics, iron, rubber, prefabricated buildings, seafood and delivery trucks ((Meick, Ker and Chan 2018).

Furthermore, besides trade and commerce Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) has also been rapidly growing in the Pacific since President Xi’s visit in 2014. It now stands at USD 3 billion, indicating a growth of 173 percent since 2014 (Zhang 2019). Most of these investments are made in Papua New Guinea because the country is home to massive untapped natural resources. Since 2005, Chinese State-owned companies with funding from EXIM Bank have invested USD 970 million in two major mining projects in PNG (Meick, Ker and Chan 2018). There are predictions that given its fast-pace economic growth, China’s demand for natural resources will increase even further to keep the engine of its economic growth running (Thomas 2010). In addition to natural resources, Chinese enterprises have invested heavily in transport and real estate. In 2017, China signed an investment deal worth USD 4.4 billion with the PNG to build roads, agricultural industrial parks and water supply in various parts of the country (Lyons 2018). The other big beneficiary of Chinese FDI is Fiji where Guangdong Silk Road Ark Investment is building a USD 500 million resort on the coast of the main island.

Chinese state-owned enterprises and firms have been investing in information and telecommunication projects throughout the Pacific region. Fiji has already partnered with Huawei to roll out a new fibre internet network in the country (Radio New Zealand 2019). In addition, Chinese FDI besides sending a huge body of labour force, has enticed large numbers of Chinese diasporas into the Pacific region engaging in various activities – from small shops to “cybercrimes, prostitutions, money laundering and drug dealing” (Interview SP007, 04 April 2019). People’s resentment towards the increasing number of Chinese citizens is growing fast. If the situation continues in the same manner where more and more new Chinese nationals arrive in the island nations, Pacific-watchers predict the local population will once again react against it harshly the way they did in Solomon Islands and Tonga in 2006 and Papua New Guinea in 2009 (Smyth 2019; Cave 2019). In such an eventuality, Beijing’s official response, as many analysts believe, will not be limited to chartered flights to rescue its endangered citizens. It will respond with “military force if members of the Chinese diaspora were threatened” (Connolly 2016, 9). It is probably because of these grand strategies that PRC is expanding its sphere of influence and operations in the entire Pacific region. Analysts speculate that China is laying the foundations for its long-term plan of a military base in the region. A wharf for commercial cruise ships built by China on Espiritu Santo Islands in Vanuatu would also be able to accommodate naval vessels. More so, the wharf is close to the island nation’s international airport which China is helping to upgrade (Citowicki 2020)

Beijing is also expanding its territorial reach with an objective to tighten Taiwan’s space. Out of the six countries that had diplomatic relations with Taiwan, it is now reduced to four. The probability of these four aid-dependent countries switching to China is very big (Zhang 2019).

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Diplomatic Interests

China’s diplomatic interests in the Pacific region is deeply rooted in the presence of Taiwan, which Beijing considers as one of its breakaway provinces. The Sino-Taiwan diplomatic competition in the Pacific has a long history. Ever since the assuming of the UN seat by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1979 from Taiwan (ROC), the two countries have locked horns over diplomatic manoeuvring around the world (Atkinson 2010). This power posturing between the two Asian economic giants has now brought Pacific into the equation, which was otherwise known as a remote part of the world with less significance on the global stage. As for the aid dependent Pacific island nations they, arguably, need such a diplomatic rivalry between China and Taiwan in order to benefit from their surplus wealth, which they are willing to disperse in return for diplomatic recognition (Dornan and Brant 2014).

It is due in large part to these opportunistic agendas that the Pacific microstates have time and again switched their diplomatic allegiances between China and Taiwan. As recent as September 2019, Solomon Islands and Kiribati switched their diplomatic allegiance from Taiwan to China citing their burgeoning socio-economic needs as the rationale behind the decision. Ever since their independence, these countries have switched multiple times before (Cave 2019; Zhang 2019). The longevity of their loyalty is heavily dependent on the amount of foreign aid and concessional loans they receive from these emerging donors. Whichever donor defaults on their aid promises or provides hard loans, the recipient nation declares allegiance to the more generous one. In an interview with a prominent Vanuatuan government official, the author was told that if Taiwan provided more aid to Vanuatu than China, the government will “probably” switch to Taiwan (Interview SP008, 5 April 2019). So far, the microstates have shrewdly succeeded in playing one donor against the other to secure more aid and friendly loans.

However, as many analysts believe, the honeymoon period of the Pacific Island States is drawing to a close. With president Trump’s ‘America First’ policy, China is boldly and rapidly filling the void created by the US (Wallis 2012). This US decision has inadvertently created space for China, raising alarm amongst the Pacific island nations. China’s encroachment into new territories does not come through military force, rather, through investments in social development projects implemented by Chinese state-owned enterprises and labour force thereby, intentionally indebting the recipient nations with unsustainable loans. The second tier of encroachment is the planned population of foreign lands by Chinese nationals with a mission objective to invest in real estate. The final tier is deployment of military force and warships under the pretext of ‘overseas citizen protection’ mission (Connolly 2016). The latter will be a pre-emptive action to prevent the kind of anti-Chinese riots that took place in Solomon Islands, Tonga and Papua New Guinea in 2006 and 2009 respectively.

Given that the US, as a dominant global power is becoming more ‘isolationist’ and not willing to curtail the rising Chinese global expansionism, Beijing has become emboldened to the extent of justifying its global expansionist policies. The Chinese policy-making brass is developing and nurturing this philosophy that China is now a global power and the future belongs to them. It is largely in this spirit that Beijing

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is increasingly modernising its military, increasing its annual defence spending and generously investing in science and technology (Pant 2009). It is perhaps because of all these grand strategies that the Chinese government has introduced ‘Go Global’ initiative in a bid to send out state-owned enterprises with astronomical sums of money around the world and create space for Chinese workers and citizens (Dayant 2019).

As far as the diplomatic competition with Taiwan goes, the more the US retreats and the more China widens its global expansions, the more inevitable it becomes for Taiwan to give up its separatist ideology. The US support for Taiwan has its roots in the fact that over the years ROC (Taiwan) has built a robust democratic system, a strong and active civil society, advanced technological prowess, a vibrant young population and a dynamic growing economy (Atkinson 2010). It is an economic powerhouse in Asia, which has a huge trade and commerce dealings with the US. Taiwan has also been a major US ally at the international level and has supported it at the multilateral organisations with the exception of the United Nations where PRC occupies the UN Seat and is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The US also considers Taiwan as a strong and “valuable contributor to aviation safety, combating the spread of infectious disease, and fighting transnational crimes” (Meick, Ker, and Chan 2018, 20).

With the election of president Ma Ying-Jeou in 2008, there was a period of ‘diplomatic truce’ between PRC and ROC. During his election campaign president Ma had made promises of concessions towards China in order to expand commercial and economic cooperation between the two nations (Brant 2013). The diplomatic truce between the two rivals had significantly transformed their political, economic and diplomatic dealings beyond their shores. Both nations had tacitly agreed to “leave the other with its current number of diplomatic relationships” (Atkinson 2010, 420). Although Beijing did not admit publicly that there was an official truce with Taipei, the international dealings and reduction in their earlier diplomatic competition pointed towards such a tacit agreement. A truce is a “relatively pointless concession to make, requiring only that Beijing leave Taiwan with the allies it has while admitting nothing publicly” (Atkinson 2010, 420).

The Sino-Taiwan diplomatic truce officially ended in 2016, which heralded the beginning of new diplomatic competition particularly in the Pacific region. China once again started bribing politicians and continuously increased its development aid to Taiwan’s diplomatic allies with an aim to lure them to end their relations with Taipei. “Growing economic incentives offered by China to Taiwan’s diplomatic partners could cause these countries to switch diplomatic recognition to Beijing, shrinking Taiwan’s international space and expanding China’s presence in the region” (Meick, Ker, and Chan 2018, 20). Beijing has continuously and aggressively been exerting political and economic pressure on Taiwan’s diplomatic partners in order to abandon relations with Taiwan. In 2017, following the visit of Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen to the Pacific region, China banned tourists travelling to Palau to coerce the tourist dependent country to switch allegiance in return for more socio-economic benefits, development, as a favourable tourist destination for the Chinese nationals (Cave 2019). More than half of Palau’s tourists come from mainland China, contributing significantly to its economic growth (Zhang 2019). By preventing Chinese tourists from visiting Palau, Beijing brazenly applied its “carrot and stick policy” signalling to the

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country, that diplomatic recognition of Taipei, comes with a huge economic and tourism cost.

Beijing’s ‘reward and punish’ tactic has seemingly been effective. In 2018, Papua New Guinea (PNG) downgraded its diplomatic ties with Taiwan. China then invested in multiple projects in the resource-rich PNG. According to sources from Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs the PNG government has compelled Taipei to change the name of its mission there from Trade Mission of the Republic of China to Taipei Economic and Cultural Office (Pitol 2019). This clearly demonstrates the type of political and economic clout Beijing has cultivated in the region, thanks to its relentless investments in various projects. In a similar move and of course under pressure from China, Fiji closed its Taipei-based mission, which was opened in 1997 following Fijian Prime Minister’s visit to China in May 2017 (Pitol 2019). According to Taiwan’s foreign ministry, the Fijian government made the decision to attract more Chinese investments and tourism to the country. However, many commentators as well as Taiwanese authorities attributed Fiji’s diplomatic manoeuvring to Chinese interference in the domestic affairs of the island nation by bribing politicians and giving them luxurious holidays to China as well as promises of aid and generous investments in various sectors (Smyth 2019).

In the aftermath of the diplomatic truce, the Sino-Taiwan diplomatic rivalry returned to the region with an unprecedented force. Under the stewardship of President Xi, Beijing’s financial investments, concessional loans and trade soared disproportionately (Dayant 2019). Taiwan, quite understandably, has not been able to keep up with gigantic Chinese funds. As a result, in recent years Taiwan’s foreign aid to the Pacific region has diminished markedly (ABC 2009). This reduction in aid from Taipei and increase of Chinese monetary incentives has cajoled two of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies to switch allegiance to China. There are speculations that if Beijing continues bribing Pacific politicians at the current level and magnitude, all of Taipei’s diplomatic allies would prefer to give up their relations with Taiwan, for the interest of more aid and concessional loans from China.

Towards that end, China is tirelessly working to expand its sphere of influence in the region. As part of its cultural diplomacy, China is actively working to boost its cultural and political influences in the island nations. In 2006, China established Confucius Institute at the University of the South Pacific in Fiji where Chinese culture and language is taught (Zhang and Lawson 2017). Beijing has also offered 2000 fully funded scholarships to Pacific students to pursue postgraduate education in China. Moreover, between 2004 and 2012, China has offered six diplomatic training programs for the diplomats of the Pacific island nations in China. When President Xi visited Fiji in 2014, he announced opening of a Chinese cultural centre in Fiji (Dornan and Pryke 2017).

Furthermore, China’s heavy-handed engagement in the region is also a clear manifestation of its quest to gain more global prominence, especially at the multilateral organizations. Beijing needs the votes of the Pacific ‘microstates’ at the UN, which constitutes 7 percent of the total votes (Fossen 2012). China is also aiming to have the voting support of these island nations to block, for instance, Japan and India’s bid for a

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permanent UN Security Council seat. Beijing is also working with the aid dependent island nations to tighten Taiwan’s diplomatic space.

Multilateral Interests

China has been accelerating its economic, political and diplomatic influence in the Pacific region since early 2000. Today, China is one of the leading trade and investment partners as well as aid contributors to the region (Shie 2007). Before the coming of President Xi in 2013, Beijing was doing business exclusively with its diplomatic partners as a reward for recognising its One China Policy and punishing those countries that had relations with Taipei. However, president Xi Jinping has expedited his country’s multidimensional engagements in the region. After realising that the policy of punishing was not producing the kind of outcome that China was hoping for, President Xi reversed this policy. As a result, Beijing is now doing a lot of bilateral trade and commerce with Taiwan’s allies in the region in a bid to entice them to give up relations with Taipei. Beijing has also geared all its efforts towards marginalising Taiwan in the region.

Towards that end, PRC is now actively engaged with the regional multilateral organisations. Since 1989, China was only a dialogue partner with the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) represented by junior ranking Chinese officials. However, in recent years Beijing has changed its dialogue partner role significantly by replacing junior level officials to senior level officials at the vice-foreign minister level to attend the annual meetings (Brant 2013). In 2000, China spearheaded the establishment of China-PIF Cooperation Fund and facilitated the establishment of PIF trade office in Beijing in 2002. PRC has also established close relations with other regional and sub-regional multilateral organisations such as the Melanesia Spearhead Group (MSG) and funded the building of its headquarters in Vanuatu.

Furthermore, China has been the vanguard of setting up new multilateral organisations to serve its own purpose. In 2006, when Premier Wen Jiabao visited Fiji, he presided over the establishment of China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum (CPICEDCF). Although Chinese authorities have reiterated that Beijing does not have the intention to undermine the activities of any regional multilateral organisations, regional observers believe otherwise. China has, time and again, been blamed for orchestrating grand strategies vis-à-vis the Pacific region. It is commonly argued that Beijing wants to have a strong footprint in the region in order to prevent Taipei from any kind of ‘independent’ diplomatic engagement. Beijing’s activities are also viewed as intending to have a strong military presence in the region, possibly keeping an eye on the US bases in nearby island nations. Creation of new multilateral regional organisations under the auspices of PRC itself highlights China’s intention to have a greater role in the political and economic decision making of the island countries.

In addition, Beijing has been generously funding the running costs of these regional agencies. In 2006, when CPICEDCF held its first intergovernmental meeting in the capital city Beijing, premier Wen pledged a total of RMB 300 million (approximately USD 43 million) and promised tariff reductions and debt waiver initiative (Zhang 2019).

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The second meeting of the China-led Forum was held in the Chinese city of Guangzhou where PRC pledged a generous aid package of USD 1 billion and promised another USD 1 billion for infrastructure and social development projects in the member countries—China’s diplomatic allies. Ever since, Beijing has been steadily incrementing its foreign aid, concessional loans, trade and investments and diplomatic engagements in the region in an attempt to deepen and widen its diplomatic, political and economic activities, a move that has unnerved traditional and regional powers.

Furthermore, it is observed that there has been an unwarranted growth in the number of Chinese diplomats in the Pacific region. PRC “has invested heavily in diplomacy and is now said to have the highest number of diplomats in the region” (Wallis 2012). At the bilateral level, there has been continued high level Chinese officials visiting the island nations, which has been reciprocated by the Pacific Island nations’ government officials and politicians. Chinese immigrants, tourists, labourers and state-owned firms have flooded the region over the past two decades at the expense of local firms, local labour force and domestic manufacturing companies.

Additionally, Beijing has been involved in providing military training, equipment and funding for military capacity building projects, which has been welcomed by the aid recipient island countries (Connolly 2016). In the aftermath of the 2006 military coup in Fiji, the international community, lobbied by Australia and New Zealand, applied crippling sanctions on the leadership of the coup (Dornan and Brant 2014). In order to have a reduced impact of the sanctions, the military government adopted its “Look North Policy”, which essentially meant widening and deepening political, economic and diplomatic relations with China and secure Chinese aid and investments in Fiji. For the establishment in China, this was a God-sent diplomatic gesture, which they welcomed wholeheartedly.

Given that Fiji is considered as the hub of the South Pacific, China harnessed the opportunity to expand its sphere of influence in the wider Pacific region. For China, the “Blue Pacific” has multipronged advantages. First, despite being relatively small in terms of land mass but a large Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) covering a large maritime space, the region is a good source of raw materials, needed by Beijing for its economic growth. Secondly, the region is a growing market for cheap Chinese goods and services that could not be exported to the industrialised world. Thirdly, the Pacific region provides great opportunities for less skilled Chinese labour force who would not otherwise be able to secure employment in China or outside. Finally, China envisions huge potential in the vast Pacific Ocean. In other words, the maritime value of the region is significantly high to Beijing.

Maritime Interests

Most scholars and analysts agree that the Pacific region is increasingly becoming important to PRC, though less important than most other regions around the world. Diplomatic competition with Taiwan, island dispute with Japan and getting a step closer to the US military bases have all contributed to the rising importance of the Pacific region for China. Beijing considers it as part of its “greater periphery” for diplomatic strategy and future expansion as well as its “peaceful rise”. As a rising global power, PRC

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has global alliance building agendas in order to attain its strategic goals. China has already heavily indebted most of these aid-dependent developing island countries. For Tonga, Samoa, and Vanuatu, China is the single largest creditor with Tonga owing more than half of its public debt to China (Rajah et al. 2019).

Diplomatically, China’s future grand strategy is to isolate Taipei. Politically, Beijing wants these countries to bandwagon with it at international level. Militarily, China aims to emerge as the dominant power in order to challenge US and curtail Japan (Connolly 2016).

When President Xi Jinping assumed power in 2013, he unveiled his plan that the Pacific region is part of his futuristic Maritime Silk Road Initiative, a major component of Belt and Road Initiative. It is in this spirit that China has steadfastly increased its engagement in the region and has inundated the island nations with Chinese state-owned enterprises, labourers, immigrants and tourists. Through its Maritime Silk Road Initiative, Beijing intends to connect the region to international markets around the world. As of now the plan sounds promising on paper and the governments of the island nations have warmly welcomed the initiative because they believe successful implementation of the project will lead to their social development and economic growth.

However, experts and scholars paint a grim picture for the Pacific region as China’s footprint is becoming more pronounced and wide-reaching. There is this constant fear that Beijing’s expansionism will inevitably bring US into the equation, which will react to project itself as a dominant power and to preserve its vested interests in the wider Pacific region (Wallis 2012). The Sino-US power politic in the region could have destabilising repercussions for the island nations. For instance, during the Cold War, the US and former Soviet Union fought for influence mostly in the third world countries where the two superpowers were funding rival groups to fight against each other. As a result, the host country suffered from years of civil conflict, forced displacement, destruction of infrastructures and soaring poverty (Wallis 2012). In the wake of a potential Sino-US rivalry in the region, it is believed that history could once again repeat itself. As for China, it is now clear that “among other diplomatic and strategic aims, Beijing pursues greater influence in regional organisations to promote its political and economic interest, support Chinese firms’ access to the Pacific islands, and protect its sea lines of communication” (Meick, Ker, and Chan 2018, 4).

In addition, some analysts believe that China’s geostrategic and maritime interests play an important role in its continued pursuit of expanding its presence in the region. According to Sinologists, the Pacific region is vitally important to Beijing’s “offshore defence strategy” and its further development and modernisation of a “blue water navy”. They believe that “China’s maritime great power dream will not be realised if the second island chain remains intact” (Meick, Ker, and Chan 2018, 4). This reflects the significance of the island chain to China’s security needs. As a potential future superpower, Beijing has now felt the need to expand its reach throughout the world in order to have a transformative role in every possible decision it might make in the future. It is along the lines of such grand strategies that China is investing in its Maritime Silk Road Initiative project, which passes through the Pacific Ocean. This

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project will allow China to claim legitimate ownership over the vast untapped Pacific Ocean in the same manner it has done over the South China Sea.

Conclusion

Since the turn of the 21st century, China’s interests have been rising steadily. This unprecedented growth in Beijing’s footprint in the Pacific region is meant to expand its presence. On the diplomatic front, PRC has tried to limit diplomatic recognition of ROC for the past many years now with former dispensing colossal sums of foreign aid to the aid dependent island nations in South Pacific to recognise its One China Policy.

Despite all these threats, ROC has not been deterred by Chinese aggressive power posturing and is pushing for its quest for independence through diplomatic means. Both countries have been flexing their muscles and continuously modernising their already sophisticated militaries and fast pacing their technological advancements. For the past two decades both Taipei and Beijing have been engaged in their “Chequebook Diplomacy” in the Pacific region where the former is trying to create a diplomatic space for itself while the latter is strenuously working to curtail it. So far, the Pacific microstates have been the biggest beneficiaries of the competitive diplomacy between the two economic giants. It is due to Taiwan’s diplomatic, developmental and commercial activities in the region that Beijing is expanding and deepening its footprint for the past two decades.

In the 1990s, for instance, trade and commerce between China and the Pacific island nations was almost non-existent. However, post-2000, China’s trade and investments have increased many folds. It is all thanks to diplomatic rivalry with Taiwan that China started exploring the region and is seeing potential in parts of it. Analysts believe that if Beijing continues with the current level of aid, trade and investments, ROC will be squeezed out of the region and China will become a dominant regional player. Moreover, given its steady unchallenged economic growth, PRC has a keen interest in the natural resources of the region where Chinese state-owned enterprises have invested heavily, especially in Papua New Guinea’s oil and gas sectors, as well as nickel, timber and gold mines. China has also invested in fishing and other mineral sectors, throughout the region.

It is worth highlighting that, Chinese investments in infrastructure building projects has created employment for its own unemployed population, attracting Chinese nationals to migrate and settle down in the region. Initially, Pacific Island governments were hopeful that Chinese development projects would create employment for the local population. Nonetheless, in recent years this hope has eroded and has become apparent that Chinese aid is benefiting its own nationals only. The Island nations are experiencing Chinese aid boomerang, which has disenchanted the local population. As a result, the locals have developed high levels of resentment against Chinese nationals – so much so that people in Solomon Islands, Tonga and Papua New Guinea have, a few years ago, staged massive demonstrations against Chinese nationals.

Furthermore, China also has maritime interests in the region. There were speculations that China might open a military base in Vanuatu after signing a number of seaport

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development agreements. Although both Beijing and Port Vila have vehemently rejected such a deal, regional powers and observers believe there is a tacit agreement of such nature between the two governments. The other development that points a finger towards China’s military agendas in the region is rapid growth in Chinese nationals migrating to the Island nations and investing in real estate. Analysts argue that a large influx of Chinese nationals will inevitably arouse social tensions, which is nothing new. In such an eventuality, Chinese government will justify deploying a military force to protect its overseas endangered citizens. This seemingly temporary military deployment could result in permanent military bases. Only time will tell the true nature of China’s interests in the region.

References

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Article - II

China’s expanding national interests in the broader Red Sea arena

Femi Rachma Pertiwi2

Anak Agung Banyu Perwita3

Abstract

This article seeks to explain the importance of the broader Red Sea arena and what national interests China particularly owns within that specific region. China has been making its presence felt in the region, in the past few years, especially after Beijing decided to establish its very first foreign naval base in Djibouti. This research paper shows that the specific region holds significance in economic, security, and political dimensions. That being said, China’s national interests in this study are further classified into geo-economic, geo-security, and geo-political dimensions. Through the theoretical framework of national interest, maritime security, and foreign policy, this study will explain what makes this broader Red Sea arena important and how it is related with China’s expanding national interests surrounding the said region. The paper concludes that China’s global presence in the broader Red Sea arena can be justified based on the importance that the mentioned region holds as well as China’s expanding global interests which already exceed Beijing’s national territory itself. In that sense, maritime security has also become an important aspect to identify China’s behaviour in the region. The confirmation of such a conclusion is drawn from China’s several foreign policy initiatives, executed to protect and secure its own interests.

Keywords: Broader Red Sea arena, China, dimension, expanding national interests

Introduction

Historically speaking, the sea has always been an important vector for economic development for it provides the states a platform for trade and it acts as a stimulus for maritime enterprise. Over the years, states have started to grow dependent on seas as a substantial economic means of transport. As dependence grows, it inevitably invites states to pay greater attention to the safety of the sea lines of communications (SLOCs) from any threat that occurs in between. That being stated, any action or practice which is considered as a threat to the SLOCs also puts security in danger (Sakhuja, 2008, p. 689). Oftentimes, SLOCs are also known as state’s economic arteries, considering how crucial they are. The SLOCs also may vary in length and purposes, where the latter mainly depends on the situation. SLOCs are utilized for trade routes during times of peace, whereas it plays as strategic paths during war. For a state’s decision maker, the

2 Research Assistant, President Centre for International Studies (PRECIS), President University, Indonesia. Email: femirachmap@gmail.com 3 Professor of International Relations, School of International Relations, President University, Indonesia. Email: aabanyu.perwita@gmail.com

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geography of SLOCs and its effects play a key role to formulate a certain strategy to maintain the safety of it. (Sakhuja, 2008, p. 690).

The Indian Ocean holds various important SLOCs as well as maritime chokepoints, noticeably the Straits of Malacca, Hormuz, and the Bab el-Mandeb. A huge volume of global long haul cargo, primarily oil, from Africa, Europe, and Persian Gulf passes this ocean each year. (Sakhuja, 2008, p. 690) Oil and gas that travels through the Indian Ocean region is a big deal of the world’s economy. The Indian Ocean region holds approximately 55 percent and 40 percent of oil and gas reserves respectively. Arab and Gulf states are home to 21 percent of the world's oil stock, reflecting approximately 43 percent of international exports worth 17,262 million barrels for a size of daily crude exports (Potgieter, 2012, p. 2). Small states such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar, as middle powers, in addition with external powers like China are competing for influence, access and market share in the region. As a consequence, it has also blurred the boundary between Middle East and Africa, creating new emerging trans-regional dynamics (Vertin, 2020, p. 4). To simplify the mentioned regions as a part of the Indian Ocean, this article refers to it as the ‘broader Red Sea arena,’ following the report made by the United States Institute of Peace titled “China’s Impact on Conflict Dynamics in the Red Sea Arena”.

Figure 1: Broader Red Sea arena includes the Red Sea from the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, all the way through the Horn of Africa. The strategic waterways include the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and Gulf of Aden. (United States Institute of Peace, 2020, p. 4).

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As China climbs its way to be the world’s second largest economy, a secured supply of energy also becomes essential to maintain the country’s economic growth. Imported petroleum mainly from the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa shares an increasing importance of the mentioned supply. As a matter of fact, China relies on maritime transportation through long sea lines of communication. Among other objectives, China itself has also deployed its navy whose mission is to safeguard the SLOC as a maritime- and energy-dependent country (Cole, 2016, p. 7). In the following years, China will also focus on increasing international cooperation, particularly “going out” for Central Asia, Russia, Middle East, Africa, Asian Pacific, and America at the same time establishing land and sea transport. In a bigger picture, it is also related to the Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) plan (Cole, 2016, p. 134). All explained; hence it is also logical and justifiable for China to build its naval base in Djibouti where many of its interests lie around the area.

Considering the facts above, this article finds it intriguing that a specific region holds so many different significances for a state, especially given the fact that the state itself is expanding its own national interests as well as global presence accompanied by a rapid economic growth like China. That being said, this study would like to explore those significance and its relation with China’s expanding national interests as to determine the meeting point of these two aspects in a dynamic of international relations.

China’s National Interests, Foreign Policy and Maritime Security- A Unique Equation

It is argued that national interests still become the preeminent reason for why a state does what it does in the international system. Therefore, it is also argued that foreign policy is a reflection of what a state considers its national interest. In other words, national interest is often incorporated with the making of foreign policy (Manan, 2017, p. 176). From national interest, one may see a representation of a state’s aspiration where it can be a base to an actual policy and programme application (Bion, 1963, p. 121). As China faces a significant rise and growth, its national interest has drawn attention where it also becomes a reference to identify Beijing’s foreign policy. Back in the 1980s, China

followed the saying of “Keep a low profile and do something” (韬光养晦,有所作为) as its

principle of foreign policy. However, that principle has changed, to “Strive for

achievement” (奋发有为), as President Xi Jinping took the office in 2013. It is argued that

what China desires is much more than only an accumulation of material capability and a share of its growing gain. He and Feng (2012) elaborated such a notion by arguing that as a state starts to gain power, its interest in security will also expand. It allows China to provide itself with more strategic choices in order to create a space of favourable or secure external surroundings, based on its relative capability, for its expanding national interest (Ye, 2019, pp. 2–5) .

Defining geo-politics, Gray (1996) pointed out that interactions which occur between states as a result from geography, along with its challenges and opportunities, may result in a strategic pattern for foreign policy. Therefore, he further argued that geographic features may contribute as a platform or a stage that influences a flow and states as characters. (Sören Scholvin, 2016, pp. 16–17) Cohen (1991) also shared a similar

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view in a sense that geopolitics consist of mutual impact between geography and politics. A policy as an outcome of such interaction may be driven by a particular region’s resources or its strategic location (Sören Scholvin, 2016, p. 22). From the perspective of China itself, its effort to upgrade the armed forces as well as establish bases and ports throughout the Indian Ocean region may be seen as a crucial milestone to secure its energy and oil supply. A permanent naval base in Djibouti which leads to an increasing military presence, may elevate China’s power projection through its navy, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region as a whole (Chaziza, 2018, p. 9).

There are various discussions circulating among scholars to define or describe what can be classified as geo-economics. On one side, geo-economics can refer to a strategic interaction between state actors with its related economic players to boost a state’s power position in the international system. On the other side, it can be categorized as both strategy and a part of analysis done by a state or business. Two important components of geo-economics involve indirect strategy and soft power which contribute in the pursuit of a state’s strategic objectives. A non-direct approach to project power is evident in the case of China’s growing influence in different geographic areas, where Africa is included (Csurgai, 2018, pp. 4, 6).

For a state to be the most advanced geo-economic actor, Blackwill and Harris (2016) argued that geo-economic and military means “tend to be mutually reinforcing,” meaning that military and geo-economics coexist with one another and the way it is used depends on how a state perceives certain challenge. In that sense, Grosse (2014) also shared the same view by suggesting that there is a combination of strategies of power projection between military and economic domains. Grosse (2014) also analysed how China’s developing economy-based power may allow Beijing to shape the structure of the global economy in accordance with its desire. In short, many IR scholars see geo-economics (in addition to geopolitics) as how a state focuses on controlling space and flow (Soren Scholvin & Wigell, 2018, pp. 5–6). Apparently, the 2015 Defence White Paper of China is important not only because it laid out the main global responsibility of Chinese armed forces to protect the country’s overseas interest, but also pointed out the coordination between military and commercial enterprises to safeguard such interest (Heath, 2018, p. 22).

Foreign Policy

Padelford and Lincoln (1977) defined foreign policy as a comprehensive result of the process of a state translating its goals and interests into definite actions in the external environment. From that definition, there are two main functions of foreign policy: to achieve a state’s objectives and to drive its interests. Gibson (1944) shared the same views with that of Padelford and Lincoln (1977), in terms of how a state connects the dots of its interests to form an overall plan in dealing with the rest of the world. However, one additional contribution which is worth to be noted in this study from Gibson (1944) is how far a state is determined to attain those interests at their disposal. Combined together, there are three important parts to explain what foreign policy is. It consists of the ends, the ways, and the means. The ends refer to a set of vision or desired interests that a state attempts to obtain in dealing with other states. In order to do so,

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there are ways in which it refers to the ideas or tactics that a state formulates. The means here involve the kinds of resources that a state owns, be it economic or military (AS, 2018, p. 2).

In a more recent context, China’s dimension of foreign policy goes through not only a course of expansion (kuozhang 扩张) but also a reconstruction (chongjian 重建) in

which it is done through various different ways. One of it is through the growing number of actors within the formulation process of China’s foreign policy where it involves not only the government, but also non-state actors and individuals. The said reconstruction consequently influences Chinese interests abroad as well as the goals of Chinese foreign policy itself (Lanteigne, 2020, p. 5). Furthermore, ensuring a steady source of global energy and deploying an advanced navy are two of the main elements in formulating China’s foreign policy (Cole, 2016, p. 7).

Maritime Security

According to Bueger (2015), there are four important concepts which are linked to maritime security: economic development, marine environment, national security, and human security. Maritime security is associated with economic development as many economic activities occur via the ocean. Not to forget that the majority of trade takes place through the sea lanes. In addition to that, many economic activities have resulted in various industries worth billions of dollars, like shipping, fishery, and coastal tourism industries. Resources in the ocean, such as fossil energy and mining, have also caused the commercial value of the ocean to be re-evaluated for good. It is also pertinent to note that the role of naval forces and their strategies are particularly important in maritime security. It is based on the classical understanding of national security in securing a state’s survival and the concept of sea power to determine how far a state should engage outside its territorial maritime domain in order to make its presence noticeable in international waters in general (Bueger, 2015, pp. 160–161).

According to Mahan (1900), a state’s interests will thrive with its development in international communication. As a result, the sea command of any maritime power should exceed beyond offshore waters in accordance with the expanding national interests. In other words, as a state’s national interests reach a certain space, its sea power with its command of the sea should also be present there. With expanding national interests as a basis for a maritime power, a typical and strategic duty of the navy is to protect and to control crucial locations in sea routes. Once a state is capable of controlling particular spots that consist of multiple important sea lanes, then it is safe to say that a state’s sea power is strong enough to have a control over everything (Ju, 2015, pp. 26–27).

Economic, Political, and Security Dimension of the broader Red Sea arena

Djibouti is located strategically in the region where several states compete for various different desired outcomes. Therefore, the Red Sea region is often called as a competitive arena. Djibouti is located in the zone along the coast of Red Sea, where other states have started to cover the area with both commercial and military posts, as well as infrastructure projects. To counter this development, Djibouti and its

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neighbours have tried to undertake new investments without giving up their sovereignty or getting pulled into unhealthy rivalries. Not to forget that the region’s domestic politics are starting to be flooded with foreign agendas from external powers (Vertin, 2020, pp. 3–4). Tensions that take place between Iran and Saudi Arabia have also contributed to the change of Red Sea’s profile, due to the threat ignited by Tehran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to disturb the trade that transits through Bab el-Mandeb strait and other close waterways. The continuous conflict has also formed the civil war in Yemen which has dragged African territory, fighters, and partners into the complicated loop (Vertin, 2020, p. 4). Thus, regional peace and stability is a complex matter in this region. Foreign or external powers have also added the complexity in this region’s politics. While China and the U.S chose Djibouti as home to their naval bases, Russia has also stepped onto the Great Power Competition by including a plan to build its own military base in Eritrea and Sudan, further signalling Moscow’s specific overseas interests, economic, and security roles asserted in the region (Wuthnow, 2020, p. 2).

Even though security may be the main impulse on how several states insert their presence and deploy their military forces to this region, this trend has been bolstered by the rise of new economic and commercial opportunities provided in the region (Melvin, 2019, p. 13). Economically speaking, the 1,400-mile Red Sea that connects the Mediterranean and Arabian seas through the Suez Canal and the Bab el-Mandeb, is central for Europe-Asia annual trade which is worth USD 700 billion. It also involves 6.2 million oil barrels a day which is counted for (approximately) 9 percent of the world’s total consumption. Moreover, this region is also a specific spot where major oil-producing countries are located, such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Oman. Sudan and South Sudan also produce oil, although in smaller quantities. Nonetheless, both are also home to natural resources, such as chromium and copper (Wuthnow, 2020, p. 2).

More importantly, China’s economic development has significantly raised the emphasis of the global commerce that takes place in the East-West trade corridor which travels through the Red Sea. The importance of this sea route itself has been intensified by China's BRI project with the objective of establishing the Chinese dependent economies throughout the region. In that context, the Arabian Peninsula countries and China have attempted to position themselves commercially in the region through the development of ports and infrastructure projects which are capable of connecting crucial market points (Melvin, 2019, p. 13). These ports which are located on the African side of the Red Sea allow foreign exporters to access Africa’s flourishing consumer markets (Wuthnow, 2020, p. 2). The Gulf of Aden (and Indian Ocean in general) are critical sea lanes for international trade. It is represented by the profound maritime trade that occurs throughout the region. The East-West route which passes Suez Canal and links Africa and Asia to the market in Europe crosses through the Gulf of Aden. In fact, most of the ships that pass the Suez Canal inevitably pass by this gulf (Hamza & Priotti, 2018, p. 10) and eventually Bab el-Mandeb. In that sense, these sea lanes are also central for the global energy security (U.S Energy Information Administration, 2019). It’s significance becomes even more substantial if one takes into account the globalization of the energy market and its unequal distribution between different countries and continents, further encouraging trade between producing and consuming regions. Thus, such a market is

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sensitive to the changes that might occur in these sea lanes caused by security threats (Hamza & Priotti, 2018, p. 10) .

Geo-economics is a phenomenon where commercial schemes and strategic interests converge. Therefore, commerce and security also have long been correlated with one another. Naval forces that involve several states have had varied success in guarding crucial sea lines of commerce (Pandya et al., 2011, p. 2,5). As it has been previously mentioned, Indian Ocean in general holds some of the world’s most vital SLOCs. It is further accompanied with ports and bases developed by several states. With such a significance, ports and bases have ignited competition among states as well. Furthermore, it has also led to the securitization of such races for the said ports and bases (Melvin, 2019, p. 13). It is visible by the expansion of military presence by states throughout the Indian Ocean, elevating their power projection capabilities to secure the SLOCs on which they rely. It is also the other forms of security threats, such as trafficking of people, weapons, drugs, armed robbery and piracy, which raise security concerns in the maritime domain. (Pandya et al., 2011, p. 99)

China’s expanding national interests towards the broader Red Sea Arena

As China strives to be the “great global power” that possesses “the geopolitical centrality and respect,” it is deemed as something important for China to be able to project its power overseas. In regards to the MENA region, Beijing’s naval base in Djibouti plays a considerable role in fulfilling such interest, as a vector for the People’s Republic of China Navy (PLAN) to discover its potential and to provide the Navy with immediate capabilities. (Chaziza, 2018, p. 10) First, UN peacekeeping operations and anti-piracy patrols. Not only is it executed to protect China’s economic interests with regards to safeguarding flow of resources, but these efforts are crucial in the maintenance of international security where China can ensure the political and security interests (Wuthnow, 2020, pp. 3–4). People’s Liberation Army (PLA) peacekeepers have indirectly contributed to China’s promotion of “soft power” as they provided medical services and assistance in infrastructure, like in Sudan and South Sudan. Meanwhile in Djibouti, China has also provided the country with “over 600 teaching aids to local schools” as reported from China’s 2019 Defence White Paper. These kinds of activities are aimed at countering negative impressions of China in the region and also enhance Chinese presence on the international stage in a way that reduces fears of its rising power amongst partners (Wuthnow, 2020, p. 6). In addition to that, cooperative activity that China carries out also extends to military diplomacy. China’s PLA has conducted around 178 activities with 10 Red Sea nations from 2002 to 2018 alone, reported from the database of the U.S National Defence University (NDU). These include meetings of senior officials (both in China and the region), port calls of Escort Task Forces (ETFs) particularly from the Gulf of Aden, and involvement in both bilateral and multilateral exercises. Maintaining military diplomacy in the region is also principal to China’s arms transfers with most of the countries in the region for the past 15 years. Chinese military weapons which have been purchased vary from rocket launchers, missiles, personnel carriers with armours, helicopters, and other assets.

This is also particularly due to Beijing’s focus on this market as other UCAVS-producing countries are restricted to export the assets under the Missile Technology Control

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Regime and the Wassenaar Agreement. (Wuthnow, 2020, pp. 4–6) With all such initiatives in this region and others, China has attempted to label itself as “new type of major power”. President Xi has also emphasized it in his speech at the 19th Communist Party of China (CPC) National Congress that (United States Institute of Peace, 2020, p. 14):

“It makes clear that major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics aims to foster a new type of international relations and build a community with a shared future for mankind.” (China.org, 2017)

And that China has made further progress on all fronts benefitting China’s diplomatic agenda, which is also essential to generate a China-friendly environment for its rise (United States Institute of Peace, 2020, p. 14). That being said, it also affects China’s international influence and power projection to shape the global environment.

“We have made all-round efforts in the pursuit of major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, thus advancing China's diplomatic agenda in a comprehensive, multilevel, multifaceted way and creating a favourable external environment for China's development…..China champions the development of a community with a shared future for mankind, and has encouraged the evolution of the global governance system. With this we have seen a further rise in China's international influence, ability to inspire, and power to shape; and China has made great new contributions to global peace and development. (China.org, 2017)

In general, China’s overseas interests are deeply rooted on an economic basis. In a bigger context, the Indian Ocean region is significantly important for China’s BRI where Beijing attempts to connect its mainland with neighbouring countries through belt and maritime routes as shown by the figure below.

Figure 2: China’s BRI routes (Cai, 2017, p. 2).

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BRI was launched by Xi at a time when China’s foreign policy had started to become more assertive compared to other previous periods. That being said, it is not rare for BRI to be interpreted as a geopolitical tool instead of a mere geo-economic one. In that end, opinions and perspectives are varied. However, one thing is for sure: BRI surely possesses geo-economic drivers in its execution. Through BRI, Xi admitted that China’s neighbours owned “extremely significant strategic value” for China. In his speech at the Peripheral Diplomacy Work Conference, he also further stated that China:

“…must encourage and participate in the process of regional economic integration, speed up the process of building up infrastructure and connectivity. We must build the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, creating a new regional economic order.”

In that sense, Xi generally perceives China’s economic resources as a primary tool to preserve regional stability and affirm China’s leadership within its neighbourhood. The two geo-economic interests and goals of BRI have two aspects: maintain China’s regional leadership through an extensive program of economic integration and to generate a regional production chain in which China is the key player of leading innovation and manufacturing, apart from being a standard setter (Cai, 2017, pp. 3–5). Particularly in Djibouti, the country’s geostrategic location makes it an important hub for China’s geo-economic interest. Located at the choke point of one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world, China’s presence there signals an interest to keep an ideal transhipment hub of cargo in and out of the MENA region, safe, as it also discovers a potential long-term economic growth and opportunity (Chaziza, 2018, p. 8). In other words, China sees Djibouti as a key to unlock the economies in the Horn of Africa and especially, to unleash the potential of Ethiopia’s attractive and growing market, a landlocked country.

China has invested around USD 15 billion in total to develop several ports in Djibouti, making Beijing the biggest foreign commercial player. The ports in Djibouti are decently situated to supply a commercial access to Ethiopia, acting as a transhipment hub for cargo that transits from the Indian Ocean to other markets in East and South Asia and from the Suez Canal and the Red Sea in North Africa and Europe. China’s geo-economic interests in Djibouti is due to its investments in some of the most crucial ports in the country. These ports are also located near the naval base that China built, causing Chinese firms to further root their development in a port- and military base-dependant country like Djibouti (Dutton et al., 2020, pp. 9–10).

China has grown to be one of the most dominating investors globally, with expanding overseas investments and several Chinese nationals working abroad. This is particularly due to China’s development policy- the Going Out Policy, since 2000. In the past, China relied on the host countries’ capability in protecting their investments and workers, assuming that these countries had the ability to execute such a task. However, as the host countries seemed unable to fulfil such a task from the Chinese perspective, it eventually chose to utilize its PLA to help the local governments in protecting Chinese assets.

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The reason behind China sending its personnel as well as capital, to host countries with serious security problems is to secure its access to various energy and mineral resources that fulfil its geo-security interests. In addition to that, not protecting its working nationals abroad is perceived to be equivalent to constraining the development strategy of ‘going global.’ Moreover, China has also come to the realization that these investments and nationals abroad are significant to China’s economic growth (Tanner & Mackenzie, 2015, pp. 27–28, 33).

Like any other maritime power in general, China also considers globalization as well as scientific and technological development to play a role in expanding its maritime security interests, or “zone of security interests,” which is also consequently important for China’s economic development. According to Zhang Wei, as a Senior Captain in the PLAN’s Naval Research Institute (NRI), China’s maritime security interests will eventually generate a “vibrant, outward, and expansive quality” which will also mirror the “expansion of China’s zone of security concerns, and an expansion of its defensive depth.” The first dimension of maritime interest which becomes increasingly important for China’s security is the correlation between maritime resources and sustained economic development.

Chinese maritime officials and analysts have collectively agreed that maritime interests seize an irreplaceable role in the continuation of China’s economic transformation. Reassuring China’s rapid economic growth calls for increasing access to energy and other critical resources, maintaining proper protection specifically for the security of maritime trade and transit lanes, China’s developing investments overseas and nationals abroad, and assisting more maritime industries to flourish. As China’s maritime interests are scattered around the globe and grow at the same pace as its economy grows, it becomes compulsory for China to take its maritime rights into account and to review its sea power, which includes rights to open waters and right to exploitation of international seabed regions like Indian Ocean. Other than that, seaborne exports and imports are expected to be the key drivers of China’s economic growth. Therefore, it is also in China’s geo-security interest to protect its lines of energy supply (Tanner & Mackenzie, 2015, pp. 51–54). The second dimension is China’s maritime strategic depth, access, as well as its power projection capability. To reach that end, there is a necessity for PLAN to maximize its maritime access and the range of its operations to boost China’s strategic depth itself (Tanner & Mackenzie, 2015, p. 48). Zhang Huachen, as the East Sea Fleet’s deputy commander, told Xinhua in an interview way back in 2010:

“With our naval strategy changing now, we are going from coastal defence to far sea defence. With the expansion of the country’s economic interests, the navy wants to better protect the country’s transportation routes and the safety of our major sea lanes.”

In addition to that, Yin Zhuo as former PLAN rear admiral, in another interview with People’s Daily Online in the same year that PLAN has been ordered with two major missions which are the protection of China’s maritime security and safeguarding its burgeoning economic interests. (Lin, 2013, p. 11) The second China’s geo-security interests fall on how China attempts to deepen its energy and resource security.

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China’s main national interest, which is its own economic development, cannot be maintained without a dependable and stable access to imported energy resources. This goes back to China’s dependence on imported oil and the geographic ‘weaknesses of China’s routes of imported oil. China’s current security strategy has also been focusing on how to reduce, if not tackle, the vulnerability of a possible disruption. In general, China’s expanding economic interest particularly in maritime regions goes to show that China needs to secure its new resources of oil and energy. The most pressing energy security that China encounters is not about keeping overall energy supply enough, but it is its dependence on imported oil whereas its domestic supply has no longer been able to meet up with the growing sources of demands. It is triggered by China’s personal consumption, striking changes in demographic patterns, and industrial activities such as manufacturing and exports. (Tanner & Mackenzie, 2015, pp. 38–39)

Conclusions

This study shows that the broader Red Sea arena holds various significance which can be further classified into three dimensions. Politics dimension mainly falls on power (regional instability, balancing foreign powers), while economic dimension falls on commercial activities (infrastructure and investment projects) and energy security. The security dimension falls on security threats that take place in each region. From the perspective of China, Djibouti is considered strategic to tackle these threats. For that reason, Djibouti has also become a “playground” for foreign powers with different interests in the region and China is not an exception either, coming from the need to fulfil its expanding national interests.

In further details of China’s expanding national interests, it can also be classified into geopolitical interests which focus on the interest on becoming global power, promotion of soft power in the execution of humanitarian acts, military diplomacy and arms transfer. Geo-economics with the focus on BRI, China’s infrastructure and investment projects in Djibouti and Africa at large, safeguarding China’s assets abroad, as well as geo-security interests with emphasis on maritime, energy, and resource security.

With those national expanding interests, China has been increasing its global presence around the region. In the past decade, China’s national interests have gone through an expansion in a way that it both complicates and complements its own chasing of more developed security concerns. This formulation of expanding national interests particularly evolves around China’s best pursuit to fulfil its interests in economic development. Despite the fact that Beijing has attempted to be strategic in selecting these interests, it has also been pushed to adapt strategically the same due to security challenge that arises from an outcome of global forces out of China’s control or a result of its own past policies decisions.

From that point, those interests are further translated into various distinct foreign policies which are capable in securing China’s interests globally through political, economic, and security means where China’s armed forces in PLA and its navy play a significant role as a support system. That being said, maritime security has also become an increasingly substantial matter in China’s behaviour around the broader Red Sea arena or Indian Ocean as a whole.

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Article - III

Is Vietnam-U.S heading for a Strategic Partnership?

Gitanjali Sinha Roy4

Abstract

The relations between the United States of America and Vietnam have been reinvigorated in the recent years and this has led to a change in dynamics reaching an extraordinary level of mutual trust and exchange. The turbulent past between the two countries has left an undeniable scar of the war. The primary reason for the change in relations is due to the rise of an aggressive China especially in the South China Sea. The U.S., its allies and friends bothered by Chinese aggressiveness have brought the U.S. and Vietnam together making China a common bone of contention. US President Donald John Trump has made engagement in the Indo-Pacific region a top priority. In November 2017 on his visit to Vietnam, President Trump outlined his vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) where all the countries would prosper side by side respecting the sovereignty and independence of one another. In this context, the article traces the new changes in the dynamics between the U.S. and Vietnam which in all possibility could lead to a strategic partnership between the two. Furthermore, it would lead to the formation of a ‘United States-led coalition with the Quad countries and Vietnam Axis’ in the Indo-Pacific region.

Key words: US-Vietnam strategic relations, Free and Open Indo-Pacific, Chinese Aggression, Maritime convergences, South China Sea, Quad, Quad+ Vietnam Axis.

First Phase of Changing Dynamics: Diplomatic and Economic ties

The relations between the United States of America and Vietnam for years remained turbulent and the initial years of the revamping of the relations between the two countries took a series of efforts and prolonged patience and hard work. After the war, the primary focus of the U.S. was to obtain all possible U.S. personnel listed as Prisoners of War (POW) and Missing in Action (MIAs). In 1991, Vietnam agreed to host a U.S. office in Hanoi to work towards the POW/MIA affairs. The United States in 1992 removed restrictions which they had earlier placed on the American non-governmental organisations working in Vietnam and further withdrew their opposition to lending from international financial institutions in 1993. The U.S. trade embargo against Vietnam was lifted in February 1994 and with this started the several high-level U.S.

4 Gitanjali Sinha Roy is a Ph.D. scholar at the Department of East Asian Studies, University of Delhi and prior to this; she was a visiting scholar at the University of Tokyo. At present, she is a researcher at Centre for Security and Strategy Studies (Cescube), New Delhi.

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interactions with Vietnam with the focal point remaining the POW/MIA cases.5 All these initial efforts led to political normalisation which paved the way for diplomatic relations in July 1995, under the leadership of President Bill Clinton. This marked the first phase of reinvigorating the relations between the two countries.

With the diplomatic relations in place, economic normalisation was next in line. This was preceded by a blueprint for a draft trade agreement presented to Vietnam by the U.S. in May 1996. This was followed by the visit of the U.S. National Security Adviser, Anthony Lake to Hanoi to mark the first anniversary of the normalisation of the relations between the two countries. On 7 April 1997, the U.S. Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin and Finance Minister Nguyen Sinh Hung signed an accord in Hanoi for Vietnam to repay the debts of USD145 million from the former government of South Vietnam. On 10 April 1997, Douglas Pete Peterson, a Vietnam War Veteran and former POW was confirmed as Ambassador to Vietnam. Soon, Le Van Bang presented his credentials as Ambassador of Vietnam in Washington, D.C on 9 May 1997. Secretary of State Madeline Albright arrived in Vietnam for an official visit and signed a Copyright Agreement with Vietnam on 27 June 1997. The U.S. Government passed the special legislation in August 1997 permitting the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to assist Vietnam so that it could improve trade through a Commercial Law and Trade Policy Technical program. On 11 March 1998, President William J. Clinton issued waivers of Jackson-Vanik Amendment for Vietnam which paved a way for OPIC, Ex-Im, TDA, USDA and MARAD activities. Later, on 26 March 1998, the Minister of Planning and Investment Tran Xuan Gia and Ambassador Pete Peterson finalised the signing of the OPIC Bilateral Agreement. All these endeavours led to the formation of a Bilateral Trade Agreement in principle in Hanoi, Vietnam on 25 July 1999 between the USTR Ambassador Richard Fisher and Vietnam Trade Minister Tuyen. This was followed by the U.S.-Asia Environmental Partnership (U.S.-AEP) which established Technology Representative Offices in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. The Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City was officially open for business in August 1999 and by September 1999; USAID began a technical program to the Ministry of Trade so that there could be an acceleration of negotiations in the Bilateral Trade Agreement. On 13 July 2000, the Bilateral Trade Agreement was signed by Vietnam Trade Minister Vu Khoan and USTR Ambassador Barshefsky, with US President William J. Clinton announcing the Agreement at a White House Rose Garden ceremony. This was followed by a visit of President Clinton to Vietnam on November 16-20, 2000 along with a business delegation and the leadership of the Veterans of Foreign Wars.6

All these achievements were important but the highlight was in the year of 2001 when on September 27, 2001, USAID launched the Support for Trade Acceleration (STAR-Vietnam) project so that it could support Vietnam for the implementation of the Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA). On 16 October 2001, President George W. Bush signed

5 Jonathan R. Stromseth. 2003. Dialogue on U.S.-Vietnam Relations: Domestic Dimensions. San Francisco: The Asian Foundation. https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/vietdomesticdimensions.pdf (Accessed on 26 May 2020) 6 “Chronology of U.S.-Vietnam Relations” published by the U.S. Embassy and Consulate in Vietnam https://vn.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/chronology-of-us-vietnam-relations/(Accessed on 26 May 2020)

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the Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) into Public Law No: 107-52. This was followed by the signing of the Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement in Washington, D.C. by the USTR Ambassador Robert Zoellick and Deputy Prime Minister Dung and Trade Minister Vu Khuon.7 These developments through the Bilateral Trade Agreement were major victories for both sides as the formalisation of the trade relations changed the dynamics of the relationship between the two nations in 2001.

The United States and Vietnam had fought a war and it was rather impossible to think of any defence exchanges between these two nations but on 10 November 2003, Defence Minister Pham Van Tra visited the U.S to discuss the cooperation for the promotion of regional security. In November 2003, the Navy missile frigate USS Vandegrift docked in Ho Chi Minh City. This was the first U.S. Navy ship to dock in Vietnam since the end of the brutal war, a symbolic act of boosting stronger relations which was followed by the signing of the Bilateral Aviation Agreement dated December 4, 2003. Admiral Thomas Fargo, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command paid a two-day visit on February 10-11, 2004 to Vietnam, making stopovers at Hanoi and Da Nang. February 26, 2004 saw the opening of the First American Corner in Da Nang. On 28 July 2004, the USS Curtis Wilbur DDG-54 arrived in Da Nang becoming the second U.S. Navy ship to visit Vietnam, since 1975.

The year of 2005 marked the 10th anniversary celebrations of the normalisation of diplomatic relations between the United States and Vietnam. As a gesture commemorating the 10th anniversary, the USS Gary arrived in the port of HCMC on 29 March 2005. Prime Minister of Vietnam, Phan Van Khai also paid a visit to President George W. Bush on June 19 to 24, 2005. This was a major change in the relations as for the first time a Vietnamese Prime Minister visited the U.S. in the post-War era. During this visit the two countries signed an Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement and others dealing with international adoptions, intelligence and military cooperation8. Vietnam also signed an agreement which was a prerequisite for participating in the United States’ International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. Therefore, this was a major message that even past enemies can cultivate ties and aim for stronger relations as partnership between the two countries moved to comprehensive partnership.

Eric G. John, the Deputy Assistant Secretary in his statement on 12 July 2006 before the Senate Finance Committee on Vietnam spoke about the Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) for Vietnam and quoted that there are critical economic and commercial reasons that the PNTR status for Vietnam and its accession to World Trade Organisation (WTO) would be good for both Vietnam and the US. He further quoted that there was a five-fold rise in trade of $7.8 billion in 2005 and this also included the US companies’ overseas subsidiaries who were the largest investors in Vietnam in 2005 and in 2006, seeing the economic growth of Vietnam. Intel announced its plans to invest over USD 300 million in new microchip facilities in the Ho Chi Minh City area.

7 Ibid. 8 “Chronology of U.S.- Vietnam Relations” published by the U.S. Embassy and Consulate in Vietnam. https://vn.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/chronology-of-us-vietnam-relations/(Accessed on 26 May 2020)

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Therefore, these were developments since the signing of the Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) in 2001. Eric G. John in his speech also highlighted that economic and regulatory reforms launched under the BTA were assisted by an innovative US trade capacity building program known as Support for Trade Acceleration (STAR) which expanded under the WTO accession process. Also, as Vietnam amended its commercial legislations in accordance with WTO rules and regulations, there was improved governance by increasing transparency in the decision making by the state and curtailment in the privileges of state-owned enterprises.9

With several profound structural changes in the Vietnamese economy, opportunities for the US firms and investors increased by leaps and bounds, carving out a new beginning between the U.S. and Vietnam. On 11 January 2007, Vietnam became the 150th Member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) which was a greater win for the relations between the U.S. and Vietnam as the U.S. was instrumental in pushing for the membership of Vietnam. On January 22-23, 2007, Admiral Gary Roughhead Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet visited Vietnam for two days and met the Vice Admiral Nguyen Van Hien, the Commander of the Vietnamese Navy. Later the Deputy Prime Minister Pham Gian Khiem visited the U.S. between 11 to 16 March, 2007 and on 15 March 2007, the U.S-Vietnam Bilateral Maritime Agreement was signed in Washington D.C. The signing of the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) followed on 21 June 2007. From June 18-23, 2007 President Nguyen Minh Triet visited the United States to deepen cooperation in the sectors of economics and trade. The psychological impact of the war was felt on both sides but despite that the effort to work to normalise the relations between them and work for successful diplomatic as well as economic ties was a major step towards the future.

Second Phase: Security and Maritime Cooperation in the South China Sea

A U.S. inter-agency delegation was led by the Deputy Secretary of the State James Steinberg to Hanoi from September 26-27, 2009. The delegation held productive discussions with Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, Deputy Prime Minister Hoang Trung Hai and Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Thien Nhan aiming to strengthen the bilateral relations. Several regional as well as global security issues such as the South China Sea and the nuclear programs of countries like North Korea and Iran were also discussed. These discussions paved the way for optimistic cooperation between the U.S. and Vietnam. In fact, 2009 saw a major highlight in the military ties between the two countries when two US naval ships, USS Blue Ridge and the USS Lassen, docked at Da Nang port on 7 November 2009. This marked a goodwill gesture as for the first time two U.S. Navy ships visited Da Nang concurrently. Also, the Admiral of USS Lassen, Le Ba Hung was born in Hue City and grew up in Northern Virginia, becoming the first Vietnamese-American to command a U.S. naval ship.10 The U.S.-Vietnam security cooperation advanced rapidly, fuelled by the convergence of the two countries’ strategic

9 Eric G. John. 2006. “Statement before the Senate Finance Committee on Vietnam Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) for Vietnam” published by the U.S. Department of State Archive, Washington, D.C. dated July 12, 2006. https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/68939.htm(Accessed on 26 May 2020) 10 “Chronology of U.S.- Vietnam Relations” published by the U.S. Embassy and Consulate in Vietnam https://vn.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/chronology-of-us-vietnam-relations/ (Accessed on 9 June 2020)

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interests in the South China Sea and this could be seen as the second phase of the relationship.

Vietnam’s prudent stance had changed towards the security cooperation with the U.S. with regard to the South China Sea’s regional emergence as initially in the early 2000’s, the disputes over territorial rights of islands and waters in the SCS had subsided for a while but it resurfaced in 2009 as the Vietnamese fishing boats operation resumed in the Paracel Islands which were seized by the patrol vessels of China’s maritime law enforcement agencies by the end of 2009, about 100 Vietnamese fishermen were detained by Chinese authorities and 50 were detained in the first half of 2010 and this led to the aggravating of the situation. Chinese government was reported to have said that it considers the South China Sea as one of its “core interests,” which further heightened Vietnam’s sense of wariness.11

In 2009, President Obama was the first American leader to have ever attended a meeting with all the ten ASEAN leaders and became a party to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia which was an anchor diplomatic document of ASEAN and this opened the door to the East Asia Summit for the United States. On 15 November 2009, the 1stASEAN-U.S. Leaders’ Meeting in Singapore was held with the theme as “Enhanced Partnership for Enduring Peace and Prosperity” and worked on the “ASEAN-U.S. Enhanced Partnership 2009”. This was followed by making America the first non-ASEAN country to establish a dedicated Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta in 2010 and its ASEAN Development Vision to Advance National Cooperation and Economic Integration (ADVANCE) program. ASEAN also noted and welcomed the intention of the United States in the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) and welcomed the intention of the U.S. Secretary of Defence to undertake consultations with his ASEAN counterparts concerning the ADMM-Plus.12 On 14 November 2009 in Tokyo, Japan, President Obama announced his decision that the U.S would be engaging with the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and quoted “The United States will also be engaging with the Trans-Pacific Partnership countries with the goal of shaping a regional agreement that will have broad-based membership and the high standards worthy of a 21st century trade agreement” and by 5 October 2010, Malaysia joined Australia, Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States and Vietnam as a party to the TPP negotiations.13

The U.S. was represented by Hillary Clinton, the Secretary of State who attended the fifth East Asia Summit for the first time in October 2010 and launched the “Lower Mekong Initiative”, the first-of-its-kind agreement between countries like Cambodia,

11 National Institute for Defense Studies. 2011.” East Asian Strategic Review 2011” published by National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo, pp.156-158. 12 Please refer to “Joint Statement-1st ASEAN-U.S. Leaders’ Meeting, Singapore” dated 15 November 2009. https://asean.org/joint-statement-1st-asean-us-leaders-meeting-singapore-15-november-2009-2/ (Accessed on 10 June 2020) 13 The USTR Archives 2007-2017. 2009. “TPP Statements and Actions to Date” dated 2009 December. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2009/december/tpp-statements-and-actions-date#:~:text=On%20December%2014%2C%202009%2C%20the,%2C%20Asia%2DPacific%20trade%20agreement. (Accessed on 10 June 2020)

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Laos, Thailand, Vietnam and the U.S. and together aimed to enhance cooperation in the sectors of water, forest management, education and health.14 Hillary Clinton said “The United States is back in Southeast Asia... and we are fully engaged with our... partners on the wide range of challenges confronting us”.15 America being accepted by all the ASEAN nations would mean a major change in the policy and with this, America was now an accepted power in Asia. ASEAN has always been seen as a balanced regional entity and they accepted the U.S. mention that the U.S. was now seen as a friend and these efforts from either ends was like a breath of fresh air especially keeping in mind the historical factors and the China factor in mind.

In December 2009, the Assistant Secretary level Defence Policy Dialogue was formally established and this was done when General Phung Quang Thanh, the Defence Minister of Vietnam visited the U.S. On August 8, 2010, the U.S Navy’s nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, USS George Washington arrived off the coast of Da Nang, in central Vietnam. Many military and government interactions between the two countries also took place such as a joint navy search and rescue training program. Aegis destroyer USS John S McCain made a port call in Danang anchoring off Southern Vietnam in August 2011 and October 2012. Both navies conducted non-traditional security joint exercises regularly since 2010. Later on, 17 August, 2010 the first dialogue between the Deputy Minister of Defence Lieutenant General Nguyen Chi Vinh and the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence Robert Scher was held in Hanoi. The meeting focused on the future of bilateral cooperation and worked on regional and international issues, resolving MIA issues and exchanges between the military students in the US and Hanoi.16 The Cam Ranh Bay emerged as a strategic point from the perspective of maritime defence. In October 2010, Prime Minister Nguyễn Tấn Dũng declared the port open to foreign navies and also provided logistic support services for vessels, with the U.S. being their first customer. From August 2011, dry cargo ship USNS Richard Byrd, the U.S. Navy contracted for maintenance and repair services for logistics support ships in Cam Ranh Bay almost every year.17

On 19 September 2011, the second Vietnam-U.S. Defence Policy Dialogue was held in Washington D.C. and was co-chaired by Vietnamese Deputy Defence Minister Lieutenant General Nguyen Chi Vinh and U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence Robert Scher. Both agreed to enhance defence cooperation at the regional as well as at the international level. The two representatives signed a Memorandum of

14 Nina Hachigan.2011. “President Obama’s Asia Overdrive: The Forthcoming APEC Summit Is Part of a Wider Strategy” published by Center for American Progress dated November 9, 2011. https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2011/11/09/10604/president-obamas-asia-overdrive/ (Accessed on 9 June 2020) 15 “Lower Mekong Initiative” in the Editorial dated July 31, 2010. https://editorials.voa.gov/a/lower-mekong-initiative-99780124/1481965.html (Accessed on 10 June 2020) 16 BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific.2017. “Vietnam, USA Hold Defence Policy Dialogue in Hanoi” dated 17 August 2010. http://search.proquest.com.lumen.cgsccarl.com/docview/744414083?accountid=28992. (Accessed on 11 June 2020) 17 Tomotaka Shoji. 2018.” Vietnam’s Security Cooperation with the United States: Historical Background, Present and Future Outlook” published by NIDS, Tokyo. http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/pdf/2018/bulletin_e2018_2.pdf (Accessed on 12 June 2020)

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Understanding for advancing bilateral defence cooperation in five key sectors of maritime security, a commitment to continue high-level dialogues, cooperation on search and rescue operations, cooperation on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and cooperation on peacekeeping operations.18

The highlight was President Obama’s speech in the Australian Parliament on 17 November 2011 and he mentioned in his speech about America’s enhanced presence in the Southeast Asian nations with their relations with Indonesia against piracy and violent extremism, Malaysia’s work to prevent proliferation, deploying ships in Singapore, closer cooperation Vietnam and Cambodia and India’s ‘look east’ and together play a greater role in the Asian power balance and address the challenges of proliferation and maritime security especially cooperating in the South China Sea.19 By mentioning the South China Sea, it was clear that China was being indirectly being mentioned especially for its maritime aggressiveness and this was another reason why the relations with the ASEAN nations and the U.S. kept growing and becoming closer aiming for greater cooperation.

In June 2012, in a historic visit of the U.S. Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta to Cam Ranh, Vietnam, Secretary Panetta commented, “Today I stand on a U.S. ship here in Cam Ranh Bay to recognize the 17th anniversary of the normalization of relations between the United States and Vietnam. . . . We have a complicated relationship but we’re not bound by that history . . . it is very important that we be able to protect key maritime rights for all nations in the South China Sea and elsewhere”.20 All these heightened activities by the U.S. made one thing extremely clear that the U.S. was going after China and it needed a partner in Southeast Asia and Vietnam was emerging as a vital partner.

“The Vietnam-U.S. Comprehensive Partnership, established in 2013, could be seen as a great move in the relations between the two countries. The progress of relations originated from traditional and shared interests in the Asia-Pacific, where the U.S. had strategies such as ‘pivot to Asia’ and ‘Indo-Pacific’ to ‘defend regional stability’ among others”.21 In July 2013, President Obama and President Sang together launched the U.S-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership. Secretary of State John Kerry announced commitment in maritime capacity building, economic engagement, issues of climate

18 Ambassador Ted Osius.2015. “Twenty Years of Diplomatic Relations with Vietnam-And What Comes Next published U.S Embassy and Consulate in Vietnam dated 10 April, 2015.https://vn.usembassy.gov/twenty-years-of-diplomatic-relations-with-vietnam-and-what-comes-next/ (Accessed on 12 June 2020) 19 Barack Obama. 2011. President Obama to the Australian Parliament published by The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Canberra, Australia dated November 17, 2011 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament (Accessed on 26 May 2020) 20 Lolita C. Baldor, “Panetta sends message to China on Vietnam visit,” Associated Press, June 3, 2012. https://news.yahoo.com/panetta-sends-message-china-vietnam-visit-165721537.html (Accessed on 11 June 2020) 21 Pankaj K Jha and Vo Xuan Vinh. 2020.” The US factor in Vietnam–India relations” in India, Vietnam and the Indo-Pacific: Expanding Horizons published by Routledge-Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York. ISBN: 978-0-367-11030-7. pp.131

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change and environment, education cooperation, respect for human rights and civil nuclear cooperation. USD 32.5 million was announced as an initial commitment as a part of the new regional and bilateral assistance to expand the maritime capacity building in the region of Southeast Asia. Additionally, USD 18 million was given to Vietnam as new assistance, to enhance the capacity of coastal patrol units to deploy rapidly for search and rescue, disaster response and training along with provision of five fast patrol vessels to the Vietnamese Coast Guard. A USD 500 million MoU was signed between the Export-Import Bank of the United States and the Vietnam Development Bank. The first U.S-Vietnam private sector agreement under the U.S-Asia Pacific Comprehensive Energy Partnership and the first renewable energy project was all financed as part of the MoU. GE Aviation signed a deal to provide USD 1.7 billion in engines and servicing for Vietnam Airlines’ Boeing 787 aircrafts. All these commercial deals crossed over 50-fold in the last 20 years reaching USD 25 billion which build a strong bilateral trade relationship. USD 4.2 million were announced for USAID’s “Governance for Inclusive Growth” assistance program aimed to facilitate broad-based sustainable growth. USD 17 million for the USAID’s “Vietnam Forests and Deltas” Program was announced in four provinces along with the Long Island in the Mekong Delta. The Lower Mekong Initiative and the Smart Infrastructure for the Mekong program were established and it would help countries with the best science to make decisions on infrastructure. Both the countries initiated the Civil Nuclear Cooperation and then awarded a contract for an environmental assessment of dioxin contamination at Bien Hoa Air Base and then a MoU was signed on the continued unexploded ordnance cooperation.22 The relations between the U.S-Vietnam in this phase grew to newer heights of maritime security and Hanoi worked on greater cooperation on security aspects with America as the partners knew that the China threat was soon going to become an even bigger reason for their cooperation and so, this phase also brought in a major change in dynamics of their relations.

Third Phase of Changing Dynamics: Heightened Chinese Aggression

In May 2014, China National Offshore Oil Corporation deployed a mobile oil rig, HYSY-981, inside the exclusive economic zone of Vietnam and after several weeks of tensions between the two countries, China eventually withdrew from the region. This incident paved the way for Vietnam to look for external partners to balance China23 and preserve its own interests. With US interests also being under threat from the rising Chinese belligerence in the South China Sea, the U.S. emerged as a natural partner for Vietnam.

In 2015, the United States and Vietnam marked the 20th anniversary of diplomatic relations. The 2015 Joint Vision Statement on Defence Relations reaffirmed and expanded defence cooperation and highlighted mutual trust, enhancement of military capabilities, the expansion of collaboration in maritime security and cooperation in

22 U.S. State Government. 2013.”U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership” in the Fact Sheet by the Office of the Spokesperson, Washington, DC dated 16 December 2013.https://20092017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/218734.htm (Accessed on 10 June 2020) 23 Huong Le Thu. 2017. US–Vietnam Relations under President Trump published in Analysis, Lowy Institute dated 9 November 2017. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/us-vietnam-relations-under-president-trump (Accessed on 11 June 2020)

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promoting security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Additionally, the Defence Policy Dialogues that are held periodically, are considered to be primary mechanisms to increase shared understanding between both countries and provide practical guidance to the U.S.-Vietnam defence relationship.24 From 5-10 July 2015, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Nguyen Phu Trong visited Washington D.C. and met US President Obama. The two leaders discussed the 20 years of diplomatic ties between the two nations and also addressed growth in economic and trade cooperation, science and technology, education, healthcare, environment and climate change, defence security and ultimately working on regional and international cooperation for the prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. They also discussed ASEAN’s central role in the region as well as the security architecture. Both the countries voiced their concerns about the developments in the East Sea recognising each other’s internationally recognised freedom of navigation and overflight and supported the peaceful solution of disputes in conformity with international law especially with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982. Both the states also recognised the importance of fully implementing the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the East Sea and efforts to conclude the Code of Conduct of Parties in the East Sea.25

In May 2015, China’s Navy issued eight warnings to the crew of a U.S P8A Poseidon when it flew directly to the artificial island and in response to this, the American pilots’ responded saying they were flying over international airspace and a Chinese radio operator said in complete exasperation “This is Chinese Navy…..You go!”26 On October 2015, the U.S. sent the destroyer USS Lassen and it conducted a transit within the twelve nautical miles of Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands. Further, the U.S. sent surveillance planes and war ships to contested waters as they have concerns over Chinese activities in those waters of the South China Sea (SCS) and it then that the U.S, surveillance imagery showed China’s weaponry on the artificial islands which had been built for military purposes and was a hindrance to the freedom of navigation and also, the U.S. doesn’t accept the air and sea patrols that pass directly above or very the artificial islands and doesn’t accept China’s claim over the disputed waters.27

In March 2016, Vietnam opened its third international port in the Cam Ranh Bay and began to accept foreign naval vessels. In April 2016, the U.S. Department of Defence commenced the Maritime Security Initiative (MSI). Under the initiative, a program was designed to support the improvements in the sectors of intelligence, surveillance,

24 https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1020336.pdf (Accessed on 11 June 2020) 25 Vietnam Embassy in the U.S. 2015. “General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong Concludes” dated 12 July 2015. http://vietnamembassy-usa.org/news/2015/07/general-secretary-nguyen-phu-trong-concludes-us-visit (Accessed on 10 June 2020) 26 David Brunnstrom.2015. “U.S., China Rift Grows over Sea Provocations,” The World Post dated May 21, 2015. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/21/us-china-sea_n_7417478.html. (Accessed on 11 June 2020) 27 Jim Sciutto and Barbara Starr, “U.S. Warship Sails Close to Chinese Artificial Island in South China Sea.” CNN Wire Service dated October 26, 2015. https://lumen.cgsccarl.com/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.lumen. cgsccarl.com/docview/1726932321?accountid=28992 (Accessed on 11 June 2020)

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reconnaissance (ISR) and MDA capabilities of Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. Also as part of the MSI, the U.S decided to give USD 2 million for Vietnam’s maritime patrol aircraft and vessel modernisation; building of search and rescue command, control, communications systems and training.28 In the month of May 2016, the U.S. lifted their ban on the sale of lethal weapons to Vietnam and continued to provide maritime security assistance like Maritime Security Initiative, the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and Foreign Military Financing to Vietnam. The Peace Corps was signed between both the countries in 2016 as well. In October 2016, two combat vessels of the U.S Navy made their first port call at the port. In Hague, July 2016, a major development took place in the SCS dispute, post- HYSY-981 incident had taken place due to the ruling of the arbitral tribunal and got the Philippines against China due to Chinese aggressiveness in the SCS and the court ruling showed that China’s artificial islands had no legal status and the exclusive economic zone of the 12 nautical miles couldn’t be applied.29 Vietnam was one of the seven countries like the Philippines, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the United States that openly welcomed the ruling. Other ASEAN nations however, were rather cautious and wary of Chinese reaction to them. With this, Vietnam emerged as the main protagonist in the region of Southeast Asia for the issue on the South China Sea.

US Hamilton ship was received in Vietnam in 2017 and also transfer the Hamilton-class Coast Guard cutter to improve Vietnam’s law enforcement capabilities. The two countries established a working group for Cooperative Humanitarian and Medical Storage Initiative to be used for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Both sides also established bilateral dialogue mechanisms. People-to-People ties between Vietnam and the US flourished as 30,000 Vietnamese went to the U.S to study, a new Fulbright University in Vietnam was set up and 21,000 Vietnamese were members of the Young Southeast Asia Leaders Initiative. In August 2017, the Deputy Defence Minister Nguyen Chi Vinh visited the U.S. and attended the Defence Policy Dialogue in October 2017.30

The highlight in the relations between the U.S and Vietnam was in 2017 when President Donald John Trump announced America’s vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) at the APEC Summit in Vietnam. FOIP aimed at the commitment of a safe, secure, prosperous and free Indo-Pacific region. This announcement made in Vietnam was a game-changer as Vietnam has a major importance in the U.S. FOIP strategy. Secondly, the Indo-Pacific construct continues to gain traction as more nations try to determine their own course of action keeping their future needs in mind. This is also important for the U.S as it looks for partners while pursuing its ‘America first policy’. With the US wants smaller countries to be active members in the region, tackling Chinese aggressiveness, Vietnam has emerged as a strong alternative, with the largest

28 Prashanth Parameswaran. 2016.“US Kicks Off New Maritime Security Initiative for Southeast Asia,” The Diplomat dated April 10, 2016. https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/us-kicks-off-new-maritime-security-initiative-for-southeast-asia/ /(Accessed on 12 June 2020) 29 Full text of the Arbitral Tribunal Award: https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-.... (Accessed on 11 June 2020) 30 Vietnam’s MOFA. 2018. “Basic Documents about Vietnamese-U.S. Relations”. http://www.mofa.gov.vn/vi/cn_vakv/america/nr040819114015/ns181031102536 (Accessed on 12 June 2020)

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standing army in Southeast Asia. Also, both the countries share common interest in promoting a rules-based order which could be hindered due to China and so there is a need to work to together and protect one another’s territorial sovereignty as Chinese militarization of islands in the South China Sea is soon becoming a major threat and is also directly changing the Indo-Pacific strategic construct.

Fourth Phase of Changing Dynamics: Indo-Pacific, the strategic conjecture

According to the 2019 U.S. Department of Defence, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report (IPRS), Indo-Pacific is their priority theatre as China has been trying to reorder the region to its benefit by leveraging military modernisation, influencing operations, pursuing predatory economics to coerce other nations and threatening the rules-based international order.31 This was a clear indication that the U.S is ready to tackle China. In 2019, the Defence White Paper of Vietnam mentioned “the new developments in the East Sea like the unilateral actions, power-based coercion, violation of international law, militarization, change in the status quo, and infringement upon Vietnam’s sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction as provided in international law have undermined the interests of nations concerned and threatened peace, stability, security, safety, and freedom of navigation and overflight in the region”. Although this statement did not mention any particular nation, it was a direct hit at China due to its tensions in the South China Sea, militarisation of islands, detention of Vietnamese fishing men and then ramming and knowingly sinking the Vietnamese fishermen boats by China32 .

America finds Hanoi extremely supportive among all the other Southeast Asian nations. One of the reasons is Vietnam has a big standing Army and is one of the most courageous ASEAN nations. The Cam Ranh Bay is seen as the ‘Apple of the Eye of the East’ due to its strategic importance in dealing with China’s maritime aggressiveness. As Vietnam has a weak navy the U.S has been working actively on its maritime relations with Vietnam to make them a stronger maritime power to tackle China. According to the National Defence Strategy, the U.S has been prioritising its relations with Vietnam by improving its defence capabilities with the ScanEagle Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, T-6 trainer aircraft, a former U.S. Coast Guard high-endurance cutter, small patrol boats and associated training and maintenance of facilities. They have also worked on numerous training exchanges and activities to enhance bilateral cooperation along with interoperability with the Vietnam People’s Army, Air Force, Navy and Coast Guard.33 USAID’s new trade facilitation program built in Vietnam's customs department to comply with the global trade norms has helped in reducing the time and cost of trade.

31 The Department of Defense. 2019. “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report-Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region” dated June 1, 2019. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF (Accessed on 30 May 2020) 32 Gitanjali Sinha Roy. 2020. A New Dynamics of U.S.-Vietnam Relations: U.S.-led ‘Quad and Vietnam Axis’ in the Indo-Pacific published in Modern Diplomacy dated 26 April 2020. URL: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/04/26/a-new-dynamics-of-u-s-viet-nam-relations-u-s-led-quad-and-viet-nam-axis-in-the-indo-pacific/ (Accessed on 12 June 2020) 33 “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision”-Report published by the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs dated 3 November 2019. pp 36-37 https://www.state.gov/a-free-and-open-indo-pacific-advancing-a-shared-vision/ (Accessed on 11 June 2020)

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A Development Plan was deduced to attract investment and executed workshops in Vietnam with best transportation planning, financing and maintenance and all of this aimed to improve the infrastructure procurement transparency across the region of Indo-Pacific. In September 2019, the U.S launched a new Transaction Advisory Fund (TAF) under ITAN. The National Defence Authorisation Act (NDAA) was enacted in 2016 to work with partners’ maritime capacity, extending it till 2025. The Act expanded the scope of initiative now designated as the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative (MSI). MSI authorizes the provision of training, equipment, supplies and small-scale construction to Vietnam and other countries to work for maritime security, create a common regional maritime picture and observe and control more effectively in maritime spaces.34 All these efforts are being made in order to deal with Chinese aggressiveness. The highlight was the visit of the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71), a nuclear-powered aircraft docked into Tien Sa Port, Danang along with Bunker Hill, a highly sophisticated US navy cruiser from March 5-8, 2020. It was believed that it would send a message to Chinese aggression taking place in the region in recent months, with this gesture not being liked by China as it carried advanced weaponry.35 Therefore, one thing is pretty clear that the new leadership in Vietnam isn’t pro-China and on the contrary is ready to tackle China and the U.S. is the best suited partner it has.

Conclusion

The relations between Vietnam and the U.S. face several issues of human rights, tariff duties have increased and the battle for catfish and shrimp prices still remain unsolved. China’s aggressiveness in the South China Sea is the major point of convergence. Together US and Vietnam can form a ‘U.S. led coalition with Quad countries and Vietnam Axis in the Indo-Pacific region’. Vietnam is the ASEAN chair for the year 2020 and 2021. This coincides with its non-permanent tenure at the UN Security Council during 2020-2021. 2020 also marks the 25th anniversary of the normalization of the U.S.‐Vietnam relations. Therefore, it can be said that from all the above-mentioned arguments accompanied with the present situation, the relations between Vietnam and the U.S. can for sure lead to strategic partnership which would inevitably shape the future course of the Indo-Pacific and cater to the shaping of the regional order.

34 Ibid. 35 Dr.Pankaj Jha. 2020. “USS Roosevelt in Vietnam waters” published by Cescube dated 9 March 2020. http://www.cescube.com/vp-uss-roosevelt-in-vietnam-waters (Accessed on 12 June 2020)

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Article - IV

Outlining Policy and Assessing Success of Policy

Dinh The Toan36

Abstract

Government policy operates in response to the demands of society. Policy success, the general expectation of any policy-maker, is claimed commonly in political life. That is a general goal for any government in order to prove effectiveness and efficiency in its actions. However, the outcome of policies usually lies somewhere between success and failure. This is because of the three dimensions of policy success and their contradictions. Whilst policy learning is concerned as a tool to assess how policies are working and to move policy toward the achievement of desired goals. The case of banning plastic bags in Australia is an ideal example to investigate how a policy can be successful at different levels.

Key words: policy success, policy failure, assessing policy success.

Introduction

In societies, government policy operates in response to the demands of society. Policy success, the general expectation of any policy-maker, is claimed commonly in political life. Many countries, ranging from Australia, Singapore, Sweden, Germany, the UK, the US and Canada, have debated the success and failure of public policies, such as internet censorship, welfare cutbacks, pollution control and tackling climate change (McConnell, 2010b). Baldwin (2000) states that a concept of success is slippery due to human behaviour being purposeful, success being defined as desired or favourable results. Although policy-makers attempt to generate successful programs, it is a difficult and sometimes impossible process (Peters, 2015). However, while various policies are claimed to have been successful, many have failed. Partisan politics raise problems that depend on social circumstances and ideas (McConnell 2010a). That is, policies can be seen as successes by supporters or failures by critics. Peters (2015) shows that identifying policy failure is easier for citizens than policy analysts. For most citizens the idea of success or failure is more related to effectiveness and what the policies deliver. For policy analysts, assessment of policies is more complicated. Many authors (May, 1992 and Howlett, 2012) agree that policy can fail in numerous ways, such as the extent and

36 Junior Researcher at Institute of Social Sciences in the Central Region, Email: toandinh1042@gmail.com

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duration of policy.

The claim of policy success has created the need for definition of a ‘successful policy’. However, the key problem in defining success or failure is the lack of any systematic criteria for assessment (Mash and McConnell, 2010). These assessments are narrowly focused on success meaning meeting policy objectives.

In addition, it is also acknowledged that policies may not result in either full success or complete failure. In fact, most results of policies often lie between success and failure. In this context, the evaluation of and learning from a partly failed policy requires studying the successful aspects of that policy. Policy evaluation, which is the last stage of the policy cycle, is often used by the government to assess how policies are working (Howlett et. al., 2009). Furthermore, one of the major purposes of evaluation is for the policy-maker to be able to learn from past mistakes or even past successes in order to be able to make subsequent policies better (Peters, 2015).

This paper will firstly discuss policy success. This will include the definition of policy success, its three dimensions (process, program and politics), and the different types of policy success. In the second part, the paper will examine policy learning to show how it benefits policies and policy-makers. The case study about the banning of plastic shopping bags in Australia will be used in the third part to integrate and compare all the ideas in the first and second part.

Understanding policy success and its dimensions

Defining policy success is not easy because assessing the results of policies is a subjective process involving the different interests of individuals and groups (Newman, 2014). In reality, the idea of complete success in policy-making is met rarely (McConnell, 2010a). However, it is accepted that some aspects of a policy may be successful. In order to understand how policies succeed or fail it is needed to comprehend the different dimensions of policy, which are process, program and politics (McConnell, 2010b). Process is the traditional major concern of public policy analysts and examines how policies are legitimised through collective choices in the public interest. This also includes the policy making process which illustrates the creation of a specific or set of policies (McConnell, 2010). The process also refers to the adoption of a policy (Bovens, 2010). Program is concerned with the quality of the goals of policies and the generalised intentions of statements of policies. It is rooted in the traditional analysis of policy-making processes. Thus, it assesses policies based on their objectives and goal achievements (Bovens, 2010). Politics refer to consequences of the policy decisions on the reputation and the electoral prospects of the politicians.

McConnell (2010a, p.351), based on the three dimensions, defines that ‘a policy is successful if it achieves the goals that proponents set out to achieve and attracts no criticism of any significance and/or support is virtually universal’. This definition of policy success shows that government can and sometimes does attain its goals even though not everyone will perceive the achievements of government as successful. This

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definition also points out that there needs to be success in the three dimensions in order to be termed a ‘successful’ policy.

Different types of policy successes

The results of policies are not only seen as success and failure. Because the three dimensions of policy always have different results, hence, policy can be assessed and categorised into different types of successes. Ranging from success to failure, they are success, resilient success, conflict success, precarious success and failure (McConnell, 2010b).

Success can be considered as a government does, what it set out to do with major public support and hardly any opposition. This happens when the three dimensions of policy are successful. Process success is first of all the preservation of the government’s policy goals and instruments (McConnell, 2010a). Process refers to the five stages of policy-making, in which public issues emerge and are framed, options for these issues are created and explored, interests are consulted and decisions are made. Success occurs when the policy passes successfully the required procedures. In this context, it can generate ‘a considerable degree of legitimacy on policy outcomes, even when those policies are contested’ (Fawcett and Marsh, 2012). In this dimension, political executives want to see their core proposals become laws and success is seen as achievements of these proposals (Mash and McConnell, 2010). Program success occurs when the measures that the government adopts produce the desired results (McConnell, 2010a) and a policy is implemented according to objectives laid down when it was approved (Mash and McConnell, 2010). The nature of programmatic success is defined by the positive reflection from society to the results of policies. The analysis can consider the quantifiable benefits or saving resulting from the policy (Fawcett and Marsh, 2012). In addition, a policy program can also be successful if it benefits a particular actor, target group or interest based on issues such as territory, religion and gender. In this context, for example, in 2004 in the UK, civil partnerships legislation entitling gay and lesbian couples to legal recognition of their relationships can be seen as a success for Gay Rights (Mash and McConnell, 2010).

Political success provides significant political benefits and enhances the reputation of the government and political parties and assists both, the electoral prospects of politicians and overall governance projects (Fawcett and Marsh, 2012). A successful policy may help rescue the political party from low popularity or help consolidate its lead in the polls.

Resilient success is the second best result. Resilient success means that the government has achieved its policy in broad terms although the policy has required small modifications. Resilient programs are survivors although they have shortfalls.

Conflict success is a struggle for government. It achieves its goals of policy-making in some respects, but has to make significant modification along the way. Conflict success is not what the program intended. Proponents are troubled by substantial time delays,

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considerable target shortfalls, reduced resources and failure of communication. The program generates substantial controversy, galvanising reviews and amendments from opposition parties and forcing the government into a defence of its core values and the aim of its program. Conflict success allows the government to partially achieve its goals, but it gets less than it desired in terms of result, and more than it expected in terms of opposition.

Precarious success operates on the edge of failure. Policies do exhibit small achievements, but the level of opposition and consequent departures from goals outweigh any success. Precarious success has some merit for proponents but falls well short of the original intentions with substantial controversy. Precarious political success is a substantial liability for the government, even if there are small benefits. The political benefits of retaining a policy are small, but the cost is great. Precarious success is often transient to failure and termination.

Failure is defined as ‘inability of a policy to achieve the goals that proponents set out to achieve, and opposition is great and/or support is virtually non-existent’ (McConnell, 2010a, p.356). This may include policies that have small success overshadowed by large scale failure. Process failure occurs when the government is defeated in its ambition to enact legislation or make a decision. Howlett (2012) shows that public administration, laws and public management are the sources of failure. This focuses on the ability to ‘deliver-the-goods’ through many stages of a policy process from the inception of ideas to reality. The failure of any stage (agenda-setting, policy formulation, decision-making, policy implementation or policy evaluation) will lead to process failure. It may be a consequence of the mobilisation of opposition preventing the government from doing what it thinks desirable or it may be due to the lack of a sufficient coalition of interests necessary to achieve governmental goals. Program failure happens when the government fails to accomplish what it intended. Howlett (2012) shows that failure comes from the design of policy and its effectiveness; that although the policy may have been implemented well, its goals were of no value. In addition, the policy program was less effective despite costing the planned budget. Political failure refers to political consequences, negatively affecting the reputation of political parties and individual politicians, such as threatening the position of those politicians and political parties that sponsored the failed program (Howlett, 2012).

Contradiction between dimensions

The results of policy do not always have to be tidy. Different results may occur across the three dimensions of policy i.e. a policy can be more successful in one dimension than in others.

Successful process and unsuccessful program: A key concern of policy-makers is to get decisions taken and legislation passed by using executive power to steer the policy-making process toward its goals (McConnell, 2010a). Process success occurs when the government gets the policy it wants through the support of a coalition of interests. However, success at the process stages does not mean that success of the program is guaranteed. McConnell (2010b) shows that a poor understanding of societal checks and balances and a poor capacity for adjustment of policy goals and proposed instruments

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will lead to failure.

Successful process and unsuccessful politics: Good processes do not often create successful politics. Due to the capability of agencies or local systems (for more specific, see Zahariadis and Exadaktylos, 2015), the image of policy and its creators can be drifted or on track.

Successful politic and unsuccessful program: The inference is that some policies can succeed in political terms, but fail in program terms (McConnell, 2010b). Political success sometimes necessitates programs that leave much to be desired in terms of tackling policy problems (McConnell, 2010a). For example, wicked problems are complex policy problems with no clear solutions. A compromise program for these kinds of problems may be a success for politicians, even though the programs may ultimately fail.

Successful program and unsuccessful politics: Programs which produce the results desired by policy makers do not always result in political success. Although the policy-makers run programs well, critics may frame the policy as ‘ruthlessly efficient’ and ‘inflexible’ (McConnell, 2010b).

However, as the nature of policy success is far more complicated (McConell, 2010b), it is necessary to combine many more factors rather than simply the success-failure spectrum to understand the success of a policy. There are two reasons that are considered as common complicating factors in assessing policy success.

Success for whom: A policy often benefits particular targets. Assessing a policy requires identification of the reaction of interest groups to that policy (McConnell, 2010b). Mash and McConnell (2010) state that the result of policy reflects power relations and are likely to be perceived differently by different individuals or groups. Therefore, some would claim that policy success is nothing but a social construct which reflects existing power relations.

Time, space and culture: Any assessment of success can only be applied to a specific moment. A policy that appears as successful in the short term may seem less successful after a longer period of time. On the other hand, some policies may fail at first place, but get success in the long-term. For example, the educational policies on migrants and minorities in the Netherlands had achieved its success after 30 years (Rijkschroeff et al., 2005). Moreover, depending on the political system, socio-economic and cultural conditions, policy success may be defined differently in different countries (Mash and McConnell, 2010).

Policy Learning

Policy learning is an important process in the context of policy success. Because it can help to improve the desired result of policy, move the less successful policy towards success. Bennett and Howlett (1992) show that, based on experience, policy-makers can modify their present policies and actions based on the interpretation of how the previous action had fared in the past. Learning occurs when new information, including past experiences and lessons, can be drawn as an important aspect of any form of

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learning discussed in the policy literature (May, 1992). This happens not in a single instrument program but in two. One is linked to instrumental arguments about policy program contents, while the other, more political experiential in nature, affects overall consideration about knowledge-use, which affect policy process and political components and environment of policy making.

Policy learning is a primary motivation for much policy behaviour. It is generally associated with intentional, progressive, cognitive consequence of the learning that results from policy evaluation (Howlett et. al., 2009). It includes decision-makers understanding the intended and unintended consequences of policy-making activity. In addition, the implementing agencies need to understand the positive and negative implications of existing and alternative policies to evaluate both positive and negative examples of policies (Howlett, 2012). Policy learning can avoid repeating mistakes and move policy implementation even closer toward the achievement of desired goals.

Learning can be distinguished from automatic copying and mimicking behaviours. May (1992) shows that learning improves understanding as reflected by an ability to draw lessons from positive and negative experiences with policy problems, objectives and interventions.

There are different interpretations of what is meant by policy-learning. Hall (1993) states that learning is a part of the normal public policy process in which policy-makers attempt to understand why certain initiatives may have succeeded whilst others failed. On the other hand, Heclo (1974) shows that policy-learning is seen as an activity undertaken by policy-maker mainly in reaction to change in the external policy environment. The differences between Hall (1993) and Heclo (1974) result from the different kinds of evaluation (Howlett et. al., 2009). These two different types of evaluation are instrumental learning and social learning.

Instrumental learning entails new understandings about the viability of policy interventions or implementation designs. Policy-makers have to increase their understanding of different policy instruments or designs to avoid the inflexible copies. In principle instrumental learning could be facilitated by incorporating learning into policy designing.

Social learning involves either a new or an adaptation of the social construct of the policy by the policy-makers within a given policy domain. This learning does not require individuals or organisations to find out what will improve policy, but focuses on changing the view of policy-makers (Hall 1993). Social learning entails rethinking the fundamental aspects of a policy which relate to problems, interventions and objectives and the conflicting opinions of experts. The principle contribution of social learning is to draw attention to the role of ideas in policy-making. To attain policy success, decision-makers must understand why certain initiatives in a society may have succeeded whilst others have failed (Bennett and Howlett, 1992).

Bennett and Howlett (1992) show that to increase the effectiveness of policy-learning, it is necessary to identify who has to learn and what needs to be learnt. Bennett and Howlett (1992) also show that learning is an activity that can take place, both at the

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individual and organisational levels, both of which play important roles in the generation, dissemination and evaluation of policy ideas. Bennett and Howlett (1992) also state that there are three indicators of learning. These are an increasing capacity for recognising differences, for organisational and hierarchical integration, and for reflective thought on the choice of structuring principle. In addition, policy-makers have to be aware of past and present experiences and future possibilities in order to reduce dissatisfaction with the existing policy.

CASE STUDY

THE BAN ON THE PLASTIC SHOPPING BAGS IN AUSTRALIA

Summary of the trend

During the past decade, legislation to ban or severely restrict the use of plastic bags have been legislated at a number of local, state and federal levels. There has been a rapid and worldwide emergence of opposition to the use of plastic bags. This opposition has been incorporated into policy and has given rise to new insights about the dynamics between norms of adoption and implementation of policy.

Plastic bags were introduced in the US in the 1970s, then in the Western Europe in the 1980s and in developing countries in the 1990s. There are between 500 billion to 1500 billion plastic bags used each year (Clapp and Swarnston, 2009). However, only a tiny percentage of them are successfully recycled. Plastic bags are increasingly seen as an environmental hazard that threaten human and animal welfare, because of their physical and chemical characteristics. There are some significant problems that plastic bags have created for the environment. Firstly, they create unsightly litter in public spaces, exacerbated by their light weight and parachute shaped design which enables them to travel easily through the air and in water. Secondly, they pose a public health and safety threat because they can act as breeding grounds for malarial mosquitoes and can block sewers and storm-water drains. Thirdly, they pose threat to wild-life which may become tangled in and may also ingest them. Fourthly, when plastic bags do break down, they are not biodegradable but photo-degrade into smaller pieces, and have long-term effects on quality of soil and water.

The early wave of the policy of banning plastic bags in a number of countries in the developing world was based on the primary concerns for human health and livelihoods. Following the initial emergence of the opposition to plastic bags, several rich industrialised countries began to adopt this policy. Up to 2011 at least 25 percent of the world population lives in areas with bans or fees placed on the use of plastic bags. In many countries, new industries have been established to recycle plastic bags (Department of Environment and Heritage Protection (DEHP), 2016).

The ban on plastic shopping bags in Australia

In Australia, Smith (2004) estimated that 6.9 billion plastic bags are used per year. Supplying plastic bags cost Australian retailers millions of dollars annually. This price is built into the cost of products and applies for all customers regarding whether they use plastic bags or not (DEHP, 2016). The concern about plastic bags focuses on littering,

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particularly along the coast line, and the hazards that plastic bags pose for marine animals. In addition, the Australian government, local governments and departments of transport have to spend money to clean the plastic bags and other types of litter (Clapp and Swarnston, 2009). The Australian government adopted a voluntary reduction program and undertook a major study on the issue. In 2003, the Environment Protection and Heritage Council was committed to phasing out lightweight, single-use plastic bags by January 1, 2009 (DEHP, 2016). Meanwhile, a number of states took their own initiatives to ban plastic bags: South Australia in 2009, Northern Territory and Australian Capital Territory in 2011, Tasmania in 2012. The remaining states are still preparing their own banning policy.

The South Australian Government’s Plastic Shopping Bags (Waste Avoidance) Act, 2008 legitimised the ban of plastic bags starting in May 2009. The ban on lightweight single-use plastic bags has been highly effective at reducing its supply from South Australia and has induced consumers to use alternatives to plastic shopping bags (ACT Government, 2014). Most consumers bring their own bags when shopping and attempt to re-use all types of bags. The waste stream data from Keep Australia Beautiful indicate a significant 45 percent decrease in the percentage of lightweight single-use plastic shopping bags contributing to the litter stream in South Australia (Aspin, 2012). The ban led to the widespread increase of reusable bags and encouraged the idea of extending the ban to include heavy and thick plastic bags. However, as people can no longer use plastic shopping bags to line rubbish bins there has been an increase in the purchase of plastic bin liners, from 15 percent to 80 percent; this is an unseen negative consequence of the policy. This will still affect the environment and may negate the success of the ban. This requires further education regarding use of plastic bags and the influence of choice of bags on the waste-stream and environment (Aspin, 2012).

In the Australian Capital Territory, the Plastic Shopping Bags Act, 2010 was implemented in 2011 to restrict the supply of plastic bags for shopping and the other purposes. This ban has led to the reduction of the plastic material going to landfill, successful in reducing the incidence of plastic bags as litter and has attracted support from most shoppers (DEHP, 2016).

However, the Northern Territory’s Environment Protection (Beverage Containers and Plastic Bags) Act, 2011 and the Tasmanian Plastic Shopping Bags Ban Act, 2013 have shown only variable success in reducing plastic litter (ACT Government, 2014).

Some states have not implemented this policy, but have responded to this idea. In the state of Victoria, it was proposed in 2009 that the ‘free plastic bag’ would be banned from 2009 and a 10-cent fee per bag would be charged to retailers who wished to distribute them (Clapp and Swarns, 2009).

In 2015, the Queensland government committed to investigate possible restrictions on single-use plastic bags. This plan aims to reduce the amount of plastic entering the environment (DEHP, 2016). Three instruments, a voluntary reduction measure, banning plastic bags, or requiring a charge for plastic bags, are considered for use. The Queensland government is still learning from international and national experience how to prepare more carefully, for the ban will be implemented in 2018 (DEHP, 2016).

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In New South Wales, the plan for implementing the banning of plastic bags aims to reduce the environmental effects of plastic litter, to reduce the consumption of plastic bags and to recover the environment (Environment Protection Authority, 2016). The number of options considered for banning follows the South Australian experience of banning the high density polyethylene bag, banning the lightweight bags and banning all types of handled plastic bags. As per the learning results, the New South Wales government determined that educational campaigns can be effective when implementing their proposed program with other tools such as environmental warnings and labellings to provide information and to change the behaviour of the community.

Assessing the banning of plastic shopping bag policy in Australia

The policy of banning plastic shopping bags in Australia can neither be seen as a failure nor a success. This policy shows firstly the responsibility and accountability of Australian government to the demands of society about the protection of human health and the environment. Secondly, it shows the response to the international trend.

In terms of the three dimensions of policy, this policy has achieved some successes. For the process dimension, the banning policy attracted public interest and was legitimised at the national government level, and by some state governments. This can be seen as a success for those States which implemented the ban on the use of plastic bags, although at the national level it cannot yet be called a success.

In the program dimension, this policy has aimed at the target of reducing plastic litter in the environment. It can be seen as successful in South Australia and the Australian Capital Territory where the desired results met the goals. Mackle (2016) shows that, for environmental policy, the claim for success is supported by data. However for the other States which have not yet implemented it, this program can be seen as neither a success nor a failure. This is the same status as at the national level.

For the political dimension, this banning policy is supported not only by the whole political system but also by society, which includes consumers, retailers and other stakeholders.

Conclusion

Assessing a policy may be complicated. That is because a policy rarely has fixed criteria for measuring its success or failure and can be applied regardless of time and place (Mackle, 2016). The assessment is enhanced by understanding of the three dimensions involved: the process, program and politics of policies. These dimensions will provide a clear view of how policies either succeed or fail. Moreover, policies may not either be a complete success or complete failure. The different aspects of the three dimensions can be used to define the variations between success and failure which include resilient success, conflict success and precarious success. In addition, because assessing policies is predominately subjective, a policy needs to be set in its particular context and the beneficiaries identified. This will help in better understanding those areas and targets in which the policy has been successful.

Policy-learning is important to the success of policy-making. It can improve the results

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of even the less successful policy. Through instrumental and social learning, the policy-makers can draw lessons from both failed and successful policies, from past and current experience and from the different jurisdiction systems. In order that policy-learning is successful it is necessary to identify who needs to learn and what will be learnt for any particular policy. This will enhance knowledge of the process, program and politics required for the best practice of making and implementing policies.

The policy of banning the plastic shopping bag in Australia has demonstrated some key factors for success in establishing a policy. Firstly, this ban was supported and approved across the Australian Federal Government and States and Territory Governments. Secondly, the ban has good goals and results which are a response to the demand of society against the impact of plastics on the environment and human health, as well as reducing the financial cost to governments. Although the implementation of banning plastic bags has differed between Australian states (some jurisdictions adopted an outright ban while others tried to limit ban, tax and adopt voluntary measures), the results have been valuable. Finally, the reputation of the government has had a positive reaction and as a consequence, the support of communities. The success of this policy in some states has also created lessons by which the other states can learn for their future implementations of this policy. At present, this policy can be seen as a success at the state level, but from the national viewpoint, the policy has not yet been implemented fully. Thus, the Australian Government cannot yet claim that this policy has been fully successful.

REFERENCES

1. ACT Government. 2014. Review of the Plastic Shopping Bags Ban.

2. Aspin, M. 2012. Review of the Plastic Shopping Bags (Waste Avoidance) Act 2008.

3. Baldwin, David, A. 2000. “Success and failure in foreign policy”. Annual Review of Political Science 3, no. 1:167-182.

4. Bennett, Colin J., and Michael Howlett. 1992. “The lessons of learning: Reconciling theories of policy learning and policy change”. Policy sciences 25, no. 3:275-294.

5. Bovens, Mark. 2010. “A comment on Marsh and McConnell: Towards a framework for establishing policy success”. Public Administration 88, no. 2:584-585.

6. Clapp, Jennifer, and Linda Swanston. 2009. “Doing away with plastic shopping bags: international patterns of norm emergence and policy implementation”. Environmental politics 18, no. 3:315-332.

7. Department of Environment and Heritage Protection. 2016. Implementing a Lightweight Plastic Shopping Bag Ban in Queensland. Discussion paper.

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8. Environment Protection Authority. 2016. ‘Plastic Shopping Bags’. Options paper.

9. Fawcett, Paul, and David Marsh. 2012. “Policy transfer and policy success: The case of the gateway review process (2001–10)”. Government and opposition 47, no. 2:162-185.

10. Hall, Peter A. 1993. “Policy paradigms, social learning, and the state: the case of economic policymaking in Britain”. Comparative politics :275-296.

11. Heclo, Hugh. 1974. Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden. New Haven: Yale University Press.

12. Howlett, Michael, Michael Ramesh, and Anthony Perl. 2009. Studying public policy: Policy cycles and policy subsystems. Vol. 3. Oxford University Press.

13. Howlett, Michael. 2012. “The lessons of failure: learning and blame avoidance in public policy-making”. International Political Science Review 33, no. 5:539-555.

14. Mackie, Kathleen. 2016. “Success and failure in environment policy: The role of policy officials”. Australian Journal of Public Administration 75, no. 3:291-304.

15. May, Peter J. 1992. “Policy learning and failure”. Journal of public policy 12, no. 4:331-354.

16. McConnell, Allan. 2010a. “Policy success, policy failure and grey areas in-between”. Journal of Public Policy 30, no. 3:345-362.

17. McConnell, Allan. 2011. “Success? Failure? Something in-between? A framework for evaluating crisis management”. Policy and Society 30, no. 2:63-76.

18. McConnell, Allan. 2010b. Understanding policy success: Rethinking public policy. Macmillan International Higher Education.

19. McLaughlin, Milbrey Wallin. 1987. “Learning from experience: Lessons from policy implementation”. Educational evaluation and policy analysis 9, no. 2:171-178.

20. Newman, Joshua. 2014. “Measuring policy success: Case studies from Canada and Australia”. Australian Journal of Public Administration 73, no. 2:192-205.

21. Peters, B. Guy. 2015. Advanced introduction to public policy. Edward Elgar Publishing.

22. Rijkschroeff, Rally, Geert Ten Dam, Jan Willem Duyvendak, Marjan De Gruijter, and Trees Pels. 2005. “Educational policies on migrants and minorities in the Netherlands: Success or failure?”. Journal of education policy 20, no. 4:417-435.

23. Smith, Stewart. 2004. Plastic bags. NSW Parliamentary Library Research Service.

24. Zahariadis, Nikolaos, and Theofanis Exadaktylos. 2016. “Policies that succeed and

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programs that fail: Ambiguity, conflict, and crisis in Greek higher education”. Policy Studies Journal 44, no. 1:59-82.

Article - V

Bilingual Policy of Singapore and Policy Implications for Vietnam in the Context of National Integration

Nguyen Thi Hai Anh37

Nguyen Thi Bich Hanh38

Abstract

Language and language policy is one of the basic issues and an important foundation for social development. Language policy is related to a series of issues such as ethnicity, religion, culture, media, education, national security, etc. and becomes a strategic content for each country, especially for nation building and development by the government. The development of a language policy that is appropriate to the language situation will contribute to promoting the overall economic and social development, which is essential for maintaining stability and integration. The research topic of the article is the bilingual situation and policy of Singapore, thereby giving policy implications for Vietnam in the context of international integration.

Key words: bilingual education, language situation, multilingualism, language policy, bilingual policy, developmental government, Singapore, Vietnam.

Introduction

When studying the miraculous development of Japan, Professor Chalmers Ashby Jonhson proposed the concept of: “Developmental State” (DS). A DS is a model of state management, in which the State sets development-oriented policies, creates an environment and conditions for economic entities to bring into full play all potentials in an environment of fair competition, strengthens monitoring to detect possible imbalances, ensures macroeconomic stability and improves people's living standards.39

In explaining the concept of: “Developmental government”, Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc emphasised at the first point… “it must be a government that proactively designs a good system of laws, good policies and good institutions to maintain a developed economy, rather than passively coping with actual developments”. According to Dinh

37 The HUB Education Singapore – Myanmar Branch. Email: ada@adanguyen.com 38 Faculty of Linguistics, Graduate Academy of Social Sciences. Email: ntbichhanh78@gmail.com 39 Johnson, Chalmers (1994). Japan: Who Governs? – The Rise of the Developmental State. W. W. Norton & Company. ISBN 0-393-31450-2.

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Dung Sy 40, when considering the connotation of the relationship between politics and the rule of law, the concept of policy should be explored in the following aspects: (i) Policy is a concrete expression of the general political line. The policy is determined based on the general political line, the political programme of the ruling party; (ii) The policy is the basis for making the law, or in other words, the law is the result of institutionalisation. There may be policies that have not been legislated (institutionalised), or may never be legalised because they are not selected for legalisation when they are no longer relevant to new ideas or change of reality. But there will be no non-policy or outside-policy laws. In that sense, the policy is the soul, the content of the law, and the law is the form, the means of expression of the policy when it is acknowledged, "moulded" by "powerful hands'', that is, issued by the state in a legal order. As such, the policy is always associated with political power, with the ruling party and with the state - public power apparatus. We often talk about a principle of organizing the exercise of political power, that is: "The Party sets the guidelines and policies, the State institutionalises the Party's policies and policies into the laws''41.

Therefore, it can be said that the design and development of appropriate policies on all aspects of life and society plays a very important role for a country. One of the policies that contribute to promoting the stable and social sustainability of each country and nation is the language policy.

According to Nguyen Van Khang, “Language along with the national flag and the national anthem are the three elements to form and affirm the independent position of the nation”42; “Language is a social phenomenon, a mirror of society”43. National consciousness is always attached to the awareness of language, therefore, the language is the criterion and symbol of cultural identity and national pride. After any nation gains independence the selection of a "national language" becomes a top issue. According to statistics from 147 Constitutions of the world, 110 out of 147 constitutions have regulations related to the language mentioned44. Language is associated with the survival and prosperity of a nation as a tool to direct all activities and social development. Language issues is related to national unity and national stability45. Language is an essential component in the development of a civilisation and is an essential element to promote and maintain the peaceful development. Foreign languages too, act as a bridge for knowledge, making the world "flat" as people around the globe are no longer limited by the language barrier. The implementation of the language policy, which emphasised the role of English - the global language, in the island nation of Singapore has proved, the late Prime Minister Ly Quang Dieu a success.

40Director of the Law Department, Government Office. 41Đinh Dũng Sỹ, Chính sách và mối quan hệ giữa chính sách và pháp luật trong hoạt động lập pháp, https://thongtinphapluatdansu.edu.vn/2008/09/16/1673/. 42Nguyễn Văn Khang (2019), “Hiến định ngôn ngữ quốc gia và việc xây dựng “Luật ngôn ngữ quốc gia” ở Việt Nam”, Kỷ yếu Hội thảo Ngôn ngữ học toàn quốc 2019, tập 1, tr.334. 43Nguyễn Văn Khang, “Hiến định ngôn ngữ quốc gia và việc xây dựng “Luật ngôn ngữ quốc gia” ở Việt Nam”, Kỷ yếu Hội thảo Ngôn ngữ học toàn quốc 2019, tập 1, tr.340. 44Nguyễn Văn Khang (2019), “Hiến định ngôn ngữ quốc gia và việc xây dựng “Luật ngôn ngữ quốc gia” ở Việt Nam”, Kỷ yếu Hội thảo Ngôn ngữ học toàn quốc 2019, tập 1, tr.334. 45Nguyễn Văn Khang (2014), Chính sách ngôn ngữ và lập pháp ngôn ngữ ở Việt Nam, Nxb Khoa học xã hội, tr.17.

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It has transformed a poor fishing village into a thriving migrant community, a resource-less island into an Asian dragon.

The Arabs have a famous adage: “Learn a language, and you will avoid a war” – (temporarily translated into Vietnamese “nếu bạn học thêm một ngôn ngữ, bạn sẽ tránh được xung đột”). This is also the content that Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke at the Koerber Foundation in Berlin, Germany in March 2014.46.

This has once again asserted that the issue of multilingualism or policy on issues related to different languages in a country, is an indispensable policy in the establishment of a developmental state and global integration. The issue of bilingual policy in Vietnam is to demonstrate "proactive designing of good policies to maintain the developed economy". As directed by Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc: "The developmental government is a Government that is more proactive in establishing institutions and laws, not only operating on what the law is available", "The Government apparatus must be more dynamic, have more initiatives, study the surrounding world more in order to apply along with the Party's guidelines and policies to be more proactive, not to be passive."

As is known, language plays an important role in human life, social community and ethnicity. The language also goes beyond the national scope and acts as a bridge, bringing the community to integrate into the region and the world. “Language is one of the most important elements of national enlightenment consciousness, the means of national unity”7 As a result, governments in countries that are increasingly conscious of the impact of languages are shown by developing language policies in concordance with their country's language situation.

Language situation: According to V.Yu.Mikhalchenko: “The language situation is the distribution that has been formed over a long period of time in a given territory in different forms of existence (literary languages, conversational languages, dialects) and the various forms of expression (spoken and written) of the languages currently operating in this territory”7. The language situation is made up of several factors, ethnicity-demography, linguistic factor, material factors, and the human factor. Based on the number of languages, the language situation can be divided into two categories: single component language context and multi-component language situation. Vietnam and Singapore are both multi-ethnic countries, so the language situation in both countries are classified as multi-component language situations.

Language policy: There are currently many definitions of the language policy. Avronin, Isaev defines the language policy as, “an integral part of the national policy of a state, a class or a party” and “is the linguistic dimension of the party and state's policy on national issues”8. Nguyen Ham Duong said that: “Most of the language policy refers to the conscious, organised, and scientific intervention of society in the operation and development of language of society. In other words, the language policy is the leadership of linguistic requirements of society based on scientific understanding of the rules of language, putting language into the general trajectory of society, making service language

46https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1148640.shtml

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matching with the development of society”47. According to Nguyen Van Khang48, in the past, the language policy was only recognised as a part of ethnic policy; nowadays, the language is related to a range of issues such as ethnicity, religion, culture, media, education, security and defence, becoming a strategic content when referring to national policies on these issues. According to Nguyen Van Khang, there is no similar language policy among countries, even in those having similar political backgrounds, as each country has its own language policy. In general, it is built on theoretical premises as well as a common framework of the foundation such as language situations, political and social conditions, etc., so the language policy can be attributed to some models such as: (i) language assimilation policy; (ii) recognition policy of the different language status; (iii) non-intervention language policy; (iv) national language stabilisation policy; (v) regional language policy; and (vi) language internationalisation policy. From the actual language situation of each country, the language policy issue needs to be adjusted accordingly, it should be built on the basis of a harmony between national interests, creating a language uniformity and diversity. It is also important to consider transnational language policy (as regional language policy). A language policy in accordance with the language situation must be: making the language to become a symbol of political, cultural, social; a tool of political solidarity among different ethno linguistic communities within the country.

Bilingual policy: Bilingualism and more broadly, multilingualism is common throughout the multi-ethnic countries of the world. This is a linguistic-social phenomenon related to the language policy of the state, especially in countries and territories with many ethnic groups living together but speaking in different languages. According to Nguyen Duc Ton 49, in a multilingual society, there are two phenomena that are related but different, which need to be clearly distinguished, that is bilingualism and diglossia (Nguyen Van Khang call it bilingualism và multilingualism50). According to Ferguson (1959) and Fishman (1972), bilingualism refers to two languages of an individual. And two languages in a society is called diglossia51. Diglossia is a word derived from Greek, referring to two languages that a speech community uses, one in which is used for some of these situations and functions, and the other is used for a number of other situations and functions. For example, a speed community may use the minority language they inherit from their family for religious purposes or use in an informal social environment (informal situations). And majority language is used by this community in workplaces, schools or on the mass media (formal situations).

47Dẫn theo Nguyễn Văn Khang (2014), Chính sách ngôn ngữ và lập pháp ngôn ngữ ở Việt Nam, Nxb Khoa học xã hội, tr.14. 48Nguyễn Văn Khang (2014), Chính sách ngôn ngữ và lập pháp ngôn ngữ ở Việt Nam, Nxb Khoa học xã hội. 49Nguyễn Đức Tồn (2016), Cảnh huống và chính sách ngôn ngữ ở Việt Nam trong thời kì công nghiệp hóa, hiện đại hóa đất nước và hội nhập quốc tế, Nxb Khoa học xã hội, tr. 30. 50Nguyễn Văn Khang (1999), Ngôn ngữ học xã hội – Những vấn đề cơ bản, Nxb Khoa học xã hội, Hà Nội, tr. 90. 51Dẫn theo Nguyễn Đức Tồn (2016), Cảnh huống và chính sách ngôn ngữ ở Việt Nam trong thời kì công nghiệp hóa, hiện đại hóa đất nước và hội nhập quốc tế, Nxb Khoa học xã htạoội, tr. 30.

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When referring to linguistic policy, there are usually three most mentioned areas: (i) Language selection (defining and assigning social functions of the language); (ii) Language protection (the protection of linguistic and cultural diversity); (iii) Multilingual development ( facilitating development of several languages of the same function).

The role of Language policy in the Developmental government: The proactive development of language policy in accordance with language situation in the country and the world trend which will contribute to promoting the synchronous development of the economy and society is essential for maintaining stability and integration.

The concept of "Developmental government" was developed by researcher Chalmers Johnson from the 1980s, before he studied the miraculous development of Japan. He realised that in that miraculous development, the role of the state was very important. The Japanese state not only created a framework for development, but also directed and promoted that development. Later, in addition to Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and others, were all considered as developmental states. The very basic characteristic of the developmental government model is that the government directly sets an industrial development plan (with great ambitions) and strongly invests in mechanisms, policies and other incentives to promote industrial development. According to the researchers, this is a state model in the middle of the Anglo-American governing state (under the free market theory) and the central planning state (according to the traditional socialist model). The developmental state does not stand outside the market, but it does not change the market. The developmental state actively intervenes in the market to promote development and realise the development goals that have been set. It is a state management model, in which the state sets development-oriented policies, creates an environment and conditions for economic sectors to bring into full play their potentials in the competitive environment and international integration; and ensures macroeconomic stability.

From the above analysis, it can be seen that the policy system is the cornerstone of the developmental government. When a country builds a right policy system, it will mean successful construction of a developmental state, with the function of public authority, social management, service and provision of public services.

Language issues in multicultural and multi-ethnic countries are both scientific, political and important in the process of economic development, political stability, cultural preservation and national unity. The language policy of a country exists and develops depending on the language situation and the future needs of society - the language needs, which is the gap between the existing language and the future according to the laws of movement and development. This is the relationship of building a Developmental state, consistent with the development trend, in parallel with the language policy and in accordance with the laws of economic and social motivation and development. In other words, the language policy and the Developmental government have an integrated relationship in the political environment, with the overall goal of moving towards the nation's development. The foundation of the development is the crystallised human knowledge to build a policy system consistent with the development of a nation. And the prerequisite for improving knowledge is language. The use of global

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language is the leading policy of any country in the period of integration and development.

BILINGUAL POLICY OF SINGAPORE

The effect of bilingual policy on economic and social development

Through Table 1 and Figure 1 (source from Washington Post) we can see the important role of English as a global language. In the world, the number of people learning English is greater than the total number of people learning French, Spanish, Italian, Japanese, German and Chinese. English is widely used thanks to the effect of countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom and developed countries around the world in important areas such as military, economics, science, politics, informatics, culture, etc.

Table 1: Number of countries using different languages52

Figure 1: Diagram of the number of people using common languages53

52Source: Language of the world, Eighteenth edition, The Washington Post. 53Source: Ulrich Ammon, University of Dusseldorf - The Washington Post.

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Bilingualism has been the cornerstone of Singapore's language policy since the election of the People's Action Party (PAP) in 1959. This policy requires that every person must be fluent in English and their mother tongue. This policy was constituted in the Constitution of Singapore, in Article 37, regulating Singapore's official languages by ethnic groups: Malayu (for Malay community), English, Mandarin ( for Chinese) and Tamil (for Indian). English is the working language of Singapore (in formal contexts), while the mother tongue of ethnic groups helps to reinforce personal values and cultural awareness. Bilingual policy in Singapore was implemented primarily through the education system, requiring students to learn English and their respective mother tongue. In addition, annual campaigns are organised to promote the learning and speaking of the mother tongue and to encourage the correct use of English grammar among Singaporean communities. The Lee Kuan Yew Fund for Bilingualism was established in 2011 to help nurture the love of bilingual learning in children in this country.

In the 1980s, Singapore's leaders had a movement "towards change" with a focus on renovating the government's management mechanism to adapt to change. Bilingual policy is one of the positive impact policies, helping Singaporeans to adapt well to the pressures of globalisation. As such, it can be seen that Singapore's goal is to build a government which is responsible for and serves the socio-economic development of the people.

The bilingual education policy is one of the first policies of the newly established independent government. This policy is implemented as a way to unify different ethnic groups while providing an anchor for students for their cultural and ethnic heritage. With the implementation of this policy, English high schools are expected to offer a choice of Mandarin, Malayu and Tamil as a second language. English is offered as a second language in non-English high schools. Schools are also expected to use students' native language as a medium of instruction for Citizenship and History lessons. Due to the growing popularity of using English as the language of international trade, non-English high schools face declining enrolment. By 1987, all schools were converted to English intermediate schools. In terms of higher education, English has been used as a medium of teaching since 1979.

Since the implementation of the bilingual policy, the population of bilingual people who know English has been increasing. According to information reported on the Singapore Census of Population 2010 website, the proportion of bilingual people in the population increased by 13.5 percent between the most recent census data released in 2000 and 2010.

Bilingual education policy also gives policy makers, educational leaders and teachers immediate language ability and access ability to learn from other education systems, especially English-speaking countries. From teaching materials to curriculum development, teacher education, school management and leadership, Singapore began the important task of building the nation through the education system. Educators have gained international access to countless resources around the world through various

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stages of education development, from the life-oriented stage of the 1960s and 1970s to the efficiency-oriented stage in the late 1970s to 1980s.

Table 2: Comparison of the use of English and mother tongue in Singapore over the years54

Ethnic group Language 1980 1990 2000 2010

Chinese

English 10.2% 21.4% 23.9% 32.6%

Mandarin 13.1% 30% 45.1% 47.7%

Chinese dialect 76.2% 48.2% 30.7% 19.2%

Malaysian

English 2.3% 5.7% 7.9% 17%

Malaysian 96.7% 94.1% 91.6% 82.6%

Indian

English 24.3% 34.% 35.6% 41.6%

Tamil 52.2% 43.5% 42.9% 36.6%

Malaysian 8.6% 14.1% 11.6% 7.9%

Other languages 14.9% 8.1% 9.2% 13.2%

In addition to education, English proficiency remains Singapore's most important asset for international trade. With the economic development of China and India, the introduction of Singapore's bilingual policy has proved the importance of this issue. With Malay-speaking regional neighbours, Singapore has richer cooperation prospects and advantage of exploring opportunities outside the region. The use of four official languages in Singapore means that while Singaporeans have the ability to use English as an international language, cultural and heritage relationships are not lost by mastering a second language closely linked to the national language of one of the major racial groups in Singapore. Therefore, this policy has the knack for uniting the Singaporean community in a language that no racial group can claim to be biologically biased while allowing different ethnicities to honour the diversity of languages

54Lau, K. E. (1993), Singapore census of population 1990; Singapore: Department of Statistics (2005, 2011).

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associated with multi-ethnic, multicultural styles. In today's digital age, where the transmission of information takes place at a blistering pace, the high level of language competence to effectively process, transfer and communicate information on a global platform will only grow in importance.

Limitations of bilingual policy in Singapore

While bilingual policy has made significant contributions to the development of education, economy, society, and people in Singapore, we cannot deny the limitations of this policy such as:

According to a Singapore Ministry of Education report, 1978: Evaluating the bilingual policy, under the leadership of Deputy Prime Minister -Dr. Goh Keng Swee, showed that its bilingual policy is not fully effective. The Goh report criticised the inefficiency of the bilingual policy leading to the main cause of language education problems in Singapore. Although the bilingual policy has increased the overall literacy rate, according to the statistical figures, less than 40% of students with education enrolment have minimum competence level in two languages at a time:

At least 25 percent of elementary students do not meet the minimum literacy standards.

Only 11 percent of the recruited armed forces meet English proficiency fully.

Despite an increased access to language in curriculum at schools, teaching strategies are ineffective in raising students' language proficiency levels.

The bilingual policy in English and Malayu, Chinese or Tamil are all a burden for students because these three native languages have absolutely nothing to do with English. Mandarin Chinese belongs to the Sino-Tibetan language family, Malayu belongs to the Austronesian language family, and Tamil belongs to the South Asian language family. These three languages are themselves on the same continent, but they are not related to each other, not to mention the connection with a Western language, English.

When using English as a teaching language, traditional Confucian values cannot be improved throughout the school because both teachers and students are ethnically diverse and textbooks are not written in Chinese. The "many tongues, one language" policy is also a risk of diminishing the traditional moral values of students through increased access to Western culture. They are educated in English from an early age so they are fluent in English. It is very easy for qualified people in Singapore to study and work in a better environment like the UK, Australia because they have their own key - English, and this becomes a drawback as it promotes brain drain from Singapore.

After years of widespread use of English, sociologists have observed that Singapore's culture is clearly divided into two layers: the upper, very strong layer, a lifestyle based on English of different ethnic communities and the lower, weaker layer including Chinese, Malay and Indian cultures, such layers have harmonious but separate coexistence. Institutionally, all three languages: Mandarin Chinese, Malayu and Tamil

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are still equal to English but in reality, the native languages and the original cultures of the ethnic groups are weakening in Singapore.

Phenomenon of Speakers Without a Native Tongue (SWONAL) is a common phenomenon in Singapore today, especially for the 3rd generation since 1986 when the bilingual policy was officially successful in this country. Babies born in the present face the reality that their parents try to teach them the first language as native language but when they go to kindergarten as well as start their social interaction, it is compulsory to have to switch to the English language. Therefore, in order for their children not to be slow with the curriculum as well as to maintain their native language, all families have to face a challenge. They are forced to teach their children English to keep up with the curriculum and it is difficult for children to balance the knowledge of both languages. It is even more difficult for children whose parents are from different ethnic groups. For example: Father is of Chinese origin and mother is of Indian or Thai or Vietnamese origin (very common in Singapore).

From the first day of its establishment, the Singapore government has been aware and prepared enough good conditions in all aspects to set a basic language policy: all students must prioritise learning English, and the ethnic languages of the three main ethnic groups located at a backward position. An interesting point about cultural policy in Singapore is that Bahasa Melayu is defined as the national language, the national anthem is also composed and sung in Bahasa Melayu, but the Constitution stipulates that people and the government can use one of four administrative languages (English, Chinese, Bahasa Melayu, Tamil) to transact with each other. Important and official documents of the state, particularly when it is necessary to disseminate a certain policy to all citizens, all four languages must be used. People can use one of these four languages when making formal communication and asking the government to respond in the same language. In the current Singapore Parliament, the majority of parliamentarians speak in English, but occasionally there are Tamil (one of the ethnic minorities with Indian origin in Singapore), or Chinese, or Malayu parliamentarians speak in their languages, their speeches are translated into English through cabin translation. Parliamentarians have the right to do so, and perhaps in the days of the founding, more parliamentarians used languages other than English to speak in parliament than currently. When there is a dispute over the meaning of vocabulary, the State takes English as the standard language. Even the oaths that the students read during the national flag salute are shown mostly in English.

After many years of implementing the English-important policy, most Singaporeans now use English, although the older generation still use Chinese ethnic languages and dialects fluently. However, overall, in studying, setting standards in science, law, industrial and commercial transactions, international integration, etc., Singaporeans must use English no matter how much their Queen's English standard meets. The journey of a transition on the language policy of the Singapore government is not difficult, but it has achieved a lot of success, with a multi-ethnic country like Singapore, the bold application of bilingual language policy in unity has helped this country shorten the path of international integration and rise to become the Dragon of Asia.

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Implications for Bilingual Policy in Vietnam during the Integration Period

Singapore and Vietnam are located in Southeast Asia, so there are some similarities in cultural and historical circumstances. Both are multi-ethnic and multilingual countries, although there are different linguistic situations but the implementation of language policies in the two countries will have a basis for similarities. However, each country has different policies in its steps.

In a research on "The situation and language policy in Vietnam during the period of industrialisation and modernisation of the country and international integration", Mr. Nguyen Duc Ton also said: "Due to the diversity of the linguistic situations, so if a country has a multi-language situation, it is difficult to implement the plan to develop a single language across the territory of that country ... Therefore, in a commune with multi-ethnic groups, the only way to unite languages and for people from different ethnic and linguistic communities to understand each other in the process of communicating will be a bilingual phenomenon (or multi-language). Vietnam is not an exception”.55 Referring to the experience of bilingual education model in many countries around the world, based on analysis of similar and different linguistic situations in the development of bilingual policy of the surveyed countries, Mr. Nguyen Duc Ton also gave the conclusion that: "Vietnam can fully teach bilingual programs with two types: Vietnamese - international language (first of all, English) for Kinh students and ethnic minority language (native language) and Vietnamese for ethnic minority students, from the time children start going to school”56.

By implementing the Foreign Language Project 2020, Vietnam has affirmed its interest in the universalisation of international languages to improve human resource capacity, educational level, etc. towards globalisation in the region and the world. However, the implementation of Project 2020 faces many shortcomings due to objective reasons such as: different routes for teaching and learning foreign languages, uneven language proficiency of teachers, low number of teachers trained in foreign countries, high fees of examination for international English certificate and limited time; basic-level programs, curriculum, learning materials, irregular updates to the output standard of foreign language competency for students; lack of learning materials, and unattractive materials for students.... Therefore, in 2017, the Ministry of Education and Training submitted to the Government, to supplement the project for the next period and the Government approved the project to amend and supplement, issuing a new decision for the project for the period of 2017-2025. The implementation of the national foreign language project will be one of the nine focal points of the Ministry of Education and Training. However, the national foreign language project is still only a program to improve the capacity of teachers, not a policy to improve human resources capacity in languages. This has caused us to slow down in globalisation. During his trip to Vietnam in 2007, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew suggested many ideas, especially educational ideas. "If winning in the education race, we will win in economic development". At the same time,

55 Nguyễn Đức Tồn (2016), Cảnh huống và chính sách ngôn ngữ ở Việt Nam trong thời kì công nghiệp hóa, hiện đại hóa đất nước và hội nhập quốc tế, Nxb Khoa học xã hội, tr.24. 56Nguyễn Đức Tồn (2016), Cảnh huống và chính sách ngôn ngữ ở Việt Nam trong thời kì công nghiệp hóa, hiện đại hóa đất nước và hội nhập quốc tế, Nxb Khoa học xã hội, tr.65.

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Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew also suggested that, “Universities in Vietnam should have English textbooks in the fields of engineering and technology, because if only using Vietnamese books, they will definitely fall behind.” In fact now all international working engineers have the ability to speak English very well. He warned that if all future Vietnamese students could not hear and speak English fluently, and they could only read English, they would lag behind57.

In order to answer the question "How not to fall behind?", being good at English is the only way. This is what Mr. Lee Kuan Yew emphasised. With the Singapore Government, selecting English as a working language it helped to prevent the emergence of ethnic conflicts, giving Singaporeans competitive advantage. According to Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, it is required to persistently pursue the policy of "many tongues, one language" to bring English into schools. “Today, Singapore has a great advantage because of that. This is an unforeseen reward for implementing this regulation by Singapore”. So, what are we to do?

Policies need to be made to use English as a second language

Vietnam is a multilingual country with 54 ethnic groups, the majority of Kinh ethnic group is accounted for, and Vietnamese is constitutionally the national language. But Vietnamese is not an international language and we cannot integrate into the world community if we only use Vietnamese.

Thus, if it is not legalised to study English as well as to affirm that studying and passing the international standard exams of English is a mandatory condition for not only students, teachers and other people, we will not only fail to implement the 2020 Project approved by the Prime Minister, but also never achieve the criteria for developing human resources for integration and globalisation. The “Rather master than worker” mentality of the Vietnamese will remain forever with an overloading condition, theory outweighs practice. Tourism development, FDI attraction, economy, and all other policies will accordingly slow down, because we do not have enough resources to receive them.

Legalisation of English as a second language will proactively standardise teachers, lecturers – important subjects of the policy. This standardisation is an opportunity and challenge for all teachers in the transition process. Teachers in Singapore have really made efforts and attempted to move from teaching using Chinese to teaching by English. “We have undergone and witnessed shocks and tears when they had to switch from Chinese to English in a short time”. Legalisation will give people the sense of learning English as a necessary need, thereby increasing the ability of self-study, self-improvement to self–deal and connect. Legalisation is the highest leverage to implement policies and realise goals towards a rich, strong country and civilised society.

57Lee Kuan Yew – My Lifelong challenge: Singapore's Bilingual Journey - Straits Times Press (SG) (Hardcover – 2011)

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(i) Application of the mother tongue, Vietnamese and English as the three languages used officially in Vietnam

Lesson from Singapore shows that the maintenance of the mother tongue helps maintain the culture and the values of each nation. This is suitable for the language situation in our country with 54 different ethnic groups. The maintenance of ethnic languages does not necessarily have to be taught at training institutions, but the Government encourages and directs by introducing policies for minority languages such as: building ethnic language centres in ethnic minority areas, maintaining traditional customs and festivals, etc. in order to promote and maintain the cultures of ethnic groups. Ethnic minorities will be taught in two languages: Vietnamese and English to standardise training. This is a difficult problem, but if it is maintained that ethnic groups desire to either learn their own language and Vietnamese or learn English and their own language, it will be difficult to agree on standardisation of national language. Minority languages are culturally valuable but do not represent a nation and have no value in international trade.

(ii) Use English as the language of trade transaction

If English is neither prescribed as a trading language nor taught by subjects in educational institutions, the maintenance of English as the official language will only be a formality. When English becomes the language of transaction, it means that all people have to read, understand and speak in this language.

In fact, there are many subjects claiming that they do not need to know foreign languages, especially English because their working environment, communication,… are not used or not related to English. Lessons from Singapore show that the Government’s application of bilingual policy, forcing people to rise up to integrate with the trend, avoiding the evasions that learning English is unnecessary, is accessible to new human knowledge, that subjective and ideological thinking always arises whenever a new problem arises. It requires a determination from top to below to be able to teach and learn well. With a global perspective, the National Assembly, the Government and Ministry of Education and Training have been guiding and orienting foreign language strategies for our country in the current period of intensive international integration, including the special role of English. Only when both the political and social systems are involved to guide and support the education and training sector will this strategy be successful. This provision is the tool to ensure effective policy implementation.

Focus on investing in the quality of lecturers and teachers with practical measures

Vietnamese education needs to increase teachers’ salaries adequately, because when salaries are high, they will focus on investing on research for their teaching, thereby the quality of lectures will improve. Mr. Lee Kuan Yew said, “If the administrative system is good, the investment in a lot of revenue will be high, the salary for officials will be high, talents will be attracted, so that the administrative apparatus will work well.”58 Therefore,

58Lee Kuan Yew – My Lifelong challenge: Singapore’s Bilingual Journey – Straits Times Press (SG) (Hardcover – 2011)

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in order to create good education, the most important condition is to have a team of high quality and dedicated teachers. Salary increment for teachers is a measure that not only affects the economy but also their psychology, just like the Singapore Government has done.

In addition to salary increment, training and retraining of foreign language teachers, should also be planned in detail and systematise qualifications by maximizing the rigor of national examination centres.

Quality of teachers includes qualifications, communication ability and teaching experience. Therefore, the standard certification only meets one of the three criteria above. In fact, there are teachers who meet professional standards but the ability to impart knowledge and teaching experience are weak, so the final effect of one teaching hour is often very low. Therefore, in order to comprehensively change the quality of foreign languages, it is necessary to assess and select more qualified teachers, instead of only assessing Foreign language ability. Qualified certificates issued by Vietnam are only valid in the country and have not been widely recognised, so teachers tend to take the prestigious and internationally valued exams such as IELTS, TOEFL, TOEIC, etc. Therefore, teachers will “kill two birds with one arrow”, both “paying the debt” which is the certificate of proficiency assessment in foreign language prescribed by the Ministry of Education and Training, and having an international English certificate, which is convenient for learning and research abroad. For teachers, the issuance of a certificate of Foreign language standard achievement only, also stops at the response in terms of administrative procedures, the assessment results have not really helped the teaching profession of teachers yet. In addition, the certificate, normally, is abandoned after issuance, as the completion of “debt payment” after one exam, which does not create motivation for further professional improvement. Thus, the participation in self-review and taking Foreign language proficiency assessment exams are crucial for teachers.

Communicate about the role of learning English

This is a tool to implement the policy for the purpose of explaining to the people about its necessity for the country in general and for each individual in particular. We have lagged behind all the countries in Asia, not just in ASEAN. It cannot be compared with countries like Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, etc. because they have been ahead and travelled outside their country to work in international languages. However, even in countries such as Laos, Cambodia or Myanmar – that have been newly opened for less than 03 years, the percentage of people speaking English is much higher than that of Vietnam. There is a need for communication tools to promote and communicate the role as well as importance of the policy.

Currently, Ministry of Education and Training has also introduced a 6-level foreign language competency framework for Vietnam to be the basis for unifying the competency requirements for all taught foreign languages, bases for the program, bases for teachers to select content, teaching methods, helping learners understand the content and requirements for each level of foreign language competency, creating favourable conditions for cooperation and exchange of education, recognition of diplomas with countries applying the Common European Framework of Reference

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(CEFR)59. It has been 04 years since the promulgation of this Circular, but it has been inefficient to really develop its spirit in the society. The Project 2020 is almost treading water. Thus, if it is not taken as seriously as Legalisation of learning English policy, invest in the quality of teachers as well as promote the importance of such policy.

Conclusion

Vietnam's cultural origin, historical context and national situation are very different from Singapore, therefore, it is difficult to find a “Singapore model” to apply and reform the teaching and learning of English more effectively. Questions to ask are: What are the purposes of learning English by Vietnamese students? Which level should students study, sufficient or advanced? Is it the State's responsibility to organise the good studying of English?

“When meeting Vietnamese leaders of many generations, Mr. Ly Quang Dieu gave frank comments and until now, it is startling to re-read them. After more than 20 years of looking back, many judgments about Vietnam produced by him since the 1990s have now become a reality”. It was the statement given by the Deputy Foreign Minister Dang Dinh Quy during the premiere of the Vietnamese version of Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew, published on the official visit to Vietnam by the Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Hsien Loong and on the two-year death anniversary of the former Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew. Deputy Minister Dang Dinh Quy believed that Mr. Yew is the legendary leader of Asia and the founder of modern Singapore. Many Vietnamese leaders, from the General Secretary Do Muoi, Former Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet and other leaders, have considered Lee Kuan Yew as a sincere, profound friend of the leaders in particular and of Vietnam in general. Deputy Minister Quy said that in the book "Quan điểm của một con người về thế giới", there are about 5 pages about Vietnam, containing frank comments about the leadership and future generations of Vietnam. These sincere advice have been listened to and acquired by Vietnamese leaders. After 20 years of looking back, many of his comments and advice to Vietnam since the 1990s up to now have become a reality.

With the desire to control the entire national education policy, of course, the government shall execute an English learning program so that the people can learn and compete with the world. But this program cannot be the same as Singapore because Vietnam has a more homogeneous culture and English (and Western culture attached) is difficult to be imposed above Vietnamese and Vietnamese culture.

Vietnam officially joined ASEAN and became the seventh member of this organisation on July 28th, 1995 and the language to communicate in ASEAN is English. Therefore, the recognition of English as a second language (rather than a foreign language) should be a policy that really needs attention in the process of building and perfecting the Developmental State.

A thread running throughout here is that it is impossible for the development and competition among countries during the Industrial Revolution 4.0 to lack English skills

59 According to promulgated Circular on the 6-level foreign language competency framework for Vietnam No. 01/2014/TT_BGDDT

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in order to acquire and exchange technology, science, attract investment, update our country's commodity information with the global market..., in general, meaning the world integration. The design of language policies, especially those focusing on the role of foreign languages, particularly English in the context of integration, is a strategic issue at national level. In the roles of the Developmental State, the issue on consulting and designing language policies is not only the work of social science researchers but also the strong involvement of the Government so that Vietnam can change vigorously and confidently to enter into the world and bring the world closer to Vietnam.

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1. Chua, L. H. (2011). Mother tongue teaching revamped, The Straits Times, Singapore.

2. Colony of Singapore. (1953). Chinese schools – bilingual education and increased aid, Singapore.

3. Dixon, L. Q. (2005). Bilingual education policy in Singapore: An analysis of its sociohistorical roots and current academic outcomes. International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism, USA.

4. Đỗ Phú Hải, Võ Khánh Vinh (2012), Những vấn đề cơ bản về chính sách công, Chuyên khảo, Học viện Khoa học Xã hội.

5. Giao thông vận tải, Lý Quang Diệu tặng Việt Nam 4 ý tưởng giáo dục, http://www.giaothongvantai.com.vn/Desktop.aspx/News/khoa-hoc-doisong/Ong_Ly_Quang_Dieu_tang_Viet_Nam_4_y_tuong_giao_duc, ngày cập nhật 23/01/2007.

6. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1148640.shtml

7. Johnson & Chalmers (1994). Japan: Who Governs? – The Rise of the Developmental State. W. W. Norton & Company. ISBN 0-393-31450-2

8. Language of the world, Eighteenth edition, The Washington Post.

9. Lau, K. E. (1993), Singapore census of population 1990; Singapore: Department of Statistics (2005, 2011).

10. Lee, K. Y (2011) – My Life long challenge: Singapore's Bilingual Journey - Straits Times Press (SG) (Hard cover).

11. Ngôn ngữ Việt Nam trong bối cảnh giao lưu, hội nhập và phát triển (2019), Kỷ yếu Hội thảo Ngôn ngữ học toàn quốc 2019, Nxb Dân trí.

12. Nguyễn Đức Tồn (2016), Cảnh huống và chính sách ngôn ngữ ở Việt Nam trong thời kì công nghiệp hóa, hiện đại hóa đất nước và hội nhập quốc tế, Nxb Khoa học xã hội, 2016.

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13. Nguyễn Văn Khang (2014), Chính sách ngôn ngữ và lập pháp ngôn ngữ ở Việt Nam, Nxb Khoa học xã hội.

14. Tan, E. K. B. (2007). The multilingual state in search of the nation: The language policy and discourse in Singapore’s nation building, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.

15. Viện Ngôn ngữ học (1997), Cảnh huống và chính sách ngôn ngữ ở các quốc gia đa dân tộc, Nxb Khoa học xã hội, Hà Nội.

16. Viện Ngôn ngữ học (2002), Cảnh huống và chính sách ngôn ngữ ở các quốc gia đa dân tộc, Nxb Khoa học xã hội, Hà Nội.

17. Viet bao, Lý Quang Diệu và chính sách giáo dục để hóa rồng, http://vietbao.vn/Giao-duc/Ly-Quang-Dieu-va-chinh-sach-giao-duc-de-hoa-rong/20655080/203/, ngày cập nhật 18/01/2007.

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Article - VI

Strengthening Corporate Governance of Vietnamese SOEs: with reference to Chinese and Korean experience

Prof. Emeritus Nam, Sang-Woo60

Dr. Phan Thi Song Thuong61

Abstract

State-owned enterprises (SOEs), particularly large corporations and economic groups, play a core role in the Vietnamese economy. Thus, their corporate governance is likely to exert a substantial impact on the efficiency and competitiveness of the whole economy. In this paper, we review the past reform efforts and current state of corporate governance at Vietnamese SOEs and identify key challenges they face. In doing so, we make a reference to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of SOEs, and make a comparison with the evolution of corporate governance at Chinese and Korean SOEs. We note that Vietnamese SOEs have a long way to go for improving their corporate governance. Line ministries are advised to phase out their role of exercising state ownership rights by dominating the SOE boards of directors. Separate accounting is needed for socio-politically motivated services provided by SOEs, which is a prerequisite for better evaluation of CEO performance and holding them more accountable. Recent push for better transparency and disclosure at SOEs should be kept on. And, high priority should be given to strengthening board independence and professionalism at both SOEs and equitized, exchange-listed enterprises.

Keywords: State-owned enterprises (SOEs), corporate governance, SOE equitization

Introduction

With continued efforts to restructure state-owned enterprises (SOEs) since the early 1990s, Vietnamese SOEs still contribute 26-28 percent to the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2018. They are comprised of 490 wholly state-owned enterprises including six state economic groups and 55 state general corporations (Hanoitimes, 2019). These figures are likely to underestimate the roles played by the state in industrial activities, as SOEs are currently defined as only those fully owned by the state. This definition is also misleading as long as the corporations with partial state ownership are actually run just like those wholly owned by the state.

60 KDI School of Public Policy and Management, sangwoonam@gmail.com 61 Institute of Social Sciences of the Central Region, phansoongthuong.vass@gmail.com

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Equitisation means the conversion of an SOE into a joint stock company, an essential element of SOE restructuring in Vietnam. Even though the number of SOEs has substantially shrunken over the last 25 years or so, SOE equitisation has generally been slow and cautious in Vietnam. And, usually there was much delay until the equitized enterprises were listed on the stock exchange. In more recent years, efforts have been made to invite foreign strategic investors with a view to enhancing operational efficiencies of major state corporations. However, the results so far seem to have fallen short of expectation partly due to technical difficulties in evaluating the corporate assets and legal constraints on maximum foreign ownership. But, a more fundamental concern of potential foreign investors seems to be poor corporate governance of these enterprises: inadequate information disclosure, lack of transparency, and low confidence in honouring minority shareholder rights.

The establishment of the State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC) in 2005 and the Commission for the Management of State Capital at Enterprises (CMSC) in 2018 was a move in the right direction for Vietnam, concentrating the exercise of state capital ownership rights under these specialised entities. It would help avoid conflicts of interests arising from the dual roles of the state as both regulator and owner, and professionalise state asset management for the maximisation of their values. However, ensuring good corporate governance at the group or corporation level must be a rather challenging task as evidenced by the bankruptcy of VINASHIN, a shipbuilding state economic group. It was the result of failure in corporate governance. The lesson we may draw from this experience is that corporate governance reform should be an integral part of the whole process of SOE restructuring.

In this paper, we try to provide some suggestions for the improvement of corporate governance of Vietnamese SOEs and equitized exchange-listed corporations. In doing so, we review corporate governance reform efforts and the current state of SOE governance in China and Korea. Vietnam and China share similarities in political ideology and system, the roles played by SOEs, and their importance in the whole economy. In transition from a centrally planned economy to a socialist market economy, the two countries have been going through similar processes in roughly the same directions. However, there might be some differences in the role of the Communist Party in the governance of SOEs and the degree the state expects SOEs to support its socio-political objectives and major policies. In Korea, without the legacy of a centrally planned economy and several rounds of major SOE privatisation since the late 1960s, the contribution of SOEs to the whole economy is much smaller than in Vietnam or China. Actually, the number of SOEs subject to the Act on the Management of Public Institutions remains at 36 in 2019. Korea is certainly not a model country for practicing good corporate governance neither for state-owned nor for private enterprises. However, the evolution of SOE governance in Korea may serve as a good reference for Vietnam, which envisages to reduce the number of SOEs substantially in the near future.

Corporate Governance of Vietnamese SOEs

The reform of Vietnamese SOEs, as a part of the “Doi moi” (Renovation), started in 1992. The reform has mainly focused on two tasks: SOEs equitisation and institutional reform.

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Corporate governance reform in relation to SOE is currently one of the most important tasks in which the government aims to balance between the adequate and effective exercise of state ownership rights and managerial autonomy. Although a lot of efforts have been made in reforming the corporate governance of SOEs, the reform has not brought much success. For the enhanced efficiency and accountability of SOE management, it is critical to improve their internal corporate together with operational transparency and information disclosure.

Brief Review of SOE Corporate Governance Reform

In Vietnam, SOEs include relatively small independent SOEs and larger State-owned General Corporations (SGCs) established in strategically important sectors either under the Prime Minister or under other line ministries or provincial people's committees. Even larger and strategically important state business conglomerates are called State-owned Economic Groups (SEGs). Improving corporate governance of SOEs is a high priority given their important role in the economy. The Vietnamese government initiated SOE corporate governance reform by legislating the Law on SOEs in 1995. The reform efforts since the 1990s can be divided into the following three phases.

- Phase 1 (1992-2004): The Vietnamese government started the SOE equitisation program in 1992 with the aim of improving their governance and performance. And, the Law on SOEs of 1995 clearly specified the objectives of the Law, one of which was enhancing “state supervision over enterprises.” However, detailed guidelines on how to exercise the state ownership rights were missing in the Law resulting in poor Law enforcement in this regard (Nguyen Dinh Cung, 2008, p.13). The Law on SOEs 2003 stipulated a corporate governance framework more adequately and clearly. There, the state ownership rights were to be exercised by different state authorities including the Prime Minister, line ministries and the people’s committee. However, in this decentralised system, an effective mechanism for coordination among the state authorities was not specified in the Law. Additionally, the government established the Debt and Asset Trading Corporation (DATC) in 2003, whose main function was SOEs' debt resolution and restructuring, thereby helping the government undertake the equitisation of SOEs.

- Phase 2 (2005-2013): The equitisation process accelerated after the promulgation of the Revised Enterprise Law, the Competition Law, and the Investment Law in 2005. Enterprise Law 2005 stipulates a clear and comprehensive corporate governance framework for all types of enterprises, which is similar to the corporate governance model adopted by most advanced countries. This Law made a significant contribution to improving corporate governance in Vietnam (Nguyen Dinh Cung, 2018). In 2005, the State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC) was established to serve as the government's strategic investor. Taking over state shareholdings and exercising the ownership rights in SOEs, it is also tasked to promote best corporate governance practices at SOEs in order to enhance the efficiency of state capital utilisation. In 2012, the government set out an overall plan for the restructuring of SGCs and SEGs detailing some commitments to improve their operational transparency. In the same year, the Ministry of Finance issued a Circular focused on regulating corporate management and governance of publicly listed companies.

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- Phase 3 (2014-Now): With the Law on Enterprises 2014, the definition of an SOE was changed. SOEs are now defined as those ‘100 percent owned by the state’, rather than ‘majority owned by the state’, as was the case previously. Thus, joint stock companies partly owned by the state are supposed to be treated equally with private companies. This also applies to rules and regulations on corporate governance. Also, in 2014, the Law No. 69/2014/QH13 (on the management and utilisation of state capital invested in the enterprise’s manufacturing and business activities) was enacted with a view to improving the transparency and accountability of SOE operation holding them to be more accountable for their performance and making the management of state capital investment more efficient. In 2018, Decree 131/2018/ND-CP (on the functions, tasks, authority and organisational structure of the Commission for the Management of State Capital at Enterprises, "CMSC") was issued. As a ministry-level state agency, the CMSC is mandated to improve the performance of the nation’s largest core SOEs through better corporate governance, thus enhancing the competitiveness of the economy.

Roles of the SCIC and the CMSC

The State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC) has a key role in representing the state capital interests in enterprises. As an “effective state capital manager and investor”, the SCIC is tasked to improve the performance of SOEs through enterprise restructuring and better corporate internal control and governance (SCIC brochure; www.scic.vn). The SCIC appoints nominee directors to the board of enterprises it manages to protect state capital interests at the board meetings, although they are mostly incumbent directors rather than SCIC employees. The SCIC provides hands-on support to the SOEs they manage when they are in trouble, and even transitional supports to those newly equitized (Jica, 2015).

The CMSC was launched taking over the rights of state capital representatives held by different line ministries in the nation's 19 core SOEs including the SCIC, SEGs and selected SGCs in strategic industries. This transfer was a significant move towards establishing a single central entity mandated to exercise state capital ownership rights, and separating this right from the state regulation/policy function. Acting as the state shareholder at these strategically most important SOEs, the CMSC is expected to promote and practice good corporate governance at these enterprises, thereby enhancing the competitiveness of the whole economy. One of its main tasks is to appoint, assess and remove the chairman and other members of the boards of directors and supervisors of the SOEs. As for the appointment or dismissal of the CEOs and senior managers, the CMSC approves the final decision on the basis of the suggestions made by the boards of directors or board chairmen of the SOEs.

Roles of the Party

As SOEs have been playing a “leading role” in creating a momentum for Vietnam's economic development, the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) has been expected to play a “leadership role” in SOE governance. At each SOE, one or more Party committees are instituted, and they are significantly controlled by the Party through the following mechanisms:

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• All Party members are required to comply with the Party line, while most top executives and many other employees at SOEs are Party members.

• The Party committees within SOEs make decisions on major corporate matters before they go to the boards of directors for final determination. It ensures that SOE operation is consistent with the Party line.

• The Party Committees within SOEs formally approve the appointment, assessment, promotion and dismissal of top executives and board members. For core central SOEs, this role is played by the Party central committee (PCC).

• The Party also takes the responsibility of investigating and punishing SOE executives who are accused of wrongdoing or mismanagement.

Key Corporate Governance Practices

In Vietnam, the CMSC, SCIC, ministries and people’s committees share the role of representing the state capital invested in SOEs. And, the key internal corporate governance actors include CEO, board of directors, and the shareholders meeting. The roles of these representatives on three key corporate governance actors are mainly specified by the Decree 97/2015/NĐCP.

Selection of CEOs and senior executives and their compensation

The CEOs and senior executives of the 18 SOEs under the supervision of the CMSC are appointed, assessed, promoted, and removed by the boards of directors or board chairmen of the SOEs on the basis of the CMSC’s approval. However, the CMSC is obliged to report these actions to the PCC and the Government for final decision. In the case of the SCIC, the CEO is directly appointed and removed by the Prime Minister in consultation with the Minister of Finance (MOF), Minister of Home Affairs (MoHA) and the CMSC. For SOEs under the SCIC's management, the SCIC approves the selection of the CEOs on the basis of the proposals by the boards of directors. For other SOEs, selection of the CEOs is made by the boards of directors or board chairmen, but requires the official agreement of the supervising authorities: the line ministries or the local people’s committees.

CEO and senior executive compensation is a potentially effective means of encouraging them to act in the best interests of shareholder(s). According to Article 117 of the Law on Enterprises, their compensation is to be based on business performance measured by such indicators as pre-tax profit and economic value added. CEO salary is determined by the board of management (BOM), and the annual bonus is based on their triennial performance evaluation.

Board of Directors, Supervisory Board, and Board of Management: its composition and effectiveness

As is the case with private companies, the SOE board of directors is to take full responsibility for the company's performance. As for SOEs under the supervision of the

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CMSC, chairmen and other members of board are appointed, assessed and removed by the CMSC. In the case of the SCIC, the appointment or dismissal of the chairman is made by the Prime Minister, while this role is played by the MOF for other members. These actions are to be reported to the PCC and the Government for final decision. For other SOEs, the members of the board of directors including the chairman are appointed, assessed and removed by the supervising authorities: the SCIC, line ministries or the local people’s committees.

In addition to the board of directors, SOEs in the form of joint stock company were required to have a supervisory board. However, the revised Law on Enterprises 2014 allows them not to have the supervisory board. In this case, the board of directors is required to have at least 20% of the members as independent directors, and to institute an Audit Committee under it (IFC, 2015, p1).

Exchange-listed companies partially owned by the state are no longer defined as SOEs. They have both the board of management (BOM) and the supervisory board (SB). This unique structure of the board might be called ‘the unitary board with the supervisory board supplemented’. Whilst the BOM performs enterprise management at the strategic level, the SB performs the governing role. Members of both BOM and SB are appointed at the shareholders meeting (Minh Tam Bui Thi, 2018, p. 33-36).

The BOM consists of executive directors and independent/non-executive directors (at least 30 percent of the total BOM members), while the SB consists exclusively of non-executive members. However, the independence of the ‘independent or non-executive directors’ is rather loosely defined and interpreted compared with the standards of the Anglo-Saxon model. The two positions of the CEO and BOM chairman are prohibited to be performed by the same person from August 2020 by the revised Law on Enterprises 2014. The SB is to consist of 3-5 members chosen by the BOM and formally elected by the shareholders meeting unless otherwise stipulated by company’s charter. The SB is mandated to check and approve company’s financial reports and inspect the company books if requested by the shareholders. It is also tasked to supervise the BOM and senior managers.

Rights of minority shareholders

Balancing of interests between controlling and minority shareholders is a key challenge in corporate governance of listed SOEs. Basic rights of minority shareholders are stipulated in the Law on Enterprises. Vietnam is poorly evaluated compared with neighbouring countries in key shareholder rights and equitable treatment of shareholders. For example, requests to convene an extraordinary shareholders meeting and to place items on the agenda of a shareholders meeting each requires a minimum shareholding of 10 percent for at least 6 months--which is a high threshold by international standards. And, the minimum advance notice required to request a shareholders meeting is only 10 days. Disclosure of profiles of directors seeking election and policy on dealing with related party transactions are also viewed inadequate (OECD, 2017, and Asian Development Bank, 2016).

Transparency and disclosure

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Transparency and disclosure has been known to be notoriously weak at Vietnamese SOEs. That is considered one of the major reasons why foreign investors, particularly potential strategic investors, have not shown keen interest in the recent SOE equitisation drive. Disclosure requirements imposed by different authorities have often been overlapping and unsystematic. And, disclosed information was generally of poor quality, except for some large SOEs, being outdated, ambiguous, contradictory, inaccurate and unsubstantial (WB, 2014, pp. 22 & 31).

However, with the Decree 81/2015/NĐ-CP on information disclosure of SOEs, there seems to be a noticeable progress. The required information is to be disclosed on the websites of the SOE and the agency representing its state ownership. The Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) is mandated to centralise the information from all SOEs and discloses it on its Business Portal, www.business.gov.vn. The Decree also stipulates various disciplinary actions such as warning for those neglecting this duty of information disclosure. According to an MPI report, 383 SOEs disclosed the required information on the MPI Business Portal by the end of 2018. This number of SOEs accounts for 71.6 percent of the total, which represents a significant increase from 38 percent at the end of 2016. However, on average, the SOEs disclosed only about five items of information out of the total nine items required to disclose (VNExpress, 2019).

Corporate Governance of Chinese SOEs

Probably the most prominent feature of Chinese SOEs' governance is the substantial role played by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The Party largely controls personnel appointments in large SOEs and is broadening its participation in the SOE decision-making process. However, the role of the Party in the governance of SOEs seems to be played without seriously colliding with the more formal rules on the corporate governance of SOEs. Obviously, this coexistence of the two separate structures is possible as the representatives in the two structures are substantially overlapped with each other. With the broader and leading roles called in recent years for the Party units at SOES, there is a concern that the formal corporate governance structure such as the corporate board of directors would become increasingly marginalised (Wang, 2014, p. 648).

Brief Review of SOE Corporate Governance Reforms

It was towards the end of the 1990s that the Chinese government officially recognised the importance of corporate governance as an essential part of SOE reform. In 2001, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) mandated all exchange-listed companies to have two or more independent directors constituting at least one third of the total board members. This was followed by the CSRC issuing a “Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies.” With the creation of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) in 2003, boards of directors were newly established in many central SOEs' group (holding) companies. However, these efforts have largely been stalled since 2009 as the powers of the SASAC and Party committee within an SOE undermined the effectiveness of the board. Until that time, power exercise of Party representatives had mainly been focused on personnel and political affairs and internal supervision and anti-corruption issues (Rosen, Leutert, &

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Guo, 2018, pp.19-21). In 2017, the SASAC ordered SOEs to revise their articles of association and the CCP Constitution was also revised, to incorporate the leadership role of Party committees in corporate governance.

Roles of the Party and the SASAC

Each SOE has one or more Party committees, and SOEs are substantially controlled by the CCP through the following mechanisms: (Wang, 2014, p. 652)

• All Party members are required to comply with the Party line (while most top executives and many other employees at SOEs are Party members)

• Party committees within SOEs make important decisions to ensure the company’s operation is consistent with the Party line; and

• The Party decides the appointment and promotion of the top executives of (core central) SOEs; SOE executives accused of wrongdoing are investigated by the CCP and punished under Party discipline.

With the recent institutionalisation of the Party’s “leadership role” in SOE governance under the Xi Administration, Party committees are formally discussing “major decisions” before they go to boards of directors for final decision. The Party leaders seem to believe that more expansive involvement of the Party committee will result in improvement, rather than deterioration, of SOE performance and valuation thanks to better supervision and accountability.

The SASAC has the mission of administering the central government’s portfolio of industrial SOEs. Acting as the state shareholder in central industrial SOEs, the SASAC:

• supervises these enterprises, evaluates their management performance and determines executive compensation,

• appoints/removes the CEOs and senior executives of wholly state-owned enterprises as well as the chairman and other members of the board and supervisors, and

• proposes candidates for directors and supervisors to the general shareholders meeting of a company in which the State has partial interest.

These legal rights of the SASAC are actually exercised subject to tight control by the Party, practically letting the SASAC perform its functions on behalf of the Party (Wang, 2014, pp. 653-654).

Key Corporate Governance Practices

SOEs in China consist of about 100 central SOEs and numerous local SOEs. A large-scale SOE is composed of a group (holding) company and many subsidiaries. Group company is typically wholly owned by SASAC (or a local SASAC) or government body, and holds controlling shares in listed subsidiaries. As is the case for private companies, SOEs have

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three key corporate governance actors: the CEO, board of directors, and shareholders meeting.

CEO selection and compensation

Senior SOE executives, though mostly spent their careers in SOEs, are typically also government officials. That's why they are likely to be more sensitive to state policies than devoting themselves to maximizing corporate profits and shareholder value. It is widely viewed that senior executives of exchange-listed SOEs tend to regard their positions as a stepping stone to a higher position in their political or administrative careers (Rosen, et al., 2018, pp. 31-32).

• At the group (holding) company level, CEOs (together with board chairmen and Party secretaries) are directly appointed, assessed, promoted, and removed by the Party and the government authorities.

• Top leaders of core central SOEs (subsidiaries) are appointed by the Central Organisation Department of the Party in consultation with higher Party authorities.

• Heads of non-core central SOEs (subsidiaries) and local SOEs are appointed by

the SASAC and local governments, respectively.

Executive compensation, by motivating them to act in the best interest of shareholders, can serve as a corporate government device. Compensation for the cheap executives of Chinese SOEs consists of base salary and performance-based annual bonus.62 The annual bonus is based on the annual and triennial performance reviews. The performance is measured by pre-tax profit, economic value added (EVA; net profit less the enterprise’s total cost of capital), and other indicators. Stock options, which may be a powerful incentive for the CEOs to align their interest with that of shareholders, are not allowed for SOE executives (Lin, 2019).

Board of directors: its composition and effectiveness

Board chairman at the group (holding) company level typically also serves as Party secretary, and frequently serves as the chairman of the SOE’s main subsidiaries. Other board members are significantly represented by the Party committee. On paper, all directors are supposed to be selected at the general shareholders meeting. But, the realities are different (Rosen et al., 2018, pp. 28-30).

At the group (holding) company level, the SASAC selects the executive directors and external directors (representing the interests of the state). As they are mostly Party members, they share a common duty to represent the interests of the Party. For exchange-listed subsidiaries of SOEs, executive directors are usually pre-determined by

62 The base salary, common for all the CEOs of the central SOEs under SASAC’s supervision, is fixed at twice the previous year’s average wage of all the workers, while the annual bonus is capped at eight times the average wage of all SOE workers (Song, 2017, endnote 2).

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the Party, and the SASAC-proposed independent directors (who are to constitute at least a third of the total board membership) are rarely viewed as independent.

Boards of directors at Chinese SOEs are not fully performing their functions as specified in the law. This is largely because the board’s role is undermined by the SASAC and the Party's Central Organisation Department, which exert their critical influence on such corporate issues as personnel selection, performance evaluation, and compensation. Setting the agendas of a board meeting by the Party committee and its discussion on major corporate affairs before they go to the board are also substantially weakening the roles of the board at Chinese SOEs.

There were welcome initiatives in 2017 towards enhancing the role of the board in SOE corporate governance. One was the SASAC relinquishing its function of performance evaluation of SOE management and determining their compensation to the board of directors. This was tried on an experimental basis at several central SOEs or their subsidiaries. Another was mandating all central SOEs which had not gone through a corporatisation process to corporatize by the end of 2017. It means these still numerous central SOEs have to put in place a board of directors, which is expected to give a positive impact on SOE performance (Song, 2017, p.8).63

Rights of minority shareholders

Key challenge in corporate governance of listed SOEs is how to effectively protect the interests of minority shareholders from abuses by the state owner or senior executives. It is argued that “many elements of rights for minority shareholders in China may be virtually impossible to exercise” (Osburn, 2018). The general shareholders meeting is usually not effective in protecting the interests of minority shareholders. It simply serves as a mechanism for the controlling owner (the state) to have its agendas formally approved (Allen, J., & Li, R., 2018, p. 98).

Mixed Ownership Reform under the Xi Administration

Another SOE policy the Xi administration is strongly promoting is the Mixed Ownership Reform. It aims at attracting private sector capital and efficiency into SOEs (often granting employees stock ownership as well). Though it is actually nothing new, this time, the reform is more formally pushed with strong political backing. How enthusiastically the private sector would respond to this state initiative will very much depend on the degree of confidence they have in their interests being adequately protected. Thus, enhancing corporate governance at the mixed-owned enterprises would be critical to the success of this initiative (Rosen et al., 2018, pp. 25-26). Since 2016, a total of 50 SOEs in three batches have gone through the pilot mixed-ownership reform with reportedly significant improvement in their business performance. In 2019,

63 Actually, Chinese SOEs have a dual board system with a supervisory committee/board. As a part of SOE internal governance structure, the committee/board exercises independent supervisory power over the board of directors and executive officers. However, its role has largely been focused on preventing fraud without much contribution to enhancing SOE corporate governance. (Wang, 2014, p. 650, and Song, 2017, endnote 1).

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it was reported that the fourth batch of SOEs to undergo the ownership reform would be as many as 160 SOEs (Xinhua Net, 2019).64

Corporate Governance of SOEs in Korea

The current corporate governance system for SOEs in Korea is based on the Act on the Management of Public Institutions (AMPI) which went into effect in April 2007. The line ministries are allowed to intervene in the management of SOEs only on limited issues mainly related to its industrial policy functions. The ownership functions are mainly exercised by the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) through the newly established Ownership Steering Committee (OSC). The AMPI also includes public disclosure of management information and the performance evaluation of SOEs as essential elements of corporate governance (Act on the Management of Public Institutions, 2019).

The Ownership Steering Committee (OSC)

This Committee is chaired by the Minister of MOSF and plays a central role in deliberation and resolution on the operation of public institutions. Other members of the Committee include vice-ministers or vice minister-level government officials, and 11 or less non-governmental members commissioned by the President on the recommendation of the Minister of MOSF from among persons in the fields of law, economy, academia, labour, etc. The total member of the Committee cannot exceed 20. Essential matters for deliberation and resolution by the Committee include (Act on the Management of Public Institutions, 2019, Article 8):

• Designation/cancellation of public institutions

• Selection of CEOs, (senior) non-executive directors, and auditors of SOEs

• Providing guidelines on remuneration

• Performance evaluation of SOEs, non-executive directors and auditors

• Matters related to the public disclosure of managerial information

• Dismissal (or request for dismissal) of CEOs, non-executive directors and auditors of SOEs who neglected their duties, and

• Checking whether the line ministries' supervision over SOEs is appropriate and taking necessary measures to correct inappropriate supervision.

64 In this pilot reform, the state has kept its majority ownership. At present, there seems to be little indication that the state would go as far as relinquishing its controlling ownership, or letting the board of directors play its proper role, in order to improve SOE profitability and valuation (Wang, 2018, pp. 5-6).

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SOE Performance Report, Performance Evaluation, and Remuneration

By March 20 of every year, each SOE is required to submit its Performance Report to the Ministers of MOSF and relevant line ministry. The MOSF evaluates the performance of SOEs on the basis of this Report and other relevant materials. The MOSF Minister organises an evaluation team composed of professors, research fellows at government funded research institutes, experienced CPAs, lawyers, consultants, and other experts. The evaluation results are forwarded to the OSC for its deliberation/resolution before finalisation and being reported to the National Assembly and the President. The remuneration for the CEOs, other executives and employees of SOEs are linked to these evaluation results. Highly evaluated SOEs are given rewards such as additional budget allocation for the following year along with promotion or awards for the best-performed employees. The OSC can recommend or demand the firing of poorly-performed CEOs. Depending on the main causes of poor performance, the OSC can take measures to reduce the budget or put ceilings on employees’ salaries and bonuses.

Board of Directors

The board of directors is the supreme decision-making body of SOEs with important tasks of setting management goals, preparing long-term financial management plans, determining remuneration for CEO, making decisions on major business matters, and overseeing the performance and compliance of CEO. The board consists of executive and non-executive directors, and the total number should not be more than 15. For 'large' SOEs (market-type SOEs and quasi-market-type SOEs with assets over 2 trillion won), non-executive directors (NEDs) should be the majority, while the minimum required NEDs are one third of the total for small SOEs. All SOEs are to have one senior NED, who has the authority to convene and preside over meetings attended by NEDs. In the case of large SOEs, the senior NED also serves as the chairman of the board of directors. He/she is appointed by the Minister of MOSF upon the deliberation of OSC, while the senior NED of small SOEs is selected by NEDs’ vote.

Appointment of the CEO, Board Members, and Auditor

The CEOs of large SOEs are appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Minister of line ministry. The appointment process starts with the Committee for Recommending Executive Officers selecting multiple candidates, and the OSC selecting one of them, and notifying the selection to the Minister of line ministry. The process is the same for small SOEs, but the final appointment of the CEO is made by the Minister of line ministry. Executive directors of an SOE are appointed by the CEO (except for the executive director who also serves as an audit committee member). NEDs are appointed by the MOSF after the OSC selects one of the multiple candidates recommended by the Committee for Recommending Executive Officers. The auditors of large SOEs are appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Minister of MOSF after being selected by the OSC among the multiple candidates recommended by the Committee for Recommending Executive Officers. The auditors of small SOEs are selected through the same process, but appointed by the Minister of MOSF.

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Rights of Minority Shareholders

Minority shareholders of unlisted SOEs can exercise some of the rights allowed to minority shareholders of the listed companies by the Commercial Act. They include rights to call an extraordinary shareholders meeting, inspect affairs and status of company's assets, make proposals, request the court to remove the director, etc. (Commercial Act, 2019, Article 542-6). Also, in the case of SOEs instituted with the shareholders meeting, the selection of executive officers needs the resolution of the shareholders meeting, if so required by other laws.

Public Disclosure

Timely disclosure of accurate information to the public is an essential element of transparent and accountable management, and is expected to contribute to efficiency enhancement. In addition to the Official Information Disclosure Act which became effective in 1998, the AMPI mandates SOEs and public institutions to disclose important management information on their internet homepage. Also, the MOSF requires all public institutions to provide their management information in specific and standardised manner so that the information is consolidated to be disclosed on the integrated website ALIO (all public information in one, www.alio.go.kr). The common list of information to be disclosed is prepared by the MOSF, but is finalised by the OSC. The MOSF is in charge of checking and confirming the disclosed information. In case an SOE or public institution is found to have neglected the duty with failure to disclose, delayed or incorrect disclosure, they get a disciplinary warning with penalty points and the employees responsible for the negligence can be subject to disciplinary measures.

Overall Evaluation

In spite of the seemingly elaborate mechanisms instituted, corporate governance of SOEs in Korea has some serious weaknesses. First, SOEs which went public by exchange listing but are still subject to the Act on the Management of Public Institutions (AMPI) have shown little improvement in their corporate governance (Korea Institute of Public Finance, 2014, p.8). This is largely due to rigid rules of the AMPI lacking adequate attention to listed SOEs. Second, SOEs pursuing both profit and public interest, such as electricity, gas and district heating, have been unsuccessful in balancing the two objectives, resulting in strong rejection and legal actions by small shareholders. It indicates that these SOEs have failed in separate accounting of cost and revenue for commercial activities and services provided with socio-political considerations, and let the government bear the net loss accruing to the latter activities. Third, SOE boards of directors are generally lacking independence and professional expertise. This is mainly because the selection of non-executive directors is all too often made on the basis of connections, nepotism, and political favoritism. Fourth, CEO positions of SOEs are vulnerable to the change of government often threatening management stability. In Korea, the government changes every five years, and the new government tends to consider SOEs as their trophies and attempt to replace the CEOs. Finally, small shareholder rights are poorly protected at SOEs in situations just noted and other circumstances. It is not surprising given that corporate governance scores are rather low even in private enterprises.

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Conclusion

A big obstacle to the improvement of the Vietnamese SOEs has been the dual role played by line ministries: the roles both as the owner and the regulator. Even though the SCIC and more recently established CMSC are playing the role of the owner of the SOEs, the line ministries still have strong influence in the selection of CEOs and members of the board of directors. When a ministry plays the dual role, the commercial objectives (of the owner) are likely to be compromised leading to poor performance and low efficiency of the SOEs. In order to mitigate this problem, the board of directors might be mandated to have a majority of non-executive independent directors. These directors should not have any ties with the management of the SOEs. This will also help professionalise the boards, bringing valuable expertise to board decision making.

Performance evaluation of SOEs and their CEOs is another mechanism of corporate governance. A problem is that Vietnamese SOEs are often required by the state to provide services and carry out other activities motivated by socio-political considerations. In these situations, the realised financial performance of the SOE would not be a reliable measure of the performance. To address this problem, SOEs are to do separate accounting for these activities with the incurred deficit borne by the state budget.

Transparency and disclosure of SOE operation is a powerful means of disciplining the managers of SOEs to be more accountable. Vietnamese SOEs seem to be doing poorly in disclosing relevant information to the general public, the ultimate owner of SOEs. However, SOEs have been subject to stronger disclosure requirements since 2014. They include penalties for the non-compliance of the disclosure regulations. The authorities are advised to put high priority on more timely and adequate information disclosure with stricter compliance measures.

The Vietnamese authorities are pushing for attracting strategic foreign investors as an effective way of enhancing the international competitiveness of domestic enterprises (with the similar policy intention to that of pilot mixed-ownership reform in China). However, these efforts have generally fallen short of expectations so far. There are issues of valuation of the company and ownership ceiling allowed to foreign investors that discourage potential strategic foreign investors to join. However, the most serious hindrance seems to be poor corporate governance including lack of transparency and inadequate information disclosure. It is imperative to significantly improve corporate governance of exchange-listed companies not only for the healthy growth of the capital market but also for strengthening the international competitiveness of Vietnamese industries.

The exchange-listed companies in Vietnam are mandated to have at least 30 percent of the total BOM members as independent/non-executive directors, and the SB consisting of exclusively non-executive members are tasked to supervise the BOM and senior managers. Nevertheless, board independence and effectiveness seems to remain rather poor. Even poorer might be the protection of minority shareholders. Even though basic rights of minority shareholders are mostly recognised in the relevant law and the Model Charter, there seems to be a large gap between the written rules and the reality. The

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same appears to be true for information disclosure. Despite noticeable improvement in recent years, the rate of compliance with the disclosure requirements among the exchange-listed companies in Vietnam remains very low.

Korean and Vietnamese SOEs share some common weaknesses in their corporate governance. They include no clear separate accounting for socio-politically motivated activities of SOEs, ineffective boards of directors, and poor protection of minority shareholders. Still, Vietnamese SOEs may be able to improve their governance by adopting some of the practices employed by Korean SOEs. One thing to consider might be the role of the Committee for Recommending Executive Officers in the selection of CEO and non-executive directors. Another might be the system of SOE performance evaluation assisted by an independent evaluation team consisting of professionals with relevant expertise, and the remuneration system based on the evaluation results. Vietnamese SOEs might also take the Korean ALIO disclosure system as a reference.

Vietnam still has as many as 490 wholly SOEs at the central level (under the supervision of either SCIC or CMSC), while China has 96 central SOEs (supervised by the SASAC). In Korea, there are only 36 central SOEs in such limited sectors as power generation, gas, petroleum, district heating, mineral resources, seaports and airports. These SOEs include enterprises partially (basically minimum 50 percent, but as low as 30 percent for some enterprises) owned by the government and public institutions. The Vietnamese government is advised to accelerate the SOE equitisation process so as to reduce the number of SOEs substantially within a few years.

Both Vietnamese and Chinese SOEs have their origin from the centrally planned economy. They also have taken a similar course of transformation: corporatisation or equitisation, selective listing of their shares at the stock exchange, and adopting some features of the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance model. However, the process of divestiture of state ownership and corporate governance reform has been slow, cautious and sometimes stagnant. This might be understandable given that SOEs in the two countries are still expected to serve as the key forces of socio-economic stability. In the case of China, actually, corporate governance of SOEs seems to have been backtracking since around 2010 with the rising emphasis on the leading role of the Party. Also, in Vietnam, Party organ(s) is in place at every SOE, but it does not seem very intrusive in the governance of SOEs. Although there might be some positive roles played by the Party committees, it is likely to weaken the independence and professionalism of the board of directors and the protection of minority shareholders.

References

1. Act on the Management of Public Institutions, Statutes of the Republic of Korea. Retrieved July 6, 2019 from https://elaw.klri.re.kr/ENG_service/lawView.do?hseq=41210&lang=ENG.

2. All Public Information in-One (ALIO) (n.d.). Retrieved July 6, 2019, from

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http://www.alio.go.kr/alioSystem.do.

3. Allen, J., & Li, R. (2018). Awakening governance: The evolution of corporate governance in China. ACGA China CG Report 2018. Asian Corporate Governance Association.

4. Asian Development Bank. (2016). ASEAN corporate governance scorecard: Country reports and assessments 2014.

5. Berle, A. A., & Means, G. C. (1932). The modern corporation and private property. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.

6. Commercial Act, Statutes of the Republic of Korea. Retrieved July 6, 2019 from https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=29875&lang=ENG.

7. Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance. (1992). Report of the committee on the financial aspects of corporate governance (Cadbury Report). London: Gee & Co. Ltd.

8. Hanoitimes. (2019). State firms contribute 28% to Vietnam’s GDP in 2018. Updated on April 17, 2019. Retrieved from http://www.hanoitimes.vn/economy/2019/04/81e0d5bf/state-firms-contribute-28-to-vietnam-s-gdp-in-2018/

9. IFC. (2015). Corporate governance in Vietnam: success stories.

10. JICA. (2015). Overview of SCIC operation and measures for operational improvement. JICA project on operational improvement of SCIC.

11. Korea Institute of Public Finance. (2014). Policy Environment and Issues for Exchange-listed SOEs. Tax and Public Finance Brief (in Korean).

12. Lin, L-W. (2019). Revisiting executive pay of China's state-owned enterprises: Formal design, fresh data, and further doubts. UC Davis Business Law Journal, 19, 27-66.

13. Minh Tam Bui Thi. (2018). Ownership as a moderator of relation between corporate governance and firm performance in Vietnam. Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for degree of doctor of philosophy, Queensland University of Technology Business School.

14. Nam, I.C. (2013). Governance of SOEs and public institutions in Korea. 2012 modularisation of Korea13). Governance of SOEs and public institutions in Korea. 2012 moduublications Registration Number 11-7003625-000036-01. Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Republic of Korea.

15. Nguyen Dinh Cung. (2008). Corporate governance in Vietnam: regulations, practices and problems. CIEM & GTZ project report.

16. OECD. (2015a). G20/OECD principles of corporate governance. Paris: OECD Publishing.

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17. OECD. (2015b). OECD guidelines on corporate governance of state-owned enterprises, 2015 edition. Paris: OECD Publishing.

18. OECD. (2017). OECD Survey of corporate governance frameworks in Asia.

19. Osburn, I. Z. (2018). State-Controlled/Privately Traded: Corporate Governance in Chinese Overseas Listed State-Owned Enterprises. The Seminar on Corporations and International Law. Retrieved from https://sites.duke.edu/corporations/2018/01/20/state-controlled-privately-traded-corporate-governance-in-chinese-overseas-listed-state-owned-enterprises/

20. Rosen, D. H., Leutert, W., & Guo, S. (2018). Missing Link: Corporate governance in Chinate-governance-in-chinese-overseas-listed-state-owned-enterprises/enterprises/" Republic of Korea. tor.

21. Song, H. (2017). State-owned enterprise reforms: Untangling ownership, control, and corporate governance. Decoding China's economic arrival. MacroPolo. https://macropolo.org/analysis/state-owned-enterprise-reforms-untangling-ownership-control-corporate-governance/

22. Vietnam News. (2016). Compliance with disclosure requirements grows. September 21, 2016. Retrieved from https://vietnamnews.vn/economy/343122/compliance-with-disclosure-requirements-grows.html#fL6B8MDHph0yQTw1.97.

23. VNExpress. (2019, July 15). More than 150 state-owned enterprises are slow to disclose information. (dated on July 15 2019) https://vnexpress.net/kinh-doanh/hon-150-doanh-nghiep-nha-nuoc-chay-i-cong-bo-thong-tin-3952703.html.

24. Wang, J. (2014). The political logic of corporate governance in China’s state-owned enterprises. Cornell International Law Journal, 47, 632-669.

25. World Bank. (2014). Transparency of state owned enterprises in Vietnam: current status and ideas for reform.

26. Xinhua Net. (2019). China approves 160 SOEs in pilot mixed-ownership reform. Retrieved from http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-05/17/c_138067007.htm

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Book Review-I

Shiv Shanker Menon, Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy

Arjun65

As India continues to wrestle with the Chinese military aggression in the Galwan Valley in the Union Territory of Ladakh, similarly the South East Asian nations are tackling the brazen military expansionism of the Chinese in the South China Sea. A sudden surge of hostilities triggered by China has led the world community to question Beijing’s political ambition and military aggression. In India’s context, it is all the more imperative that she comprehend the motive of the Chinese, as she has, in the recent years, encountered a rise in tensions along the India-China Border. A comprehensive answer for the Chinese posture lies in Shivshankar Menon’s ‘Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy’. A retired career diplomat and a former National Security Adviser to the Indian Prime Minister between 2010-14, Menon had served as India’s Ambassador to China between 2000-03. Prior to 2000-03, he served a couple of tenures in China and had also completed his PhD on ‘Ancient India-China Kingship.’

Unlike other Indian foreign policy books, Choices presents a profound understanding of the fundamental workings of decision-making machinery which enables the formulation of Indian foreign policy. The book comprises five chapters, each narrating a major international event in India’s recent past. These five events have been particularly selected by the author as he was directly involved and associated with the decision-making process. Interestingly, the author sheds light on the various arguments, discussions and negotiations that were involved in shaping the course of action at the highest political and bureaucratic levels. He weighs in and analyses their outcome in terms of the best national interest through the- maximising gains and minimising loss- matrix. The author keeps feeding his audience with different arguments, perspectives, and assessments without thrusting his opinions onto them. Rather, he appears to be stimulating the reader to understand the rationale of the state’s actions and decisions.

In his capacity as a practitioner of diplomacy and a scholar of Chinese culture, Menon has well-articulated and evaluated the Chinese politico-cultural dimension through a historical account, featuring various challenges that prevail between India and China since India’s independence. Having been instrumental in the formulation of the Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement, Menon has used his bureaucratic experience and interaction with the Chinese to provide his readers with an accurate insight into the Chinese psyche and thinking.

The opening chapter discusses the 1993 Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement between India and China and their historical bilateral relation post-1947. The backstory

65The reviewer is Phd scholar with JSIA, O P Jindal University. His research interests are maritime security, Indian Ocean and India’s maritime strategy.

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of India-China ties helps the reader to understand the events that led up to the border disputes, thus enabling the audience to put into perspective the ongoing tensions along the India-China border in the Eastern Theatre of Ladakh. Menon’s incisive understanding of the Chinese history, culture, and political vision helps his audience grasp the intricate nature of the Chinese psyche with ease and clarity. In view of the current military entanglement with China, a parallel could be drawn with the past Chinese aggressions on the Indian state- the genesis of the events being strikingly similar. The chapter recounts the near impossible challenges that hindered the execution of the Agreement from within the country’s political spectrum and acknowledges the cleverness of the then incumbent Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, who used his political astuteness to dissolve any dissent by bringing the opposition on board for the formulation of the policy.

The following chapter delineates India’s decision to initiate the Civil Nuclear Deal with the United States (U.S) and expounds the complexities involved in the nuclear negotiations, including the convolutions concerning the formulation of the agreement besides India’s strategic calculations and dilemma over the civil-nuclear pact. The author remarks at the far-sightedness, determination, and tenacity of the Indian political leadership to ensure the nuclear deal goes through successfully, despite heavy criticisms from within the political party as well as from the opposition. During the course of the chapter, the reader trails the trajectory of the development of the Indo-US ties over the nuclear covenant and spells out the arduous tasks taken by the Indian stakeholders along with their U.S counterparts in ensuring the completion of the agreement.

The third chapter deals with the 26/11 Mumbai attack and addresses the state sponsored terrorism from Pakistan. It weighs and analyses India’s response and puts forth other possible counter-retaliatory measures that could have been carried out by India while pre-empting the consequences of those actions. Menon articulates the reason why the Indian political leadership consciously chose the use of restraint over a military riposte as a counter-offensive. The decision-makers assess and evaluate situations before arriving at decisions based on the minimax matrix. In response to the terror attack, the leadership was convinced that there was more to gain for the state by exercising a restraint response than a knee jerk military riposte. To substantiate this argument the author offers accounts of different countries that have adopted different strategic mechanisms to engage terrorism and evaluates their outcomes while contrasting them with India’s decision. In doing so, the writer allows the audience to develop a different perspective by helping to recognise the motive behind India’s choice of response.

In the following chapter, the author sets up the stage by providing a glimpse at the historical social fabric of Sri Lanka to explain the cause of the civil war that ravaged the country for 26 years. Furthermore, he reports the key factors that drove India to militarily intervene in the Sri Lankan conflict. Addressing the issue, Menon presents both India and Sri Lanka’s perspectives vis a vis the conflict while contrasting the differences of perception between the two governments. He presents the reason and the justification for the choice of decisions made by the leadership of both countries without attempting to prove the superiority of anyone. While giving credit to the Sri Lankan leadership for its role in the elimination of the LTTE and in the rehabilitation

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of the Sri Lankan Tamils with the help of the Indian Government, Menon was equally lacerating regarding their leadership for failing to show compassion towards the vanquished and disregarding the humanitarian aspect and for creating a devolution of political power through a democratic system to create an inclusive united social structure.

The penultimate chapter delivers the rationale behind India’s assertion and its strategic decision to acquire nuclear weapons and it endorses the reasons for India’s ‘No First Use’ policy. India has been steadfast in its stance of wanting to create a nuclear-weapon-free world. However, it has refrained itself from signing and complying with the discriminatory policy of the Nuclear-Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Having been threatened on more than one occasion by nuclear armed states, the Indian establishment was left with no other choice than to arm itself with nuclear weapons as a form of deterrence, with the sole purpose of protecting its citizens from nuclear threats. Despite not being a signatory of the NPT and being a nuclear state, India has conscientiously adhered to the non-proliferation policies and has desisted the spread of nuclear technology and has been the only nuclear weapon state to call for a global nuclear disarmament. Additionally, India’s ‘No First Use’ policy has reassured the global community of its unwavering aspiration and commitment to create a nuclear-weapon-free world.

In the concluding chapter, the author reviews the five events and discusses the behaviour of the respective states and points out the policy choices made by the Indian decision makers. He reiterates the complexities involved in the decision-making apparatus as he states that countries make decisions based on the minimax matrix of -minimising harm to one’s own interests while maximising the gain. He concludes by expressing his conviction about India’s rise and confirms that it is on the path to becoming a great, powerful, and prosperous nation in the years to come.

The book leaves no room for criticism as the author comprehensively synthesises his experiences in a well-articulated, rational, and succinct manner which enables even a layman to understand the process of decision making at the highest level. Menon has beautifully expressed the evolution and trajectory of India’s relation with various countries using these five events and has also depicted the complex and strenuous historical overhang of relations with its hostile neighbourhood. Choices can certainly be deemed as one of the finest books ever written on India’s foreign policy as it ropes in history, diplomacy, politics and state’s principles to illustrate the manner in which they play a significant role in determining and influencing the making of Indian foreign policy.

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Book Review -II

Manuela Lavinas Picq and Markus Thiel(Eds) Sexualities in World Politics: How LGBTQ claims shape International Relations, London: Routledge, 2015

Deepika Mann66

The ‘Sexualities in World Politics: How LGBTQ claims shape International Relations’ is a peculiar work which discusses the impact of LGBTQ politics on the study of International Relations (IR) through LGBTQ experiences to the IR system. This book contains an introduction, eight chapters and a conclusion edited by Manuela Lavinas Picq and Markus Thiel. The eight chapters are based on different themes and written by different authors which helps in collaborating vibrant and insightful ideas about inclusion of the LGBTQ community in mainstream politics. The focus of the book is on the subtitle- ‘How LGBTQ claims shape International Relations’, rather than on the title which talks about Sexualities in World Politics. The editors in the introductory chapter introduce the LGBTQ terminology under the startling acronym LGBTIQQ2SA (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual, transgender, intersex, queer, questioning, 2-spirited, and allies) along with different elements of LGBTQ perspectives which have an immense impact on the gender studies. The case studies in the book cover a wide range of regions from Europe to the United States and discuss the relations between core, non-core and peripheral countries through different concepts such as war, security, modernity, particularism and universalism. The chapters merely focus on the LGBTQ politics and theories through anthropological and sociological perspective of sexuality and their impact on international politics, rather than the feminist and queer theories.

The first chapter by Anthony J. Langlois elucidates the relationship between human rights, LGBT rights and international theory and questions whether LGBT rights can be queered. The author theorizes four different approaches to human rights that are performativity, positionality, queer liberalism and state critique to critically analyse IR through LGBTQ perspective.

In the second chapter, Michael J. Bosia writes about the role of state as an actor and its capability to absorb concepts like gender, sexuality, etc. The focus of the chapter is on a state’s relationship with sexuality from modernity perspective, as modernity plays an important role in transforming and shaping the state as explained in the case study of Uganda. At the same time, Bosia discusses the role of the state in producing ‘homosexualisaton’ because the state has the capacity to generate sexualities or LGBT identities that can be done through legal authorization and prohibition. While discussing the role of state, the question of morality also arises for which the author clearly explains that state is above and before morality. State is considered as a psychopath because it loves or loathes a specific object as per its own interest.

Further, Francine D’Amico in her work LGBT and (Dis) United Nations clearly propounds the concept of LGBTIQ which stands for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer, that emerged at the UN in mid 2000s. She furthermore, elucidates

66 Deepika Mann is the Phd Scholar, JSIA, O P Jindal University.

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the role of the UN and its efforts towards the promotion of the universal human rights to the sexual and gender minorities. The author also discusses the challenges faced by the international human rights law; as of now there is no global judicial court where the issues of LGBTIQ and the question of their rights can be appealed. Keeping in mind the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, D’Amico claims that while all human beings are part of this Declaration, several specific problems faced by the LGBTQ community are not addressed and states are still given leeway to discriminate under the blanket of “cultural values”. In other words, LGBTQ concerns are being effaced from both the “human” and the “rights'' part of the declaration.

Markus Thiel, one of the organisers of the book in the chapter ‘Transversal and particularistic politics in the European Union’s anti-discrimination policy’, talks about LGBT politics in the European Union (EU) through the neoliberal perspective and follows an institutional approach in order to explain the struggle of the LGBT community. He validates how the Western state modernity capitalizes different sexualities. Thiel encapsulates that EU has anti-discrimination policies for the LGBTQ community and these policies are protected by the court of law- for example in 2000, the EU passed an employment based anti-discrimination law for the inclusion of LGBTQ community. Although the law ensures providing equal employment opportunities to the LGBTQ community, in order to create a capitalist economy but has however failed to provide basic rights to these sexual minorities with basic amenities and facilities such as housing, education and health.

In the fifth chapter, Momin Rahman enunciates about homophobia and homosexualities through an Islamic perspective which emerges in the West and further relates it to Western modernity. According to Rahman, there is a presence of cultural variances between the East and the West and he discusses about the LGBT rights struggle on the basis of literature available for queer based on homonationalism. Rehman explains how Islamophobia can be used as a condition for the internationalization of gay rights.

Through the case study based on Peripheral Pride, Manuela Lavinas Picq, the co- editor of the book looked at the LGBT experiences in the Amazon town in order to narrow down the gap between the local and the global. Through the ethnographic study of the LGBT agitation in the Amazon region and through a sociological perspective, Picq proved that even the most isolated peripheries have modernised concepts when it comes to sexuality and gender studies which can further shape and challenge IR as a discipline. She also clears that sexual identity is not only a product of Western modernity through the example of the Amazon region where there is a coexistence of all forms of sexualities.

In the next chapter, Mehmet Sinan Birdal addresses the LGBT movements in Turkey’s politics through local movements like the Gezi protests and explains the success of the LGBT movement with the help of a world system theory. He also introduces the concepts of universalism and particularism, identity and difference, hegemony and sub-altering which lie at the heart of the LGBT community. The author explains how the LGBT community in Turkey advanced their social and political agendas by collaborating with other social movements.

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In the last chapter, Sandra McEvoy delves into the LGBT and queer contributions to security studies in Northern Ireland and followed an autobiographical and ethnographical outlook in order to explore the LGBT and queer issues. McEvoy questions the role of the state in constructing homosexuality as a mainstream security issue.

The conclusion of the book is written by Laura Sjoberg who critically analyses the work of the editors and authors and explicitly distinguishes the LGBT perspectives from queer theories. Sjoberg suggests to follow an integrated approach based on ‘LGBT, queer, feminist, critical and postcolonial theories’, to deal with the challenges that are possessed by LGBT community for mainstreaming LGBT issues in world politics. She also showcases the failure of various institutions like the UN and the EU to mainstream LGBT politics. The work is based on the contemporary issues and the authors effortlessly explain how LGBTQ perspectives can impact theory making in IR. The readers will find editors highly critical of queer research and the promoters of LGBT perspectives and they somehow fail to explain the elements of queer theory. As a reader, one would also find it grim to correlate the title with the chapters since the editors have failed to provide sufficient material to justify the title. Moreover, while talking about LGBTQ rights and human rights, the readers may wonder about the difference between the LGBT rights and the existing Universal Human Rights. Notwithstanding this, the handbook is an insightful and educative source for any reader and scholar who is interested in studying the concept of LGBTQ from an IR perspective. And it will allow readers to understand the relationship of state, queer and LGBT politics with the mainstream IR theories and practices. The chapters while discussing about LGBTQ politics clearly indicate the structure and functions of the state in contemporary global politics. Overall, the editors have done tremendous work by embracing the LGBTQ community in the mainstream gender politics.

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Book Review -III

Niall Ferguson, The Square and the Tower: Networks and Power, From the Freemasons to Facebook, Penguin Books Limited, Delhi, 2017 , pp 608.

Ankit Malhotra67

In the early 1930s, a Jewish man gleefully staring at Der Stürmer, a Nazi propaganda rag baffled his friends. His friends inquired: “Why are you enjoying it so much?” He answers, “if you read Jewish papers, the news is terrible. But, according to this, the news is all good. We control the banks, we control the country and we run the whole world!” Such has been the fate of the Jewish community and especially of the Rothschild Family. A fate which has been marred with hate and envy, which perpetuated itself as a point of discourse and corny theory. Deciphering and de-bunking these theories, Niall Ferguson, through his writings allows readers an alternative and academic perspective. One can string a common thread in the masterful writing of Nial Ferguson as he covers expansive ground citing examples to evidence that networks have existed ever since humanity has. From the structure of the brain to the food chain, from the family tree to freemasonry.

From the ancient Roman civilisation to the dynasties of the Renaissance and finally, from the Founding Fathers to Facebook, The Square and the Tower, signs the song of the rise, fall and renaissance of networks. He depicts how networks transform understanding of both the past and the present. Just as The Ascent of Money put Wall Street into historical perspective, The Square and the Tower does the same for Silicon Valley because it offers a bold prediction about which hierarchies will withstand this latest wave of network disruption–and which will be toppled.

The Great Degeneration (2013) describes the collapse of the institutions on which the West made its success. His book, ‘Civilisation’ which was subtitled, with a market eye on contemporary buzzwords, The Six Killer Apps of Western Power. The Square and Tower: Networks, Hierarchies and the Struggle for Global Power, claims to be “a whole new way of looking at the world”. This is and has been Ferguson’s hyperbole. In ‘The Square’ and the ‘Tower’ he describes the Bavarian “Illuminati” as a secretive group that lasted just a decade and never had more than around 2,000 members as a ‘network’. Similarly, Facebook, which has over a quarter of the human race as members, many of whom seem not nearly secretive enough. Between these extremes come the Jesuits, European royalty in the 19th century, British abolitionists, al-Qaida, the Chinese Communist party and more, all of whom are or were networks, in Niall Ferguson’s rather expansive usage.

Ferguson sets the title of the book using a metaphorical understanding of the tower and the square set in the city of Siena. In Siena, the square and the tower coincide in architectural harmony that draws tourists to the scenic legacy of the Medici family. A family of opulence and vast networks which single-handedly controlled the Renaissance and banking Era of and from Florence. Ferguson’s analysis of human relations and

67 Ankit Malhotra is BA LLB student at Jindal Law school. He is a Graduate in Global Affairs from JSIA, O P Jindal University.

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political power views the tower standing as a beacon of authority and residence of formal hierarchical authority which has claimed to rule. Whereas, the square, depicts itself as an edifice of organic human congregation and a place of society for informal social networks. Offering these vantage points, according to Ferguson, is an accurate perspective of studying international history and relations as these networks tend to innovate and are responsible for the contagious spread of revolutionary ideas. Ferguson depicts two eras as intensely “networked eras.” The first, late 15th century, after the introduction of the printing press in Europe and the second, “our own time,” which began in the 1970s. The dominant structures of networks survived both world wars, according to Ferguson, with the mid-twentieth century representing the “zenith of hierarchy.” His account shows the ability to navigate and influence these and other nascent networks determined which empires thrived in the reconfigured hierarchical orders.

Indeed, at the heart of Ferguson’s claim is that the world is shaped by two distinct organisational forces: hierarchies and networks. The distinction seems much without a difference. That is because most networks are hierarchical and only a few hierarchies are not part of a wider network. But, for the sake of argument, the book gives an insight that enables Ferguson to make a poignant point. In the book, Ferguson leapfrogs leaves of history extracting compelling empirical facts from one place, intriguing anecdotes from another and forming an amalgam. These ingredients allow him to whip an absorbing, enthralling and powerful narrative of networks and their confluence.

But, there remains one problem. There are multiple strands of distant information. This results in a lack of a coherent thesis to emerge. Indeed, such is Ferguson’s restless desire to uncover connectedness. He notes in the preface, conspiracy theorists see networks as hidden elites in cahoots with the established power structure, while far more often, he argues, networks are the power structure. In the 21st Century, the internet itself is a network of networks. The ability to communicate and transact across vast distances is indeed unprecedented and represented as a basic infrastructure of what has been termed as the “network society”. The book does far more than simply track the use of the word “network” from its introduction in the English language. Rather, he seeks to reframe the entirety of human history as an endless struggle for power between eras in which powerful hierarchical institutions predominate (the Tower) only to be undermined by the influence of emerging networks (corresponding Square). At the end of each struggle, these networks are invariably reconstituted with new hierarchies and the process too, is reconstituted.

Ferguson claims it was the printing press that was largely responsible for three network-based revolutions, namely, the Reformation, the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment. These were followed by hundreds of years of the hierarchical international order established at the Congress of Vienna. An order dominated by the quintet of Austria, Britain, France, Prussia and Russia leading up to the First World War. But, today, as the world seeks order amongst utter chaos caused by a global pandemic and Cold War II predominantly between the United States of America and China but also between India and China and ASEAN and China, The Square and the Tower compels the reader to re-configure their understanding of networks and hierarchies to understand diplomacy and the intricate design of networks in which it operates. In the

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very last section of the book, Ferguson discusses the point of a new world order which bears routes in an older one. That of the United Nations Security Council. The Council was predated by an elegant solution of the quintet of great powers who established themselves as the guardians of order at the Congress of Vienna. Ferguson expresses the requirement of an international order with a similar hierarchical structure to the international order of the Congress of Vienna. That is because if one were to leave it to the networks of Facebook and Twitter then the dream of a global community of netizens communicating would be turned on its head and will result in polarization and viral manias erupting on a global scale. Thus, a network solely dependent on Facebook and Twitter will not be stable.

There needs to be a hierarchical order not exclusively of the United States of America and China rather of a recent quintet, the United Nations Security Council and the five permanent members. The members of the Council are the Congress of Vienna of the 21st century. Even though it is an arbitrary remnant of history. The Council is boosted by legitimacy and authority, globally. The Council’s Resolution garners the world’s attention and compliance. The fact that the five permanent members are five proven victorious States happens to have a privileged position than others. This network creates a similar web of the Congress of Vienna- five powers that outrank the others, permanently. Nonetheless, this exposes a riveting paradox for our time. Is there an opportunity that exists today to use the Council in a way that was impossible in the era after it was created? Because in the Cold War either the Soviets vetoed America’s Resolutions and vice-versa. The one possibility here is that international order could be based on a pre-existing institutional structure that has witnessed historical events. On a personal note, it is a long shot if one believes that China and America is a better idea. That will not suffice. It does not create enough legitimacy for the rest of the world to buy into.

In conclusion, the focal point Ferguson makes in The Square and the Tower is the existence of ‘The Network’, and, or networks’ effect. Ferguson believes they should be the beginning and not the end of an analysis. In other words, the critical questions related to the network’s key characteristics and how it interacts with other networks and hierarchies.

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Research Centres of JSIA

CENTRE FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND POLICY (CGGP)

Traditional notions of sovereignty and the nation-state in international relations and international law have, if not entirely eroded, been joined by the rise in importance of transnational actors. These bodies may be state driven international institutions such as the World Trade Organization or the G-20, regional political organizations such as the Southern African Development Community, or private sector entities ranging from multinational corporations (MNCs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to activist networks. Cooperation and interdependence between this network of state and non-state actors with the intention of tackling problems that transcend traditional nation-state boundaries is the aim of the area of study known as global governance. The Centre for Global Governance and Policy (CGGP) is unique in its study of global governance issues. CGGP is held jointly by the Jindal School of International Affairs (JSIA) and Jindal Global Law School (JGLS). As such, CGGP combines legal and International Relations perspectives. As disciplines, International Relations and Law often speak in separate tones. CGGP aims at intensive and multi-disciplinary research on the abovementioned cross-border problems, marrying the insights of Law and International Relations to address both the academe and a policymaking audience. CGGP emphasizes a Global South perspective and probes the possibility for more balanced and even-handed structure for global governance. Simultaneously, CGGP feels that academic focus on Indian foreign policy is fixated on strategic issues relating to immediate neighbours (i.e. Pakistan, China, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka et al) or with Europe and the US, leaving the country’s relations with Latin America, Africa, and the rest of Asia understudied. The CGGP seeks to break new ground in transcending this parochial mould and promoting cutting edge research on South-South relations with a special onus on India’s role as a bridge-builder and consensus maker. In March 2011, CGGP released a report entitled Rethinking International Institutions: A Global South Agenda. The Report interrogates existing international institutions—both formal institutions, such as the World Trade Organization and the United Nations Security Council, and informal institutions, including concepts like humanitarian intervention and democracy promotion. The Report builds on existing literature on institutions within International Relations and International Law parlance. It notes the declining prominence conferred by the Global South on traditional international institutions, and examines the implications for the rise of so-called post millennium international institutions. The Report highlights diverging aspirations between, roughly, advanced and less advanced emerging economies, creating marked differences in use of traditional international institutions, and access to post millennium international institutions. The Report calls for the development of a Standing Committee in the G-77, chaired by India, to address these divergences.

CENTRE FOR STUDY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE (CSPV)

The Centre aims to study political violence from two prisms–globalized violence and globalized ethics–and to explore alternative ways to understand it. The Centre takes an interdisciplinary approach, in particular combining international relations, political

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theory, sociology, ethics and philosophy in general. There is a particular focus on specific and urgent phenomena, such as mass killing, forced displacement, human security, and gender-based violence. Starting from Western ways of thinking, the Centre’s focus has expanded to cover non-Western philosophy, thereby inserting inter-civilizational perspectives. The Centre also aims to provide an Indian hub for those interested in both globalized violence and ethics.

Tackling political violence is a daunting task. Part of its reason exists in its very paradoxical nature that all politics requires some kinds of violence in some stages in order to establish and secure authority. Poststructuralist understanding tells us about the inevitable linkage between politics and violence. Nevertheless, it is a hasty evaluation that we have lived in a world of harming and the harmed. Learning and analysing globalized violence is, therefore, a task to learn globalized ethics, and vice versa. CSPV organizes bi-weekly reading seminars with faculty and postgraduate students. It will host international seminars and lectures and provide the JGU community with opportunities to exchange views and enriching ideas. Research outcomes will be released through various media, including the University’s in-house journals and working papers, so that the Centre will also offer a locus for global feedback. Finally, the Centre also aims to develop international linkages and joint activities with JSIA’s other research centres. The overall goal of the Centre will be to provide firm knowledge and value basis for the future generations of scholars and practitioners, both domestic and global.

CENTRE FOR NEW ECONOMIC STUDIES (CNES)

Espousing the philosophy of how contemporary economic theories look at socio-economic problems in a variety of ways, the Centre for New Economics Studies (CNES) through its research and activities aims to focus more on exploring the diversity of the scholarship on economics. At CNES, students and young researchers are not only exposed to the basic foundations of economic reasoning and thought but are exposed to the inter-disciplinary application of the discipline of economics in fields of political science (via political economy), psychology (via behavioural economics), history (via economic history), legal studies (via law and economics) etc.

In most universities and traditional learning centres for mainstream economics learning, there still remains a lacuna between the taught economic theory and the application of such theories in the real policy environment. CNES aims to fill this lacuna by linking economic theory with historical experience(s) and empirical observation under a robust, experimental environment of research. At CNES, teaching or understanding a given economic theory cannot be viewed merely as an exposition of received and established truths or as an intellectual exercise in the skills of logical deduction and inference.

CENTRE FOR MIDDLE EAST STUDIES (CMES)

The Centre for Middle East studies was launched with the objectives of fostering interdisciplinary research on Middle East Studies in collaboration with regional academics, experts and practitioners; conducting research and analysis on bilateral

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relations between India and the Middle East to explore synergies and address mutual long-standing economic, political and social challenges; supporting a balanced Middle Eastern research studies from various perspectives to widen access to first-hand knowledge of the Middle East; developing materials and resources for educators and the wider public readership; contributing to broad dissemination of research results and information regarding the Middle East; and expanding the network of institutional partnerships with universities in the Middle East, opening opportunities for student and faculty exchange.

CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES (CES)

The field of European studies has over the decades engaged in extensive research of the plurality and diversity of Europe. Consequently, any focus on Europe has been of an elaborated yet contested one. Moving beyond the “tunnel history” which risks ignoring the relations of domination, exploitation and exclusion of non-Europe that has shaped Europe to the present day, CES aims to contextually study socio-political and legal transformations that continues to reinvent the region and engage in interdisciplinary diffusions - a shift from eternally studying Europe as the “inside” to Europe “inside-out”. The Centre for European Studies (CES) intends to build an unprecedented and discursive community of researchers who can engage and debate their approaches in open floors together with peers from other continents, academic traditions and cultures. Founded in 2011, CES at the Jindal School of International Affairs (JSIA) aims to establish plural observers who will endeavour to study Europe, Europeanness and its myriad identities as a reflexive concern through three core research groups: Anthropology of Europe • European Politics, Culture and Society • New Democracies of Europe Centre for European Studies is now a part of Globus Research Cluster funded by EU commission’s Horizon 2020 project. The cluster is led by Prof. Helene Sjursen, ARENA Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo, Norway. Earlier, CES has coordinated and published the European edition of the Jindal Journal of International Affairs (JJIA) Volume 2 Issue 1. It was released by Cord Meier-Klodt, Acting Ambassador, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, New Delhi. Through its research networking, CES has coordinated and concluded JSIA MoUs with Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Warsaw, Poland; Centre for European Studies, Katholieke Universiteit (KU), Leuven, Belgium, Institute for European Global Studies, Basel University, Switzerland and Faculty of Humanities, Leiden University, The Netherlands.

CENTRE FOR A NEW SOUTH ASIA (CNSA)

The Centre seeks to mitigate the security dilemma of the South Asia region of great potential and immense risk by reviving the liberal and free exchange which formerly existed and which is the foundation of peace and civilizational growth. The Centre utilizes interdisciplinary research, debate, dialogue, performances and ideas to advance this goal. Along with talks, seminars, conferences and exchanges with academics, students and practitioners from across the region as well as globally, the Centre focuses on the power of performances and consanguinity in culture to move the prevailing paradigm from a realist zero sum interaction towards the liberal order prevalent in other parts of the world.

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CENTRE FOR AFGHANISTAN STUDIES (CAS)

Located at the crossroads of South Asia and Central Asia, facing southwards from the Hindukush into the Indian sub-continent and looks down northwards into India’s extended neighbourhood. Afghanistan’s political geography has left a deep imprint not only on the regional geopolitical calculus but is also mirrored in its diverse and complex sociocultural tapestry. Traditionally the India has had deep civilizational links with Afghanistan. The change in political geography of the region with the 1947 partition notwithstanding, India has maintained good political relations with the Afghan state. The only aberration thus far being the period of Taliban rule (1996-2001). India’s engagement with the country was stepped up after 2001 with the aim of contributing to international efforts to bring peace, stability and eventually resuscitating the country as a bridge between South and Central Asia. However, intensified political and diplomatic engagement has not translated into a deeper socio-anthropological understanding of Afghan society, essential to evolving a sound policy prognosis.

The Centre for Afghanistan Studies (CAS) through its research intends to provide a window into complex yet fascinating dynamics shaping sociocultural, geo-political and economic landscape of Afghanistan. CAS would contribute to cutting edge, policy-oriented research on Afghanistan and its implications for the region at large. It would also provide a platform for collaborative exchange programs and transmission of knowledge to students and scholars.

CENTRE FOR SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES (CSEAS)

Southeast Asia, a sub-region of Asia, consists of the countries that are geographically south of China, east of India, west of New Guinea and north of Australia, which includes Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. These countries share historical, political, economic, cultural and social ties, and all but East Timor are members of the regional bloc called Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In recent years, the regional bloc has taken several initiatives to integrate member countries, including developing a single market that will ensure the free flow of goods, services, investment and skilled labour, and the free flow of capital. Nonetheless, the region is far from being homogeneous and encompassing with different political institutions, diverse languages and cultures. Because of the geostrategic location and its emerging economy, the region has become greater interest to its neighbouring countries as well as the Western democracies.

JINDAL CENTRE FOR ISRAEL STUDIES (JCIS)

The field of Israel Studies is an important area of geo-politics. It merges studies of race, peoplehood, culture, identity, history, regional conflict in the Middle-East and spatial coexistence. Since August 2012 Jindal Centre for Israel studies in JSIA through the initiatives of Dr. Rohee Dasgupta has been engaging MA students in the study of modern Israel and organizing academic conferences. It has fostered institutional

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networks and exchange on Israel Studies with the Schusterman Centre for Israel Studies, Brandeis University, USA and Tel Aviv University, Israel. JCIS aims to carry out research on race, ethnicity and conflict; Jewish Identity, bilateral relations between India and Israel, the American-Jewish Diaspora and Israel as well as on Europe and Israel. It intends to build a research colloquium of scholars pertaining to modern Israeli politics, culture, society, and economy and the betterment of Israeli-Arab relations (including Israeli-Palestinian relations). It welcomes students to write MA dissertations on Israel Studies. JCIS currently offers two elective courses in the Jindal School of International Affairs (JSIA) and the Jindal Global Law School (JGLS).

CENTRE FOR AFRICAN, LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN STUDIES (CALACS)

JSIA’s Centre for African, Latin American and Caribbean Studies (CALACS) mission is to enhance interregional understanding and cooperation through policy-oriented research, dialogue and training. To achieve this goal, CALACS serves as a hub at JGU for academics, policy-makers, diplomats and businessmen in India and abroad to connect, exchange, and develop initiatives related to: African, Latin American and Caribbean (ALAC) countries relations with India ALAC countries, India and the Global South: interregional policy coalitions and institutions Sustainable development, trade, investment and other issues affecting ALAC countries

CENTRE FOR BORDER STUDIES (CBS)

It is increasingly being recognized in the study of international relations that Borderlands represent a dynamic subsystem marked by complex and historical interlinkages between communities and local governance systems that transcend established inter-state boundaries. The concept of interstate borders (and the functional role of frontier regions) in international relations has undergone a fundamental shift. Borders are not only seen as barriers, but also as institutional mechanisms that create new opportunity structures for the communities residing adjacent to them. Despite the emergence of the interdisciplinary field of Borderland Studies (and the creation of academic associations both regionally and globally) there is still a marked disjuncture in terms of practical and academic training being provided to students of the social sciences (such as international relations, political science, history and sociology) in the Indian context for understanding developmental trajectories of Borderlands.

The Centre for Border Studies seeks to conduct research in border regions through collaborations and participation of institutions based in border districts and border communities. Some of the Key Research being undertaken include: BADP Case Studies, Rehabilitation Challenges in J&K (LoC) and confidence building measures, health inequality in Border Regions and Border Trade, markets and Infrastructure. The four pillars of the Centre are: Research Initiatives, Certificate Programme in Border Studies, Border Studies Immersion Programmes (Field Schools and Internships) and Advocacy.

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JINDAL CENTRE FOR THE GLOBAL SOUTH (JCGS)

Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly poverty eradication, requires national policies, an international and regional cooperation that supports development efforts. The research Centres that are focusing on the Global South studies are very few in the Southern globe in comparison to their number in the North countries. Jindal Centre for the Global South aims to fill this gap and conducts policy-oriented research, dialogue and training into the social, economic and political key issues across countries of the Global South with a special emphasis on South-South Cooperation and its underpinning development opportunities for the Global South countries. The Centre promotes the unity of the South in achieving the SDGs while recognizing the diversity of national interests and priorities. Jindal Centre for the Global South is affiliated to the School of International Affairs at Jindal Global University (JGU). It draws researchers from across the faculties of social sciences and humanities from inside and outside JGU.

CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES (CSS)

The role of security is paramount to all levels of the global environment, from international organisations and states to societies and individuals. In line with this, while the Centre for Security Studies (CSS) concentrates more specifically on topics of security, it situates itself in the larger domain of international relations studies. International security is in the end not merely defined by the concept of war or the effects to mitigate it, but rather goes far beyond it to encompass a plethora of issues. Every action of every actor in the international system defines the concept of security both for itself and for others in the system. In this, the concept of international security has been expanded to reflect, not merely the study of state security but also include topics like ethnic, sectarian and religious conflict; civil wars and state failure; cyber and space warfare; resource related security issues; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; defence economics and also the role of ethics or morality in security policies.

The evolution of the field of international security studies is an impressive topic in itself. It has changed and diversified from an initial concern with superpower rivalry and nuclear weapons to focus upon sectors of political, economic, military, environmental and social life. CSS believes that these sectors must be better understood in order to gauge and examine their influence on important current trends defining international politics and dynamics as well. In this regard, the Coronavirus pandemic, a surge of populism in Europe, the threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia and increasing resource scarcity in many regions of the world must all be understood as key security issues in order to gain a deeper understanding of international security as a whole. The Centre for Security Studies thus, through in-depth analysis, reports and policy briefs, and projects explores both regional and thematic topics in the broader field of International Security Studies.

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Submission Guidelines for Jindal Journal of International Affairs (JJIA)

MANUSCRIPT SUBMISSION

Manuscripts and all editorial correspondence should be addressed to: The Editor-in-Chief, Jindal Journal of International Affairs, at Jindal School of International Affairs O.P. Jindal Global University Sonipat-Narela Road, Sonipat, Haryana-131001, NCR of Delhi, India.

Manuscripts should be submitted via email to editorjjia@gmail.com or submissionsjjia@gmail.com. Contributors must provide their affiliation; complete postal and e-mail addresses and telephone numbers.

The onus lies on the author to divulge any potential conflict of interest regarding the manuscript.

The preferred length of an article submitted to JJIA is between 6000 and 7500 words including references. All articles must be accompanied by an abstract of 150–200 words together with eight important keywords.

Book reviews should be between 1500 -2500 words with full details of the reviewed book including the subtitle, the name of the author, place of publication, name of publisher, year of publication, number of pages and the price. Notes should be numbered serially and presented as footnotes. Notes, other than website sources (with access date), must contain more than a mere reference.

All figures, i.e., diagrams, images, photographs and tables should be placed at the end of the contribution and numbered in the order they appear in text. Table and figure locations should be indicated in text by callouts (e.g., “[See Table 1]”) inserted after the respective paragraphs.

Each table or figure should have a heading, an explanatory caption, if necessary, and a source or reference. Tables need to be submitted in MS Excel or MS Word.

All figures having an image resolution of minimum 300 dpi, 1500 pixels, min width 4 inches and their format should be TIFF or JPEG. It is requested that excessive formatting for tables and figures be avoided.

Limit the levels of heading within an article to two, or at most three. Avoid long headings and do not number them.

JJIA prefers British spellings throughout (‘labour’ not ‘labor’, ‘centre’ not ‘center’); universal ‘s’ in ‘-ise’ and ‘-isation’ words.

Single quotes throughout; double quotes used within single quotes. Spellings of words in quotations should not be changed.

Quotations of 45 words or more should be separated from the text and indented with one space with a line space above and below supported by specific page source.

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Use ‘eighteenth century’, ‘1980s’. It is suggested to spell out numbers from one to nine (in words), 10 and above to remain in figures. However, for exact measurements use only figures (5 km, 7 per cent not %).

Use thousands, millions and billions. It is advised that the use of italics should be minimized unless necessary, but used consistently.

Permissions and Releases- Material taken directly from a copyrighted source should be clearly identified, and the copyright holder’s written permission to reproduce it must be submitted in a separate file. It is the author’s responsibility to seek permission for reproducing copyrighted material.

References and Citations for citing and referring to scholarly works the Journal follows Chicago Manual of Style. The Journal prefers footnotes instead of endnotes. We will consider manuscripts for publication only if they are written in accordance with this style.

Sample of Chicago Manual of Style is given below.

For further details, kindly see the website - http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide/citation-guide-2.html

Book

Reference list entries (in alphabetical order)

Grazer, Brian, and Charles Fishman. 2015. A Curious Mind: The Secret to a Bigger Life. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Smith, Zadie. 2016. Swing Time. New York: Penguin Press.

In-text citations

(Grazer and Fishman 2015, 12)

(Smith 2016, 315–160)

Chapter or other part of an edited book

In the reference list, include the page range for the chapter or part. In the text, cite specific pages.

Reference list entry

Thoreau, Henry David. 2016. “Walking.” In The Making of the American Essay, edited by John D’Agata, 167–95. Minneapolis: Graywolf Press.

In-text citation

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(Thoreau 2016, 177–78)

In some cases, you may want to cite the collection as a whole instead.

Reference list entry

D’Agata, John, ed. 2016. The Making of the American Essay. Minneapolis: Graywolf Press.

In-text citation

(D’Agata 2016, 177–78)

Translated book

Reference list entry

Lahiri, Jhumpa. 2016. In Other Words. Translated by Ann Goldstein. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

In-text citation

(Lahiri 2016, 146)

E-book

For books consulted online, include a URL or the name of the database in the reference list entry. For other types of e-books, name the format. If no fixed page numbers are available, cite a section title or a chapter or other number in the text, if any (or simply omit).

Reference list entries (in alphabetical order)

Austen, Jane. 2007. Pride and Prejudice. New York: Penguin Classics. Kindle.

Borel, Brooke. 2016. The Chicago Guide to Fact-Checking. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ProQuest Ebrary.

Kurland, Philip B., and Ralph Lerner, eds. 1987. The Founders’ Constitution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/.

Melville, Herman. 1851. Moby-Dick; or, The Whale. New York: Harper & Brothers. http://mel.hofstra.edu/moby-dick-the-whale-proofs.html.

In-text citations

(Austen 2007, chap. 3)

(Borel 2016, 92)

(Kurland and Lerner 1987, chap. 10, doc. 19)

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(Melville 1851, 627)

Journal article

In the reference list, include the page range for the whole article. In the text, cite specific page numbers. For articles consulted online, include a URL or the name of the database in the reference list entry. Many journal articles list a DOI (Digital Object Identifier). A DOI forms a permanent URL that begins https://doi.org/. This URL is preferable to the URL that appears in your browser’s address bar.

Reference list entries (in alphabetical order)

Keng, Shao-Hsun, Chun-Hung Lin, and Peter F. Orazem. 2017. “Expanding College Access in Taiwan, 1978–2014: Effects on Graduate Quality and Income Inequality.” Journal of Human Capital 11, no. 1 (Spring): 1–34. https://doi.org/10.1086/690235.

LaSalle, Peter. 2017. “Conundrum: A Story about Reading.” New England Review 38 (1): 95–109. Project MUSE.

Satterfield, Susan. 2016. “Livy and the Pax Deum.” Classical Philology 111, no. 2 (April): 165–76.

In-text citations

(Keng, Lin, and Orazem 2017, 9–10)

(LaSalle 2017, 95)

(Satterfield 2016, 170)

Journal articles often list many authors, especially in the sciences. If there are four or more authors, list up to ten in the reference list; in the text, list only the first, followed by et al. (“and others”). For more than ten authors (not shown here), list the first seven in the reference list, followed by et al.

Reference list entry

Bay, Rachael A., Noah Rose, Rowan Barrett, Louis Bernatchez, Cameron K. Ghalambor, Jesse R. Lasky, Rachel B. Brem, Stephen R. Palumbi, and Peter Ralph. 2017. “Predicting Responses to Contemporary Environmental Change Using Evolutionary Response Architectures,” American Naturalist189, no. 5 (May): 463–73. https://doi.org/10.1086/691233.

In-text citation

(Bay et al. 2017, 465)

For more examples, see 15.46–49 in The Chicago Manual of Style.

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News or magazine article

Articles from newspapers or news sites, magazines, blogs, and the like are cited similarly. In the reference list, it can be helpful to repeat the year with sources that are cited also by month and day. Page numbers, if any, can be cited in the text but are omitted from a reference list entry. If you consulted the article online, include a URL or the name of the database.

Reference list entries (in alphabetical order)

Manjoo, Farhad. 2017. “Snap Makes a Bet on the Cultural Supremacy of the Camera.” New York Times, March 8, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/technology/snap-makes-a-bet-on-the-cultural-supremacy-of-the-camera.html.

Mead, Rebecca. 2017. “The Prophet of Dystopia.” New Yorker, April 17, 2017.

Pai, Tanya. 2017. “The Squishy, Sugary History of Peeps.” Vox, April 11, 2017. http://www.vox.com/culture/2017/4/11/15209084/peeps-easter.

Pegoraro, Rob. 2007. “Apple’s iPhone Is Sleek, Smart and Simple.” Washington Post, July 5, 2007. LexisNexis Academic.

In-text citation

(Manjoo 2017)

(Mead 2017, 43)

(Pegoraro 2007)

Readers’ comments are cited in the text but omitted from a reference list.

In-text citation

(Eduardo B [Los Angeles], March 9, 2017, comment on Manjoo 2017)

For more examples, see 15.49 (newspapers and magazines) and 15.51(blogs) in The Chicago Manual of Style.

Book review

Reference list entry

Kakutani, Michiko. 2016. “Friendship Takes a Path That Diverges.” Review of Swing Time, by Zadie Smith. New York Times, November 7, 2016.

In-text citation

(Kakutani 2016)

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Interview

Reference list entry

Stamper, Kory. 2017. “From ‘F-Bomb’ to ‘Photobomb,’ How the Dictionary Keeps Up with English.” Interview by Terry Gross. Fresh Air, NPR, April 19, 2017. Audio, 35:25. http://www.npr.org/2017/04/19/524618639/from-f-bomb-to-photobomb-how-the-dictionary-keeps-up-with-english.

In-text citation

(Stamper 2017)

Thesis or dissertation

Reference list entry

Rutz, Cynthia Lillian. 2013. “King Lear and Its Folktale Analogues.” PhD diss., University of Chicago.

In-text citation

(Rutz 2013, 99–100)

Website content

It is often sufficient simply to describe web pages and other website content in the text (“As of May 1, 2017, Yale’s home page listed . . .”). If a more formal citation is needed, it may be styled like the examples below. For a source that does not list a date of publication or revision, use n.d. (for “no date”) in place of the year and include an access date.

Reference list entries (in alphabetical order)

Bouman, Katie. 2016. “How to Take a Picture of a Black Hole.” Filmed November 2016 at TEDxBeaconStreet, Brookline, MA. Video, 12:51. https://www.ted.com/talks/katie_bouman_what_does_a_black_hole_look_like.

Google. 2017. “Privacy Policy.” Privacy & Terms. Last modified April 17, 2017. https://www.google.com/policies/privacy/.

Yale University. n.d. “About Yale: Yale Facts.” Accessed May 1, 2017. https://www.yale.edu/about-yale/yale-facts.

In-text citations

(Bouman 2016)

(Google 2017)

(Yale University n.d.)

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For more examples, see 15.50–52 in The Chicago Manual of Style. For multimedia, including live performances, see 15.57.

Social media content

Citations of content shared through social media can usually be limited to the text (as in the first example below). If a more formal citation is needed, a reference list entry may be appropriate. In place of a title, quote up to the first 160 characters of the post. Comments are cited in reference to the original post.

Text

Conan O’Brien’s tweet was characteristically deadpan: “In honor of Earth Day, I’m recycling my tweets” (@ConanOBrien, April 22, 2015).

Reference list entries (in alphabetical order)

Chicago Manual of Style. “Is the world ready for singular they? We thought so back in 1993.” Facebook, April 17, 2015. https://www.facebook.com/ChicagoManual/posts/10152906193679151.

Souza, Pete (@petesouza). 2016. “President Obama bids farewell to President Xi of China at the conclusion of the Nuclear Security Summit.” Instagram photo, April 1, 2016. https://www.instagram.com/p/BDrmfXTtNCt/.

In-text citations

(Chicago Manual of Style 2015)

(Souza 2016)

(Michele Truty, April 17, 2015, 1:09 p.m., comment on Chicago Manual of Style 2015)

Personal communication

Personal communications, including email and text messages and direct messages sent through social media, are usually cited in the text only; they are rarely included in a reference list.

In-text citation

(Sam Gomez, Facebook message to author, August 1, 2017)