Pick Your Poison: Beg the Question or EmbraceCircularity

Abstract: According to Roderick Chisholm (1973, 1983, 1989), there are three ways to respond to the Problem of the Criterion and they all leave something to be desired. Michael DePaul (1988), Paul Moser (1989), and Earl Conee (2004) have each proposed variations of a fourth way of responding to this problemthat rely on reflective equilibrium. We argue that these four options for responding to the Problem of the Criterion leave one with a tough choice: accept one of the three that Chisholm describes or DePaul’s reflective equilibrium approach and beg thequestion or accept a reflective equilibrium response of the sort Conee and Moser propose and embrace epistemic circularity.

Keywords: Chisholm, Circularity, Problem of the Criterion, Question-Begging, Reflective Equilibrium

Roderick Chisholm claims of the Problem of the Criterion, or the

“Wheel”, that “one has not begun to philosophize until one has

faced this problem and has recognized how unappealing, in the

end, each of the possible solutions is.”1 Perhaps Chisholm

overstates the problem; after all, it seems that one can begin to

philosophize without considering this problem at all (at least if

we understand ‘philosophize’ to mean simply think about or work

through philosophical issues). However, he is correct to note

its importance and the fact that the various responses to the

problem are unappealing. Chisholm contends that the responses 1 Chisholm (1983) pg. 63 See also Chisholm (1973) pg. 1

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are unappealing because “we can deal with the problem only by

begging the question.”2 Although Chisholm is correct that the

kinds of responses he considers: particularism, methodism, and

skepticism, each beg the question; his general claim that all

responses to the problem beg the question is false. We will

argue that the method of reflective equilibrium provides a fourth

way of responding to the Problem of the Criterion and it can be

developed so that it does not beg the question. Despite the fact

that this fourth way of responding to the problem does not beg

the question, it has an unappealing feature of its own.

Responding to the Problem of the Criterion by using reflective

equilibrium commits one to embracing certain forms of circular

reasoning as epistemically acceptable. So, responding to the

Problem of the Criterion forces us to pick a poison: either beg

the question or embrace circular reasoning.

1. The Problem of the Criterion

Before exploring the difficulties arising from the various ways

of trying to solve the Problem of the Criterion (POC), it is

worth pausing briefly to get clear about the nature of the 2 Chisholm (1973) pg. 37

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problem. Roderick Chisholm often introduces the POC by posing

two pairs of general questions:

(A) What do we know? What is the extent of our knowledge?(B) How are we to decide whether we know? What are the

criteria of knowledge?3

Although Chisholm often expresses the POC in terms of knowledge,

the problem is not merely a problem about knowledge.4 It is

plausible that a better pair of questions for expressing the POC

in its most general form would be the following:

(A’) Which propositions are true?(B’) How can we tell which propositions are true?5,6

Perhaps the most straightforward way of understanding the POC is

in the form of a single question: “how is it possible to theorize

in epistemology without taking anything epistemic for granted?”7

3 Chisholm (1973) pg. 12 See Chisholm (1989) for a similar expression of the problem in terms of these general questions. 4 This is something that Chisholm seems to recognize because, as Amico (1993) notes, Chisholm expresses the POC in a variety of different ways in his writings, not all of which are in terms of knowledge.5 This is very similar to the way that Cling (1994) expresses the questions. The primary difference is that we put the questions in terms of propositions whereas Cling puts the questions in terms of statements.6 It is important to keep in mind that A’ and B’ are not questions about the nature of truth itself. Rather, these are epistemological questions concerning what propositions we should think are true and what the correct criteria are for determining whether a proposition should be accepted as true or false.7 Conee (2004) pg. 17. Of course, one must keep in mind that it may be that the answer to this question is negative. That is, it may turn out that the correct answer to this question is that it is impossible to theorize in epistemology without taking anything epistemic for granted.

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Whichever questions best express the POC, the problem seems to be

one of trying to determine how we get our epistemological

theorizing off on the right foot.

Most would admit that it is important to start our

epistemological theorizing in an appropriate way by not taking

anything epistemic for granted, if we can. However, simply

noting the questions of the POC and our desire to start

theorizing in the right way does not yield a problem. The POC is

problematic because it is often thought to lead to skepticism.

The skeptic claims that we cannot answer A’ until we have an

answer for B’, but we cannot answer B’ until we have an answer to

A’. So, the skeptic claims that we cannot answer either

question. If this is correct, it seems that epistemology cannot

get off the ground.

Of course, there are anti-skeptical ways to respond to the

POC. According to Chisholm, there are two: particularism and

methodism. The particularist assumes an answer to A’ and then

uses that to answer B’, whereas the methodist assumes an answer

to B’ and then uses that to answer A’. Although he advocates

particularism, Chisholm notes that this is not a happy situation

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because whether we are particularists or methodists we must beg

the question (more about this below). These considerations might

lead one to think that skepticism is correct. However,

concluding this would be moving too quickly. Skepticism itself

seems guilty of question-begging. The skeptic assumes that we

cannot answer either A’ or B’ independently, but assuming this

begs the question against particularists and methodists. So,

skepticism does not seem any better off than particularism or

methodism with respect to begging the question. Thus, Chisholm

claims “we can deal with the problem only by begging the

question.”8

Chisholm is mistaken in claiming that all responses to the

POC must beg the question, but he is not far from the truth. We

will argue that non-question-begging solutions have their own

problems. The method of reflective equilibrium offers a way of

responding to the POC that seems to be able to avoid begging the

question, but it does so by embracing a kind of circularity. So,

as we will make clear below, it seems that when dealing with the

POC we have two broad options: beg the question or accept

8 Chisholm (1973) pg. 37

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circularity. Thus, while his claim that all responses to the POC

beg the question is incorrect, perhaps Chisholm’s claim that each

possible solution to the POC is unappealing is spot on.

2. Begging the Question

Now that the POC has been clarified we will turn toward an

examination of why the three options that Chisholm considers,

particularism, methodism, and skepticism, each beg the question

against the others.9

Let us begin with particularism. The particularist starts

with an answer to A’ that does not epistemically depend on an

answer to B’ and uses his answer to A’ to answer B’. More

precisely, the particularist response to the POC is as follows:

PR Assume an answer to A’ (we take some set of propositions p1, p2, … pn to be true) that does not depend on an answer to B’ and use our answer to A’ to answer B’.

9 We leave the precise nature of the fallacy of “begging the question” at an intuitive level. However, we do assume that begging the question in answering the POC is not merely a conversational fault. It is not as though one has merely violated a conversational norm when as particularist she begs the question against the methodist and the skeptic. When one solves the POC by begging the question, the fault is epistemic in nature, though we do not here take a stand on how serious it is – i.e., whether one’s solution to the POC can be justified and question-begging or known and question-begging, and so on.

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What is the epistemic status of the particularist’s answer to A’?

Chisholm seems to take it that its status is weak, being nothing

more than an assumption:

But in all of this I have presupposed the approach I have called “particularism.” The “methodist” and the “skeptic” will tell us that we have started in the wrong place. If nowwe try to reason with them, then, I am afraid, we will be back on the wheel.10

It may be that Chisholm thinks the question-begging only occurs

when the particularist tries to reason with her opponents.  So,

the problem for particularism would lie in the particularist’s

lacking reasons in support of particularism that advocates of

methodism or skepticism would accept.11 But, things are worse

than this, whether Chisholm recognized it or not.12 It is not

merely that the particularist cannot defend her position using

propositions that her opponents would accept, but that the

particularist’s starting point is an unfounded assumption. The

particularist must start with a set of particular propositions and

work from there. If she goes outside that set of particular 10 Chisholm (1983) pg. 75. See also Chisholm (1973) pg. 3711 Thanks to Michael DePaul for suggesting that this is where Chisholm locatesthe question-begging.12 We are not convinced that Chisholm failed to recognize this point. But, to argue that Chisholm recognized both the question-begging that DePaul suggests and the more problematic question-begging that we describe would take us too far into Chisholm exegesis for our current purposes.

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propositions to provide reasons for them, she abandons that

particularist response and either picks a new set of particular

propositions to assume (a new particularist response) or picks

something other than simply a new set of only particular

propositions to assume and ceases to be a particularist. This

shows how deep the problem for the particularist response is: the

particularist cannot offer reasons for particularism beyond the

unfounded assumption of a set of particular propositions. By

simply assuming an answer to A’, the particularist begs the

question against the alternative responses to the POC.

The problem of question-begging is not unique to

particularism. The methodist faces a similar problem. We may

render the methodist response as follows:

MR Assume an answer to B’ (we take some criterion C to be a correct criterion of truth – C successfully discriminates which propositions are true and which arefalse) that does not depend on an answer to A’ and use our answer to B’ to answer A’.

The methodist too begs the question against the other solutions

by simply assuming that some criterion is a correct criterion of

truth without having any epistemic reason to prefer her response

to the alternatives.

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The skeptical response Chisholm considers responds to the

POC by assuming that PR and MR are both false: there is no answer

to A’ that does not depend on an answer to B’ and there is no

answer to B’ that does not depend on an answer to A’. As Chisholm

explains the response:

And so we can formulate the position of the skeptic on thesematters. He will say: ‘You cannot answer question A until you answer question B. And you cannot answer question B until you answer question A. Therefore, you cannot answer either question. You cannot know what, if anything, you know, and there is no possible way for you to decide in any particular case.’13

So, we have a third response,

SR Assume that there is no independent answer to A’ or B’.

According to Chisholm, SR “is only one of the three possibilities

and in itself has nothing more to recommend it than the others

do.”14 Why does it have nothing more to recommend it that the

others do? It begs the question against PR and MR. As Chisholm

explains, “the “skeptic” will tell us that we have started in the

wrong place. If we try now to reason with them, then, I am

afraid, we will be back on the wheel.”15 The reason that we end

13 (1973: 14)14 (1973: 38)15 (1973: 37)

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up back on the wheel is that the skeptic simply assumes that

there is no independent answer to A’ or B’ and though both the

particularist and the methodist deny this assumption, they can

only respond by appealing to assumptions of their own. The

conflict between these three responses amounts to a battle of

ungrounded assumptions. It is because of the fact that all three

responses beg the question against one another that Chisholm

claims “What few philosophers have had the courage to recognize

is this: we can deal with the problem only by begging the

question.”16 Since all three responses are question-begging, SR

is on no better epistemic footing than PR or MR.

One might worry that calling SR the “skeptical response” may

be a bit of a misnomer; it might better be called the “non-

independence response.”17 To draw a skeptical conclusion a

16 (1973: 37) 17 A further reason to worry about calling this the “skeptical response” is that particularism and methodism do not ensure that one does not eventually end up a skeptic. The POC concerns how one starts doing epistemology, not how a completed epistemology will look. One might start as a methodist, for example, and find out that one’s assumption of a criterion C does not satisfy C, for example. It is somewhat harder to imagine how a particularist might endup a skeptic, but imagine a particularist who starts by assuming p and ~p as his starting place. It seems open to the particularist to eventually notice the contradiction and suspend judgment when he realizes he has no better reason for believing p than ~p and vice versa. However, since it is fairly standard to refer to the sort of response offered by SR as the “skeptical response”, we will do so.

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further assumption is necessary. In order to get skepticism from

SR one must also assume that if A’ and B’ cannot be answered

independently, they cannot be answered at all. Given that this

further assumption is required to get from SR to a skeptical

conclusion, it is possible to accept SR without endorsing

skepticism. Andrew Cling has suggested a response to the POC of

this sort, which he terms “coherentism.”18 The coherentist

starts with SR, but proceeds non-skeptically:

To be a coherentist is to reject the epistemic priority of beliefs and criteria of truth. Instead, coherentists recommend balancing beliefs against criteria and criteria against beliefs until they all form a consistent, mutually supporting system.19

Cling takes coherentism to be an alternative to methodism and

particularism, so the coherentist should not be understood to be

simply assuming that the criterion of truth is to balance

“beliefs against criteria and criteria against beliefs.” To

understand coherentism in this way would simply make it a variety

of methodism. Instead, the coherentist response should be

understood as assuming SR and adding to it three further

18 Cling notes that his terminology is borrowed from Michael DePaul (1988), though it is not clear that Cling’s coherentism is the same as DePaul’s. We will say more about DePaul’s coherentism below. 19 Cling (1994) pg. 274.

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assumptions: that a particular criterion is correct, that a set

of particular propositions are true, and that the criterion and

the set of propositions are not independent of each other.

However, the coherentist’s assumption of SR begs the question

against PR and MR. Since SR begs the question against PR and MR,

the coherentist position, which includes SR without eliminating

the question-begging, begs the question against PR and MR. Thus,

whether one adopts a skeptical version or a coherentist version

of SR, one is stuck begging the question: the starting point

remains simply an assumption as groundless as the assumption made

by the methodist or the particularist.

At this point one might worry that this mischaracterizes the

skeptical response. The reason for this is that one might think

that the skeptical response does not merely assume that there is

no independent answer to A’ or B’; but rather, the skeptical

response simply emerges from consideration of the problems facing

both PR and MR. If this is so, one might think that the skeptical

response is not really SR and that it does not beg the question

at all.20

20 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this worry.

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Although the skeptical response may arise from consideration

of the problems facing PR and MR, it does not mean that this

skeptical response is not question-begging. The reason for this

is that, as Chisholm notes, the skeptical response has nothing in

itself that makes it better than PR or MR. This skeptical

resolution cannot appeal to anything other than an unfounded

assumption, and therefore has not generated the needed asymmetry

to give us reason to prefer the skeptic’s response. Given this

fact, accepting the skeptical response because there are problems

with PR and MR is question-begging. The reason the skeptical

response would still beg the question if it is understood in this

way is that there is no more reason to accept it than there is to

accept any of the other positions. Since the skeptical response

has nothing more to recommend it in itself than the other

responses, there is no more reason to accept the skeptical

response because of the problems for PR and MR than there is to

accept PR because of problems with the skeptical response and MR,

or to accept MR because of problems with the skeptical response

and PR. All three options PR, MR, and skepticism seem to be on

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equal footing. Thus, starting by favoring one over the others

amounts to begging the question.

Each response to the POC just considered proceeds by making

an assumption and thereby begging the question against all other

responses to the POC.21 However, our choice among these responses

need not be entirely arbitrary. We may have pragmatic reasons for

preferring one solution to the others. Since all of these

responses to the POC beg the question, it seems that no response

is on better epistemic footing than any other. However, one might

think that the non-skeptical responses, particularism and

methodism, are in a better position, pragmatically speaking.

After all, if the world is more or less the way common sense

tells us that it is, being a non-skeptic has practical value – if

I believe that there is food at the grocery store, I am more

likely to go to the store to get food than if I withhold judgment

about whether or not there is food at the grocery store. Thus,

assuming that common sense is more or less right about such

21 It is worth noting that the problem here is not simply that advocates of these responses cannot mount defenses of their position that advocates of the other responses will accept. This is true, but the real problem is the fact that each of these responses rests on an ungrounded assumption.

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things, adopting a non-skeptical response to the POC is

pragmatically, though not epistemically, reasonable.

Unfortunately, even if there are pragmatic reasons for

preferring one of the responses to the POC over the others, that

does not seem to give us epistemic reasons to prefer one response

over the others. Without epistemic reasons to prefer one response

to the others our choice of any of the responses Chisholm offers

is epistemically arbitrary. Thus, adopting any of these

responses forces us to beg the question.

3. Embracing Circularity

Although we have argued that all three responses to the POC that

Chisholm considers as well as the coherentist version of SR beg

the question, Chisholm’s claim that “we can deal with the problem

only by begging the question” is mistaken.22 The method of

reflective equilibrium offers a way of responding to the POC that

does not beg the question. Roughly, reflective equilibrium

involves starting with a set of data (beliefs, intuitions, etc.)

and making revisions to that set—giving up some of the data,

adding new data to the set, giving more/less weight to some of 22 Chisholm (1973) pg. 37

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the data, and so on—so as to create the most agreement among the

members of the resulting set.23 Reaching this equilibrium state

of maximized coherence of one’s data is thought to make accepting

whatever data remains, whether this includes any of one’s initial

data or not, reasonable.24 Of course, there have been criticisms

of the viability of this method; however, for current purposes

these can be set aside because the ultimate concern here is

simply whether reflective equilibrium offers the possibility of a

non-question-begging response to the POC.25

There are a variety of ways that one might attempt to

respond to the POC by using the method of reflective equilibrium.

The variation in these responses is a result of what one includes

in the set of data that will form the basis for one’s reflection.

For instance, Michael DePaul (1988) suggests a response to the

POC that starts with both beliefs about which propositions are

true and beliefs about the correct method(s) for telling which

23 Of course, our rough formulation of reflective equilibrium ignores various complications. For instance, a full description of reflective equilibrium would explain how levels of credence, strength of seemings, etc. affect the overall coherence of the data set. However, for our purposes this and other complications can be set aside. 24 For seminal presentations of this method see Goodman (1953) and Rawls (1971).25 See Kelly and McGrath (2010) for recent criticism of the method of reflective equilibrium.

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beliefs are true and uses these to attempt to answer both A’ and

B’ at the same time.26 Given this set of beliefs one might begin

to make adjustments to one’s beliefs in an attempt to reach

reflective equilibrium and then use the equilibrium state that

results to complete one’s answers A’ and B’. On one

understanding of this approach it is simply the coherentist

version of SR mentioned above. If one begins with beliefs about

which propositions are true and about the correct method(s) for

telling which beliefs are true along with the assumption that

there is no independent answer to A’ or B’, this use of

reflective equilibrium amounts to a variation of the coherentist

version of SR; and thus begs the question for the reasons

outlined above.27 Another way of understanding this approach is

as DePaul depicts it. According to this way of understanding the

approach, one starts with beliefs about which propositions are

true and about the correct method(s) for telling which beliefs

are true, but one does not assume SR. This way of construing the 26 DePaul frames his discussion of the POC in terms of knowledge, but we thinkthat his response can be readily applied to A’ and B’. Further, the question-begging nature of DePaul’s suggested response is not mitigated by restricting it to the POC that is put in terms of knowledge.27 This is not DePaul’s way of understanding the approach, but it is worth considering here because it is a possible way of fleshing out the details of the response.

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approach seems to avoid begging the question against both

particularists and methodists because it does not assume that we

can answer A’ prior to B’ or that we can answer B’ prior to A’

nor does it assume that they cannot be answered independently.

Instead, this response merely applies reflective equilibrium to

these beliefs without taking a stand on SR at all. Now it might

turn out that after the application of reflective equilibrium one

would be committed to a particular position with respect to SR,

but this approach does not have to take one from the start. So,

in some respects this way of understanding the approach is

superior to the responses considered in the previous section.

However, its use of beliefs in the relevant data set seems to beg

the question against the skeptic because starting with beliefs

about which propositions are true assumes that we can answer and

in fact already have an answer to A’. Likewise, a belief about

which method(s) are successful for telling which beliefs are true

assumes that we can answer and have an answer to B’. Thus,

applying reflective equilibrium to a set of beliefs without

assuming SR begs the question by assuming that skepticism is

false from the outset.

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Fortunately for those seeking a fourth kind of response to

the POC, reflective equilibrium does not have to be applied to a

set of beliefs. Another way to apply reflective equilibrium when

responding to the POC has been suggested by both Earl Conee

(2004) and Paul Moser (1989). 28 The sort of response that Conee

and Moser each suggest, which we will call the “Seeming Intuition

Response (SIR)”, differs from the previous ways of using

reflective equilibrium to respond to the POC in that the set of

data that it starts with is not a set of beliefs. Rather, this

way of responding to the POC begins with our set of intuitions or

what seems true to us.29,30 That is to say, SIR starts with what

28 Conee recognizes his “Applied Evidentialism” as a fourth way of responding to the POC, but it is unclear if Moser does so, since he refers to his versionof this response as “Explanatory Particularism”. Regardless, both of these responses involve applying reflective equilibrium in the way that we describe.29 Conee explains his response in terms of starting with what seems true to one, whereas Moser puts things in terms of intuitions.30 We understand intuitions/seemings in roughly the way that George Bealer (2000:3) describes “For you to have an intuition that A is just for it to seemto you that A. Here ‘seems’ is understood, not as a cautionary or “hedging” term, but in its use as a term for a genuine kind of conscious episode.” We also agree with Bealer (2000:4) that intuitions/seemings are not beliefs for the sort of reasons that he provides: “Conversely, I have an intuition – it still seems to me – that the naive truth schema holds; this is so despite the fact that I do not believe that it holds (because I know of the Liar Paradox).There is a rather similar phenomenon in sensory (vs. intellectual) seeming. Inthe Müller-Lyer illusion, it still seems to me that one of the arrows is longer than the other; this is so despite the fact that I do not believe that it is (because I have measured them). In each case, the seeming (intellectual or sensory) persists in spite of the countervailing belief.” For additional reasons for thinking that intuitions/seemings are not beliefs see Cullison (2010) and McCain (2012).

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seems true to us both with respect to particulars and with

respect to methods for determining when propositions are true.

According to SIR, we begin with our intuitions and then make

modifications—give up some intuitions, come to have new

intuitions, give more/less weight to some intuitions, and so on—

based on our reflections in order to bring the set into a state

of equilibrium.31 Once the equilibrium state has been reached

the data from that state can be used to answer questions A’ and

B’. Like the previous way of using reflective equilibrium, SIR

does not seem to beg the question against particularists or

methodists. Additionally, SIR does not beg the question against

the skeptic. SIR does not presuppose that we have an answer to

either A’ or B’ before we complete our process of reflection nor

does it assume, like SR, that there is no independent answer to

A’ or B’. Further, SIR does not even guarantee that the

equilibrium state that we end up with will be anti-skeptical. It

is consistent with SIR that reflection on our initial intuitions

31 Although it is consistent with what we are saying here that our intuitions are under our direct, voluntary control, we are not endorsing such a view. Itis more plausible that we lack this sort of control over our intuitions. So, the claim that we make modifications to our intuitions should not be taken to imply that these modifications are something other than simply results of our reflections, which are out of our direct, voluntary control.

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ultimately leads us to the conclusion that we are not aware of

which propositions are true and that we lack a method for

discovering this information. In other words, it is consistent

with SIR that our data in the equilibrium state leaves us without

answers to either A’ or B’. So, SIR does not beg any questions

against skeptics.

At this point one might question whether SIR really is a

fourth option for responding to the POC. One might think that

SIR is simply a disguised version of particularism or methodism.

Close inspection reveals that SIR is neither of these. It is

apparent that SIR is not a form of particularism. SIR does not

start with a set of propositions that are believed or known or

taken to be true like particularism. Instead, SIR begins with

our intuitions about which propositions seem to us to be true.32

These intuitions are not themselves beliefs, so SIR is clearly

not a form of particularism.

32 One might worry that this merely pushes the POC back a level. That is, onemight worry that we will be faced with the questions: “what are our intuitions?” and “how can we tell an intuition from a non-intuition?” The answer is that we go with our intuitions concerning the items relative to these questions and employ reflective equilibrium. In other words SIR offers the same sort of response at this level as at the original level of the POC. Does this open the way for a regress? Perhaps, but the regress does not seem troubling. SIR can simply be reapplied at each level where a version of the POC arises.

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Things are not as obvious with respect to methodism. At

first blush one might think that SIR is a form of methodism.

After all, reflective equilibrium is a method for modifying one’s

commitments (beliefs or intuitions) and SIR suggests that using

this method can provide a response to the POC. So, one might be

inclined to think that SIR is really a form of methodism, and as

such, is susceptible to the same charge of question-begging as

methodism.

Despite initial appearances to the contrary, SIR is not a

form of methodism. In order to see this point it is important to

recognize a fact about employing methods. One can employ a

method without believing the method is good or even being

conscious of the method at all. The situation with methods is

analogous to that of rule following. S might behave in

accordance with the rule not to walk on the grass without

intending to obey the rule and without even being aware that

there is such a rule. S’s ignorance does not make it incorrect

to say that S is acting in accordance with a rule. Likewise, one

might employ the method of reflective equilibrium without being

aware of the method at all. SIR does not require that one accept

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or even be aware of the method being used. So, SIR does not beg

the question by assuming that one is aware that the method of

reflective equilibrium is the correct method for distinguishing

true propositions from those that are false.33

One further point of distinction between methodism and SIR

should be noted. Methodism makes the assumption that the method

employed is known to be correct, or at least that one is assuming

that it is correct. SIR makes no such assumptions. SIR starts

with our intuitions about various epistemic principles; perhaps

reflective equilibrium is among these, perhaps not. If

reflective equilibrium is not among the epistemic principles that

seem true at the outset of our investigation, it is clear that

SIR does not involve assuming that reflective equilibrium is a

correct method for sorting true propositions from false

propositions. If reflective equilibrium is among the epistemic

principles that seem true at the outset of our investigation, it

33 It is important to note that this is not to say that one cannot be aware that reflective equilibrium is a good method of reasoning when one starts the epistemological project. Rather, the idea is that SIR does not take this on board as a starting assumption—perhaps one has the intuition/seeming that reflective equilibrium is a good method to employ, perhaps not. Either way isfine according to SIR. The key is that unlike methodism SIR does not require one to have a belief about, or even be aware of, the quality of the method being used in order to begin the epistemological project.

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still does not follow that SIR assumes that it is true nor does

it follow that SIR will guarantee that we will accept reflective

equilibrium as a true epistemic principle once our reflection is

completed. SIR is simply committed to the idea that we can use

reflective equilibrium to answer the questions of the POC and if

reflective equilibrium is a good method for distinguishing true

propositions from false propositions, then its results will give

us good guidance concerning truth and falsity throughout our

investigation. However, this does not imply that SIR assumes

from the start that reflective equilibrium is the correct method

for determining which propositions are true.34 So, SIR is not a

form of methodism. And thus, SIR is not susceptible to the

charge of begging the question in the way that methodism is.

34 One might worry that any theorist who employs SIR must, or at least will, believe that reflective equilibrium is a good method to use. In light of thisone might worry that theorists who employ SIR will end up methodists and so end up begging the question. While it is true that theorists might have such a belief in the appropriateness of reflective equilibrium, it does not follow that SIR will end up question-begging in these cases. The reason for this is that belief in the appropriateness of reflective equilibrium is not a necessary feature of SIR. That is to say, the theorist does not have to have a belief about reflective equilibrium at all in order to employ SIR. This is not true of methodist positions. Methodism begs the question precisely because it requires believing that a particular method is correct. Thus, there is a key difference between SIR and methodism, which allows the former, but not the latter, to avoid begging the question. (Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing this worry).

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At this point one might object that the results of employing

SIR will only be ultimately acceptable if reflective equilibrium

is in fact a correct method for sorting true propositions from

false. This is correct, but in itself this is not an objection

to SIR. If reflective equilibrium is a correct method for

sorting true propositions from false, then the propositions that

seem true to us after we have reached equilibrium will be likely

to be true. This is the fact whether or not we have thought at

all about reflective equilibrium. In spite of this, one might

worry that we will not have good reasons for believing these

propositions to be true without having reasons to believe that

reflective equilibrium is a good method. This worry seems to be

an instance of a more general claim: in order for S to have good

reasons to believe that p S needs to have good reasons to think

that the method by which she arrived at p is likely to yield

truth. One might plausibly doubt this. Take perception for

instance. S can have good reason to believe that p because she

has a perceptual experience as of p. Does S need to have good

reasons to think that her perceptual faculties are likely to

produce true beliefs in order for her perceptual experience as of

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p to give her good reason to believe that p? It is not obviously

unreasonable to think that she does not. It is plausible that

ordinary people have good reasons to believe things on the basis

of perception, even though many have never considered whether

perception is likely to produce true beliefs. So, one might

think that there is no need to have reasons for thinking that the

method by which one arrived at p is likely to yield truth in

order to have good reasons to believe that p. Thus, one might

dismiss this worry for SIR.

Although this seems to be a plausible response to this worry

for SIR, responding in this way comes with a cost. Accepting

that one might use SIR as a response to the POC without having

reasons to accept that reflective equilibrium is a good method

seems to commit one to accepting that certain kinds of circular

reasoning can provide one with good reasons. More precisely, the

problem is this: if SIR is to avoid being a form of methodism,

and hence avoid being susceptible to the charge of begging the

question, then SIR has to accept that one can have good reasons

to believe the results of employing reflective equilibrium

without first having good reasons to accept reflective

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equilibrium as a good method. However, if SIR allows one to have

good reasons to believe the results of employing reflective

equilibrium without first having good reasons to accept

reflective equilibrium as a good method, then SIR allows for

circularity because it can be the case that the claim that

reflective equilibrium is a good method is itself one of the

results that is yielded by reflective equilibrium. The gist of

the worry is that SIR will allow it to be reasonable for someone

to come to believe that reflective equilibrium is a good method

for determining true propositions by using reflective equilibrium

to support that belief. This is a kind of circular reasoning has

been termed “rule-circularity”. Rule-circularity occurs when a

rule or method is employed to establish that that very rule or

method is acceptable. Some have argued that rule-circularity is

unproblematic; while others argue that it is problematic.35

Given that the status of rule-circularity is contentious, SIR

comes at a cost.

Of course, SIR could avoid the cost of rule-circularity by

denying that one can have good reasons to believe the results of

35 See Braithwaite (1953) and Van Cleve (1984) for the former view and Cling (2003) and Vogel (2008) for the latter.

27

employing reflective equilibrium without first having good

reasons to accept reflective equilibrium as a good method.

However, denying this would either turn SIR into methodism by

including from the start the assumption that reflective

equilibrium is a good method or it would turn SIR into skepticism

because we would never be in a position to gain good reasons to

believe the results of employing reflective equilibrium because

we would first need to have reasons for thinking that reflective

equilibrium is a good method. As we argued in the previous

section, both methodism and skepticism beg the question when

responding to the POC. So, understanding SIR in this way would

render it question-begging as a response to the POC. Thus, it

seems that we can either accept a form of SIR that renders it a

fourth option for responding to the POC or accept a form of SIR

that renders it one of the familiar three. So, we can embrace

rule-circularity or beg the question.

4. Concluding Remarks

The POC remains a serious challenge. The three kinds of

responses that Chisholm considered are all problematic because

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they beg the question against each other. Although reflective

equilibrium offers a fourth option, which can avoid begging the

question, it does so only by embracing rule-circularity. So, all

four options come with a price. Barring some as yet elusive

fifth option for responding to the POC, we seem to be stuck with

a problematic choice when responding to the POC: either beg the

question or embrace rule-circularity. In both cases we seem to

face a similar problem of starting our inquiry on an unjustified

basis—in the former case we rest on an unjustified assumption, in

the latter case on an unjustified rule.36 Given our choice of

what appear to be bad options, it seems that further research

into both question-begging and rule-circularity is warranted.

This further research is especially warranted when we recognize

that the considerations presented here may very well reveal a

deep truth about all of our philosophical enquiries—they all must

begin with some unjustified basis or other.37 Perhaps such

research will reveal that one of these options is clearly best or

that each is epistemically innocent. Until one of these options

36 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this general lesson that can be drawn from our discussion.37 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this much wider implication of our discussion of the POC.

29

can be shown to be superior to the other it seems that when

responding to the POC we have an unpalatable pick of poisons.38

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