Mapping Discourse:Using Network Analysis and Citation Analysis to Map Trends in Liberal

Dialogue

Brittnee CarterUniversity of Kansas

and

Adelaido Godinez IIIUniversity of Kansas

Abstract

In his 2008 article, Reflexive Realism, Brent Steele argues that discourse and scholarship can have strong influence on state behavior.Often times, discourse becomes embedded with rules of thumb and standards of appropriateness that may potentially lead actors to acquiesce to these expectations. On the other hand, those subscribing to the behavioralist camp may argue observations of state behavior drive trends in academic research and political dialogue. In this paper, we will use network analysis and citation analysis to map the trend of liberal dialogue in politics and academics as well as trends in state behavior that signify increasing liberal-ness. While these sociograms will not identify a causal relationship, they will visuallydemonstrate whether the liberal-ness of dialogue and states develop simultaneously or consecutively. Additionally, it will afford some insight as to whether state behavior influences political discourse. The analysis will examine the discourse between National Security

Paper prepared for the ISA Midwest Annual Conference 2014, St. Louis, MO.

Strategies in 1998, 2002, and the invasion into Iraq. It will employ qualitative methods to develop the event case study and content analysis of major texts surrounding the event. This paper may serve asa complement to studies of democratic peace theory, reflexive realism,and critical theory among others as it maps the development of IR narrative, international political dialogue and state behavior.

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The invasion into Iraq should have created a dialogue between academics and policymakers, however; the invasions failed to evencreate a discussion. Today, the universal conventional wisdom argues that it was a bad idea. By 2003, the debate heated up overthe power of a democracy in Iraq as a touchstone, perhaps even aninfection that would spread liberal economic and social mores throughout the rest of the Middle East. The paper will show just how different the perspectives between scholars and practitionerswere before the invasion into Iraq; however, the lack of consensus prevented an important discourse about the efficacy of war in Iraq to introduce a western democracy in the Middle East and to ultimately resolve the Middle East problem.

Robert Cox (1981) wrote that practical knowledge is always partial and fragmentary. International relations scholars have made their task to partition the “real social world” into simplistic categorizations that make interpretation and understanding less confusing and more convenient and manageable.1

Should this be taken to mean that IR scholarship has little to nopractical application in the “real social world?” There is a growing cohort of scholars who argue the fragmentation between academics and practitioners to be growing and many of whom criticize IR scholars as the culprits. In this paper, we seek tounderstand the relationship between IR scholarship and practice in foreign policy and to empirically investigate the presence of this discursive gap.

1 Robert Cox. 1981. “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory.” Millenium – Journal of International Studies 10: 126-155.

This paper will specifically examine discourse surrounding the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. It will employ qualitative methods to develop the event case study and content analysis of major texts surrounding the event. A major contribution of this research is the use of discourse network analysis, which maps academic and policy belief systems surrounding the Iraq invasion and allows for the direct visual comparison of discourse within the two groups.

The paper will proceed in five sections. The first section will discuss the link, or lack thereof, between academic literature and policy action focusing predominantly on literature within IR.The second section will discuss the role of discourse in understanding and interpreting knowledge and experience and defining political belief systems. The third section will introduce the Discourse Network Analysis as a method of inquiry for this research and will discuss our data sources. The next section will introduce our case study of the discourse leading upto and including the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, and will discussour initial findings about the link between academic and policy discourse. The conclusion will discuss limitations to this research and how we would like to proceed in the future.

Theorizing the Relationship between IR Scholarship and Global Politics

We can consider the relationship between IR scholarship and enacted policy by assessing the IR literature and practitioner statements made on this subject. According to Robert Cox (1981),IR theory can serve one of two purposes: critical reflection or problem solving. Critical theory is meant to look at the political world as a whole (rather than divided parts over time) and question how it is possible that the current system or event of interest came to be. Critical theory questions the role of

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framework, structure, and institutions (material, legal, normative, discursive or otherwise) in international political behavior across various units of analysis and also incorporates considerations of cultural, social knowledge, ad historical context.2 Problem solving theory is meant to provide a framework for action in a prevailing issue space given a set of current arrangements. This type of theory is not ahistorical but instead“posits a continuing present” and assumes the permanence of institutions and their effects into the immediate future.3

The likely, yet misguided, conclusion here is that critical theory is not relevant to political practice since it does not give instructions for what policymakers should do in any particular situation. One might also conclude that problem solving theory is more useful for practitioners because it does (or at least should) provide a framework for acting on problems. However, it is important to note that no theory is completely divorced from a reality or point in time and space which can serve as a reference for how it reflects that reality. That said, thisreflection is not necessarily dependent on current political events.4

Is the fact that IR theory has no requirement to reflect current events problematic for the pursuit of knowledge in global politics? Jim George (1994) argues that political scholarship, at the least, should provide alternative ways of thinking about 2 Chris Brown. 1994. “Turtles all the way down: Anti-foundationalism, criticaltheory and International Relations.” Millenium – Journal of International Studies 23: 213-236.3 Robert Cox. 2010. “Theory Talks: World Orders, Historical Change,and the Purpose of Theory in International Relations.” Accessed, Oct. 1, 2014. http://www.theory-talks.org/2010/03/theory-talk-37.html4 Cox 1981

action to global issues.5 Others, however, questions whether or not scholars are even in a position to give foreign policy adviceor how to best deal with specific or general issues that require timely action.6 Others, argue that scholars who seek out policy relevance run the increased risk of diminishing the intellectual integrity of the academic field.7 Joespy Nye (2008) writes the concern for policy relevance in scholarship leads to the “danger of analysts trimming political sails to accommodate prevailing political winds,” and that this danger leads to short term relevance and the temptation to “forgo levels of abstraction and elegance necessary for academic progress.” 8 Academics must always be careful not to confuse themselves as serving the same role as politicians and activists who have a more “direct relationship to power.”9

This line of thinking, that academics must be weary of pursuing policy relevance, is one possible reason for the widening of the gap between academics and practitioners. The perpetuation of this type of divide leads to the continued estrangement of academics and intellectuals from real world issues. As a result, it is argued IR scholarship remains largely informed about and 5 Jim George. 1994. Discourses in Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 6 Alexander George. 1993. Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy. United States Institute of Peace Press. Paul Nitze. 1993. Tension Between Opposites: Reflections on the Practice and Theory of Politics. New York: Macmillan International. 7 Christopher Hill and Pamela Beshoff. 1994. Two Worlds of international Relations: Academics, Practitioners and the Trade in Ideas. London: Routledge. Joseph Lepgold and Miroslav Nincic. 2002. Beyond the Ivory Tower: International Relations Theory and the Issue of Policy Relevance. New York: Columbia University Press.Stephen Walt. 2005. “The Relationship between Theory and Policy in International Relations.” Annual Review of Political Science 8: 23-48.

8 Joseph Nye. 2008. “Bridging the Gap between Theory and Policy.” Political Psychology 29(4): 593-603.9 Nye, 595.

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contrary to common sense and political experience and therefore has limited value and is counterproductive as a guide to policy.10 Stephen Walt argues while theory and scholarship is essential to statecraft and policy, the norms and incentives in the field simply do not support and actually discourse IR scholars from performing policy relevant work.11

Earlier this year, Peter Feaver published a blog piece in the Washington Post that considered the expectations policymakers have from academicians.12 Faever, though a professor of Political Science, served on the National Security Council for the Bush Administration from 2005-2007 and notes one of his principle responsibilities was to ensure that policy makers were considering testimony from academic experts. During his tenure he concluded that policymakers need theory to make decisions, butthat academic research often does not respect the limits of its own expertise and needs to be more explicit and self-aware about the reasonability of its judgments and prescriptions. He concludes that the link between scholarship and practice is one of sustained discourse and deliberation and not necessarily one that is meant to lead to consensus of action.

The College of William and Mary has completed several waves of surveys of policymakers, academics and the public in order to determine the how each group views the contributions of the otheras concerns issues of domestic and foreign policy. The survey of

10 Nizte 1993, Walt 200511 Walt 200512 Peter Faever. 2014. “What do policymakers want from academic experts on nuclear proliferation?” Washington Post, July 8 2014. Accessed 10/14/2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/07/08/what-do-policymakers-want-from-academic-experts-on-nuclear-proliferation/

policymakers (2013) shows general skepticism about the utility ofacademic scholarship in the policy realm (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Courtesy of Paul Avey (MIT) and Michael Desch (Notre Dame)13

While the study is conducted and interpreted by academics, it provides valuable insights into the opinions of policymakers. Inaddition, policymakers were offered the opportunity to provide general commentary on the utility of academic political research in which many responded that academic research is too theoretical, too quantitative, focuses too much on modeling and not enough on policy implications, and lacks contemporary

13 Paul Avey and Michael Desch. 2014. “What do policymakers want from us? Results of a survey of current and former senior national security decision-makers.” International Studies Quarterly 58(4).

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applicability (see TRIP data, College of William and Mary 2012).14 Apart from public opinion research, there is very little academic research that policymakers agree to be particularly useful when making decisions about policy action.

“Power of Words:” The Role of Discourse in Global Politics

Discourse analysis has become an increasingly popular method across an array of social sciences. It is more than a mere exchange of words and information and its analysis extends beyondliteral meaning and attempts to incorporate context in the investigation of language itself.15 Discourse is how we give meaning and interpretation to social and political identities andexperience and encompasses the social and cultural nuances inherent to language and recognizes linguistic subjectivity.16

According to Jennifer Milliken (1999), discourse can hold any oneof three theoretical commitments that lead to a common understanding of social research and context: discourses as systems of signification, discourse productivity, and the play ofpractice.17 Discourse is a pervasive structure that gives meaning to social context; it is a system of signification which employs predominately linguistic processes that illuminates and provides meanings and understandings of relationships between 14 Daniel Maliniak, Amy Oakes, Susan Peterson, Michael Tierney. 2011. “International Relations in the US Academy.” International Studies Quarterly 55: 437-464. 15 James Paul Gee. 2008. Social Linguistics and Literacies: Ideology in Discourses. New York: Routledge. 16 Charlotte Epstein. 2008. The Power of Words in International Relations: Birth of an Anti-Whaling Discourse. Cambridge: MIT Press.17 Jennifer Milliken. 1999. “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research Methods.” European Journal of International Relations 5: 225-254.

people, things or events, and ideas. Discourse also helps to define the relationships between subject, object, and action. Itdefines what knowledge a subject has about an object and sets standards of practices regarding that relationship which is “productive (or reproductive) of the things defined by the discourse.”18 That discourses are productive necessarily entailsa dominant way of understanding and action. Practice can reify this tendency toward singular discursive structures and the thirdcommitment is one which seeks to be reflexive in its continued attempt to “articulate” and “rearticulate” truth.19

The political realm has a tendency to treat theory as discourse, rather than view it as an account of political events.20 This means that theory merely serves as a discursive layer of global politics but cannot or does not constitute explanations of an objective political reality. The literature is filled with “deepsilences and omissions” of events in political history and the academic discourse remains “distant and unimmersed in actual political discussion.”21 At any rate, this discourse is then sustained through repetition and practice despite its detachment from practical experience and can lead to further engrained polarization between academics and policymakers.22

Even the analysis of policy maker opinion on the utility of academic research shows the beginnings of reification of discourse on this subject. The College of William and Mary TRIP Institute has been conducting these surveys every other year since 2004 and the trends in language used to describe the 18 Milliken, 229.19 Milliken, 229.20 J. George 199421 J. George, 10. 22 J. Heatheshaw. 2008. “Unpacking the liberal peace: The dividing and mergingof peacebuilding discourses.” Millennium- Journal of International Studies 36 (3): 597-621.

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relationship between policy and academia seem to be sustained, signifying the possible existence of discursive consensus (network formation) on the way policymakers view their relationship with academics and academic research.

Discourse Network Analysis: The Method

Network analysis can be used to define coordinate networks as well as identify trends in information and discourse.23 Discourse network analysis (DNA) is a type of social analysis that incorporates a measure of attributes of actors within a defined system and the use of language of statements associated with those actor networks. For the purposes of this research, itwill be used to identify coordination of policymaker and academicbelief systems about the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. Both scholars and practitioners share a respective set of normative and causal beliefs about political events, DNA not only helps us to identify those belief systems subsumed by political discourse,but the longitudinal aspect allows us to map changes and trends in those belief systems.

We hypothesize that scholars and policymakers will not only have different initial belief systems, but will also display differentpatterns of change in those systems over time. This hypothesis is reflected in a 2002 publication in the New York Times which denotes the academic community’s detest for the use of force in Iraq and a warning that a war in Iraq would deter from U.S.

23 Ingold, Karin Mirjam. 2011. “Network Structures Within Policy Processes: Coalitions, Power, and Brokerage in Swiss Climate Policy.” Policy Studies Journal 39(3): 435–59.Lubell, Mark N., John T. Scholz, Ramiro Berardo, and Garry Robins. 2012. “Testing Policy Theory With Statistical Models of Networks.” Policy Studies Journal 40 (3): 351–74.

ambitions to defeat al-Qaeda. This publication had a signatory which included over 30 renowned scholars of international relations. The subsequent disregard of this plea for prudence inforeign policy endeavors in the Middle East led to the creation of a group called Security Scholars for a Sensible Foreign Policywhich issued an open letter in 2004 declaring its disapproval of the Bush administration policy for U.S. national security and included the signatures of more than 850 IR scholars.24

For this paper, we have chosen to closely follow the framework set forth by Philip Leifeld (2013).25 Leifeld argues that policyexperts express statements about events or concepts in the political realm, as do academics, and generally do so in a positive or negative way. This understanding of political discourse entails an actor (policy expert), a subject or concept,and binary positionality (belief system) on said event or concept. These can be represented through affiliation networks of discourse in which the relationship between actors and subjectpositionality condense into a single vertice. In addition, thesesystems can be depicted to represent the congruent or incongruentpatterns of beliefs and commitments (congruence networks.26

Following in Leifeld’s footsteps, we have selected reputable newsand academic sources to perform qualitative content analysis in conjunction with social network analysis. One way in which our methods will differ from Leifeld’s is that they will include an

24 James Long, Daniel Malniak, Sue Peterson, and Michael Tierney. 2013. “International Relations Scholars, U.S. Foreign Policy, and the Iraq War.” Working Draft, College of William and Mary TRIP Institute. http://www.wm.edu/offices/itpir/_documents/trip/ir-scholars-iraq.pdf 25 Philip Leifeld. 2013. “Reconceptualizing Major Policy Change in the Coalition Framework: A Discourse Network Analysis of German Pension Politics.”Policy Studies Journal 41(1): 169-198.26 Shulman, N. 1976. “Network analysis: a new addition to an old bag of tricks.” ActaSociologica 19:307–23.

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interpretivist element inherent to discourse analysis that is largely left out of his research. Not only do we intend to identify changes in belief systems and (in)congruence across discursive networks, but we also intend to provide at least some explanations for why these across network variations exist; rather, we seek to add a contextual element unseen in Leifeld’s analysis.

Data.

Our data will come from several sources that document discourse leading up to and surrounding the 2003 Iraq invasion. From the policy side, our sources will include the 1998 and 2002 White House National Security Strategy and will follow Leifeld’s example of qualitative content analysis of New York Times (chosing only one major source in order to avoid duplicate coverage) articles discussing this event from 1998 to 2003. For the analysis of academic literature, we will not only include thetwo publications listed in the preceeding section but will also include articles published in the 3 IR journals spanning from 1998 to 2005 (in order account for lag in publication time): Foreign Affairs, Journal of Conflict Resolution, and American Political Science Review.

Case study: From Theory to Flawed Practice in National Security Directives

“And the reason why I'm so strong on democracy is democracies don't go to war with each other. And the reason why is the people of most societies don't like war, and they understand what war means.”

- President George W. Bush, The East Room, November2004

The Goldwaters-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 amended the National Security Act of 1947 to require the executive branch to provide an annual report to Congress on worldwide interests, goals, and objectives. The Act mandated thatthe executive branch propose short-term and long-term uses of political, economic, military, and other elements of national power all to be submitted along with the President’s budget for the next fiscal year.27

The drafters of the Act assumed that the United States operated with a guiding grand strategy.28 There are several reasons for the report: legitimize a rationale for resources; communicate thesame vision to different audiences; communicate with constituentswith the power of the Presidency; create internal consensus on foreign and defense policies; and contribute to the Presidential agenda.29

The process of the National Security Strategy (NSS) document creates an internal consensus, that often disregards scholarly

27 http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/dod_reforms/Goldwater-NicholsCR.pdf. Accessed October 31, 2014.28 James R. Locher, "Victory on the Potomac the Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon," (2002)., 441. Victory on the Potomac highlights the idea of strategymaking in the act: 1) the President’s NSS; 2) Secretary of Defense’s requirement to provide written guidance, now called the Global Employment of the Force, or GEF; 3) CJCS fiscally constrained strategic plans, now describedas the National Military Strategy (NMS); and 4) DUSD for policy should assist the Secretary in developing contingency plans. Snider, Don M, “The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision,” Strategic Studies Institute:Carlisle, PA, March 1995. Accessed at http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Snider.pdf on October 29, 2014. Snider published a paper, after helping develop an NSS document, that each president after Goldwaters-Nichols should prepare and articulate this grand strategy to Congress and the rest of the interagency. 29 Snider, 2-7.

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inputs, on foreign and defense policies and as such, serves as anartifact of an administrations thinking in a specific moment. Theplurality of centers of power in the United States Government complicates the coherence of strategy development. The 43rd Bush Administration successfully completed two NSS documents within close proximity to September 11, 2001. The NSS serves as a starting point for the United States national security dialogue.

Dr. Philip Zelikow, University of Virginia, developed the first draft of the 2002 NSS, based on the request by National Security Advisor (NSA) Condoleeza Rice. The development of the 2002 NSS was considered controversial and limited to a small group of participants. After reading one of the later drafts, the President felt that the NSC’s NSS lacked his voice, “‘I thought this document was supposed to be my strategy. It doesn’t sound like me.’”30 This smaller than normal group produced the Bush preemption doctrine that Zelikow would later term, “aggressively opaque.”31

On September 13, 2012, a few days before the release of the 2002 NSS, President Bush addressed the United Nations Security Counciljuxtaposing human dignity, prosperity, and human rights against Saddam Hussein’s “gathering danger.”32 By January 2003, the WhiteHouse’s internal machinations churned toward what war might look 30 Stolberg, Alan G, “How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents,” Strategic Studies Institute: Carlisle, PA, October 2012, 75. Accessed on October 3, 2014 at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1128.31 Judith Miller, "Keeping U.S. No. 1: Is It Wise? Is It New? The Bush Doctrine of Pre-Eminence Plucks a Sensitive Nerve.," (2002). accessed at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/26/arts/keeping-us-no-1-is-it-wise-is-it-new.html?pagewanted=1.32 "Threats and Responses; in Bush's Words: On Iraq, U.N. Must Face up to Its Founding Purpose," (2002).. Accessed at

like inside Iraq. Bush, and his extended NSC staff, met constantly with Iraqi diaspora to try to grasp the human suffering and the American reception in an American invasion intoIraq.33

Meanwhile, a few academics offered commentary in the New York Times about a potential war with Iraq. Robert Wright, a visiting scholar at the University of Pennsylvania and the author of “Nonzero,” wrote “[b]ut an honest liberal has to admit that Mr. Bush’s unilateralist’s lit a fire under the [United Nations] Security Council,” giving institutional liberalism legitimacy.34 But, most of the academic writing in the Times referenced the potential losses in art, museum artifacts, and other important relics in a potential war in Iraq.35

Academia has often lamented that it had little influence beyond the Ivory towers.36 Some academics have even pilloried peers who have entered into the national security dialogue or other policy discourses. While yet others have chastened those academics that chased headlines for publishing articles de rigueur. But few have noted the influence that academia has had on the National Security debates, or, the dialectical nature of theory and practice.

A National Security Strategy for a New Century (October 1998)33 Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004)., 257-261.34 Wright, Robert. "George Bush, Multilateralist? How the President Could Rescue the United Nations." The New York Times, February 04, 2003.35 See “An Army for Art,” Apr 17, 2003; “A NATION AT WAR: TREASURES: Art Experts Fear Worst in Plunder of Museum,” Apr 13, 2003; or even, “Missing: A Vase, A Bird, and 10,000 Years of History,” Apr. 20, 2003. There were few dissenting academic voices in the Times before the invasion. 36 Ivo H. Lindsay James M. Daalder, America Unbound : The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2003)., 41. This also speaks to the Bush non-response to the Realist ad published in the New York Times September 26, 2002. 33 scholars signed the document, to include eminent scholars: Desch,Jervis, Mearsheimer, Pape, Posen, Schelling, Snyder, Walt, and Waltz.

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This case study posits that the October 1998 NSS and the September 2002 NSS were not heavily influenced by the neo-liberalism research program. Instead, the Bush administration reacted with a “gut-instinct” many describe as instinct.

The 1998 NSS outlined three core objectives in response to globalization. A process, the NSS described, of accelerating economic, technological, cultural and political integration.

To enhance our security (United States). To bolster America’s economic prosperity. To promote democracy abroad.

Despite the number of challenges outlined in 1998, the document cited the promise of globalization that “[m]any nations around the world have embraced America’s core values of representative governance, free market economics, and respect for fundamental human rights and the rule of law, creating greater opportunities to promote peace, prosperity and greater cooperation among nations.”37 The 1998 NSS seemed to rely on the web of international institutions and arrangements to secure the gains made by democracy and free market economics. (NSS, 1998)

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002)

“The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty andtotalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom—and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.” Bush signed introduction, NSS, 2002

37 Council National Security, A National Security Strategy for a New Century ([Washington,D.C.]: The White House : [National Security Council], 1999)., 1.

The 2002 NSS outlined “a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests.The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just saferbut better. Our goals on the path to progress are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity.” (NSS, 2002)

The 2002 NSS outlined nine imperatives: Champion aspirations for human dignity; Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and

work to prevent attacks against us and our friends; Work with others to defuse regional conflicts; Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies,

and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction; Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free

markets and free trade; Expand the circle of development by opening societies

and building the infrastructure of democracy; Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main

centers of global power; and Transform America’s national security institutions to

meet challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.

Some of the more aspirational prose describes the belief in an “unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism.”(Fukuyama, Summer 1989) The 2002 NSS reflected an administration determined to create democracies, a much stronger approach than the 1998 NSS that intended to promote democracies.

Several journalists seemed convinced by the economic and political liberal agenda, after Fukuyama’s article, Thomas Friedman, for example published The Lexus and the Olive Tree in

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1999.38 Friedman offered several metaphors that fit the neo-liberal research program but were much easier for laymen to understand: the Golden Arches theory of conflict prevention,for example.39

While this research will not be able to determine a causal relationship between policy and IR scholarship, the DNA method will allow for inquiry into correlation between the two. The next step in this research project is to collect our data as outlined in the data section above. We conducted an initial Boolean search using both Lexis –Nexis and Web of Science to attempt to create a visual map of the discourse waged about an American incursion into Iraq in March 2012. The search included several terms of Iraq AND democracy OR democratization in the New York Times between the dates of Sept 1, 1998 and Oct 31, 2003 (a year after the 2002 NSS was published). The keyword searches resulted in over 1000 results and required a narrowing of the approach. It also necessitated expanding the keyword terms to other liberal terms: globalization, institutions, and liberalization.

Based on our initial reaction to the 1998 and 2002 NSS documents, we believe that our initial hypothesis, that discourse outlining belief systems in IR scholarship and policy initiatives are likely to present themselves as different discourse networks with different patterns of 38 A Lexis-Nexis search of the New York Times for Globalization, democratization, economic and political liberalism returned 2736, 329, and 5 results, respectively, during the same time being researched. One of the more interesting articles linked the internet, political liberalization, and American preeminence. 39 I think my favorite Friedman concept is the Super-empowered individual, in particular, because in the nytimes.com article he mentions Osama bin Laden. Irony or luck, even a broken clock is right twice a day.

change over time, will be refuted. The NSS documents appearto show strong affinity for dominant discourse of Liberal and Democratic Peace Theory. For example, the President’s letter explicitly stated: “We are also increasingly united by common values;” or “In time, they will find that social and political is the only source of national greatness.”40

Once the data has been collected, we plan to use UCINET to create visual actor networks on both the policy and academicsides. These actor networks are important in understanding which type of actor belongs to which group, and which actorsspan across groups (for example, Peter Faever who served on NSC as an academic). It’s also important to show the interaction between different types of actors within the same group. The next step is to use Leifeld’s JAVA based Discourse Network Analyzer to facilitate the qualitative coding process which will be cross checked with the manuallycoded text.

Upon conclusion of this research we hope that our longitudinal textual analysis will empirically demonstrate arelationship between academic and policy discourse surrounding the 1998 and 2002 NSS its role in the 2003 Iraq invasion. We believe that there is likely to be correlationacross discursive groups, especially with regard to the use of Liberal and Democratic Peace objectives in political practice. This finding would refute IR and policy statements that the two discursive groups are becoming increasingly distant from one another. That said, considering the lack of consensus in the policy realm on theIraq invasion, it may be difficult to show external validityof this research project.

40 2002, NSS, George Bush letter, September 17, 2002.

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Works cited:

"Threats and Responses; in Bush's Words: On Iraq, U.N. Must Face up toIts Founding Purpose." Section A; Column 1; Foreign Desk; Pg. 10,2002.

Daalder, Ivo H. Lindsay James M. America Unbound : The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2003.

Locher, James R. "Victory on the Potomac the Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon." (2002).

Miller, Judith. "Keeping U.S. No. 1: Is It Wise? Is It New? The Bush Doctrine of Pre-Eminence Plucks a Sensitive Nerve.", 152, A19, 2002.

National Security, Council. A National Security Strategy for a New Century. [Washington, D.C.]: The White House : [National Security Council], 1999.

Woodward, Bob. Plan of Attack. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004.