“Polish-Russian Relations: History, Geography and Geopolitics,” East European Quarterly, 42 (1):...

East European Quarterly. XLII, No. 1March 2008

POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS:HISTORY, GEOGRAPHY AND GEOPOLITICS

Fatih OzbayTurkish-Asia Center for Strategic Studies

Bulent ArasIsik University

The history of Polish-Russian relations had been dominated bythe serious problems ranging from war and occupation to regionalrivalry. The relations are no better shape in the past two decades.Probably, the recent period has witnessed an escalation of a numberof crises emanating from historical memory and clashing geopoliticalconcerns. There has been an expanding third party factor in the rela-tions following Poland's joining NATO in 1999 and entrance to theEuropean Union in 2004. Russian relations with the U.S. and the EUare coming under increasing stress because of the problematicRussian-Polish relations. Poland has a strategically important positionin Eastem Europe. It is one of the transit countries for Russian naturalgas to the EU, which makes Poland important to both Russia and theEU, The U.S.-Poland talks to place a part of a proposed U.S. missiledefense system in Poland illustrates the significance of this strategicposition on the Western frontier of Eurasia and the newly conceptua-lized Greater Middle East. The strains on Russian-Polish relations arenot restricted to foreign policy and security issues. There is also astrong domestic dimension with a highly sensitive perception of his-torical legacy of the relations and rising societal tension toward eachother. For that reason, minor problems may turn into serious debatesand diplomatic scandals between the two states. In this sense,Russian-Polish relations preserve a unique mechanism of problemcreation utilizing domestic and foreign policy issues.

There is a tendency to explain the Russian-Polish relationsthrough the impact of a number of recent and short term develop-ments. However, the roots of the problematic situation should befound in more than a thousand years of historical relations. Polandhas history has left traces of pain and suffering in the collective

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consciousness of Polish people. There is a common sense that Russiahad been behind all these negative developments. We hold the ideathat the relations have structural patterns and only a comprehensiveanalysis which goes beyond the myopic focus on current problemsmay help to discover the root causes and the determinants of the rela-tions between these two states. In this article, we will discuss thePolish-Russian relations putting emphasis on the long-lasting influ-ences of the burden of historical relations and clashing geopoliticalconcerns. In this sense, first part of this article outlines the historicaldevelopment of these relations. We will next analyze the role andinfluence of the burden of history in the problematic relations. It willbe followed by a further analysis of the clashing geopolitical concernsbetween Russia and Poland. Finally, we will discuss what lies aheadand how future relations wiil be shaped.

Historical BackgroundPoles belong to the Western Slavic part of the Slavic peoples

and their first state was established by the Piast Dynasty in 966. Afterthe emergence of a common Russian threat, the Grand Duchy ofLithuania and the Kingdom of Poland created a joint entity in 1386and began to be known as the Commonwealth of Both States (Polandand Lithuania) (Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodow) or known in shortas "Rzeczpospolita." Under the Jagiellon dynasty's rule, which lasteduntil 1572, this Commonwealth became one of the most powerfulstates in Eastem Europe ruling in territories from the Baltic Sea to theBlack Sea. In today's terms, the Commonwealth consisted of Lithua-nia, Belarusia, Poland, Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, and Kaliningrad,parts of Russia, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia. The majorchallenge to the Commonwealth was endless Russian threats andsubsequent attacks. Russia waged violent and severe wars againstSweden and Poland in the first half of 17th century. Poland's armiesinvaded first Smolensk and later Moscow in 1611. A Russian patriot,Kuzman Minin, organized a people's army in Nijniy Novgorod andfreed Moscow from Polish invasion on 4 November 1612.'

Poland was much more influential and powerful than Russia inthe first half of 17th century. The major powers of the Eastem Europewere the Kingdom of Sweden, Poland and the Ottoman Empire. TTiebalance of power began to shift to Russia in the second half of the17th century. In 1667, Sweden acquired the Baltic lands of Poland,

Polish-Russian Relations: History, Geography and Geopolitics 29

while Russia occupied Eastem Ukraine. Poland was under scrutiny ofthe Russian Czardom, Prussia and the Ottoman Empire since Poland'sdispartition or invasion would likely result in negative results for theregional powers. However, neither Poland's strength nor regionalstatus quo would be able to protect Poland's unity due to a number ofweaknesses. These were the land-locked character of kingdom, thePolish tradition of importing rulers from abroad, which lead to out-side intervention in Polish intemal affairs, the failure of controllingvast geography, the extensive privileges of local rulers, the domin-ance of landed aristocracy and the overruling rights of royal class. Inaddition, while Poland was losing its power base, there were risingcenters of power, like Berlin and Moscow. As a result, the new powercenters put an end to Poland and partitioned the country.^

The new balance of power in Europe replaced Sweden, Polandand the Ottoman Empire with Russia, Prussia and Austria. Polandwas partitioned by the increasing pressure of the major actors of thisnew balance of power in 1772. Poland's territory was divided intothree: Austria grabbed the South, Prussia acquired the Center andNorth, and Russia dominated the East. These tiiree states partitionedPoland twice in 1793 and 1795, and Poland finally disappeared fromthe me^ in 1795. 19th century Polish history is full of rebellions andpolitical struggles for independence. In this period, the uprisingsagainst Russian occupation were violently repressed by Russianarmy. Tbe well known Polish rebellions were those in 1830 and 1863.All these negative developments left deep and traumatic traces in thePolish national memory. Polish migrants who fled to the OttomanEmpire and France used this negative Russian involvement as a glueto preserve their national identity. Poles were without a national statefor 123 years. The Polish state was established again in 1918 after thefailure of Germany and the withdrawal of Russia in the aftermath ofWorld War I. Poland reemerged in the territories of Western Prussiaand Poznan with access to Baltic Sea, which was given to the Polesby the Versailles Peace treaty on 28 June 1919. Tbis new Polish statehad a short experience of parliamentarian democracy but found itselfin a state of insecurity and instability. Tbis chaotic situation endedwith Marshall Jozef Pilsudski's authoritarian rule and tight measuresto provide security in Poland.

Tbe problematic years did not end for tbe Poles even after theyregained their independence. Germany recovered quickly after WWIand created a new fear of large scale war and occupation again in


Europe in the 1930s. Soviet Russia was afraid that the Westempowers would use Germany against them and was seeking ways toavoid any German offensive in tbe ftiture.^ The most concrete movewas the Soviet Union's initiative to sign a Non-Aggression Treatywhich stated that ideological differences between Soviet Union andGermany would not prevent friendly political and economic relations.This Treaty was signed on 23 August 1939. Not surprisingly,Germany increased its pressure on Poland after signing this Treatywith the Soviet Union. In September 1939, Germany invaded Polandwithout declaring a war. German armies occupied tbe vast majority ofPoland toward the end of the same month including Warsaw. TheSoviet Union quickly occupied some territories of Poland based ontbe Non-Aggression Treaty it signed witb Germany. Soviet Union andGermany even signed an additional agreement which determined thepartition of Poland between them on 28 September 1939. This agree-ment is known as Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which indicated thatGermany would grasp Westem Poland including Warsaw and SovietUnion will integrate Eastem Poland to its territories. Tbis was thefourth partition of Poland in history. Poland's independence lastedonly two decades after 1918.*

After the German and Soviet invasions, former tbe Polishadministration established an exile government in Paris. After the fallof France in 1940, tbis exile govemment moved to London. ThePolish people—under both German and Soviet controls—facedsevere oppression, forced migration and massacre. German Nazismassacred Polish Jews and the Soviet administration forced massivenumbers of Poles to move to Siberia and Kazakhstan or to work inlabor camps. There was a brief period of warm relations between theSoviet Union and Poland's govemment in exile after Germanyattacked Soviet territories in 1941. However, this dialogue ended in1943 after the Soviets insisted on continuing to occupy the Polishlands it acquired in 1939. The Soviet army stopped the German armyat Stalingrad in November 1942 and progressed to Warsaw in thesummer of 1944 after gaining a definite victory against tbe Germans.Tbe Polish exile govemment started an uprising in Warsaw againstGermans, when the Soviet army was approacbing the city. Tbe Sovietarmy stopped its advance after reaching Vistul and waited twomonths until German forces totally destroyed the Polish rebels.

In January 1945, Soviet forces attacked again, drove tbe Germanarmy out of Warsaw and established a pro-Soviet administration and


army by uniting communist elements in Poland. The U.S. andEngland accepted the Soviet demands over Eastem Poland during theYalta Conference in Febmary 1945. Poland's border was redrawn andincluded German territories with a reference to the Oder-NeisseRivers at the Potsdam Conference in August 1945. Poland's bordersshifted West with new territories taken from Germany, replacing theareas of Eastem Poland given to the Soviet Union,^ The immediatedevelopment after this border delineation was an outflow of Germansfrom territories of Poland, placing the formerly migrated Poles inthese new lands, Soviet forces dictated a communist system for thecountry, deployed Soviet military forces in Poland and removed non-Socialist cadres from the state bureaucracy.

As these developments may indicate, Poland was falling into theorbit of the Eastem Bloc represented by the Soviet Union. It wastransformed to a Soviet style regime and the new constitutionchanged the name of country to the People's Republic of Poland in1952. Poland's economy was re-organized to address the needs of theSoviet Union and a centrally planned economic model was imple-mented gradually starting in 1948. The shift was toward heavy indus-trial plants like iron-steel factories or military industries. Afler JosephStalin, the Polish people attempted to facilitate a newly emergingenvironment of relative freedom under Nikita Khrushchev, but therising demands were oppressed severely in 1956. Such riots occurredin 1976 country wide, but ended with the same lack of success. In1978, there was an important extemal development for Poland whenPolish Cardinal Karol Wojtyla was chosen as the Pope John Paul IIand became leader Catholic Christians. His visit to Poland in June1979 was a tuming point for a new set of developments in this coun-try. The Polish people gained a source for increased self-confidenceagainst communist dominance which was in decay throughout thewhole Eastem Bloc, The Solidarity Movement in Poland played animportant role in decreasing communist influence through themassive riots and political struggles in the 1980s. The Communistadministration had to agree to negotiate the list of demands of theworkers. The increasing tension between the Solidarity Movementand the Communist Party led to declaration of a state of emergencyon 12 December 1981. The leaders of the Solidarity Movement werearrested and the riots were oppressed violently by the state forces.

A massive resistance to the state of emergency occurred and theopposition gained strength in this process. There was a new wave of


riots in 1988, which resulted in talks between the govemment andopposition in 1989. The Polish opposition reached its aim of a freerPolish political system as a result of both their decisive resistance anda number of intemationai developments such as the emergence ofglasnost (openness) and perestroika (restmcturing) policies in theSoviet Union, a suitable intemationai environmmt and Westemcountries' support for reform in Poland. Free elections were held in1989, which ended with the first non-communist govemment in theEastem bloc. After the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact and fall ofSoviet Union, there has been substantial changes in former Soviet ter-ritories and transformation in intemationai systems.

After the Soviet Union, Russian-Polish relations were far frompromising and even worse than during the Soviet era. The jointschemes in political, economic and cultural realms were ended andthe differing interest perceptions in many regional issues surfaced.Poland tumed its face to the West in military, economic and politicalterms. There seemed no other altemative to solve the problems oftheeconomy and security in the absence of the socialist system. Thischoice of integration into Westem world was presented to the Polishpeople as an opportunity for Poland to make rapid progress to reachthe level ofthe developed world,*

In the mid-1990s, the expected result of Poland's bid for EUmembership was worsening Russian-Polish relations. The relationstumed to short term scandals, political maneuverings and cyclicalwarming of relations. The worst relations that Russia has in the for-mer Soviet sphere is with Poland. One needs to understeind the deepand historical involvement of these two countries to understand theproblematic nature of the relations. A myopic focus on short termproblems would fall short of providing a comprehensive understand-ing of Russian-Polish relations. It would be impossible to get rid ofthe burden of history and historical representations such as Poland asa victim and Russia as the oppressor which surface in a determinativemanner in the relations.

The Burden of History in Russian-Potish RelationsThere are different perspectives in Russia and Poland on the

causes and results of World War II and Poland's involvement in thiswar. The different approaches have been reflected negatively in therelations. The Polish govemment still holds the Russians responsible

Polish-Russian Relations: History. Geography and Geopolitics 33

for the "Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact" signed in 1939. AlthoughPoland's borders were partly determined by this pact and has inter-national legitimacy, it is one of the major sources of problemsbetween Russia and Poland. Another interesting fact is that some ofthe territories lost by this Pact are now part of Belarusia and Ukraine,but Poland has no territorial demands on these countries. There is atrauma from partition and Russia is held responsible in collectiveconsciousness of the Polish people. Thus, Russian moves in regionaland intemational politics have been followed carefully with thisburden of history. Any step implies a threat to Polish national inter-ests and falls into the category of aggravating Polish sensitivity. Thisperception is to a lesser extent valid for the West, which has beenheld responsible for delivering Poland to the Soviet sphere of influ-ence at tiie Yalta Conference.

As an example, the personnel of the Osventsima State Museumclosed the section which presented the Soviet troops' rescue of peoplein Nazi concentration camps. The museum personnel pointed out Uiatthey may open this section again if the Russians provide the docu-ments, facts and realities about the Russian occupation of Polishterritories within the frame of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The Rus-sian Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered this demand meaninglessand ridiculous.* There are different perspectives on the causes and theresults of WWII in Russia and some argue that it served only the in-terest of the Polish people. The Chair of Poland's Institute of NationalRemembrance, Leon Keres, replied to this argument with:

Yes, our borders gained certainty. But they determined theseborders without our consent. They did not ask our idea forshifting our borders westward. It is right, Yalta provided dec-ades of peace including the most difficult periods of Cold War,It is right but everything was done by force and oppression. Wehear frequently that Soviet Union helped to Poland, providedprotective security umbrella. But we did not demand such ahelp, umbrella was protecting us from the danger it produced.Socialism may be considered useful for Poland from some pers-pectives but it does not change the realty that our national sove-reignty was restricted, Russia considers sovereignty as a highpriority issue. It is normal but restricting other's sovereignty iswrong.


The worst memory of the WWII years is the Katyn massacre.Katyn is the name of a forest area near Harkov-Mednom. After theSoviet invasion of Eastem Poland, Stalin ordered Soviet soldiers tokill 22 thousand people in the spring of 1940. They consisted ofhighly educated segments of Polish society including officers, doc-tors, policemen, teachers and others. Soviet officials hid this massacrefrom its own public and the outside world and held Germans respon-sible for this massacre until Moscow finally admitted responsibility in1989. During Polisb President Voytsech Jaruzelsky's visit to Mos-cow, Soviet President Michael Gorbacbev delivered tbe documentsabout Katyn to bis counterpart. In bis August 1993 visit to Warsaw,Russian President Boris Yeltsin visited tbe Katyn Memorial andapologized by putting fiowers to the Memorial. However, Poland didnot consider these moves satisfactory and demanded an officialexplanation and delivery of all Katyn documents, providing thenames of any surviving perpetrators of this crime.

Poland declared 1995 as the year of Katyn memory and therewere discussions to open a Katyn museum directly across from theRussian embassy in Warsaw.'" There are speculations that for Katynvictims and Polish exiles in Siberia" Poland may demand hugeindemnity payments from Russia.'^ But Russia has taken a decisiveattitude on this subject and Russian ambassador in Poland, V.M.Grinin, commented on speculations in Polisb newspapers that Polandmay demand 150 billion USD stated, "Only in WWII, Russia lost 40million people. Tbere is not tbis mucb people living in Poland. Russiadoes not owe anytbing to anyone."'^ Sucb claims did not cbange tbestrengthening Polish position to define what happened in Katyn asgenocide. Poland's President Aleksander Kwasniewski underlined theimportance of this issue by saying, "We want from Russian Federa-tion to definitely recognize that the crime committed in Katyn wasgenocide."'*

In addition, tbe relations between Russia and Poland may easilyworsen with the impact of domestic political developments. Tworecent developments may constitute good examples. Russia disbandedthe commemoration of the anniversary of the 1917 October revolu-tion held on of 7 October in 2005. The Russian administrationreplaced it with a new anniversary called Unity of People's Day to beheld on 4 November. As mentioned Kuzman Minin organized apeople's army in Nijniy Novgorod and saved Moscow from Polisboccupation on 4 November 1612. This choice of date created tension


and is still a source of problems between Poland and Russia. A simi-lar development occurred after children of Russian diplomats wereattacked in a park in Warsaw on 31 July 2005. Russian official circlesconsidered tbis event as a political issue and sent a diplomatic note toPoland. Russia interpreted this attack as a result of rising anti-Russianfeelings in Poland. In next month, two Polish diplomats and a jour-nalist were attacked in Russia. These attacks were considered as therevenge of tbe attack on tbe diplomat's children.

Geopotiticat Determinants in the RelationsPoland began to follow an independent foreign policy line in tbe

1990s. It wants to utilize the historical background of the old andpowerful "Rzeczpospolita" as a source of energy and dynamism toacbieve tbe aims and objectives of tbe current Republic of Poland.Poland has tbree objectives in tbe aftermath of tbe Cold War inregional policy: (1) Maintaining good relations witb its Eastemneigbbors—Lithuania, Belarusia, Ukraine—^without raising the issuetbat these states were established partially on former Polisb territories(2) Supporting independence of the countries—Belarusia, Ukraine—which would provide a buffer zone between Poland and Russia (3)Playing a facilitator role in integration of tbese countries into tbeWestem institutions and tbe EU.

There is widespread belief in Polish policy circles and tbe aca-demic world tbat Poland's role and infiuence in tbe EU is largelydependent on Poland's relations and interactions witb its Eastemneigbbors. In tbis line of tbougbt, Poland bas a geopolitically advan-tageous position in the EU and may tum tbis into solid benefits."Poland developed this idea during its EU membersbip process andbegan to use tbe "Eastem Dimension" starting in 1998. This approachwas refiected in tbe two following documents: "Poland's Viewpointon tbe Eastem policy of tbe European Union in tbe run-up to the EU'senlargement to include tbe countries of Central and Eastem Europe inJuly 2001" and "Informal Document on Poland's Proposals onExpanding EU's Relations witb tbe New Eastem Neigbbors inDecember 2002."'* These documents focus on raising tbe political,economic and legal standards of Ukraine, Belarusia and Moldova tothe level of the EU." Tbese tbree countries are members of tbe Rus-sian led Commonwealtb of Independent States (CIS) and the Moscowadministration does not seem willing to give up its infiuence ih the


CIS, From Poland's perspective, the EU's Eastem policy is narrowlyfocused on Ukraine and should be extended by assigning Poland aspecial role in this policy. Poland's bid for a more active role withinthe EU framework and even leading the EU foreign policy in the Rus-sian neighborhood underlined the fact that Poland and Russia haveclashing geopolitical objectives.

If we look from a different angle, Poland's search for democrati-zation, human rights reform, promotion of rule of law and economicdevelopment in Ukraine and Belarusia could be considered as Polishattempts to constrain Russian imperial ambitions. Poland wants tokeep Russia away from the EU's Eastem borders and control Russianinfluence in a number of countries which would constitute a bufferzone between Russia and Poland, The roots of this policy of devel-oping good relations with Lithuania, Ukraine and Belarusia go backto intellectual discussion of the Polish migrants in the West in the1950s. The idea was to prevent a domino effect by preserving the fallof Ukraine into Russian influence, which may lead subsequently tothe fall of other countries. Russia adopted a more independent policyline under President Vladimir Putin supporting the fear that the risingRussian imperial engagement westward may put regional countriesinto jeopardy. This perception is a lesson drawn from history. Thelate Leonid Kucma administration in Ukraine strengthened theseperceptions by following integration policies with the RussianFederation, As a result, Poland became actively involved in the West-Russia struggle over Ukraine under the cover of supporting a demo-cratic Ukraine for the purpose of limiting Russian influence in itsneighborhood. The same struggle continues over Belarusia in thesame framework.'*

Russian natural gas reaches to European countries through Bela-rusia, Poland and Ukraine. Moscow follows a policy of offeringprivileged gas prices to a number of former Soviet republics andEastem bloc countries based on the relations of these countries withRussia. Russian Deputy President, S. Yasterjemskiy, admitted that theMoscow administration uses energy resources as a diplomatic lever-age against transit countries.'^ Russian natural gas reaches Polandafter passing through Belarusia and Poland is heavily dependent onRussian gas and oil; namely 70 percent of natural gas and 90 percentof oil it consumes. In this respect, the prestigious publication,"Rzeczpospolita" pointed out that Warsaw's emancipation from theRussian gas monopoly is no less important than the departure of Rus-


sian troops from Polish territories.^" The Russian decision to increasegas prices has been a wake-up call for Poland which is trying to flndaltemative sources of gas supply.

Russia follows a two-track policy in natural gas supply. It is in-creasing natural gas prices while at the same time it is trying to avoidtransit countries for carrying gas to the European markets. There aretwo projected routes to directly reach these markets: north and southroutes. The key countries for these routes are Germany and Turkey(Blue Stream). There is increasing attention on the northem route.This is a projected pipeline which will pass through the Baltic Seaand be named the North European Natural Gas Pipeline (NEPG).There is an agreement that was signed during Russian PresidentPutin's September 2005 visit to Germany to start working on theproject. The construction of the pipeline is supposed to be completedin 2010, It will be 1200 km long and cost more than USD 4 billion.The starting point is Vilborg city of the Leningrad province and willend in Graysfald city in Germany. This pipeline will carry 27.5billion cubic meters natural gas annually. If a parallel pipeline isadded, this volume will reach to 55 billion cubic meters. This amountis equal to half of the Russian natural gas which reaches Europethrough Ukraine,^'

Russia considers the NEGP as a strategically important projectsince it will help Russia escape the strains of transit countries. Thecrisis with Ukraine supported this perception. The Blue Streamproject already decreased the importance of Ukraine as a gas transitcountry. The Warsaw administration does not consider these twoprojects favorably since they decrease Poland's importance as a tran-sit country .̂ ^ The main result ofthe NEGP project will be strengthen-ing German-Russian relations, which are already in good shape.Three Baltic countries and Poland have expressed their worries aboutthe situation and have reacted negatively to German-Russian raip-prochement. These concems have risen at a point where history meetswith geopolitics. The Polish Defense Minister has presented theNEGP as something reminiscent ofthe "Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact"^'After the agreement ofthe NEGP project was signed, Polish PresidentAleksander Kwasniewski argued that this pipeline project is notsecure in environmental terms and does not satisfy economic andpolitical criteria, which should be taken into serious considerationbefore starting such projects. In addition, the Polish ambassador toMoscow, Jezhe Bar, told the Russian Interfax news agency, "This


project is a few times expansive than building a land pipeline. In ourview, this is a political project not economical.

Another source of contention, though rare, between Russia andPoland is the Chechen question. For example, when Poland's ForeignMinister Adam Rotfeld commented on Russian security forces' kill-ing of Chechen leader Asian Mashadov as political mistake, hisinvolvement led to a diplomatic crisis between Poland and Russia.After Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman, AleksanderHechko classified Mashadov's death not only a crime, but a politi-cally stupid act, the tension further escalated. The Russian Ministry ofForeign Affairs immediately released a harsh response that Mashadovwas a terrorist and was on the wanted list of Interpol. The statementalso included a question, "Would Poland feel sorry if Osama BinLaden is killed?" Following this statement, the Warsaw municipalCouncil had a session to discuss the naming of a street after formerChechen leader Cahar Dudayev, who also was killed by Russian mil-itary forces.^* These kinds of mutually aggravating acts only serve toincrease distrust between two states.^'

Russian-American short term rapprochement after the Septem-ber 11 attacks also warmed up Russian-Poland relations for a while.But these relations were again tense after Poland became a member ofthe EU in May 2004. Poland's different concerns in regional issuesand active foreign policy line toward new independent states inRussia's environs began to occupy a central place in Russian-Polandrelations in the aftermath of Poland's joining the European club. Putinand Kwasniewski were on the opposing sides during the OrangeRevolution in Ukraine. Polish leader actively engaged in mediationattempts between presidential candidates Viktor Yanukovich andViktor Yuschenko. Russian President Putin criticized Poland forallying with the West against Russia on the Ukrainian issue and fortrying to eliminate Russia from regional politics. Polish PresidentKwasniewski responded that he prefers Ukraine independent fromRussian domination.

The Russian response to Poland's position in color revolutionsand other regional issues were a Russian embargo on Polish products.This embargo was issued in 2004 for meat products and expanded toagricultural products in 2005. Russia refuses to lift this embargodespite continuous attempts of Polish diplomacy. Polish officials fmdthe health criteria for issuing this embargo meaningless and argueRussia aims to penalize Poland for having different perspective on the


color revolution in Ukraine.^^ Poland vetoed, in response, the negotia-tions on a EU-Russia partnership in energy, trade and human rightsissues. Poland argues that Moscow should lift the embargo on Polishproducts and accept the 1994 European Energy Charter.^" Poland'sposition was to make sure that it would not be penalized easily asRussia attempted in the cases of embargoes toward Georgia andMoldova. The US-Poland talks of deploying a part of the U.S. missiledefense system in Poland add insult to injury in Polish-Russian rela-tions. Poland's willingness to host the U.S. missile system has alreadyraised a considerable reaction in Russia. Moscow regards this missilesystem as targeted against itself. Polish Prime Minister JaroslawKaczynski commented that the U.S. missile defense system isWarsaw's guarantee that it will not fall into orbit of Russia again formore than a few decades.^'

ConctusionAfter discussing the problems of Russian-Polish relations at the

crossroads of history and geopolitics, the burden should be shifted todiscuss what lies ahead. Poland's foreign policy will be beised on thenotion that its role and influence will depend on exploiting theadvantage of its geographical position in the eastem frontier of theEU. This position has two clear implications. First, it will be a highpriority for Poland to stay in the EU and further integrate into West-em institutions and schemes. Second, Poland will follow an activeand dynamic policy line in the Eastem neighborhood of the EU.

Poland will have the historical memory of both the golden agerepresented by "Rzeczpospolita" and its past partitions at four differ-ent times and border delineations represented by the "Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact". The extemal reference to tough times in the past asa responsible significant other will be Russia.̂ ^ The mixture of thesehistorical perceptions point to a traumatic situation, which will lead todaring in the case of having opportunity to follow an active policyline in regional policy and to caution in cases like Russian-Germanrapprochement. Poland's imperial ambitions would be disciplinedthrough partial delivery of sovereignty to the EU. However, theseambitions are running deep in the collective consciousness both at thelevels of state and society.

On the other hand, the EU membership helps Poland in the casesof cautious times which surface when Polish policy-makers feel


threatened by Russia or any other extemal factors. The EU provides asecure political umbrella and Poland can follow a policy of fulfillingits national interest through EU schemes. However, the EU frame-work is neither good enough to satisfy Polish desires of keepingRussia out of regional power configurations nor does it have the nec-essary institutional capability to be utilized in an active and dynamicPolish foreign policy in the eastem frontiers of the EU. In sum, theEU is not likely to back Poland in its regional rivalry against Russia,which has regional and intemationai capabilities in terms of powerpolitics. In addition, Poland's overplay of its hand against Russia inthe EU framework is also likely to erode its position in the EU. Aswitnessed in the Russian embargo on Polish products, Holland,Denmark £ind other European countries are in line to provide the samegoods to the Russian market.

Russia considers Poland as a sort of Trojan horse because ofthesettlement ofthe missile defense system issue, Poland's involvementin the Iraqi invasion and its pro-Westem position in the Ukrainian is-sue. Moscow divides the EU members into two: old and new Europe.From the Russian perspective, old Europe should be taken moreseriously into consideration. Russian policy makers do not considerthe equal vote issue as an important fact. There is a risk of underesti-mating the role of new member states as Russia tests the limits ofEurope.^' Moscow's policy of dividing EU public opinion whichleads to disagreement in the EU is already in practice through thecontinuous Polish veto of Russian related issues. Russia aims tominimize the role and influence of Poland in this way. Only time mayshow the success of this policy. Another matter of time is whetherRussia will accept Poland as a difficult neighbor or continue toconsider it as a small country on which it can dictate its terms. On thePolish side, the future course of relations will be determined byPoland's ability to escape from the traumatic strains of the historicalmemory of pains and sufferings associated with Russia. Too muchambiguity does not promise much hope for better relations in short-to-medium tenh, if not in long mn.

Notes1. For Russian-Polish relations see A. V. Lipatov, I. O. Saytanov, Polyaki i

Ruskie: Vzaimoponimanie i Vzaimoneponimanie [Poles and Russians: Mutual Under-standing and Misunderstanding] (Moskva: Indrik, 2000); A. N. Kurat, Rusya Tarihi:Baslangictan 1917ye Kadar [Russian History until 1917] (Ankara: TTK, 1993); B. G.

Polish-Russian Relations: History. Geography and Geopolitics 41

Paskov. Rus-Rossiya-Rossiyskaya Imperiya. Hronika pravleniy i sobitiy 862-1917[Russian-Russia-Russian Empire: Chronology of Administration and Developments 862-1917] (Moskva: Tsentrkom, 1997).

2, "Polonya'nin Zayifligi" [Weakness of Poland], See Oral Sander, Siyasi Tarihlikcaglardan I918'e [Political History until 1918] (Istanbul: Imge Publications, 2ndEdition, 1992), p, 85.

3, For detailed information on political history of the 20th Century, see Eric Hobs-bawm, Kisa 20. Yuzyil (1914-1991) Asirihklar Cagi [Age of Extremes: A Short Historyof 20th Century (1914-1991)], Translated by Yavuz Alogan (Istanbul, 1996),

4, For detailed information on WWII, see Lidell Hart, //. Dunya Savasi Tarihi[History of Second World War], Translated by Kerim Bagriacik (Istanbul, 1998);Georges Lestien, Roger Cere, Iki Dunya Savasi, (1914-1918: 1939-1945) [Two WorldWars: (1914-1918; 1939-1945)], Translated by Nihal Onol (Istanbul, 1966),

5, Poland's western borders was recognized by Federal Germany with an agree-ment signed on 7 December 1970,

6, N, I, Buharin, "Rossiya i Polsa: Obozrimie Perspektivi" [Russia and Poland:Recognized Future], Sovremennaya Yevropa, Vipusk 2, Aprel-Iyun 2001,http://wvAV,ieras,ru/jounial/ioumal2,2001/lI,htm

7, See Yan Prokop, "Antiruskiy mif i Polskie kompleksi" [Antirus Legend andPolish Complexes], in A, V, Lipatov, I, O, Saytanov, eds,, Polyaki i Ruskie:Vzaimoponimanie i Vzaimonepommanie [Poles and Russians: Mutual Understanding andMisunderstanding] (Moskva: Indrik, 2000), pp, 30-38,

8, MID RF DIP, 03 March 2007, http://www,mid.ru9, Rossiya v Globalnoy Folitike, Tom: 3, No: 3, May-lyun 2005, pp, 118-119,10, Petr Andrusecko, "Polsa-Rossiya: Poka sto holodno" [Poland-Russia: Still

Cold], Izvestia, 20 December 2006,11, See Aleksandr Guryanov, "Obzor sovetskih represivnih kompaniy protiv

polyakov i polskih grajdan" [Polish Citizens and Their Perception of Russian Oppres-sion], Polyaki i Ruskie: Vzaimoponimanie i Vzaimoneponimanie [Poles and Russians:Mutual Understanding and Misunderstanding] (Moskva: Indrik, 2000), pp, 199-207,

12, Aleksey Basun and Yevgeniy Sestakov, "Poise mojet potrebovat u Rossiikompensatsii za Katin" [Poland may Ask for War Indemnity from Russia], Izvestia, 10December 2004,

13, Intervyu posla Rossii v Poise V, M, Grinina gazete "Tribuna" [The briefmg ofRussian Ambassador in Poland, V. M, Grinin in Tribuna Newspaper],http://www,poland,mid,ru/speeches/speeches.html

14, Rossiysko-poliskie otnoseniya perejivayut nilohkie vremena [Russian-PolandRelations: Witnessing a Tough Period], Radio Svoboda, 11 May 2005,http://www,svoboda,org/ll/polit/0505/ll,051105-8,asp#

15, Nikolay Buharin, "Rossiysko-Polskie Otnoseniya i vistoplenie Polsi v ES"[Russian-Poland Relations and Poland's Joining to the EU], Vestnik Yevropi, 2004, No:II,

16, Neofitsialniy dokument Ministerstvo inostrannih del Respubliki Polsa [Infor-mal Document of Poland Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Yevropa (Jumal Polskovo Insti-tuta Mejdunarodnih Del), Tom: 3, No: 1(6), 2003, pp, 129-143; Ministerstvo inostrannihdel Respubliki Polsa. Polskie predlojeniya po povodu politiki v otnosenii novihVostocnih sosedey posle rossireniya v ES, Neofitsialniy dokument [Informal Documenton Poland's Proposals on Expanding EU's Relations with the New Eastem Neighbors],Vostocnoe Izmerenie Yevropeyskovo Soyuza i Rossiya. Sbornik dokladov mejdunarodnoykonferentsii, Velikiy Novgorod, 14 noyabrya 2003 g, Sankt-Peterburg, 2004, pp. 121-132,


17, VIodzimezh Chimoshevich, "Yevropa doljno imeet 'Vostocnoe izmerenie'"[Europe Should Have an "Eastern Dimension"], Izvestia, 10 May 2004,

18, See Esra Hatipoglu, "Rusya-Avrupa Birligi Iliskilerinde Polonya Faktoru"[Polish Factor in Russian-EU Relations], http://www,usakgundem,com/uayazar,php?id=578

19, Sergey Yasterjemskiy, "Gospoda, Rossiya Vemulas!" [Sergey Yasterjemskiy:"Gentlemen: Russia is Back!"], Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 22 February 2007.

20, Alia Samoletova, "Obnovlan polskiy proyekt diversifikatsii postavokprirodnovo gaza" [Polish Project for Carrying Natural Gas Has Been Publicized], BRC-Info, 01 February 2006, www,brcinfo.ru/publics/public,php?id=2389

21, For detailed information, see http://www,negp,ru22, "Rus-Alman boru hattmatepki" [Response to Rtissian-German Pipeline], BBC

Turkish, 01 May 2006. http://www,bbc.co.ukAurkish/europe/story/2006/05/060501_poland-gas,shtml

23, "Polsa obvinyayet Rossiyu v energosantaje" [Poland Blames Russia forEnergy Blackmailing], BBC Russian, 19 May 2006. http://news.bbc.co,uk/go/pr/fr/-/hi/russian/business/newsid_4998000/4998134,stm

24, "V polsko-rossiyskih otnoseniyah prisutstvuyet nevejestvo, a ne poholodanie,Intervyu s poslom v Rossii Ezhi Barom" [Interview with Polish Ambassador in Russia,Ezhi Bar], Interfaks, 06 September 2006. http://www,interfax,ru/r/B/exclusive/22,html?menu= 1 &id_issue= 11577501

25, "Asian Mashadov mojet possorit prezidentov Rossii i Polsi" [Asian Mashadovmay Worsen the Relations of the Head of States of Poland and Russia], Izvestia, 11March 2005.

26, "Moskova'da Dudayev Kav;agi Rahatsizligi" [Moscow is Uneasy aboutDudayev Street] BBC Turkish, 22 March 2005, http://www,bbc.co.uk/turkish/europe/story/ 2005/ 03/050322_russia_poland,shtml

27, See Aleksey Malasenko and Dmitriy Trenin, Vremya Yuga: Rossiya v Cecne,Cecnya v Rossii [Time of South: Russia in Chechenistan, Chechenistan in Russia](Moskva: Gendalf, 2002), p, 214,

28, "Polonya: Rusya'nin Elestirileri Haksiz" [Poland: Russian Criticisms are notRight], BBC Turkish, 24 December 2004. http://www,bbc,co.uk/turkish/europe/story/2004/12/041224_polandnissia.shtml

29, V polsko-rossiyskih otno$eniyah prisutstvuyet nevejestvo,,,, agm,30, "Polonya'dan Rusya'ya engelleme" [Polish Obstacle to Russia], BBC Turkish,

13 November 2006. http://www,bbc,co.uk/turkish/europe/story/2006/l I/printable/061113_russia_eu,shtml

31, Yuliya Petrovskaya, "Kacinskiy Pereputal Rossiyu s izgoyami" [KachinskiyConfused Russia with Outsiders], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 21 February 2007,

32, Buharin, "Rossiysko-Polskie Otnoseniya i vistoplenie Polsi v ES."33, Andrusecko, ibid.

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