European Journal of Social Psychology

Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 1118–1134 (2007)

Published online 4 May 2007 in Wiley InterScience

(www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.430

*E

C

Perceived collective continuity: Seeing groups as entities thatmove through time

Correspondence to: Fabio Sani, Department of P-mail: f.sani@dundee.ac.uk

opyright # 2007 John Wiley & Son

FABIO SANI1*, MHAIRI BOWE1,MARINA HERRERA2, CRISTIAN MANNA3,TIZIANA COSSA4,XIULOU MIAO5 AND YUEFANG ZHOU1

1University of Dundee, UK2University of Valencia, Spain3University of Bologna, Italy4University of Padua, Italy5University of Suzhou, China

Abstract

This paper presents two studies, conducted in two different countries, investigating perceptions of

ingroups as enduring, temporally persistent entities, and introduces a new instrument measuring

‘perceived collective continuity’ (PCC). In Study 1 we show that perceptions of ingroup continuity are

based on two main dimensions: perceived cultural continuity (perceived continuity of norms and

traditions) and perceived historical continuity (perceived interconnection between different historical

ages and events). This study also allows the construction of an internally consistent PCC scale

including two subscales tapping on these two dimensions. Study 2 replicates findings from the first

study; it also reveals that PCC is positively correlated to a set of social identity-related measures (e.g.,

group identification and collective self-esteem), and that its effects on these measures are mediated by

perceived group entitativity. Overall, these two studies confirm that PCC is an important theoretical

construct, and that the PCC scale may become an important instrument in future research on group

processes and social identity. Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

People tend to perceive their ingroups – such as nations, ethnic communities, religious institutions,

extended families, and so on – as having temporal continuity, as being entities that move through time

(Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). That means that, as members of these groups, we see ourselves as parts of

an endless chain, a body that transcends us not only in space, but also, and perhaps more importantly, in

time.

sychology, Park Place, University of Dundee, Dundee DD1 4HN, Scotland, UK.

s, Ltd.

Received 14 March 2006

Accepted 13 February 2007

Perceived collective continuity 1119

To date, social psychologists have largely neglected the issue of perceived collective continuity. For

instance, researchers interested in aspects of group perception and representation – such as group

homogeneity, variability, and stereotypes - have focused on people’s perceptions of groups’

contemporary features. That is, these researchers have directed their attention to the perception of

social groups as ‘‘synchronic collections of individuals co-existing and acting in parallel’’ (Condor,

1996, p. 305), rather than as temporally constituted and enduring communities, stretching back into the

past and forward into the future. It’s worthwhile noting that social psychologists interested in the

factors leading to perceived group entitativity – that is the perception that a group is like an entity, a

cohesive whole (Campbell, 1958; Sani, Todman, & Lunn, 2005) – postulate that the perception of the

group temporal continuity constitutes an important antecedent of perceived group entitativity.

However, they have never investigated perceptions of group continuity in depth, and their main interest

resides on whether or not perceived group continuity is responsible for seeing contemporaneous group

members as forming an entity.

Contrary to research about group perception, research on social psychological processes within

and between groups – especially recent work on schisms and mergers – has fully acknowledged

the importance of perceived group continuity, and is generating a growing interest in the issue.

More specifically, research on schismatic processes has shown that factions which secede from

their parent group do so because they perceive a given change endorsed by the group majority as

subverting the group identity, thereby determining a rupture in the temporal continuity of the

group (Sani, 2005, in press; Sani & Reicher, 1998, 2000; Sani & Todman, 2002). Consistent with this,

research on group merger (van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, Monden, & de Lima, 2002)

has revealed that a merger will be happily endorsed only on condition that group members

perceive some continuity between the pre-merger and the post-merger group. If the post-merger group

looks too different from the pre-merger group, group members may have a sense that the post-merger

group is no longer their group, and therefore may not identify with it. However, despite revealing the

importance of perceptions of collective continuity, work on schism and merger does not address it in a

direct fashion.

Because perceived collective continuity is related with very important aspects of group perception

and life, we are convinced that it deserves to be tackled directly by social psychologists. The aim of the

studies presented in this article is to move a first step into this uncharted territory.

TWO DIMENSIONS OF PERCEIVED COLLECTIVE CONTINUITY

In some fundamental respects, the person I am now is the same person that I was in the past and will be

in the future. Philosophers generally agree that everyone needs a sense of self-continuity in order to

qualify as a person at all (Cassirer, 1923), and that a sense of continuity is a ‘constitutive’ condition of

the coming into being of the self (Habermas, 1991). Likewise, psychologists contend that a

fundamental feature of the human self is that of being experienced as temporally extended, as a

singularity that moves across time (James, 1890/1981; Neisser, 1988).

The way in which human selves achieve a sense of temporal persistence remains, however, a

philosophical quandary (Harre, 1979; Rorty, 1976). Nonetheless, it is possible to speculate upon, and

even empirically investigate, perceptions of self-continuity. Based on inspiring research concerning the

interface between personal and institutional continuity in Canadian aboriginals, Chandler and his

colleagues (Chandler et al., 2003; Chandler & Proulx, in press) have proposed that our sense of the

personal self as diachronically persistent may be grounded on two different perceptions. One is the

perception that the self has a deep, inherent essence that remains the same through time, despite

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1120 Fabio Sani et al.

obvious physical and psychological changes that people sustain in their life-span. The other perception

concerns a sense that, although our own self is fluid and ever-changing, the different phases it goes

through during its existence are meaningfully interconnected: they are part of a coherent, intelligible

story.

We believe that perceived collective continuity has two main dimensions, which broadly match the

two different forms of perceived individual continuity proposed by Chandler and his colleagues. The

first dimension is concerned with the perceptions that core values, beliefs, traditions, habits,

mentalities, and inclinations are trans-generationally transmitted within the group. That means that the

group is perceived as having deep, essential cultural traits that have a degree of permanence. The

second dimension is related to the perception that the different ages, periods, and events in the history

of the group are causally linked to one another, that they form a coherent narrative.

As well as being consistent with work by Chandler and his colleagues, this dual aspect of collective

continuity perceptions is implicitly accepted by numerous social scientists. For instance, the

historiographer Breisach (1986), who was interested in the origins of perceived collective continuity,

observed that the Greeks in the Homeric period did not have ‘‘any notion that events, big and small,

when told in proper time sequence, would result in an explanatory narrative. [. . . .] They recognized the

continuity only of timeless ideals and virtues which the heroes of the past taught to the people of the

present’’ (p. 7). This statement includes a clear distinction between the continuity of values, ideals, and

virtues, on the one hand, and the continuity of events and historical ages, on the other hand. The

meaningfulness of this distinction is backed up by historical and sociological research showing how

perceived continuity of values, beliefs, and customs, on the one hand, and perceived continuity of

historical phases and events, on the other hand, have followed relatively distinct developmental

trajectories.

The first manifestations of perceived continuity of beliefs and values can probably be found in

ancestors worship, by means of which archaic people expressed their identification with ideals,

behaviours and values held by ‘‘the members now living, but also to those who have died and to those

who are not yet born’’ (Radcliffe-Brown, 1945). Eventually, this form of continuity took more mature,

sophisticated forms. For example, one of the core characteristics of ethnic communities and nations of

modern times is that their members feel tied together by virtue of beliefs, values, customs, and practices

that have being inherited from previous generations and that are expected to be transmitted to future

generations (Smith, 1998).

Concerning the perception that different events and ages in the group history are causally

interconnected, this probably constitutes a relatively recent achievement in human history.

Anthropologists contend that people in pre-historic communities and traditional societies,

despite being obviously aware of the passing of time, tried ‘‘to annul the possible effects of

historical factors on their equilibrium and continuity’’ (Levi-Strauss, 1972, p. 234); that is, these people

lived in a timeless dimension, a sort of expanded present where events moved in a circle, with things

occurring, going away, and then recurring. Several historians (e.g., Breisach, 1986) believe that the first

rudimentary forms of historical consciousness emerged during the early stages of the first great

civilizations. For instance, the Mesopotamians, Egyptians, and Chinese of the third and second

millennia BC wrote chronicles, lists and inscriptions – usually concerned with the deeds of great

leaders – showing a sense of chronology. However, these documents did not try to interpret and analyse

the events described, nor did they showed any appreciation of the causal relationships among those

events (Butterfield, 1981). It was only during the first millennium BC that history came to be

understood as the unfolding of causally related episodes and stages. So, for instance, the Jews of ancient

Israel saw the vicissitudes of their groups as forming a chain of causally interconnected events, having

an origin and an endpoint. This conception of time and group history as linear, as having a direction,

eventually became a central assumption in modern conceptions of history. This is eloquently explained

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Perceived collective continuity 1121

by Lowenthal (1985): ‘‘Historical and other stories have moved well beyond the straightforward,

unilinear, annalistic framework inherited from chronologists. Historical intelligibility requires not

merely past events occurring at particular times, but a coherent story in which many events are skipped,

others are coalesced, and temporal sequence is often subordinated to explanation and interpretation’’

(p. 223).

We believe that the conceptual distinction between the perceived continuity of values, beliefs and

traditions on the one hand, and the perceived continuity of historical phases and events on the other

hand, might have important social psychological implications and must therefore be emphasized. For

instance, different national or regional groups may pursue or claim collective continuity by stressing

either one or the other dimension, depending on the specificity of the group. It is possible, for example,

that groups that have undergone dramatic and radical social and political transformations may find it

hard, or even undesirable, to claim high degrees of cultural continuity, while they may wish to stress

historical continuity in order to enhance the intelligibility of the group narrative and to make sense of

the changes that have taken place. Also, the cultural and historical sides of perceived collective

continuity could have differential relations to theoretically important variables. For instance, since the

perceived continuity of cultural elements may afford those elements with a special sense of truthfulness

and transcendence, perceptions of cultural continuity could be especially related with collective

self-esteem (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). On the other hand, perceived historical continuity might have

structuring and stabilizing functions for the self, thereby being positively associated with one’s own

sense of coherence (Antonovsky, 1987). Despite the distinctive features of the cultural and historical

dimension of perceived collective continuity, we emphasize that we consider them as related. This is

because perceived continuity of traditions and values should be facilitated by the perception that the

group history has narrative coherence, and vice versa.

The aim of our first study was twofold. First, we wanted to test the idea that cultural and historical

continuity form two distinct, but at the same time related dimensions of a superordinate construct,

namely perceived collective continuity. Second, we wanted to construct a measuring instrument that

could eventually be used to explore the nature of the relationship of perceived collective continuity and

its components with other important aspects of group representation and social identity. In this study we

focus on a national group, while in Study 2 we will focus on a regional group.

STUDY 1

Method

Participants and Procedure

The study involved 244 Italian undergraduate students (64 men, 175 women, and 5 who failed to

report their gender) from both Milan University at Como and Bologna University at Cesena.

Their mean age was 20.88 years (SD¼ 5.08). Participants were recruited from psychology classes

and their participation was voluntary. They were given a questionnaire including a set of 36 items and

asked to specify their agreement with each item by rating them on a seven-point scale, with higher

numbers indicating greater agreement with the item. The study was presented as part of an international

research project on people’s understandings of their own national or regional group, as was the

subsequent study.

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1122 Fabio Sani et al.

Items

We included two subsets of items, each broadly addressing one of the two dimensions of perceived

collective continuity discussed above. More specifically, one subset of 20 items referred to the

perception of ‘cultural’ continuity, that is the fact that the group values, traditions, customs, habits,

inclinations, mentality, and so on, have been and will be trans-generationally transmitted (e.g., ‘‘Italian

people have passed on their traditions across different generations’’). The other subset, made of

16 items, concerned the perception of ‘historical’ continuity, that is the fact that different events and

ages in the group history are causally interconnected, that they are part of a temporal sequence forming

a coherent story (e.g., ‘‘Major phases in Italian history are linked to one another’’). We therefore had an

initial pool of 36 items in total.1

Results and Discussion

To start with, we submitted the 36-item, two-factor model to confirmatory factor analyses (CFA). The

fit of the model was assessed through the x2 value, the comparative-fit index (CFI), and the root mean

square error of approximation (RMSEA) index. If the model was not satisfactory, problematic items

were identified by means of modification indexes and standardised residuals and removed. The fit of the

model was then re-assessed by running a further CFA. These operations were repeated until removal of

items did not lead to a significant decrease in the x2 value. Each CFA was performed following a

Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) approach using AMOS program, Version 5 (Arbuckle, 2003).

The application of this procedure allowed us to progress from an initial 36-item model yielding a

relatively modest fit with the data (x2 (593)¼ 1328.193; x2/df¼ 2.24; p< .001; CFI¼ 0.72;

RMSEA¼ 0.07), to a 12-item (six on each factor) model yielding a very good fit with the data (x2

(53)¼ 46.09; x2/df¼ 0.87; p¼ .74, ns; CFI¼ 1.00; RMSEA¼ 0.00). To ensure that this 12-item,

two-factor model was to be preferred to a more parsimonious model, we conducted a CFA on a 12-item,

single factor model. Goodness of fit indexes indicated that this model did not fit the data adequately: x2

(54)¼ 366.11; x2/df¼ 6.78; p< .001; CFI¼ 0.61; RMSEA¼ 0.15. Furthermore, the chi-square of the

two-factor model was significantly better than the chi-square of the single-factor model (x2difference

(1)¼ 320.02, p< .001), and the two-factor model was clearly superior in terms of the Akaike

Information Criterion (AIC) relative to the single-factor model (120.09 and 414.11, respectively).

The procedure described above showed that, as expected, a two-dimensional conceptualization of

perceived collective continuity is better than a unidimensional one. We therefore produced a 12-item

‘perceived collective continuity’ (PCC) scale formed by two 6-item subscales labelled as ‘History’ and

‘Culture’, respectively. The internal consistency – as measured by Cronbach’s a – of the PCC scale was

.80, while that of the two subscales was .77 for History and .82 for Culture. This was seen as

satisfactory, especially when considering that the two subscales include a relatively small number of

items, something that tends to lower the Cronbach a substantially (Briggs & Cheek, 1986). Importantly,

the correlation between the two subscales was modest but statistically significant: r¼ .23; p< .01. This

confirmed our speculations about the relatedness of the two subscales. With regards to descriptive

statistics, the mean of the PCC scale as a whole was 4.84 (0.72) and that of the History and Culture

subscales was 5.35 (0.85) and 4.34 (0.99), respectively. (See Appendix 1 for the scale and for how it

should be administered.)

1The items were developed by the first two authors, who independently selected and paraphrased sentences from articles andbooks discussing collective continuity, and then met together to decide which items were too similar to each other and shouldtherefore be discarded. The selected 36 items were also submitted to a small opportunistic sample of Scottish people (N¼ 12),who confirmed that, in their opinion, the items made sense and were amenable to ratings in terms of agreement and disagreement.

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Perceived collective continuity 1123

STUDY 22

The present study was conducted with several aims in mind. First of all, we wanted to replicate the

factor structure of the PCC scale found in Study 1 with an independent sample. Second, we wished to

assess the cross-national validity of findings. Third, we were interested in testing a sample of members

of a sub-national, rather than national group, in order to test the applicability of the PCC scale to

different types of groups. Fourth, we wanted to include additional measures, which could be used to test

some specific hypotheses. These additional measures and the hypotheses that we wanted to test are

discussed below.

A set of additional measures concerned various aspects of group identification and evaluation (e.g.,

social identification, collective self-esteem). These measures were included to assess the prediction that

they would be positively correlated with PCC. This prediction was based on three considerations.

First, in a recent series of studies, Vignoles, Regalia, Manzi, Golledge, & Scabini (2006) have

demonstrated that people pursue identities (either personal, relational, or collective) that can fulfil some

core psychological needs, including a need for self-continuity. Therefore, an ingroup that is perceived

as having historical and cultural continuity should enhance one’s own sense of self-continuity and, in

turn, this enhanced sense of self-continuity should increase one’s own social identification and

emotional ties with, and evaluation of, the ingroup. Second, terror management theorists (Pyszczynski,

Greenberg, & Solomon, 2000) have demonstrated that one of the crucial defences against fear of death

is one’s own ascription to groups and their worldviews. Group beliefs and values provide us with ‘‘a set

of standards through which one can attain a sense of personal value, and the promise of literal and/or

symbolic immortality to those who live up to these standards’’ (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon,

2000, p. 78). We contend that, if identification with groups is sought, at least in part, in order to achieve

a sense of symbolic immortality, then groups that are seen as temporally persistent should be even more

effective in providing a sense of symbolic immortality and in shielding people from fear of death, and

should therefore prompt stronger social identification, collective self-esteem, and so on. Third, the

body of literature on nationalism and ethnicity (Smith, 1998) has produced plenty of convincing

arguments that people like to believe that their nations have a very long history and quasi-mythical

origins, because this affords the group, and the affective ties between the group members, a sense of

timelessness and primordiality, which enhances and glorifies the group and its members (e.g., Geertz,

1973). We can therefore expect that, because a sense of cultural and historical continuity will

presumably produce a sense of timelessness and primordiality, higher PCC will go hand in hand with

higher group identification, emotional attachment, collective self-esteem, and so on.

An additional measure concerning the perception of group entitativity was also included. As

anticipated in the introduction, the perceived continuous existence of a collective is normally seen as an

antecedent of its perceived entitativity (Haslam, Rothchild, & Ernst, 2000). Therefore, we expected to

find a substantial correlation between these two constructs, which would afford convergent validity to

the PCC scale. It is also important to note that, as argued by Yzerbyt, Castano, Leyens, and Paladino

(2000), and subsequently demonstrated by Castano, Yzerbyt, and Bourguignon (2003), people prefer to

2Before moving to Study 2, we conducted a study aimed at establishing the test–retest reliability of the PCC scale. Fortyundergraduate students (15 men and 25 women) at the University of Dundee, in Scotland, were paid £.3 to participate in this study.Their mean age was 20.67 years (SD¼ 5.50). They completed a questionnaire containing an English-language version of the PCCscale twice, with a 3-week time interval between test and retest. Calculation of the correlation coefficient between data collectedat Time 1 and Time 2 showed a satisfactory degree of temporal stability for the PCC scale as a whole: r¼ .74; p< .001. Regardingthe two constituents subscales, we obtained an r value of .80 (p< .001) and .44 (p< .01) for Culture and History, respectively.Though the test–retest correlation of the History subscale was not as good as we hoped, we considered it acceptable and thereforewe employed this subscale in Study 2.

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1124 Fabio Sani et al.

be members of entitative, rather than non-entitative groups, probably because entitative groups fulfil

basic needs such as, for instance, self-understanding. Therefore, given that PCC is an antecedent of

perceived group entitativity, we expected that the hypothesized effects of PCC on social identity

measures would be mediated by perceived group entitativity.

Another set of additional measures that we included in the questionnaire was about needs fulfilled

through group membership (e.g., belonging). These measures were included because Vignoles et al.

(2006) not only found that people are more prone to identify with groups that fulfil a need for

self-continuity, but also that the sense of continuity provided by given identities was positively

correlated with fulfilment of other group-mediated motives, for instance a sense of belonging and

distinctiveness. Therefore, we expected that higher PCC would be associated with higher fulfilment of

need for belonging, distinctiveness and so forth.

Finally, we added a measure concerned with the respondents’ political orientation. This measure

was included to assess whether PCC is somehow associated with a specific political stance. Our interest

in the possible association between PCC and given political positions derived from the observation

that claims of collective continuity are often a central element in nationalistic ideologies (Anderson,

1983).

Although at this stage of our research it may be premature to make differential predictions for the

two subscales, we suspect that, in general, perceptions of cultural continuity will be more strongly

correlated to the various social identity measures and to the needs than perceptions of historical

continuity. This is because, while we see cultural continuity as a rather intuitive, immediate, and

emotionally charged notion, we believe that historical continuity is a more intellectualistic, abstract,

and ‘cold’ type of idea.

Method

Participants

Participants were 243 undergraduate students at the University of Valencia (mean age¼ 21.63 years,

SD¼ 3.05), who defined themselves as ‘Valencians’. In total, 42 were men and 201 were women. They

were recruited from psychology classes and participated voluntarily.

Procedure and Measures

Participants were given a questionnaire to complete, including a Spanish version of the PCC scale and a

set of other measures. These included a measure of perceived group entitativity, some measures broadly

addressing the three core dimensions of social identity proposed by Jackson (2002), namely the

cognitive, affective, and evaluative dimension, and measures of needs fulfilled through group

membership. All the measures referred to the group of Valencians. We also included a measure of

political orientation. These measures are described below.

Perceived Group Entitativity (PGE). This is an eight-item scale addressing definitional aspects of

PGE that are widely accepted by researchers, that is the perception that the group is a cohesive, unified

whole retaining a quasi-tangible quality (e.g., ‘‘The group of Valencian people is like a unified whole’’,

or ‘‘The group of Valencian people has a tangible existence’’). Three items were adapted from Sani

(2005) and two from Castano et al. (2003), while the other three were especially created for this study.

Respondents specified how much they agreed with each item on a seven-point scale.

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Perceived collective continuity 1125

Group Identification. This is a four-item global measure of identification with a social group adapted

from Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears (1995) (e.g., ‘‘I see myself as a member of the Valencian group’’).

We chose this specific measure of social identification over several others that are available because it is

succinct, easily adaptable, and generally reliable. Respondents specified how much they agreed with

each item on a seven-point scale.

Inclusion of the Ingroup in the Self (IIS). This is a single-item measure based on seven Venn-diagram

figures devised by Tropp and Wright (2001). Each figure includes two converging circles – one

representing the self and one representing the ingroup – having different degrees of overlap.

Participants are asked to tick the pair of circles that best represent their sense of psychological overlap

with the group.

Collective Self-Esteem (CSE) (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). This is a widely used 16-item measure of

global collective self-esteem (e.g., ‘‘In general, others respect Valencians’’) composed of four

subscales concerning one’s feelings of worthiness as a member of one’s social group, one’s private

regard for one’s social group, one’s perception of how one’s social group is regarded by others, and the

importance of one’s group membership to one’s sense of self. Respondents specified their level of

agreement with each item on a seven-point scale.

Feeling Thermometer (FT). This is a two-item measure of affect toward a given object (Campbell,

1971). Respondents specified both how unfavourable/favourable and how cold/warm they felt toward

Valencian people by indicating a number ranging between 0 (extremely unfavourable/cold) and 100

(extremely favourable/warm).

Traits. This is a list of eight positive adjectives (intelligent, honest, efficient, practical, industrious,

imaginative, hardworking, friendly) and eight negative adjectives (arrogant, selfish, insensitive,

deceitful, incompetent, aggressive, lazy, hostile). Participants were instructed to specify the extent to

which, in general, ingroup members possess each characteristic on a seven-point scale, where 1¼ not at

all [adjective], and 7¼ very [adjective].

Emotions. This is a shortened version of the Frequency of Emotion Index (FEI) used by Simpson

(1990), and consists of a list of eight either intense or mild positive emotions (happy, content, excited,

optimistic, joyful, serene, satisfied, passionate) and eight either intense or mild negative emotions

(irritated, lonely, hostile, depressed, sad, distressed, angry, fearful). Participants indicated how often

they experience each emotion in their relationships and interactions with other Valencian people, on a

seven-point scale, where 1¼ ‘never’, and 7¼ ‘very often’. Simpson originally used 28 emotions. We

dropped those that were not particularly relevant for national groups.

Needs. We refer here to a set of five scales especially created for this study, measuring the extent to

which group membership fulfils different needs that social psychologists have indicated as being of

particular importance. These scales are as follows: (i) need for belonging (Baumeister & Leary, 1995)

(four items; e.g., ‘‘To be a member of the Valencian group gives me a sense of belonging’’); need for

self-knowledge (Markus, 1983) (five items; e.g., ‘‘Other members of the Valencian group have helped

me understand myself better’’); need for uncertainty reduction (Mullin & Hogg, 1999) (five items; e.g.,

‘‘If I feel uncertain about specific issues, I discuss them with other members of the Valencian group’’);

need for distinctiveness (Vignoles, Chryssochoou, & Breakwell, 2000) (four items; e.g., ‘‘As a member

of the Valencian group I am distinct from members of other groups’’); need for self-expansion (Aron &

Aron, 1996) (four items, e.g., ‘‘I am enriched by the characteristics of the other members of the

Valencian group’’). All items were rated on a seven-point scale, with higher numbers indicating greater

level of agreement with the item.

Political Orientation. This measure is based on a single question asking participants to specify their

political position by ticking one of the following categories: extreme left; left; centre-left; centre;

centre-right; right; extreme right; none of the above.

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1126 Fabio Sani et al.

Results and Discussion

To start with, we assessed the reliabilities of the PCC scale and its subscales. These were satisfactory: PCC:

a¼ .80; Culture: a¼ .86; History: a¼ .71. Then we performed a SEM analysis on the 12-item two-factor

model. The model fit with the data was acceptable: x2 (53)¼ 128; x2/df¼ 2.42; p> .05; CFI¼ 0.92;

RMSEA¼ 0.08. In addition, an alternative single-factor model did not fit the data well: x2 (54)¼ 297.88;

x2/df¼ 5.52; p< .001; CFI¼ 0.73; RMSEA¼ 0.14. Also, the two-factor model had a significantly better

x2 than the single-factor model (x2difference (1)¼ 169.88; p< .001), and the AIC of the two-factor model

(147.78) was lower than that of the single-factor model (202.70). These results replicate findings from the

first study, thereby affording the PCC scale some degree of cross-national validity.

Before proceeding to other analyses, we reversed scores for negative emotions, so that the less a

negative emotion was experienced the higher the score. Then, we submitted the scores on the 16

emotions to reliability analysis. Because reliability was good (a¼ .89), we created an overall score and

labelled this composite variable as ‘‘Emotions’’, where the higher the score the more emotionally

positive toward other ingroup members the participant felt. We also reversed scores for negative traits,

so that the less a negative trait was seen as applicable to the group of Valencians the higher the score.

Scores on the 16 traits were also submitted to reliability analysis, which was good: a¼ .86. Therefore,

we created an overall score and labelled this new variable as ‘‘Traits’’, where the higher the score the

more positive was the participant’s judgement of the ingroup members.

At this point, we calculated the correlation coefficient between all the variables, including the two

PCC subscales. Concerning Political orientation, we excluded those who responded ‘‘none of the

above’’ (N¼ 15; 6.2%) from the analysis. Consider that, because 1¼ ‘extreme left’ and 7¼ ‘extreme

right’, a negative correlation between PCC and Political orientation would indicate that PCC increases

as people move toward the left pole of the continuum, while a positive correlation would mean that

PCC increases as people move toward the right pole. All correlations, together with standard

deviations, and reliabilities for all the variables, are reported in Table 1.

We found that PCC had a positive correlation with all the variables, and that all correlations were

statistically significant except that with Political orientation. Two of these correlations, namely the one

with CSE (r¼ .39; p< .01) and PGE (r¼ .50; p< .01), were noticeably stronger than the others.

Concerning the Culture subscale, all correlations were positive. The correlation with PGE was

statistically significant and particularly strong (r¼ .56; p< .01). Importantly, all correlations with

social identity measures were statistically significant, with the correlation with CSE being the strongest

among them (r¼ 37; p< .01). Statistically significant correlations also emerged with three out of five

needs, that is the need for belonging (r¼ .22; p< .01), self-expansion (r¼ .23; p< .01), and uncertainty

reduction (r¼ .15; p< .05). Finally, Culture was significantly correlated with Political orientation

(r¼ .22; p< .01). With regard to the History subscale, all correlations were positive, except that with

Political orientation, which, however, was not statistically significant. The correlation with PGE,

though retaining a rather modest coefficient, was statistically significant (r¼ .17; p< .01). There was

also a statistically significant correlation with three social identity measures, namely Group

identification (r¼ .20; p< .01), CSE (r¼ .26; p< .01), and FT (r¼ .16; p< .05). Finally, correlations

with the needs were all statistically significant, with the correlation with the need for belonging being

the strongest among them (r¼ .23; p< .01).

It is also useful to note that, as expected, PGE was substantially correlated with all social identity

measures. The most noticeable of these correlations were those with CSE (r¼ .51; p< .01), FT (r¼ .45;

p< .01), and Traits (r¼ .40; p< .01). This confirms that importance of assessing the extent to which

PGE mediates the effects of PCC on the various social identity measures. We did so by performing a

series of mediation analyses, in accordance with the classic procedure suggested by Baron and Kenny

(1986). The results of these analyses are reported in Figure 1.

Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 1118–1134 (2007)

DOI: 10.1002/ejsp

Tab

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Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 1118–1134 (2007)

DOI: 10.1002/ejsp

Perceived collective continuity 1127

Figure 1. Path analysis of the predicted mediations, Study 2. �p< .05; ��p< .01

Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 1118–1134 (2007)

DOI: 10.1002/ejsp

1128 Fabio Sani et al.

Perceived collective continuity 1129

We first conducted a regression analysis to ascertain that PCC has an impact on PGE (b¼ .50,

p< .001). Then we used regression analysis to assess the influence of PCC on each identity measure.

We found a statistically significant positive influence of PCC on all identity-related measures, with

betas ranging from .19 in the case of IIS, to .39 in the case of CSE. At this point we used regression

analysis in order to explore the effect of PGE on each identity measure. We found that PGE had a

significant positive impact on all identity measures. Betas ranged from .29 in the case of Emotions, to

.51 in the case of CSE. Finally, we conducted regression analysis with both PCC and PGE predicting

each identity measure. When either Group Identification, or IIS, or FT, or Traits, or Emotions were used

as dependent variable, the direct effects of PCC on the dependent variable were non-significant. This

suggests that PGE fully mediates the effects of PCC on any of these identity measures. However, when

CSE was used as dependent variable, the direct effects of PCC on CSE were statistically significant,

thereby suggesting that PGE only partially mediates the effect of PCC on CSE. In order to confirm these

results (i.e., that PGE carries the influence, either fully or partially, of PCC on the identity variables), we

run a Sobel (1982) test for each mediation analysis. We found that the mediation of PGE was

statistically significant in all models, with p-values being always <.001. The Sobel test statistic for the

different models was as follows: Model a: 5.24; Model b: 5.08; Model c: 6.14; Model d: 5.72; Model e:

5.01; Model f: 4.30.

To summarize the results of our analyses, there are three aspects that should be emphasized. First,

PCC is related to a set of social identity-related measures, thereby showing the relevance of PCC for

group life and identity. In particular, it is important to stress the moderate correlation between PCC and

PGE, which confirms that PCC is connected to, but independent from PGE. Second, findings suggest

that PCC influences the various social identity-related constructs, and that PGE mediates the influence

that PCC exerts on these measures. An ingroup will be seen as a more cohesive, unified, and somehow

tangible whole if the group members are seen as the carriers of a trans-generationally transmitted

culture, and if the group history forming a coherent narrative. In turn, a group that is seen as cohesive

and unified enhances identification and raises positive sentiments towards the group as a whole and its

members (Festinger, 1950). Third, results show that PCC has some effects on CSE that are independent

from the effects exerted by PGE on this same variable. These effects are of particular importance,

because CSE has substantive implications for phenomena as diverse as subjective well-being

(Bettencourt & Dorr, 1997; Crocker, Luhtanen, Blaine, & Broadnax, 1994) and ingroup favouritism

(De Cremer & Oosterwegel, 2000). We suspect that PCC boosts CSE in a direct fashion because PCC

provides a sense of symbolic immortality, which is known to raise group members’ self-esteem

(Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004).

GENERAL DISCUSSION

In this article we have presented two studies aimed at shedding some light on the perception of

collective continuity, a largely unexplored, though very important issue, in social psychology. Overall,

results from these two studies are very encouraging. Firstly, the studies have generated a scale of

‘perceived collective continuity’ (PCC) that is internally consistent and valid across different European

countries. Secondly, they have shown that people’s perceptions of their ingroups as entities that persist

over time are positively associated with fundamental aspects of social identity. Third, these studies

demonstrate that PCC is intimately connected to the perception of group entitativity – an increasingly

important construct in the social psychology of group processes – and that entitativity might mediate

the effects of PCC on different social identity dimensions. Finally, results suggest that PCC has some

direct, unique effects on CSE, thereby pointing to the importance of a sense of collective timelessness

and durability for the development of ingroup pride and regard. We believe that, for all these reasons,

Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 1118–1134 (2007)

DOI: 10.1002/ejsp

1130 Fabio Sani et al.

the PCC scale has the potential to become a very useful instrument in research dealing with group

processes and social identity.

Clearly, the studies presented in this paper are only a first step into research on perceptions of

collective continuity, and are not without limitations. In particular, it should be noted that the History

subscale of the PCC scale is not as internally reliable as the Culture subscale, and that its test–retest

reliability is not as satisfactory as we hoped. This might be due, at least in part, to the intrinsic

abstractedness of the concept. However, we suspect that the main problem lays in the nature of the

items we have selected, in the sense that they probably do not convey the idea of historical continuity in

the best possible way. Therefore, in future research we might try to improve this subscale by making

some semantic and lexical modifications to the items. The second limitation is concerned with the

mediation analyses. While we believe that, on a theoretical ground, the idea that PGE mediates the

effects of PCC on social identity–related constructs is plausible and justified, we must keep in mind that

our empirical findings are based on a cross-sectional design and therefore any speculation about causal

processes should be taken with caution.

Future Directions of Research

Our studies not only have limitations in terms of the results they have produced, but also in terms of the

number of theoretically relevant issues that have been addressed. Obviously, many aspects and

implications of perceptions of collective continuity remain to be investigated, and further research is

needed. At present, we would like to suggest three possible avenues for future research.

First, it is important to investigate PCC in contexts other than national and sub-national ones. While

it is true that national and sub-national groups tend to place great importance on issues of continuity and

durability, other groups may emphasize their own persistence across time too. For instance, people can

make strong efforts to establish and maintain a sense of continuity as members of extended families, as

testified by the growing interest in genealogy and family trees (Lowenthal, 1985). Consistent with this,

a large survey on the popular uses of history in American life has revealed that, when people were asked

which ‘area of the past’ – that of family, racial group, community, and country – was most important to

them, over 60 per cent selected family history (Rosenzweig & Thelen, 1998). People can also care for

the continuity of their own organization, as found by various researchers (e.g., van Knippenberg et al.,

2002), or religious institution, as clearly emerging from studies on schism (Sani, 2005). The adaptation

of the PCC scale for use in these different types of groups may represent a preliminary requirement for

the study of perceived continuity beyond the national context.

The second possible avenue for research concerns the interrelationship between PCC and the sense

of personal continuity. In his monumental work ‘Principles of Psychology’, James (1890/1981)

considered the sense of continuity as a foundational aspect of the ‘I’, that is the ‘self as knower’. Along

the same line, the psychologist Neisser (1988), in a seminal paper written a century after James’ work,

listed the ‘extended self’ among the five core forms of self-knowledge. Consistent with that, scholars in

different disciplines have emphasized the importance of maintaining a sense of self-continuity. For

instance, prominent neurologists (e.g., Sacks, 1995) have argued that the real challenge of people with

memory deficits is to maintain a sense of temporal persistence in their life. The importance of

individual self-continuity raises the question of how this specific form of continuity may interplay with

our sense of collective continuity. We suspect that they fulfil similar functions, and that deficits in one of

these two forms of continuity will produce defensive efforts to reinforce continuity in the other form,

and would like to encourage researchers to explore this possibility.

A third possible avenue for future research concerns the relationship between PCC and well-being.

Several authors have already stressed the importance of personal continuity for the sense of well-being.

Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 1118–1134 (2007)

DOI: 10.1002/ejsp

Perceived collective continuity 1131

For instance, the very influential psychoanalyst Kohut (1977) was convinced that a sense of personal

endurance through time is related with stronger vitality, creativity, and self-esteem. Chandler et al.

(2003) have even produced some initial evidence that collective continuity is important for well-being.

These researchers found not only that an inner sense of personal continuity predicted well-being in

Canadian adolescents, but also that institutional continuity predicted well-being in Aboriginal

Canadian youths. In a similar vein, Fivush, Bohanek, and Duke (in press) found that preadolescents

who develop a sense of self as embedded in an intergenerational family context show relatively high

levels of self-understanding and well-being. Consistent with these findings, we may hypothesize that

PCC will have positive effects on group members’ sense of social well-being. That is, PCC might

contribute to integrate and assimilate people into their groups, thereby reducing experiences of

estrangement and anomy (Cozzarelli & Karafa, 1998).

Concluding Remarks

The philosopher Taylor (1989) argued that ‘‘in order to have a sense of who we are, we have to have a

notion of how we have become and of where we are going’’ (p. 47). That implies that to reinforce our

identity and to live in a meaningful world we need to perceive the groups to which we belong as having

continuity across time. In this paper we have moved a first step towards an understanding of people’s

perceptions of collective continuity, and of the correlates of these perceptions. We hope to have

persuaded researchers that this is an issue holding crucial implications for our knowledge of group

perception and processes, and to have provided an impetus for further investigation into a fascinating

research topic.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research was supported by a grant from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC):

RES-000-22-0738.

We would like to thank Monica Rubini for allowing us to use students in her class as participants. We

are also grateful to the archaeologist Cornelius Holtorf and the historian James Whitley for very useful

insight about perceived collective continuity in ancient history and pre-history.

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APPENDIX 1: PERCEIVED COLLECTIVE CONTINUITY (PCC) SCALE

(Italian national group is used as an example here).

Respondents specify their level of disagreement or agreement with each statement, on a seven-point

scale, where:

1¼ I totally disagree;

2¼ I disagree;

3¼ I slightly disagree;

4¼ I neither disagree nor agree;

5¼ I slightly agree;

6¼ I agree;

7¼ I totally agree.

1: I

Copy

talian people have passed on their traditions across different generations.

2: I

talian history is a sequence of interconnected events.

3: S

hared values, beliefs and attitudes of Italian people have endurance across times.

4: M

ajor phases in Italian history are linked to one another.

right # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 1118–1134 (2007)

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1134 Fabio Sani et al.

All in-text r

5: T

Copy

efere

hroughout history the members of the Italian group have maintained their inclinations and

mentality.

6: T

here is no connection between past, present, and future events in Italy.

7: I

talian people will always be characterised by specific traditions and beliefs.

8: T

here is a causal link between different events in Italian history.

9: I

taly has preserved its traditions and customs throughout history.

10: T

he main events in Italian history are part of an ‘unbroken stream’.

11: I

talian people have maintained their values across time.

12: T

here is no continuity between different ages in Italian history.

The two subscales are as follows:

� I

tems 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11¼Culture.

� I

tems 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12¼History.

First, reverse the scores on items 6 and 12, such that:

(1¼ 7), (2¼ 6), (3¼ 5), (4¼ 4), (5¼ 3), (6¼ 2), (7¼ 1).

Then, sum the scores to the six items for each respective subscale score, and divide each by 6.

right # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 1118–1134 (2007)

DOI: 10.1002/ejsp

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