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Pace, Sequencing, Scope and Duration: What About Them in African Civil and Administrative Reforms? Abstract

Issues of pace, sequencing, credibility, and timing have for a while constituted important debates in economic reforms in transition and developing countries. Without a doubt, these macroeconomic debates have been important for the way civil service and administrative reforms have been conceptualized and implemented in these countries. In this article, I argue that African civil service and administrative reforms have been taken hostage by these macroeconomic debates and, moreover, economists’ conceptualisation of sequencing and other concurrent issues has been detrimental to the whole emphasis on reforming the African state. For the civil service and administrative reforms to work, among other things, it is critical that scholars and practitioners go back to the drawing board and redesign new reforms with special emphasis on ‘getting right’ their pace and sequence, their scope and finally their duration. In the end, a real shift away from the current fiscal vision of African bureaucracies is necessary for reform to work.

Key words: ‘Big Bang’, Gradualism, Pace, Sequencing, Scope, Duration, Administrative Reform, Africa Introduction A quick scholarly search about issues of pace, timing, sequencing, credibility and the

likes in macroeconomic and structural reforms in transitioning as well as developing

countries yield to the reader a mountain of information (Bhattacharya, 1997; Edwards,

1990; Falvey and Kim, 1992; Feltenstein and Nsouli, 2003; Funke, 1993; Lora, 2000;

Martinelli and Tommasi, 1997; Nsouli et al., 2005; Roland, 1994; Wei, 1997).1 In effect,

the reader can easily appreciate, in a nutshell, the big issues that economic scholars and

practitioners have been dealing with since the first wave of Latin American structural and

economic reforms of the late 1970s (see Lora, 2000; Nsouli et al., 2005: 745-746). By

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contrast, if one were to do a similar search on civil service/administrative reforms, one

would have to search long to find satisfactory information on these crucial issues.2 In

fact, one might even conclude on the surface that the issues raised above do not matter in

the case of administrative reforms,3 or indeed start assuming so. However, I doubt that

such a stark assessment exists.

It is no secret for economists that the debates about gradualism and ‘Big Bang’ or

shock therapy, and issues of pace, timing, and sequencing have long consumed scholars

interested in transitioning and developing countries’ reforms (Bhattacharya, 1997;

Edwards, 1990; Falvey and Kim, 1992; Feltenstein and Nsouli, 2003; Funke, 1993;

Koromzay, 2004; Nsouli et al., 2005; Santiso, 2004; Wei, 1997). These debates have not

faded out despite some agreements among researchers for instance, on sequencing and

credibility (Nsouli et al., 2005).

The question one might ask is why, in fact, are these economic debates important

for civil service and administrative reforms? Is there a link between these questions and

administrative reforms? Do they matter? If so, where do issues of pace, sequencing,

scope and duration fit in the overall scheme of administrative reforms? Below, I will

argue that issues of pace and sequencing are, at least, crucial to the success of

administrative reforms.4 Particularly important is the debate between gradualists and

shock therapists on the one hand, and the issue of sequencing on the other hand. Second I

would like to suggest that two other issues scope or content, and duration (time and

length) are important for the future of administrative reforms

My main argument is that, except for a few scholars, issues of pace, sequencing,

scope and duration in administrative reforms have been taken hostage by the

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macroeconomic and structural reforms literature and practice since the 1980s in Africa,

this despite the latest official emphasis on capacity building and the likes.5 Such capture,

in turn, has led to scholars of bureaucracy and practitioners alike paying inadequate

attention to reforms that conflict to each other in their fundamental objectives.

Ultimately, I stress that a return to the issues I examine below is critical for redesigning

new reforms that can be effective and sustainable.

The paper is organised as follows. First, I review the main debates in the

economic literature6, from which come the concepts I discuss later. In the second and

third sections, I talk about pace and sequencing first, and then about scope and duration

of administrative reforms. I conclude with the policy implications by (re) emphasising

that change is long overdue in the redesign of African administrative reforms.

Main Debates in the Economic Literature

In this section, I do not review all the relevant debates in the economic literature

concerned with macroeconomic and structural reforms in transitioning and developing

countries. Rather, I summarise the main arguments regarding gradualism versus ‘Big

Bang’, and sequencing of economic reform programmes and thereafter use the above

economic literature to illustrate my case vis-a-vis administrative reforms.

Gradualism versus ‘Big Bang’

The major relevant debate in the economic literature regards the pace of macroeconomic

and structural reforms (Nsouli et al., 2005; Wei, 1997). The question that scholars have

been debating is which approach is best to implement economic reforms? Is it better to go

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with a gradualist approach, meaning in fact that reforms have to be incremental; one at a

time, effectively building on one another. The opposite approach called shock therapy or

‘Big Bang’ is well known for having been applied in the 1990s to Russia and Poland after

the collapse of the Soviet Union. With ‘Big Bang’, the goal is to quickly and

simultaneously remove what economists call ‘distortions’, by that they mean things they

believe detract from efficient allocation of resources by markets.

Needless to say, different scholars have advocated both approaches to introducing

economic reforms and for different reasons (Feltenstein, 2003; Funke, 1993; Martinelli

and Tommasi, 1997; Nsouli et al., 2005; Wei, 1997)). As an illustration, arguments for

gradualism have been drawn from the sphere of political economy (Martinelli and

Tommasi, 1997; Koromzay, 2004). In this view, resistance from interest groups and

politicians’ fears of losing office will require a gradual approach to reform (Funke, 1993;

see also Wei, 1997 on the uncertainty of winners and losers that pushes people to oppose

reforms).

On the other hand, partisans of the ‘Big Bang’ approach have stressed that a

gradual strategy gives the opponents of reform time to mobilise. Thus, it is argued on that

basis that it is best to adopt the shock therapy, since it does not give time for opponents to

mobilise and derail reforms (see Martinelli and Tommasi, 1997). In the same way,

supporters of the ‘Big Bang’ approach argue that gradualism risks stopping reforms, for

people who are not satisfied with reforms (Martinelli and Tommasi, 1997: 116), or have

already achieved their own aims can block further reform.

In reality, despite this important debate on economic reforms in transitioning and

developing countries, it has been difficult to implement a “Big Bang” strategy, because of

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political economy constraints among others. The truth is, as Nsouli et al., (2005: 744)

have pointed out, “In spite of strong theoretical support for rapid and comprehensive

reforms, many economists and policymakers believe that gradualism is the inevitable

approach.”

Recognition of these realities, however, has not stopped the debate about which

strategy gradualism or shock therapy is the best path for transitioning and developing

countries moving into market economies. On this question, there is no agreement about

the best way to approach reform. Simply put, “Economic thinking on the speed and the

sequencing of reform has been changing over time. (…) the arguments favouring a

gradual or a shock approach are not absolute. Each country has to choose the proper

speed of adjustment and sequencing by examining country-specific factors.” (Nsouli et

al., 2005: 756)

Sequencing of Macroeconomic and Structural Reforms

Nsouli et al., define sequencing as

[Referring] to the order in which either macroeconomic policy actions or specific reforms are introduced. Sequencing involves the order in which reforms are undertaken across sectors (for example, whether fiscal adjustment should be a prerequisite for introducing current account liberalisation or decontrolling prices) and the order in which reforms are undertaken within sectors (for example, whether in the case of capital account liberalisation, foreign direct investment or short-term capital flows should be liberalised first). (2005: 766)

This second important debate concerns the proper sequencing of economic reforms,

whether macroeconomic stabilisation should precede structural reforms or whether both

should be pursued simultaneously. This debate is not so important for the sake of this

paper, so I will not delve deeply into it. Most economists, in fact, agree that before

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embarking on structural reforms, candidate countries should clean up their

macroeconomic indicators. If they do not follow this sequence, according to most

economists, structural reforms would not bear fruit (see for instance Nsouli et al., 2005:

747-748) on initiating stabilisation before embarking on trade reforms).

What is more interesting for us are the sectoral debates regarding the ideal order

of trade liberalisation, capital accounts liberalisation, privatisation and restructuring

(Falvey and Kim, 1992; Roland, 1994). These debates point to the necessity of carefully

thinking through the proper sequence of actions in order to ensure the success of reform.

As Funke (1993: 337) put it at the time, “The fear is that an inappropriate sequence may

render the adjustment process more difficult or even contribute to the collapse of the

whole reform programme.” In short, although getting the proper sequence would not

automatically translate into success, as path dependency theorists have for a whilst shown

the first steps of a policy decisively determine the path that it pursues afterwards (Falleti,

2005; Thelen, 2000). Therefore, getting the first steps right has been judged critical for

the future of structural and economic reforms in the transitioning as well as developing

countries concerned. I now turn to the main thrust of this article administrative reforms.

Pace and Sequencing of Administrative Reforms

Gradualism or Big Bang: Which Pace?

First of all, before talking about sequencing of administrative reforms, one has to

recognise which approach to choose in the pursuit of implementing reforms. In theory,

the preferred approach has been to quickly reduce the economic ‘distortions’ to allow

markets to function efficiently. But in reality, when faced with challenges, most reforms

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have been more gradual than otherwise (see Nsouli et al., 2005). Since these

macroeconomic and structural reforms have taken precedence and shaped administrative

reforms, I argue the same approach has been pursued (see Corkery, 1995). The goal of

administrative reforms has been to quickly remove civil and public service distortions,

and introduce the merit system (see Shepherd, 2003, on the difficulty of introducing this

universal model of civil service reforms). Such speed was seen as essential to change the

bureaucracy in order to support economic changes as well as private sector development

(remember first ‘the retreat of the state’, and then the so-called ‘enabling state’).

Because of that, I would argue, there has been an absence of a thorough

discussion on the sequencing of administrative reforms. In effect, the common

assumption then was that before reforming the bureaucracy, one first had to cut costs and

personnel. Now, this latter emphasis is coupled with pursuing capacity building and

service enhancements’ objectives (For the different phases of public sector reforms, see

Mutahaba and Kiragu, 2002; Heredia and Schneider, 2003; and Olowu, 2003). Indeed,

cutting costs still takes priority despite theoretical shift towards capacity-building and

service delivery improvement. Further, I will argue that this emphasis on cost-cutting has

been detrimental to the whole enterprise of (re)building African bureaucracies. So when I

talk about sequencing and associated issues in this article, I do so within the framework

of a gradualist approach. The latter, based on the above review, has proven to be the most

politically feasible, as well as sustainable in the long run that administrative reforms need

to fully take effect.7 I now turn to the sequencing of African administrative reforms.

Sequencing of Administrative reform programmes

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Since the 1980s and the first wave of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in

Africa supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (the

Bank) which ushered in the first neoliberal administrative reforms, the emphasis has been

on cutting the cost of the civil service as well as on personnel reduction (Mills and Sahn,

1995; Olowu, 1999). In actual fact, when looking at the literature of administrative

reforms in Africa since the inception of the neoliberal reforms one can find, depending on

the author, two or three phases of such reforms (Mutahaba and Kiragu, 2002; Heredia and

Schneider, 2003; and Olowu, 2003).8 The first wave of reforms is generally considered to

have started in the 1980s with SAPs, and it was the most ‘ideological’ phase of all that

proclaimed ‘the retreat of the state’.

The assumption, as Olowu (1999) noted, was that African bureaucracies were too

big and too inefficient. Personnel and costs were to be reduced in order to make these

bureaucracies leaner and more efficient. Now with hindsight these assumptions were too

simple and the reforms they inspired undermined African bureaucratic capacity to

implement and deliver services (Olowu, 1999). Clearly, after the realisation that African

bureaucracies had been hampered by the ideological and practical retreat of the state, the

objective of the later wave of the 1990s was to rebuild the capacity lost during the

previous decades of changes (Candell-Mills and Serageldin, 1995; Hyden, 2000). The

aim then was also to improve capacity in order that the state could better serve its

constituents, i.e., through increased delivery of services, but also in support of the private

sector, the so-called ‘enabling state’.

However, in the most comprehensive review to date by the Bank of African pay

and employment reforms, part of overall administrative reforms, Lindauer and Nunberg’s

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Rehabilitating Government: Pay and Employment Reform in Africa (1994) noted the

mixed results, if not failures, of this set of reforms. The assumption of pay and

employment reforms, part of the first reform wave, was that cutting costs and personnel

would help save money that would later on be used to improve African civil services’ pay

as well as working conditions (see McCourt, 2000: 2, and Olowu, 1999: 9-10). More to

the point, there was also a sense of quickness taken from the ‘Big Bang’ approach

(Nunberg and Lindauer, 1994: 243). As an illustration, the authors of the edited volume

complained at the time that these reforms were not far-reaching enough. (Nunberg, 1994;

Nunberg and Lindauer, 1994: 240-241). Visibly, the assumption that these reforms would

be quickly implemented and would yield immediate results was not borne out by the

results (see McCourt, 2000).

Although this and other assumptions of these reforms turned out to be false, the

merit of these pay and employment reforms was that they implicitly, if not explicitly,

posed the sequencing problem of the bureaucratic reforms (see Nunberg, 1989: 21 for a

short discussion of pay and employment timing and sequencing issues). Indeed, the

question arising from these first neoliberal reforms was “which reform should proceed

first”? And the answer was that by cutting the cost and size of the bureaucracy, African

civil services would be reined in and other necessary reforms would ensue. The

preoccupation of the 1980s was first and foremost sequencing cost and personnel

reduction, and consequently other reforms were not seen as critical. The sequencing of

the 1980s reforms entailed conducting civil service censuses, removing ghost workers,

hiring and pay freezes and other changes described in Lindauer and Nunberg (1994).

When the goal of the minimalist state was not realised, and the concern shifted towards

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rebuilding the state and its bureaucracy, the reforms of the 1980s were not simply

abandoned; they were, and still are being, pursued in sync with the new emphasis on

capacity building and service delivery ameliorations (see Mutahaba and Kiragu, 2002;

Olowu, 2002).

This might not have been a problem if the 1980s reforms had not been considered

a disaster for African civil services (see Olowu, 2002 and 2003). The wrong diagnosis

and prognosis had the prolonged effect, with hiring and salary freezes, of sapping civil

servants’ morale and working conditions (Olowu, 1999). Already in the 1990s, Corkery

et al., (1998: 129) examining Cameroon’s administrative reform programme pointed out

that the country’s reform programme suffered badly, because of being one component of

the country’s SAP. The problem in Cameroon was that the IMF, as expected, emphasised

fiscal and budgetary concerns over other issues. Indeed, according to these authors,

Cameroonian reformers were more preoccupied with meeting IMF’s targets than their

long-term objective of reforming the bureaucracy (Idem).

In fact, I noted the same thing happening in Gabon, where since 2004 I have

observed closely the country’s National Programme for Administrative Reform (PNRA).9

In reality, Gabon administrative reform has been tightly linked to the IMF’s programme

there, and the effect has been disturbing for the reform itself. As an illustration, the

reformers still emphasises cost and personnel reductions over other concerns (see

MEFBP, 2004; and IMF, 2005), to the point that the reform is negatively seen by civil

servants.10 Besides, the PNRA has been slowed down every time the financial and

budgetary reforms have been halted. Actually, the reform got a new fresh start in 2004

with the signature of an agreement between the country and the IMF (Gabon, 2004).

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Put another way, de facto financial and budgetary issues have been driving Gabon

administrative reform. Priority is still given to consolidating macroeconomic and

structural indicators to the detriment of the equally important objectives of creating a new

bureaucratic culture, improving service delivery, and the (ever-present) capacity building

(see MEFBP, 2004; and IMF, 2005). Talking of economic reforms, Lora (2000: 9)

summed up the whole state of affairs in proclaiming that “In the recent literature on the

political economy of reform, the question of order is notoriously absent.” One might add

that the sequence and order of reforms since the 1980s have remained the same. And, as

Mutahaba and Kiragu have pointed out, the tragedy is that the first wave of cuts has had a

negative impact on the way subsequent reforms are being perceived on the ground (2002:

73-74).11

Next, in general, the types of reform being considered or implemented are the

following. First reducing the cost of the public service, freezing the number of state

employees, deconcentrating and decentralising services to local levels, and ameliorating

the distribution of services to clients and enabling e-government. Second, the reforms

also aim at changing the bureaucratic culture as well as public servants’ attitudes towards

their clients, building a meritocratic public administration, and adopting a new

management philosophy emphasising performance goals and results (see Howlett, 2003;

Olowu, 2002; and Shepherd, 2003).

The fact that all the changes of the 1980s and the 1990s are being pursued

simultaneously also shows that the consensus about the universal model of civil service

reform has not changed in respect of the sequencing and order of the transformations put

into practice (Shepherd, 2003). Still cutting cost and personnel, although at a reduced

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level, when the evidence is clear that the diagnosis was wrong at first, and pursuing

service delivery improvement and building capacity simultaneously appear to be difficult.

Who is to improve service delivery when resources are being cut and personnel

trimmed? In the same way, who is to be trained when the best people are leaving African

civil services because of lack of incentives as well as the degradation of pay and working

conditions? It is very clear that this is a thorny predicament facing African civil services.

They do not currently have the means to support an important and well-paid bureaucracy,

at the same time that the international consensus is in favour of a less intrusive and leaner

state, yet they need it. Regrettably, current sequencing does not help in the longer term in

the rebuilding of African civil services. It might help to have a fiscally sound national

budget, but such frugality does not help the civil service, for in reality, if one wants an

effective bureaucracy it is bound to cost more (in terms of personnel and salaries for

instance), not less, at least in the short run.12

Scope and Duration of Administrative Reform

Scope (Content) of Administrative reforms

The next thing I would like to address is the scope or content of African administrative

reforms. My point here is that African administrative reforms are too broad and

ambitious, trying to do too many things at once. For instance, the range of changes that

these reforms seek to accomplish goes from reducing the cost of the public service, to

privatising, decentralising services to local levels, and improving services distribution to

clients. What is more, these reforms aspire to change the bureaucratic culture as well as

building a meritocratic public administration and this with a clear emphasis on

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performance goals and results (see Shepherd, 2003). The problem is to decide which

reforms, cost reduction apart, are to be prioritised? And the answer is not very clear.

Another problem is that, as mentioned above, in my view, some of these reforms

conflict with each other. As an illustration, cost-cutting measures undermine morale

necessary for rebuilding the bureaucratic ethos. Additionally, what is to take precedence

between reforming the central state and creating local ones? What are the most urgent

reforms? Are all of these reforms to be pursued at the same time? If not, what is the

answer?

I do not believe that the current fiscal and budgetary reforms are so ‘vital’ for the

future of administrative reforms. The debate about the scope or content of these reforms

boils down in some way to which approach to choose ‘Big Bang’ or gradualism

(Feltenstein and Nsouli, 2003). Nonetheless, it takes time to transform bureaucracy in

general, as the experience has shown elsewhere (see Shepherd, 2003, for the painfully

slow process of bureaucratic evolution in developed countries).

Truly, there is a sense that since the mixed results, and outright failures in some

cases of the 1980s wave of reforms, African reformers and their allies are now pursuing

reforms just for their own sake. They do not seem to have a clear roadmap as to what

changes are needed and which should take precedence, and where these changes should

lead African administrations. Furthermore, more than twenty years of neoliberal

transformative work have yielded mixed results, with no clear end and satisfaction in

sight (Shepherd, 2003; and Olowu, 2002 on the failure of the New Public Management

(NPM) in Africa). As Corbo reminded us regarding economic reforms (and the same can

be said of administrative reforms) “The problem with the second-generation of policy

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reforms is that no blueprint for these reforms is available, as there was for the first

generation of reforms. [Moreover] the order and sequence is much less clear cut than was

the case with the first generation of reforms.” (Quoted in Santiso, 2004: 841)

Among the reasons for the lack of blueprint for current changes is the complexity

of the problems involved, but also the failure and mixed results of earlier experiments

have left a vacuum. In fact, reforming the central state is pursued even whilst trying to

build local states at the same time; other reforms are being pursued without clear apparent

links between them. For instance, in 2004, the United Nations Development Programme

(UNDP) granted Gabon USD 300,000, specifically to support the PNRA decentralisation

component (UNDP, 2004). According to the author’s field observations, the

decentralisation component of the PNRA seems to be completely delinked from the

country’s overall administrative programme. The connection between all the PNRA

components is not as obvious as it should be. Without a doubt this confusion has an effect

on the whole programme of bureaucratic transformation.

I should note that the things I am referring to here are not new; in fact, they have

already been the subject of other works. Mutahaba and Kiragu (2002), for example, talk

about the need for a more integrated approach in the pursuit of African Public Sector

Reforms (PSRs). They point out the need to have a more unified, and coherent global

programme covering all reform sectors for more effectiveness (Mutahaba and Kiragu,

2002: 72-74). The same is noted by a Swedish International Development Agency

(SIDA)-supported document, “Strategies should be comprehensive and integrated.

Piecemeal and fragmented public service reforms have shown to be rarely effective and

their outcomes are generally not sustained.” (2005: 3)

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At the end of the day, we still face the question of what should be the appropriate

scope of administrative reform. Should we pursue some reforms to the detriment of

others? If so, what are they? Do we include all reforms necessary to transform African

bureaucracies? In sum, what to include in administrative reform? Serious rethinking

needs to be done concerning the scope or content of administrative reform.

Duration (Time and Length) of Administrative Reforms

Before I conclude with the theoretical as well as policy implications of this study, I would

like to take on the issue of the duration of administrative reforms. Though the existing

literature acknowledges that administrative reforms take time, the clear implications of

this are not fully recognised. Olowu (1999), for instance, has conceded this but he has not

systematically investigated duration as an issue. Fortunately for us, Wescott (1999), in

what I believe was a very thoughtful essay, has pointed out two crucial issues facing

administrative reforms, namely, on the one hand the long-term needed to implement

changes, and on the other hand, the short-term (financial) commitment that donors and

reformers devote to the task.13

In effect, support is lacking, whilst impatience is plentiful. Thus, the design of

current administrative reform programmes does not allow for the flexibility needed for

reforming African bureaucracy (see Wescott, 1999; and Mutahaba and Kiragu, 2002 who

argue for the creation of new mechanisms to finance PSRs). Finally, Wescott (1999) also

shows that tangible results of civil service reforms come only after ten or fifteen years.

For this reason, it is vital to have committed donors, clear country leadership, and public

servants’ and the public’s awareness, for the changes to be sustained in the long-term.

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Unfortunately, the way administrative reforms have been conceptualised and put

in practice generally seek quick results. Consequently, if results are not achieved in a

very short-term, the support of donors and reformers for the endeavour weakens. As an

example, evaluations of decentralisation across Africa have shown that, despite having

been since the 1980s at the top of the agenda of international donors and scholars, the

actual results have been poor (Dickovick, 2005 for Senegal; Olowu and Wunsch, 2004;

Oyono, 2005 for Cameroon; Wunsch and Olowu, 1995).

In fact, a quick glance of decentralisation on the African continent paints the

following picture. After some years in implementation, attempts at decentralisation have

generally encountered several problems (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004, especially the

Conclusions section). First among these, is the resistance of central elites, and their

determination to stay in power at all costs (see, for the case of Cameroon, Fonchingong,

2004; and Oyono, 2005). Second, the lack of capacity at the local level has greatly

reduced the impact of the experiment; local authorities have yet to realise that they are no

longer part of the central state, but are themselves emerging actors in the political,

administrative, and economic realms of their countries and should act accordingly. Third,

despite these problems, decentralisation is progressing and donors still have an important

supporting role in pushing for more powers to local authorities (Romeo, 2003). And

crucially, decentralisation takes time and the final assessment should wait until the

experiment has a proper opportunity to take root (see also Chinsinga, 2005 on the politics

of capacity).14 This is suggested by the case of Botswana, where -notwithstanding years

of local government practice and autonomy- local government is still battling for its place

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in the country’s political, administrative, and economic organisation (Hope, 2000;

Wunsch, 1998; also for a more recent assessment, see Olowu and Wunsch, 2004: 241).

Certainly, the case of Botswana is very interesting, since the country is regularly

touted as a model to be emulated throughout the continent (Hope, 2000). The example of

the decentralisation experiment in this country suggests that it is an ongoing process; yet

a contested one, and therefore time-consuming (Hope, 2000). Decentralisation and other

administrative reforms do not happen overnight. The mistake would be to simply

consider them as failures because they have not delivered according to our own schedule.

Evidently, there are outright failures that scholars have identified (Lindauer and Nunberg,

1994; Lienert, 1998), but these should not be confused with the types of reform such as

state reconstruction and restructuring that inevitably take time.

In the same vein, despite all the policy pronouncements and eagerness to reform,

one does not easily change bureaucracy, especially African bureaucracies inherited from

the colonial era. The evidence that bureaucracy is hard to transform can be found

throughout the whole world (see Hirschmann, 1999 on the history of development

management in developing countries; and Shepherd, 2003 on the history of changes in

developed countries). Additionally, the magnitude of changes required is daunting. The

current emphasis, once again, goes from reducing the cost of the public service, to

privatising and decentralising, to improving services distribution, and finally to changing

the bureaucratic culture plus building a meritocratic public administration; a tall order to

say the least.

The question that one is left to ponder is whether anyone really believes that these

efforts could succeed in no less than a decade or more of sustained financial and technical

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commitment? I do not believe that anyone but the most optimistic really considers that

these reforms could be implemented quickly and, more importantly, yield the expected

benefits soon. The paradox is that given the current predicament of some African

countries, time is not a luxury that Africa as a whole can afford.

So we are left with two options. One is to continue on the current reform path,

which I think has proven not to be sustainable in the long-term. The other is to focus on

long-term reforms and the (re)building of administrative capacity that is needed to initiate

and sustain sound economic policies (see Koromzay, 2004 on the sequencing of

bureaucratic reforms in Europe in order to support the ‘right’ economic changes). Finally,

when talking of the experience of advanced industrialised countries, Shepherd reminded

us that “There was no such thing as quick reform: laws may get written quickly, but the

reforms typically took a number of decades to become more or less universalised across

the executive branch.” (2003: 3) The mistake would be to forget this historical reality as

well as the lesson in the case of developing countries in general.

Conclusion and Policy Implications

In this article, I have sought to discuss issues of pace and sequencing, scope and duration

in respect to African administrative reforms. Issues of pace, sequencing, and credibility

(among others) have been widely debated in the developing and transitioning countries’

economic literature. Thus, I have used the latter conceptualisation of these issues to

illustrate my case about administrative reforms.

In effect, the central thrust of this article has been that the economic thinking has

been driving and defining the conceptualisation of those issues for the administrative

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reforms’ literature. Additionally, I have argued for the importance of pace and

sequencing, as well as scope and duration, for the future of administrative reforms. My

point is that it is critical that scholars and practitioners of administrative reforms should

recapture these issues and design new reforms with special emphasis on ‘getting right’

their sequencing, scope and duration. This constitutes the main theoretical conclusion of

this study.

On the practical side, I argue that gradualism is the most realistic and suitable

course of action. Second, the role of cost-cutting should be diminished, along with the

role of macroeconomic policies in driving administrative reforms. Third, on the scope of

administrative reforms, priority should be given to some reforms, whilst delaying others

for later periods or rounds. For instance, in the short-term, priority should go to

increasing pay and salaries, recruiting qualified and talented personnel, and improving

working conditions. Admittedly, costs in the short-term will increase, but the long-term

benefits will possibly include adoption of sounder policies. Fourth, on the duration issue,

it is clear that, on top of projects, a new mechanism to support long-term reforms is

needed. There should be a shift from short-term projects to more long lasting technical,

capacity building as well as financial support for reforms that will be spread over ten to

fifteen years’ time-span.

In the end, pace, sequencing, scope and duration of administrative reforms should

be seriously rethought and should not be left simply to economists. Experience has

demonstrated that their concerns do not necessarily go hand in hand with those of

administrative reformers.

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Notes

1 Path dependency theorists have also dealt with timing and sequence or sequencing and I informed myself from this literature. Nonetheless, I primarily use the economic literature and its conceptualisation of pace and sequencing among the issues I am referring to therein. For more on the path dependency literature, see, for instance, Thelen (2000); Gains et al., (2005); and Falleti (2005). 2 Notable exceptions include, for instance, Kiragu et al. study (2004) where they briefly discuss civil service pay sequencing; Painter (2006) on civil service pay and employment reforms in Vietnam; and Falleti (2005) on a sequential theory of decentralisation, although this last author’s study is more ‘political’ than ;administrative’. 3 I use in this paper the shorthand of administrative reforms to refer to both civil service and administrative reforms. Strictly speaking administrative reform is more encompassing than civil service. I use the shorthand administrative reforms, because the latter targets the overall state bureaucracy, and thus includes the civil service. Some scholars nowadays simply call all the above Public Sector Reforms (PSRs). 4 As will become later apparent, these issues have been extensively and de facto dealt with by the economic literature in lieu of bureaucratic reform scholars. The result has been that fiscal and technical concerns have predominated over others in the pursuit of administrative reforms. See also the then-argument of Olowu (1999) on this precise theme. 5 By that, I mean the economic and fiscal discussion has dictated the conceptualisation as well as the practice of administrative reforms. In that argument, I follow the lead of Olowu (1999) who said at the time that the failure of African civil service reforms was due to the large emphasis on technical concerns rather than long-term ones. 6 The debates I am addressing here do not, in any way, represent all the debates in the economic literature. Those debates and concepts cited throughout this article are simply those I judged to be pertinent to the issues I seek to highlight here. Moreover, I do not discus timing here, especially, since I recognise that from the 1980s onwards, administrative reforms in Africa for the most part, have been brought and pursued under crisis situations and following the rationale of neoliberal reforms, not by themselves or for their own sake. 7 Funke (1993: 358) disagrees with me. He states “A speedy implementation of reforms is preferable to a gradual approach. A gradual approach is hardly sustainable because the administrative capacity to successfully handle a gradual adjustment is lacking.” And Falvey and Kim (1992: 922) add “The difficulty in signaling commitment is that the reform programme under consideration is usually not the first to be tried, but rather the latest in a series of partial successes and total failures. The government then lacks a ‘reputation’ for credible reform. Indicating commitment in such circumstances may require quick and decisive action- a ‘radical’ reform.” Needless to say that I believe the opposite is true for the African continent. The reality is that the administrative capacity to handle enormous changes is so deficient in many settings that we are only left with one option: prudence, i.e., go slowly. Furthermore, a radical reform still could be gradual, but radical in the sense that it goes against previous government policies. 8 Mutahaba and Kiragu talk of three waves of administrative reforms: the wave of the 1980s’ SAPs, the second wave of capacity building of the 1990s, and the last current wave of service delivery improvement. However, I see the last two waves as simply one which seeks to improve capacity in order, among other goals, to improve service delivery. Finally, I should note that these authors aptly recognise that these distinctions are purely theoretical, and in practice these reforms are being pursued simultaneously. (For more, see Mutahaba and Kiragu 2002). 9 In truth, I have been since the mid-1990s an observer of Gabon PNRA, but it is only since 2004 that I have been a deliberate student of the country’s programme. . 10 2004 personal communication with team members of the reform directorate and selected civil servants. 11 That is where the issue of credibility comes in. The first waves of cuts having had a negative impact, ‘positive’ measures are desperately needed to reverse that state of affairs and regain the lost ground since the 1980s. As Falvey and Kim (1992) noted, reform programmes are usually not the first to be tried. So, restoring the credibility for the government might necessitate bold action. This does not necessarily equate to quick action. But, it could be steps to increase salaries, stop retrenching or other ‘positive’ steps. 12 Olowu (1999: 16) for instance, said “It is likewise acknowledged that reforms on this scale involve changes not only in structure but in organisational behaviour. Changing behaviour takes time to bear fruit

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for which some observers have suggested a period of 10 to 15 years.” He added “What Africa needs is not necessarily smaller but more capable and reconfigured civil services. The latter are bound to cost more not less, and everything must be done to leverage these resources in the short and long terms.” (1999: 21). 13 Remember that I have conflated civil service and administrative reforms. However, Wescott (1999) only speaks of civil service reforms in Africa. 14 This does not mean that periodical evaluations could be not conducted, for those help get a state of affairs, corrective measures and give directions for the future. What’s more, I am not suggesting with the decentralisation example that the experiment is not facing problems. Rather, what I am proposing is that once we conceptualise and design decentralisation programmes with different time horizons, their assessments should automatically change as well. The current lens that we use will be no longer the one that we use for redesigned programmes. References Bhattacharya, Rina (1997) ‘Pace, Sequencing and Credibility of Structural Reforms’,

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