PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING AND THE PERFORMANCE

OF POLICE MANDATE IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS:

THE CASE OF RWANDA NATIONAL POLICE

NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF RWANDA

CENTER FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

MASTER’S PROGRAMME OF ARTS IN PEACE STUDIES AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment for the award of a Master’s Degree in Peace Studies and Conflict Transformation

By Khalid KABASHA

Supervisor: Prof. François MASABO

Musanze, August 2013

PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING AND THE PERFORMANCE

OF POLICE MANDATE IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS:

THE CASE OF RWANDA NATIONAL POLICE

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DECLARATION

I, undersigned, hereby declare that, to the best of my knowledge, this thesis has never been

published in any other institution of higher learning. It is my own work and whenever other

people’s publications or ideas were used in this thesis, references were provided.

Signature:

Khalid T. KABASHA

Date: … August 2013

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DEDICATION

To all true peacekeepers trying to make a difference around the world,

To my family members,

To Patricie UWASE, the love of my life 

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This thesis that crowns completion of the Master’s programme in Peace Studies and Conflict

Transformation is a result of the Almighty God’s will through contributions and support from

different people.

I am very thankful to the Government of Rwanda in general and the Rwanda National Police in

particular under the transformational leadership of Commissioner General Emmanuel K.

GASANA, the Inspector General of Police for establishing such a prestigious institution of

higher learning, the National Police College, which develops not only officers’ careers, but also

their academic status.

My gratitude goes to the Commandant of the College, Commissioner Felix NAMUHORANYE

for his valuable and inspirational guidance throughout the course.

I cannot fail to express my genuine appreciation to Professor François MASABO who, despite a

tight schedule and lots of responsibilities, accepted to supervise this thesis with keenness.

Many thanks to Dr. Aggée SHYAKA MUGABE for his valuable advice and support to the

completion of this work

Last but not least, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to Patricie UWASE, my fiancée,

for her unconditional love and support especially in difficult times.

May God bless you all!

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION ................................................................................................................................................... I 

DEDICATION ...................................................................................................................................................... II 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ................................................................................................................................... III 

TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................................................... IV 

LIST OF FIGURES AND CHARTS .................................................................................................................. VII 

LIST OF TABLES............................................................................................................................................. VIII 

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACCRONYMS........................................................................................... IX 

ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................................................................... X 

CHAPTER I.  INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1 

I.1.  BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................................... 1 I.2.  STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM .................................................................................. 2 I.3.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS .................................................................................................................... 4 I.4.  PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH ........................................................................................................... 4 I.5.  RESEARCH OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................................... 4 I.6.  HYPOTHESES ..................................................................................................................................... 5 I.7.  SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY ........................................................................................................ 5 1.8.  SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY ..................................................................................... 6 I.9.  CONCEPTUAL AND CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK ........................................................................ 6 

I.9.1.  Pre-deployment Training ................................................................................................................... 7 I.9.2.  Police Performance in Peacekeeping Operations ............................................................................... 8 I.10.  PARADIGM .................................................................................................................................... 10 

CHAPTER II: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (UNPKO) .................................................................................................................................. 11 

II.1.  THE CONCEPT OF PEACE, SECURITY, AND PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS ........................... 12 II.1.1.  What is peace? ............................................................................................................................ 12 II.1.2.  The Concept of Security ............................................................................................................... 13 II.1.3.  Peace Support Operations .......................................................................................................... 14 

II.1.3.1.  Conflict prevention .................................................................................................................................15 II.1.3.2.  Peace-making .........................................................................................................................................15 II.1.3.3.  Peacekeeping ..........................................................................................................................................15 II.1.3.4.  Peace enforcement ..................................................................................................................................16 II.1.3.5.  Peace Building ........................................................................................................................................16 

II.2.  THE EVOLUTION OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS ................................................................... 17 II.2.1.  Traditional UN Peacekeeping Operations .................................................................................... 17 II.2.2.  Multi-dimensional Peacekeeping ................................................................................................. 18 II.2.3.  Guiding principles ...................................................................................................................... 20 II.2.4.  The Brahimi Report ..................................................................................................................... 21 

II.3.  THE POLICE COMPONENT IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS .................................................... 23 II.3.1.  The Police .................................................................................................................................. 23 

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II.3.2.  The United Nations Police (UNPOL) ........................................................................................... 25 II.3.3.  The Role of UNPOL .................................................................................................................... 27 II.3.4.  UNPOL Pre-deployment Training and its Contents ...................................................................... 28 II.3.5.  Individual Police Officers and Formed Police Officers ................................................................. 29 

II.3.5.1.  Individual Police Officers (IPO) ..............................................................................................................29 II.3.5.2.  Formed Police Unit (FPU).......................................................................................................................30 

II.4.  RWANDAN EXPERIENCE IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS ...................................................... 31 II.4.1.  The Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF)............................................................................................. 31 II.4.2.  The Rwanda National Police (RNP) ............................................................................................. 32 

II.4.2.1.  EASFCOM-Sponsored Pre-deployment Trainings ...................................................................................32 II.4.2.2.  ISS-TfP Sponsored UNPOL Trainings .....................................................................................................33 

II.5.  CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................... 33 

CHAPTER III:  METHODOLOGY............................................................................................................ 35 

III.1.  INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 35 III.2.  POPULATION .................................................................................................................................... 35 III.3.  INSTRUMENTS OF DATA COLLECTION ........................................................................................ 36 

III.3.1.  Questionnaire ............................................................................................................................ 36 III.3.2.  Interviews................................................................................................................................... 36 

III.4.  DATA ANALYSIS .............................................................................................................................. 37 III.4.1. Quantitative Data ........................................................................................................................... 37 III.4.2. Qualitative data and content analysis .............................................................................................. 38 

III.5.  CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................... 38 

CHAPTER IV: PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS .............................................. 39 

IV.1.  INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................. 39 IV.2.  DESCRIPTION OF DATA ON RESPONDENTS ................................................................................ 39 

IV.2.1. Respondents’ ranks ......................................................................................................................... 40 IV.2.2.  Respondents’ age ........................................................................................................................ 40 IV.2.3. Respondents’ sex ............................................................................................................................. 41 IV.2.4. Classification of respondents by education level .............................................................................. 41 IV.2.5. Classification of respondents by seniority in service ........................................................................ 42 IV.2.6.  Categorization of respondents by number of major professional courses attended ........................ 42 

IV.3.   DESCRIPTION OF DATA ON PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING .................................................. 43 IV.3.1.  Awareness of mission and mandate, and issues related to training content.................................. 43 IV.3.2.  Awareness of mission-like environment through practical aspect of the training ........................... 45 IV.3.3. Level of familiarity with mentoring and advising prior and after pre-deployment training ................ 46 IV.3.4. Improvement of capacity to communicate and negotiate with other actors ........................................ 47 

IV.4.  ISSUES PERTAINING TO MISSION EXPERIENCE ........................................................................ 48 IV.4.1. Tasks performed by respondents in the mission area ........................................................................ 48 IV.4.2. The extent at which pre-deployment training prepared officers to perform the tasks ........................... 49 4.4.3.  Challenges encountered by officers in the mission area ................................................................ 50 4.4.4 Link between pre-deployment training content and the reality in the mission area ................................ 52 IV.4.5. Some peculiar aspects highlighted from qualitative data .................................................................... 54 

IV.5.   CONCLUSION................................................................................................................................... 55 

CHAPTER V:  GENERAL CONCLUSION, SUGGESTIONS, AND ........................................................... 56 

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IMPLICATION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH ............................................................................................... 56 

V.1.  GENERAL CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 56 V.2.  SUGGESTIONS .................................................................................................................................. 58 V.3.  IMPLICATION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH .................................................................................... 59 

REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................................... 60 

ANNEXES .......................................................................................................................................................... 66 

   

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LIST OF FIGURES AND CHARTS

Figure 1: Paradigm showing nexus between research variables ................................................. 10

Figure 2: Awareness of mission-like environment ..................................................................... 45

Figure 3: Familiarity with mentoring before & after pre-deployment training ............................ 46

Figure 4: Improvement of communication and negotiation skills ............................................... 47

Figure 5: Tasks performed by respondents in the mission area................................................... 49

Figure 6: Preparation for future tasks......................................................................................... 50

Figure 7: Anticipative preparation for challenges ...................................................................... 52

Figure 8: Link between training and reality in the mission area ................................................. 53 

 

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Respondents by rank category ..................................................................................... 40

Table 2: Respondents by age .................................................................................................... 40

Table 3: Respondents by sex .................................................................................................... 41

Table 4: Respondents by level of education ............................................................................... 41

Table 5: Respondents by seniority in service ............................................................................. 42

Table 6: Respondents by number of courses attended ................................................................ 42

Table 7: Awareness of mission and mandate before pre-deployment ......................................... 43

Table 8: Frequency of most important topics ............................................................................. 44

Table 9: Challenges encountered by respondents in the mission area ......................................... 51 

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACCRONYMS AMIS: African Union Mission in Sudan

APSTA: African Peace Support Trainers’ Association

CCTV: Closed Circuit Television

COE: Contingent Owned Equipment

CPTM: Core Pre-deployment Training Materials

DPET: Division of Policy Evaluation and Training

DPKO: Department of Peacekeeping Operations

DSF: Department of Field Support

EASFCOM: East African Standby Force Coordination Mechanism

FPU: Formed Police Unit

IPO: Individual Police Officer

ISS/TfP: Institute for Security Studies/Training for Peace  

ITS: Integrated Training Service

MoU: Memorandum of Understanding

PKO: Peacekeeping Operations

PPC: Pearson Peacekeeping Center

PSO: Peace Support Operations

RDF: Rwanda Defence Forces

RNP: Rwanda National Police

RtoP: Responsibility to protect

SAAT: Selection Assistance and Assessment Teams

SOP: Standard Operating Procedures

STM: Standard Training Materials

TCC/PCC: Troop Contributing Country/Police Contributing Country

UN: United Nations

UNAMID:      African Union–UN Assistance Mission in Darfur

UNCIVPOL/UNPOL: United Nations Civilian Police/ United Nations Police

UNPOC: United Nations Police Officers Course

UNTSO: United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

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ABSTRACT

This study assesses pre-deployment training as a remedy to issues of unsatisfactory performance of the United Nations Police in peacekeeping operations using the case of Rwanda National Police and its experience of pre-deployment training and peacekeeping operations. The study attempts to answer the questions: “does pre-deployment enhance performance of police performance in peace support operations?

In line with the above main question, the study pursues three objectives. First, to examine the role of pre-deployment training in equipping police personnel with necessary knowledge to successfully carry out their duties in peace support operations. The second is to establish whether only competent, knowledgeable, and experienced police officers are selected for SAAT and subsequent pre-deployment training prior to deployment in a peacekeeping operations, while the third is to establish whether the content of the pre-deployment training reflects the reality in the mission area by assessing whether the content of the training pre-empts and addresses challenges such as history, laws, and culture of the host country that police personnel may face in the mission area.

To achieve this, both quantitative and qualitative approaches were use to collect data on the population consisting of Rwandan police officers who attended pre-deployment training organized in Rwanda in 2011 and early 2012 by the Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism. Data was collected in line with three variables: selected officers’ competence verified through their background, pre-deployment training as the independent variable and performance in peace keeping operations as the dependent variable.

Findings on respondents’ background showed that selected officers for pre-deployment training and peacekeeping operations were competent enough to perform police tasks, as more than 61 % of respondents had previously undergone a minimum of five professional courses, while 71 % of respondents had spent more than 16 years in service. Respondents were mainly junior and senior officers as well as commissioners. With regard to education level, data showed that 48.9% of respondents had a bachelor’s degree, whereas 42.2% had completed secondary school. Regarding pre-deployment training findings show that indeed officers gained enough skills that would enable them to mentor and advise other less experienced officers as well as communicate and negotiate with different partners, 67% and 57 % respectively. On mission experience, data corroborated that the training content indeed reflected the reality in the mission area and that awareness of potential challenges was enhanced. As a matter of fact, 55.6% of respondents said yes, while 44.4 % rated it as partial, which creates a nuance on the achievement of the third objective.

As shown by the data, the research objectives were all achieved, with a nuance on the third one as shown in the previous paragraph. It was suggested that pre-deployment trainings be organized after officers have received deployment order to a particular mission, so as to include peculiar aspects of that mission in the training. It was also suggested that the duration of the training be extended to four weeks in order to deepen the preparation of officers especially through field exercises. Finally, other researchers could look into the motivation of officers and their countries to participate in peacekeeping operations as an element that can affect peacekeepers’ performance.

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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

I.1. BACKGROUND

The UN does not possess a stand-by force composed of both the military and the police waiting

for deployment when need arise. It counts on Member States to avail necessary police officers or

soldiers to serve in Peacekeeping missions. However, some of these nations might not always be

disposed to provide officers when required to do so due to security risks in conflict areas. In the

same line, those countries which would be willing to provide large numbers of personnel might

not be able to satisfy the quality requirements established by the UN. This results in a dilemma

that leaves the UN with no choice but to take what is available, hence a potential for poor

performance.

In addition, Member States also referred to as Police Contributing Countries (PCCs) sometimes,

if not usually, have different trainings, doctrines, laws and procedures not only among

themselves but also from the mission country where they are expected to send their officers, yet

these officers working under the UN need to operate as one team of UNCIVPOL which is able to

carry out their mandated tasks in a coherent and harmonious manner. The differences among

UNPOL officers can result in inconsistency while carrying out their tasks of mentoring, advising

and training local police. It is in this perspective that UN Police pre-deployment trainings were

introduced to address these discrepancies as well as creating acquainting officers with the

mandate they are expected to perform. This has been explained by Mobekk (2005:17), when she

says “there has been too little emphasis placed on unified pre-deployment training for

international officers. The responsibility to conduct pre-deployment has been left in the hands of

contributing nations. The result is that variations in police training, capacity and capabilities can

sometimes be vast. There is a reliance on the contributing nations to provide officers that meet a

certain standard, although this standard has repeatedly not been met. Once in the mission country

the UN provides a one-week-long course. However, the course tends to focus too much on the

history of the UN and human rights. What has largely been omitted is in-depth pre-deployment

training in history, culture and conflict of the mission country”.

In addition to the above observations made by Mobbeck, another important element that

UNCIVPOL need to have an understanding in is the set of local laws in the country of

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deployment. This is vital especially if the mandate includes law enforcement or if the force is

there to train or mentor the local police. The UN police must have some knowledge of the

current laws applied in the mission country; otherwise they cannot effectively train local police

or monitor how they comply with those laws. These are issues that are supposed to be addressed

in pre-deployment training in order to enable officers attending the training to successfully carry

out their mandated tasks in peacekeeping operations.

I.2. STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

The autonomy from military component implied that the police component had to accomplish

some of its due responsibilities such as selecting only suitable police officers to serve on

missions, coordinating trainings not only within mission areas but also in member states through

selection assistance and assessment teams (SAAT), setting Standard Operating Procedures

(SOPs) and other guidelines.

This means the police personnel deployed to carry out the above mentioned tasks are required to

be very knowledgeable and skilled in order to impart their expertise to the local police. However,

it has not always been the case and instances of UNCIVPOL officers who appeared to be

inefficient and under qualified are noticeable in peacekeeping operations worldwide. Chappell

and Evans (1999:27) mention how disturbing it can be when some UN Member States fail to

comply even remotely with the minimum requirements set by the UN when they send on

missions individuals who lack experience, language, driving and allied skills needed to fulfil

their anticipated tasks. The above concern was also noticed and raised by the Panel on United

Nations Peace Operations in their Report (also known as the Brahimi Report) in 2000 when they

stated in paragraph 119, reinforcing arguments in paragraph 39 and 40, that in order to enhance

the shift in the use of civilian police in UN PKO to focus primarily on the reform and

restructuring of local police forces in addition to traditional advisory, training and monitoring

task; Member States were required to provide the UN with even more well-trained and

specialized police experts to carryout mandated tasks. To increase efficiency and effectiveness of

UNCIVPOL contingents, pre-deployment curriculum have been created in accordance with the

UN core pre-deployment training materials. Several organisations such as the East African

Standby Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM), The Pearson Peace support Centre

(PPC), or the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) provide pre-deployment trainings in Africa.

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The three organisations above, mostly EASFCOM, had each conducted a pre-deployment course

in Rwanda.

For purposes of relevance, pre-deployment trainings are expected to enlighten participants not

only on specific mandate and tasks for the mission they are going to serve in, but also on the

mission country, its history, culture and laws. However, it is not the case, as officers attend

EASFCOM pre-deployment trainings before they get a deployment order from the DPKO. As a

result the training is conducted basing on generic UNPOL functions like mentoring, monitoring

and advising, human rights, negotiation and mediation skills, reporting, radio communication, to

name but a few rather than mission specific requirements.

These key factors – history, culture, and laws of the mission area- which are not catered for in

pre-deployment training does not help the officers to psychologically prepare themselves for the

deployment. Even if some of these elements are provided in form of a briefing during a five-days

induction course upon arrival in the mission area, still the disorientation in the new environment

could have been minimized if mission specific awareness regarding culture, history, laws, and

weather of the host country were provided as part of the content during pre-deployment training.

In the same line, pre-deployment training does not cover police duties, as it is planned under the

assumption that participants to the training are SAAT cleared and were selected by their

respective countries basing on their experience and competence in police matters. It is important

to note that the SAAT assess candidates only on three criteria, namely language ability –

particularly reading and listening comprehension as well as report writing- driving skills, and

shooting. Competence in police matters such as investigation and police operations are not

assessed by the UN teams. From this situation, it can be argued that the assumption of assurance

by PCC about competence and experience of the officers is not a given, as the priority and

motives of countries when contributing officers might not necessarily match with what UN

requirements. Besides, what the UN Staff conducting the SAAT record about the participants in

terms of credentials and experience is what has been mentioned by the latter, without any other

mechanism of verification such as displaying course certificates or starting from the basic police

course that shows the date of entry in service. As a result, one may deceitfully claim to be an

expert in a certain domain or to have several years of experience. This factor can also

compromise the performance once the officer is already deployed in the mission area, even if he

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or she had attended pre-deployment training. In this perspective, officers’ background matters in

determining how they will perform.

From this situation, a concern arises and the question remains the effectiveness of these pre-

deployment trainings in preparing police officers to carry out their mandated tasks in

peacekeeping operations considering the constant concerns about limited skills of many police

officers in most missions, which has been a persistent problem with UNPOL and recognised by

the DPKO as stressed by Hartz (1999: 38). Does pre-deployment training enhance performance

of police officers in Peace Support Operations? In this study focus will be put on pre-deployment

trainings provided by the EASFCOM attended by Rwandan officers with a view to finding

answers to the above main question as well as to the other questions stated in the research

questions.

I.3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This research attempts to answer the following questions:

1. Do selected police officers possess necessary competence, knowledge, and experience in

police matters prior to attending pre-deployment training and subsequent deployment to

peacekeeping operations?

2. What is the role of pre-deployment training in equipping police personnel with necessary

knowledge to successfully carry out their duties in peace support operations?

3. Does the training content reflect the reality in the mission area by pre-empting and

addressing possible challenges that police personnel may face in the mission area, such as

history, laws, and culture of the host country?

I.4. PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH

The purpose of this research is to examine the effectiveness of police pre-deployment trainings in

preparing police officers to carry out police mandates in Peace Support Operations.

I.5. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The following are the objectives pursued in this research:

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1. To establish whether only competent, knowledgeable, and experienced police officers are

selected for SAAT and subsequent pre-deployment training prior to deployment in a

peacekeeping operations.

2. To examine the role of pre-deployment training in equipping police personnel with necessary

knowledge to successfully carry out their duties in peace support operations

3. To establish whether the content of the pre-deployment training reflects the reality in the

mission area by assessing whether the content of the training pre-empts and addresses

possible challenges such as history, laws, and culture of the host country that police

personnel may face in the mission area.

I.6. HYPOTHESES

This study operates around the following hypotheses:

1. Only competent, knowledgeable, and experienced police officers are selected for SAAT,

subsequent pre-deployment training, and ensuing deployment to peacekeeping operations.

2. Pre-deployment training contributes to equipping police personnel with necessary knowledge

to successfully carryout their duties in peace support operations.

3. The content of the pre-deployment training reflected the reality in the mission area pre-

empting possible challenges that police personnel may face in the mission area.

I.7. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Rwanda is among the main African police contributing countries (TCC/PCC) to the UN with a

total of 458 Police officers. As of June 2012, as shown in the July 2012 UN Police Magazine,

Rwanda had the second biggest number of female police officers serving in UNPKOs, after

Bangladesh. By virtue of being a large police contributor, Rwanda has the responsibility to make

sure its officers are well prepared in order to effectively perform their mandated tasks in the

mission area. It is in this line that the Rwanda National Police (RNP) resorts to regional

organisations like the EASCOM to conduct pre-deployment trainings for selected officers.

However, it has never been scientifically established whether the training indeed provided the

officers with adequate skills to effectively carry out their tasks in PKO. This study will provide

both the RNP and the EASFCOM with a clear view of the extent at which these trainings

enhanced performance of officers in peacekeeping operations. It will shed light on the relevance

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of skills and knowledge acquired during the training in relation to the task performed in mission

area as well as the gaps that need to be filled, hence allowing decision makers to adjust the

training content to suit and address relevant issues encountered on the field during peacekeeping

operations.

1.8. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

This study seeks to examine the effectiveness of police pre-deployment trainings in preparing

police officers to carry out police mandates in Peace Support Operations. Although the Police

Component consists of both the Individual Police Officers (IPOs) and the Formed Police Units

(FPUs), this study does not explore the aspect of Formed Police Units, even if a brief review of

the literature on the FPUs will be undertaken. It rather focuses on pre-deployment trainings

conducted for IPOs by the EASFCOM that were conducted in Rwanda in 2011 and 2012

respectively. The aspects that will be looked into are the content of the training, the relevance of

the theories and practical exercises conducted in enabling officers to effectively mentor, advise,

train, reform local police, investigate, negotiate and mediate with other stakeholders in UN

missions. These will be analysed as information provided by Rwandan police officers who

attended the EASFCOM courses and who served or are still serving in UN missions.

However, possible limitations to this study include constraints in reaching all respondents, as

some of them are still serving in UN missions, while a few among Rwandan officers who

attended EASFCOM pre-deployments have not yet been deployed to any UN missions. In the

same line, time constraints and funding deficiencies might limit the collection of participatory,

onsite data in mission areas.

I.9. CONCEPTUAL AND CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK

The focus of this conceptual and contextual framework is put on concepts that constitute the two

variables in this study as shown in the research topic. The independent variable is pre-

deployment training, while the dependent variable in performance of police officers in

peacekeeping operations, or how they effectively carry out their mandated tasks in the mission

area as result of having attended pre-deployment training.

It is as well important to note that there are other intervening variables that can also be referred

to as proper input to the independent variable. These are: competence, motivation, knowledge, as

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well as experience in police matters. Here, it is argued that the independent variable, pre-

deployment training would not result into good performance of police officers in peacekeeping

operations without the proper intervention of the intervening variables mentioned above. These

concepts as well as other that are relevant but not directly concerned with the variables are

further expounded in the literature review.

I.9.1. Pre-deployment Training

UN Police officers are contributed by a large number of countries, with differing policing

systems, training and specializations. In order to support the individual police officer to adjust to

the challenges of new and different living and working conditions in a peacekeeping operation,

UN DPKO, the Integrated Training Service developed pre-deployment training standards for UN

Police. According to the African Peace Support Trainer’s Association (APSTA

http://www.apsta-africa.org) these UN Pre-deployment Training Standards are part of the UN’s

commitment to ensuring that all peacekeeping personnel are properly prepared for peacekeeping

operations as outlined in General Assembly Resolution (A/RES/49/37) and the Selection

Standards and Training Guidelines for United Nations Civilian Police (1997).

The training objectives of the UN Pre-deployment Training Standards for police are to generally

prepare the participants for duties in a peacekeeping operation so that they can:

Fulfil police aspects of UN peacekeeping mandates in accordance with DPKO/DFS

principles and guidelines;

Perform their police functions in an effective, professional and integrated manner; and

Demonstrate the core values and competencies of the United Nations

In fact, it is true that officers need to be supported in the way they can adjust to different living

and working conditions in the mission. However, it is paramount to mention that professional

quality of the officers attending pre-deployment training is initially up to the standards with

regard to policing matters, because a two-weeks-long training cannot reasonably transform an

incompetent officer into a professional peacekeeper.

UN police pre-deployment training content is organised into two parts; the generic materials for

all peacekeepers, also referred to as the Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTM), and

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the Specialized Training Materials (STM) that are specific to UN police tasks. The Core Pre-

deployment Training Materials (CPTM) include subjects like Strategic Level Overview of UN

Peacekeeping; Introduction to UN Peacekeeping; Fundamental Principles of UN Peacekeeping;

The Establishment and Functioning of UN Peacekeeping Operations; Effective Mandate

Implementation; Working with Mission Partners; Standards, Values and Safety of UN

Peacekeeping Personnel; Conduct and Discipline; HIV/AIDS in Peacekeeping Operations;

Respect for Diversity in UN Peacekeeping; Safety and Security. The STM on the other hand

consist of subjects like Core Business of UN Police and its Key Partners; Reform, Restructuring

and Rebuilding of Police and Law Enforcement Agencies; UNPOL and Different Legal System;

Mentoring and Advising; Community Based Policing; Human Rights Standards in Arrest and

Detention; Human Rights Standards in the Use of Force; Negotiation/Mediation and the Use of

Language Assistants; Land Navigation; Basic UN Radio Communication; Report writing; and

Road Safety.

The Concept of pre-deployment refers to the process of imparting the above mentioned

knowledge and skills from both the CPTM and STM to police officers who have been selected

through the UN SAAT and are ready for deployment in UNPKO. In the particular context of this

research, it is about the two pre-deployment trainings conducted by the EASF in Rwanda.

I.9.2. Police Performance in Peacekeeping Operations

Police performance refers to the actual tasks stated in the police mandate, such as advising,

mentoring, training, reforming and restructuring the local police as well as how well the UNPOL

carry out these tasks. It is assumed that police officers who are selected to attend pre-deployment

trainings are experienced, well trained and professionals. Without these qualities within officers,

it is almost impossible to carry out police mandated tasks mentioned above. Chappell & Evans

(1999) reiterate the same fact arguing that there is “no single function of DPKO’s UNCIVPOL

component is of great importance than the influence it can exert on Member States to ensure that

only police officers possessing appropriate qualifications and experience are assigned to

UNPKO”.

This implies that the capacity of police officers to carry out mentoring, advising, training, as well

as reforming and restructuring duties in UN missions is largely influenced by their prior

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professional competency and a fairly by the specific guiding skills obtained through pre-

deployment trainings. The African Peace Support Trainer’s Association (APSTA) explains the

concept of Pre-deployment Training Standards by saying “The training is aimed to turn a

capable police officer into a competent peacekeeper” (http://www.apsta-africa.org).

Mentoring in the context of UNPOL refers to a more comprehensive, long term, one-on-one

relationship between a more experienced professional and a less experienced individual.

Advising is a short term relationship aimed at directing solutions to individual policing problems

in a longer term development process.

The DPKO policy on reform, restructuring and rebuilding of law enforcement agencies defines

the terms as follows:

Reform is the change process leading to greater capacity and integrity in the concerned law

enforcement agency.

Restructuring is the internal reorganization of the concerned law enforcement agency for the

purpose of making it more efficient and able to fulfill its mandated functions.

Rebuilding is the provision of the material and financial means to the concerned law

enforcement agency to allow it to fulfill its mandated functions.

Still according to the DPKO, Law Enforcement Agency refers to any national security agency

that exercises police powers, especially powers of arrest and detention.

The ability to conduct of the above mentioned activities determines the performance of UN

police in PKO.

Peacekeeping operations (PSO): are defined by the Africa Standby Force (ASF) as

multifunctional operations in which impartial activities of diplomatic, military and civilian

(which among others include police, rule of law and civilian administration) components,

normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and principles, work to restore or

maintain peace in a mandated area of operations. The term is often used synonymously with the

term ‘peace missions.’ (www.africa-union.org.)

10  

In the same line, Robert E. Hoffler, Jr. (2002) argues that despite a lack of consensus in defining

and identifying peace, Peace Support Operations (PSO) are conducted either to maintain the

current level of peace or to facilitate the development of peace, while diplomatic means are

sought to resolve the underlying causes of conflict.

In line with the above theories around the concepts of pre-deployment training and police

performance in PSO, this study will be carried out within the framework that police performance

in PSO depends upon effective pre-deployment trainings as well as on the officers’ selection by

contributing countries basing on prior professionalism, competency and experience in usual

police matters.

I.10. PARADIGM Figure 1: Paradigm showing nexus between research variables

Inputs Process Outputs

Source: Researcher’s initiative

Good police performance in PSO

Effective mentoring, advising, training, reform and restructuring of local law enforcement in reality during PSO

 

Appropriate selection of officers by police contributing nations

Professional Officers

Experienced officers

Competent officers

Motivation, attitude, and commitment

 

Pre-deployment Training

Theory and practical exercises of the training content (mentoring, advising, reform and restructuring of local police)

Acquisition of knowledge and skills in PSO

Awareness of local history, culture, laws, and weather of mission area

 11 

CHAPTER II: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON UNITED NATIONS

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (UNPKO)

The first article of Chapter one of the United Nations Charter highlights the four purposes of this

organization. The very first purpose is to maintain international peace and security, and to that

end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace,

and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about

by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law,

adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of

the peace. The UN Charter entrusts the Security Council with the responsibility to fulfill the

above purpose. In the same line, three more chapters specify different circumstances under

which maintenance of international peace can be pursued. Thus, Chapter VI provides for pacific

settlement of disputes, while Chapter VII caters for action with respect to threats to the peace,

breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. Chapter VIII, on the other hand, allows for

regional arrangements by regional bodies to perform the mandate provided for under chapter

seven, but after seeking authorization from the Security Council (www.un.org).

From this information, it can be argued that the four Chapters of the UN Charter mentioned

above constitute the fundamental baseline for peacekeeping operations. In fact, although the type

of a UN peacekeeping operation is partly informed by the type of conflict, which is also a

reflection of the prevalent global political landscape, it is worth noting that irrespective of the

case, the initiation of a PKO must refer to one of the UN Charter’s chapters discussed above.

In addition to the UN Charter, other documents that constitute the normative framework for PKO

include the International Human Rights Law, the International Humanitarian Law, and the

Security Council Mandates (UN DPKO, 2008).

In order to undertake the analysis that was required for this study, it was necessary to examine

and clarify the major concepts that were to be encountered. These are the concepts of peace,

security, and peace support operations. The chapter examines the scholarly definition

understanding of peace and security, as well as the relationship with or influence upon the

shaping of peace support operations and their evolution under various peace activities. It further

12  

reviews the major literature on police as one of the major components of UN peace support

operations, as well as their preparation through pre-deployment training for purposes of

improving their performance in mission areas.

II.1. THE CONCEPT OF PEACE, SECURITY, AND PEACE SUPPORT

OPERATIONS

II.1.1. What is peace?

There is no consensual definition of the word peace; different scholars explain this concept

differently. In fact, there is a difficulty to conceptualise it, thus it is sometimes considered as a

utopia which is hard to achieve. The word peace, as an English simple term, invokes ideas of

quietness, stability, harmony, joy, and delight (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 2006).

However reality here on earth proves to be very different from these images.

From an academic understanding of peace, some scholars, like Michael Banks, say that in order

to understand peace, one should first understand what peace is not. As for what peace is not,

Banks (1987:259) mentions harmony, order, justice, or conflict management; thus categorically

rejecting the idea of peace as the four elements that commonly come to mind when the word

peace is mentioned. Banks considers all the four aspects as leading to negative peace. In fact he

argues that harmony can be forced, conflict management is a superficial solution, as for justice, it

means different things to different people, while order or stability can also be brutally enforced.

In line with the above, Johan Galtung defines peace from two perspectives; negative peace and

positive peace. The difference between the two can be summarized by the major characteristics

of each, as suggested by Galtung. Thus, negative peace refers to the absence of war and physical

violence. It is pessimistic, curative, and not always achieved by peaceful means. On the other

hand, positive peace, in addition to absence of war and physical violence, implies the absence of

structural and cultural violence. It is optimistic, preventive, and achieved by peaceful means

(Galtung 1969).

Like Galtung, Banks advocates for positive peace as a means to achieve a peaceful society. This

implies addressing problems of inequality, poverty, marginalization, scarcity of resources,

reparation of broken relationships, and reconciliation; thus, leading to transformation.

13  

From this definition it can be stated that the pursuit of these two different types of peace, would

require two different types of security approaches. As a result both peace and security

understandings inform the design and types of UN peace and security operations. The concept of

Security is going to be discussed below.

II.1.2. The Concept of Security

With regard to security, just like peace, there is no common definition, for the debate is wide

over the issue of security. Security can be understood differently in different contexts, thus

according to Buzan et al (1998:2) from the narrow traditional realist perspective, it may mean the

pursuit, by a state, of freedom from threat to the nation and territorial integrity, while the wide

understanding of security includes other non-state actors like individuals or societies and

involves a wide range of aspects from welfare through health, to human rights. Security has

different layers as suggested by Buzan et al (1998:14) with the individual at the lower, through

the community and the state, to the global scale.

Literature shows that the narrow perspective has however dominated the general understanding

of concept of security for a long period of time, including the whole twentieth century. In fact, as

stated by Stern and Öjendal (2011:2) “Security remained, throughout the 20th century, heavily

dominated by the Westphalian mindset in general, and the Cold War influence in particular,

emphasising national security through the establishment of a specific territory, guaranteed

through a realist emphasis on military means to keep up that security.” This referrers to the first

type of security in the table above.

From the arguments provided above and for purposes of coherence and in line with the

discussion about peace that was tackled in the previous section, it is important to clarify once

again the types of security and their related outcome in terms of peace. Hence, it can be argued

that the narrow state-centered negative security will engender negative peace in terms of stability

and order, while broad and human or individual-centered security will produce positive peace in

terms of satisfaction of human needs. This argument can be supported by Henning Melber when

he elucidates that poverty and destitution are root causes for despair. Poverty prevents us from

living in peace, as peace is supposed to be more than the absence of war (Melber, 2011).

14  

II.1.3. Peace Support Operations

The terms Peace Support Operation and Peacekeeping Operation are usually used

interchangeably, but in this study a slight difference is specified in the sense that peacekeeping

means an operation of peace carried out and dominated by uniformed personnel, i.e. the military

and, at a lesser extent, the police. Peace support operations, on the other hand, bears a

multidimensional aspect involving many actors including a wide civilian component and

humanitarians, besides the uniformed personnel. The leadership in a multidimensional peace

support operations is assumed by the civilian component. This is a result of a shift in the nature

of PSO that has happened in recent years, most of which were influenced by the Brahimi Report

(2000), from the predominantly peacekeeping requirements, such as those identified in Chapter

VI of the UN Charter, to a wider range of complex operations, covering a broad spectrum of

conflict intensity levels as explained by the need for a wide range of UN actors and a broader

mandate. Both Peacekeeping and peace support imply that there is a peace to keep or support, in

absence of which the operation is termed differently using one of the terminologies discussed in

the next section.

Regarding the meaning and use of the term “peacekeeping”, Reynaert (2011: 10) explains that it

has a dual meaning: Peacekeeping can refer to (UN) peace operations in general. In that sense

peacekeeping is used as an umbrella term for all (UN) peace operations. However, the concept

can also refer to traditional or robust peacekeeping operations.

Knill (2007:7) alternatively defines United Nations Peace Support Operations as multifunctional

operations in which impartial military activities are designed to create a secure environment and

to facilitate the efforts of the civilian elements of the mission to create a self-sustaining peace.

According to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Peacekeeping is one

among a range of activities undertaken by the United Nations and other international actors to

maintain international peace and security throughout the world. Other peace and security

activities include conflict prevention or preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace enforcement

and peacebuilding. In order to understand how peacekeeping is related to and different from

15  

other peace activities, each activity or role is going to be defined below according to the United

Nations (DPKO, 2008:17-18).

II.1.3.1. Conflict prevention

This involves the application of structural or diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or inter-

state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict. It is built on structured early

warning, information gathering and a careful analysis of the factors driving the conflict. Conflict

prevention activities may include the use of the Secretary General’s “good offices,” preventive

deployment of UN missions or conflict mediation led by the Department of Political Affairs

II.1.3.2. Peace-making

Peacemaking generally includes measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves

diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement. The United Nations

Secretary-General, upon the request of the Security Council or the General Assembly or at his

her own initiative, may exercise his or her “good offices” to facilitate the resolution of the

conflict. Peacemakers may also be envoys, governments, groups of states, regional organizations

or the United Nations. Peacemaking efforts may also be under taken by unofficial and non-

governmental groups, or by a prominent personality working independently (DPKO, 2008).

II.1.3.3. Peacekeeping

This is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been

halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years,

peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing cease-fires and the

separation of forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements –

military, police and civilian – working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace.

In the context of this study, the new multi component peacekeeping can be referred to as peace

support operation. This type of operation is undertaken under Chapter VI of the UN Charter.

Considering the above explanation, it can be said of Rwandan troops in the troubled region of

Darfur in Sudan and in the capital city of South Sudan alongside their compatriots, police

officers, that they are performing peacekeeping.

16  

II.1.3.4. Peace enforcement

Peace enforcement involves the application of a range of coercive measures, including the use of

military force. It requires the explicit authorization of the Security Council.

It is used to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has

decided to act in the face of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. The

Council may utilize, where appropriate, regional organizations and agencies for enforcement

action under its authority and in accordance with the UN Charter.

UN Peace enforcement operations are carried out under Chapter VII of the Charter, while the

possibility of having recourse to regional organizations and agencies is provided for by Chapter

VIII.

In this context peacekeepers are equipped with executive powers including force in order to carry

out their mandated tasks. Thus, the police would be performing typical police work like in their

home countries, such as investigation of crimes, arrests of offenders, protection duties, and even

high risk operations such as riot control or armed interventions to counter terrorism or armed

robberies. This is the case of Rwandan Formed Police Units operating in Haiti.

II.1.3.5. Peace Building

Peacebuilding aims to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening

national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable

peace and development. It is a complex, long-term process of creating the necessary conditions

for sustainable peace by addressing the deep-rooted, structural causes of violent conflict in a

comprehensive manner. Peacebuilding measures address core issues that affect the functioning of

society and the State, and seek to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately

carry out its core functions.

When looked at closely, it can be argued that the different peace activities or types of PSO, as

put forward by the DPKO, can be aligned along the two different types of security which

16ndeavour to achieve different types of peace, as discussed earlier. Thus, preventive diplomacy

or conflict prevention, peacemaking, and peacebuilding are closely linked to the broad human

17  

security approach with a potential to achieve positive peace, while peacekeeping and peace

enforcement are more related to absence of war violence by applying the narrow approach to

security, which is likely susceptible to lead to negative peace.

II.2. THE EVOLUTION OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

The first ever peacekeeping operation to be initiated by the UN was the United Nations Truce

Supervision Organization (UNTSO), deployed in the Middle East in May 1948, shortly after the

creation of the State of Israel. Since then, UNTSO military observers have remained in the

Middle East to monitor ceasefires, supervise armistice agreements, prevent isolated incidents

from escalating and assist other UN peacekeeping operations in the region to fulfill their

respective mandates. This mission has been operational for 65 years now and is still ongoing

(www.un.org).

Peacekeeping operations come as one of the UN responses to conflicts. For the UN to envisage

an appropriate response or approach to help parties in addressing the conflict, it has to take in to

consideration the type of hostilities as well as the actors involved. Thus, two characteristics of

peacekeeping operations can be classified: traditional peacekeeping and multidimensional

peacekeeping.

II.2.1. Traditional UN Peacekeeping Operations

Traditional UN peacekeeping operations are deployed as an interim measure to help manage a

conflict and create conditions in which the negotiation of a lasting settlement can proceed. The

tasks assigned to traditional United Nations peacekeeping operations by the Security Council are

essentially military in character and may involve the following:

Observation, monitoring and reporting – using static posts, patrols, overflights or

other technical means, with the agreement of the parties;

Supervision of cease-fire and support to verification mechanisms;

Interposition as a buffer and confidence-building measure. (DPKO, 2008:21).

18  

In view of the fact that most conflicts during the cold war were interstate, mostly over territorial

issues, as a result the UN response was relatively restrained, with few military observers and

limited Rules of Engagement.

In line of the above, Dominik Knill argues that the presence of peacekeepers is intended to be

more symbolic than coercive, and the success of peacekeeping missions is dependent on the

consent of the fighting parties between whom they find themselves attempting to keep the peace

Knill (2007:11).

This is due to the fact that the conflicts were usually between two host states capable to credibly

guarantee the safety of UN staff. The hostility was localised mostly on disputed territories and

was conducted by regular (professional and accountable) armed forces, which implied that

civilian populations were generally not at risk, and were under protection of the state.

An example of such symbolic presence is that of peacekeepers of the UN Assistance Mission for

Rwanda (UNAMIR), which from 1993 to 1996 saw the genocide against Tutsis happen under

their passive presence, without any action to protect the targeted populations. A failure that

served as reference to initiate many changes of approach within UN peacekeeping, until then

more traditionally conducted even in the decade following the end of end Cold War. This decade

was characterized by a shift from interstate conflicts to intrastate conflicts, which also triggered

the need from the UN to shift to a more appropriate response to the new dynamic in conflicts.

II.2.2. Multi-dimensional Peacekeeping

Unlike the traditional peacekeeping operations that were mostly constituted by the military,

mainly observers monitoring cease fire agreements, multidimensional peacekeeping operations

consist of three components namely the military, the police, and the civilian component

alongside humanitarian agencies.

This type of peacekeeping came as a response to the need to address the devastating nature of the

new type of conflicts, internal wars, which dominated the post-Cold War era up to today. As

ascertained by the DPKO (2008: 25), many of these conflicts take place in the world’s poorest

countries where state capacity may be weak, and where belligerents may be motivated by

economic gain, as much as ideology

19  

In situations of internal armed conflict, civilians account for the vast majority of casualties.

Many civilians are forcibly uprooted within their own countries and have specific vulnerabilities

arising from their displacement.

As a result, most multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations are now mandated

by the Security Council to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. The

protection of civilians requires concerted and coordinated action among the military, police and

civilian components of a United Nations peacekeeping operation and must be mainstreamed into

the planning and conduct of its core activities. United Nations humanitarian agencies and non-

governmental organization (NGO) partners also undertake a broad range of activities in support

of the protection of civilians. Close coordination with these actors is, therefore, essential. In

addition to protection of civilians, multidimensional interventions involved a much wider range

of tasks, including protecting territory, people and aid operations, disarming belligerents,

policing demilitarized sites and monitoring demobilization, monitoring and running elections and

helping to reconstruct governments, police forces, and armies.

At the 2005 World Summit, on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the United Nations, all

governments accepted the collective obligation to protect populations from crimes against

humanity. Consequently, UN peace operations are increasingly being mandated with a Chapter

VII mandate to protect civilians in conflict (Reynaert 2011:8). To reaffirm its commitment to the

above obligation, the UN Security Council passed the resolution 1674 in 2006 making Protection

of Civilians an integral part of any peacekeeping mandate, thus assigning all peacekeeping

operations the “responsibility to protect”, commonly referred to as “RtoP” (International

Coalition for the RtoP, 2012).

However, the implementation of multidimensional peacekeeping tasks is not as easy as it may

sound. Thus, as argued by Robert Swop:

“further complication of peacekeeping is the added mission requirement of ‘protection of

civilians’, though often with the caveat of language limiting the scope of this tasking to

the mission’s operational areas and whatever the peacekeeping force is deemed capable

of. Yet too often UN missions are still hamstrung by ill-conceived and unclear mission

mandates, an unwillingness of the peacekeeping intervention forces to engage in robust

20  

use of force to include pre-emptive action, and a lack of resources, both in terms of

material and personnel” (Swop, 2011: 8).

An example of the difficulty of implementation of the above mentioned requirements of a

multidimensional mission can be observed from the former UN Mission in Congo (MONUC),

now the UN Mission for Stabilization of Congo (MONUSCO). In fact, this mission has always

been accused of failure and despite its robust presence with nearly 20, 000 peacekeepers, yet the

security in the Democratic Republic of Congo keeps getting worse, particularly in the eastern

part. This can be demonstrated by Julie Reynaert’s argument when she asserts that:

“[…] until today MONUC struggles to effectively address civilian protection.

Consequently, the mission is heavily criticized, including by the DRC government. In

March 2010 the Congolese Minister of Communication, Lambert Mende, issued a press

release, in which he recommended a full withdrawal of MONUC by June 2011”.

(Reynaert, 2011: idem)

II.2.3. Guiding principles

Since the first peacekeeping mission in the Middle East and others that followed in other parts of

the world throughout the Cold War era, UN Peacekeeping operations were guided by three major

principles namely consent of conflicting parties to the deployment of the peacekeeping

operation, the impartiality of UN peacekeepers in the performance of their duties, and finally the

principle of non-use of force by peacekeepers except in self defense (DPKO, 2008:31).

As a result of the RtoP, The latter principle has since evolved to encompass not only self-

defense, but also defense of civilian non combatants and enforcement (defense) of the UN

mandate.

In addition to the three core principle, three additional principles, also known as success factors,

are also considered. These are: Legitimacy drawn from the Security Council resolution and

mandate approved by all UN member states, Credibility supported by observance to the UN code

of conduct as well as effective implementation of the mandate alongside a proper management of

expectations, and lastly the Promotion of national and local ownership which presupposes that

21  

the peacekeeping operation is not an invading force, but rather a impartial force working towards

sustainable peace (DPKO, 2008).

II.2.4. The Brahimi Report

In the aftermath of the Cold War, marked by the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of a bipolar

world system, where the greatest threat to international security was major interstate war, there

was a rise of new type of conflict known as intrastate conflicts. These conflicts were

characterized by total collapse of state control and institutional structures, breakdown of the rule

of law, destruction of infrastructures, various factions and militia groups, extreme violence of

which civilian populations are the victims, mass killings, and humanitarian catastrophes

spreading country wide, and sometimes over spilling in other countries.

In this new era of devastating intrastate conflicts that characterized the 1990s, the UN had not

shifted from its traditional observer missions, thus kept responding with a traditional

peacekeeping. As a result in countries like Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, which

suffered or still suffer from intrastate conflicts, peace support operations mandated by the UN

Security Council were widely viewed as failures for their inability to maintain peace, enforce the

UN mandate, and protect civilians. A failure that rate that, stresses Wellensteen (2012:267), “is

unacceptable in view of the suffering involved”, particularly in the case of Rwanda.

Thus, in order to rectify on this evident ineffectiveness to serve the purpose for which

peacekeeping operations were established, on 7 March 2000 the then UN Secretary General,

Koffi Annan, convened a high level Panel, to undertake a thorough review of the United Nations

peace and security activities, and to present a clear set of specific, concrete and practical

recommendations to assist the United Nations in conducting such activities better in the future.

Lakhdar Brahimi, a former minister of foreign affairs of Algeria, was appointed to chair the

Panel. The “Brahimi” Report, as it is commonly known, was published in October 2000.

The Brahimi Report contained 57 explicit recommendations to the Secretary-General, the

Security Council, the General Assembly and Member States in general. The report focused

attention on strategic, political and basic operational matters. Many peacekeeping reforms have

been instituted as a result of the dialogue that ensued following the report’s issuance and

22  

continued implementation of its recommendations remains a very high priority for DPKO and

the Secretariat in general (Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit/DPKO, 2003).

The size and scope of UN peacekeeping operations has expanded dramatically, since the

deployment of the first peace mission three years after the UN was created in 1945. The UN can

bring unique skills and resources to bear on conflicts that are ready for resolution, thus helping to

alleviate the suffering of people affected by war and assisting them in the reconstruction of their

post-conflict societies. As there is no “one-size-fits-all” model, multidimensional can still require

adjustments depending on the context and nature of conflict for which the intervention is made.

To succeed, as realized in Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit/DPKO (2003), peacekeeping

operations must have clear mandates and adequate resources and must be tailored to fit the

political, regional and other realities of the country or territory in question. Most important, they

must respond to the desires and aspirations of the local population. Only then do

multidimensional peacekeeping operations serve as a truly effective tool as the UN strives for a

world at peace, the goal envisioned at its creation in 1945.

Concerning the United Nations Police, as summarized in article 126 of the the Brahimi Report,

the following recommendations were made:

Member States should establish national pools of serving police

Police contributing States should establish regional partnerships to conduct joint Police

training exercises. The trainings should be conducted in accordance with UN guidelines

and available for UN service on short notice

Members States are encouraged to designate a single point of contact within their

governmental structures for the provision of civilian police to United Nations peace

operations;

The Panel recommends that a revolving on-call list of about 100 police officers and

related experts be created in UNSAS to be available on seven days’ notice with teams

23  

trained to create the civilian police component of a new peacekeeping operation, train

incoming personnel and give the component greater coherence at an early date;

Similar Personnel pools and training partnerships should be established for judiciary,

prisons and human rights, as well as other civilian experts who would form UN rule of

law teams.

This study is more linked to the second recommendation as it looks into the training aspect, in

particular the pre-deployment training of police officers scheduled for peacekeeping operations.

II.3. THE POLICE COMPONENT IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Peacekeeping operations are involves different components namely the military, the police, the

civilians, and the humanitarian agencies. However in this study, focus is specifically on the

police component.  

II.3.1. The Police

Generally, the police is defined as an official organization whose job is to make people obey the

law and to prevent and solve crime. This term refers also to the people who work for this

organization. Lastly this term is also used as a verb meaning to perform law enforcement in a

particular area (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 2006).

Regarding the origin, it is not possible to identify the exact starting point of the function of

maintaining order. However, it can be said that law enforcement is as old as group life itself and

has existed in one form or another, as preserving order and limiting potentially destructive acts of

deviance on the part of individuals were necessarily major concerns in even the earliest of human

societies (Kirkham and Wollan Jr, 1980: 14). Reiner (2000:4) differentiates the idea of policing

from that of police, stating that the former implies the set of activities aimed at preserving the

security of a particular social order, or social order in general. This can be done through

surveillance and the threat of sanctioning. The latter refers to a specific body that may be

entrusted to perform policing. In this sense, besides the police, policing functions can be carried

24  

out by other state agencies, like the Army, the migration authority, boarder authority or

Technology, like CCTV cameras and other listening devices.

Furthermore, Crawford (2008: 147) argues that, while policing has always been performed since

long ago, the development of the professional police was coupled to the formation of modern

state. As a result, policing came to be seen as a product of what the police actually do.

In line with the above, Robinson and Scaglion (1987:109) argue that the police institution has a

double and contradictory origin and function, for at the same time and in the same society it may

be both the agent of the people it polices and of the dominant class controlling these same

people.

Crawford reiterates that modern policing may be a task of professionals employed either by

(local or central) state agencies with specialist policing functions, such as the regulation of

particular types of crimes or offences committed in defined places, or by state departments with

other primary functions. He further states that policing may be conducted by municipal agents,

private security personnel or by the public in their local networks of informal social control

(Crawford, 2008: 148).

Modern policing, like other institutions inspired by western values, focuses also on democratic

policing. Democratic policing, as asserted by Graham Ellison, refers to a type of policing that are

not only “culturally appropriate but also democratic and respectful of fundamental human rights”

(Ellison, 2007:243). Democratic policing works under the principle of responsiveness,

representativeness, accountability, and respect for human rights. Caparini and Marenin (2004:2)

argue that the need for these principles is to prevent the police from misusing the powers they are

entrusted with by the law. In fact, the two authors contend that “the police can protect and they

can use force, even deadly force, and sometimes with impunity. The police can serve the

interests of the few or they can support the basic preconditions which enable all members of a

society to live a reasonably secure personal and community life. Being powerful, the police must

be controlled. They must be held accountable for their actions”. For Caparini and Marenin, the

police need to be accountable because although they are provided with the legal parameters

within which they have to operate, they are also allowed some flexibility to exercise their

judgment in and expertise in carrying out their mandated tasks. Thus, being sometimes the

25  

decision makers in the course of duty, they need to account for their decisions, especially is they

turn out to produce undesirable outcome.

Ellison (2007) argues that democratic policing is crucial in post authoritatrian and post-conflict

countries, in order to enhance peacebuilding efforts, as the police play a key role in creating

secure and favourable condition for sustainable peace. In the same line, Caparini and Marenin

(2004:1) asserts that “ineffective, arbitrary or repressive social control undermines the legitimacy

of existing state-society relations, complicates efforts to promote development, and severely

limits the (re)building of democratic forms of governance and order.”

These arguments demonstrates the reason why the United Nations, in its multidimensional

peacekeeping operations, deploy the police to reform and restructure the local police of the post

conflict countries through mentoring, advising, and training in accordance with a focus on

democratic policing.

II.3.2. The United Nations Police (UNPOL)

The United Nations (UN) deployed a police contingent for the first time in July 1960 in the

Democratic Republic of Congo under the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC). Since

then, the United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL or UNPOL) has become part of the UN

peacekeeping operations, which were previously conducted solely by the military.

In the Cold War era, conflicts were mostly inter-state with known belligerents as responsible

states with full control of their forces. The implication was that there were minimum

humanitarian consequences to civilian populations and no breakdown of the rule of law within

the country. As a response, the UN deployed mainly a small force composed of mainly military

observers. The post cold war era was different, as it was characterized by intra-state conflicts,

which are very devastating and cause a complete breakdown of the rule of law and infrastructure

within the country, occasioning a serious threat to civilian populations.

In line with the above, Eirin Mobekk states that the role of UNCIVPOL in the earlier operations

functioned according to the SMART concept which consisted in supporting human rights,

monitoring performance of local police forces, advising local police forces, reporting incidents

and abuses, as well as training local police . However, this concept has changed in such a way

26  

that the tasks included in mandates of policing operations can now broadly be divided into five

areas namely: monitoring and advising, local reform, building a new force, and executive

policing (Mobekk 2005). The initial four practices are concerned with non- executive mandates

in which the UNPOL does not use force, while the last element refers to the application of actual

police powers by UNPOL, hence the term, executive policing.

Policing mandates often contain several of the above tasks although there have been more

policing operations mandated to train, to monitor and to assist local reform than to conduct

executive policing, as Mobekk further points out.

This means advisory, mentoring and training functions have become core duties of UNPOL in

order to reform, restructure and rebuild the host country police agencies with the ultimate aim of

capacity enhancement.

Nevertheless, alongside all these developments within the UNCIVPOL, it was not until the end

of the Cold War era, precisely in May 1993 that a UN Civilian Police Unit was established in the

Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) at the UN Headquarters. The formation of this

unit followed widespread criticism about lack of adequate preparatory planning for

UNCIVPOL’s involvement in peacekeeping missions which resulted from almost total

dependency of the police component upon the military for participation in all missions (Duncan

Chappell and John Evans 1999).

It is important to note that most of the developments of UN police component are a result of

recommendations put forward in the report of the United Nations Panel on Peace Operations,

also known as the “Brahimi Report”. Thus, this panel called for, among other things, a “doctrinal

shift” in the use of police and other rule of law elements to support a greater focus on reform and

restructuring activities. The panel recommended that police work together with their justice,

corrections and other rule of law colleagues in a coordinated and integrated manner. As a result

of these developments, in 2000, the Police Division was established, changing from a mere Unit,

and in 2007 it became a part of the DPKO Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions

(United Nations website, UNPOL Division).

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II.3.3. The Role of UNPOL

Greener (2009) contends that the UN Police Division, which has been working under the

umbrella of the military component for many decades, had finally been elevated to a new status

with the Division being embedded within a rule of law and security institutions pillar, with its

own Assistant Secretary-General, and which is increasingly recognised as being central to the

successful conduct of UN peacekeeping operations.

In the same line, Durch & Center (2010) state that the contemporary UN police role has shifted

from the traditional monitoring and reporting tasks to the direction of potential future “interim

law enforcement” missions, focusing mostly on transformational activities with their subsequent

requirements such as mentoring, advising, training, reform and restructuring, as well as

rebuilding of post-conflict police services, while providing interim operational security support

to national police and other law enforcement agencies. This author further asserts that the shift

happened as a result of the UN Police Division realizing a lack of operational merit in traditional

monitoring and reporting, thus undertaking to reconceptualize the fundamental objectives of UN

policing to include the above mentioned transformational dimensions.

It can therefore be said that today, UNPOL promotes human rights and rule of law in post-

conflict countries by reforming, restructuring, and rebuilding the local law enforcement agencies.

This is done mostly through mentoring, advising, and training of local police force in accordance

to democratic policing principles.

The UN itself recognizes the police as a vital component in rebuilding a post-conflict society. In

fact, as highlighted by the UN Police Division, The role of United Nations Police has grown very

fast over the last two decade, since the early 1990s to be precise. “Not only has the United

Nations almost tripled the number of police authorized for deployment from less than 6,000 to

more than 17,500, but also UN police mandates have become more multi-dimensional” (UNPOL

Division, www.un.org). In support of this, Smith, Holt and Durch (2007), argue that the reason

for the changes in the UN Police and the prevalence of police in peacekeeping operations are a

result of the recognition that the establishment of public security and combating lawlessness is

among the great priorities of post-conflict societies.

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To achieve the above task, the Police Division in the DPKO, set a vision of striving towards a

professional service for a lasting impact. As highlighted in 2010 by Commissioner Ann-Marie

Orler, Police Advisor and Director of the Police Division, the Police Division undertakes to

achieve among other objectives, in the endeavor of professionalizing UN Police peacekeeping, to

improve efforts to recruit, select, deploy, and rotate the staff in the missions ensuring that they

are highly qualified and trained, and engaging them in challenging and rewarding tasks.

(http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/documents/unpol_vision.pdf).

When considering the above objective of the Police Division in its efforts to professionalize the

UNPOL, it is crystal clear that pre-deployment training attempts to ensure police officers

provided by member states are qualified to perform their mandated tasks in the mission area.

Thus, in light of the same objective, pre-deployment training is going to be discussed below.

II.3.4. UNPOL Pre-deployment Training and its Contents

Pre-deployment training endeavours to put into practice one of the recommendations from the

Brahimi Report on paragraph 87, which calls for a rapid deployment of UN peacekeepers

(military, police, and civilians into post-conflict settings once peace agreements had been signed.

The recommendation stresses that the deployed personnel must be competent and capable, well-

equipped, well-trained in their basic skill-sets, and well-informed about the mission environment,

with good mission guidance.

This recommendation, as Durch & Center (2010) argue, was made against a historical

background of slow and ineffective UN police deployments, which could reach up to 6 months to

deploy at least half of the authorized officers with no consistent pre-deployment training, and

spotty logistical support.

In reaction to this recommendation, and considering the fact that

UN Police officers are contributed by a large number of countries, with differing policing

systems, training and specializations, the UN DPKO, the Integrated Training Service (ITS)

developed pre-deployment training standards for UN Police (UN Peacekeeping Resourse Hub,

2007).

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In view of the fact that peacekeeping work is too demanding to officers both at a professional

and individual level, member states are required by the UN to provide their selected police

officers with the UN pre-deployment training standards consisting of the Core

Pre-Deployment Training Material

(CPTM) and the Specialized Training Material (STM) for Police. Details of the training content

are in the annex.

The target group is all individual police officers to be deployed to peacekeeping operations.

These officers are selected by Member States and must have satisfied to the selection criteria set

by DPKO Police Division (PD). In addition, the selected officers are expected to be competent

and well trained in their police related profession, for only such an officer can be turned into a

good peacekeeper. Police Pre-deployment Training is delivered by Regional or

National Peacekeeping Training Institutes over a minimum period of two weeks (UN

Peacekeeping Resourse Hub, 2007).

When observed closely, it is apparent that contents of pre-deployment training provides generic

knowledge of police mandates and UN core values, rather than a mission specific knowledge as

well as knowledge of the laws and culture of the country of deployment. In fact, most of the

participants attend the pre-deployment after having passed the SAAT, but before being aware of

their deployment to a specific peacekeeping operation. Thus, the interest to conduct this study of

attempting to examine the assumed positive contribution of pre-deployment in enhancing

performance of police officers in peacekeeping operation was informed by the above

observation.

II.3.5. Individual Police Officers and Formed Police Officers

UNPOL consist of two sections depending on the functions. There are Individual Police Officers

(IPO) on one hand, and the Formed Police Units (FPU) on the other.

II.3.5.1. Individual Police Officers (IPO)

These are Police officers who are recruited individually and are deployed for six to 24 months.

Each one must be assessed, interviewed and evaluated. As of 2012, UNPOL counted 14, 000

officers, among whom 7100 were IPOs. The expanded mandate of IPO may include:

30  

support for the reform, restructuring and rebuilding of host-state police and other law

enforcement agencies (implied tasks include mentoring, advising, and training local

police)

Interim policing and other law enforcement (depending on whether the mission is

executive or non-executive)

Many recent mandates also include specific reference to promoting and protecting human

rights and the protection of civilians (United Nations Police Division, 2008).

According to the Police Division, there is a never-ending demand for new police and—given

today’s multidimensional mandates—there is a constant demand for different specializations,

language skills and for female officers. The other area of police specialization that is increasingly

needed in modern peacekeeping include the FPU.

II.3.5.2. Formed Police Unit (FPU)

The DPKO/DFS defines UN FPUs as a cohesive mobile police units, providing support to

United Nations operations and ensuring the safety and security of United Nations personnel and

missions, primarily in public order management (United Nations/ DPKO/DFS, 2013:4).

Tasks & skills/necessary capabilities require the FPUs to have a special training in the domain of

VIP protection, special weapons and tactics, as well as riot control. The primary objective in

assigning tasks to FPUs, as stipulated in the DPKO/DFS Policy on FPUs in PKOs, is to make the

best possible use of their added value, which is derived from their ability to act as a cohesive unit

and their special weapons and equipment which gives them a heightened robustness compared to

IPOs. FPUs have three core tasks:

Public order management;

Protection of United Nations personnel and facilities;

Supporting police operations that require a formed response and may involve a higher

risk (above the general capability of individual United Nations police).

In view of the above literature, it is important to note that Rwanda is among the UN Troop

Contributing Countries (TCC), with military peacekeepers, both protection force and military

observers in Sudan, Darfur and in South Sudan. In addition to being a TCC, Rwanda is as well a

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Police Contributing Country (PCC), with both IPOs, in Sudan, South Sudan, Liberia, Ivory

Coast, and Haiti, as well as FPUs in Haiti and recently in Mali. A more detailed experience of

Rwandan armed forces, both the military and the police is going to be discussed below.

II.4. RWANDAN EXPERIENCE IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Regarding the Rwandan experience as a TCC, Beswick (2010) argues that since 2004 Rwanda

has been the second largest contributor to both the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and

its successor the hybrid African Union–UN Assistance Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), although

Rwanda was not part of traditional providers of troops for peacekeeping missions. In the same

line, it is important to note that, from 2009 to 2013, the Force Commander of the peacekeeping

operation in Darfur is a Rwandan, Lieutenant General Patrick Nyamvumba, while currently

Major General Jean-Bosco Kazura leads UN forces in Mali (Ministry of Defence, 2013). 

II.4.1. The Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF)

The Rwandan Army’s commitment to peacekeeping is well articulated in Matthew Ross’

statement that:

“After the United Nations withdrew its peacekeepers, the invasion of Rwanda by the

Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was the only means to end the

genocide. Just 10 years after this genocide, in May of 2005, Rwanda contributed its first

peacekeeper to the United Nations. Over the next two years, that contribution grew

exponentially to over 2,000 peacekeepers and by January of 2011, Rwanda became the

8th largest contributor of peacekeepers in the world. […] Rwanda, with a current military

size of only 33,000, sends 3,233 peacekeepers to the United Nations African Union

Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), an amazing 10.6% of its military” (Ross, 2011:35).

In line with the Above, Rwandan troops have been praised for their professionalism and hard

word in the cause of peace under the umbrella of the UN, particularly in the conflict-torn

Sudanese region of Darfur.

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II.4.2. The Rwanda National Police (RNP)

The Rwanda National Police (RNP) deployed police officers in peacekeeping for the first time in

2005, in Darfur under the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). This first RNP contingent in

peacekeeping consisted of 50 officers.

In 2012, Rwanda has been ranked the first country with the highest number of female police

officers in UN missions. In total it maintains about 500 police officers in seven UN missions,

namely; South Sudan, Haiti, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Darfur, Guinea Bissau and Liberia

(Rwanda National Police, 2012).

Before going in mission Rwandan Police officers go through pre-deployment courses preparing

them to properly carry out their duties in mission areas. These courses are conducted either in

Rwanda or in Kenya. When conducted in Rwanda, National Police Academy is one of the

centers, in which Police officers are trained before they go in mission. The training is conducted

in partnership with regional bodies, particularly the Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination

Mechanism (EASFCOM).

II.4.2.1. EASFCOM-Sponsored Pre-deployment Trainings

Of the many pre-deployment courses, also known as United Nations Police Officer Course

(UNPOC), conducted by the EASFCOM, two of them, namely the 30th and the 36th took place in

Rwanda in August 2011 and October 2012 respectively. The EASF aims to develop the Regional

Capacity for police in peacekeeping operation and prepare a number of standby police officers

for deployment as per the recommendation regarding police capacity in PSO in the Brahimi

Report. This is explained by the EASF Senior Police Advisor, Sande Torbjorn that:

“UNPOC is a vital part of the education of police officers from this region. By the end of

2015, we are supposed to educate at least 720 police officers, but we have already passed

that number. We need to even continue educating more police officers” (RNP, 2012)

The pre-deployment trainings conducted by the EASCOM fall under the above objective. The

duration is extended over a two-week period of time covering both theory and practice. And the

content is in line with the UN standards set in the CPTM and the STM.

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II.4.2.2. ISS-TfP Sponsored UNPOL Trainings

The ISS conducts UNPOC Training of Trainers (ToT). As a result, the EASFCOM uses

graduates from ISS ToTS. So far, two UNPOC ToT have been conducted in Rwanda by the ISS-

TfP. The first training took place in 2006 and the second in 2012.

The two regional organisations mentioned above derive their training contents from the standard

materials for UNPOL pre-deployment training provided by the DPKO. Thus is can be argued

that whatever strength or weakness found in the contents can be traced back to the standard

DPKO. However, without altering the standard, the organisation or country undertaking to

conduct a pre-deployment training for its police officers might include knowledge deemed

crucial for a better performance of the officers in peacekeeping operations.

II.5. CONCLUSION

In order to respond to the prevalent intrastate nature of modern conflicts, peace operations also

evolved from traditional military-dominated peace keeping to multidimensional peace operations

that involve many actors including the civilian component and the police component. The police

component, which constitutes the focus of this study, has since been assigned the mandate to

reform, restructure and rebuild the local law enforcement agencies in line with democratic

policing and human rights standards.

To achieve this, the UN police had to recruit competent and skilled officers who could

effectively carry out the contemporary UN police mandates, as recommended in the Brahimi

Report. One of the mechanisms to increase the competence of police officers in peacekeeping

operations was to prepare pre-deployment trainings for them and equip them with necessary

knowledge to perform better in peacekeeping operations. This demonstrates the major

assumption of the study that pre-deployment training enhances the performance of police officers

in carrying out their mandated tasks in peacekeeping operations.

However, as shown in the literature, the pre-deployment content does not cover mission specific

mandate, local laws and culture of the country of deployment. This is due to the fact that police

officers attend pre-deployment trainings before they are informed by the DPKO of the mission

they will be serving in. In addition, PPC are the ones choosing officers who sit for UN SAAT,

34  

which assesses only language, driving and shooting skills of the officers. In other words, it is

only assumed that the officers are competent and knowledgeable in the domain of policing to the

extent of mentoring and training local police in the mission area, as the real police competency is

not assessed by the UN SAAT. Thus, this study will try to verify the above mentioned

assumption, taking into account other intervening variables such as officers’ competency in

policing, their commitment, and the conditions encountered in the mission area.

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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY

III.1. INTRODUCTION

This section provides an overview of the type under which this study falls as well as the

population that will be used. Methods and instruments that will be used to collect, analyse and

interpret data will also be discussed.

This study will use both quantitative and qualitative approaches as it seeks to explain the causal

relationship between pre-deployment training and police performance in PSO, particularly the

effectiveness of pre-deployment in enhancing the performance of police officers in carrying out

their mandated tasks once deployed in the mission area.

Elucidating this not only requires generating data in quantitative form which can be subjected to

rigorous quantitative analysis in a formal fashion, as stated by Kothari (2004:5), but also

generating data in a non-quantitative form such as respondents’ attitudes, perceptions,

impressions, or insights. Thus, as mentioned above, a combination of both quantitative and

qualitative approaches has been used. The researcher used primary data that will be collected

directly on the population, as well as secondary data from different reports and documents

relevant to the subject under study. EASFCOM Pre-deployment trainings conducted in Rwanda

in 2011 and 2012 have been used as a case study.

III.2. POPULATION

The population of this study consists of a consensus of forty-five (45) Rwandan police officers

who attended the above mentioned trainings in 2011 and 2012. This consensus of forty-five

respondents is reasonable basing on the argument by Gay and Airasian (2003:113) that for a

small population of less than 100 people or units, the researcher should survey the entire

population. It is to be noted that part of the population had completed their tour of duty in peace

PSO, while another part is still serving in different missions. The latter would be accessed by the

researcher through email.

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III.3. INSTRUMENTS OF DATA COLLECTION

III.3.1. Questionnaire

A questionnaire was used as instrument to collect data from the population. This was done in the

sake of exploring the quantitative aspect of this research. The questionnaire consisted of both

yes/no questions and open ended questions based on the research questions. These were

formulated in relation to the content of pre-deployment training attended and the knowledge and

skills acquired; the reality in the mission area and tasks assigned to respondents, and finally the

relevance of the knowledge learned during pre-deployment as well as its application in police

functions in PSO.

The choice of the use of the questionnaire, in addition to the logic of covering the qualitative

aspect of the study, was enthused by explanations of its merit provided by Kothari (2004:101).

He states that a questionnaire minimizes the cost even in the case of a huge and widespread

population. Unlike the interviews, questionnaires are free from the interviewer’s bias, as answers

are in the respondents’ own words. Besides the fact that respondents have adequate time to give

well thought out answers and can be reached conveniently through mails even when

geographically apart, Kothari further argues that questionnaire allows the use of large samples,

which makes results more dependable and reliable. In fact, some of the respondents of this study

are still serving in different peacekeeping operations; therefore the questionnaire makes it easy to

collect data from them even at a distance through mails.

III.3.2. Interviews

As this research covered both quantitative and qualitative aspect of the problem, interviews were

used, in addition to the questionnaire, in order to explore the qualitative aspect of the main

question; that is the perception of Rwandan officers of relevance of pre-deployment trainings in

allowing them respond effectively to their mandated tasks in the mission area. As interviews

require contact with respondents whether face to face or on telephone or other live conversation

technology like Skype which are very costly and unaffordable by the researcher, they were

applied only on respondents who were in Rwanda.

37  

The type of interview that was used is the Focused Interview. According to Merton & Kendal

(1946, cited in Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996: 234), this is a personal form of interview that takes

place with respondents known to have been involved in a particular experience. It refers to

situations that have been analysed prior to the interview. It proceeds on the basis of an interview

guide specifying topics related to the research hypotheses. Lastly, it focuses on the subjects’

experiences regarding the situations under study.

The interview was conducted at the police general headquarters at Kacyiru with five senior

officers of the rank of Chief Superintendent on Thursday 18 July 2013 in the Director of

Administration, Rwanda National Police, who was also part of the interviewees. All the five

officers attended UN pre-deployment training and later on served in peacekeeping operations.

Most importantly, they currently hold posts that allow them to be directly involved in selection

of officers, organisation of trainings and follow up of police performance both within the country

and on external duty like peacekeeping operations. The five respondents were all directors: of

administration, of personnel, of training, and of peace support operations.

The choice of focused interviews was informed by the argument by Nachmias & Nachmias,

(1996:235) that the considerable liberty given to respondents in expressing themselves allows the

researcher to obtain details of personal reactions as well as specific emotions. An element that

serves the purpose of this study, which covers also the perception aspect of respondents, as

highlighted earlier.

III.4. DATA ANALYSIS

III.4.1. Quantitative Data

The quantitative data that were collected using a questionnaire have been analysed and

interpreted using statistical means. The SPSS Software was used to provide graphs and

percentages of responses in favour or in opposition to the research hypotheses. As a result, the

analysis and interpretation of data allowed the confirmation or rejection of the hypotheses, or

even coming up with new conclusions.

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III.4.2. Qualitative data and content analysis

Hsieh & Shannon (2005:1278) define Qualitative content analysis as “a research method for the

subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process

of coding and identifying themes or patterns”. In the same line, Patton (2002:453) refers to it as

“any qualitative data reduction and sense-making effort that takes a volume of qualitative

material and attempts to identify core consistencies and meanings”, while Yan Zhang and

Barbara M. Wildemuth state that qualitative content analysis goes beyond merely counting

words or extracting objective content from texts to examine meanings, themes and patterns that

may be manifest or latent in a particular text, as it allows researchers to understand social reality

in a subjective but scientific manner (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009).

This technique was used to explore pre-deployment training contents and their background. The

EASFCOM police pre-deployment training program/content was analyzed based on curricular

characteristics, such as program duration, training locations, instructor requirements,

implementation of training standards, and methods of training feedback and evaluation. This was

done in comparison with the UN Pre-deployment Training Standards for police, details of which

are provided in the literature review. UN training standards constitute the reference for

EASFCOM trainings. In fact, they are identical, because differences from UN requirements

would compromise the validity of the content, whereas the UN is the future employer of the

trained officers.

III.5. CONCLUSION

This research combined three techniques of data collection namely, the Questionnaire, Focused

Interview, and Qualitative Content analysis. The first one covers the quantitative aspect of the

research while the last two deal with the qualitative side of it. The aim of using both qualitative

and quantitative approaches was to maximize the information provided by respondents ranging

from quantifiable facts to subjective perceptions and insights. This enabled the provision of

relevant answers to the research questions initially posed, and subsequent confirmation or

disproval of hypotheses at the end of data analysis and interpretation. The following chapter

discusses the findings from the focused interview and from recovered questionnaires

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CHAPTER IV: PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING AND THE

PERFORMANCE OF RNP IN PSO

IV.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter is devoted to the presentation, analysis and interpretation of data on pre-deployment

trainings and the performance of RNP in PSO collected through the questionnaires distributed to

45 the respondents, all of which were recovered. It also explores information gotten from the

focused interview with the 5 senior officers involved in pre-deployment trainings and peace

support operations planning at the Rwanda National Police Headquarters, Kacyiru.

The questionnaire was organized into 3 headings that represent the three variables: pre-

deployment training as independent, performance in peacekeeping operation as the dependent

variable, and finally identification of the respondent -without mentioning names- that shades

light on their experience, competence and skills which is the intervening variable, which is

crucial for the success of the previous two. The interview guide was also organized along the

same logic. However, on the actual template, the identification of the respondents came first.

IV.2. DESCRIPTION OF DATA ON RESPONDENTS

Demographic information; such as rank, age, sex, education level, seniority in the police, major

professional courses attended, as well as different responsibilities held or tasks performed in

RNP, has been used determine the experience and competence of officers prior to attending pre-

deployment training and subsequent UN mission.

This information constitutes a measurement reference or indicators of initial competence in

police service which in the context of this study is viewed as a necessary intervening variable for

pre-deployment training to turn the selected police officers into effective peacekeepers. Thus,

respondents’ identification data is described around the factors mentioned above.

 

40  

IV.2.1. Respondents’ ranks

Table 1: Respondents by rank category

Rank Category Frequency Percentage (%) NCO 7 15.6 Junior Officers 21 46.7 Senior Officers 15 33.3 Commissioners 2 4.4 Total 45 100

Source: Primary data from respondents, July 2013

Respondents were classified by category and not by rank, because ranks in the same category are

close in terms training and knowledge, and are entitled to the same privileges, although the ranks

are hierarchically organized. It is clear that the rank of constable was not represented; this is due

to the fact that very few of them are sent to missions, as they lack enough experience are newly

recruited into the force.

As shown by the above table, junior officers constitute the bigger number of respondents,

followed by senior officers, then NCOs, and finally commissioners.

IV.2.2.Respondents’ age Table 2: Respondents by age

Age category Frequency Percent (%) 20 to 30 years 5 11.1 31 to 40 years 22 48.9 41 to 60 years 18 40.0 Total 45 100

Source: Primary data from respondents, July 2013 The table above show the age group between 31 and 40 years as the most dominant among the

respondents. This could be partly explained by the fact that the RNP is only 13 years old, and its

sister institution, the Rwanda Defence Forces that provided the police with part of personnel,

former “gendarmes” and other staff is also less than 25 years old. It is however important to note

that some personnel within the police were serving in former Rwandan armed forces, the former

Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) or other countries armies before the inception of the current

Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF). Since the year 2000 the RNP kept recruiting new entrants as per

41  

the law in order to strengthen the force and reach a ratio of police officers in comparison to the

growing number of the Rwandan population. This explains the phenomenon of the variety of age

groups among the respondents, with older officers likely to have more experience than younger

ones in terms of duration in service.

IV.2.3. Respondents’ sex Table 3: Respondents by sex

Gender Frequency Percentage Female 10 22.2 Male 35 77.8 Total 45 100

Source: Primary data from respondents, July 2013

As shown by the table above, the number of Rwandan female police officers that are involved in

peacekeeping operations is still low compared to that of their male counterparts. This reality is

by and large prevalent in uniformed services.

IV.2.4. Classification of respondents by education level

Table 4: Respondents by level of education

Education level Frequency Percentage (%) Below A2 2 4.4

A2 19 42.2 Bachelor’s Degree 22 48.9

Above Bachelor’s Degree 2 4.4 Total 45 100

Source: Primary data from respondents, July 2013

 

 

42  

IV.2.5. Classification of respondents by seniority in service

Table 5: Respondents by seniority in service

Years in service Frequency Percentage (%) 1 to 5 years 0 0 6 to 10 years 4 8.9

11 to 15 years 9 20.0 16 years and above 32 71.1

Total 45 100 Source: Primary data from respondents, July 2013

The explanation of more years of service than the establishment of RNP was provided previously in section IV.2.2 on page 40.

IV.2.6. Categorization of respondents by number of major professional courses attended

Table 6: Respondents by number of courses attended

Number of courses Frequency Percentage (%) Below 5 Police Professional Courses 14 31.1 5 to 10 courses 18 40.0 11 to 15 courses 9 20.0 16 courses and above 4 8.9 Total 45 100.0

Source: Primary data from respondents, July 2013 

In the RNP, there is no specified number of professional courses (horizontal courses) an officer

has to attend, as these are job-related and do not consider ranks. On the other hand, promotional

courses (vertical) are concerned with the rank and category, thus to become a constable the

recruit must attend the basic training, whereas a cadet course is required for commissioned

officers. Junior officers must attend the Junior Supervisory, or intermediate Command and Staff

Course, while senior officers must attend the Senior Command and Staff Course.

For purposes of this research, professional courses were used as an indicator instead of

promotional courses, because the study is about training and subsequent performance in field

rather than an elevation in status, which is the case of promotional courses. Attending

professional courses or trainings is the only way to improve officers’ skills and competence in

43  

performing their duties. Thus, it can be deduced that the more professional courses an officer

attends the higher the competency in carrying out related tasks.

The fact that all respondents had attended a professional course, with 31 % having attended

between 1 and five course, and the remaining 61 % of respondents having undergone a minimum

of five courses, shows that Rwandan police officers selected for pre-deployment training and

subsequent deployment in peacekeeping operations are sufficiently competent and skilled

enough to perform their mandated tasks in peacekeeping operations. This deduction is also

consolidated by the fact that the majority of officers have enough experience in the police

service, as shown by the findings (20% between 11 and 15 years, while 71 % have above 16

years). Besides, only 15.6% of respondents are non commissioned officers, the majority is made

up of Junior Officers followed by senior officers and a few commissioners. In the same line, with

regard the level of education, a bigger portion of respondents fall in the range of a bachelor’s

degree (48.9%) followed by 42.2% having completed their secondary school. With these

elements combined, officers are indeed selected to attend pre-deployment training and

peacekeeping operations basing on their competence and skills. The above analysis confirms the

first hypothesis that only competent officers are selected to attend pre-deployment training and

further service in peacekeeping operations.

IV.3. DESCRIPTION OF DATA ON PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING

IV.3.1. Awareness of mission and mandate, and issues related to training content

The table below shows how many respondents were aware, upon attending the training, of the mission and mandate they were to carry out once deployed in the mission area.

Table 7: Awareness of mission and mandate before pre-deployment

Awareness of mission and mandate prior to pre-deployment training

Frequency Percentage

Yes 0 0 % No 45 100 % Source: Primary data from respondents, July 2013

All respondents had attended pre-deployment training prior to being deployed to a UN

peacekeeping operation as Individual Police Officers (IPO).

44  

However, on the issue of whether they were aware of the mission they would be serving in when

they were undergoing pre-deployment training, all 45 respondents, that is 100%, stated that they

did not know which peacekeeping operation they would be deployed in, nor could they know the

mandate to be carried out in their future specific missions.

The implication of not knowing the mission as well as the mandate to be carried out by these

future peacekeepers when attending pre-deployment training is that the planners of pre-

deployment trainings keep the content to a more generic aspect that applies to peacekeeping in

general, thus lacking a focus on preparing participants for specific tasks to be performed as well

as challenges pertaining to the specific mission they would be serving in.

Regarding the ten most important topics learned during pre-deployment training, respondents

provided different answers.

Table 8: Frequency of most important topics

Topics Frequency Percentage (%)Introduction to UN Systems 0 0 Establishment and Types of PKOs 0 0 Fundamental Principles of Peacekeeping 0 0 Qualities of a peacekeeper 0 0 Report writing 15 33.3 Working with Language Assistants 4 8.8 Liaison in Peacekeeping 0 0 Negotiation, Mediation & Arbitration 45 100 Mentoring & Advising 22 48.8 Mandate Translation & Implementation – RRR. 12 26.6 Components of PK Operations 4 8.8 Communication skill and message handling 45 100 Community Policing 41 91.1 International Humanitarian Law 5 11.1 International Human Rights 31 68.9 Different Legal Systems 14 31.1 Sexual exploitation &abuse (Women & Children in Conflict) 36 80 Respect for Diversity 45 100 Stress Management 45 100 UN Core Values 27 60 Safety & Security in Mission Areas 13 28.8 Hostage Taking & Survival 45 100 Personal Health, HIV & AIDS  33 73.3 Source: Primary data from respondents, July 2013

45  

Nonetheless, among the 23 topics mentioned, five topics appeared similarly for the totality of

respondents (100%). These are Stress Management, Hostage Survival Skills, Culture Awareness

and Respect for Diversity, Mediation and Negotiation Skills, as well as Message handling and

Radio Communication Skills. These four topics are taught theoretically in class, but they also

constitute the basis final practical exercise of the training. This explains the fact that despite

differences in naming the remaining 6 topics among the 10 most important, all respondents

mentioned the four that were learned both theoretically and practically. It can, therefore, be

deduced that practical exercises enhances the mastery of skills learned theoretically in class.

In fact, with regard to the training content covering both a theoretical and practical aspect, 100%

of respondents confirmed that there was a practical part in form of a field exercise towards the

last two days of the two-week-long pre-deployment training.

IV.3.2. Awareness of mission-like environment through practical aspect of the training

About the level at which the practical aspect, also referred to as field exercise, of the training

improved participants’ awareness of mission-like environment, 5 respondents (11.1 %) stated

that it somehow improved their awareness of mission-like environment, while for 8 others

(17.8%) the awareness was a fairly improved. On the other hand, 10 respondents or (22.2 %)

affirmed that field exercises satisfactorily improved their awareness, while for the remaining

majority of 22 respondents or (48.9%) the improvement was rated as very much. The following

chart illustrates the above discussed frequency of awareness improvement of mission-like

environment as a result of the practical aspect of pre-deployment training.

Figure 2: Awareness of mission-like environment

 

Source: primary data from respondents, July 2013.

Not at all0%

Somehow11%

Fairly18%

Satisfactorily22%

Very much49%

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As illustrated by the above chart, it is evident that the practical aspect of the training enhances

participants awareness of mission-like scenarios to a greater extent, which is one of prerequisites

for a better performance once deployed in the mission, as the newly deployed peacekeeper would

not spend much time in disorientation due to awareness of similar setup obtained during training.

IV.3.3. Level of familiarity with mentoring and advising prior and after pre-deployment

training

Before pre-deployment training, 5 respondents (11.1%) affirmed to have never practiced

mentoring and advising in their career, 15 others (33.3 %) uttered that they rarely mentored and

advised less experienced workers, while for 15 others (33.3%) it was a regular practice. On the

other hand 10 respondents (22.2 %) stated that they were familiar with mentoring and advising

prior to attending pre-deployment training.

After the training, the level of familiarity in practicing mentoring and advising increases as

shown by the statistics. In fact, 30 respondents (66.7 %) affirmed to have become familiar with

the practice, while 15 others (33.3 %) stated that they had become very familiar with mentoring

and advising as a result of the knowledge gained during pre-deployment.  

Figure 3: Familiarity with mentoring before & after pre-deployment training

Source: Primary data from respondents, July 2013.

Never11%

Rarely34%Regularl

y33%

Familiar22%

Very familiar0%

Before Trainingnever0%

rarely0% regularly

0%

Familiar67%

Very familiar33%

After training

47  

As shown by the chart in Figure 3 and preceding statistics from collected data, it is clear that

indeed pre-deployment training improved the knowledge and skills of officers regarding

mentoring and advising, an activity that constitutes one of core business of UNPOL in

peacekeeping operation in its endeavour to reform local police according to democratic policing

requirements.

IV.3.4. Improvement of capacity to communicate and negotiate with other actors

On the question regarding the extent at which lessons on communication and negotiation skills

learnt during pre-deployment training improved participants’ capacity to communicate and

negotiate with other actors from different agencies, 3 respondents (6.7%) stated that their

capacity was improved fairly. They explained that the time allocated for the exercise was too

short for them to fully acquire the knowledge. On the same question, 26 respondents (57.8%)

estimate their capacity to have improved satisfactorily, while 16 others (35.5%) consider their

capacity to communicate and negotiate with other actors in a multi cultural set up to have

improved very much.

The following chart illustrates the level of improvement of communication and negotiation

skills.

Figure 4: Improvement of communication and negotiation skills

Source: Primary data from respondents, July 2013.

Not at all0%

Fairly6.7%

Satisfactorily57.5%

Very much35.5%

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The statistics above show that the majority of respondents had improved their capacity to

communicate and negotiate with different actors in a set up other than their familiar one, as a

result of lessons learnt during pre-deployment training and subsequent practical exercises.

However, due to individual differences as well as the rate and pace at which people learn, some

respondents considered the time allotted for the practical part not sufficient for them to get hold

of the skills, thus the lesson was not adequately beneficial for this small portion of respondents.

From the above findings regarding pre-deployment training and whether it provided participants

with adequate skills to mentor and advise other less experienced officers as well as communicate

and negotiate with different partners, it is evident that statistics show that indeed officers gained

enough skills from the training that would enable them to perform the said tasks.

Thus the second hypothesis, which state that pre-deployment trainings had equipped police

personnel with necessary knowledge to carry out their duties in the mission area, is also

confirmed.

IV.4. ISSUES PERTAINING TO MISSION EXPERIENCE

The totality of respondents, 45 that is (100%), has participated in peacekeeping operations where

the UNPOL was assigned to carry out a non executive mandate. This means, UNPOL officers

are not supposed to perform enforcement duties such as arrest, investigations, traffic regulations

or public order and other security tasks. Nor do they carry weapons, unlike in the case of an

executive mandate. Tasks performed by UNPOL in a non executive mission include mentoring

and advising, confidence building patrols, reform and restructuring of local police, as well as

training. Therefore, respondents’ mission experience rotates around tasks listed in the non

executive mandated peacekeeping operation.

IV.4.1. Tasks performed by respondents in the mission area

With regard to the tasks performed by respondents once deployed in the mission, 30 respondents

(66.7%) affirmed to perform different tasks typical for a non executive mission which include

confidence building patrols, daily co-location with local police officers during which they

perform mentoring and advising, providing on-job training at police stations about human rights

standards on arrest and detention of suspects, as well as sensitization activities in partnership

49  

with local police about community policing, women and children’s rights, and fighting against

gender based violence. 9 others (20%) stated that they were performing training duties to

increase local police capacity, while the remaining 6 (13.3 %) were working in administrative

duties at headquarters at different levels mainly team sites and sectors.

Figure 5: Tasks performed by respondents in the mission area

 

Source: Primary data from respondents, July 2013.

IV.4.2. The extent at which pre-deployment training prepared officers to perform the tasks

On the question about whether pre-deployment training attended respondents prior to their

deployment did sufficiently prepare them for the tasks they came to perform once in the mission

area, 26 the respondents (57.8 %) said yes it sufficiently did. Other 13 respondents (28.9 %) said

pre-deployment training prepared them to some extent, while the remaining 6 respondents (13.3

%) stated that it did not prepare them at all for the tasks they happen to perform in the mission

area.

 

Generic  non executive 

UNPOL duties66.7%

Admini & personnel office

20%

Training department

13.3%

50  

Figure 6: Preparation for future tasks

Source: Primary data from respondents, July 2013.

When analyzing the other related information, particularly the tasks performed by these

respondents, it has been established that all the 58 % who admitted to have been well prepared

during pre-deployment training for the tasks their happen to be performing in mission were

performing the generic non executive UNPOL tasks as described previously in section 4.4.1. On

the other hand, those who stated that pre-deployment prepared them to some extent (28.9%) were

performing training tasks, which is not catered for in pre-deployment. However, they explained

that some knowledge learnt in pre-deployment, such as culture awareness and respect for

diversity as well as human right standards on arrest, detention and use of force were very

relevant to their training duties, although they had to recourse to their policing knowledge and

training skills to deliver other subjects. As for those (13.3%) who denied to have been prepared

during pre-deployment for the tasks they happened to be performing in the mission area, it was

realized that all were working in administration and personnel offices at headquarters. Indeed,

skills such as planning leaves, travel arrangements, and record keeping in specialized software

that used in the said offices are not part of the pre-deployment training content. Thus, these

officers had to learn from others in order to perform their tasks.

4.4.3. Challenges encountered by officers in the mission area

All respondents in entirety (100%) asserted that they encountered challenges in the mission area.

Those that were common to all include culture difference, extreme weather conditions (flooding

Yes, very much57.8%

To some extent28.9%

No13.3%

51  

or extreme heat), homesickness and depression, communication barrier, unfamiliar food, and a

different legal system.

Table 9: Challenges encountered by respondents in the mission area

Challenges Frequency Percentage (%) Harsh weather conditions 45 100 % Cultural shock 25 55.5 % Unfamiliar diet 10 22.2 % Language barrier 15 33.3 % Homesickness and Stress 15 33.3 % Difference of doctrines 16 35.5 % Generalized lack of commitment

1 2.2 %

Source: primary data from respondents, July 2013.

One respondent mentioned a generalized lack of commitment from peacekeepers’ part as the

major challenge. All respondents asserted that these challenges somehow reduced their

performance at work.

Regarding whether these challenges were anticipatively discussed during pre-deployment

training and practiced during field exercise, 21 respondents (46.7 %) said that they were prepared

during pre-deployment training to encounter such challenges. 23 other respondents (51.1 %)

estimate that they were somehow informed about these potential challenges during pre-

deployment training, thus they said to have been prepared to some extent. They explained that

however information one can get in training or exercise does not fully equal the reality on the

ground, for instance it is impossible to simulate a desert and its harsh weather during pre-

deployment to prepare Rwandan officers for such situation they are likely to find in Darfur. Or

that they were introduced to different legal systems including Sharia law, but that they could not

master even an article so as to use it in a country like Sudan.

The remaining 1 respondent (2.2 %) explained that the challenge about lack of commitment was

not catered for in the training, arguing that there is a generalized attitude in the mission area that

no one came to solve the problems or become a hero in a foreign country, rather to get one’s

allowance and return home safely. This, explained the respondent, reduces the performance of

officers.

52  

Figure 7: Anticipative preparation for challenges

Source: Primary data from respondents, July 2013.

The respondent went on to say that even when one is motivated to work as required, one faces

discouragement from colleagues and ends up pretending to work but in reality no one cares.

4.4.4 Link between pre-deployment training content and the reality in the mission area

On the question of whether pre-deployment training content reflected the reality of the mission

area, respondents had to choose among three choices namely yes, to some extent, or no then

provide explanation basing on their experience of having attended pre-deployment and later on

serve in a peacekeeping operation.

Thus, 25 respondents (55.6%) of respondents said yes, the training content indeed reflected the

reality of the mission area they were deployed to, while 20 other respondents (44.4 %) admitted

that pre-deployment training reflected the reality of peacekeeping operation only to some extent.

None of the respondents denied the fact that the training reflected the reality on the ground in

peacekeeping operations. 

Yes46.7%

To some extent51.1%

No2.2%

53  

Figure 8: Link between training and reality in the mission area

Source: primary data from respondents, July 2013.

Those 55.6% who said yes, provided almost a similar explanation that despite the fact that they

did not know the mission where they would serve nor the mandate they would be carrying out

during pre-deployment, they realized once in the mission area that the tasks they were

performing such as mentoring and advising, confidence building patrols, community policing,

working in teams of people from different nationalities and cultures, and promoting human rights

were those they learnt during pre-deployment both theoretically and practically as field exercise.

The remaining 44.4 % who stated that the training reflected the reality on the ground only to

some extent argued by and large that whatever scenario used in pre-deployment training was just

a simulation which could not depict a hundred percent the reality. One respondent explained that

there is a big difference between being told that Darfur is a hot desert with frequent sand storms

and seeing, feeling, and suffering from the pain of the actual desert heat and sand storm. They

admitted that being aware of different weather characteristics of different missions and being

informed during pre-deployment training about the diversity of cultures among peacekeepers and

local population, which needed to be respected according to the UN Code of Conduct, somehow

prepared them psychologically to gradually adapt to the challenging reality of the mission area.

They also argued that the major case study scenario used during pre-deployment training was

about Darfur, yet some of them were deployed in South Sudan which has a completely different

set up, culture, and weather.

To summarize the issues related to mission experience, as discussed in sections 4.4.1, 2, 3 and 4,

data collected from respondents, corroborate that pre-deployment training content indeed reflect

Yes55.6%

To some extent44.4%

54  

the reality in the mission area and that awareness of challenges was pre-emptively enhanced.

This conclusion from findings confirms the third and last hypothesis of this research, which

asserts that the content of the pre-deployment training reflected the reality in the mission area

pre-empting possible challenges police personnel may face in the mission area, but with nuance.

This is due to the fact that there are respondents (13.3%), who stated that considering the tasks

they were carrying out in the mission, pre-deployment training did not prepare them at all.

IV.4.5. Some peculiar aspects highlighted from qualitative data

On the question about what they think should be included in the pre-deployment training content

in order to better prepare officers for an effective mandate implementation, respondents

generally stated that the two-week-long training in which 10 working days are only used, is not

enough to equip participants with adequate skills. They also argue that for adequate preparation,

participants should learn about specific mission mandate, culture, and laws of the host country as

well as the genesis and dynamics of the conflict in question. However, they also recognized that

for this to happen, selected officers should be aware of the mission they will serve in prior to

attending pre-deployment training, so that those who prepare the training content can include the

mission specific relevant knowledge.

When asked about any other factor, in addition to pre-deployment training, that can enhance

officers’ effectiveness in carrying out their mandated tasks in peacekeeping operations,

respondents generally reiterated the necessity for police contributing countries to select only

competent and skilled officers so as to deliver and make a difference once in the mission. In the

same line they suggested that officers’ area of expertise be considered in relation to the mission’s

mandate when selecting officers for a peacekeeping operation.

In line with the above, during an interview with the 5 senior RNP police officers, they stated that

there is a prevalent lack of commitment to perform their duties from many peacekeepers due to

the fact that they are interest in peacekeeping is motivated mainly by earning enough money than

they do back home. One respondent stated: “You go there for money and to improve your life, of

course you must also behave ethically, because the way you behave will be labelled to your

country, but the problem is the generalised lack of ownership for the job” (interview conducted

at Kacyiru, Police General Headquarters, on 11 July 2013)

55  

Another one explained: “When I was in a remote station in Darfur, there was this colleague

from West Africa who did not want to send his money back home, he kept all of it in a purse and

took it even in the bathroom, this guy always avoided long range patrols and invented all

reasons not to go out of office for patrol. This went on until he finished his tour of duty. You

know, it is a general situation. You are there for only one year, you can’t solve that conflict. You

just make sure you do some work and make a report, the UN like reports. Get your cash and go

back home alive” (interview conducted at Kacyiru, Police General Headquarters, on 11 July

2013)

Indeed, according to Smith et al. (2010: 27) “Mission Subsistence Allowances vary from roughly

$85 per day in Kosovo to nearly $140 per day in Haiti. Every individual UNPOL officer in a

given mission receives the same amount of MSA, regardless of rank”.

This is slightly more than an assistance inspector of police’s monthly salary. The interviewee

explained that spending a year in mission could generate for the officer enough money to buy his

or her own house and a small car. This can only happen is the officer returns home safely with

his or her money. As a result, many officers are reluctant to perform tasks that require them to be

much involved in local issues, or medium and long range patrols which they consider to be risky.

This factor contributes to poor performance of police officers in mission area, not because they

are incompetent or the pre-deployment training was not adequate, but simply because the officers

are not committed to work or making any difference in the mission area rather on making money

and go back home safely. This is a new variable that was not initially thought of in this research.

Thus it constitutes an area that can be explored by other researchers. 

IV.5. CONCLUSION

In a nut shell, the collected data have been presented and interpreted along three themes, namely

background of respondents, issues related to pre-deployment training, and lastly respondent’s

experience in peacekeeping operations. The organization of findings into these three themes was

in line with the three research questions and related hypotheses, all of which have been

confirmed as per the results.

56  

CHAPTER V: GENERAL CONCLUSION, SUGGESTIONS, AND

IMPLICATION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

V.1. GENERAL CONCLUSION

Multidimensional peacekeeping operations has been advocated for as a means to improve UN

peace interventions in conflicts with a holistic approach that include reforming and restructuring

of law enforcement agencies in accordance with internationally recognized standards. This is

where the UNPOL comes in as a key player in this endeavour. However, instances of

inefficiency and unsatisfactory performance have been raised as was elaborated in the

introductory part of this study. Thus as a remedy pre-deployment trainings for UNPOL were

established to address the said issues.

Nonetheless, police officers who passed the UN Selection Assistance and Assessment Teams

(SAAT) are sent for pre-deployment training, before they are aware of the mission they would be

deployed in or the mandate they would be carrying out, as the deployment order is issued by the

Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New York only a short time of

approximately one month. This is at least the case in Rwanda. As a result of not knowing the

mission or mandate for which officers are trained, issues like culture, law of the host country,

climatic considerations, as well as the conflict in the mission area are not taught to course

participants, yet they are vital to the preparation of officers. In addition, pre-deployment training

does not cover police duties, but rather peacekeeping issues. This raised the concern on whether

this training indeed prepares officers to effectively carryout police mandate in peacekeeping

operations, and if so, at what extent.

Thus, the purpose of this research was to examine the effectiveness of police pre-deployment

trainings in preparing Rwandan police officers to carry out police mandates in Peace Support

Operations.

The interest to assess the effectiveness of pre-deployment training was triggered by the fact that

police officers attend these trainings before they are aware of both the mission they would be

serving in and the mandate they would be performing. Although generic UNPOL mandates are

taught, still awareness by officers of issues like specific cultures, laws, and weather of the

57  

country of the mission, which are not known constitute a key element of preparation. It is in this

perspective that this research was conducted.

After presentation and interpretation of data collected from Rwandan officers who attended pre-

deployment training and later on were deployed in different peacekeeping operations, it was

established that indeed, as the officers were initially competent and knowledgeable in police

matters, the majority confirmed that pre-deployment training effectively prepared them to carry

out UNPOL tasks in the mission area.

In fact, under the theme of respondents’ background, it was established that more than 61 % of

respondents had undergone a minimum of five courses, while regarding the number of years in

law enforcement 71 % of respondents had spent more than 16 years in service. In the same line,

the majority of respondents is made up of Junior Officers followed by senior officers and a few

commissioners. In addition, with regard to education level, data showed that the larger segment

of respondents fall in the range of a bachelor’s degree (48.9%) followed by 42.2% having

completed their secondary school.

All these elements show that indeed selected to attend pre-deployment training and peacekeeping

operations basing on their competence and skills, thus, confirming the first hypothesis that only

competent officers are selected to attend pre-deployment training and further service in

peacekeeping operations.

The second theme that, which was about pre-deployment training, findings showed that despite

the fact that trainees are not aware of the mission they would be serving in, nor the mandate they

would be carrying out, officers who attended the training were sufficiently prepared to perform

UNPOL generic mandates through topics like mentoring and advising, human rights standards

on arrest and detention, democratic policing, community policing, culture awareness and respect

for diversity, communication skills, and UN code of conduct. In the same line, it was also

established that the practical aspect of pre-deployment training by and large enhanced

participants’ awareness of mission-like environment, as testified by 22.2 % who affirmed that

field exercises satisfactorily improved their awareness, while for the majority of respondents

(48.9%) the improvement was rated as very much.

58  

Findings on pre-deployment training show that indeed officers gained enough skills that would

enable them to mentor and advise other less experienced officers as well as communicate and

negotiate with different partners, 67% and 57 % respectively.

This proves the second hypothesis of this study, which states that police officers who attended

Pre-deployment trainings had adequate skills to effectively mentor and advise the local police, as

well as communicate and negotiate with other partners in the mission area, is also confirmed.

The third theme, which dealt with issues related to mission experience and whether it was

depicted during pre-deployment training, data collected from respondents, corroborate that the

training content indeed reflects the reality in the mission area and that awareness of challenges

was pre-emptively enhanced. This conclusion from findings confirms the third and last

hypothesis of this research which asserts that the content of the pre-deployment training reflected

the reality in the mission area pre-empting possible challenges encountered in the mission area

and preparing police officers to overcome them.

It can therefore be deduced that this research achieved its objectives, as all the hypotheses were

confirmed, though the third was nuanced. In fact, the study proved that when only competent

police personnel are selected, pre-deployment training can turn them into good and performing

peacekeepers.

The result of good performance in PSO is a positive reputation, which, in turn, increases the

credibility of the PCC, making it an indispensable stakeholder in UN PSO. This situation can be

very beneficial for a country like Rwanda that has relatively less bargaining power in the

International Community.

V.2. SUGGESTIONS

Two major concerns arose from the findings namely the length of pre-deployment training which

does not facilitate the adequate grasping of all necessary knowledge and skills to effectively

serve in a peacekeeping operation and the fact that police officers attend the training before they

are aware of the peacekeeping mission in which they would participate, nor the mandate they

would be carrying out.

59  

Thus, in line with the first concern, it is suggested that the Rwanda National Police in partnership

with other organisations such as the EASFCOM, that conduct pre-deployment trainings to

expand the duration of the training from 10 working days (2 weeks) to 20 working days (4

weeks/1 month), as this would avail enough time to expand on relevant knowledge and more

importantly on practical exercises. This would enhance awareness of mission-like situations.

Regarding the second concern, it is suggested that the RNP organise pre-deployment trainings

for selected officers after they had been issued with a deployment order from the DPKO to a

particular mission, so that lessons be focused on specific mission and host country peculiarities

such as culture, laws, weather, available food, and other do’s and don’ts. This would focus the

preparation of officers on real life situations, which reduces their disorientation to the minimum

once they enter the theatre of work in that particular country, and thus enhance their preparation.

Lastly, regarding the reluctance of some officers to work with commitment in peacekeeping

operations due to the fact that they are there only to earn money and not to make a change, it is

suggested that the RNP enhance the necessity for officers to perform as up to the required

standards, as it is a responsibility of the sending country to provide reliable officers for the UN to

fulfil its mandate. Besides, poor performance of a certain contingent affects the reputation and

credibility of the sending country.

V.3. IMPLICATION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

A new element that was not initially assumed as a variable that might influence the performance

of peacekeepers in the mission area emerged from qualitative data. This new variable is the

motivation of officers to participate in peacekeeping mission, which appeared to be oriented

more on earning enough money and return back home safely, rather than making a change in the

conflict-affected country.

This aspect could be further explored by other researchers in order to examine the motivation of

individual officers to participate in peacekeeping. Interested researchers can also study police

contributing countries’ motivation to participate in peace keeping operations and the interest in

having their officers to perform better in the mission area.

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ANNEXES