EtntHd rosé Miranda JustoElisabete M. de SousaRené Rosfort

Kierkegaardand the Challenges of InfinitudePhitosophy and Literature in Dialogue

CrNrno DE FtLo5oFtA pe UNrvrnsrpnor pe Lrssoe) o 1 l

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abbrev ia t ions

I n t rod uc t ion

Pid Soltol i Faith as Fal l ing in Love

.) lot't ' io Gimencs de Puulu Love Will Hide a Multitude of Sins: A Discourse by Kierkegaard ...

Sura E. Eckerson Kierkegaard's Musical ldeas. Determinations and Reconcil iation ofA Cursory ObservotÌon and The Immediate Erotic Stages.

f. l i :;uhata M. dc Sou.tu Repetit ion in Continual Reference to Liszt

l 'ott l Li ihcke An Inf inity of Voices

.-1nu Pinto Lcitc Cl imacus' Revocation. A Diatogical Perspective

lngrid Ba.s.s. Inf ini tude and Freedom, Possibi l i ty and Negation. Kierkegaard and theln f luence o f the La te Sche l t ing

Rrltarto (ìuruvcnru The Aesthetic way of Life Between Boredom and the searcho f t h e I n t e r e s t i n g . . . .

o.scur Part 'cnt ouhinha Loquere ut videam. " 'Guil ty ' / 'Not Guitty" ' and the writ ing of lrony.

Í'crnuntkt Manuel F-crrcirtt du Silvu "A sublectivity Raised to the second power."

K ie rkegaard 's V iew o f Sch lege l ' s Concept o f l rony

Ilurtholomau R-yair Into the Nothing with Kierkegaard and pessoa

. \ t t sunu Jan ic Pre faces as Po lemica t and Fragmentary D iscourses . . . . . .

l l ichunl Purkurtholèr lmages of Inf ini tude

IJnrrut Paixc Dias Existential l ruths and Challenging Acts. The Antiphi losophy ofK ie rkegaard Accord ing to A la in Bad iou .

René Rosfòr t F rus t ra ted Happ iness . Emot ion and Human Nature in K ie rkegaardand Sp inoza

.lo.sl Mirundu JustoKierkegaard's writ ing and Inf initude. l f we are Finite, How can weRela te o r Refer to In f in i tude?

Cont r i b u to rs

Abstracts in Por tuguese/Resumos em Portugués

I ndex

o

1,',t

2 7

R e

93

39

v )

73

105

115

129

135

157

t6't

1 7 3

185

18g

195

Abbreviations of Soren Kierkegaard's Worksused in the volume

llA 'fhe

Butk on Adler, ed. and trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, prìnccton:Princeton University Press, I 99tì.

CA Tha (. 'oncept of Amict.v. ed. and trans. by RcidarThomtc, Princcton: Princeton UniversityPrcss. 1980.

CI Thc Concept of lrutn.r, , ed. and trans. by l loward V. Hong and Edna t l . I long, Princctgn:Princcton Univcrsity Press, l9[Ì9.

COR The Cor.suir A//air; Articles Ralutcd to the llritings. cd. and trans. by floward V ancl ticlnal l . Hong, Princeton: Princeton Univcrsity prcss, 1982.

cD Chri:;tiun [)i.scour.scs. cd. and trans. by lìoward V. Ilong ancl Edna H. Hong, princcton:Princcton tJnivcrsity Prcss. I 997.

C'UPl Concluding Lln.sc'ienti/i< Po.sÍ:;cripÍ to Philo.sophicul l;rugmcnfs, ed. and trans. by IlgwarclV Hong and Udna IL I long. Princcton: Princcton University prcss, l9l l2.

CIUP2 ()oncluding Unscianti/it Po.stst'ript. vol.2, cd. and trans. by Howard V. Hong and tr{na H.Hong, Princcton: Princcton University Prcss, 1982.

FOI Either/Or 1, ed. and trans. by Howard V. I Iong and [dna t l . I long, Princeton: PrinccronUnivcrsity Prcss, 1987.

hO2 Either/Or 1/, cd. and trans. by I loward V. I long and Edna l l . t long, Princeton: PrincctonUniversity Prcss, I i ) tJ7.

EPW Earl.t, Polemitul lltriting"s: Artitlcs.ffutm Studcnt Doys, !.-ron tha Pupar.s ol One SrittI'iving, Thc Bortlc hcrwean the old und thc Nev'soup-c'cllur.s,cd. and trans. by.luliaWatkin. Princeton: Princcton University Prcss, 1990.

EUD Eightaen Uphuilding Discutr.ses, cd. and trans. by Howard V. tlong and Edna H. Hong,Princcton: Princcton University Prcss, 1990.

lìT/lì Fear und rrembling. Repetition, cd. and trans. by Howard V. Ilong ancl Edna H. Hong,Princcton: Princcton Urrivcrsity Prcss. 1983

JP Soren Kierkeguurd'.s Journols and Pt4tcrs, ed. and trans. by Howard V Hong and Edna II.Hong, vo l . l -6 , B loorn ing ton , London: lnd iana Un ivers i ty p rcss , 1967-1978.

JFY Judge./òr Yourself! , ed. and trans. by Howard V. l long and Edna H. Hong, princeton:Princcton Univcrsity Prcss, 1990.

KJN Kierkegaard'.s Journals und Notehook,r, Vol. l-ó, cd. by N. J. cappclorn, et al., princeton,

Oxford: Princeton Univcrsity Press. 2007-201 3.

Krenr rcn lno AND THE CnatLr te rs oF lNFrNt ruDE, L isboa, CFUL,20 l3 , pp .9- l t )

lhbreviations ol Soren Kicrkegaard"s llorks used in lhe volume

LD Kierkegaartl: Letîers and Documenîs, ed. and trans. by Henrik Rosenmeier, Princeton:

Princcton University Press, 1978'

Pap. Soren Kierkegaanls Papirer. vol. I-XI, ed. by P. A. Heiberg, V. Kuhr and E. Torsting,

Copenhagcn: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag, 1909-194tì;2nd. cdit ion. ed. by

N. Thulstrup, vol. XII-XIII , supplements by N. Thulstrup, vol. XIV-XVI. lndex by N. J.

Cappelorn, Copenhagen: Gyldcndal, 1968-1978.

P Pre/rtrcs/Il/riîing Sumpler, ed. and trans. by Todd W. Nichol, Princeton: Princeton

Universìty Prcss. 1997.

pC PracÍic,e in Christiunitt,, ed. and trans. by Howard V Hong and Edna H. llong. Princcton:

Princelon UnivcrsitY Press, 1991.

pF Philosophital I ' ragments, cd. and trans. by Howard V Hong and Edna II . Hong, Princcton:

Princcton UniversitY Prcss, 1985.

POV | 'he Poinî of Viaw, ed. and trans. by Howard V. I long and Ddna H. l long. Princcton:

Princcton University Press. 1998

R l'-eur untl Trcmhling. Ragtctirion, ed. and trans. by Howard V. I{ong and Edna H. lìong.

Princcton: Princcton Univcrsity Prcss, 1983.

SKS Sorcn Kiarkegaunls Skrilier; cd. Sorcn Kicrkegaard Forskningsccntcrct. vol. l-55.

Copcnhagcn: Gads Forlag. 199'7 -2013.

SLW Stugcs on Li lels Wv. cd. and trans. by f loward V. Hong and [:dna H. Hong. Princekrn:

Princcton Univcrsity Prcss, I 9[ì t ' ì .

SUD 'l'he

Sicknes.s unîo Dauth. A Christion Psy-t:hologi<:ul E.rposition fòr Uphuilding, ond

Awukcning, ecl. ani i trans. by Howard V. t long and Edr-ra IL Hong, Princcton: Princcton

Univcrsity Prcss, I 9fì0.

SVI Sunlct lc Vttrkar cd. by A. B. Drachrnann,. l . L. l leibcrg, and l l O' Langc' vol ' I-XlV

('opcnhagcn: Cìyldcndalskc Boghandels Forlag, l90l -1906.

TA Tw,o Agas: The Age tf Revolution and the Presant Age. A I'itararl'

Rcvicyr,, ctl. and trans. by Howard V. and fldna H. Hong, Princcton: Princcton

Univcrsity Press. I 97t1.

UDVS (lpbui l t l ing Di.sttLrr.scs in Vuriou,s Spir i ts,ccl. and trans. by Howard V and Edna H. l long'

Princcton: Princcton [Jnivcrsity Press, 1993.

WAA On Mt, Iktrk u.s An Author, in'l'he Point o/ View, ed. and trans. by Iloward V. Ilong and

Edna t l . Hong, Princeton: Princcton Univcrsity Prcss' 1998.

WL Wrks of Lrn,c, cd. ancl trans. by I loward V. f long and Edna H. I1ong, Princcton: Princeton

Univcrsity Prcss, 1995.

Kierkegaarcl utcuhninat ing thcthe translation ;by the Fundagàrcssays reunltedheld in Octob.-Univcrsidade d.hosted by thc F01 ' thc Un ivers r r. lusto and El isabRcné Rosfort. riprojcct during rl

The prescnbirth of Kicrkcg.rpotcnt ial ly cneoMost of the aurlin thc above rncwho have bccrrl:The i r con t r ibur r .that emcrge oncithc actual coilîr.:-

ht F-aith u, .dcscr ipt ions ol ' t\ lcw both t\ p!-:of 'what f-ai th an;ta r th i s a lso d i : , . -o/ Sin.y: A Di.:, :inrpl icat ions o: ' .. r l 'Kierkcsaarc .Eckerson. in ó.' ,1 ( ' t t t 'sot-. t . ()-

rhc relat ion tr; '

K t e n x

Possibility and Negation, Freedom and FinitenessKierkegaard and the Influence of the Late schefling

Ingrid BassoP H I L O S O P H Y C E N T R E O F - T H E U N I V E R S I ' T Y O F L I S B O N

The aim of this paper is to identify the hidden metaphysical structure, and examinethe strictly philosophical elaboration, of four concepts that Kierkegaard constantlyuses in his works unt i l 1843 by means of an aestheì ical point of v iew: possibi l i t j ,Negation' Freedom, Actuality. While in the so-called "aesthetical works,' theseconcepts are, in some ways, embodied into spccial paradigmatic situations andfigures I am obviously thinking of the procession of òharu.t-"., who paracle alongEither/or, but also of thc prurarity of Kierkegaard's pseudonyms, in the worksof 1844 wherc Kierkegaard develops a rear phirosophicar survey of them, and hedoes so by using some tools, hc part ly borrows also from Schel l ing's lcctures on"positive philosophy" that he hcard in Berrin onry two years bcfore. p'irst, I wourdlike to emphasize that. when Kicrkegaard conceivcd and bcgan writing Eirher/or, he was stil l in Berlin and he was hearing and reflccting o"n s.n"tting's latestphilosophy; hc then finishcd his work irnmetliately after reùrning to Denmark onMarch 1842 (LD 107-l0B). l t is preciscly in thesó ycars that Kicrkegaard tr ies tocal ibrate his phi losophical instruments in order to mect the requrrements of histhought, which since his university ycars as his old professor Sibbern recallcdlater in 1869 - were already directed towards the relaiion bctwcen actuality andthe logical sphcre:

I do remember, howcveq that once during his Flegelian pcriod, he met me at Gammcltorvand askcd me what relationship obtained betwecn pnitosopny and actuality, whichastonished nrc, bccause the gist of the whore of'my philosopny was the study of lifèand actuality.l

Schelling's latest speculation, the so-called "positive philosophy,', had its origin inthe atternpt to reach philosophicalry the so-called ..positivc,,: túat is, thc truJ,./reeActuaf ity with its intrinsic contradictions, without falling into logical pantheism.Thiswas the reason why Kierkegaard moved to Berlin in order to co-nsider the possibilityof evaluating Schelling's latest philosophy as a valid alternative to the Heselian one.

Bruce H' Kirmmse, ed.' Enc:ounters wirh Kierkegaarcl. A Li/e as Seen by ]lis C1nîempraries,Princeton: Princeton University prcss, I 996, p. 2 I 7; editcd by Hans peter Barfbd, I f Soren KierkegaanlsElierladte Papirer. 1833-t843, copenhagen: c. A. Reitzers Forlag, 1g69, pp. t i r- t i i i .

K t rnx tennno AND THE Cta l l r t c rs o r lH 'HtTUoE, L isboa, CFUL,20 l3 , pp . 73_ ' l

Ingrid Basso

Therefore, Kierkegaard's "exultation" and expectations after the second lectures areunderstandable:

I am so happy to have heard Schelling's second lecture * indescribably. I have beenpining and thinking mournful thoughts long enough. The embryonic child of thoughtleapt within me...when he mentioned the word "actuality" in connection with therelation of philosophy to actuality. I remember almost every word he said after that.Here, perhaps, clarity can be achieved. This one word recalled all my philosophicalpains and suffering. (KJN3 229)

But as wc know, eventually, Kierkegaard became disappointed: he l iterally "escaped"from Berlin and abandoned the last part of the old German philosopher's lectures,the so-called "Philosophy of Mythology."z Some emblematic statements in Either/Or declare, in a sense, this disappointment concerning Sche ll ing's treatment of theconcept of Actuality:

What philosophers say about actuality is often just as disappointing as it is when oncrcads on a sign in a secondhand shop: Prcssing Done Here. If a person were to bringh i sc lo thcs tobep ressed ,hewou ldbeduped , fo r thes ign i smere l y fo rsa le . (EO l 32 ) r

But the struggle between real l i fe and the c:oncepÍ of it means the impossibil i ty ofthinking actuality, and thus talking about it without petrifying it into the immobilelogical idea must indeed have represcntcd a problem for the young Kierkegaard,who was intcrcstcd in analyzing the many-sided and ctcrnal bccoming reality. Helate r e xplains this problem very clearly in thc Po.rtsc ript, where, among other things,he also recalls Schcll ing's rcfcrcnce, from the first lecture in Berlin, to the Platonicidea of being dead in order to think (KJN3 303):

To think cxistencc suh spec'ie aeterni and in abstraction is essentially to annul it,and thc merit of it rcscmblcs the much-heralded merit of canceling the principle ofcontradiction. Existence without motion is unthinkable. and motion is unthinkablc ^sróspet' ie ueternl. To omit motion is not exactly a masterstroke, and to introduce it intologic as transition, and along with it t ime and space, is only ncw confusion. But sinceall thinking is ctcrnal, thc diff iculty is for the existing person. Existence, l ikc motion,is a very diff icult matter to handlc. If I think it, I canccl it. and thcn I do not think it.

I On this point I would rcfcr to my longcr rnonograph: Kierkaguunl utlitora di Schelting. Le lezioniharlinesi .strlla "h-ilosot'iu dcllu Rivelazionc,"lSll-1842. Trucce dclla.filoso.t'io .r<hellinghiunanell'opero di Soren Kierkeguanl, Milano: Mimesis. 2007. p. l7 ff. and p. 147 ff. For an historicalsurvey on the topic, see in particular Tonny Aagaard Olcscn, "Kicrkcgaards Schclling. Eine historischeEinfùhrung", in AA. VV. Kierkegoard und Schelling. Freiheit, Angst untl lìl/irklichkeit, editcd byJochem tlenningfelcl and Jon Stewart, in "Kierkegaard Studics," Monograph Scries n. [ì, Berlin,New York: De Gruyter,2003, pp. l-102. For a systematic description of Schell ing's division of hisseries of lectures in Berlin, see my arliclc in English "Schcll ing's Mcontology and the Concept ofPossibility in Kicrkegaard", in Ars Brevis, 20ll, pp. 254-269.

' On the relation between actuality and thc sphcrc of logic also in Kierkcgaard and Schelling seecspccially Jon Stewart, Kierkegaanl'.s Relalions îo Hegel Reconsidered, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2003, pp. 380ff, and Id., "The Notion of Actuality in Kierkegaard and Schell ing'slnflucncc", in Ars Brevis,20lI, pp. 237-253.

Possibility and I

It wouexistinthe onrmotionexistinin thethink.existenit conti

When consitried to desthrough hislater that htpoint of virboth writtcr

Evcn tfollow theconcept. TÌworks P/zilrundcr the ndecidc to d,

Therclphi losophy.to scicntifìcthe etcrnal 1figurcs whopossibi l i t iepo.s,sihility tchosc to refnot only bchim to the rthe multi-simotion, is icxist ing." ((of Either/Othe philosol

a Philosophit

March and

1844 , an

thc wr i t in,

Knudsen

The (lont

many rc

Possibility and Negation, Freedom and Finiteness. Kierkegaard und îhe Influence ofthe Late schellinp

It would seem colrect to say that there is something that cannot be thought namely,existing' But again there is the difficulty that existence puts it together in this way:the one who is thinking is existing. Because Greek philosàphy *a, not absentminded,motion was a perpetual topic for its dialectical efforts. The creek philosopher was anexisting person' and he did not forget this. Therefore he resorted to suicide or to dyingin the Pythagorean sense or to being dead in the Socratic sense in order to be able tothink' He was aware that he was a thinking being, but hc was also awarc that it wasexistence as medium that perpetually prevented hiÀ from thinking in continuity becauscit conrinually placed him in a proccss of becoming. (cupl 30g:309)

when considering this problem, Kierkegaard secms, in the beginning, to have simprytried to describe actuality and, in a ceftain way, also triedictively to .live, in itthrough his pseudonyms, who embodied diflereni possibilities of exisÍence. It is onlylaterthat he comcs to the real skeleton of the question by means of'aphilosophicalpoint of view, in the works philostphical Fragmenl" und The Crncept o/ Anriaty,both wri t rcn in 1844

Even the use of several pseudonyms indicates the will to makc lifc and thoughtfollow the same many-sided route without bcing entangleci in the snarcs of theconcept. Thus, it is not a coincidcnce that, on the contrary both thc philosophicalworks Philosophir:al Fragments and The concept ,/ Anxiety wcre originally signcdunder thc name of Snren Kierkegaard himscll, and only later <lid thÉ phiiosJphcrdecidc to dclete his own name and choosc a pscudonym.l

Thcrcforc, according to Kicrkcgaarcl, thc rcal qucstion, and thus the task ofphilosophy, was exactly to recovcr thc non-inf-crablc becomlng, without rcnouncingto scicntifìc discoursc' to philosophical rJiscoursc. If Kierkegu-d t.i"d at first to,shov,thc eternalpotcntiality that charactcrizes actuality by rneani of descnptions ol-livclyfigurcs who attempt to reach infinitutlc through the constant play o1-ncver exhausteclpossibilities, then, later on, he wantcd to grasp philosophically thc meaning ofprtssihiliÍy without losing its mobilc nature. Probably, if in tlc bcginning Kierkegàardchose to rcprcsent his view through a numcrous series of differcnt characters, it wasnot only becausc he wanted to trap thc readcr into the aesthetical in order to bringhirn to the rcligious, as he said, but also because rhis was hi.s first atrempt to grastrttha multi-sidedne,ss ol,raality without losing ir in a concept, since ..feJxistcnce, likcmotion, is a vcry diffìcult mattcr to handlc" because .,the onc who is thinking iscxisting'" (CUP I 309) ln this sense the philosophcr could statc right in the first p"agcof Either/or: "l have done alr I could to makc up for what has ùeen lefi undone inthe phi losophical wri t ings." (EOl 3)

a Ph i losoph i to l [ ' - rognan lscanìcoutonJune l ] 'h , 1844,bu twasprobab lywr i t t cnrn thcpcr iodbc twccnMarch and the cnd of May of thc samc year, whilc The Concept of Ànxiett,calre out on Junc l7'r, ,Itl44 , and secms to havc becn writtcn bel'orc thc Fragment.s. on the datìng and elaboration ofthe writings, sec thc commcntaries to SKS4, pp. l7l-196 (on philosophical l,-ragments, by JcttcKnudscn and Johnny Kondrup) ancr pp. 305-339 (on The Concapf ol Anxiety, by Sorcn Bruun). InThe Concepî fi Anxietv, arnong othcr things, cven if Kierkegaard's namc *u, d.l.t"d. there are stillmany refèrcnces to Kicrkegaard's own lilè, for instance his stay in Berlin.

Ingrid Basso

And it is not a coincidence that the most meaningful characters Kierkegaard represents

arc not able to take any decision in life, because they simply want to maintain this

eternal "mobility" by remaining in the realm of possibility, that is, the realm of

negation: they do not decide and in a cer1rain sense they simply think they can remaln

foiever free and young (in spirit) but in this way they are necessarily condemned to

despair. In a ceftain sense, they are the embodied image of the Schellingian principle

natura onceps as etemal freedom, doubleness of being and not-being, that is mere

possibility, and does not fall into actuality. But they are indeed "embodied;" they

live within temporality, i.e. they are not eternal, and are thus condemned to despair'

while they pretend to live "ecstatically" like God. So they end up finding themselves

in a "kingdom of mist," in a "dreamland" (EO t 310), in which one "abandons dates

altogether, as if thc story in its development became so qualitatively significant that,

atthàugh hístorícalty actual, it came so close to beíng idea that specifications of

time became unimportant." (EOI 310-3ll) Temporality thus crumbles into infinite

instants that negate time, actuality, and fransfonr the sclf into a mirage, a "kingdom

of mist." As Kierkegaard later states in The Sic'kness unto Death about the dcsperation

of possibility as lack of nccessity:

It takes time for each little possibility to bccome actuality. Evcntually, howcver, the timc

that should be uscd fbr actuality grows shorter and shorter; evcrything bccomcs morc

and rnore momentary. Possibility bccomes more and rnore intensive but in the sense of

possibility, not in the scnse of actuality, for the intcnsivc in the scnse of-actuality means

to aotualizc some of what is possiblc. The instant something appcars to be possiblc, a

ncw possibility appears, and finally these phantasmagoria fbllow one anothcr in such

rapid succession that it seems as if evcrything were possible, and this is cxactly the

lìnal moment, the point at which the individual himself bccomes a mirage. (SUD 36)

But what is exact ly, phi losophical ly spcaking, this possihi l i ty, and why does

Kicrkegaard use Schelling in ordcr to show that it is not true that a decision in life

(i.c. the passage from possibility to actuality) kills the "freedom" of the becoming,just like thc transformation of rcality in the conccpt (as it was in Hegel) transforms

this rcality into neccssity?I think that in Kicrkegaard's analysis of thc conccpt of possibility (as well as in

thc conccpt of the not-necessity of history) both in thc Concept o/'Anxiety and in thc

contcmporary Philosophical Fragmenls, it is possible to find Schelling's so-called

meontology. The tcrm "rneontology" derives from an imporlant distinction Schclling

took from Plato's Sophist5 between the Greek "subjective" and "objective" negation,

Tn òq and ?,1Úgò<p, in ordcr to find God's freedom. While the Greek negation fuÙg

totally denies the reality of somcthing both in thought and in aclualiQ, the negation

Tn just dcnies thc actual being of something, but not its possibility, therefore, it

defincs somcthing as "not existing," but stil l possible.

Possibility is indeed not an absolute nothing, but according to the Platonic

distinction, it is a relative one (T11 òrp); in The Concept o/'Anxiety it is intcresting to

i P la to . Soph is t 237 a ss . ,256 d ss . ,258 a ss

\

il\ :,cll Í

- : rÌ:\-Lllftr0l'

ri:]J{: I-*:

! -iL ril l

.,:l .L ilu[

-ri\r.5l*l![

-Ira !ú

! :il"fl

\nc

Possibilitt- and Negaîion, Freedom and Finiteness. Kierkegaard and the Infuence oJ the Late Schelling

note that Kierkegaard does not examine this "relative nothing - possibility" by meansof a strictly metaphysical discourse, rather he does it by using the 'phenomenology'

of anxiety which can be considered the human resonance of the only conceivable"nothing:" not the pure "nothing" (the category in Hegelian logic), but the relative andunpredictable one, in the root of human freedom. In Philosophical Fragments (nowmaking use of a metaphysical discourse) Kierkegaard actually talks about "becoming"as a change that does not concerî the essence, but being: it is a change from thcnoÍ-exisîing to the existing (PF 73) Still, this non-beingfhat the becoming abandonshas to exist, otherwise one could not talk about a change, but about something else."So, such a heing that nevertheless is a non-heing is possibility." (PF 74)

It is prccisely thanks to the concept of non-being as possibiliry (that is somethingreal, not the Hegelian pure nothing) that Schelling could claborate his "positivephilosophy," escaping Hegel's panlogism -. a philosophy that, according to him,was founded on historical actuality, the essence of which is frcedom; and in fact, asKierkegaard writes down in his notes on Schelling's lecture no. l8: "Onc can neverknow what freedom wi l l br ing to l ight." (KJN3 325)6

ln The concept rf Anxiee, Kierkegaard chooscs psychology as an epistcmologicalinstrument in ordcr to allow for a discoursc on actuality. Psychology is indeed thcinstrumcnt by virtuc of which Kierkcgaard thinks it is possible to talk about thenegative. Using psychology, thc negativc will bc not graspcd in its conccpt, but itcan bc truly analyzed from, one could say, a 'phenomcnological' point of vicw. Infact, Kierkcgaard analyzcs thc only possible human understanding of thc Nagotive,not as an abstract conccpt, but in its cxistential reality: the possihilitr-. an idea thatcauscs anxiety. Wc read in The C.ont,cpt rf'Anxiety that

[N]o scicnce can cxplain. Psychology corncs closcst and cxplains the last approxirlation.which is frccdom's showing-itsclf'-tbr-itsclf in the anxiety of possibility, or in thc nothingof possibility, or in thc nothing of anxiety. (CA 76)

fWlhat cffèct does Nothing havc/ lt bcgcts anxicty t I Thc actuality of'thc spiritconstantly shows itself as a form that tcmpts its possibility but disappears as soon asit seeks to grasp fbr it, and it is a nothing that can only bring anxiety. 1...1 Anxietv islreedom'.s actuuliÍv a.s the possibility o/ pos.sihility. [...] The possibility is to bc able.ln a logical systcm, it is convenic-nt to say that possibility passes ovcr into actuality.Howcver, in actuality it is not so convenient, and an intcmediate term is rcquircd.Thc intcrmediatc tcrm is anxiety, [...]. Anxiety is neither a category olncccssity nora category of ficedom; it is entanglcd freedom, where frcedom is not ficc in itsclf butcntangled, not by neccssity, but in itself. (CA 42)

And anxiety is indccd the fecling that characterizes the most meaningful charactcrof Kierkegaard's aesthetical "procession" in Either-or 1, Don Giovanni: anxicty isan ontological fèeling that evcn seems to precedc despair:

" Schell ing had presentcd the dist inct ion betwccn Tn òq and ?oùpòrp,during the lecture in Bcrl in thatKierkcgaard in his notes numbcrs with no. 7, dating from the end of November. (KJN3 308-309)

'rldb

Ingrid Bassct

There is an anxiety in that flash; it is as if in that deep darkness it were born in anxietyjust so is Don Giovanni's life. There is an anxiety in him, but this anxiety is his

energy. In him, it is not a subjectively reflected anxiety; it is a substantial anxiety.In the overture there is not what is commonly called * without knowing what one issaying - despair. Don Giovanni's lifc is not despair; it is, however, the full force ofthe sensuous, which is born in anxiety; and Don Giovanni himself is this anxiety, butthis anxiety is precisely the demonic zest for life. After Mozart has had Don Giovannicome into existence this way, his l i fe now develops for us in the dancing strains ofthe violin, in which he l ightly, f leetingly speeds on over thc abyss. When onc throws apebble in such a way that it skims thc surface oîthe water, it can for a time skip overthe water in l ight hops, but it sinks down to the bottom. (EOl 129-130)

Anxiety may bc comparcd with dizziness. He whosc cye happcns to look down intothe yawning abyss becomes dizzy. But what is thc rcason for this' l l t is just as muchin his own eye as in thc abyss, for suppose he had not looked down. Ilcnce anxiety isthe dizziness of freedorn, which cmcrges when the spirit wants to posit the synthesisand fiecdom looks down into its own possibil i ty, laying hold of f initcncss to supportitself. Freedom succumbs in this dizziness. (CA 61)

The qual i ty of thc human bcing as synthesis of thc psychicaland thc physicaluni tcdin the spirit (CA 43) is his feeling of anxiety, bccausc human freedom is "cntanglcd"

ficcdom, as Kicrkegaard clearly states. What does "entangled" mean preciscly?

Speaking about "cntangled f reedom" sccms to be a contradic t ion. This being"cntanglcd" pcr fcct ly def ìnes the naturc of something that ' is , 'but d id not decideits original being. As Schcll ing stated in his lecturcs on Philosophv of Revelation,"thc authcntic frccdom means not just bcing, but also the possible decision ol notbcing," that is only God's fit:edom.l

Coming back to the init ial problem, wc have seen that both Schell ing and Kierkegaardemphasize thc samc risk for philosophy, the risk of transfonning actuality by mcansof using rational apprehcnsion in something that is ncccssary. Ncvcrthclcss, Schcll inghad managed to includc not-bcing in his Systcm, taking it as somcthing cxisting,but in the way of possib i l i ty .

This is the same problematical point that Kierkegaard emphasizes in the InÍerludeof Philosophicctl Frctgmenl.r, when hc talks aboLrt historical apprehension:

E,verything that comes into existence dcrnonstratcs that it is not necessary, for the onlything that cannot come into existcncc is thc necessary, because thc ncccssary is. [...]The changc of coming into existence is actuality; thc transition takes place in frccdom.No coming into existencc is ncccssary. eF 12, 15)

But if by understanding we transfonn something which has become (the past)into something necessary, we lose the objcct we wanted to grasp: "lf what is

' Scc F. W. J. Schelling , et ,t,,,r,,,1,rio: ìtr Ol/cnl,,trung,in F Ití/..1. Schettingls Srimttic,ha Werkt,,SttttgaftundAugsburg, 1t356-1861, sect ion I I , vo l .3, p.209: "Aber d ie e igent l iche Fre ihei t besteht n icht imse-vn 1...), sondern im nicht seyn."

Poss ib i l í t y un , i \ .

apprehendeda misunderst

In a ccraccording tcìthe estheticmost inu ardseen from amisrepresent

So. th r :perpetual bcwho does n.pretends to rthe attitude tpetrifying itreligious appparameters.

Ner enialthough insame. Kierkcof his notcbinstrumcnls:point of his 1ph i losophr .elaboration tdiflìcult1 isinto factuaì Ibut he cann.,has transct--n,even if "Th.'

and nouher.Schc I I r :

being" as r : .being that ..:.gives to thr' :Hower c-r. ::.not passcJ. '.

outside tr : . :testifi ' ttr ..indeed. , : . '

I S e r ' p : :

" \ \ ' i th - , -

and . : -

h u r r . . : : ' ,

Ingrid Bas,so

In neg. phil. nothing is fixed, everything is fluid, until one affives at the principle.Already here, thc unfinished character ofneg. phil. is apparent; it possesses the principlein reverse fashion, as the end and not as the beginning. Consequently, it ends with thcprinciple. The principle is, namely, potency which does not vorausgeht its Seyn butpresupposes it. Thc principle is rcally nothing other than that which is safcguardedagainst all subsequent possibilities. The Pythagoreans distinguished between òuoq andpovoq, and set them in opposition to one another. By the first, they meant this doublemovcment, this fluidity, and by Fovog, true being. In true science, positivc sciencc,monos must come before dùas. This monas is both mcre idca, as it is in the neg. phil.,and also actual cxistence. lnsofar as it is the latter, we begin not with potency butwith Seyr, thc Seyr that nevcr moves a poîentio ad ac:tum, but that immediately isactus and always actus. Here, one might object, "an actuality that in this way precedesall possibil i ty is unthinkable." There is some truth in this, and therefore it may alsobe said of this Seyn that it is da,s unvordenkliche Sevn. As such it is the An/àng ofall thought, but is neverlhclcss not thought; it is the first objcct of thinking Qtrimumquod se oh.iit:it c'ogitcttioni), which is not thc content of thought but may become that.It might be objected that this, too, dcfics imagination; but to this the reply might bcgiven that thcrc are many instances in which such a possibil i ty may be imagined priorto actuality, and only such conccpts are truly original. To this extcntAristotle's dictumholds true: inilium philosophic est admiratio, and Plato's: ro norgoq rou $ú"ooo$outorl ro rSou;.to(etv. What is incomprchensible a priori phtlosophy now comprchcndsa posîcriori. (KJN3 333)

But now Kierkegaard objccts two things: ( l) thc conceptual knowledge of this purcBcing (its ideality that is the knowledge of its possibil i ty) docs not mcan that thisBeing exists ncccssarily; (2) also the /irct thal this Being rs does not necessarilymean that it is the "neccssary Being." (PF 40-43)

In th is space, the possib i l i ty of a passage is not g iven, but i t is merely possib leto leap with.feur und trembling by virtue of faith. This means that not cvcn Schellingwas ablc to find that point ofjunction that binds ideality and reality, i.e. the possibil i tyof thc comprehension of bcing.

According to Kierkcgaard, Faith is indeed thc only organ through which it ispossible to understand actuality. And here we havc the religious perspcctivc:

Thc organ f-or the historical must be l 'onned in l ikencss to this, must have withinitself thc corrcsponding something by which in its cefi itude it continually annuls thcincertitude that corresponds to thc uncertainty of coming into existence , a doubleuncertainty: the nothingness of non-being and the annihilatcd possibil i ty, which is alsothe annihilation of every other possibil i ty. This is prcciscly the nature of belief - forcontinually present as the null if ied in the certitude of belief is the inccrtitude that inevery way corresponds to the uncertainty of coming into existence. Thus, bclicf belicvcswhat i t does not see. (PF 8 l )

The position of the human being within existencc is well described in a famouspassage of the Posls cript, where Kierkegaard says:

For the existing person, existing is for him his highest interest, and his interestednessin existing is his actuality. What actuality is cannot be rendered in the language of

Possihility and I'tg,

abstracticthe hypotbut its ccbut possr

Only an ecstthat is, the aLwords, this i:explain somenot passed yc"faith."Accorbc intcl l ig iblrand human c,the differentcould not accexisting thinksvcelgende qtbefore the Fa

. . . w h i c hdiffèrcncso that Gin some

L ' - : /

m

Possibilitv and Negation, Freedom and Finileness. Kierkegaard antl the Influence oJ'the Late Schelling

abstraction. Actuality is an inîer esse lbetween-being] between thinking and being inthe hypothetical unity of abstraction. Abstraction deals with possibility and actuality,but its conception of actuality is a false rendition, since the medium is not actualitybur possibi l i ty. (CUPI 3la)

Only an ecstatic reason could conceive the Schellingian unvordenkliche Sein,that is, the absolute Prius, and be able to be or not to be, if it wanted to. In otherwords, this is a reason which in itsclf is divine, because otherwise it could notexplain something that would lie outside itself, l ike the purc possibility that hasnot passcd yet into actuality, i.e. the pure freedom; in this case we do not need thc"faith."According to Schelling, a theory of revelation, in order for revelation tobe intelligible, presupposes an already existing original rclationship between Godand human consciousness lhet precedes the revelafion itself and develops throughthe different degrees of Mythology. This is something that Kicrkegaard absolutely,could not accept and, with respect to Schelling's position, he opposcs his subjec:tivecxisting thinker in that person's "infìnitc, yawning, qualitative diffèrence" [uendeligsvcelgende qvalitativ Forskjelfiri from God, a differcnce which is establishcd cvenbefore thc Fall; and against speculation, hc rccalled Socratic ignorance:

. . . which guards faith against speculation, keeping watch so that the gulf of qualitativcdifference betwcen God and man may bc rnaintaincd as it is in thc paradox and laith,so that God and man do not, cven morc drcadfully than evcr in paganism, do not mcrgcin somc way, philosctphice, poetit'c, etc., into one in the systcm. (SUD 99)

r, KJN5 244;see also NB29:18, SKS25 309,"Qvali tets F-orskjel."