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‘Politicals’, Tribes and Musahibans:The Indian Political Service and Anglo-Afghan Relations 1929–39Christian TripodiVersion of record first published: 08 Jun 2012.

To cite this article: Christian Tripodi (2012): ‘Politicals’, Tribes and Musahibans: The Indian PoliticalService and Anglo-Afghan Relations 1929–39, The International History Review, 34:4, 865-886

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2012.690203

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‘Politicals’, Tribes and Musahibans: The Indian Political Service and

Anglo-Afghan Relations 1929–39

Christian Tripodi*

This article examines the way in which the tribal areas of the North-West Frontiercame to constitute a recurrent point of contention and dispute in Anglo-Afghanrelations during the period under examination. It argues that while muchattention has been paid to the way in which the activities of autonomous tribes ofthe frontier impacted upon British interests, much of the existing historiographyhas tended to focus upon the physical confrontation between tribe and state andhas hitherto ignored perhaps the most complex aspect of the ‘tribal problem’during this period; its impact upon the Government of India’s diplomaticrelations with Afghanistan. The article proposes that the period 1929–39constituted a particularly challenging context for British policy-makers wrestlingwith the requirement to formulate a cost-effective tribal policy that would suit theinterests of British India without undermining the newly emerged, pro-British butinherently weak Musahiban regime. It argues that while the Government of Indiaavoided any fatal breach in relations with the Afghan leadership, the process offrontier policy-making illustrated some fundamental weaknesses in perspective onthe part of that government department most closely associated with theformulation of such policy: the Indian Political Service.

Keywords: Afghanistan; British India; North-West Frontier; diplomacy; Pashtun;tribal policy

Studies of the North-West Frontier (NWF) and its indigenous tribes under Britishcolonial administration have tended to follow stark and uncomplicated lines. Aperhaps natural emphasis upon repeated instances of violence and rebellion hascome to confirm both the tribal areas’ status as an insurgent stronghold and thetribesman as serial adversary to government.1 The legend of Pashtun resistance toauthority has become entrenched but in the process encourages the ‘tribal problem’to be viewed as inherently parochial, often divorced from wider strategic ordiplomatic concerns. As a consequence one of the most important aspects of the‘tribal problem’, namely its influence upon the course of Anglo-Afghan relations,remains largely obscured and, if not entirely marginalised within the existinghistoriography, is nevertheless often relegated to a secondary or tertiary

*Email: christian.tripodi@kcl.ac.uk

The author would like to thank Professor Ashley Jackson and Dr Saul Kelly for their guidancein preparing this manuscript. Thanks must also go to the anonymous reviewers for theirattention to detail and valuable advice.

The International History Review

Vol. 34, No. 4, December 2012, 865–886

ISSN 0707-5332 print/ISSN 1949-6540 online

� 2012 Taylor & Francis

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consideration within the relevant literature.2 But in the process we are encouraged tooverlook potentially the most interesting and, from the British point of view, testingaspects of the tribal problem. Possessed of a keen interest in political developmentswithin Afghanistan, sharing strong cultural ties with a significant proportion of thatcountry’s population and with only a porous border between them, the tribes of theNWF were a feature of numerous Anglo-Afghan disputes between the latenineteenth century and the outbreak of the Second World War. During the periodunder examination however, the tribal territories assumed a particular relevance toproceedings, for not only were they crucial to shaping Britain’s relations withAfghanistan during a period of increasing strategic uncertainty, but over the courseof this initial decade of Musahiban rule they were simultaneously poised to shape thefragile political construct within Afghanistan, with potentially significant anddetrimental consequences for British interests.3

It is this initial decade of Musahiban rule, 1929–39, that lends the followingdebate its interest, this period of Anglo-Afghan diplomacy distinct in substanceand tone from those that preceded it.4 The way in which this emergent politicaldynasty – that centred upon Nadir Shah, his siblings, and, from his assassinationin 1933, his son Zahir – conceptualised its relationship with the tribal areas of theNWF reveals a series of concerns that were often quite different to those of itspredecessors and which dictate the form and nature of the disputes that wouldemerge with respect to British India. Whereas successive amirs Abdurrahman(1880–1901), Habibullah (1901–19), and Amanullah (1919–28) had treated theirdealings with tribes of the North-West Frontier as an opportunity to demonstratethe influence and authority of Afghanistan’s rulers over the wider Pashtundiaspora, by contrast the Musahibans were far more circumspect, spending muchof this period regarding certain of those same tribes with unease and apprehension,deeply conscious of their fickle political allegiances and latent power in determiningthe fate of the new regime.

It is in this context – that of the fragile political consensus existing withinAfghanistan 1929–39 – that this article examines the British response to the firstdecade of Musahiban rule.5 There is a focus throughout upon the way in which triballands acted as a form of ‘connective tissue’ between British India and Afghanistan,repeatedly influencing the nature of their relationship as both governments soughteither to co-operate or improve their position there at the expense of the other. Butthere are specific matters of interest that require investigation. For the Governmentof India (GOI) there was a fundamental contradiction between domestic (tribal)policy, and the demands of international diplomacy. For much of the period underdiscussion the twin imperatives weighing upon policy-makers – the continuedstability of the pro-British Musahiban regime on the one hand, and the formulationof a cost-effective and strategically viable tribal policy on the other – lay inopposition to each other. Why this should be the case is explored by examining theweaknesses and contradictions within the frontier policy-making apparatus. Thediffering appreciations of the weight that should be accorded to Afghan sensibilitieswhen formulating domestic policy illustrated a fundamental divergence ofphilosophy within the frontier cadre of the Indian Political Service (IPS), thegovernment department responsible for both tribal affairs and diplomaticrepresentation to Kabul.6 It is from the perspective of this troublesome yetsymbiotic relationship between tribal administration and international diplomacythat this article re-interprets a series of events that troubled Anglo-Afghan relations

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during this period, notably: the Peshawar and Khost ‘invasions’ of 1930 and 1933respectively; moves by the GOI toward a ‘forward policy’ post-1934; and, last butnot least, the Fakir of Ipi and Shami Pir affairs of the late 1930s. It argues thatthroughout this period the IPS’ frontier leadership was slow to recognise that thetribal problem had assumed a strategic relevance far removed from that which hadhitherto conditioned thinking. Successive Chief Commissioners persisted with anoutmoded appreciation of the NWF tribal areas, preferring for it to remain withinthe realm of that historically seductive clash between Imperial power and indigenouspeoples: the legend of the Soldier Sahib.7 Paternalism, autocracy, and isolationcombined to rid the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) political administrationof the necessary perspective to see the tribal problem in its international as well asdomestic context. In this respect its blushes were spared only by the dual perspectiveprovided by those of its number stationed in Kabul who were forced to adopt analmost adversarial posture toward their fellow ‘Politicals’ across the Durand Line.But this article also suggests that while British administrators may have beenculpable in engineering many of their own difficulties, their task was made inherentlymore complex by the nature of the Afghan government’s interest in the tribal areasof the NWF. From the Musahiban perspective, attitudes toward frontier politicswere driven not purely by identification with the sizeable Pashtun diaspora lyingwithin British territory, or indeed fear of its motives. Rather, as time progressed, theMusahiban leadership began to exhibit a far more strategic perspective, one thatobserved the rapid pace of political change within India during the period concernedand sought to preserve a degree of authority within the tribal areas enabling it toforestall the likely Hindu dominance of Afghanistan’s eastern borders subsequent toa British withdrawal from India.

II.

As this paper argues, the tribal areas and their Pashtun inhabitants were of centralimportance to this particular Anglo-Afghan debate, but some clarification isrequired. The autonomous tribal territories of the NWF occupied some 17,000square miles, sandwiched between Baluchistan to the south, Chitral to the north, andthe North-West Frontier Province to the East. Divided by the British into the tribalagencies of Malakand, Khyber, and North and South Waziristan, they were home toa multitude of distinct socio-political communities which together in their hundredscomprised a patchwork of a dozen or so major, and a similar number of smaller,tribes: a population of roughly 1.5 million with an estimated fighting strength ofsome 400,000 men in total.8 Over the duration of some seven decades between thelate 1870s and its eventual withdrawal from the sub-continent in 1947, the GOIengaged in a protracted struggle to draw these indigenous tribes within its politicalorbit and so facilitate control over what was generally accepted as being astrategically vital quarter.9 Although successful in many respects, a fact oftenoverlooked courtesy of those received wisdoms concerning the colonial experienceon the Frontier, there is no doubt that prolonged resistance to government authoritywas endemic to significant swathes of the tribal areas throughout the entire period, avexatious problem for those military and civilian officials tasked with devising asuitably cost-effective response.10 Understandably this corrosive antipathy, inter-spersed with occasional flashes of widespread organised rebellion, has tended toencourage analysis of this colonial-era encounter to be framed by the frequently

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antagonistic relationship between tribe and state. As a consequence however, themore oblique aspects of the ‘tribal problem’, particularly in relation to internationaldiplomacy, remain largely disguised.

In this context, it was the four largest of the NWF tribes that tended to dominateproceedings: the Mohmands, inhabiting the highlands to the northwest of Peshawar;the Afridis of Khyber and Tirah; and the Mahsuds and Wazirs of Waziristan. TheMohmands and Wazirs were ‘trans-border’ tribes, elements of their populationsresiding in both Afghanistan and India and thus giving them an automatic relevanceto the issues at hand. The Afridis were a powerful conglomeration of eight clanscontrolling, among other things, access to the Khyber Pass and had long consideredAfghanistan’s neighbouring Nangarhar province to be fair game. The Mahsud weregenerally perceived as aggressive and opportunistic, alert to the prospect of profitingeconomically from whatever misfortune or instability might be visiting Afghanistanat a given point.11 None of these tribes shared any unified political identity or loyaltywith respect to either Britain or Afghanistan. The former was regarded withsuspicion and occasional enmity but generally tolerated due to the geographicallimits of government influence and the emoluments that flowed from its coffers in theform of the ‘allowance’ system, through which relationships with the majority oftribes were sustained.12 And while there is no doubt that these tribes as a whole didin principle pledge allegiance to the Afghan throne and expected a certain degree ofsupport in return, their attitudes toward the Afghan government were equallymalleable. Loyalty to the Amir might be quickly supplanted by recognition of hischallenger, or of the advantage to be gained by a breakdown of law and order in aneighbouring Afghan province, for example. So if tribesmen crossed intoAfghanistan it was often impossible for Afghan or British officials to discernwhether their motivations were supportive or antagonistic, whether they werepolitical, economic, familial, or simply criminal in nature.13

The tribal problem in its various guises took its place against a febrile strategicbackdrop, both regional and domestic. During the 1920s India had witnessed theseemingly inexorable spread of Congress influence throughout its vast rural societyand with it increasingly voluble calls for self-government. The early part of thedecade had also witnessed a brief explosion in Muslim nationalist sentiment in theform of the Khilafatist movement, a pan-Islamic political awakening based in Indiaand inspired by the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate after the First World War.14

The activities of both the Khilafat and Congress emphasised to British policy-makersthat the GOI must focus its political and fiscal resources toward the ‘centre’, yet the‘periphery’ began to distract in the form of a gradual recrudescence of Russianinterest in Afghanistan.15 The threat was an intriguing one, albeit in the sense ofpotentiality rather than inevitability. Despite military concern at the prospect of aninvasion of India via Afghanistan and the NWF, the threat was recognised asprimarily fiscal and political. Fiscal in the sense that any Russian occupation ofAfghanistan would require the precautionary but rapid inflation of the strength ofthe Indian Army at an unacceptable financial cost, political in the sense that intrigueswithin Afghanistan, which were active, were designed to provide a launch-pad forthe political penetration of India and a supplement to the Nationalist agenda.16 Ineither scenario, the GOI would be forced to direct a greater share of its limitedfinancial resources and diminishing political goodwill toward the instruments ofcontrol and repression, specifically the military and the police. In the context ofIndia’s crippling financial condition post-1930 and an increasingly ambitious

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nationalist agenda, such a shift might cause a genuine crisis for British rule inIndia.17

It was against this backdrop of Great Power suspicion and political upheaval inIndia that Afghanistan’s internal political construct disintegrated in late 1928. Thefall of Amir Amannullah Khan was a consequence of a series of hurried socio-economic reforms designed by him to thrust Afghanistan into the new internationalorder, but which simply incensed religious and conservative tribal opinion: a sense ofalienation exacerbated by the elevated taxation of rural society to pay for themodernisation and apparent secularisation of the urban political and economicelite.18 The subsequent revolt had resulted in Amanullah’s flight to Kandahar andthe capture of Kabul by the Tajik warlord Habibullah Kalakani in January 1929.19

Somewhat predictably Kalakani’s rule was a disastrous one. The rapid degenerationof his authority – unsurprising in light of his ethnicity and lack of politicallegitimacy – led to a state of utter lawlessness in Kabul and the country as a whole. Itwas in the context of this deeply unsatisfactory scenario that the former Amanullahfavourite Nadir Khan emerged from imposed exile in France.20 Accompanied by hisinfluential brothers, Hashim Khan and Shah Wali Khan, later to become PrimeMinister and Minister for War respectively, he entered Afghanistan from India inlate February 1929, carefully positioning himself as an ally of both the pro and anti-Amanullist factions.21 Garnering what support he could, and acting as the primarychallenger to Kalakani subsequent to Amanullah’s departure into his Italian exile inMay of that year, he engaged in a series of battles throughout that summer beforeforces loyal to him captured Kabul in October. Claiming the throne and taking thetitle Nadir Shah, he restored Pashtun rule to Afghanistan.

The Afghan civil war and its resolution had raised a series of issues for Britishpolicy-makers in London and New Delhi, in particular those within the frontiercadre responsible for tribal administration on the NWF. The collapse ofAmanullah’s regime and Kalakani’s emergence in his place had posed questions asto precisely what Britain required with respect to Afghanistan. Support forAmanullah had risked cementing in place an Afghan ruler who appeared too closeto Moscow for comfort and simultaneously opened Britain up to accusations ofinterfering in the internal political affairs of a newly emerged sovereign state, anunpalatable charge in the inter-war era. By contrast, recognition of Kalakani’s rebeladministration might, in light of his pro-Basmachi stance, provide a handy obstacleto any Soviet penetration into northern Afghanistan. It might equally result in thecountry’s fragmentation and so facilitate those Soviet ambitions.22 At the very leastit would lend credence to accusations by the Soviet Union, Indian, and Muslimnationalists that the GOI had supported Kalakani’s regime in order to ensureAfghanistan’s collapse and eventual subservience to British designs.23 In this context,the British reaction to Nadir’s appearance and eventual triumph was muted.24 Therewas no doubt that Afghanistan’s new leader appealed to British sensibilities.Although a fierce opponent, when Commander-in-Chief, of the British forwardpolicy in Waziristan subsequent to the tribal rebellion there of 1919–21, his exile inParis as Amanullah’s envoy had encouraged a far more pro-Western perspectivewhile his fervent nationalism, noted by those British officials in contact with him,indicated a potentially effective bulwark against Soviet agitations.25 But despite thesegenerally favourable impressions, it was recognised that his position was weak andpotentially untenable. Worryingly for a Pashtun ruler, much of the Pashtunpopulation within Afghanistan had refrained from lending any support whatsoever.

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Some, like the Ghilzai, were traditional opponents of the Durrani, that tribalfederation from which the Musahibans were drawn, having suffered consistentpolitical and economic disenfranchisement over the years at the hands of their morepolitically astute rivals. Others such as the Shinwari of eastern Afghanistan hadprofited from the lack of authority and freedom from taxation that existed duringthe civil war. The southern Suleiman Khel, a sub-tribe of the Ghilzai federation, hadeven backed Kalakani; despite his ethnicity, his refutation of Amanullah’s reformsand declaration to a return to the precepts of Islamic rule encouraged that tribe’sreligious leaders to declare their support.26 In addition to tribal antipathy, there werevocal accusations from the powerful pro-Amanullist Tarzi and Charki families thatNadir had usurped the throne.27 As a consequence of such an actively unsupportiveenvironment within Afghanistan, British officials were unwilling to discountAmanullah’s eventual return to power. It also had to be acknowledged that Nadir’striumph represented new and unfamiliar ground for British policy-makers. TheMusahibans represented an unprecedented departure from that which had gonebefore. Despite Amanullah’s antipathy toward Britain he was in effect a knownquantity. The same could not be said for Nadir, and the safe assumptions that hadhitherto underpinned British policy with regard to Afghanistan’s leadership wouldhave to be hastily redrawn.

But there was also a more immediate issue at hand for those officials to ponder inrelation to Nadir’s triumph, namely the support that had been provided by the‘British’ tribes of the NWF.28 This was a significant and potentially awkward issuefor both the GOI – the frontier cadre of the IPS in particular – and the Musahibans.Despite concerted and consistent efforts on the part of British officials throughoutmuch of 1929 to prevent the recruitment of its tribesmen as Afghan kingmakers, andexplicit warnings to Nadir that his attempts at such recruitment would not betolerated, he had succeeded in drawing some 12,000 Mahsud and Wazirs to his side,a force that was absolutely instrumental in aiding his triumph. The GOI had notonly been deceived by Afghanistan’s new leader but had also been exposed to theinevitable charge by its critics that it had knowingly interfered in Afghanistan’sinternal political process by facilitating Nadir’s entry into Afghanistan (which wasthe case), and encouraging him to recruit from tribes resident in British territory(which was not).29 And protestations that it had tried to prevent that recruitmentsimply suggested in light of its failure to do so a glaring lack of influence in the tribalareas, something that officials were understandably keen to disguise. There werepositives of course; a pro-British Pashtun amir was upon the Afghan throne and theofficial commitment to neutrality had not only pre-empted Soviet intrigues but alsoplayed well with the new regime who duly acknowledged (as had been calculated) thedeference shown to Afghanistan’s sovereignty.30 Yet, despite potential benefits theIPS’ inability to prevent what was in effect a crucial intervention by the tribes wastroubling, hinting at its inability to safeguard India’s international obligations toAfghanistan when required, with obvious implications.

But, somewhat ironically, it was to be Nadir who would have cause to feel thegreatest concern. His path to power may have been smoothed by the supportprovided by ‘British’ tribes but it had simultaneously alerted him to the fact thatthere resided within alien territory a fickle political constituency effortlessly poised tointerfere in Afghanistan’s domestic affairs. The apprehensions of both parties nowgave shape to the debate that would follow. The GOI recognised the potential for itsinternational obligations to a friendly Afghan regime to be severely compromised by

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the activities of its own subjects. The way in which policy-makers responsible forfrontier affairs accommodated this new reality within the broader issue of NWFtribal policy would be crucial to resolving this dilemma. For their part theMusahibans, unwilling to allow their political survivability to hang on the whims ofBritish administrators, sought to ensure that Kabul’s influence flourished where itmattered: in British territory.

III.

Afghanistan’s attempts to improve its position within India’s tribal areas hadobvious implications for the IPS. First and foremost it constituted a challenge tothose charged with directing tribal loyalties toward New Delhi. But there were moresubtle issues at play. Simply put, the Musahibans’ weak domestic positioncompromised the GOI’s ability to act freely within its own territory. That Nadir’sposition remained vulnerable into 1930 was indisputable. Despite the approval of anassembly of notables (Jirga) in November 1929, Amannullist supporters had rejectedthe convocation as being unrepresentative of wider tribal opinion.31 The influentialGhulam Nabi Charki, former Ambassador at Moscow and now in hiding in SovietCentral Asia, denounced the election as fraudulent, proposing instead a popularnationwide plebiscite.32 Conservative tribal and religious elements within Afghani-stan remained suspicious of the new government’s economic and religious policies.33

There was even an invasion to contend with: Soviet forces penetrating into the Northof the country in pursuit of Basmachi forces in June 1930.34 But active internaldisaffection was the primary concern. In May, Shinwaris in the perenniallytroublesome eastern province of Khost revolted, while in July a prolonged assaulton government forces by the rump of Kalakani’s support located in the valleys to thenorth-east of Kabul, (the so called Koh-I-Daman uprising) required some 20,000tribesmen, mainly Ghilzai, to be summoned in aid of the army.35 Unfortunately,Nadir’s lack of authority simply encouraged the tribesmen, once the ‘insurgency’ hadbeen quelled, to surround Kabul; it was only with the utmost difficulty that he wasable to negotiate their departure.36 Matters were serious enough for the GOI to agreethe supply of 15,000 rifles and 500,000 cartridges, alongside an unconditional gift of£175,000, to provide the new administration with some sort of military and financialfooting.37

It was in this fraught context that the invasion of Peshawar, capital of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) took place in the summer of 1930. The occupationof the city and surrounding areas by some 2,000 Afridi tribesmen provoked SirStuart Pears, Chief Commissioner and thus the most senior member of the IPSstationed on the NWFP, to recommend the annexation and occupation of Afriditerritory in Khyber and Tirah as punishment. His logic was dictated by not only byhis duty of care to the Province per se, but by the ramifications of unhindered tribalviolence in the wider context of an increasingly delicate political condition within theNWFP courtesy of the activities of the Pashtun nationalist Khudai Khidmatgar(KK). Indeed, it had been the violent government countermeasures to KK activity inPeshawar – the so-called Khissa Khani Bazaar killings – that had stirred suchresentment on the part of the Afridis.38 But Pears was immediately forestalled in hisproposals by Sir Richard Maconachie, fellow IPS officer and newly appointed envoyto Kabul, who warned that if British forces were to advance into tribal territory theAfghan government would be forced, despite its antipathy to a tribe that remained

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vocal in its support for Amanullah, to provide material support simply in order todeflect accusations that the new regime was complicit in British ambitions to conquertribal territories.39 Refusal to provide that support, Maconachie warned, could leadto an upsurge in opposition activity within Afghanistan and among British tribesthat might feasibly result in the Afghan government’s downfall, with all theconsequent implications for British interests.40 The India Office acknowledged theargument and instructed the NWFP administration to downscale its proposedresponse. Pears’ disenchantment was understandable. The IPS, the government’sauthority on tribal affairs, had been prevented from dealing with tribal matters as itsaw fit for the benefit of an apparently paranoid Afghan government. But it was theIPS that had been at fault, both for the initial lapse which had allowed the Afridis toapproach Peshawar without detection, but particularly for the subsequentrecommendation to annex Afridi territory in response. It was, arguably, Pears’intemperate proposal, divorced from the diplomatic realities of the situation, whichgave real impetus to Musahiban designs in British territory. It had merelyemphasised to Nadir the importance of gaining traction in the tribal areas asquickly as possible, if only to mitigate the effects of future British countermeasuresthere. From this point forward, through a strategy of financial inducements, theprovision of political patronage to tribal leaders and promises (albeit evasive) tosupport the tribes against British ‘oppression’, all combined with a natural appeal toethnic solidarity, the Afghan government sought to establish a measure of influenceamong the most influential tribes.41

With respect to the period under consideration, the Afridi invasion of Peshawarconstituted the point at which the dual responsibilities of the IPS – tribal in the formof the NWFP administration, diplomatic in the shape of the Kabul legation – beganto clash. It was also clear that the GOI’s response to matters of frontier policyinherently affecting the health and wellbeing of the Afghan government was largelythe responsibility of those possessed of little interest or even expertise in the matter.Within a month of the Peshawar incident’s resolution, the India Office wasrecommending that artillery fire be aimed at Afghan territory following an incursionby errant Chamkanni tribesmen into Kurram, while in early 1931, a sizeable lashkarof Afridis was allowed to cross unhindered into Afghanistan’s Nangarharprovince.42 The presence of Afridis in particular was highly offensive to the Afghangovernment; in addition to their perceived pro-Amanullist tendencies they wereconsidered to be the focal point of Congress penetration into the Frontier andbeyond and Hashim Khan in particular had warned of the presence of ‘foamingHindu nationalists’ within the tribe.43 Nadir’s response was provocative; heestablished Afghan Khassadar units – a form of tribal police – within Britishterritory.44 But despite this evident display of political insecurity on his part, seniorPoliticals still appeared unwilling to accommodate Musahiban insecurities within thebroader framework of tribal policy. In the spring of 1932 Sir Ralph Griffith, Pears’replacement as Governor, proposed military action be taken against the Afghansections of the Mohmands that had been mounting attacks within British territory. Itwas left to Maconachie to remind him of the potential consequences of any suchaction, arguing that the use of troops would simply provoke the Afghan Mohmandsinto demanding help from Nadir, thereby forcing him to either acquiesce to theirdemands, thus signalling a de facto policy of opposition to the British, or refuse,thereby raising the possibility of anti-government uprisings both in Afghanistan andthe tribal areas.45 Fortunately, violence had dissipated before the GOI was forced to

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act on its considerations, but Maconachie’s warning had been perceptive. GhulamNabi Charki, having re-entered Afghanistan from the Soviet Union the previousyear, had without warning appeared in southern Afghanistan in the late summer of1932 whereupon he promptly fomented a pro-Amanullist uprising among the DareKhel and Mangal tribes. Although the revolt was suppressed, and he was arrestedand executed on Nadir’s orders in November that year; his ability to inspire unrestunder Amanullah’s banner was illustrative of the continued delicacy of theMusahiban position and lent weight to Maconachie’s concerns at the reflexivenature of British tribal policy.46

The evident discordance between the views of those IPS representatives in Kabuland their colleagues in the NWFP administration demands investigation. One mightassume that ‘Political’ elite, regardless of their station, would have been inherentlywell suited to an exercise of such delicacy, but matters were not so straightforward.Despite a legacy of engagement over the previous century by successive Indian andhome administrations, and despite the undoubted capabilities of governmentmandarins and senior officials in New Delhi and London who maintained strategicover-watch where India’s security was concerned, claims to any thoroughinstitutional understanding of Afghanistan’s internal political landscape weredebateable. Indeed, it could be argued that the sole repository for any genuinelydetailed and informed understanding of Afghan politics was the Kabul Legation,specifically the ministers in situ, which during the period under discussion were theaforementioned Sir Richard Maconachie (1930–5) and Sir William Kerr Fraser-Tytler (1935–41). These two individuals were almost single-handedly responsible forproviding the necessary balance to their government’s appreciation of Afghan affairsover the course of the following decade, yet they were drawn from the same‘Political’ cadre as their fellow officers in the NWFP. But why should there exist suchsharp distinctions in perspective and understanding? Both Maconachie and Fraser-Tytler were outstanding intellects, certainly. Indeed, Maconachie was described asone of the most brilliant officers in the Service and both men had benefitted fromlengthy careers as frontier political officers, which, in conjunction with their positionin Kabul, provided them with an elevated understanding of the fundamentalinterrelationship between tribal and diplomatic affairs.47 But in truth the IPS washome to any number of exceptional intellects perfectly capable of grasping theintricate detail of Afghanistan’s political condition. That they did not was largelydown to the structure of frontier administration, and the ethos and perspective of theService’s senior frontier cadre.

There is no doubt that the architecture of frontier administration had a concretebearing upon the dissonance between diplomatic and ‘tribal’ perspectives. The IPSwas part of a multifarious policy apparatus that formulated Britain’s Afghan policy,one that included at the strategic level the Foreign Office, India Office, Committee ofImperial Defence (CID), Viceroy’s Council, and Indian General Staff. However,with regard to Afghanistan and the tribal areas of the NWF, both politicalintelligence and the actual execution of diplomacy were the preserve of the Service.48

Theoretically, this dual tasking should have ensured a broad understanding ofAfghan affairs. But even in 1938 Fraser-Tytler was to observe that only around afifth of the thirty-five or so political officers then stationed on the frontier had evervisited Kabul, and that only one of these had remained there for more than twodays.49 He suggested that the frontier cadre in general: ‘[K]now little or nothingabout the actual trend of Afghan politics, of the development of the country, of the

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Afghan point of view or its relations with foreign powers.’50 Such criticismshighlighted a fundamental problem; despite its diplomatic role, when it came to theFrontier the Service’s primary task remained the arcane practice of tribaladministration. The structures set in place for that purpose – individual PoliticalAgents responsible for discrete agencies and the tribal groups within – tended toconfine their analysis of frontier events to the potential ramifications for Britishrather than Afghan territory. A young ‘Political’ responsible for a strategically vitalagency such as the Khyber Pass or Malakand would have as his primary concern theposture of the resident Afridis or Yusufzai; the sensibilities of the Afghangovernment came a distant second in his considerations. The same was true forhis ultimate superior, the Chief Commissioner (Governor from 1932) whose primaryresponsibility was the protection of the settled districts of the Province at anacceptable human and financial cost. The one member of the Service specificallyconcerned with the international dimension to its activities was the Foreign Secretaryof the GOI. But his was a position of marginal influence, with little political weight atthe highest levels particularly in comparison to the military and finance members ofthe Viceroy’s council. So although the IPS was fundamental to shaping a broaderunderstanding of Afghan and Frontier affairs due to its physical and conceptualproximity to the issues at hand, such proximity did not necessarily compensate forinherent distortion in its priorities – which placed a premium upon resolution oftribal rather than diplomatic disputes – nor the lack of influence at the highest levelsof government.

The tribal focus, it appeared, was inbuilt. In his memoirs, the former politicalofficer Leslie Mallam raises the subject of the ‘Great Frontiersmen’, a double-edgedsobriquet that he bestows upon his superiors, the prominent chief commissioners/governors of the 1930s; Stuart Pears (1929–30), Ralph Griffith (1930–6), and GeorgeCunningham (1937–46 and 1948). Whilst acknowledging their personal qualities,Mallam’s contention is cutting: that these men grew up within the intrinsicallydynamic, autocratic, and reactionary environment of the NWF Political cadre – asociety as closed as that which it administered. Drawing upon the tradition of thosewho had gone before them – Nicholson, Herbert, Edwardes, Roos-Keppel, et al. –they persisted in adopting an outmoded form of paternalistic rule, ‘glorying in thatwhich gave them prominence’.51 In other words, the tribal problem was still seenprimarily through the eyes of that seductive and elemental confrontation betweenBritish officer and native warrior rather than as part of a much larger but inherentlyless interesting diplomatic puzzle. And this appreciation of tribal affairs was onlyworsened by the NWFP status changing to that of a governor’s province in 1932. Byfinally adhering to the system of Dyarchy that had previously been introduced in themajor provinces of British India in 1919 under the auspices of the Government ofIndia Act of that year, and by placing responsibility for Provincial concerns such ashealth, education, and local government in the hands of a democratically elected andlargely native legislature – the Indian Council – the Governor was shorn of much ofhis personal power. Yet his authority over tribal matters, that one arena of Frontieraffairs that provided the ‘Great Frontiersmen’ with his traditional validation,remained undiluted, becoming the focal point of his self-identity.52 Mallam’sobservations strike a chord. From the very beginning, successive chiefs of Britain’sfrontier administration displayed a predominantly Orientalist perspective of tribalsociety. Harold Deane and George Roos-Keppel, for example, had beendistinguished by their close personal association with the tribesmen. The former

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had been noted by none other than Winston Churchill who, acting as an observer forthe Daily Telegraph during the frontier uprising of 1897 wrote, ‘We had with us avery brilliant political officer, a Major Deane . . . Apparently all these savage chiefswere his old friends and almost his blood relations. Nothing disturbed theirfriendship. In between fights, they talked as man to man and as pal to pal.’53 Roos-Keppel was regarded as having a particularly close bond with the Afridis, amongwhom he served as PA Khyber for eight years. Upon his promotion to ChiefCommissioner in 1908 the tribe’s seniorMaliks (leaders) even held a garden party forhim; an unparalleled event.54 Olaf Caroe, in the words of a contemporary, developeda ‘romantic passion’ for the region and its peoples, spending much of his spare timetranslating Pashtun poetry.55 In 1958 he would publish his famous and still oft-quoted work The Pathans. George Cunningham was similarly seduced, speaking ofthe tribesmen as being splendid of physique, as having never been tamed, of havingindependence of the soul. ‘It is personal touch and knowledge that are our realmeans of control over these men,’ he exclaimed.56 Sir Norman Bolton, Pears’predecessor as Chief Commissioner, spoke of a society that was, cruel, treacherous,almost inhuman. ‘Such a race cannot be ruled by tact and kindness alone,’ heexclaimed.57 Endless comparisons were made of the way in which the tribes of thefrontier mimicked the behaviour of the Scottish Highland clans, ‘their pride quick towound, their spirit of independence, their nobility of tongue . . . All these things arereproduced identically out here’.58 Such attitudes were only encouraged by a systemthat drew its most senior officers from those Political Agents with extensive tribalservice behind them but who had minimal experience outside of the claustrophobicconfines of the NWFP; Pears (Waziristan and Khyber), Griffith (Waziristan), andCunningham (Bannu and Waziristan) fitted this mould exactly. Their formativeexposure to the tribes, combined with the leeway provided by their geographicalisolation and the esoteric nature of the task at hand created an aura in the minds ofboth the frontier cadre themselves and their political masters of an indisputableexpertise in tribal matters. In reality, however, not only was such expertise somewhatsuperficial in nature, but also tended to convince practitioners and observers thattribal administration was the preserve of select alchemists.

This is not to say that the ‘tribal’ heritage of its senior frontier cadre blinded theIPS to the wider ramifications of any chosen tribal policy. But it is clear that theirfocus was in the first instance related to matters of provincial security and thecontinuing prestige of government authority. The strategic perspective was generallyconfined to matters of finance and the direct and indirect implications for India ofadministering what was in reality a deficit Province; by 1932 the NWFP wasoperating at a deficit of 283 lakh per annum, nearly four times its revenue.59 Yet whatwas missing was a willingness to look outside India’s borders: to envisage the way inwhich tribal policy affected India’s regional interests by virtue of its potentiallynegative effect upon the Afghan government. And it is certainly instructive thatalthough the 1930s saw tribal policy inextricably linked to Britain’s strategic interestsin Afghanistan, and although that same decade should be characterised by perhapsthe greatest degree of concerted intellectualisation on the future of tribal policy sincethe 1890s, the decision eventually arrived at – peaceful penetration – would in factonly worsen relations with Kabul.60

Yet, it is clear that the IPS was not alone in its inability to piece together theprecise relationship between frontier affairs and diplomatic relations. The Afghangovernment was equally culpable in this respect, albeit as a consequence of rather

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more fundamental problems. A dynamic and unstable domestic politicalenvironment, fear of active Russian intrigues, the pressing yet delicate need tocentralise and modernise in the face of conservative tribal and religious opinion,and a lack of the elementary components of effective government – revenue,military, police – dictated an inherently irregular and reactive response to Frontieraffairs. Essentially, the Musahibans paid attention to such events when their owninterests were directly threatened. Such a selective approach ensured an unevenappreciation of detail and a lack of familiarity with all aspects of the question athand, particularly the complex arrangements relating to jurisdiction over certaintribes, and the ways in which Afghan actions in this respect might be perceived byBritish officials. This had two consequences. The first was a fundamental lack ofany really comprehensive understanding of Britain’s position on Frontier andtribal matters. Maconachie, for example, was taken aback upon being informed byHashim Khan that the NWFP and Baluchistan were not only separate from BritishIndia but that Nepal and Kashmir were indeed part of it, which of course theywere not.61 Fraser-Tytler was similarly surprised to be informed, again by HashimKhan, that the tribal areas were entirely independent, free from either Afghan orBritish authority.62 Although these were genuine misapprehensions as opposed towilful misinterpretations of the facts, such misapprehensions only encouraged arelatively cavalier attitude toward Frontier policy-making on the part of theAfghan government, often implementing schemes or mounting protests inignorance of accepted convention and thus the sensitivities of British officials.Such actions merely helped to illuminate the unavoidable misunderstandings thatarose as a consequence of two governments maintaining frequently differingdegrees of interest in a matter that was nonetheless of mutual importance. Andsuch misunderstandings were only magnified when an inability to perceive thisdifference in perspectives went unchecked.63

IV.

Although the period 1929–32 had highlighted the inherent relationship between theNorth-West Frontier tribal areas and Afghanistan’s political stability, the period1933–8 was to feature a subtle change in attitude on the part of the Musahibans.Although concerns remained at the potential for British tribes to complement anystate of insecurity that might arise in Afghanistan, the gradual strengthening of thegovernment’s domestic authority encouraged a broader perspective of how the tribalareas might relate to Afghanistan’s security. So, while the Khost invasion of March1933 and the Shami Pir incident of July 1938 may have pandered to lingering fears ofAmanullist agitation, they bracketed a far more insidious development from theAfghan perspective: the alteration in Britain’s Frontier policy from ‘watch and ward’to the aforementioned ‘peaceful penetration’, an opportunistic system that sought topush the GOI’s authority, wherever feasible, into those areas previously consideredterra incognita. Designed to address the concerns of the NWFP administration withrespect to continuing levels of violence in the tribal areas, it led to significant disquieton the part of an Afghan government concerned at the diminution of its owndefensive ‘space’.

‘Peaceful penetration’ was still a vaguely defined concept in the spring of 1933when there occurred the first of a series of significant shocks to Anglo-Afghanrelations. Nadir’s settling of the southern revolt in 1932 had displaced local Malang

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tribesmen across the border into Waziristan, where over the course of the winter theyhad begun to agitate among the Wazirs and Mahsud for a lashkar to be raisedagainst the Afghan government. Although pushed back into Afghanistan by tribalforces loyal to the British, their thwarting of Afghan forces sent to apprehend themencouraged numbers of British tribesmen, apparently convinced of the Afghangovernment’s weakness, to proceed across the border. By March an estimated 10,000had infiltrated into Khost province, some of whom had mounted attacks uponAfghan government forces. Nadir and his close circle, mindful of the Amanullistthreat, were incensed. Not only did they resent the apparent ease with which Britishtribesmen had infiltrated across the border but in particular their ability to sustainthemselves in situ, suggesting the maintenance of robust supply routes emanatingfrom British territory. Maconachie was summoned by Prime Minister Hashim Khanand informed that the GOI appeared engaged in a systematic attempt to weaken andundermine the Afghan government’s authority.64 Although publicly defending theIPS’ decision not to use force for fear of sparking a wider conflagration, in privatehis embarrassment was palpable and he urged ministers to recognise the legitimacyof Afghan anger, demanding to know from the NWFP administration why such asizeable lashkar had been able to remain under observation without being subject topunitive action. Maconachie’s anxieties were manifold but his primary concern wasthat the Frontier cadre continued to labour under an obsessive and misplaced fear ofviolence within British territory, which was in reality exposing the government topotentially more serious consequences in Afghanistan. Failure to prevent themovement of tribesmen across the border provided a marked impetus torevolutionary movements there as the disavowal by Britain of its responsibilitiesin support of Nadir publicly weakened his pro-British position and encouraged pro-Amanullist and, by extension, pro-Soviet factions. Meanwhile, constant reassurancesas to the efficiency of British frontier administration led to a legitimate conclusion byNadir that, if the competence of that administration was not in question, the onlypossible explanation for events was British collaboration with opposition factions inthe tribal areas, which in turn only encouraged reciprocal Afghan intrigues amongBritish tribes. All in all, surmised Maconachie, the Political Department appearedintent on frustrating the fundamental and specific objective of British policy, namelythe improvement of relations with Afghanistan.65

Although the Viceroy, Lord Willingdon, mounted a spirited defence of the IPS’actions in the face of the India Office’s enquiries, pointing out that the IPS hadprevented some 80 per cent of tribal strength from crossing the border, he was forcedto acknowledge his envoy’s warnings.66 But in seeking to escape this repetitive anddamaging scenario, officialdom remained trapped in an eternal quandary: what wasgood for Afghanistan was not necessarily good for British India and the NWFP. Itwas clear that as it stood, Frontier policy – a system of isolated military bases inWaziristan with the remainder of tribal territory administered by a handful ofpolitical officers – was proving unsatisfactory. The minimal administrative presencewas not only a false economy when the cost of repeated military operations againstthe tribes was factored in, but it also appeared to put the government on the backfoot when it came to detecting and pre-empting tribal incursions into Afghanistan.One might assume therefore that the new policy unveiled post-1933 might in part atleast have been a response to the problems identified by Maconachie, and thusdesigned to ameliorate the conditions that were helping to place Britain’s relationswith a vital strategic partner in jeopardy. But those within the Political Department

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responsible for recommending the adoption of a policy of ‘peaceful penetration’ –the extension of a road network and associated administrative apparatus into tribalterritory – had confined their analysis to provincial and national concerns, withseemingly little regard for Afghan sensibilities. As it was, due to a fundamental lackof enthusiasm and consensus across government, that policy which eventuallymaterialised was a pale shadow of the Committee’s recommendations, focusingpurely upon road-building as a ‘civilisation carrier’ into the tribal territories, thehistorical model being the scheme implemented by General George Wade in theHighlands of Scotland 1724–40.67 In light of India’s fiscal woes at the time, this wasunsurprising, but it was still regarded as short-sighted by some. Maconachie wasexplicit in his concern that the new policy would worsen relations with the stillvulnerable Musahibans. The enhancement of a British presence in the tribal areaswould simply cause those tribes affected to appeal to the Afghan government forhelp, the latter bound by domestic considerations to offer a measure of support lest itbe accused of complicity, further complicating its relations with Britain. And hisfears over Afghanistan’s still febrile political condition were far from alarmist.Ghulam Nabi’s execution had caused resentment even on the part of those relativelywell disposed to Nadir. The violation of legal redress had given the impression of apersonal vendetta, elevating the dispute into a blood feud between the Musahibanand Charki families. Indeed, Fraser-Tytler condemned the affair as the major errorof Nadir’s entire administration.68 Impatient modernists and disillusioned nation-alists, frustrated at the slow pace of change, added to the sense of unease.69 AndNadir’s perceived pro-British leanings were to have serious ramifications. In July hisbrother Mohammed Aziz, envoy to Berlin, was assassinated, his assailant claimingjustification as a consequence of Nadir’s betrayal of the Frontier tribes and hisacquiescence to British control over them.70 Shortly afterward, Maconachie himselfwas the target of an assassination attempt.71 And matters came to a head on 8November 1933, the anniversary of Ghulam Nabi’s execution, with Nadir’s owndeath at the hand of one of Nabi’s former circle.72

The event actually had surprisingly little effect in terms of governance. Theregime moved instantaneously to crown Nadir’s son Zahir as King while moving defacto control of government affairs into the hands of Prime Minister Hashim Khan.But the incident emphasised the underlying sense of insecurity that still grippedAfghanistan. That the GOI recognised the delicacy of the Afghan government’sposition during this period can be divined from its response to requests by HashimKhan shortly after Nadir’s death to provide assurances of the defence ofAfghanistan in the case of an attack by Soviet forces. The British response waslukewarm to say the least. Aside from a general unwillingness to complicate relationswith Moscow, there was an acknowledgment that any formal agreement between theBritish and Afghan governments only damaged the latter. As the committeeconvened to examine Hashim Khan’s request admitted: ‘The whole history of KingNadir’s reign had been remarkable for the difficulty experienced by the Afghangovernment in maintaining a friendly attitude toward the British governmentwithout incurring the opprobrium of being the subservient creature of thatgovernment.’ The committee’s express fear was that any formal agreement alongthe lines proposed would be interpreted by the Musahibans’ opponents as an attemptby Britain to manufacture control over Afghanistan by way of a non-existent Sovietthreat, propaganda so damaging that it might prove fatal to him or potentially theregime as a whole.73

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Yet, despite this explicit recognition of the continued delicacy of the Musahibanposition, the GOI, with the IPS at its helm, persisted with its push into the tribalareas from 1934 onward, a policy that appeared to offer the prospect of even greaterinstability in Afghanistan. The further the British encroached into tribal territory,the greater the pressure placed upon the Afghan government to come to theassistance of the tribes affected. Refusal to do so – the only feasible option in thecircumstances lest they prefer open conflict with a neighbouring Great Power –merely served as ammunition for those critical of the government’s pro-Britishstance, so prolonging the corrosive disunity that was still a feature of Afghanpolitical life and which chronically hampered Hashim Khan’s overriding ambition tomodernise the country: an impossible task in the face of constant and disruptiveoutbursts of violence. It was certainly this consideration that led, in March 1934, toMaconachie once again resisting Griffith’s efforts to push forward the ‘Political’agenda into Bajaur, in the process antagonising not only the Chief Commissionerbut the military high command too.74 But in truth there was a deeper anxiety beingexercised by the Afghan government and which tapped into rather more far-sightedconcerns. Successive Afghan leaders since the mid-eighteenth century had viewed thePashtun tribes of the North-West Frontier as the ‘outer ramparts’ of their country’sdefences, that which would entangle any aggressor advancing from India.75 Andwhile the Musahibans did not fear the British in that respect, they viewed withconcern those who might take Britain’s place, namely an independent India. As the1930s progressed, and the political winds of change hinted strongly at the prospect ofIndia’s future independence, the Musahibans felt justifiably concerned at the sight ofBritish authority extending across more and more of Afghanistan’s own defensivebuffer zone on the North-West Frontier.76 The fear of course was that such authoritywould then be bequeathed to the hugely powerful Hindu government that wouldfollow it into power. It was this anxiety over future political developments in India,rather than any simplistic concern over the posture of fellow Pashtuns, thatcontributed to a heightened opposition to ‘peaceful penetration’. And matters werenot helped by the fact that although the new policy was originally intended to be aprogressive civilian affair carried out under the auspices of the IPS, it rapidly evolvedinto a quasi-military policy of expansion, ‘less peaceful and more penetrating’ astime went on, seemingly more an instrument of the GOI’s military commanders thanits civilian administrators. Admittedly, the military’s hijack of the new policy didantagonise the IPS, but the quarrel was essentially a territorial dispute betweengovernment departments, part of a long-standing civil-military struggle for influenceon the Frontier and less to do with the Political cadre’s concern over the diplomaticramifications of the new policy.77

Undoubtedly, the new policy raised tensions with the Afghan government.Their premonition that attempts to push British authority into the tribal heartlandwould result in violence and instability, reverberating into Afghanistan, wasrealised by the events of November 1936–June 1937. An uprising centred inWaziristan and led by the charismatic Fakir of Ipi fitted neatly into the familiarnarrative of religiously inspired insurrection, following the examples of 1897 and1919 which had witnessed similarly sudden, widespread, and large-scale outburstsof tribal violence.78 Yet rather than evidence of the tribes’ atavistic hostility to theBritish per se, the incident was in fact largely a consequence of the new forwardpolicy. The Fakir himself, although prompted into a declaration of Jihad due to anincident of religious controversy in the settled districts, had simply capitalised upon

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the tribes’ fears of the seemingly relentless encroachment of the government’spresence into their homeland, a concern that had prompted the Fakir of Alingarand his followers to take up arms the previous year in Bajaur.79 For in Waziristanthe upsurge in violence had come not as a consequence of the Fakir’s unproductivereligious agitations, but because the philosophy of a more robust approach totribal affairs had encouraged the IPS to face down his provocations by authorisinga robust display of military force. That display, by virtue of its unprecedentedintrusion deep into tribal territory, had an explosive effect, transforming the affairfrom a minor irritation to a major military campaign against a host of differentclans and requiring some 40,000 troops and irregulars to be deployed intoWaziristan.80

The incident fed fresh suspicions on the part of both the British and Afghangovernments. The former, memories of Afghanistan’s manipulation of previousfrontier uprisings still relatively fresh in the mind, noted that that the Fakir’s forceshad been swelled by some 5,000 Afghan tribesmen and officials in the EasternProvinces had been encouraging enlistment in the insurgency.81 It was also apparentthat the Fakir himself found Afghan territory to be a welcome refuge from Britishforces tasked with hunting him: signs, if any were needed, of Kabul’s traditionalduplicity where tribal matters were concerned. Yet for Prime Minister HashimKhan, the eminence grise behind King Zahir, events had simply confirmed his doubtsas to the wisdom of any British intrusion into the tribal areas and so encouraged himto provide his local government officials with the leeway, always deniable, to offerlimited support to the tribes while maintaining an official posture of non-involvement, a technique legitimised by a tradition of regional political autonomyand lack of central control.82 But while the NWFP Political cadre bristled at suchduplicity, the Kabul legation again moved to provide an extenuating context to theAfghan government’s behaviour. Fraser-Tytler, Maconachie’s replacement andpreviously long-serving subordinate, proposed that the advance into the Khaisorahad genuinely antagonised the Afghan government who refused to believe that couldnot have been avoided. As he reiterated to Sir Herbert Metcalfe, India’s ForeignSecretary:

No amount of material assistance can compensate for the difficulties, dangers andfearful unpopularity among their own people which these actions of ours on theFrontier have caused them . . . The Afghan Government will not survive anothershock like the one they have just received and resulting chaos is likely to cost Indiadear.83

Somewhat predictably the shock that Fraser-Tytler cautioned against cameperilously close to materialising within months. Despite the entrenchment ofMusahiban rule and changing attitudes on the part of the regime as to precisely howand why the tribal areas of the NWF mattered in the context of Afghanistan’spolitical and territorial security, the events of June 1938 were an uncomfortablereminder of the way in which developments occurring within British territory carriedsevere implications for the Musahiban’s domestic political fortunes. In early 1938Sayyid Mohammed Sadi, a Turkish subject domiciled in Syria who had adopted thehonorific Shami Pir, entered Waziristan claiming to be an arbitrator in various inter-tribal disputes. The Afghan government objected, informing the Foreign Office thathe was in fact an Amanullist agent whose intention was to gather together a sizeabletribal force in British territory prior to marching on Kabul.84 The IPS ignored

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Afghan concerns and allowed the Pir to carry on without interruption whereupon, inmid-June in front of 3,000 tribesmen at Kaniguram, the Pir declared his support forthe ‘rightful’ King of Afghanistan, announcing that it was the religious duty of alltribesmen to overthrow Zahir Shah.85 The Afghan government was predictablyoutraged. Its intelligence network, though still in its infancy, had long identified thePir as an anti-government activist but the IPS had continued to refute such evidenceuntil the point that tribesmen began to cross the border into Afghanistan and joindisturbances already underway on the part of the Suleiman Khel.86 The AfghanEnvoy informed the British government that if the situation was not resolved to hisgovernment’s satisfaction, then Anglo-Afghan relations would, in the words of theForeign Office: ‘[B]ecome as bad as they had ever been.’87 The situation was seriousenough to prompt the Daily Telegraph to announce the likelihood of a tribalinvasion of Afghanistan intended to overthrow the government.88

The IPS was forced to drastically enhance its efforts to resolve the situationbefore British tribesmen caused either a permanent rift in Anglo-Afghan relations orthe actual collapse of Zahir Shah’s administration. The PA North Waziristan,Humphrey Barnes, engaged in a frantic round of consultations designed to drawtribal sections back into the government’s orbit using the threat of imminenteconomic sanction and bombing action by the RAF, aided by numerous Mullahswho resented the Pir’s sudden grasp over tribal allegiances.89 Yet despite Barnes’undoubted skills, the IPS’ lack of real leverage over the body politic of tribal opinionwas glaringly exposed. Attempts to physically apprehend the Pir would doubtlessinspire a violent reaction on the part of those providing sanctuary. Alternatively, ifforced out of Waziristan he might simply make his way into Afghanistan, withpotentially explosive consequences. Sir George Cunningham, recently appointedGovernor of the NWFP, was forced to authorise a more oblique route toreconciliation. On 29 June the Pir left Waziristan by air, clutching a cheque for£25,000 (subsequently cancelled) drawn personally from Cunningham’s ownaccount.90 Afghan suspicions lingered, excited by the fact that he was not onlyspirited away back to India but was accompanied as far as Karachi by Barnes.Indeed, resentment was enough for the Afghan government’s official newspaper Islahto publish a series of articles so inflammatory in their accusations of Britishmalfeasance over the entire affair that Fraser-Tytler was forced to present a formalprotest to Hashim Khan.91

Despite its eventually pacific conclusion, Fraser-Tytler sought to encourage theBritish government to view the affair as a watershed in Anglo-Afghan relations: thepoint in time at which the GOI ceased its adversarial competition for influence in thetribal areas and pandered to Afghanistan’s desire to be seen as a vital partner inBritain’s regional ambitions – a trusted guardian of India’s north-westernapproaches rather than simply an impediment to its domestic policies.92 Acontinuation of a forward policy in the form of peaceful penetration, he argued,undermined any such commonality of interests, leading as it did to corrosive anti-government propaganda and fanaticism. And most significantly, he warned, anAfghan government collapse at this point would be extraordinarily disadvantageousto British interests. Amanullah, exiled for nigh on a decade by now, had mostprobably lost his window of opportunity to return to Afghanistan. The disintegra-tion of government authority in this context would most probably lead to thedissolution of any sense of order whatsoever there. In short, summarised Fraser-Tytler, the forward policy was a response to a minor problem – frontier tribal

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policy – that was affecting the application of a response to a far bigger problem,namely the protection of the Musahiban regime and the establishment of a strong,modern, and pro-British Afghanistan.93

V.

The Shami Pir incident drew to a close this turbulent period of Anglo-Afghandiplomacy. Its legacy, however, was more encouraging. Perhaps shaken by a decadeof seemingly continual confrontation, and mindful of Fraser-Tytler’s warnings, theGOI enhanced its efforts to establish more informal links with the Afghangovernment. In October 1938 Sir Aubrey Metcalfe, Foreign Secretary, visitedKabul. He was followed in April and June the following year by the PA Khyber,Iskander Mirza, and General Officer Commanding (GOC) Waziristan, GeneralEdward Quinan, respectively, while at a governmental level the Viceroy, LordLinlithgow, established friendly personal relations with Hashim Khan and the innerroyal circle. But the rapidity of the thaw emphasised the paucity of any suchinitiatives on the part of the GOI over the previous decade. Neither could it distractfrom the difficulties that had been experienced in squaring the demands of tribalpolicy with the requirements of international diplomacy. That the Afghangovernment should find the problem challenging was unsurprising. Establishing afledgling political dynasty in the face of violent domestic dissent, inherentlyvulnerable to events occurring in the territory of a neighbouring Great Power, wouldhave been a challenge for any government. The paucity of effective communications,an inexperienced ruling elite, an under-developed intelligence apparatus, and non-existent security forces only compounded the problems. But perhaps more surprisingwas the degree of difficulty faced by the British, in particular the IPS. A system ofgovernment and administration well suited to the esoteric demands of tribaladministration proved less capable of handling the stresses of internationaldiplomacy, as officials wrestled with the contradictory demands of each, the inwardlooking and parochial focus of the service repeatedly exposed in this context: itsresponse driven increasingly not by cold-blooded considerations of strategy but byan emotional engagement with the tribes and the tribal areas. Only the presence ofselect individuals within the Kabul legation spared the NWFP Political Cadre itsblushes on more than one occasion. Obviously, the IPS’ deficiencies in this respectcannot be held entirely responsible for the GOI’s inability to marginalise Afghaninfluence in this vital aspect of India’s territory. Weaknesses in the British approachnotwithstanding, ethnic, cultural, and political ties combined with an invisible andporous international border to render Afghanistan and the tribal territoriesindistinguishable from one another from the perspective of both the Afghangovernment itself and the indigenous Pashtun population. In that sense, the ability ofthe Frontier cadre to force a transfer of political allegiance by the tribes from Kabulto New Delhi was always going to be compromised. And from Kabul’s ownperspective, cultural and political ties with the tribal areas of the North-WestFrontier grew increasingly important for solid, strategic reasons. The prospect ofBritain’s departure from the sub-continent and India’s subsequent independence hadnot escaped the attention of the Musahibans. Consequently, as time progressed andregardless of Britain’s various frontier strategies, chosen diplomatic approaches orpolicy-making infrastructure, the Afghan government was fixed in its determinationto oppose the entrenchment of British influence in the tribal areas. In this respect, the

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Anglo-Afghan narrative was increasingly dictated by events far removed from thefrontier itself.

Yet, although the ruptures had provided the opportunity for a significant breachin relations between the two they countries they had not been fatal. Why?Undoubtedly, there was a mutual appreciation of each other’s value to respectivenational interests. British policy-makers were fully conscious of the benefits thataccrued as a consequence of a pro-British leadership in Kabul while the Musahibansfor their part were intimately aware of the power wielded over their politicalsurvivability by the British and both were keen not to let the matter of the tribalareas obscure these pertinent facts. But it cannot be argued that such realpolitik wasthe difference between (eventual) harmony or catastrophic discord for, despite thecalming machinery of policy-making and the rational appreciations of self-interestevident throughout on the part of both governments, the Anglo-Afghan relationshipduring this period was a hostage to fortune, preserved in large part by the self-interest that really mattered: that of the autonomous tribes of the NWF. Lackingunity, unwilling to commit themselves and content to play those that bid for theirloyalty off against one another in an effort to preserve political autonomy, theirwillingness to involve themselves in Afghanistan’s affairs masked an unwillingness todeclare any definitive political allegiance.

Notes

1. The majority of such accounts stem from the colonial or immediate post-colonial period.Books include: C. Davies, The Problems of the North-West Frontier 1890–1908 (London,1932); Sir W. Barton, India’s North West Frontier (London, 1939); A. Swinson, TheNorth West Frontier; People and Events (London, 1967); C. Miller, Khyber: BritishIndia’s North-West Frontier: The Story of an Imperial Migraine (London, 1977); V.Schofield, Every Rock, Every Hill: the Plain Tale of the North-West Frontier andAfghanistan (London, 1984); and J. Stewart, The Khyber Rifles: From the British Raj toal-Qaeda (Stroud, 2005) and The Savage Border (London, 2007). See also and, mostrecently, A. Roe, Waging War in the Land of Bin Laden: British Policy in Waziristan1849–1947 (Kansas, 2009)

2. Exceptions to this are Sir W. Kerr Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan (Oxford, 1958) and K.Surridge, ‘The Ambigious Amir: Britain, Afghanistan and the 1897 Uprising’, Journal ofImperial and Commonwealth History, xxxvi, no. 3 (2008), 417–34.

3. For analysis of the diplomatic ramifications of tribal affairs during the nineteenthcentury particularly, see Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan and Sir H. Rawlinson, ‘Reorganisa-tion of the Western and North-Western Frontiers’, 28 July 1877 [India Office Collection,British Library, London] I[ndia] O[ffice] R[ecords] L/PS/[Letters, Political and SecretDepartment memoranda] 18 [1840–1947] A17.

4. It should be acknowledged that questions of jurisdiction over the tribal areas of theNWF were a feature of Afghan negotiations leading up to the signing of the Treaty ofKabul, otherwise known as the Anglo-Afghan treaty, of 1921. See F. Clements, Conflictin Afghanistan: A Historical Encyclopaedia (Santa Barbara, 2003), 31–2.

5. For a review of those sources examining Afghanistan’s internal political condition duringthis period see V. Gregorian, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan; Politics of Reformand Modernization (Stanford, 1969), T. Barfield’s excellent Afghanistan, A Political andCultural History (Princeton, 2009), and B. Rubin’s authoritative The Fragmentation ofAfghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System (New Haven,2002).

6. Until 1932 the IPS was referred to as the Foreign and Political (F&P) Department of theGovernment of India, usually abbreviated to the Political Department. It was alsoresponsible for diplomatic representation to India’s independent states, as well as theHorn of Africa, the Gulf, and the Arabian Peninsula. See T. Creagh Coen, The IndianPolitical Service: A Study in Indirect Rule (London, 1971) and J. Onley, ‘The Raj

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Reconsidered: British India’s Informal Empire and Spheres of Influence in Asia andAfrica’, Asian Affairs, xl, no. 1 (2009) 44–62.

7. See C. Allen, Soldier Sahibs: The Men who made the North-West Frontier (London, 2001).8. For a deeper structural analysis of the tribes of the North-West Frontier see H. Beattie,

Imperial Frontier: Tribe and State in Waziristan (London, 2000). The additional tribalagency of Kurram was under direct British administration and therefore not strictlyautonomous.

9. For more on the debates that raged over the importance of the NWF to India’s securitysee R. Johnson, ‘Russians at the Gates of India: Planning the Defence of India 1885–1890’, Journal of Military History, lxvii, no. 3 (2003), 694–729, A. Preston, ‘Sir CharlesMacgregor and the Defence of India 1857–1887’, The Historical Journal, xii, no. 1 (1969),58–77 and M. Yapp, ‘British Perceptions of the Russian Threat to India’ Modern AsianStudies, xxi, no. 4 (1987), 647–65.

10. See C. Tripodi, Edge of Empire: The British Political Officer and Tribal Administration onthe North-West Frontier 1877–1947 (Farnham, 2011).

11. Anglo-Mahsud relations during the nineteenth century are explored in Beattie, ‘ImperialFrontier’ passim.

12. For more on the allowance system see Coen, ‘The Indian Political Service’, 208.13. R.O. Christensen, ‘Tribesmen, Government and Political Economy on the North-West

Frontier’ in B. Ingham and C. Simmons (eds), Development Studies and Colonial Policies(New Jersey, 1987), 175–93.

14. See J. Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and fall of the British World System 1830–1970 (Cambridge, 2009) 388–92.

15. See ‘Policy in Regard to Afghanistan’ memorandum by the Secretary of State for India 9Feb 1934 [Kew, United Kingdom National Archives, Public Records Office] Cab[inetPapers] 24 [Interwar Memoranda] 247. For a broader understanding of Indian securityconcerns during this period see M. Yapp, ‘The Legend of the Great Game’, ElieKedourie Memorial Lecture, Proceedings of the British Academy III (The BritishAcademy, 2001), 179–98.

16. Maconachie to Henderson, 16 Dec. 1930, IOR/R/12 (Records of the British legation,Kabul 1922–30)181 N/235/235/97. Maconachie is reporting intelligence from the Russianembassy in Kabul.

17. Russo-Afghan relations, policy of HMG 31 Sep. 1931, Secret. See memo attached byViceroy, IOR R/12/89.

18. P. Overby, Amanullah: The Hard Case for Reform (New York, 2002), 17. See also Rubin,‘The Fragmentation of Afghanistan’, 54–8.

19. A. Saikal, R. Farhadi and K. Nourzhanov, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggleand Survival (London, 2006), 94–7.

20. Nadir Khan had been envoy to Paris 1924–6 before retiring to Nice.21. Gregorian, Emergence, 285.22. Irwin to Peel, 30 Sept. 1929 [Kew, United Kingdom National Archives, Public Records

Office] F(oreign) O(ffice records) 402/11 N4424/1/97. The Basmachi revolt was a Muslimopposition movement originating in Turkestan in the immediate aftermath of the FirstWorld War and which pursued a policy of active opposition against Bolshevik forces incentral Asia. See M. Olcott, ‘The Basmachi or Freemen’s Revolt in Turkestan 1918–24’,Soviet Studies, xxxiii, no. 33 (1981), 352–69.

23. For more on the attitudes of Indian nationalists and the wider Muslim community toevents in Afghanistan see Irwin to Wedgewood-Benn, New Delhi, 19 Sept. 1929, FO 402/11/N4234/1/97.

24. Irwin to Wedgewood-Benn, New Delhi, 19 Sept. 1929, FO 402 11 N4233/1/97.25. Gregorian, Emergence, 290.26. Ibid., 285–330. For more on Musahiban attitudes during this period, see Barfield,

Afghanistan, 191–7.27. P. Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts and the

Failures of Great Powers (New York, 2011), 81.28. In order to distinguish them from their kin in Afghanistan, the term ‘British’ will be used

to refer to those tribal groups resident within the British-administered agencies of theNWF.

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29. Precis on Afghan Affairs Vol. II 1927–1936 Compiled by ADF Dundas, F&PDepartment GOI (New Delhi GOI Press 1938) L/PS [India Office Collection, BritishLibrary London] 20 [Political and Secret Department Library 1757–1952]/B305.

30. Irwin to Wedgewood-Benn, 7 Sept. 1929, FO/402/11 N 4065/1/97.31. Gregorian, Emergence, 278.32. Maconachie to Henderson, London, 7 Jan. 1931, L/PS/18/A213 Annual Report for

Afghanistan 1930.33. GOI to India Office, 24 Jan 1929, FO/402/10 N515/1/97 No 330S.34. See A. Liakhovskii, Tragediia i doblest Afgana (Moscow, 1995), 45–7.35. The Shinwaris revolted in anticipation of imminent taxation. As for the Ghilzai, it was

calculated that their hatred of the Tajiks would outweigh their antipathy to thegovernment.

36. Maconachie to Henderson, 7 Jan. 1931, L/PS/A213 Annual Report Afghanistan 1930.37. Fraser-Tytler to Lord Halifax, 4 May 1939, IOR/12/112 British Legation Kabul No 17/

K No 23.38. See M. Banerjee, The Pathan Unarmed (New Delhi, 2000), 181.39. Tribal support for Amanullah was generally predicated upon his impeccable political

heritage, directly descended as he was from the great Afghan emirs Dost Mohammed(1793–1863) and Abdur Rahman (est. 1844–1901).

40. Anglo-Afghan relations, British policy, 16 Aug. 1930, IOR/12/38 British Legation KabulFile 371 Part 1.

41. Maconachie to Henderson, 7 Jan. 1931, L/PS/18/A213 Annual Report Afghanistan1930.

42. Ibid.43. Maconachie to Henderson, 8 Aug. 1931, FO/402/13 N5962/95/97.44. Khassadars: a form of tribal police force. L/PS/12 [Political Department External

Collections] 3176 PZ 3593/32/1 Afghan interference with British tribes. Northern DeptFO letter to GOI, 19 June 1932.

45. Maconachie to Lord Willingdon, 30 May 1932, FO/402/15 N3371/94/97.46. For more on the activities of Ghulam Nabi see Fraser-Tytler to Hoare, 27 June 1935,

FO/402/16 N3713/91/97.47. For the description of Maconachie see L. Mallam, Frogs in the Well (Moray, 2010), 136.

Mallam served under Maconachie at the British Legation in Kabul 1932–3.48. The Army’s military-intelligence department was also responsible for gathering intelli-

gence on Afghan affairs but had been criticised as providing inaccurate and out-of-dateinformation. See Humphreys to Bray, 4 July 1925, IOR/L/PS/12 3165. From the early1930s onward intelligence was the preserve of the Peshawar Intelligence Bureau (PIB).

49. Fraser-Tytler to Metcalfe, 14 Dec. 1938, ‘Attitude of the Afghan Govt to the problem ofthe frontier tribes’, IOR/R/112.

50. Ibid.51. Mallam, Frogs in the Well, 250.52. Mallam, Frogs in the Well, 252.53. D. S. Richards, The Savage Frontier: A History of the Anglo-Afghan Wars (London,

1990), 152.54. W.M. Hogben, ‘The Foreign and Political Department of India 1876–1919: A Study in

Imperial Careers and Attitudes’, Unpublished PhD Thesis (Toronto, 1973), 143.55. [India Office Collection, British Library, London] MSS [Private Papers] Eur Photo Eur

401 Papers of Sir James Acheson.56. [India Office Collection, British Library, London] MSS Eur D/673 papers of Sir George

Cunningham. See within for reproduced article from ‘World Review’, Feb. 1947.57. Memo by Sir Norman Bolton: Use of Aeroplanes for Tribal Control, 26 July 1923, L/PS/

12/3260 P1761/24.58. F. Noble, Something in India (Edinburgh, 1997), 65.59. Lakh: 100,000 rupees, roughly equivalent to £10,000 pounds sterling. See North-West

Frontier policy Watch and Ward: Report of the NWFP Subjects Committee July 1931,L/PS/12/3172, 335.

60. For more on tribal policy during this period see Tripodi, ‘Edge of Empire’, 191–210.61. Maconachie to Henderson, 8 Aug. 1931, FO/402/13 N5962/95/97.

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62. Fraser-Tytler to Simon, 18 Aug 1932, FO/402/15 N5236/94/97.63. Maconachie to Metcalfe, 22 Feb. 1935, L/PS/12/3210 PZ 2903.64. Maconachie to Simon, 4 Mar. 1933, FO/402/15 N1457/97/97.65. Maconachie to Simon, 6 Mar. 1933. Maconachie is referring to the recommendation of

the Committee of Imperial Defence, 5 Jan. 1928, FO/402/15 N1496/97/97.66. Willingdon to Hoare, 9 Mar. 1933, FO/402/15 N1580/97/97.67. W. Taylor, The Military Roads in Scotland (Argyll, 1976), 17–60.68. Gregorian, Modern Afghanistan, 338.69. Ibid.70. Ibid Aziz had been appointed Ambassador to Germany. The killing occurred there.71. Mallam, Frogs in the Well, 143–5. Mallam was Counsellor at the British Legation in

Kabul at the time.72. Nadir’s assailant was, according to some reports, the natural or adopted son of Ghulam

Nabi.73. Government of India despatch No 1 Foreign and Political Department 4 Jan. 1934,

‘Attitude of the Government of India toward Russian Aggression in Afghanistan’, CAB24/247.

74. Bajaur was a hitherto closed tribal area some 50 miles to the north of Peshawar.75. [India Office Collection, British Library, London] MSS Eur D/613 Lord Hardinge,

Viceroy, to Sir George Roos-Keppel, CC NWFP, 24 July 1915.76. Maconachie to Metcalfe, 22 Feb. 1935, L/PS/12/3210 PZ 2903.77. Ibid.78. For an excellent examination of the Fakir of Ipi affair see M. Hauner, ‘One Man against

the Empire: The Fakir of Ipi and the British in Central Asia in the Eve of the SecondWorld War’, Journal of Contemporary History, xvi, no. 1 (1981), 181–212.

79. With regard to the actions around Bajaur in 1934 see Malakand situation 14 May 1930–26 November 1941, IOR/L/PS/12/3124 Coll 23/3 Tribal disturbances 1930–41.

80. For an in-depth analysis of the military campaign against the Fakir of Ipi see A. Warren,Waziristan, The Faqir of Ipi and the Indian Army: The North-West Frontier Revolt of1936–37 (Oxford, 2000). For a more personal account see J. Masters, Bugles and a Tiger(London, 2002).

81. Fraser-Tytler to Eden, 12 July 1937, FO/402/18 N4052/14/97.82. Admittedly the Afghan government was trying to implement a much-enhanced system of

centralisation but even after three decades of rule, the influence of government outsidemajor political and urban centres was largely limited.

83. Fraser-Tytler to Metcalfe, 23 July 1938, IOR/12/112 Attitude of the afghan Govt to theproblem of the frontier tribes.

84. Northern Department FO to GOI, 22 June 1938, L/PS/12/3255 PZ 4224.85. Ibid.86. The Suleiman Khel Ghilzai, perennial opponents of the Musahibans, had mounted

disturbances for much of the spring and summer of 1938.87. GOI EAD (External Affairs Department) to Northern Command, 20 June 1938, L/PS/

12/3255 PZ 4290.88. Fraser-Tytler to EAD, 24 June 1938, L/PS/12/3255 PZ442089. Copy of memo from D[eputy] D[irector] I[ntelligence] GOI Peshawar to the

D[elhi]I[ntelligence]B[ureau] Simla, 6 July 1938, No 43/C/38/4823/27 PZ 5106/1938Shami Pir.

90. Waziristan: Activities of the Shami Pir and the Baghdadi Pir, 18 May 1938, 10 Nov. 1939L/PS/12/3255 Coll 23/93.

91. Fraser-Tytler to Lord Halifax, 9 Aug. 1938, L/PS/12/3255.92. Fraser-Tytler to Lord Halifax, 7 July 1938, FO/402/19 N3287/76/97.93. Ibid.

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