2

Perspectives of the Beneficiaries and Their Stakeholders on Cash and

Voucher Interventions in South Central Somalia

3

FOREWORD

The practice of using participatory methodologies to assess and monitor the perspective of

project beneficiaries and their stakeholders is becoming increasingly widespread in Somalia,

particularly in cash and voucher distribution programmes. The Somalia Cash and Voucher

Monitoring Group (CVMG) has been at the forefront of implementing such exercises, and has

carried out two monitoring assessments since September 2011. This report covers the second

monitoring exercise (December 2012–February 2013). This exercise built on the experience

of the first phase and proposed the use of participatory approaches to monitor the

implementation and impact of policy instruments (cash transfers and voucher distribution) to

the targeted beneficiaries and their stakeholders.

This report presents the findings from 11 districts in South Central Somalia. The results help

explain why many people are unhappy to be living in camps and villages for Internally

Displaced People (IDP), despite the continuous efforts targeted at assisting displaced,

marginalized and poor people. Further, this report provides some basic recommendations on

how to better focus efforts and improve transparency and accountability in targeting, and to

reduce diversion and improve accountability and feedback mechanisms.

The results of this study bring to light the complexity and diversity facing people in the camps

and villages. For example, the situation of the affected population is not uniform: it varies

between urban and rural, between socioeconomic groups and even within households. The

results show that their living situation has been influenced by several factors, such as

governance (relationship among the stakeholders), institutional weaknesses (NGOs, local

authorities) and the roles played by other stakeholders in the running of the program. In the

11 districts where the study took place, the picture that emerges is unsatisfactory, as many

people are still in need of help, despite the large distribution of cash and vouchers. Poor

targeting is partly to blame – targeting that has relied on input from illegitimate stakeholders

such as gatekeepers, local authorities, village chiefs and others.

Overall, beneficiaries in eight of the 11 of visited districts appreciated the NGOs and their

partners‟ efforts to assist them through cash and vouchers during difficult times. However,

they also indicated poor program management, diversion and poor accountability, which hurt

distribution and related services. It is clear that corruption and diversion are endemic and

communities are not satisfied. Program beneficiaries expressed a desire for increased

accountability and transparency amongst those who run the program either directly or

indirectly. This is a big challenge for the NGOs and their implementing partners. They must

be seen to be dealing with the situation in a serious manner, including investigating reported

instances of mismanagement and improving complaint and feedback mechanisms.

This report, along with others that will follow, particularly the quantitative data on post-

monitoring distributions, form part of an evolving monitoring system of the cash and voucher

distribution program.

SATG Management

4

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report on the qualitative monitoring results of the Phase II Somalia Cash and Voucher

Monitoring Group (CVMG) is the result of the combined efforts of many people.

Most important is the contribution of the many hundreds of respondents who participated in

focus group discussions in the 11 districts. In all instances they gave up valuable time to take

part, and were mostly free and open in sharing information.

Managing the exercise at the district level were five Independent Field Monitoring (IFM)

supervisors, who worked with 27 IFM personnel. The smooth running of the monitoring

exercise was aided by the cooperation of the CVMG partner NGO staff, both in field and

Nairobi offices, along with local authorities and many other stakeholders, such as hawalas

(money transfer companies) and traders, who helped ensure a productive working

environment for the IFM teams.

The exercise involved 32 IFM data collectors. Their commitment to the ideals of participatory

data collection, sometimes under very trying weather conditions and long working hours,

helped to make the final report possible.

At the management level were three senior experts from Somali Agriculture Technical Group

(SATG): Aues Scek, Ph.D. (Monitoring and Evaluation Team Leader), Hussein Haji, Ph.D.

(Managing Director) and Salim Haji (Senior IT Expert). They developed data collection tools,

IFM training and data analysis, and prepared the final report.

Technical assistance was provided by Overseas Development Institute (ODI) consultants

Sophie Dunn and Mike Brewin, who supported the development of data collection tools and

training, and made suggestions on the analysis.

Finally, thanks are due to UNICEF, which provided funding, and in particular to Claire

Mariani for her dedication to the programme. Thanks also given to SATG staff, who provided

technical backstopping to the field staff for this exercise, as well Clara Busolo (Office

Manager), Crisencia Polo (Finance) and Grace Anyangat (Administration) for their logistical

support.

The combined efforts of these people in executing the exercise and preparing the final report

is highly appreciated and duly acknowledged.

5

Contents FOREWORD................................................................................................................................ 3

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................. 4

List of Charts .............................................................................................................................. 7

List of Tables .............................................................................................................................. 7

List of Boxes ............................................................................................................................... 7

ACRONYMS AND OTHER TERMS ............................................................................................... 8

Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... 9

1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 13

1.1 Background .............................................................................................................. 13

1.2 The Somalia Cash and Voucher Monitoring Group ................................................. 14

1.3 Objectives of the Monitoring and Evaluation Exercise ........................................... 15

1.4 Timing of the Exercise ............................................................................................. 15

1.5 Process ..................................................................................................................... 15

1.5.1 Selection of Policy Areas and Policy Analysis .................................................. 16

1.5.2 Site Selection ................................................................................................... 16

1.5.3 Team (IFM) Selection ....................................................................................... 17

1.5.4 Training Session ............................................................................................... 17

1.5.5 Documentation and Reporting ........................................................................ 18

1.5.6 Limitations and Lessons from the CVPM Field Exercise .................................. 18

2. Key Results ....................................................................................................................... 19

2.1 Awareness of the Program ...................................................................................... 19

3. Targeting System ............................................................................................................. 21

3.1 Stakeholder in Targeting Processes Analysis ........................................................... 25

3.2 NGOs’ Perspectives of Targeting ............................................................................. 26

3.3 Stakeholder Influencing Targeting .......................................................................... 27

3.4 Other Stakeholders’ Awareness of the Targeting Process ...................................... 28

3.4 How to Improve the Targeting System .................................................................... 30

4. Diversion, Corruption and Rent Seeking ......................................................................... 32

4.1 Results on Diversion ................................................................................................ 33

4.2 Rent Seeking ............................................................................................................ 36

4.3 Emerging Issues ....................................................................................................... 37

6

5. Accountability, Complaint and Feedback Mechanisms ................................................... 38

5.1 Operation and Structure of Complaint .................................................................... 38

5.2 Challenges of the Complaint Mechanism ................................................................ 40

5.3 Improving Complaint Mechanism ........................................................................... 41

6. Relationships among the Stakeholders ........................................................................... 43

6.1 Linkages between the Camp Leader and the NGOs ................................................ 44

6.2 Linkages between Service Providers (Traders and Hawalas) with Other

Stakeholders ........................................................................................................................ 45

6.3 Linkages between the Various Stakeholders and Local Authorities ....................... 45

7. Impact of Cash/Voucher Distribution Programme .......................................................... 46

7.1 Impacts on the Availability of Food ......................................................................... 46

7.2 Positive/Negative Impacts of the Project ................................................................ 46

7.3 Impacts on Prices and Exchange Rates .................................................................... 48

7.4 Other Impacts and Aspects of the Programme Interventions ................................ 49

8. Conclusion and Recommendations ................................................................................. 50

Bibliography ............................................................................................................................. 52

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List of Charts Chart 1: Percentage of interviewed stakeholders who reported awareness of cash and

voucher programme 17

Chart 2: Percentage of interviewees who reported that they participated in the selection of

the beneficiaries 25

Chart 3: Percentage of interviewees reporting that minorities and marginalized groups were

involved in targeting 26

Chart 4: Percentage of interviewees reporting inclusion and exclusion errors in targeting 27

Chart 5: Percentage of stakeholders reporting awareness of diversion 32

Chart 6: Percentage of interviewed stakeholders who considered diversion to be an

accepted standard 33

Chart 7: Percentage of sampled beneficiaries reporting awareness of the existence of

complaint mechanisms 36

Chart 8: Percentage of non-beneficiaries who knew to whom to complain if they wished 37

Chart 9: Percentage of stakeholders aware of the existing relationship 42

Chart 10: Percentage of non-beneficiaries whose food availability increased/stayed the same

Chart 11: Percentage of stakeholders believing the project had negative/positive impact 46

Chart 12: Percentage of stakeholders believing the interventions had positive impacts 46

Chart 13: Percentage of those who believed exchange rate varied during transfer 47

List of Tables Table 1: Regions/districts where qualitative information was collected 15

Table 2: Summary of targeting methods used by NGOs and their implementing partners 20

Table 3: Targeting stakeholders 22

List of Boxes Box 1: Specific objectives 15

Box 2: Limitations and lessons 18

Box 3: Phase 1 CVMG definition of "diversion" 31

Box 4: Suggested CVMG Phase 2 definition of corruption /diversion 32

8

ACRONYMS AND OTHER TERMS

AS Al Shabaab

BL Baseline

CBT Community-Based

Targeting

CPI Consumer Price Index

CVMG Cash and Voucher

Monitoring Group

CWW Concern Worldwide

FEWSNET Famine Early Warning

Systems Network

FGD Focus Group Discussion

FHH Female-Headed

Households

FSNAU Food Security and

Nutrition Analysis Unit

(FAO)

Hawalo Money transfer companies

HH Household

HDDS Household Dietary

Diversity Score

ID Identification

IDP Internally Displaced

People

IFMs Independent Field

Monitors

MEB Minimum Expenditure

Basket

MHH Male-Headed households

M&E Monitoring and

Evaluation

MoU Memorandum of

Understanding

MUAC Middle Upper Arm

Circumference

NFI Non-Food Items

NGO Non-Governmental

Organization

ODI Overseas Development

Institute

PDM Post-Distribution

Monitoring

QM Quarterly Monitoring

SAM Severe Acute Malnutrition

SATG Somali Agriculture

Technical Group

SoSh Somali Shilling

TFG Transitional Federal

Government

UN United Nations

UNICEF United Nations Children‟s

Fund

USD United States Dollar

VRC Village Relief Committee

WFP World Food Programme

Executive Summary

In participatory monitoring, community members are given the opportunity to provide credible and

collective feedback to service providers about their performance. This approach reflects the actual

experience of people (beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries and others involved in the programme) based

on facts that respondents are able to recall, their access to services, and their satisfaction with the

support provided.

The study was conceived to identify means of amplifying beneficiaries and their stakeholders‟

participation and engagement with the NGOs and their partner agencies (service providers, such as

hawalas, traders/shopkeepers and others). The study went beyond the existing superficial

consultative processes, to try to influence policy and decisions on the design of cash and voucher

distribution. This marks a departure in that normally, the NGOs and their partners monitor

expenditure on the various services they provide (in this case cash and voucher distribution). This

study focuses attention on the services provided from the point of view of the beneficiaries.

This participatory monitoring study is the second of its kind undertaken by the CVMG. It captures

beneficiaries‟ assessments regarding the existence or awareness of the program, accessibility, and

satisfaction with the assistance provided, including feedback mechanisms. Specific issues addressed

were:

Awareness

Targeting

Diversion

Accountability

Relationships among stakeholders

Impacts on markets, traders and hawalas

The study was conducted across six regions and 11 districts in South Central Somalia. A number of

beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries (poor and wealthy), hawalas, traders/shopkeepers and the

implementing NGOs were interviewed. Focus group discussions were held with each group using

participatory methods.

The overall objective was to consult with the beneficiaries, their stakeholders and community

members about the progress of the implementation of the cash and vouchers programme. The study

asked not only about the beneficiaries, but also about constraints to service within the community, to

ensure that their voices and concerns are included in any ongoing policy-making processes. This is

particularly relevant in light of the scaling up of the cash and voucher distribution programme at

national levels. The exercise reported on here is meant to strengthen and complement quantitative data

collected by the NGOs for monitoring and implementing the cash and voucher program.

The report brings together the voices and perspectives of communities in 11 districts within six

regions of Somalia. The study was conducted by SATG and jointly coordinated with ODI, with

support provided by UNICEF under the programme of the Cash and Voucher Monitoring Group. It

brings to light additional aspects of cash and voucher monitoring that were not covered in the

previous studies. More important, it enables the beneficiaries and their stakeholders to assess the

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impact of programme strategies on beneficiaries‟ lives, and offers the opportunity to include

beneficiaries in policy formulation through feedback generated at all levels.

This report begins by highlighting the importance of the policies put in place by the NGOs and their

partners to assist people affected by drought and civil war. Important contextual factors include the

scale and nature of the Phase 1 of cash and voucher distribution efforts and the ongoing planning to

help people affected by disasters to recover and start a new life.

The focus of the study, after review and selection of areas of investigation, was the design of a

systematic participatory approach for consulting beneficiaries and their stakeholders. This was

followed by extensive training for the Independent Field Monitors (IFMs) on the use of participatory

methods. As such, this report reflects the data collection part of the study, and presents the voices and

perspectives of the beneficiaries and their stakeholders.

Awareness: Among the respondents in urban areas, 40 percent of the sampled beneficiaries and 80

percent of the sampled non-beneficiaries reported not being aware of the cash and voucher program

before implementation. In rural areas, the majority of respondents (90 percent) were aware of the

programme. Other stakeholders who were aware of the programme included community leaders,

camp leaders and business leaders. These findings suggest that selective consultation took place,

without the involvement of all beneficiaries. The process needs to be improved by involving all key

stakeholders. The process must be made fully consultative by involving not only community

leaders but also the community at large.

Targeting: The study revealed that even though targeting systems were well designed by the NGOs,

their practical implementation was difficult. In most practical cases, the “community-based” elements

of the targeting were found to be outside the specified NGOs procedures.

Apparently it was common for local authorities (whether of the government or Al Shabaab) and camp

leaders (camp owners, gatekeepers and village chiefs and leaders), who often lacked any legitimacy

with the community, to influence the targeting procedures and selection criteria. This affected the

targeting methodology considerably and ended up being led by groups other than the NGOs and the

affected beneficiaries. As a result, the targeting done by many CVMG partners ended up having

poor participation and in some cases lacked transparency and a system of checks and balances.

Beneficiaries were not informed of their entitlements or provided any information on how the system

was supposed to work. This left the system subject to abuse. However, considering the conditions

under which the NGOs and their partners were operating, such as lack of accessibility, troubled

security conditions, an emergency situation, and a large number of affected people needing support,

one can conclude that the program made a great impact in reaching and supporting affected people.

Diversion: The information provided by informants at the community level indicates that diversion,

corruption and rent seeking were major impediments to poor people receiving their rightful

cash or voucher distribution. This permeated through to the most basic levels; for instance, in

various IDP camps and villages, in order for poor people to get access to the camps, villages were

forced by the gatekeepers or villages chiefs to pay in advance a certain amount of money. If this was

not forthcoming, they had to agree to pay part of the cash or food received from the programme.

Without this agreement, the poor would not be allowed to enter the camps or any other settlement

where they would be registered to receive cash or vouchers.

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The study revealed that few CVMG agencies had clear policies on the distribution of cash and

vouchers that were then shared with the community and involved stakeholders. Beneficiaries

need to know what they are supposed to receive, when, where and for how long. It should also be

clear whether the beneficiaries will have to incur any charges. An additional finding pointed to the

need for transparency and accountability in the roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders, such

as gatekeepers, militias, local authorities and the like. This may help to overcome what the

beneficiaries saw as major discrepancies between the amount (cash or food) they are supposed to

receive and what is actually received after charges were applied by different groups.

Accountability and feedback: The study examined the existing system of accountability or feedback

mechanisms in the cash and voucher program. The study revealed that most CVMG partners put in

place a simple system to collect information from programme beneficiaries. However, the system

was only able to capture operational issues, such as lost ID cards, receipt of expired food from

shopkeepers (voucher projects), or the collection of old notes from the hawala (cash projects).

The systems relied on telephone communication. Here one must consider the literacy level in

Somalia and the potential lack of phone access in poorer households. In addition, users were not

adequately informed about how the system works. The only information provided was a telephone

number printed on the back of the beneficiary ID card. Beneficiaries were told to call whenever they

had an issue or problem. In the Rural areas beneficiaries were not provided with any information

about the system or any mechanisms to follow for making a complaint. Rather than substantive

systemic or abuse issues, all of the complaints made by the beneficiaries consisted of simple

operational matters such a lost ID cards. Compounding the problem are issues of confidentiality and a

fear of retribution for making a negative complaint.

Relationship among the stakeholders: The study examined the relationships between the various

stakeholders involved in implementing the program: how they interact, cooperate and coordinate their

activities. The results obtained from the Focus Group Discussions (FGD) and interviews are

inconclusive, as little was offered on this topic.

Beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries interviewed seem not to have had any information on how the

various stakeholders share responsibility for the program. Thus they were not aware of the

interactions between the various groups involved in implementation. Some beneficiaries suspected

that there could be family or clan relations among the various groups. Using information gathered by

the SATG informants, however, we have tried to ascertain how the relationships operate. This is vital

to understanding the ways in which the cash and voucher program can be undermined.

Camp leadership: The camp owner puts in place rudimentary, low-standard facilities to

accommodate IDPs and other marginalized groups who are looking for a place to stay. This

person initiates the establishment of the camp. Camp owner engages a gatekeeper, who could

be a member of the family of the camp owner or just a person hired to work at the camp. Most

of the time the gatekeeper is related to the camp owner and will fulfill all tasks assigned by

the camp owner. As discussed below (3.3), these figures also act as the military arm of the

camp and can wield power over vulnerable residents.

The third key person linked to camp management is the camp leader. He/she is also engaged

by the camp owner. This person has responsibility for recruiting and settling the IDPs at the

camp. The camp leader and gatekeeper are the ones with responsibility for explaining to

potential camp residents what conditions must be agreed to before they are allowed residence.

The relationship of the three people managing the camp is a form of organized

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racketeering, with the intention of exploiting IDPs and marginalized people who reside

at the camp, for the purpose of financial gain.

Program impacts: Despite the issues highlighted above, the study revealed that overall, the

programme has shown positive impacts and has been popular among the beneficiaries, whether they

received cash or vouchers. The results suggest that cash/voucher transfers contributed to an increase

in the quantity, quality and diversity of food available at any one time in the local markets. The

overriding observation from focus groups and interviews is that the program has positively

contributed to an improved livelihood for the beneficiaries and the community at large.

Beneficiaries in general were observed to have spent the received money wisely. There was no

indication to suggest that cash contributed to sustained price rises, and without exception women were

able to participate and have a say in the benefits. The programme also boosted some local economies

by giving local traders more income-generating opportunities. As a consequence, the number of shops

increased in some programme areas.

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1. Introduction In developing the monitoring and evaluation strategy for the Cash and Voucher Monitoring Group

(CVMG), participation and consultation were key concerns. The list of groups to be consulted was

extensive, including Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries (poor

and non-poor), hawalas, traders, and households. The opportunities for consultation were also

extensive – not just in the monitoring of the initiative but also in the formulation of the strategy and its

approval, implementation and evaluation.

Participatory monitoring in direct consultation with the beneficiaries and other stakeholders is seen as

playing an important role in expanding the information base for cash and voucher initiative

diagnostics, observing the strategy/policy implementation and, in retrospective, evaluating

programme policy. The type of data that this approach generates – qualitative and non-numerical –

can offer the beneficiaries perceptions on their quality of life, as well as the priorities, constraints and

opportunities for improving their situations. This type of data deepens the understanding of poverty,

particularly the causality, the multidimensionality and the inter–linkages of influencing factors, and

can help define the priorities of beneficiaries for the initiatives being implemented.

1.1 Background South and Central Somalia are among the most complex environments in the world for delivering

humanitarian assistance. Since the ousting of General Siad Barre in 1991, Somalia has suffered

continued violent conflict between groups vying for power. The absence of a permanent and effective

central government resulted in a decline in population welfare even compared to pre–civil war times.

Somalia ranks poorly in a wide range of social, economic, political and military indicators. As a

result, the country has ranked first on the Failed State Index every year since 20081. Key attributes of

a “failed state” include: loss of physical control of its territory, erosion of legitimate authority to make

collective decisions, an inability to provide reasonable public services, and the inability to interact

with other states as a full member of the international community.2 Operating in this environment

comes with considerable security risks for the humanitarian community. International humanitarian

agencies have limited access to potential beneficiaries, being forced instead to operate through remote

management or through partnerships with local organizations.

Corruption and clan politics are also problems that agencies in Somalia deal with almost daily. As a

result, humanitarian aid in Somalia faces considerable risk of diversion. In early 2010, prior to Phase

1 of this intervention, aid options in Somalia were changed significantly when the World Food

Programme (WFP) and its local partners were forced to withdraw their services after repeated attacks

on their transport convoys. Soon after, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia published a report

alleging that three of WFP Somalia‟s primary contractors had been accused of mass corruption. The

report estimated that half of WFP‟s food aid destined for Somalia was being diverted and sold off

illegally.3

1 Fund for Peace & Foreign Policy. Failed State Index – ranked by country. Somalia has been in the top 7

countries (out of 177) since the index started in 2005. 2 Fund for Peace website. http://www.ffp.statesindex.org

3 UN Somalia Monitoring Group, 2010: 60.

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Against this backdrop is a highly food-insecure country, dependent on imported food. Today large

groups of the Somali population are reliant on the humanitarian community for support. Repetitive

droughts have severely affected the largely agricultural and pastoralist households. The ongoing

conflict and droughts are the two main factors contributing to large-scale population displacement,

poor infrastructure, low education levels and lack of health care facilities, all of which have limited

the livelihood opportunities of poor Somali households.

1.2 The Somalia Cash and Voucher Monitoring Group Emergency response programmes are employed increasingly to help the poorest and most vulnerable

populations manage risk and exit from poverty. One of the most well-recognized interventions is cash

and voucher distribution. This commonly is a contributory transfer programme targeted to the

drought-affected and war-affected people, the poor, and those vulnerable to poverty and shocks.

These programmes often include conditional and unconditional cash transfers, cash for work,

vouchers, food distribution, or distributions of seeds and tools. Development partners such as NGOs

are increasingly recognizing the relevance of cash and voucher interventions in terms of their

potential to save lives.

An increasing number of development partners have launched unconditional cash transfer

programmes in South Somalia in recent years, distributing cash and vouchers to selected groups

affected by civil war, drought and security risks, and to otherwise vulnerable households. Evidence

collected in Phase 1 of the programme revealed that, beyond their humanitarian development impacts,

such cash transfers not only can save lives but can foster broader economic development. These

impacts were observed through changes in household behavior and through monitoring of local

markets. In some cases it was observed that the cash received was used in investment activities that

impacted the local economy. Further analysis is required, however, in order to confirm or refute these

findings in the medium to long term.

The Cash and Voucher Monitoring Group (CVMG) was initiated in response to the famine in

Somalia, where several development partners, INGOs and their local partners started implementing

unconditional cash transfers and voucher interventions. Phase 1 of this programme started in August

2011 and lasted until March 2012; Phase 2 from April 2012 to March 2013. This initiative represents

a comprehensive effort to address the alarming food insecurity of the most vulnerable households, for

whom high prices form the overriding barrier to food access.

The CVPM exercise was established to qualitatively monitor specific, focused policies on the targeted

IDPs, drought-affected people and marginalized groups using participatory methods of data

collection. The method was designed in such a way as to fit into the monitoring and evaluation system

established for the Cash and Voucher Monitoring Group (CVMG). The implication here is that the

methodology is linked to the existing quantitative work, such as the monthly and quarterly post-

distribution monitoring (PDM) and other ongoing monitoring and evaluation exercises, in an iterative

process under the guidance of the established CVMG4. The CVPM differs from the existing

participatory process in that it has a much more explicit link to policy, manifest in the policy analysis

and checklist (data collection tools) and is institutionally designed, with its location within the Cash

and Voucher programme, to provide stronger feedback to policy makers, and thereby better influence

policy.

4 This could see CVPM identifying possible areas of investigation in quantitative work or investigating further

unexpected results from the PDM quantitative survey.

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1.3 Objectives of the Monitoring and Evaluation Exercise The objectives of the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) exercise were agreed to among the CVMG

implementing partners. The objectives essentially involved three types of monitoring: process

monitoring, market monitoring, and monitoring of the impacts on beneficiary households and

communities. There was also a strong learning and dissemination element.

Box 1: Specific Objectives

Objective

Project Purpose A qualitative monitoring system using participatory methods is established by CVMG in partnership with NGOs and other stakeholders to keep policy makers informed about progress in implementing and addressing the impact of cash and voucher initiative.

Results 1 The programme/initiative CV (cash and voucher) is examined for its efficiency, effectiveness and accountability

Result 2 CV is examined to determine whether the implementing partners adhered to the

agreed-upon targeting criteria and the level of beneficiary participation in the

targeting process (i.e., whether implementing partners are accountable to

themselves and to beneficiaries);

Result 3 CV assessed for the effectiveness of the community feedback mechanism and

how the implementing agencies respond to comments received (i.e., whether

project is accountable to beneficiaries);

Result 4 Substantiating as far as possible any reported claims of diversion of cash or food

vouchers due to taxation, targeting inclusion, etc.

Result 5 The problems and priorities of the beneficiaries are presented from their perspectives

1.4 Timing of the Exercise The Phase 2 monitoring exercise of cash and voucher distribution, from identification of needs to

production of this report, took approximately 13 months. Extra time was needed to ensure that the

institutional base and relation with ongoing activities were properly coordinated and effectively

established. Administrative issues in the release of funds also took longer than expected. It was

believed that taking this extra time at an early stage would make for a more effective exercise later. In

future, it is possible that one round of the exercise, from identification of policy areas for investigation

to initial report, could take four to five months.

1.5 Process The Cash and Voucher Participatory Monitoring (CVPM) exercise was carried out in several stages.

First, it was established as an institutional framework within CVMG, where consensus was reached

on the objectives, purposes and desired results of the exercise. The second stage entailed a policy

analysis that examined the extent to which priorities and challenges previously expressed by the

beneficiaries were translated into social and sectoral policies. The third stage involved the collection

of data on policy areas identified by the stakeholders. These included the targeting system, the relation

with the hawalas, traders, elders, community leaders, and other stakeholders, and the perceptions of

the beneficiaries, using participatory methodologies.

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The fourth stage involved analysis of the results and the production of the report. The fifth stage will

involve dissemination of the results of the exercise and following up on the recommendations to

ensure that the voices of the beneficiaries and other stakeholders are incorporated into new initiatives.

1.5.1 Selection of Policy Areas and Policy Analysis

The objective of the policy analysis stage was to examine the extent of the previously expressed

policies of the beneficiaries and related stakeholders, identified in Phase 1 of the Cash and Voucher

(CV) programme. It was hoped that approaching the policy analysis in this manner would allow for a

preliminary assessment as to whether CV strategy was in line with the priorities and perceptions of

the beneficiaries at a grassroots level, while at the same time laying the groundwork for detailed

discussions on the impact on the target group of certain interventions.

Some of the preliminary assessment allowed for detailed discussions with decision makers,

ascertaining their information need to ensure policy relevance. In the review of policies, a key element

was identification of goals and targets that each selected policy have set, helping to lay the

foundations for future feedback and policy recommendations.

The areas for investigation were identified on the basis of the expressed priorities, challenges and

acceptance of the beneficiaries (these priorities were derived from the results of Phase 1 of the

program). It also utilized some information generated during consultations for the development of the

CV initiative. These areas were:

i. Knowledge and existence of cash and voucher initiatives,

ii. Targeting system used to select beneficiaries,

iii. Exclusion/inclusion of minority groups in the program,

iv. Diversion and mismanagement of program resources,

v. Complaint and feedback mechanisms used,

vi. Linkages within and among the various stakeholders,

vii. Impact of cash and voucher distribution,

viii. Traders‟ facilitating the distribution of food package (voucher),

ix. Hawalas facilitating the distribution of cash, and

x. Conflict between the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.

The actual policy analysis was undertaken by a team from SATG in consultation with ODI and with

NGOs active in the areas in question. The output was a detailed overview of the policies in each of

the ten eight policy areas analyzed in Phase 1 of the project. These results were used in the design of

the checklists for Phase 2 (data collection tools), and provided the basis for the discussions on the

impact of policy and the recommendations contained in the report.

1.5.2 Site Selection

The regions/districts selections for this phase (CVPM II) were done purposely. Each location was

selected on the basis of where the NGOs were based and were implementing the programme. Table 1

lists the regions/districts and where qualitative information was collected.

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Table 1: Regions/districts where qualitative information was collected

Region District Village

Banadir

Dharkinley

Hodan

Wadajir

Dhagaxtuur Alla Amiin Tawakal Djabouti II

Bay Qansaxdhere

Diinsoor

Arooskamay

Hiran Beletweyn

Lower Juba Afmadow Duyac Garon Farjano Nasiib/Dhobley Wamo

Middle Juba Bu’ale

Gedo Doolow

Ceelwaaq

Baardheere

Waranle Diishe Dayax Beeritir Buusaar Lafageri Faaraxdhuun Barguwaan

1.5.3 Team (IFM) Selection

A team of two IFMs were selected for each district. These were chosen mostly from individuals

residing in the area, the intention being to utilize their unique local knowledge to enable detailed

probing of answers, and to overcome potential dialect difficulties. Overall responsibility for selecting

the IFMs resided with the SATG head office in coordination with the IFM supervisor at the location.

While one objective of the exercise was to build capacity at the local level to carry out future rounds

of the exercise, we required candidates to have some experience in utilizing participatory

methodologies, to have completed at least secondary education, and to be available, free from all

other duties for the duration of the exercise. Each team was composed of two researchers – one team

leader with experience in participatory methodologies and report writing, and one team member with

basic knowledge and experience in participatory approaches. A total of 32 IFMs were engaged in this

exercise and were based in all the regions/districts where the project was implemented.

1.5.4 Training Session

Several training exercises were undertaken in Mogadishu for all the IFMs. The goal was to provide

the data collectors with a sound knowledge of the tools and principles on the theoretical side, and to

build their capacity to carry out future rounds of the exercise. The trainings were intensive, lasting a

week or more, and designed to familiarize the IFMs with the tools to gather information and the

procedures for documenting their results. In total, over 32 IFMs were trained in participatory methods

of data collection.

18 | P a g e

The Mogadishu training drew heavily on the expertise of SATG experts, who use participatory

approaches extensively in their work.

1.5.5 Documentation and Reporting

Several levels of documentation and reporting were undertaken during the exercise. First, at the end of

each workday, the team reviewed the collected information and discussions from that day and

completed a documentation sheet for each session held. Second, at the end of each district or NGO

site, a day or more was spent preparing a district report. Third, a senior SATG supervisor reviewed

the compiled document and initiated data entry, made tabulations at the local level and proceeded to

submit the data to the head SATG office for a consistency check, analysis and report writing.

1.5.6 Limitations and Lessons from the CVPM Field Exercise

A number of limitations and difficulties came up in the field, many of which were addressed as they

arose. Others will be used to inform future phases of the exercise. It should be noted that most of these

difficulties were isolated experiences; however, they do suggest areas of potential improvement in the

later rounds of the exercise. Many issues can be dealt with in the training sessions.

Box 2: Limitations and Lessons

Quality of IFMs and

experience

The IFMs were of more than satisfactory standard, even though in some areas

it was difficult to find people with sufficient experience to act as team leaders.

Trainings helped, but difficulties persisted with some team members (those

used to statistical data) in accepting the principles associated with the

exercise.

Documentation Despite this being an area of focus during the training sessions, some team

members found it difficult to report exactly what the beneficiaries and other

stakeholders said, choosing instead to interpret it. Triangulation with other

team member and the senior supervisor helped overcome any difficulties.

Use of checklists

(data collection

tools) as a

questionnaire

In some instances the data collection tools were used as questionnaires,

meaning yes/no answers were recorded, rather than the deeper probing that

was supposed to emerge. Much of the information was captured in the

notebooks.

Length of data

collection tools

could prohibit

detailed follow-up

A number of IFMs reported that covering several areas in the research was too

much to allow for the in-depth probing they would have liked to undertake.

This combined with respondent fatigue.

19 | P a g e

2. Key Results Understanding issues related to the cash and voucher initiatives from the viewpoint of the

beneficiaries and related stakeholders is vital to understanding the impact of the NGO and donor

policies and actions and in the design of future policies targeted to affected communities. The

information and analysis contained in the following sections draws directly from the responses and

FGDs of the beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries and other stakeholders. They deal with issues such as

how the selection process was applied, the targeting system, and the perceptions of the overall process

of the program and its implementation.

2.1 Awareness of the Program When respondents were asked whether they were aware of the cash and voucher distribution

programme before it started implementation, the answers were inconsistent. Responses largely

depended on the different stakeholders in each of community visited. Because the findings were

inconclusive, any attempt at a simple answer would devalue the importance of each individual or

community contribution. Overall, it appears that awareness varied with the perception of each

stakeholder, access to basic information, access to services, dependency, and the ability to participate

at a community level.

a) In Mogadishu and other urban areas, a large proportion of both beneficiaries and non-

beneficiaries responded that they were not aware of the cash and voucher programme

before it started. If the results are disaggregated, one notices that about 60 percent of the

beneficiaries in urban areas indicated they were aware of the existence of the program and

40 percent indicated they were not. For the non-beneficiaries, it was reported that 80

percent were not aware and only 20 percent indicated that they were to some extent

aware. This points to the fact that consultation and participation were difficult at this

stage of programme preparation for NGOs when it came to registering the beneficiaries.

b) From the perspective of wealthier non-beneficiaries, 80 percent were to some extent

aware of the existence of the programme, while 20 percent were not aware. In the regions

of Bay, Gedo, Lower and Middle Juba and other rural areas, awareness seemed to be

high. This could be attributed to the fact that the areas where the project was implemented

were small villages where people know and interact with one another. In the rural areas,

the FGDs pointed to the fact that 90 percent of the sampled individuals were aware of the

existence of the programme.

20 | P a g e

Chart 1: Percentage of interviewed stakeholders who reported awareness of the existence of the cash

and voucher programme

c) Community leaders, camp leaders and local authorities were aware of the existence of the

Cash and Voucher initiatives before the programme started its implementation. This

seems to be the case where the NGOs considered this group to be instrumental to

successful implementation, as they represented the entry point to providing support to the

affected community.

This group provided access to “the beneficiaries” and provided logistics to the NGOs,

including security. The relationship of this group to the beneficiaries, however, is not

clear. Some experts believe they are business people providing services, while others are

of the opinion that this group consists largely of unscrupulous individuals interested in

exploiting the poor through violence and oppression.

In addition, according to IFM collected data the results indicate that this group colluded

with NGO staff and others in determining how and where the programme should be

implemented. The group was involved in the listing and selection of the areas and

beneficiaries for the programme. This information was provided by village leaders and

business leaders in other regions (Bay, Gedo and the Lower and Middle Juba) who had

knowledge of Cash and Voucher of the programme.

d) Awareness of the targeting selection process is another key factor that has been

researched and analyzed. This turns out to be important in understanding how the project

was designed and operated. Beneficiaries in phase 2 were not aware of how the selection

was done, and they indicated that their representative community leaders were also not

involved. Community members were asked if they knew their community leaders and if

they believed the community leaders were the right people to represent them. Most

respondents were, however, unable to answer, as they did not have sufficient knowledge

about who was involved and how the process was done. Most beneficiaries and non-

beneficiary poor households suggested that the selection should have prioritized IDPs,

orphans, older people and other marginalized groups.

21 | P a g e

3. Targeting System Targeting must be correctly handled to avoid missing large numbers of the most affected households,

and to keep from distributing to the less needy. Cash is believed to be more fungible and may be more

attractive to the non-poor than vouchers (food aid). Agencies therefore need to prevent

diversion/corruption and must have careful targeting procedures in place. Using communities to help

select beneficiaries is one method that has been useful in ensuring that transfers go to the needy in

each community, although this approach is not without problems.

In this cash and voucher programme, NGOs have been claiming to target broadly the IDPs, food-

insecure households, families with malnourished children, elderly-headed households, households

with children, and marginalized and minority groups. Targeting was done or expected to be done first

by geographical area to certain districts and livelihood groups, based on food security information

provided by the Somalia Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU). Following that, the

beneficiaries were supposed to be selected using properly designed selection criteria.

This section presents findings on several aspects related to the targeting process that NGOs reported

to have used in selecting beneficiaries. This begins with a summary of NGO targeting procedures as

provided by the implementing agencies (Table 2). This is not intended as an exhaustive listing of all

implementing agencies. It represents the practices both in the field and at head offices in Nairobi of

the implementing agencies that were able to provide information. This is followed by an analysis and

review of the information collected from the beneficiaries and other involved stakeholders. This

provides information from the perspectives of the beneficiaries and other partners involved in the

implementation of cash and voucher distribution in the various areas of South Central Somalia.

22 | P a g e

Table 2: Summary of Targeting Methods Used by the NGOs and their Implementing Partners Implementing

partners

Involved community

representatives and

authorities

Targeting

criteria/selection

of beneficiaries

Verification of the

selected

beneficiaries

Awareness and

related information

Complaint

mechanism

NGO1 To some extent HHs with

malnourished children

through OTP, MUAC

and observation

HHs with

female/disabled head

of HH

Structurally

vulnerable HHs with

or without children

HH who lack internal

and external support

Not mentioned Not mentioned but it is

done through MUAC

Mostly done by phone

NGO2 Not mentioned but some

consideration given to

community involvement

Same as above Not mentioned Through MUAC

NGO3, 4 and 5 Same as above Suggested not clear Not clear how it is done

Joint public meeting with

clan elders, chiefs and

community

New IDP with no

shelter and basic HH

items

Pastoral drop-out who

lost their livestock

HHs with no proper

sources of income

Female-headed HHs

Poor HH with limited

coping ability, no

sources of income

Riverine vulnerable

HHs

HHs with children

under the age of five

HH with chronically

ill member

Minorities and

marginalized

30% of the HHs from

the selected

beneficiaries are

visited for

verification

Beneficiaries of the

project were identified

through community

mobilization, involving

discussions with the

community and clan

elders and direct

interviews with the HHs

identified as vulnerable

by elders, chiefs and

community committees.

A very rudimentary and

properly in place

24 | P a g e

Table 2: Summary of Targeting Methods Used by NGOs and their Implementing Partners (continued)

Implementing

partners

Involved

community

representatives and

authorities

Targeting

criteria/selection of

beneficiaries

Verification of

the selected

beneficiaries

Awareness and

related information

Complaint

mechanism

NGO5 VCR to be

established by

COOPI and village

meetings

Open forum for

community

sensitization

Should be residents of

village/district

HHs with no other

sources of income

Women-headed HHs

Vulnerable groups,

including

marginalized and

minorities

Not given Mobilization of

leaderships in target

village

None in place

3.1 Stakeholder in Targeting Processes Analysis Several different stakeholders are either directly or indirectly involved in the targeting process. Some

influenced the targeting process and others were influenced by targeting exercises. Different

stakeholders are involved at each stage of the targeting process. These include the Food Security and

Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU), which is involved in the geographical targeting, as this

organization provides detailed information on food security for all areas of Somalia, as well as the

government, local authorities, traders/business people, traditional leaders and others.

Table 3: Targeting Stakeholders

Stakeholders directly involved in

targeting

Stakeholders influencing

targeting

Stakeholders influenced by

targeting process

FSNAU Hawala Beneficiaries

NGOs and their partners Traders/shopkeepers Minority or marginalized groups

Gatekeepers Militia Al Shabaab

Camp owners Clan/minority groups Villagers

Camp leaders Donors Households

Local authorities/ Non-beneficiaries

Community leaders Hawala

Al Shabaab Traders

Local leaders/religious leaders

Brokers/brokers‟ negotiators5

The role played by each stakeholder in the targeting system varies. The clearest role was the one

played by the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU). FSNAU provided information to

all implementing agencies as a basis for making correct or deciding which area (regions, districts and

villages) to target.

The role of local authorities varied depending on whether they were part of the government or were

Al Shabaab representatives. Government institutions with their poor and limited capacity might have

participated and provided limited support during the assessments, but in general played a minimal

role. Al Shabaab leadership, on the other hand, was determined and politically strong in their

occupied areas, and they played a strong role in the targeting process. Al Shabaab influenced and in

most cases determined the location and the selection of the beneficiaries with the sponsoring NGOs or

agencies.

The NGOs also played key roles in determining the area of intervention at all levels, whether in

cooperation with other stakeholders or alone. They determined the districts and villages or IDP camps

within the districts, with little and no involvement of many other key stakeholders. Thus the NGOs

had the biggest influence on which districts, villages or IDP camps were targeted and, most

important, the number of beneficiaries in each selected area.

Within the IDP camps and villages, beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries and other stakeholders

interviewed felt that they were not informed or involved at any stage of the targeting process. In the

IDP camps, NGOs cooperating with gatekeepers, camp leaders and local authorities implemented

targeting procedures of their own, which neither reflected nor followed any of the targeting

procedures developed or proposed within the NGO strategies (see Table 2). All the stakeholders

5 Group of business people who negotiate with NGOs on behalf of Al Shabaab

26 | P a g e

interviewed were of the view that there was no targeting procedure applied to select the beneficiaries

of the program, but rather arbitrary decisions made by NGOs and those who worked with them. These

included gatekeepers, camp owners/leaders and some local authorities.

3.2 NGOs’ Perspectives of Targeting Interviews conducted with NGOs on the targeting of geographical area and districts (and villages and

camps within the districts), and the registration and selection of beneficiaries provides a

comprehensive picture of how the NGOs operated.

When the NGOs were asked about the process they used to determine which region and district would

be targeted for the interventions, most of the respondents cited:

High density of drought-affected community;

Accessibility and security conditions; and

Rapid assessments to determine the size and the needs of the households.

To avoid duplication and overlapping, NGOs consulted one another and agreed on the areas where

each should intervene. Next was the targeting methodology used to select the villages or IDP camps

within the selected geographical areas.

Some NGOs indicated that they had a head office in Nairobi that prepared a policy document that

stated or suggested the villages or IDP camps to be selected and supported. Others considered where

the villages or camps were located and which ones had a high density of vulnerable households who

were drought affected. In addition, consideration was given to camps or villages where the majority of

residents were affected by severe malnutrition. The NGOs indicated that they had specific criteria

applied to select the beneficiaries. The selection criteria reported to have been applied by the NGOs

included the following:

Consideration given to disabled, elders, women-headed households, vulnerable groups and

families with malnourished children;

Drought-affected households, orphanage and those who lost their livestock; and

Pregnant and lactating women and old-age people.

As to who from the project community was involved in the selection process, the answers can be

categorized this way:

NGOs with local authority on the basis of signed MoU;

Camp leaders, (camp owners, gatekeepers ) and the NGOs;

NGO acted alone due to emergency and security conditions;

Village committee with the NGOs, and

Community nutrition volunteers, nutrition project staff and nutrition mobilizers.

This summarizes the process used to select the beneficiaries, according to the interviewed NGOs.

However, these results contradict the observations of the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries (see

Section 3.4).

While some NGOs suggested that they concentrated on minorities, others were less concerned about

making efforts to include minorities and marginalized communities in the targeting. These NGOs

indicated that:

They didn‟t need to do anything (inclusion/exclusion), as it was by default or design that most

of the affected people were from the minorities and marginalized groups;

27 | P a g e

They were using set criteria to select the beneficiaries who were affected by the drought, and

it didn‟t matter whether they were from minorities or marginalized, as far as they satisfied the

selection criteria.

NGOs were also asked whether any groups within the community were excluded from the selection

process. Overall, 80 percent of the NGOs reported that they were not aware of any community group

that had been so excluded. The remaining NGOs reported to have observed some exclusion of certain

groups who came to the camp or villages after the registration was completed.

Some NGOs reported that after selecting their beneficiaries, they undertook a verification system

where they tried to triangulate the information they had by checking consistency of name, photos and

other related information. These efforts included visiting the camps or villages and verifying whether

the registered beneficiaries physically existed and were in place.

3.3 Stakeholder Influencing Targeting Aside from the NGOs, there were several stakeholders who exerted considerable influence in the

targeting process. These included those who had an official role and some who did not.

Already discussed was the difficult task of establishing the links among gatekeepers, camp owners,

traders, NGOs, local authorities, Al Shabaab and others. In exploring the kind of relationships that

exists among these various groups, NGOs and non-beneficiaries were asked whether they had any

knowledge of how the various groups may have tried to influence the targeting system. The NGOs‟

response was split: 50 percent indicated that no group tried and managed to influence the targeting

process. These NGOs said they tried to control the process and were not influenced by any group. The

remaining 50 percent indicated that certain groups (local authorities and some wealthier groups) tried

to influence but that the NGO managed to keep out of the process.

The majority of non-beneficiaries, however, were of the opinion that camp leaders, gatekeepers, local

authorities, militias and those associated with Al Shabaab and their freelance militia did try to

influence the targeting. In its simplest form, camp owners and their gatekeepers, shopkeepers and clan

leaders all made attempts to influence the targeting process -- in certain cases with success.

The opinion of wealthier non-beneficiaries was that community leaders, in cooperation with the

NGOs, had influenced the targeting system and that Al Shabaab, wherever it had control, imposed and

enforced a list of the beneficiaries to be supported.

In Banadir region, the concept of “gatekeepers,” and in the rural areas that of “intermediates”

(middlemen/brokers), particularly in those areas under Al Shabaab control, came up repeatedly in the

discussions and interviews.

Gatekeepers are defined as the military arm of the camp owners and camp leaders. They impose

themselves on vulnerable groups and minorities and control camp access, information and services to

all camp residents. The intermediates/brokers are business people who operate and negotiate with the

NGOs on behalf of Al Shabaab. They provide access and entry points to the NGOs to implement

programs in Al Shabaab areas.

It is therefore not clear how agencies could work with a “low profile” in Al Shabaab–controlled areas,

as it is reportedly necessary to have a detailed agreement negotiated by the brokers that provides a

share to Al Shabaab and the conditions that they impose on the NGOs. This may include the hiring of

local staff who are affiliated members of Al Shabaab. In fact, in these areas, NGO staff are often very

powerful people who can act with impunity. IFMs who attempted to contact them on several

28 | P a g e

occasions to get access to project “beneficiaries” were either arrested or advised not to enter the area

for their own sake.

Overall, the NGOs believed that the targeting system was fair and transparent and reflected the reality

on the ground. In addition, they believed that their systems had in place checks and balances for

redressing anything that might have gone wrong. However, 75 percent of the sampled non-

beneficiaries in urban areas reported that the system was not fair and transparent. This was largely

because the registration of the beneficiaries was done without informing any stakeholders except the

village and camp leaders and the NGOs themselves. This cannot be considered to be a transparent

selection and to have reflected the situation on the ground. In the rural areas the situation seems to

have been satisfactory, as most of the respondents stated that targeting and beneficiary selection was

done in a professional manner.

3.4 Other Stakeholders’ Awareness of the Targeting Process In Mogadishu, 100 percent of the focus group involving poor non-beneficiaries said they were not

aware of the targeting system used to select the beneficiaries. The majority (75 percent) of the

wealthier group said it was aware, while 25 percent said it was not. Some of the beneficiaries reported

that NGO staff and camp representatives (gatekeeper, camp owner and local authorities) arrived at the

camp early in the morning and started registering beneficiaries and distributing ID cards. In rural

areas, most beneficiaries reported that they were aware of the system used to select the beneficiaries.

Most of those interviewed reported that they were a member of the OTP nutrition program and related

programs, which measure the children‟s nutritional levels through MUAC measurement. The non-

beneficiaries interviewed were of the same opinion: generally, only those people who were directly

involved were aware of the system used to select the beneficiaries.

When asked about whether the beneficiaries or any member of his/her community participated in the

selection of the beneficiaries, 44 percent of those interviewed said that no one from their community

was involved in the selection. The remaining 56 percent of the respondents reported that their

participation was limited to providing basic information to the NGOs required for registration, such as

name and their originating areas. When the results are disaggregated by urban–rural however, a

different picture emerges. In urban areas (Mogadishu), 75 percent of sampled individuals said no

community members participated in the selection of beneficiaries. In rural areas, all those interviewed

reported that 70 of community members participated in the selection.

Chart 2: Percentage of interviewees who reported that they participated in the selection of the

beneficiaries

29 | P a g e

Further investigation found that 100 percent of the beneficiaries interviewed in Banadir reported that

they did not believe that any specific criterion was used to select the beneficiaries. NGO staff claimed

to have used a system that took into account widows, orphans, feeding mothers and older people, but

the beneficiaries refuted this. In rural areas the results suggest that the criteria used included HHs with

no income, women-headed HHs, and others.

Further enquiry was made on how the selection was done, who was involved and whether those

parties were the right people to represent the community. Of those interviewed in urban areas, 50

percent reported that the people involved in the selection included NGO staff, camp leaders and local

authorities (government or Al Shabaab). The non-beneficiaries in urban areas indicated that no

member of their community participated or was involved in the selection process of the beneficiaries.

In rural areas, the selection was reportedly done by the established committee like Village Relief

Committee (VRC) and others according to established rules.

The consensus in both rural and urban focus groups was that no minorities or marginalized groups

were actively involved at any stage of the targeting system. It is possible that in some camps or

villages, most of the residents were from a minority group and were thus supported by implementing

agencies, but apparently this was not a specific policy or criteria intended to target them.

Only 25 percent of the sampled beneficiary group in the urban areas reported believing that

marginalized and minority groups were to some extent involved in targeting. In rural areas, 60 percent

of sampled individuals reported that minorities and marginalized groups were involved. Overall,

across all regions, the result was split, with half believing one way, and half believing another.

Chart 3: Percentage of interviewees reporting that minorities and marginalized groups were involved

in targeting

Another issue discussed was whether certain groups within the community might have been excluded

from the targeting/registration process. The overall majority of participants believed that there

were groups within the community who were excluded from the targeting process. It is likely

that most of those excluded were poor and from minorities because they did not have information on

where and when the registration process took place.

30 | P a g e

In Banadir region, most of these groups were residents of various camps, but during the day of

registration they were out of the camp, gone to the market and other places to look for jobs or beg. As

a result, they missed the registration and were not included in the selection of beneficiaries.

This study also explored whether some wealthier households were registered to receive a cash

transfer. In the Banadir region, 50 percent of the beneficiaries believed that there were wealthier

households that were registered to receive cash, while 50 percent believed that no wealthier

households were registered to receive cash.

Chart 4: Percentage of interviewees reporting inclusion and exclusion errors in targeting

On the accountability issues, respondents were asked whether they thought a committee or group of

individuals had responsibility for approving or disapproving a beneficiary‟s selection. The overall

opinion was that no specific committee or group of individuals was making such decisions. Rather, it

was reported that the NGOs, in cooperation with camp leaders and local authorities, were responsible

for approving the beneficiary lists. Both interviewed beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries were of the

same opinion on this issue: 50 percent indicated that there was a committee or group with the

responsibility to approve or disapprove the list of beneficiaries, and 50 percent indicated otherwise.

3.4 How to Improve the Targeting System Based on the information collected in the field and consultations conducted in Nairobi with the NGOs

and other stakeholders, several inferences can be made for improving the targeting system.

On the geographical selection of the districts and other areas, the applied system seems to be clear. All

NGOs and other agencies involved in the implementation of the program used FSNAU-compiled

information, which provided the data to select the geographic areas. The system has its strengths and

weaknesses and these are well known to the users, such as the fact that it might include or exclude

arbitrarily some districts that might have been affected negatively by drought, war and related factors.

NGOs and their local partners stressed to the IFMs and informants that they were aware of how the

geographical targeting was done.

Another important step required to improve targeting would be to promote and improved analysis of

context, increasing the capacity of NGO staff and their partners to target in all the areas, and their

willingness to work with legitimate stakeholders.

31 | P a g e

Other suggestions, given the existing constraints in security conditions and accessibility issues,

include improving community participation in targeting. Also needed is the identification and

reinforcement of appropriate checks and balances in the targeting process. In addition, the

involvement of all key stakeholders, particularly the beneficiaries in the planning stage, would

improve transparency. Making the community aware of the objectives of the programme, the

entitlement of the beneficiaries, the roles and responsibilities of all involved stakeholders and making

use of localized complaint mechanisms would also help.

32 | P a g e

4. Diversion, Corruption and Rent Seeking During CVMG inquiries conducted by the IFMs at the community level, diversion, corruption and

rent seeking emerged as major impediments to poor people receiving their full cash or voucher

distribution. This permeates through to the most basic levels; for instance in various IDP camps, poor

people, in order to get access to the camps, were forced by the gatekeepers to pay in advance a certain

amount of money. If they were not able to do so, they had to agree to pay part of their cash or food

when they start receiving it from the programme. Without this agreement, the poor would not be

allowed to enter the camps or any other settlement where they would be registered to receive cash or

vouchers.

Before we analyze the results of the study on the diversion issue, let us first understand and examine

what is meant by diversion in this context.

Corruption / Diversion in CVMG Phase 2 Transparency International

6 uses the following definition of diversion (corruption):

“Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.”

The ODI “Corruption Perceptions and Risks in Humanitarian Assistance” case studies (2007)7 used

the definition:

“The misuse of entrusted power for private gain.”

Ewins et al. (2006)8 explains it this way:

“In the context of humanitarian relief, this means thinking through where power lies,

what would constitute misuse, how power has been entrusted and what “private”

means.”

According to the above definitions, corruption or diversion occurs when there is an abuse of power.

When power is not abused – e.g., in cases of families sharing children from nutrition centers, or

beneficiaries moving from camp to camp trying to get multiple registrations in order to access funds -

it is not diversion, but should still be monitored, and classified as an inclusion error.

The CVMG Phase 1 definition included a number of specific examples of diversion that are correct,

however, given the above definitions. For example, unintentional double registration should not be

included; this should also be classified as an inclusion error.

Box 3: Phase 1 CVMG definition of "diversion" • Taxation of beneficiaries by local militias or local authorities, landlords, shopkeepers, community

committees, NGO staff, etc., who demand payment either on a one-off basis or regular basis

• Errors of inclusion in targeting where those who do not meet the targeting criteria are included in

beneficiary lists through personal connection, political association, bribery or force/threats

• Double registration of beneficiaries (whether intentionally or unintentionally)

• Registration of „ghost‟ beneficiaries, i.e., use of false names and profiles that allow money to be collected

• Registration of fewer beneficiaries than reported by NGO, allowing funds to be retained by NGO

In light of recent experience of diversion, it is suggested that three additional points about diversion

6 Transparency International (2010). Preventing corruption in humanitarian operations. Pocket Guide of good practices. 7 ODI commissioned case studies entitled ‘Corruption perceptions and risks in humanitarian assistance’. Case studies include Afghanistan and Liberia. These were followed by HPG Policy Brief 32 in September 2008 by Sarah Bailey - Need and greed: corruption risks, perceptions and prevention in humanitarian assistance. 8 Ewins et al (2006) Mapping the risks of corruption in humanitarian action. Overseas Development Institute and Management Accounting for NGOs (MANGO) A report for

Transparency International and the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre.

33 | P a g e

be included in the definition:

NGO staff misuse of registration lists;

Collusion between stakeholders; and

A broader point of „any other instance‟ in case other examples come up that is not specifically

mentioned.

Box 4: Suggested CVMG Phase 2 definition of corruption / diversion • Taxation of beneficiaries by local militias or local authorities, landlords, shopkeepers, community

committees, NGO staff, etc., who demand payment either on a one-off basis or regular basis

• Errors of inclusion in targeting where those who do not meet the targeting criteria are included in

beneficiary lists through personal connection, political association, bribery or force/threats

• Intentional double registration of beneficiaries

• Registration of „ghost‟ beneficiaries, i.e., use of false names and profiles that allow money to be collected

• NGO staff misusing the registration lists to retain project funds e.g. by paying fewer beneficiaries than

reported, by registering fewer beneficiaries than reported, paying less money each transfer

• Collusion of stakeholders for private gain

• Any other instance where stakeholders have abused power for private gain9.

4.1 Results on Diversion Diversion, corruption and rent seeking come in various shapes and contours and may involve several

groups of individuals, institutions and stakeholders. These groups are organized under several

grouping of individuals. In the case of IDP camps there are: (a) camp owner, (b) gatekeeper, (c) camp

leader, camp committees, NGO and local authorities.

Camp Owner

The camp owner is a business person who owns the camp. He and his partners make all the

arrangements necessary to settle the IDPs. He negotiates with the NGOs on the type of support to be

provided to the poor who are settled in the camp. His business does not have anything to do with

humanitarian issues, but is purely a profit-making business to provide services. These services may

include access to camp facilities, security, “accommodation,” water and related services. The camp

owner may extract rent by using political and security pressures on the poor camp residents.

Some people believe that the camp owner‟s business involves some form of organized system of

racketeering to take advantage of and exploit the predicament of disadvantaged minorities and

marginalized poor people for financial gain. The camp owner and his partners include a gatekeeper,

camp leader, camp committees, local authorities (government or Al Shabaab and other local

committees) and the NGO working together to make the camp operational.

The gatekeeper, camp leader and camp committees are members of the staff and work for the camp

owner. The gatekeeper is the military arm of the camp community. He is in charge of the security and

is responsible for making the camp residents respect the rules set by the camp owner, which include

the unwritten agreement of forfeiting some of the cash or food they receive. The camp leader is the

political arm at the camp and acts on behalf of the camp owner. His role is to supervise, coordinate

and negotiate any agreements with participants and handle the NGOs and local authorities through the

9 Private gain refers not just to individuals but also to families and communities; ethnic, regional or religious groupings;

political or social organizations; corporations or militias. „Gain‟ is not always financial: the abuse of power may enhance

personal or organizational reputation or be for social and political purposes.

34 | P a g e

various established camp committees.

The problems in the camps and villages appear to be ingrained in the cash and voucher system; during

the various FGDs and interviews in all the areas where the programme is being implemented,

participants pointed out that there are three pillars of corruption and unless the pillars are demolished,

corruption will never end. The pillars are:

Use of illegally established camps/villages by racketeering business people and their partners;

Accepting and working with gatekeepers who are known to violate human rights and oppress the

victims (IDPs, drought-affected people, minorities and marginalized people); and

NGO relations with known crooks and corrupt officials, whether from the government or Al

Shabaab.

However, not all is bad. In some camps in Banadir region, communities have been inspired by the

establishment of representative committees who are able to complain and raise their plights to the

NGO and local authorities. In these camps some progress has been made to improve the situation of

the IDPs. The communities were inspired by the success of their truly representative committees and

felt that this had been instrumental in improving the delivery of cash and vouchers. They believed that

to end corruption in the system, there should be an elected and truly representative committee to

monitor daily activities at the camps and villages.

The results of the study provide a clear picture of the situation on ground. When the stakeholders

(beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, business leaders, NGOs and others) were asked if they were aware

of any case of diversion of cash or vouchers -- that is, if there were people other than the beneficiaries

who received cash from the NGO, or if beneficiaries paid a proportion of the cash or voucher

commodities to an external party -- the responses varied. Categorizing the responses of beneficiaries

and non-beneficiaries both poor and wealthy, respondents observed that:

They were not aware of any diversion, as they were more concerned of their day-to-day survival

than any other thing;

Of those who said they were aware of diversion in their area, they explained that the gatekeeper

collected money or food from the beneficiaries whenever beneficiaries received whatever they are

entitle to receive, but that the amount or portion of the food received was not clear;

Some were of the opinion that there was an unwritten agreement between the camp residents and

gatekeeper (or camp owner) that whenever the beneficiaries receive cash or voucher, they had to

give an agreed portion to the gatekeeper; and

Militias also collected their share from the beneficiaries whenever they received it.

Among the food or money taken by the camp owner either directly or through the gatekeeper is rent

charged for accommodation, water and other services provided at the camp, such as security and other

related services.

Business leaders, when interviewed, provided additional information. First of all, they were convinced

that diversion was taking place. They believed that this is an open secret and that everybody is aware

that when the beneficiaries are registered, the camp leaders (camp owner, gatekeeper and their

committees) inform the beneficiaries that they have to pay a certain amount or a share of food when

they receive cash or a voucher.

Another interpretation given by the business leaders was that before an IDP is allowed to enter the

camp; this person is asked to enter into an agreement with the camp owner (gatekeeper or camp

35 | P a g e

leader) whereby the beneficiary agrees to pay a certain amount of cash or a portion of food they

receive.

All the NGOs interviewed in urban and rural areas reported that they were not aware of any diversion

happening in their areas. A few NGOs suggested that diversion is only observed in the areas under the

control of Al Shabaab, although the qualitative data indicates that this was not the case. When the

various stakeholders were asked if they were aware of any diversion of cash or vouchers, the findings

were as follows: beneficiaries were not aware of any diversion, while non-beneficiaries and NGOs

reported to be aware of diversion (Chart 5).

Chart 5: Percentage of stakeholders reporting awareness of diversion

When asked if they consider diversion as a standard accepted procedure, some of the non-

beneficiaries believed that diversion was and always had been an accepted standard in most of the

camps and villages where the program is implemented.

In addition, it appeared that beneficiaries in the villages pay a certain amount of cash or a share of the

food they receive to the village leaders and their partners who are in charge of the villages. This is an

accepted practice also endorsed by most NGOs. The beneficiaries do not have any alternative but to

pay. If they don‟t, they will be kicked out of the village (or camp) by the leaders who are running the

village (or camp).

However, the interviewed beneficiaries provided a different version of the situation, or they were of a

different opinion. The following is their version:

Didn‟t experience any diversion, and made no any forced payment to anyone;

Had no knowledge of any diversion;

Would not consider diversion to be an accepted standard, but it might happen in several circumstances.

This response could be interpreted as the beneficiaries being scared to provide true information for

fear of being punished by the gatekeeper or kicked out of the camp. The opinion of business leaders is

clear in this situation, and all the business leaders (100 percent) agreed that diversion was a standard,

36 | P a g e

accepted procedure. According to them, all beneficiaries indiscriminately were charged or made

to pay part of the cash or voucher they receive to the camp owners and their associates on the

basis of an agreement made before the registration.

Chart 6: Percentage of interviewed stakeholders who considered diversion to be an accepted standard

In some instances, beneficiaries voluntarily paid someone part of their share as a token of

appreciation. It has been observed that in certain cases beneficiaries voluntarily share part of what

they receive with relatives and friends. However, the NGOs believe that the amount received by the

beneficiaries is so small that it is unlikely that they would voluntarily share with anyone unless they

were forced to do so.

4.2 Rent Seeking The study explores the possibility that powerful members of society use their power to exploit and

extract various financial and other advantages from the poor, weak members of society. These people

with power are not interested in assisting the poor but rather exploiting their plight for financial gain.

These people are described here as rent-seekers. They include camp owners, gatekeepers, camp

leaders, village chiefs, local authorities, traders, hawala, and certain NGOs and their associates.

When the stakeholders were asked if any institutions involved in implementing the program (such as

NGOs, hawala or traders) were charging an administrative fee to the beneficiaries to provide services,

all the stakeholders responded “no.” All stakeholders were of the opinion that no institutions involved

in implementation were charging such a fee. The non-beneficiaries were of similar opinion: they said

they were not aware of any charges, but were unsure if some hidden costs were charged but not

reported.

Similar responses were received when respondents were asked if any institutions involved in

implementing the programme were keeping any of the cash for themselves. Most of the respondents

were not aware of what was happening within the implementing agencies. So the responses were: we

are not aware, but it is possible that implementing agencies could keep funds and use them for

different purposes other than those intended.

The discussions and interviews conducted with the various stakeholders also explored the possibility

of whether any of the local authorities were charging taxes to the beneficiaries. About 12.5 percent of

the non-beneficiaries were of the view that indirectly, local authorities were charging some kind of

37 | P a g e

“tax” to the beneficiaries. Respondents suggested that at the time of cash distribution, some officials

with the local authorities would visit the camps and demand that each beneficiary pay or contribute

some unknown fees invented by the local authorities‟ staff. In the areas under the control of Al

Shabaab, beneficiaries were asked to contribute to zakat or make other contributions imposed on

them. The beneficiaries pointed to the fact that legally, local authorities do not charge any tax to the

beneficiaries, but militias, staff and others who operate under the umbrella of the local authorities do

collect tax as a contribution for facilitating access and security. Business leaders also shared this view.

Examining whether the NGOs and their staff were charged any taxes by the local authorities, the

study again found that, legally, the local authorities do not charge any taxes to the NGOs and their

staff. However, there is a fee charged to NGOs called a “registration fee,” which is about US$500. In

the areas operated by Al Shabaab, the fee could be much higher, and this is negotiated between the

NGOs and Al Shabaab authorities.

One NGO in the Juba region under the control of Al Shabaab reported that Al Shabaab requested a

fee of US$20,000 for the NGO to operate in the district. The NGO said it did not pay the requested

amount, but the business community in the district negotiated with Al Shabaab on behalf of the NGO

and they (the business people) paid US$6,000 for the NGO to operate in the district (Sic).

The NGOs reported that officially there are no charges or fees they must pay to local authorities;

however, 12.5 percent of the interviewees believed that some charges were leveled against NGOs.

The rest (87.5 percent) indicated that a part of the US$500 paid by the NGOs as registration fees

could include some hidden fees paid to staff and other officials. There are also local militias that

charge fees to let NGOs operate in the areas under their control.

4.3 Emerging Issues A number of recommendations can be made to improve the services and reduce rent seeking by camp

leaders. These include:

1. Having clear policies on the distribution of cash and vouchers that are transparent and shared with the

community and involved stakeholders. People need to know what they are supposed to receive, when,

where, and for how long. Also make clear whether there are any charges involved that the beneficiaries will

have to incur.

2. There is a need for transparency and accountability on the roles and responsibilities played by various

stakeholders, such as gatekeepers, militias, local authorities and the like. This may help to overcome what

the beneficiaries see as major discrepancies between the amount of cash or food the beneficiaries are

supposed to receive and what effectively they receive after several charges are applied by different groups.

3. The beneficiaries need the opportunity to provide feedback on ways of improving the service delivery

aspect. One possibility is to introduce “Reports Cards.”10

The disadvantage of this is that most beneficiaries

are illiterate; therefore, this might need to be modified to adapt to the situation on the ground. The report

cards could be collected and analyzed on a regular basis, with the results made public.

4. Information campaigns (programme awareness creation) must be clear and presented in a manner that

ensures all members of the community understand them. Campaigns using mass media (posters, radio, etc.)

need to be followed up to ensure that the community has understood them and they are resulting in the

desired behaviors.

5. Those involved in the provision of services (traders, hawalas, camp owners, gatekeepers, etc.) need to be

sensitized on how to deal with beneficiaries.

10

Report Card is a simple but powerful tool to provide service providers with systematic feedback from users of services. By collecting

feedback on the quality and adequacy of services provided from beneficiaries, it provides a rigorous basis and proactive agenda for communities and stakeholders to engage in dialogue with service providers to improve the delivery of services to the beneficiaries.

38 | P a g e

5. Accountability, Complaint and Feedback Mechanisms All NGOs implementing cash and voucher programmes in South Central Somalia have committed to

accountability to the beneficiaries and communities where they are providing support. To ensure that

this organizational value is practiced, some NGOs have established an internal “Complaints Unit”

(individual responsible for complaints, compliance desk, etc.) so beneficiaries and communities know

they have the right to complain if the implementing agencies do not abide by the commitments they

made to the communities. Other kinds of complaint mechanisms in place include:

A specific person in charge of complaint; call center; and complaint form;

Complaint desk with one or two assigned officers to receive calls and collect all complaints.

Such accountability and feedback mechanisms are supposed to provide a clear communication

channel for the communities to voice their suggestions and provide feedback on the program

interventions. This is expected to contribute to improving the quality and efficiency of the program.

There appears to be no awareness of the feedback mechanism, however -- how it operates and what it

is supposed to be doing within the context of the program. In an operating environment such as the

one in Somalia, with high corruption compounded by conflict, it takes considerable time to build trust

and confidence in the transparency of the process. Years of hardship and strife have led many poor

people to doubt that a transparent complaint process can exist.

Let us examine the results of the study and observe the situation on the ground. Enquiring from the

various stakeholders involved, such as the beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries and NGOs, on the

existence of a complaints mechanism in their areas, the beneficiaries‟ responses can be summarized as

follows:

A group of beneficiaries reported that they do not have any mechanism in place where they could

complain. In case they have any complaint, they go through their traditional leaders and report

their concerns;

Other groups reported that they were informed by the NGOs at the time of registration and

distribution of the IDs (this is restricted to Banadir region only) that there is a number behind the

ID cards where they can call in case they have any complaint or give feedback;

In other regions there was no complaint mechanism put in place due to poor communication and

inaccessibility of the areas.

When the non-beneficiaries were asked if they knew where and to whom to complain if they wished

to do so, 40 percent did not have an idea. Another 40 percent said that if they had any complaints they

would submit them to the camp leader. The remaining 20 percent said they would complain to the

NGO staff when they visited the village or camp.

5.1 Operation and Structure of Complaint The complaint mechanism in the cash and voucher intervention operates in a very simple and

rudimentary form. The system is based on a 24-hour hotline telephone system where complainants

can call or send SMS. Some NGOs have established a complaint desk and some others have assigned

one or two staff to process all complaints. There are a few NGOs who provided a Nairobi number

where beneficiaries and other stakeholders can call or ask to be called back or send an SMS.

The weaknesses of the system are that it heavily relies on telephone communication, an unfortunate

option considering that most beneficiaries are poor people who might not have or be able to access a

telephone. Second, the stakeholders are not always informed about how the system works. The

39 | P a g e

stakeholders have not been provided with any procedures or mechanisms to follow when they need to

launch any complaint. As a result, all the complaints made by the beneficiaries consisted of simple

matters such a lost ID cards and other simple operational issues.

Some of the procedural issues raised and discussed include whom the beneficiaries and/or other

stakeholders should address if they have complaints against community leaders, NGOs staff, local

authorities and others (camp leaders, gatekeepers, etc.). Any complaints against these groups pose a

huge challenge to the existing mechanism. For example, beneficiaries who wish to complain against

gatekeepers fear being kicked out of the camp and losing the assistance they receive. Similarly,

committee members both in the villages and camps fear the loss of benefits they are receiving from

the NGOs if they made complaints about the NGO. In addition, community members, especially the

poor and vulnerable, find it difficult to complain about their community leaders or raise concerns in

public (meetings and elsewhere) when the community leaders are present.

In Somalia, traditional community dispute resolution works through traditional leaders and

community members. Somalis are unfamiliar with a system that encourages people to complain

directly to someone else (NGO, local authorities, etc.). This is also an issue that is linked to

confidentiality, which has not been adequately built into the existing complaint mechanisms. This

needs to be rectified.

Of the beneficiaries who used the complaint mechanism, the majority provided feedback about

operational issues related to lost ID cards or perished food received from the shopkeepers/traders.

These issues were then addressed by the NGO representatives or other involved stakeholders. Lost ID

cards replaced, expired food items were exchanged with non-expired food items and old currency

notes received from hawala also returned to hawala and replaced with new notes.

When beneficiaries were asked if they were aware of the existence of complaint procedures for the

project, 75 percent reported they were not aware and 25 percent said they were. If the results are

disaggregated by urban and rural, then the results appear to indicate that in urban areas 75 percent

were aware and 25 percent were to some extent aware. In the rural areas, only 8 percent reported to

have been aware to some extent and 92 percent not to have been aware at all.

Chart 7: Percentage of sampled beneficiaries reporting awareness of the existence of complaint

mechanism

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Urban Rural All

% Aware

% Not aware

40 | P a g e

Non-beneficiaries were asked if they knew to whom to complain if they wished to make a complaint

about the project. The results indicate that 75 percent of non-beneficiaries did not know, compared to

25 percent who did know. In the urban areas, the percentage was reversed, with 75 percent knowing

to whom to complain and 25 percent not knowing. In rural areas, as expected, practically no one had

knowledge of whom to complain if they wanted to raise an issue about the project.

Chart 8: Percentage of non-beneficiaries who knew to whom to complain if they wished

The complaint system is not as functional and efficient in dealing with every issue it is expected to

address. It must also be noted that the system is partially operational only in the urban areas and is

totally dysfunctional in many rural areas, particularly in the areas where Al Shabaab is running the

local administration.

5.2 Challenges of the Complaint Mechanism In Somalia, the society predominantly practices a verbal tradition, and literacy rates have been

historically low. Therefore, any complaint desk officer or other established structure must make extra

effort to record verbal complaints. This will require awareness creation, particularly among the

beneficiaries, so that confidential feedback can ensue. This would alleviate fear from the

communities in reporting issues and complaints against any individual or institution (shopkeeper,

hawala, traders, gatekeepers and the like) that provides services to the beneficiaries.

Another key weakness of the system is that it focuses only on one methodological approach:

telephone communication, without understanding the underlying principles and values that form the

foundation of an effective feedback and complaints system. This may be due to limited training given

to the staff charged with operating the complaints mechanism.

Importantly, it should also be noted that beneficiaries and other stakeholders were not asked how they

prefer to give feedback or make complaints.

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The major weaknesses and strengths of the complaint system given by the beneficiaries include:

Strengths

Venue (forum) for addressing and solving issues related to the program intervention;

Offenders brought to the books and issues addressed and solved;

Sense that there is somewhere you can report mismanagement and request redress; and

Strengthens communication and relations between beneficiaries and NGOs.

Weaknesses

Fear of beneficiaries being punished for reporting against any powerful people;

Fear that reporting a problem might create more problems instead of providing a solution;

A dysfunctional system that is unable to address any problem;

Largely illiterate beneficiaries have difficulty submitting complaints in writing;

Beneficiaries, being poor, are unable to incur or cover phone call expenses; and

Poor capacity of NGO staff to handle complaints.

The majority of sampled beneficiaries said they avoided reporting or giving feedback to the

programme because they feared prosecution and the consequences of reporting on any issue that could

affect the project negatively or that was leveled against NGOs, community leaders and local

authorities. Among the key issues reported by the beneficiaries are:

Lack of awareness and ignorance;

Possible removal from the beneficiary list or camp; and

Security and related concerns.

These and other issues discussed point to the fact that the framework used for complaints and

feedback is poorly designed and lacks clear procedures that can be followed in transparent and

accountable ways.

Many NGO staff operating the complaints desk or receiving complaint phone calls do not feel

confident that they understand every aspect of the overall programme, and so feel unable to respond to

all feedback. In some cases staff felt threatened and interpreted complaints as reflecting poorly on

their performance. This led them to avoid reporting any complaints to the management or

communities. Therefore, it is important to restructure the complaint mechanism and improve its

capability. Most important, it must be integrated within the overall monitoring and evaluation of the

program.

5.3 Improving Complaint Mechanism In light of the challenges, strengths and weaknesses outlined above, the following suggestions are

made to improve the current complaint and feedback mechanism. They are derived from comments

made by programme stakeholders.

Provide Clarity on the Complaint Procedures

Awareness should be created and trust built among all the stakeholders in deciding what the purpose

of the complaint and feedback mechanism should be. Clarify for stakeholders that feedback is

encouraged and welcomed on poor behavior, poor quality and poor service delivery. Whilst this is an

enormous challenge in Somalia, it is also vital to manage expectations so that all stakeholders

42 | P a g e

understand what constitutes feedback and complaints and what responses they may expect from the

NGO.

This should be part of a broader commitment from the NGO side to provide clear information on how

the complaint mechanism operates within their organization -- its mandate and its goals. It is also

crucial that the message is strengthened and made clear that all stakeholders are free to give their

honest and sincere opinions, and that they should not fear being punished or having any benefit

withheld as a result of negative feedback. The stakeholders also suggested that the system involve

other stakeholders in its operation, rather than being operated by the NGO alone. Some of the

suggestions indicated that the running of the Complaints Unit should include donors and other

independent institutions.

Complaint Mechanism in Place

An effective structure within the organization (NGO or any implementing agency) would ideally have

clear and well-defined roles and responsibilities assigned to everyone involved in the implementation

of the programme. The Complaints Unit should be staffed with an adequate number of well-qualified

professionals in order to operate the unit (or desk) effectively and efficiently. Such a move will match

the organization‟s commitment to seriously listening and responding to stakeholders‟ concerns.

Timely Responses

As part of building trust between the communities and the NGOs, it is important that there be

more effective responses from the NGO to the communities wishing feedback. This will

encourage the community to trust and use the system, and any initial reservations or

suspicion will be reduced. The absence of negative comments should not be interpreted as a

community being happy with the implemented initiatives, but rather as an indication that the

mechanisms in place to facilitate community feedback and complaints are functioning poorly.

Factors such as length of time the NGO has been working on the ground have been found to

be less significant than the attitude and commitment of project staff. This was observed most

intensely in the areas controlled by Al Shabaab, where the communities did not build a bond

with the NGO and mistrusted NGO staff.

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6. Relationships among the Stakeholders Many of the issues that the programme of cash and voucher distributions seek to address fall outside

the control of the programme. As such, there is a need to understand and engage all the stakeholders

(and many others) to create an environment that can help meet the objectives of the programme.

Reaching programme targets depends on good relationships with a range of people and organizations

that have a stake in helping the poor and those negatively affected by drought and other emergencies.

This study examined the existing relationships among the various stakeholders involved in the

implementation of the programme -- how they interact, cooperate and coordinate with one another.

The results obtained from the Focus Group Discussions and the interviews were not conclusive,

however, as the FGDs and interviewees had relatively little information to share on this issue.

The beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries interviewed seem not to have had any information on how the

relationship between and among the various stakeholders operates. Some of beneficiaries suspected

that there could be family or clan relations among the various groups. However, information gathered

by the SATG informants can try to explain how the relationships among the various groups operate.

The camp arrangement was mentioned earlier, but bears repeating here. Within the IDP camps, the

relationship between the camp owner, gatekeeper and camp leader is clear. The establishment of the

camp is initiated by the camp owner, who put in place some rudimentary, often low-standard facilities

to accommodate IDPs and other marginalized groups who are looking for a place to stay. The camp

owner engages a gatekeeper, who could be a member of the family of the camp owner or just a person

hired to work at the camp for the owner. Most of the time the gatekeeper is related to the camp owner,

and they fulfill all the tasks assigned to him/her by the camp owner.

The third key person linked to camp management is the camp leader. He/she is also engaged by the

camp owner as a manager who has the responsibility of recruiting and settling the IDPs at the camp.

The camp leader and the gatekeeper are the two key people who have the responsibilities of

explaining to potential camp residents what conditions they have to agree to before they are allowed

to reside at the camp. The relationship of the three people managing the camp is predominantly a

business relationship (i.e., profiting from the displacement of people affected by disaster) rather than a

humanitarian relationship.

In the case of villages, the situation is even more complex than at the camp. Villages could be a

conglomeration of people who settled there because of the availability of facilities in one place. There

would be some individual who, because of his religious status or clan affiliation, is appointed or

appoints himself as village leader. He will then establish, or in case of some kind of tribal democracy,

elect a committee, to run the entire village operations needed to provide services to the community.

These people are the ones who work and negotiate with any agency intending to implement a support

program for affected people.

In the villages under the control of Al Shabaab, the village leader is often a member of Al Shabaab, as

are all the committee members. Any NGO interested in implementing any programme must therefore

obey and live by the rules of Al Shabaab, with no exception.

Negations are done directly with Al Shabaab, so NGOs have to sign or have an unwritten agreement

to implement their programme by using local staff who are Al Shabaab members or their affiliates. It

is therefore impossible for NGOs to operate with a “low profile” in the Al Shabaab areas. No activity

can take place in an Al Shabaab area without the knowledge of Al Shabaab authorities.

44 | P a g e

In the case of those NGOs that were requested to leave but still operated in the Al Shabaab areas, our

informant explained how this is made possible. There is a broker who acts as a middleman between

the NGO and Al Shabaab authorities. The NGO staff negotiates with the broker for the

implementation of their activities and agrees on the details of its implementation and finalizes an

agreement/contract endorsed by Al Shabaab. This implies that activities are or could be implemented,

providing Al Shabaab gets its share. In fact, it‟s safe to say that Al Shabaab and the broker are the

same. In summary, in Al Shabaab–controlled areas, the relationship between the village leaders and

the NGO can be interpreted as cooperation and joint implementation of the project between the NGO

and Al Shabaab.

Figure 1: Linkages among the Stakeholders

6.1 Linkages between the Camp Leader and the NGOs Once the camp has been established and IDPs recruited, negotiations between the NGOs and camp

leader enter into effect. Camp leaders representing the IDPs (as humanitarians who are trying to help

the war victims, drought-affected families, etc.) request support from the NGOs. In some cases the

NGOs suggest that some kind of assessment be conducted to determine the needs of the IDPs before

they commit to support camp residents. In other cases, before the camp is established, the business

people (camp owner, gatekeeper and camp leader) agree with the NGO that they are going to establish

Beneficiaries

INGOs/NGOs

Camp Owner

Camp Leaders &

Committees

Gatekeepers

Non-beneficiaries

Local Authorities Village Leaders/Chiefs

Hawalas

Traders/Shopkeepers

Funding Agencies CVMG

Clan & Clan Leaders

45 | P a g e

a camp and expect to be supported by the NGO. In this case the relationship between the camp leader

and the NGO could be of a business nature that benefits the NGO staff and the camp management. It

may also be the case that all these individuals might be of the same clan family.

Chart 9: Percentage of stakeholders aware of the existing relationship

0

20

40

60

80

100

Business leaders Non-beneficiaries Non-beneficiaries wealthy

% Aware

% Not aware

It is not easy to capture the kind of relationships that might exist among the various stakeholders. It

could be clan related, business or other. A study should be undertaken to uncover the kind of

relationships that exist among the involved stakeholders

6.2 Linkages between Service Providers (Traders and Hawalas) with

Other Stakeholders There are three tiers of relationships linking the NGOs, service providers, and beneficiaries. The

selection of service provider is done by the NGOs with no involvement from the beneficiaries or

clients to be served. In the case of hawalas, they are selected by the NGO head office in Nairobi,

which decides what money Transfer Company is to be used to distribute cash to the beneficiaries.

Contracts or agreements are signed between hawalas and NGOs and implemented at local levels. The

same process is followed for the selection of traders/shops in the case of voucher. The only difference

here is that local NGOs are asked to collect the list of traders/shops available in their areas and submit

them to their head offices for selection and signing of the agreement.

The last stage of this process is that when the local NGOs link the service providers with the

beneficiaries, the beneficiaries are told where to collect cash or vouchers. To date, there is no clear

mechanism to collect information on how the services are faring and how satisfied the beneficiaries

may be at regular intervals.

6.3 Linkages between the Various Stakeholders and Local Authorities Whether the local authorities are from the government or Al Shabaab, they play an important role in

facilitating or hindering the implementation of the program. In theory they should provide information

on the priority areas that need urgent support, so the NGOs could focus on them. In practical terms,

however, due to their weak institutional capacity, they are unable to provide any such services. As a

result, decision-making is often led by the NGOs rather than the local authorities.

In most cases the local authorities and their militias are seen to be hindering the implementation of the

programme through their destructive and corrupt management. Their focus on rent seeking can even

delay programme implementation.

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7. Impact of Cash/Voucher Distribution Programme Overall, the programme has shown positive results and has been popular among the beneficiaries. The

results suggest that cash/voucher transfers contributed to increase the quantity, quality and diversity of

food becoming available at any one time in the local markets. The overriding observation from the

FGDs and interviews conducted in various areas suggests that the programme has positively

contributed to improving the livelihoods of the beneficiaries and the community at large.

Beneficiaries in general were observed to have spent the money that they were given wisely. There is

no indication to suggest that cash has contributed in sustained price rises. And without exception,

women have been able to participate and have a say in the benefits from cash and voucher programs.

The program has also boosted the local economy by giving local traders more income-generation

opportunities, and as a consequence the number of shops has increased. The scheme used existing

traders/shops networks in order to respect the existing commercial organization and set the price with

them without impacting the going market price.

7.1 Impacts on the Availability of Food In general it was found that food availably increased in all project areas. When the stakeholders were

asked whether cash/voucher transfer programmes resulted in greater quantity, diversity and quality of

food in the market, most (70 percent ) of the beneficiaries were of the view that the quality and

quantity of food items remained more or less as it was before. If the data are disaggregated by urban

and rural locales, then 75 percent of urban beneficiaries were of the view that availability, quantity

and quality of food increased in the market. Similar observations were made by the non-beneficiaries.

Among business leaders 60 percent believed that the availability, quality and quantity of food

increased in the markets (see Chart 11).

Chart 10: Percentage of non-beneficiaries whose food availability increased/stayed the same

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Non- ben urban Non-ben Rural Business leader All

% increase

% didn't increase

7.2 Positive/Negative Impacts of the Project When the stakeholders were asked if the cash/voucher intervention had any negative impact, the following were their responses:

31 percent of sampled beneficiaries believed that the intervention had some negative impact and

these included beneficiaries to have changed their behaviour and attitude in life. In fact some of

them became totally dependent on the hand out whether cash or voucher and lost their old ways of life of working hard day and night to feed their families.

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Non-beneficiaries poor were of the opinion that project didn‟t have much of the negative impact

within the community. 25 percent reported that the cash/voucher intervention had some negative

impact and they pointed out that beneficiaries became lazy and adjusted their life according to

what they are given to survive. They are not considering to their original areas to restart their traditional way of life and start cultivating as farmers or rearing livestock again.

31 percent of wealthy non-beneficiaries believed that the project had negative impact.

Chart 11: Percentage of stakeholders believing the project had negative/positive impact

. 0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Beneficiaries Non-beneficiaries poor Non-beneficiarieswealthy

% Positive impact

% Neg impact

When all stakeholders were asked whether the intervention had any positive impacts at the community

level, they responded as follows. The findings suggested, by overwhelming majority, that the

intervention had a positive impact on the community.

Chart 12: Percentage of stakeholders who believed the intervention had positive impacts

Traders The monitoring findings were confirmed during an interview with the traders. All of the

traders (100 percent) said they were convinced that the intervention had positive impacts on business

in general. They indicated that their business had increased and as a result they were making more profit than before the program.

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Business Leaders were of the opinion that the project had some positive impacts on business but that

it was difficult to measure given the fact that the size of the project was not big enough to make a

huge difference to the market. Some 81 percent of the business people believed that the intervention had positive impacts on business in general.

7.3 Impacts on Prices and Exchange Rates At the end of 2012, Somalia continued to receive a huge injection of foreign currency through

humanitarian operations, Somali investors and remittances from the Diasporas, and foreign

investment. As a result, the Somali Shilling continued to strengthen against the U.S. dollar. In other

words, the Shilling appreciated by over 50 percent against the U.S. dollar during the last quarter of

2012 to the first quarters of 2013.

Stakeholders were asked whether the exchange rate varied around the time that transfers were made.

In total, 31 percent of the sampled respondents thought the rate varied during the time of transfer.

However, when the data are disaggregated by rural and urban, we noticed that in urban areas 100

percent of the respondents believed that the exchange rate varied during transfers. In the rural areas,

only 8 percent of those interviewed believed the exchange rate varied. This can be attributed to the

fact that rural markets are smaller and less sophisticated and therefore markets are more stable than

those in urban areas, where the impact of the demand is felt immediately (see Chart 13).

Chart 13: Percentage of those who believed exchange rate varied during transfer

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

% exchange rate varied % exchange rate didn't vary

All

Urban

Rural

Prices are determined by many factors, including exchange rate (dollar vs. shilling) for imported

goods, availability of commodities in the market and seasonality as most of the domestic goods are

dependent on weather conditions. On the exchange rate with the Shilling having strengthened against

the dollar, it was expected that prices would decline in terms of shilling, given the fact that the Somali

economy is a dollarized economy as the dollar became weaker the prices tended to increase in terms

of dollar. When the stakeholders were asked if traders increased their prices as a result of cash

transfers, 93 percent of respondents responded they didn‟t, but in terms of dollars the prices increased

given the fact that the value of the Shilling appreciated. For example, a meal at the restaurant was Sh.

36,000 (when the exchange rate was Sh. 28,000 to the US$) a few month ago and it is still Sh. 36,000

today when the exchange rate is just Sh. 15, 000 to the US$. So in terms of $ a meal few month ago

was a dollar and few cents and today it is two dollars and a few cents. So the prices have more

doubled in just a few months.

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7.4 Other Impacts and Aspects of the Programme Interventions This study also asked whether the cash transfer or the voucher provided to the beneficiaries was

sufficient to cover household basic needs. Overall, 70 percent of the sampled beneficiaries thought

that the given cash or voucher was not sufficient to cover all households needs, but that it helped the family to survive.

Additional information was also collected concerning the issue of non-food needs and whether these

could be covered by the cash transfer or voucher made available by the program. Here 73 percent of

the sampled beneficiaries reported that the support provided was sufficient to cover any non-food needs.

On the issue on how the transfer is spent, respondents were asked whether it was spent all at once,

used once a week, or whether spending took place on a daily basis. The findings suggest that 70 percent of the beneficiaries spent the transfer they received on a daily basis, 10 percent spent it all at

once buying monthly family needs, and 10 percent used part of the received cash to pay debts and the

rest on a daily basis to purchase family needs. The remaining 10 percent didn‟t provide any information on their spending patterns.

Additional investigations were made to understand how and who made decisions on the use of cash,

but the findings were not conclusive. In general, the beneficiary considered the decision in

consultation with husband/wife. Women seemed to be mostly involved in the decision-making process.

In this context, no conflicts were observed to have been caused by the control of cash/voucher within

the households. The findings suggest overwhelmingly (93 percent) that there were no conflicts

observed within the households stemming from the control of cash. The remaining 7 percent believed

that some conflicts were caused by the control of cash, particularly in those households where the

husband had more than one wife.

Another issue raised was whether any of beneficiaries misused the cash transfer or food vouchers. The

majority of respondents (81 percent) were of the opinion that beneficiaries didn‟t misuse the resources

allocated to them. The remaining 19 percent believed that some of the resources were misused,

particularly with young beneficiaries who ended up using or consuming khat and other mild narcotic.

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8. Conclusion and Recommendations From the 11 districts visited, the picture that emerges was a positive one. Satisfaction amongst those

receiving cash and vouchers was quite high. A major problem exists, however, in gaining access to

the programme, which was made inaccessible by an inadequate process of targeting/registration and

selection of the beneficiaries, limited availability of resources, security conditions, and lack of

cooperation and communication among the involved stakeholders. Most of the vulnerable groups,

including marginalized people and minorities, were reportedly denied access through clan control

mechanisms, inability to buy access through gatekeepers, and issues of diversion and accountability, as well as the troubling relationship among the various stakeholders in the decision-making process.

On a positive note, there was some success in improving the nutrition status of the beneficiaries and

their children through the increased number of meals per day captured from the quantitative collected

information for all members of the households who received cash or vouchers. However, on a more

worrying note, some of the communities in the study identified that they are starting to heavily rely on cash and voucher programme more and which can be a barrier to self-sufficiency going forward.

Targeting: Even though most of the NGOs planned to implement what is called “community-based

targeting,” their activities on the ground were in fact not community-based. Most beneficiaries

interviewed were not aware of the existence of the program and did not understand what the targeting

system was and how selection decisions were made.

In practical terms, the targeting system used was an arbitrary one manipulated by other stakeholders, such as illegitimate community leaders, clan leaders, gatekeepers and local authorities.

To improve the targeting system, there must be improved analysis of context, an increase in the

capacity of NGO staff and their partners to target all areas, and a willingness to work with legitimate

stakeholders. In addition, there must be improved participation in the targeting among all key

stakeholders, particularly the beneficiaries. This will require taking into consideration existing

constraints in security conditions, and accessibility to the targeted areas. Most important, appropriate

checks and balances need to be identified. This must involve all key stakeholders in the planning

stage, particularly the beneficiaries. The programme would also strongly benefit from improved

transparency by informing the community of the intention of programme, the entitlement of the

beneficiaries, and the roles and responsibilities all involved stakeholders. The study also points to the

need for sensitive, localized complaint mechanisms.

Diversion: Diversion, corruption and rent seeking emerged as major impediments to poor people

receiving cash and voucher distributions. This problem permeated through to the most basic levels;

for instance in various IDPs camps and villages, poor people wanting access to camps were forced by

the gatekeepers/village leaders to pay a certain amount of money, and if unable to do so, they were

made to agree to pay part of their cash or food when they started receiving it from the programme.

Otherwise, the poor would not be allowed to enter the camps or any other settlement where they

would be registered to receive cash or vouchers. In addition, several cases were observed of fees/taxes

being imposed on the beneficiaries by militias (whether of local authorities, Al Shabaab or freelance

militias).

This grave issue calls for a clear policy on the distribution of cash and/or vouchers, one that is

transparent and shared with the community and involved stakeholders. People need to know what they

are supposed to receive, when, where, and for how long. It also needs to be made clear whether there

are any rightful charges that the beneficiaries must incur. Those involved in implementation must

clearly define, in a transparent and accountable manner, the roles and responsibilities played by

various stakeholders, such as gatekeepers, militias, local authorities and the like. This may help to

overcome what the beneficiaries see as major discrepancies between the amount (cash or food) they

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are supposed to receive and what they effectively receive after charges are applied by different

groups.

Accountability and Feedback: The complaint mechanism in the cash and voucher intervention

programme operates in a very simple and rudimentary form. Basically the system is based on a 24-

hour hotline, where complainants can call or send SMS. The weaknesses of the system are that it

relies on the telephone – technology that is out of reach for some beneficiaries. Second, not all

beneficiaries were informed about how the system works, being told only to call the telephone

number on the back of their ID card when they have an issue to raise or encounter a problem. Third,

beneficiaries were not provided with any procedures or mechanisms for launching a complaint, which

means that most comments to date have involved simple operational issues. Thus opportunities for

valuable programme feedback have been lost. What is needed is a feedback mechanism users can feel

secure and safe in using, and the education to support it. This can be a valuable way to improve

service delivery. One recommendation is the introduction of Reports Cards or other simple instrument

to collect and analyze data on regular basis -- with the results made public. Any solution must take

into account that most of the beneficiaries are illiterate (it is culture with a strong verbal tradition) and

are culturally unused to making indirect complaints.

Relationships among Stakeholders: Many of the issues that the program of cash and voucher

distributions seek to address fall outside the control of the program. Therefore, one must understand

and engage all the stakeholders (and many others) to create an environment that supports the

objectives of the programme and the sustainability challenges it faces. Reaching the program‟s targets

depends on good relationships with a range of people and organizations that have a stake in helping

the poor and those affected by drought, civil unrest and other emergencies. The study revealed that,

although many stakeholders operate under the programme umbrella, they are often working against

one another. These parties must coordinate their efforts. There is an urgent need to identify and

include in the implementation process only legitimate stakeholders, those whose utmost desire is to

help the poor of Somalia.

Monitoring: On the monitoring side, we must continue updating data collection tools and strengthen

the capacity of data collectors. A more professional approach will enable better communication and

interaction with the beneficiaries. This study represents a start in building the capacity of data

collectors (IFMs), providing a sound knowledge of the tools and principles on the theoretical side.

Building on this can enable these and prospective data collectors to carry out future phases of these

studies. The training should be intensive, one-week affairs designed to familiarize those selected to

take part in the exercise with the theory and concepts behind the study, and acquaint them with the

proper tools for data collection and the procedures for documenting the results. In addition, the

currently developed database management system for the participatory (qualitative) data should be

expanded and liked to the quantitative data collected by the NGOs on monthly and quarterly post

distribution monitoring

.

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Hedlund, K. et al. (2012). Interim Evaluation of theUnconditional Cash and Voucher Transfer Programmes in Southern and Central Somalia. Humanitarian Outcomes.

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