Opposition to the Tanzimat State : conspiracy and legitimacy in the Ottoman Empire, 1859-1878

Opposition to the Tanzimat State Conspiracy and Legitimacy in the Ottoman Empire, 1859-1878

PhD thesis submitted by Florian Riedler, SOAS

2003

(Lc v1v. 1

Opposition to the Tanzimat State

ABSTRACT

I

This study examines the phenomenon of political opposition in the Ottoman Empire

during the time of political reform known as the Tanzimat (1839-1876). Its focus is on a

clearly defined number of small political movements organised to challenge the central

political authority in Istanbul. These are the Society of Martyrs of 1859, the secret

society of the Young Ottomans detected in 1865, the group of Ottoman statesmen

organising the successful coup against Abdiilaziz in 1876, Ali Suavi's secret

organisation inciting the riots in front of the qiragan Palace as well as the committee

formed by Kleanti Skalieri and Aziz Bey in 1878.

In all their diversity these movements illustrate themes of political opposition in a time

of great changes in the Ottoman Empire. The Kuleli conspiracy shows how an Islamic

milieu connected to the Nak§ibendi order of dervishes reacted to the challenges of the

reform policy initiated by the government. As an example for the reaction to this reform

policy from within the Ottoman administration serves the well known Young Ottoman

movement. In this case the government policy itself spawned a new type of opposition

hitherto unknown in the Ottoman context. Apart from the reaction to these new developments, however, opposition during the

Tanzimat also displayed more traditional features rooted in Ottoman political culture. The traditional court intrigue lives on in the coup against Abdiilaziz. The classical interdependence of external developments and the political climate within the empire is

represented best in the group around Ali Suavi. Many Muslim refugees from the

Balkans were part of the riots initiated by this group while its leader, a former Young

Ottoman, connects the group to the protest movement examined earlier. The reason that the study slightly surpasses the limits of the conventional chronology of

the Tanzimat is to show the link to the later Young Turk opposition. The Skalieri-Aziz

Committee of 1878 will illustrate how forty years of changes created a peculiar political

culture in which the opposition against Sultan Abdfilhamid would be thriving in the

1890s.


TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgments

I. Introduction 4

H. The Society of Martyrs 20

IH. The Young Ottomans 69

IV. The Coup against Abdillaziz 96

V. The Oskiidar Society 118

VI. The Skalieri-Aziz Committee 138

VIII. Conclusion 164

2

VIIEL Abbreviations and Bibliography 171

Opposition to the Tanzimat State 3

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many people helped me in the time I researched and wrote my PhD thesis. First of all I

would like to thank my parents, who supported me throughout this process without

always being convinced of the importance of Ottoman history. For their generous financial help I like to thank the DAAD for the three years of funding through its HSP

III programme, and my college for the One Year Language Scholarship supporting me during the last year of my studies. Regarding my fieldwork in Istanbul the staff at the Ba§bakanlik Ar§ivi, the Atat-Urk

Kitabli'l and NAM have been most helpful. For academic support and reading draft 9

chapters I would like to thank my supervisor, Ben Fortna, and especially my fellow PhD

students at SOAS.

Some people do not belong to any of the aforementioned categories, but nonetheless deserve mentioning. Nina, 6zlem, Fede, Juan, Oma Lotti and all the others supported

me in numerous way and I would like to give my warm thanks to them, too.

London, May 2003

F. R.


I maintain that one finds in history that all conspiracies have been made by men of standing or else by men in immediate attendance on a prince, for other people, unless they be sheer lunatics, cannot form a conspiracy; since men without power and those who are not in touch with a prince are devoid alike of any hope and of any opportunity of carrying out a conspiracy successfully.

Machiavelli, Discorsi, Ell, 6, (1987), 402

I INTRODUCTION

History of the Tanzimat

It seems almost natural that the history of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century

should be written from the perspective of the state. The extensive changes the empire

underwent during this time can easily be connected to the initiative of the Ottoman

government. This is not only obvious regarding reform measures in the fields

traditionally at the disposal of Ottoman rulers as, for example, the military or the civil

administration. Also the extension of state activity towards hitherto largely untouched

areas like education or lawmaking strengthen this perspective on Ottoman history,

which sees the state as the most important agent of change. Writers in the nineteenth century already make the state sponsored reforms the focus of

their attention, and so do later scholars of nineteenth century Ottoman history. ' In this

they follow the self-representation of the Ottoman goverriment, which, in 1839,

officially launched its reform policy under the title Tanzimat-i Hayriye (beneficial

reforms). This official name lives on in the conventional division of nineteenth century Ottoman history. The period between 1839 and 1876 is designated as the Tanzimat era despite the fact that the reform policy started earlier in the century and carried on after 1876 during the reign of AbdUlhamid H.

Although I partly like to modify this state-centred perspective on Ottoman history, my

study of opposition to the Tanzimat state remains indebted to earlier scholarship on the

Tanzimat. Despite the fact that the existing literature deals in great detail with the role

of the Ottoman state in the nineteenth century, especially regarding the significance of

the reform policy, I think there are still areas left worth reconsidering. In the following I

like to take a fresh look at the problems surrounding the Tanzimat state by viewing it

through the prism of opposition movements in a time frame slightly surpassing the

conventional periodisation. To help me establish the obvious connection between the

'Cf. Eichmann (1858) and Engelhardt (1882) or, for modem examples, Lewis (1960), Davison (1963), Ortayli (1983) and Berkes (1998).


Ottoman state and the opposition movements I will employ the mediating concept of legitimacy. Recently, the latter has been successfully applied to the Hamidian period (1876-1909) by Selim Deringil. ' The following study will push back the discussion

surrounding legitimacy to the Tanzimat era, however, shifting the focus from the

legitimising activity of the state to the various attempts by the opposition to delegitimise

the Ottoman government. Similar to the concept of legitimacy also the topic of opposition in the late Ottoman

Empire has obtained attention predominantly for the Hamidian period. The natural interest of modem Turkish historiography in the Young Turks at large and especially

the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and its role in the revolution of 1908

recently has found its definitive treatment in the work of *Ukhi Hanioglu. ' Apart from

the reconstruction of the complicated history of the different Young Turk groups prior

to the revolution, Hanio'lu's two volumes are important, because they enable us to 9 determine the ideological roots of the opposition against Sultan Abdiilhamid much

clearer than before.

The fact that opposition to the government during the Tanzimat era hitherto has not

attracted such detailed research seems due to various reasons. Most important may be

the fact that in historical imagination there never existed a unified opposition movement during the Tanzimat, but opposition always has been recognised as being diverse and diffuse. Thus, whereas it is Hanio'lu's tendency to destroy the myth of a unified and 9

monolithic Young Turk movement, the following study will bring together the scattered

events and groups of opposition in the Tanzimat era and display them in a single frame

of analysis. It remains to be seen what the fruits of this research strategy will be, i. e., in how far the

events and groups I put together are comparable at all. As a preliminary justification I

think this undertaking is worthwhile for the following reasons. Basically, many of the

opposition groups during the Tanzimat era are rather obscure and, in contrast to the

Young Turks, there is not much information available as to their aims and their

ideology. Thus, much of the following analysis will deal with a description of the events

as I try to rectify certain errors present in the secondary literature.

Moreover, structural similarities between the opposition movements and the fact that

most of them were conspiracies, draws our attention to Ottoman political culture in the

nineteenth century. It will be a further aim of this study to elucidate the significance of

this conspiratorial element, which obviously was not restricted to the Tanzimat era, but

'Deringil (1991) and (1998).


continued well into the next decades. The fact that the CUP remained a secret

organisation long after it effectively had taken power in the revolution of 1908

illustrates the importance of this particular element of political culture and opens the

question of whether there was a connection between the Young Turk movement and the

older conspiracies, which are in the focus of this study. Last, different opposition groups contested different aspects of legitimacy in the

Tanzimat era. The fact that these groups do not belong to a unified movement makes it

possible to sound out in detail the different aspects of Ottoman legitimacy and see how

it evolved in time. So, by looking at opposition in the nineteenth century not only do we learn more about the people involved in these groups as well as their motives. In

connection with the concept of legitimacy we will also gain a better understanding of

the Tanzimat state. Before I come to a short description of these opposition groups, let me start by

indicating the key theoretical concepts underlying this study. It will be the main task of

the next section to explain how the concept of legitimacy can be useful to understand both the Ottoman government as well as the opposition against it. I would like to derive

some guiding questions for my historical study from the theoretical observation of other disciplines, mainly the social and political sciences.

Legitimacy between obedience and opposition The most prominent example of the concept of legitimacy being used for the analysis of

power relations in human society still is presented in Max Weber's work 'Economy and Society'. Weber starts from the general assumption that domination (Herrschaft), i. e., a

regular and lasting power relation where obedience by the subjects vis-a-vis the ruler is

likely, seeks legitimacy. Rulers try to attain the obedience of the governed by other

means than sheer force or appeals to self-interest. Instead they put forward the

legitimate character of their rule to ensure this obedience. According to his concept of a

value-free social science Weber is not interested in normative questions surrounding legitimacy. Instead, he uses legitimacy mainly as a classificatory tool in that he draws

attention to the formal similarities of claims or ideologies governments in the past and

present have employed to gain legitimacy. He distinguishes three ideal types, rational- legal, traditional and charismatic legitimacy, and discovers the interdependence between

these types and different societies and historical circumstances. '

'Hanioglu (1995) and (2001). 'Weber (1978), 1,212-16.


Generally, it is Weber's non-normative approach to the question of legitimacy that

makes his writings so attractive for the historian. ' Indeed, we are not concerned with the

question, if Ottoman rule or, for that matter, the opposition against it was legitimate.

Much like Weber I will use the perspective of legitimacy to understand a certain behaviour by state and opposition alike. Nonetheless, in contrast to Purely functional

theories of power Weber's non-normative approach seems to pay justice to the

importance of beliefs and values in society. Likewise, any sympathetic historian, who is

prepared to listen to the voices of his subjects of research - in our case the members of

the various conspiracies - cannot but take seriously the justifications and moral claims

as audible in his sources. Arguably, Weber's theory of legitimacy as developed in 'Economy and Society' and

employed later in the secondary literature is very ruler- and government-centred. His

observations seem to focus entirely on the normal working of legitimacy in situations of domination and especially the self-legitimatory conduct of rulers and governments. Thus, most easily Weber's theory may help to understand the behaviour of the Ottoman

state towards its subjects and especially towards the opposition groups, which form the

centre of our study. Above that, however, there are also aspects present in Weber's

approach that allow for the question of opposition to be addressed from the theoretical

angle of legitimacy.

Basically, I believe that just like domination, opposition also normally involves

questions of legitimacy. There may be opposition, which is purely instinctive,

structurally similar to obedience, which is purely habitual, or opposition and obedience,

which are solely based on self-interest. 6 These cases, however, are not the norm and it is

a common-sense assumption that man's disposition to opposition rises towards a regime

or a law, which he or she considers illegitimate! This assumption seems especially founded regarding highly organised and conscious opposition as present in the

conspiracies against the Ottoman government in the Tanzimat era. Furthermore, it is Weber's actual use of the term legitimacy, which highlights the

interconnectedness of opposition and legitimacy. As has been noted, Weber treats

legitimacy as a claim or a promise brought before the governed rather than as the

property of an act executed by the governor or the whole regime. In this light the first

step towards opposition can be understood as the rejection of such a claim and,

possibly, as the act of putting forward a counter-claim for legitimacy. The motive for an

This has been criticised many times, cf. most recently Coicaud (2002); cf. also Barker (1990), 25-6. lone scu/Madari aga (1972), 14-15; Barker (1990), 29-33. Gurr (1970), 183-92.


attitude of opposition can derive from the fact that a promise, on account of which legitimacy has been claimed, has not been fulfilled. In this way Weber's government-

centred theory could be enriched with a useful non-normative theory of illegitimacy

examining the circumstances under which claims for legitimacy break down. '

In the following I want to address some of the questions surrounding both of these fields

- legitimacy and obedience as well as illegitimacy and opposition - which could be

helpful for our study.

The first important point is Weber's classificatory framework of the forms of legitimate

domination. Since Weber developed his different types of legitimation with regard to an

abundance of historical material, it seems especially fruitful to see how far mechanisms

of Ottoman legitimacy in the nineteenth century can be expressed in Weberian terms.

On the one hand this will help to get a grip on the historical material itself. On the other hand it may underline how much the Ottoman Empire is not a special case, but

embedded in the general history of human power relations. In the fashion of modernisation theories Weber's classification of the different types of legitimacy could be read as a progression from the traditional to the rational-legal form.

Indeed, it is Carter Findley, who, in his work on Ottoman bureaucracy, understands the

Tanzimat in such a way explicitly using Weber's term of a rational-legal order to

describe the changes going on in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. 9 In our

context this begs the question as to whether there is a connection between the switch in

the form of legitimising ideologies from the traditional to the rational-legal as suggested by Findley and opposition movements during the Tanzimat. Or, to describe the problem

of the Tanzimat state from a different angle, did new tasks the Ottoman government

acquired during this time lead to a wider 'legitimacy crisis' to which Deringil alludes

using a concept of Habennas? 'o

To address this set of questions, the process of change not only of material conditions

and the administrative structure of the empire, but also regarding its legitimising

ideologies has to be examined much more carefully. As will become clearer later in this

introduction when I will try to reconstruct the traditional system of Ottoman legitimacy,

the evolutionary model evoked above is an oversimplification, which has to be amended

in various ways. Weber was the first to point out that, regarding the three forms of

legitimacy, he was employing ideal-types, which in historical reality never occurred but

Merquior (1980), 131-4. CE Findley's studies (1980) and (1989) on the Tanzirnat bureaucracy.

10 Habermas (1976), 3-4; Deringil (1991), 346.


in a mixed fashion. " It will be the task of this study to determine in detail in what way

the legitimacy the Tanzimat state invoked vis-a-vis its subjects changed compared to

traditional Ottoman legitimacy. It is only against such a background that the question of

whether the various opposition movements were a direct reaction to the Tanzimat may be sufficiently answered. Above all, it will be interesting to see how Weber's third form of legitimate domination

resting on charisma fits into this evolutionary picture. In 'Economy and Society'

charismatic legitimacy was conceived as an extraordinary claim, which was able to

insert an element of change into more or less stable situations of domination. In its pure form, before the so-called routinisation of charisma sets in, Weber linked it even to

revolution. In this way charismatic legitimacy seems to be naturally connected to any

opposition, i. e., as a counter-claim against the steady and 'normal' legitimacy invoked

by the governor. 12

This leads us back to the other two types of legitimacy and how they are connected to

opposition. Much of the fascination of Weber's use of the concept of legitimacy stems from the fact that by amassing a huge amount of historical material he points to typical

historical constellations between legitimacy, the system of government, the culture as

well as the economical and legal system of a society. Weber calls one of these

constellations that was perhaps inspired by the historical Ottoman Empire sultanism. But here his examples are not nearly as rich as in the case of medieval European

feudalism. Overall, it would be fascinating to add the dimension of opposition to these

constellations and try to see if they included typical forms of disobedience or styles of

contestation.

It is here that I have to mention shortly the special provisions constitutional and

parliamentarian regimes have made for opposition. In contrast to other forms of

government parliamentary democracies have an institutional place for opposition,

which, for that reason, is called legal or loyal opposition. If, in the political sciences, the

concept of opposition has attracted any attention at all, it has been uniquely under this

heading of opposition in parliament. "

Historically institutionalised parliamentary opposition developed first in England in the

early eighteenth century as an attempt by the public to gain a share in government in

times between parliamentary elections. This institution was able to soften political

" Weber (1978), 1,262-6. 12 Weber (1978), U, 1115-7; also cf Bensman (1979), 24-5.


tensions and channel disagreement inside the ruling elite as well as between governors

and governed. It has to be stressed, though, that this system of opposition as the

parliamentary system in general only works when no ultimate questions of legitimacy

are addressed. Like any other political regime, parliamentary democracy cannot offer a legal way for its own abolition. It is with this qualification that the concept of a 'legal'

opposition has to be understood. Beyond this rather special arrangement of parliamentary opposition there remain, as in

every state, more basic types of opposition for the governed vis-a-vis the governors. Also these 'natural' forms of opposition are not an outright rejection of state authority - an act, which usually is termed rebellion - but rather question the legitimacy of a special

policy or law or command by the government. " This opposition can entail various forms of disobedience towards the governor and can appear in different styles regarding

the people, who are involved in it. While subjects may choose to riot, use methods of

civil disobedience or passive resistance, members of the ruling elite can revert to

subversion, whistle-blowing or initiate coups to oppose specific government policies. "

Theoretically the same possibilities of opposition are to be found in historical non- democratic and non-parliamentary polities like the Ottoman Empire, albeit different

styles might be expected according to the historical situation. In this respect the following historical analysis will attempt to determine the exact location of Ottoman

opposition during the Tanzimat era. It will focus especially on conspiracy as a historical

mode of opposition in the Ottoman Empire. On the one hand I will try to judge how this

particular style of opposition is connected to the form of the Ottoman regime. On the

other hand I will try to ascertain on what level conspiracy contests Ottoman legitimacy

in the nineteenth century. This issue is the harder to decide as it obviously involves

value questions. Governors and governed may use different scales to measure, whether

an act of opposition reaches a stage of fundamental contestation of legitimacy.

The point in question may be illustrated by the use the British government made of

conspiracy charges in the nineteenth century. Such charges were upheld not only against

opposition towards British rule as such, e. g. in the case of Irish nationalists or

republicans of aH sorts as would be expected, but also against Chartist reformers and the

first trade unions, who were regularly tried by courts under conspiracy charges. " As in

the case of nineteenth century Ottoman conspiracies the question is how to interpret this

" Cf. lone scu/Madariaga (1972); Ponton (1972) and Barker (1971), 7; and programmatically for the journal 'Opposition and Government' Sartori (1971), 33. 14Barker (1990), 163, calls this form of opposition 'disaffection'. " Barker (1990), 166-85. 16 Cf Spicer (198 1).

Opposition to the Tanzimat State II

choice of language and procedure. Were the reforms in British electoral law really

threatening the established order to such a degree that conspiracy charges were justified? What role did misconception by the elites play to make this accusation and

what was the influence of political culture from the side of the agitators to choose

conspiracy?

Last in our short overview of themes surrounding legitimacy I would like to draw

attention to the issue of the diverse recipients of legitimacy claims. It was already one of Weber's basic observations that legitimacy is an especially vital attribute in the

relationship between the ruler and his administrative staff. 17 There is ample historical

evidence for the fact that a regime can largely rest on force as long as a small group like

the army or bureaucracy believe in the ruler's claim to legitimacy and support his

government. That is the reason why it has been suggested that on an overall basis rulers direct claims of legitimacy more towards the ruling elite in particular than to their

subjects in general. Moreover, there exist not only different degrees of legitimacy

between government, elite and the governed, but also there is the possibility that the

government employs altogether different strategies of legitimation towards different

sections of the elite. 18

Like other examples the Ottoman Empire also displayed this feature of a diversified

legitimacy depending on the social, ethnic or religious group to which a claim of legitimacy is addressed to by the ruler. Regarding the general interdependency of state

and opposition in the light of legitimacy, however, this feature may also be expected inside the opposition movements. A point of interest in the following analysis of the

conspiracies in the Tanzimat era will be the question of how far their opposition was

coloured by the social origin of their members. Another important recipient of claims of legitimacy, who, however, has been totally

neglected by Weber, is the international community. '9 In the Ottoman case the

nineteenth century is the time when these claims grow immensely in importance,

because of the military weakness of the empire. How legitimising strategies of the

Ottoman government directed at the outside world have an effect on the opposition

groups will be addressed in greater detail throughout my study. Once again I follow

Deringil's research on the 'image management' of the nineteenth century Ottoman

Weber (1978), 1,212-3. Barker (2001), 71-82 and ibid. (1990), 107-128.

19 Barker (2001), 82-88.


Empire. However, I will concentrate on the, often negative, effects this strategy had at home. To sum up, choosing legitimacy as an analytical tool can add to our understanding of the Tanzimat state and the opposition movements against it. This is because state and opposition are linked conceptually and historically through legitimacy. The latter is not an external and alien concept, but it is present in the historical situation in a specific way, continually evoked in symbols and rituals, enshrined in the particular form of a polity's institutions. How this legitimacy looked in the Ottoman case I would like to

reconstruct in the following section.

The historical legitimacy of the Ottoman Empire and its contestation As it is the case with every polity, the Ottoman state's claim for legitimacy was

expressed by its peculiar political system consisting of an organic whole of political institutions and ideologies. Alongside the development of these institutions, the

legitimacy of the empire also evolved on an ongoing basis. It is understood that the

Ottoman state, in the six hundred years of its existence, employed different claims of legitimacy towards its various subjects. In the following I will present an idealised

picture of Ottoman institutions and the legitimacy flowing from them as taken from the

reign of Sultan Silleyman 1 (1520-66). According to many Ottomans and modem historians this period signified the golden age of the empire before the decline set in.

Although the paradigm of decline is problematic, to say the least, and it does little

justice to the actual history of the empire after the time of Sultan SUleyman, the image

of legitimacy in this classical period nonetheless offers a convenient starting point for

our study. First of all, we need a basis from which to evaluate the changes in Ottoman

legitimacy in the nineteenth century. The classical account of Ottoman legitimacy can be such a basis, since it persists long after the Stileymanic age and elements of it are still invoked in the nineteenth century. Secondly, the different elements of this simplified image of Ottoman legitimacy show a feature of the Ottoman system, which I will use later in understanding the reforms in the nineteenth century. This is namely the two- headed nature of Ottoman legitimacy resting on the one hand on Islam, on the other hand on more secular claims as I would like to show in the following. 20

The evidence that the Ottoman Empire drew much of its legitimacy from Islam began

with the adoption of the gazi ideology by the first Ottoman sultans to give ideological

backing to their struggle against the Byzantines. Later, especially after the conquest of


the Arab world in the first quarter of the sixteenth century, the Ottomans portrayed themselves as champions of the Sunni cause. In his dealings with other Muslim rulers the sultan claimed the title of caliph, because he was the guardian of the Holy Places of Islam. The relations of the empire with its Christian neighbour states were arranged

according to the Islamic law of outside relations (siyar), which divided the world into

two opposing realms, the abode of Islam (dar fil-Islam) and the abode of war (dar fil-

harb). Inside the empire the sharia administered by a hierarchy of Islamic judges formed

the basic and theoretically all-encompassing legal system. Accordingly, the non-Muslim

subjects of the empire had to face some legal discriminations. The ultimate guardian of the sharia, however, was the sultan-caliph, who had to watch over its proper implementation in his realm. In contrast to this description there exists also a quasi-secular picture of the Ottoman

state, which was admired by political thinkers in early modem Europe like Machiavelli

and Bodin until it fell into disrepute and was dubbed 'oriental despotism' in the

eighteenth century. In this picture the sultan's ability to defend and govern the empire

effectively and to enforce his autocratic will for the welfare of all his subjects earned him their support. The loyalty of the members of the state bureaucracy and the army to

the ruler depended on their slave status as it was institutionalised in the so-called kul

system. Also the Islamic judges together with their head, the §eyhfilislam, although by

no means slaves, were state functionaries and dependent on the sultan regarding their

pay and their advancement. The sharia they administered was substituted by secular law

(kanu^n) enacted by the sultan especially regarding land law and criminal law. In general

the ruler mediated between the different religious communities of the empire, which

were allowed to govern their internal affairs according to their own laws.

The various elements of these two contrasting pictures are also present in the classical

self-description of Ottoman legitimacy in the so-called Circle of Justice (daire-i adliye).

This is a portrait of a just and well ordered state where ruler and ruled work together for

the greater good of all, i. e., it is a pre-scientific account of a situation of legitimate

domination. According to the Circle a ruler possesses the mandate to collect taxes and

police his territory to ensure the internal peace and prosperity of his country. In doing so he raises his income and his ability to ensure peace and stability by paying for soldiers. If these conditions are fulfilled, the whole state enters into a virtuous circle. Some

version of this circle, which became popular in the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth

2' Elements of Ottoman legitimacy are to be found for example in Gibb/Bowen (1950), Itzkowitz (1972), Imber (1997) and Faroqhi (1994), 609-22.


century, but relied on much older examples, are entirely secular in that they concentrate

on the material wellbeing of the subjects as a source of state legitimacy. Other versions, however, make place for the divine mandate of the ruler and his duty to see that the

sharia is properly implemented in this country. "

Finally, these two seemingly contradictory pictures of classical Ottoman legitimacy may be understood better in a single theoretical framework offered by the sociologist Shmuel

Eisenstadt. In the tradition of Weber, who was not very much interested in the Ottoman

Empire and lacked a genuine understanding of Islam and Muslim societies, Eisenstadt

synthesises a new typical constellation of the forms of legitimate domination among

others from the example of the Ottoman Empire. Together with various states ranging from the Roman Empire to the early modem absolutist monarchies of Europe the

Ottoman Empire was what Eisenstadt calls a 'historical bureaucratic empire'. The

characteristic of this type of domination is that its rulers employed a mix of both,

traditional (especially religious) as well as modem (rational-legal) forms of legitimacy

to claim the obedience of their subjects. To a certain degree bureaucratic empires

possessed an autonomous political sphere and a rationally organised staff, but they also

needed the support of traditional groups to exist. 22

If our conjecture that opposition implies the question of legitimacy is true, the specific

elements of Ottoman legitimacy as presented above are the elements according to which

this legitimacy can be contested. In a short article ýerif Mardin, concentrating on what he called 'popular rebellions', describes exactly such an opposition on the basis of

contested legitimacy. According to Mardin these rebellions acted on the background of

a 'tacit contract' between the Ottoman sultan and his subjects to defend what he calls 'Ottoman freedom'. The latter translates as the upkeep of the traditional order, whose building blocks, much like in the Circle of Justice, consisted of religious values and

socioeconomic arrangements. Mardin describes the typical pattern of such a popular

rebellion as follows:

The earliest stage [ ... ] was gossip, talk about the misdeeds of the ruler and officials. This campaign was amplified at one stage by allusions to a general state of social decay in sermons given in mosques. [ ... ]A third stage of the rebellion was the co- optation of the armed forces. It is here that the Janissaries came in. A usual way of expanding the supporters of the rebellions was to agitate in the bazaar. This agitation might be carried out by Janissaries or by men of religion. Often theology students joined in. In all these stages there were reasons proffered for the outbreak and the

21 Mardin (1962), 95-102. 22 Eisenstadt (1963), 13-32; Eisenstadt (1962).


reasons could be summarized as claims that the ruling power had failed to keep its promises. "

As we can already see in this short sketch, various motives, active groups and different

styles of opposition are discernible. Mardin then goes on to draw a direct connection between this tradition of popular rebellion and some of the opposition groups I am

going to present in this study. We will see, in how far he is right to claim such a

continuity regarding the ideology as well as the form of the opposition in the Tanzimat

era. Before I come to the nineteenth century, however, let me first add some other

studies on the classical Ottoman Empire where the connection between legitimacy and

opposition may be observed. Most explicitly the perspective of legitimacy is used by Linda Darling in her study on the Ottoman system of taxation at the turn of the sixteenth to the seventeenth

centuries. " Darling shows how Ottoman tax payers successfully challenged the

authorities by questioning its delivery of good government and justice, the promise on

account of which their obedience was expected. In this process the right to petition the

ruler was an important institution in the Ottoman political system to rectify unjust taxation. Darling's study is a timely reminder that opposition does not always have to be

expressed in terms of violence, but that below that threshold the subjects had other

means to question the legitimacy of certain government measures. However, most other studies examining the connection between legitimacy and

opposition in the classical and post-classical empire focus on more violent forms and instances of opposition against the Ottoman government. A rather special strand of literature treats the unrest shaking Anatolia in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth

centuries, known as the Celali rebellions. These large movements in the provinces of the

empire involving various social groups like peasants, soldiers, students of religion as

well as local notables, are rather different from the movements we are concerned with in

the nineteenth century. In principle, however, also these studies try to use the history of

opposition to understand the Ottoman state. 25

More typical for opposition as defined by Mardin is the 1703 rebellion as described in a

monograph by Rifaat Abou-el-Haj. 2' In many ways this short study can figure as a

model for our analysis of opposition in the nineteenth century, not least because Abou-

el-HaJ manages to disentangle excellently the intricate web of the various groups

involved and their motives as well as the contested symbols of legitimacy present in the

23Mardin (1988), 30. 24 Darling (1996). 25 As an example cf Barkey (1994). 26Abou-el-Hai (1984).


rebellion. With regards to the model of Ottoman legitimacy the study is interesting,

because it depicts in detail how pretensions by Sultan Mustafa H to revive the

Siileymanic image of leadership was confronted violently with the then political

realities of the empire symbolised by the all-powerful factions and pasha households,

which were running Ottoman politics from the second half of the seventeenth century. Some of Abou-el-Haj's observations on intra-elite struggle hold true for the nineteenth

century. For example the series of violent events in 1807/8 in which Selim III was deposed and ultimately Mahmud H came to the Ottoman throne can be understood in

this way. 27 And, as we will see in the following, also after the re-centralisation of Ottoman politics was well under way factionalism still had a role to play regarding the

conspiracies in the Tanzimat era.

One aspect of the 1703 rebellion and other similar incidents has attracted special

attention in the secondary literature, namely the involvement of the Ottoman military in

such events. There are two studies on mutinies in the Ottoman political context

concentrating, like Abou-el-Haj, on the mutiny as a form of struggle for power inside

the elite. These studies also elucidate the connection between the state's legitimacy and 21 military victories, or in the case of defeats the occurrence of mutinies.

Unfortunately, there does not seem to exist any study on conspiracy, although there is a lot of anecdotal evidence that this was an equally frequent means of opposition in

Ottoman politics manifest especially in the form of the harem or office conspiracy. This

gap in the literature is the more surprising since for the early modem European context

there exists a broad literature on conspiracy as a prominent form of political behaviour. 29

Much like the sketch of Ottoman historical legitimacy I hope that this short overview of

the research into historical forms of Ottoman opposition can act as a reference for the

analysis of nineteenth century Ottoman opposition. I would like to examine if and how

opposition adapted to new political circumstances in the nineteenth century. The work

of Bertrand Badie gives a hint as to how protest movements were influenced by

modemisation initiated by the state. " Badie concedes such an influence by showing

how Western discourses, forms of organisation, styles of protest and ways of mobilising

followers were adopted in non-Westem countries, often with dysfunctional

consequences. In general the advent of modemisation in the Middle East reinforced a

culture d emeute' in the Muslim world shaped by a neo-patrimonial social structure.

" inalcik (1964a), 55. 21 Aksan (1998); Brummett (1998). 29 Cf. the ca. 30 articles in Berc6/Fasano Guarini (1996).


Most of Badie's examples refer to developments in the twentieth century, but keeping in

mind the early start of modernisation in the Ottoman Empire it may be worthwhile to

enquire whether the five opposition groups between 1859 and 1878 1 will describe in

the next paragraph may be understood along similar lines.

Five opposition groups When in 1984 after 32 years the second edition of Tank Zafer Tunaya's seminal work 'Political Parties in Turkey' (TUrkiye'de siyasal partiler) appeared, the book had

changed in many respects. " On the one hand, due to new material the author had been

able to collect and the political developments of the last three decades, which were incorporated into the study, the book now was published in three volumes instead of

one. One volume was entirely dedicated to the history of the CUP, which in the old as

well as in the new edition took the most important position among the first political

parties in the modem sense of the word founded in Turkey.

On the other hand some parts of the old edition did not reappear in the new one. These

missing parts included, first of all, the theoretical introduction on political parties,

second, the introductory chapter dealing with the time before the second constitutional

period after 1908. In this lost chapter Tunaya shortly mentioned the political

organisations of the Greek, Bulgarian and Armenian minorities in the Ottoman empire

striving for national independence. Then he proceeded to Ottoman political

organisations in the time before and after the first constitutional period (1876). There

were five organisations (taazzuv) - Tunaya conceded that these were not yet proper

political parties - mentioned by the author in the Tanzimat era. The first, the Society of

Martyrs (fedailer cemiyeti) was detected when it was planning an assassination attempt

on Sultan AbdUlmecid in 1859. The much better researched Young Ottoman Society

was presented by Tunaya as a forerunner to the Young Turks and as the first

constitutionalist movement in Ottoman-Turkish history. As a third political movement

the author briefly took notice of the demonstrations of the students of religious sciences

(softa) leading eventually to the deposition of Sultan AbdUlaziz in 1876. He then went

on to add two small groups, which were destroyed by the Ottoman government in 1878.

Ali Suavi's IDskiidar Society and the Skalieri/Aziz committee both had as their main

objective to bring Abdiilaziz' successor Murad back to the throne after he had been

deposed in 1876.

" Badie (1986), 223-59 and ibid., (2000), 123-30. 31CL Tunaya (1952) and ibid. (1984-89).


These five organisations, which Tunaya could not fit into the pattem of political pailies

are the ones I will analyse in the following as opposition to the Tanzimat state. Some of them, namely the Society of Martyrs, the Young Ottoman movement as well as the lDskiidar Society, also were counted among the 'popular rebellions' Mardin analyses in

the article mentioned above. The fact that they were grouped together by two such eminent Turkish scholars might offer a further justification for a re-evaluation of these incidents of opposition during the Tanziniat era in the light of the theoretical concepts presented in this introduction.

The five groups have been chosen because they were the major cases of highly

organised political opposition in Istanbul during the Tanzimat era. I exclude any cases

of regional unrest and movements of independence from this study, because these

responded to a very different set of Ottoman legitimacy, if they did not reject this legitimacy in the first place. The members of our five movements were in their

overwhelming majority Muslims and Turks, a fact that together with the size of their

groups, roughly ten to thirty members, and the conspiratorial element makes them more

effectively comparable. Another reason why I focus on these five groups is that they are either already

reasonably well researched, like e. g. the Young Ottomans, or have left a considerable

amount of traces in the Ottoman and foreign archives. Regarding the Ottoman sources the interrogation records I use extensively in the chapters about the Society of Martyrs

(chapter H), the Young Ottomans (chapter III), and the Skalieri/Aziz conspiracy (chapter VI) proved especially helpful. In the best of cases these documents - being,

after all, documents produced by the state - allow us direct access to the statements of

the members of the opposition groups. This is particularly important conceming the

question of the plotters' motivation about which information in general is rare. As

another way to get a grip on the question of motives I chose to have a closer look at the

life stories of the members of opposition. Thus, if possible, each of the following

chapters will feature biographical sketches on the leaders of the different conspiracies to

see how their lives prior to their political activism affected their stance of opposition

against the Ottoman government.

A host of other political incidences, opposition groups or office conspiracies, that either do not fulfil the criteria explained above or have not produced substantial sources, will be mentioned in passing, but not analysed in depth. The overall task of this study is

rather to make a point on Ottoman legitimacy in the nineteenth century than to contain a

complete list of incidents of political or other opposition. Therefore the analysis of the

five chosen movements will follow certain themes regarding the central question of


legitimacy. I try to make a different aspect of Ottoman legitimacy the focus of each chapter, although usually the conspiracies display various of these aspects. Chapter two on the Society of Martyrs will mainly recapitulate Ottoman reform policy in the Tanzimat and try to answer the question of whether this conspiracy was a direct

response to the reform policy and if so to what elements of it in particular. It is interesting that after the Tanzimat was declared in 1839 it took exactly twenty years,

until 1859, for a political group like the Society of Martyrs to emerge. With regards to the topic of legitimacy the emphasis of the chapter will be on the changing balance

between religious and secular legitimacy in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire.

However, also other themes that I will take up again in later chapters as the changing international environment and the political system of the Tanzimat will be mentioned for the first time.

With the Young Ottoman movement, the focus of chapter three, the reaction of a different group, the civil bureaucracy, towards the Tanzimat will move into the centre of

my study. Here, I will discuss the beginnings of this new class of intellectuals and the different changes they introduced into the Ottoman political landscape. I will pay

special attention to their relation to the sultan's authority, which gained new prominence in their writings. Chapter four will also deal with opposition from inside the Tanzimat bureaucracy as

visible in the coup against the sultan in 1876. But in this chapter also the reaction of two

other social groups, the students of theology mentioned by Tunaya as well as the

Ottoman military, will be examined in greater detail.

The last two opposition movements emerged in the fallout of this coup and the

subsequent events. One of the most interesting questions about the 0skUdar society, to

be discussed in chapter five, will be how the international situation during the Tanzimat,

represented in the form of Muslim refugees, influenced Ottoman legitimacy. Regarding

the Kleanti/Aziz committee in chapter six I will especially focus on the challenge of the

Ottoman authorities with a liberal ideology as embodied by the Freemason contacts of

the president of the committee. This last movement will be a convenient end point to the

study, because it forms a bridge to the Young Turk movement emerging slowly in the

1880s and 90s.


U. THE SOCIETY OF MARTYRS

20

The Society of Martyrs (fedailer cemiyeti), which was detected in September 1859, is

the first example of an opposition group confronting the Ottoman government in the Tanzimat era. In the first part of this chapter I will establish the events in September

and October 1859 using all the available contemporary sources. These comprise the

reports of the British embassy, articles published in the contemporary press and, from

the side of the Ottoman authorities, the document issued by the commission judging the

conspirators assembling the interrogation protocols and the judgements against the

plotters, the so-called istintakname. 1

This last document is most important regarding the organisation structure and aims of

the Society of Martyrs. It is these aims . about which there has been considerable

confusion in modem historiography of the event. The claim of some contemporary

observers that the conspiracy wanted to introduce a constitutional regime to the empire

was vigorously refuted by Ulug i9demir, the Turkish historian, who edited the

I. stintakname in 1937. His own assessment that it was a religiously motivated

(reactionary' (irticai) plot directed against the reform policy of the government has

been largely embraced by the more recent scholarship. '

In the following I would like to take a fresh look at the Society of Martyrs taking care to

picture its development in the historical framework of the Tanzimat. Since this will be

the first case to explore the relationship between legitimacy and opposition in the time

of the Tanzirnat it will be necessary to take into consideration much of the background

of the period preceding the actual events in 1859. To connect the historical background

and the history of the Society of Martyrs and find out more about the aims of the

society I will try to reconstruct the life stories of its principal members in a later section

of this chapter.

'BOA, Divan-i HUmayun Defteri, Whimme-i Mektume Defteri no. 10 edited by lkderrýr (1937); Bulwer to Russell in PRO, FO 78/1435 ff.; The Times; Takvim-i Vekayi and Ceride-i Havadis; Journal de Constantinople. For all archival abbreviations see the list of sigles in the bibliography. 2 igdemir (1937), 35,38. The author was general secretary of the TUrk Tarih Kurumu (Turkish Histoncal Society, TTK), the vanguard of Kemalism, from 1931-61.


The events in autumn 1859

At a point during Safer 1276 (September 1859) Hasan Pasha, 3 commander of a fort on the Bosphorus with the rank of a mirliva (brigadier general) of artillery, addressed himself to the minister of war (serasker) Riza Pasha. Details about their conversation or

a written notice have not survived, but most probably Hasan indicated to his superior a

plot to assassinate Sultan AbdUlmecid and to overthrow his government being hatched

by some officers of the Tophane regiment. He himself was asked to join this conspiracy by a scribe of the same regiment at the same time as he heard of its existence by the head of the Tophane military band. 4

The authorities' reaction was swift. Some of the plotters were arrested at a meeting fixed by Hasan on Thursday 17 Safer (15 September) at the Kiliq Ali Pa§a Mosque in

the Tophane quarter while others were taken directly from their houses. The plotters then were put under custody at the Kuleli barracks on the opposite side of the Bosphorus. ' There, two days later, the interrogation of the suspects began, carried out by a special commission consisting of the grand vizier, the serasker, the yeyhfilislam

and several other high ranking officials. From the name of the barracks where the trial

took place the secret society and the events surrounding it derived its name: the Kuleli

conspiracy. The plotters themselves, however, called themselves the Society of Martyrs

(fedailer cemiyeti). Meanwhile, the Porte was giving out little detailed information about the events to the

public in the capital. The Times was the first paper to publish the news of the plot in an

article on Monday, 19 September, but obviously this article only relied on rumours

circulating in Istanbul. According to the paper the number of arrests amounted up to

200 persons and an Albanian officer, Cafer Pasha, was said to be at the head of the

conspiracy. An official statement of the Ottoman government sent to the press in the

capital seems to have been the source of the article in the local Journal de

Constantinople of Wednesday, 21 September. Together with the official Ottoman paper Ceride-i Havadis (Register of Events), appearing one day later, it correctly referred to

the number of suspects, who had been arrested, as amounting to 40 persons;

additionally the formation of the special commission was reported and the future

3Sicill-i osmani, H, 172: "Hasan Pa§a (Tartar). Topqu Urneransindan olup Mirliva ve Bahr-i Siyah Bogazi Muhafiz oldu. 1276 Saferinde (ýerkes Huseyin Pap hiyanetini haber vermesinden dolayt ferik oldu ise de az mijddette kendisi de menkub oldu. MUtekaiden 1298'de vefat etti. " For his advancement in rank cf. BOA, A. MKT. MHM 170/38 (15 R 1276). 4 igdemir (1937), 50, no. 4 and 72, no. 40. 1 ikdeniir (1937), 43, intro. and 56, no. 10.

Opposition to the Tanzimat State 1) 1)

publication of its findings was announced. The Times in its following articles 6 confirmed these facts. Its earlier reports of many more arrests, however, may not have

been entirely wrong. As a diplomatic source stated, the Porte first arrested 'the usual suspects', among them some Hungarian and Polish renegades, before narrowing down

the list to the number of forty persons. Also in the account Ahmed Cevdet later gave of the event in his function as official historiographer of the empire (vakaniivis) the

number of arrests was set as high as 300. '

As the principal goal of the plotters all articles named the overthrow of the government. Only the Times, standing under no restriction by the Ottoman censor, stated that this

also would have implied the assassination of the sultan. According to its correspondent, AbdUlmecid was to be surrounded in the street, asked to abdicate in favour of his

brother AbdUlaziz, and, if unwilling to do so, immediately would have been killed. The

motive of the plotters according to the sources, which reached the public, was less clear. Only the Times hinted at "the abuses of [the sultan's] Administration". This paper was

also the only one mentioning the origin of the plotters, viz., ulema and theological

students as well as the army. Additionally it was giving the names of the two alleged leaders of the conspiracy, Cafer and HUseyin Pashas!

While the European press was speculating about the origins of the conspiracy and inside the Kuleli barracks the questioning of the suspects proceeded, the Ottoman

government tried to convey the impression to the public in the capital and the European

governments that everything was under control and that the conspiracy did not have any

repercussions on the country. 9 Accordingly, in an article placed in the Journal de

Constantinople, the Ottoman authorities denied that the sultan in any way did change his daily routine and they assured that it had not been necessary to take special security

measures regarding his person. " Another crucial point especially in the European press

was the question of the safety of the Christian inhabitants of Istanbul. All articles stated

that at no time had there been any danger of a massacre and that even the plotters had

intended to take precautions to keep this from happening. II

From the beginning the Porte showed more effort to inform the European embassies

than the public about the plot. Within two days of the arrests the British dragoman

' Times, 19/09/1859,7; Journal de Constantinople, 21/09/1859, Int6rieure. There are no editions of this paper on the 18,19 and 20/09. Also cf. the article of the Ceride-i Havadis, 24 Safer 1276 in lAdemir (1937), 9-10 and Times, 21/09/1859,8 and 30/09/1859,6. 7 Pisani to Bulwer, Yenikioy, 19/09/1859, in FO 78/1435, no. 164, Bulwer to Russell, Therapia, 20/09/1859; Ahmed Cevdet (1953-67), H, tez. 15,82. 'Times, 01/10/1859,10. The article apparently was written on 21/09. 'Cf Times, 03/10/1859,8. 10 Journal de Constantinople, 24/09/1859, Int6rieure.


Pisani was summoned to the Porte and he produced two reports for Ambassador Bulwer

on 17 and 19 September. " In these reports Pisani largely communicated the

circumstances as described above that were later also to be found in the official protocol

of investigation (istintakname). However, like in the statements of the press,

contradictions arose in these reports, be it because the Porte itself in the beginning was

not sure about the meaning of the conspiracy, be it that it wanted to create a certain image of the events. Regarding the participants of the conspiracy the dragoman's first report stated that a 'softa' named Ahmed Efendi was the head of the plot. In his second report, however,

after an interview with Ali and Fuad Pashas, grand vizier and foreign secretary

respectively, at a time when the interrogation of the prisoners already was under way, Pisani named HUseyin Pasha, a general, who was at the time of the disclosure of the

plot on a mission to Yanina, to be the initiator of the conspiracy. Perhaps the two

leading ministers of the Porte, who informed the dragoman, tried to weaken the impression that the centre of the plot was the 'fanatical party'. The fact, however, that

several persons from the religious establishment were implicated in the plot seems to have stuck. As for the origin of the plotters both of Pisani's reports stressed that they

were Circassians, like Hiiseyin, or Albanians like Cafer Pasha, whose name had been

already mentioned in the press. As for their goals and motives, in his second report the

dragoman stated bluntly:

The real object of the conspirators, as confessed by some of the prisoners, was to get rid of the Sultan by violent means and to replace him by his brother. The present Ministers were also to be sacrificed and particularly Aali Pasha and Fuad Pasha. Their successors were to be men of the fanatical party and belonging to the old school. The motive alleged is the little regard shown by the present Govt. to the Holy law, the prescriptions of which according to them are trampled under foot.

The religious interpretation of the motives of the conspiracy shows that if there had

been an attempt by Ali or Fuad to avoid such an interpretation it was not successful. As a further step in the information policy of the Porte one week after the arrests, on 22

September, the British embassy received a list of all persons that had been part of the

conspiracy. " It contained 33 names with the place of origin or military rank added in

some cases. On the top positions of the list we find the persons already named in the

diplomatic correspondence and the press: HUseyin Daim Pasha (no. 1), Sheikh Ahmed

" Times, 01/10/1859,10; Journal de Constantinople, 12/10/1859, Int6rieure. 12 FO 195/627, Pisani to Bulwer, Yenikioy, 17 and 19/09/1859, also included in FO 78/1435, no. 164, Bulwer to Russell, Therapia, 20/09/1859. 13 FO 78/1435, no. 179, Bulwer to Russell, Therapia, 27/09/1859. The same list also appears in the Journal de Constantinople, 28/09/1859.


(no. 2), Cafer Pasha (no. 4). The rest of the persons, hitherto unknown, are lower

ranking military officers, some students of religious sciences (softa), a mfiftfi and

another sheikh. At the same time this list was produced a further hint to the motives of the plotters was

given by the grand vizier Ali Pasha in a private conversation with Pisani.

The real causes of the conspiracy are, according to the Grand Vizir's statement, the unbounded liberty granted to the Sultan's Harem, the enormous expenditure incurred by the State on their account, whilst the arrears of the Troops remain unpaid, and the little attention shown to the precepts of the Coran or Holy Law. "

This is the first time there is a hint that part of the plotter's dissatisfaction was due to

the financial state of the empire.

Meanwhile, inside the Kuleli barracks interrogations were proceeding. Each suspect first was questioned separately regarding his involvement in the plot. In case of doubt

about the truth of his statements - any suspect naturally tried to minimise his role - he

was confronted with the statements made by his fellow prisoners. " In this way in the following two weeks a set of 41 interrogation protocols was produced. The

interrogation was completed on 27 Safer (25 September) and an order was issued to

have the protocols collected and neatly copied. By chance one of the original interrogation protocols survived, which shows that in the copying process the protocols

were edited. Summaries of the protocols were produced, which only contain information the interrogators deemed necessary to prove that the suspect was guilty of

the crime he was accused of. Unfortunately any additional information as well as the

interaction between the interrogator and the suspect was eliminated from these

summaries. "

To give the istintakname its final form furthermore the sentence for each suspect as

decided by the special commission was added as was a general introduction and an

afterword recapitulating the events and justifying the sentences. Five leading figures of

the Society of Martyrs were sentenced to death, the others to various combinations of

imprisonment (ka-lebend) and hard labour (kfirek). The judgement was signed on 11

Rebialevvel (8 October) by the members of the special commission and then offered to

the sultan's sanction. Later, in accordance with the information policy towards the

14FO 195/627, Pisani to Bulwer, Yenikioy 27/09/1859. 15The term used in the introduction of the istintak-name is "milriferiden ve muvaceheten"; cf. Times 12/12/1859, which complains about the unfair way of these proceedings. 16 For the order to collect the protocols as well as the surviving original cf BOA, 1D 29258.


European powers, the istintakname was also translated into French, printed and

presented to the foreign embassies. "

In the end, however, the judgements were not carried out in this form. Already in the

weeks during the trial there had been speculations in the Istanbul papers that the leaders

might be spared the expected death penalty. Also the British ambassador Bulwer had

expected the death sentences not to be carried out and later, together with his French

colleague Thouvenel, he intervened on behalf of the culprits. According to another

source the reason why the death sentences could not be carried out was a gap in the

penal code by which they were to be punished. " Eventually, on 29 Rebidlevvel (26

October), the death sentences were changed to exile and the prisoners were deported

from the capital with an Ottoman steamer to their various places of exile inside the

empire in the beginning of November. 19

The istintakname

The most comprehensive source dealing with the Kuleli conspiracy undoubtedly is the

official istintakname. In the following I will have a closer look at this document to learn

more about the secret society, which stood in the centre of the events described above. This section will be mainly concerned with the society's organisation and membership

structure as well as its objective as the members describe it. It should be kept in mind

that the only information we have about these issues comes from the Ottoman

authorities. This, however, offers the opportunity to examine more closely their attitude

towards the plot as well as their selfconception. The introduction preceding the single interrogation protocols of the 41 suspects gives

some basic information about the history and the structure of the secret society known

as the Society of Martyrs. As the group's founder and president the introduction names

a Sheikh Ahmed from Sfileymaniye, a town in what is today northern Iraq, who started

to establish the organisation. five or six months before its discovery. Together with

Ahmed four other men, Hiiseyin Daim Pasha, Cafer Dem Pasha, Rasim Bey and Arif

Bey, all of them coming from the military, formed the inner circle of the society. They

as well as the rest of the suspects, who were real members of the secret society,

17 A copy to be found in FO 78/1437, no. 256, Bulwer to Russell, Constantinople, 21/11/1859. 11 Journal de Constantinople, 24/09/1859 and 09/11/1859, Int6rieure; FO 195/646, no. 211, Bulwer to Russell, Constantinople, 12/10/1859; FO 195/627, Pisani to Bulwer, Yenikioy 23/10/1859; FO 195/646, no. 260, Bulwer to Russell, Constantinople, 22/11/1859; Thouvenel (1897), 354; Ahmed Cevdet (1953- 67), 11, tez. 15,83. " The irade concerning the commuting of the death sentences (ID 29437) appears only in the registers but was not issued; BOA, A. MKT. NZD 294/44,294/67; Journal de Constantinople, 14/11/1859.


altogether about 20 people, had to take an oath by sealing a document written in Arabic

stating that they consented to the pact with Ahmed and thus became a fedai, i. e.,

someone, who was expected to sacrifice himself for the common cause. It is from this

oath that the name of the group, Society of Martyrs, was derived. 21 Regarding the social background of its founder, Sheikh Ahmed, it is not surprising that

the Society of Martyrs resembled a small Sufi order (tarikat), which usually consisted

of a group of followers (mfirid), who were personally dependent on their sheikh and

spiritual leader (mfirýid) to whom they owe unquestioning obedience. Moreover, in the

case of the conspiracy as well as in a tarikat besides the initiated members there existed

an amorphous circle of followers (muhibban) accounting for the rest of the 41 suspects. Apart from the fact that such a form of organisation was able to preserve the secrecy of

the plot, the choice of a tarikat-like structure also seems natural for another reason. The

plotters had to choose a form of association independent from the central political

power, which would allow them to voice their demands unhindered. One of the few

examples of such relatively independent bodies in their environment was the traditional

Sufi orders. Although the latter generally were not known for their opposition to the

state, in comparison to the official religious establishment, they guarded a kind of 21 institutional independence and on some occasions could voice discontent.

In the eyes of the authorities, however, the goal of Ahmed's secret organisation was

merely criminal and therefore it was labelled throughout the text of the istintakname

'cemiyet-ifesadiye', the seditious society. According to the interrogators the major aim

of the society was to raise the people and soldiers against the state and to change its

principles (usul) and laws (kavanin) by means of bloodshed. 22 In contrast to public

statements in the istintakname it was admitted frankly that the sultan himself was to be

the aim of an assassination attempt:

And to accomplish their wretched aspirations, apart from preparing a plot against some of the ministers attacking them with an-ns in their hands, this evil opinion caused to reach up to the degree of an assassination attempt - God forbid! - against the office of the glorious caliphate, as it became clear in the full explanation in the interrogation protocol. "

20 igdeni-ir (1937), 44: i§te kullanmak dzere fedai

J-0, ASLOJI 613 Ij I" -$\-j I -kf-c -9

ibaresi ve ekseri kendi hattlyle yedlerinden ba§ka ba§ka memhur senetler dahi ahz ve istihsal eylediki [ ... T. 2 'Badie (1997), 233. 22 lkdermr (1937), 44: 1 ve bu cen-liyeti fesadiye hiidanekerde halki ve askeri saltanati seniyye aleyhine kaldirarak heyeti devleti takyir ile usul ve kavanini bozmak ve sefki dim5 etmek [ ... ]". 231 'demir (1937). 44-5: ve bu ýbnali §ekavetk, -Iranelerini husule getirmek iqin mijseRehan hUcum He g


To mark the seriousness of this 'biggest of all crimes' as well as to prepare the

announcement of the death sentences of the five main culprits the tone of disapproval

and contempt once again was stepped up by taking recourse to a moral and religious language.

And the harm and dangers can not be enumerated that the sedition they tried to stir up although it was totally opposed to the sharia, which they wanted to put forward with hypocrisy and falsehood to advocate their vicious personal purposes, was causing to religion and state. "

According to this statement not only the secular laws of the state were in danger, but

religion and state (din ii devlet). The plot was said to run counter to the sharia, which

the plotters themselves invoked to legitimise their actions, and consequently in the next

paragraph they were subjected to the damnation of god. This time the aim of the plot is

designated with the term fitne. Like fesad it basically expresses any state of sedition, disorder or rebellion and from time to time is used to alternate with fesad in the text

following the introduction. Moreover, fitne has a religious meaning in the background,

which fesad is lacking, and thus perfectly fits into the word field constantly used in this

paragraph. Taken together the terms fitne and fesad remind us that from the perspective of the

Ottoman government there was no form of legitimate opposition in the Ottoman state

neither concerning its religious nor its secular part of legitimation. Every such attempt

was classified as a rebellion against the legitimate rule of the sultan, who, at the same

time, was the protector of the sharia in the empire. The Kuleli conspiracy was not the

only example for this mechanism. Other events in opposition to the official policy, too,

had been designated with the terms fitne and fesad. These terms even were employed to

translate events outside the Islamic world. For example it was chosen by Arab and

Ottoman authors to translate the term 'French revolution' or other revolutionary events

in European history. "

How both the secular as well as the religious condemnation were present in the reaction

of the authorities towards the Society of Martyrs will come out more clearly later when

I will examine the interrogation protocols proper. First, however, before turning to the

bazi bendegAn hakkinda icrayi sui kaste hazirlanmi§ olduklarindan ba§ka istintaknameleri tafsilAtindan m0steban olacaki veghile bu sui efk, -In maazallahUtaald makami celilei hilAfet hakkinda dahi suikast derecesine kadar yetUrmU§ olduklan

lbid, 45: "Ve Agrazi fasidei zatiYelerin' terviý zimninda kemali riya ve tezvir He nami Wismi ortaya koymak istedikleri §eriati garranin tamamiyle hilAfina olaralk beynel'enam ika ve ikaz etmege qaliýtMan fitnenin dinij devlete mucip olacaki mazaffat ve mehalik tadat ve hesaba gelmez. " 25 Okumu§ (1999), 400-1; Ayalon (1987), 149-55; Lewis (1988), 95-6; Arikan (1990).


aim of the society as described by its members, let us first have a closer look at the

origin of the plotters.

As I have already mentioned above only about 20 out of the 41 arrested men had signed the pact with Ahmed, i. e., became afedai and thus can be regarded as belonging to the heart of the conspiracy. All the others were integrated into the plot to a higher or lesser degree, be it that they were only partly initiated into its plans, be it that they had declined to join the plot but nonetheless continued to be in contact with the sheikh, be it

that they were in the last meeting in the Kiliq Ali Pa§a Mosque for whatever reason. Because all of the papers of the society, among them the list with the names of fedai,

were destroyed before the authorities could lay hands on them, in the interrogation it

seems to have been a matter of heated debate as to which of these categories a suspect belonged. " Especially the less prominent suspects successfully pleaded to have been

tricked into the society without having knowledge of its real goals. As the organisational. structure of the society already suggests, many of its members were attracted by its leader Ahmed. Indeed, the sheikh directly recruited about half of the 41 people under arrest. Somewhat surprisingly few of these had a religious background, but most came from the military. Apart from the three officers and the

army scribe of the inner circle these were, for example, two old friends of Ahmed, a lieutenant from Daghistan (no. 16) and a captain, who like the sheikh himself came from Siileymaniye and was a son of the ruling family of that city (no. 8) . 2' A sergeant from the Tophane supply regiment (no. 15), who also was recruited personally by

Ahmed in the interrogation explicitly claimed to be his mfirid. He became an especially

zealous member and brought five new followers from different artillery units in Istanbul

to the conspiracy, two of whom signed the pact with the sheikh. Generally, men with a military background amounted to half of the arrested suspects

and they made up the largest group of fedai. The highest rank among them was

represented by Hiiseyin Daim. (no. 2), who was ferik (general of division). The other

members of the society were lower ranking officers, four captains (yfizbqyt) and three

majors (binbaýi), and a few non-commissioned officers. The officers from the inner

circle mostly recruited members for the society from among their colleagues and kin. A

group of artillerymen, for example, was recruited by Arif Bey (no. 4), scribe in the

Tophane regiment. HOseyin Daim recruited his own son Hasan (no. 19) as well as his

26 igdemir (1937), no. 1,47. 27 W 32064 (3 Ra 1278).


aide-de-camp (no. 27), who both were treated mildly because of their dependence on their father and superior respectively. As was also to be expected, people with a religious background were attracted to the

conspiracy. There was a group of four medrese students (nos. 10,11,34,35) of whom, however, only two signed the treaty with Ahmed. The others successfully claimed in

the interrogation not to have been told the whole truth about the society. Ahmed also

succeeded in recruiting two other Sufi sheikhs, whose task apparently was to give

support to the plot with their followers and students. One of them was the Nak§ibendi

Sheikh Feyzullah from Herazgrad in present day Bulgaria (no. 22), who claimed to

have the support of a thousand followers. He was recruited with the help of the mfiftfi of

the council of Tophane (no. 6), who functioned as a bridge between the members with a

military background and the ones coming from the religious side. The other Sufi sheikh, ismail from Ktitahya (no. 23), perhaps a Nak§ibendi, too, who is said to have had as

much as six thousand followers, was approached by Ahmed himself after a sermon in

Aya Sofya . 21 A last member from the religious side was the hodja Nasuh Efendi (no.

21), who did not become a fedai and therefore only was banned from Istanbul for a

couple of years. 29

The rest of the suspects were people from different or unclear backgrounds. There were

some old acquaintances of Ahmed, two brothers (nos. 9,24) of the officer from

Sfileymaniye mentioned earlier and one from North Africa (no. 31), the latter being

innocent altogether. There was also a poor confectioner (muhallebici), who seems to

have been a client of Rasim, one of the alleged leaders in the inner circle of the

conspiracy, and in this way got involved in the conspiracy. Last to mention was a group

of four Circassians. Two of them (nos. 18,25), one an acquaintance to Ahmed and Hiiseyin Daim since three years, were charged with recruiting a band of their

compatriots, who were supposed to be used in the actual assassination attempt. There

were a lot of Circassian refugees to be found in Istanbul at the time, but the allegation

that a large mass of them actually was included in the secret society can not be proven. 30

To sum up, we are confronted with a variety of people from different backgrounds of

whom perhaps the military officers and the men from the religious professions are the

social groups, which can be discerned most precisely. But also among them there were

different individual stories as to how they got to be members of the secret society. In

2' Abu-Manneh (2001), 126; Gfindilz (1984), 247. '9 Ahmed Uitfi (1984-93), IX, 49/a (113). 30 Cf Times, 22/12/1859,10. The article was later again published in Thornbury (1860).


the centre of this web of recruiting biographies undoubtedly stood Ahmed, who was the

real initiator of the society.

How can the statements made by this set of very different people in their interrogations

be evaluated regarding the goal of the society as a whole and the motives of its individual members? To answer this question I shall look first at Ahmed's interrogation. Being the founder and central figure of the society his statement can be

counted as the aim of the society in general. Regarding the question why the sheikh

established the society the interrogation protocol reads as follows:

According to his unfounded opinion about the matter of equality of rights, which the subjects of the Ottoman state had acquired at the time of necessity for justice and need for judgements, [ ... ] he started to establish such a society with the illusion to protect the glorious statutes of the sharia. He said that the aim of this society was not to make any kind of assassination but to introduce the ulema to this society and let them express their thoughts. "

Not surprisingly in his statement Ahmed stressed the religious aims of the organisation, his care for the sharia in the face of the reform policy of the government and his wish to discuss this with other groups of society, namely the ulema. But here and later in the interrogation when he said: "My intention was not assassination (suikast) but to carry

out the statutes of the sharia! ", he strongly denied that to cure these ills he was worried

about violent means were to be employed. It was easy for the interrogators to show that

these statements were an attempt to justify his behaviour in light of the threatening death sentence. The evidence the other suspects delivered and especially the fact of the

recruitment offedai shattered Ahmed's version of a debating club. Moreover, the authorities were eager to deny the society's ability to pursue its idealistic

goals in the first place. Their argumentation was that the members of the society were

able to understand correctly neither the sharia nor the administration of government, but

that they were just a gang of thugs, who could use their weapons. '2As we have seen

above this accusation may have been true for the greatest part of the members, who,

perhaps with the exception of the high-ranking officers, did not belong to the ruling

class of the empire. The authorities on their part left no doubt that they regarded any

" lAdemir (1937), no. 1,46: tebaai Devleti Aliyyenin icabi hakkaniyet ve iktizayi ahkkm zarnan olarak nail olduklari tesavii hukuk meselesine zanunca [... ] istizhari ahkAnu celilei §er'iyye evhaniiyle b6yle bir cemiyet te§kiline kaM§arak ve bundan maksadi dahi hiq kimse hakkinda bir gfina suikast ve rnuarnele iqin olmiyarak ulemayi bu cemiyeti ittifaka ithal ile ifadei meram etmek suretinde oldug'unu sbyleyiip [ ... I". '2 Ibid, 47: "[ ... j ve a§ikh ve fedai yazdigi adan-dar §eriat davasim anlar ve nizarm devleti bilir, velhasil husulii merama ne ilmen ve ne dirayeten rnuavenet etmege muktedir olur takirnindan olmayup ciin-desi fiili fazihi kasdi icraya dlet olacak ve silA kullanacak e§hastan olduklan meydanda iken


claim of these kind of people to have a say in secular or religious legal matters as null

and void. That the challenge to the autocratic power of the sultan and his government

came in the name of the sharia only made matters worse, because of the religious side

of Ottoman legitimacy.

The second leader of the society, HUseyin Daim, behaved similarly to Ahmed in

playing down the role of violence in the conspiracy. The officer said the society was "about realising the statutes of the sharia and reforming politics", " adding a second

motive to the care for the holy law as it was expressed by the sheikh. The interrogators

exposed Hiiseyin's role in the conspiracy, namely his initiative to distribute leaflets to

the foreign embassies and the public and to recruit a gang of Circassians, by the same

method of producing conflicting evidence. However, it can be observed that from a

moral point of view Hiiseyin was treated quite differently by the authorities than

Ahmed. Regarding his involvement in the conspiracy the istintakname stated:

Although HUseyin Pasha obtained the rank of a general of division by the great favour of the sultan and he had to know more than others about the condition of state and country and was obliged before everyone else to guard order and law, he assembled in his house some of the members of the plot [ ... ] and he worked and persuaded against the established orders of the rank and honour of the Ottoman state, which was offered to him by the sultan. "

By invoking twice his military rank the authorities strongly appealed to Hiiseyin's

esprit de corps. Being a general of the Ottoman army he was counted among the ruling

elite -a fact, which, in the eyes of the authorities, entailed a special obligation to

uphold the regime of the sultan. As a main duty of government the Ottoman authorities

stressed the assurance of law (kanun) and order (nizam). To threaten these values meant

threatening the legitimacy of the government. Thus, to morally disqualify the behaviour

of Hiiseyin and to justify the death sentence it was enough to hint to this complex of

secular values and there was no need to invoke the religious side of this legitimacy as

had been done in Ahmed's case.

Unfortunately the istintakname gives almost no information about the motives of the

other suspects. In most interrogations the question why somebody was in contact with

Ahmed or joined his secret society and what he thought was its objective simply seems

not to have been asked or was at least not recorded. It remains an open question how far

" Ibid, no. 2,48: "[ ... ] icrayi ahkdnu §er'iyye ve islahati umuru urnumiye hakkmda [ ... ] ". 34 lbid, 49: "! §bu Hiiseyin Pap sayei maalivayei hazreti §ahanede feriklik rijtbesini haiz olarak ahvali devlet ve men-dekete sairinden ziyade vukufu olmak lAzim geldigi ve muhafazai nizarn ve kanun herkesten mukaddern kendisinin vecibei zimmeti bulunduku halde [ ... ] birtakim erbabi fitenU fesadi konakina cernederek Larah hazrefi padi§ahiden kendisine ihsan buyrulmu§ olan rCitbe ve hayslyeti devleti

aliyyenin nizarnati mevzuasinin aleyhine istimale qali§masi


the summarised interrogation protocols truly picture the statements of the suspects as

well as the course of the interrogations. There are contemporary observers, who claimed that Ahmed and HUseyin were very frank about the state of the empire and why they

tried to change it. " These confessions, if they had ever been made, however, do not

appear in the istintakname. In any case, the task of the interrogators seems not to have

been to find out about the motives of the suspects, but to examine in what way and how

deeply they were implicated in the plot. However, there are some statements, which offer one or two words beyond these

technical details the interrogators later used to differentiate the sentences of the culprits. In all these cases the objective of the society was referred to as the implementation of the sharia (icra-i yeriat) (nos. 8,10,11,16,32). The conclusion might be that this has

been Ahmed's slogan to describe the goals of the society. Most interesting for not using this slogan is the statement by the Nak§ibendi sheikh FeyzuUah (no. 22). Maybe sensing that it was dangerous because verging on the

political he pretended that his only aim in associating with Ahmed and his society was

to make prayers. There are two other interesting cases where the suspects' statements

about the aim of the society slightly differed from the above-mentioned stock phrase. One of the medrese students (no. 11) compared Ahmed's group with that of Sheikh

Shamil, the Caucasian leader in the struggle against the Russians. In another instance a

private from the artillery (no. 17) reported that Ahmed commanded fifty thousand

soldiers and worked for the reform of the world (islah-1 alem). Both cases may illustrate

how the less prominent members saw the aim of the society and the sheikh's mission. Both examples will become important in the next section of this chapter when I will deal with Ahmed's sources of inspiration and his selfconception.

To sum up, the examination of the interrogation protocols clearly shows that Ahmed

played a central role regarding the objective of the secret society and the personal

motive of its members to join it. As he recruited most of its members he had been also

the one, who formulated the goals of the society. From the very personalised, tarikat-

like structure of the secret society it seems that the actual message of the sheikh was

rather unimportant. And indeed, the question arises what 'the implementation of the

sharia' actually was to mean and what the ordinary members of the society had to say

about this topic. For the lack of any personal statements we might never be able to find

" Millingen 0 881), 99. An altogether different account of the interrogation of a very nervous HUseyin is given by Abdurrahman Adil as quoted in Pakahn (1940-48), 1,195-6.


out but, as I would like to suggest later, this slogan was a conceptual umbrella under

which any unspecific feeling of discontent stemming from various sources could be

united. That it was the charismatic personality of the sheikh that attracted people rather than the blurry program of the society, may also be inferred from other parts of the istintakname.

The fact that many of the suspects were old friends of Ahmed or that they came in

contact with the sheikh for a completely different matter, like, for example, the interpretation of a dream (no. 28), shows that following the sheikh and membership in

the secret society could not always be disentangled neatly. Also the authorities

recognised this difficulty and showed leniency to the suspects, who assured that they

were only followers of the sheikh, but did not know of the political goals of his group. Because the sheikh's personality played such an important role in the formation of the

conspiracy, the recruitment of its members and the formulation of its goals, I think it is

interesting to have a closer look at his life. In the next section I will try to reconstruct Ahmed's biography prior to the Kuleli incident to see, whether there are other factors,

which led to the formation of the Society of Martyrs. This will also render an

opportunity to open up the frame of time, which until now had been restricted to the

events immediately following the arrests in September 1859.1 will investigate how the

conspiracy was related to the social and political history of the Ottoman Empire in the

nineteenth century.

Sheikh Ahmed

Beginning with the most basic information, the interrogation protocol states that Ahmed

was born in SUleymaniye in southern Kurdistan and that he was 46 years old when he

started organising the plot. Ahmed's roots lay in the periphery of the Empire and the

main task in the following account of his life will be to show how he was drawn to the

centre. This is a physical as well as a spiritual journey; apart from getting to Istanbul

Ahmed had to acquire the mentality to feel responsible for the politics of the empire to

such a degree that he was detern-tined to change it. Some conditions, which make this

twofold journey possible, are already connected with Ahmed's place of origin, as I

would like to show in the following.

Silleymaniye had been founded only thirty years before Ahmed's birth (around

1228/1813) as the centre of the surrounding region in southern Kurdistan inhabited


mainly by Kurdish Muslims. " It was the principal town of a semi-independent emirate,

since the late seventeenth century ruled by the Kurdish Baban family. As long as the Ottoman central power was weak and the Bdban princes could play off Ottoman and Persian interests in the geostrategical border region the power of the ruling family was

never seriously challenged. Only with the centralisation policy initiated by Mahmud 11

and the subsequent accord with Persia regarding the border question the last independent ruler of SUleymaniye could be deposed in 1850 and his territory was incorporated into the province of Mosul. "

Thanks to a visit James Claudius Rich, the Baghdad representative of the East Indian

company, paid the region in May 1820 there is quite a lot of inforination available about SUleymaniye in the time of Ahmed's youth. Since Rich was the guest of the ruling

pasha Mahmud Baban his observations, however, mostly concern the internal political

matters of the emirate. Although later Ahmed apparently had contacts to the ruling family - as we have seen above three of the sons of one of its members were among the

suspects in the Kuleli affair -, it is impossible to say whether these contacts already

prevailed in Ahmed's family about which we know nothing. However, considering the fact that Ahmed had access to education, regarding his behaviour and his outward

appearance he might have originated from a family of clannish Kurds. They formed the

ruling class in southern Kurdistan and were opposed to the so-called guran, the

cultivators of the soil, who apparently could be distinguished from their masters by a different dialect and by their physiognomy. "

Apart from his general observations on family power politics in SUleymaniye, Rich also

was witness to a very special event, which had more significance to Ahmed's life. In a

casual remark Rich observed:

There is a great Mahometan saint living in Sulimania. His name is Sheikh Khalid but the Koords think it profanation to call him by any other name than Hazret i Mevlana, or the holy beloved one; and talk of his sayings as being Hadeez, or inspired. He is of the Jaf tribe, and is a dervish of the Nakshibendi order, which he embraced at Delhi, under the guidance of the celebrated Soofee Sultan Abdulla. He has 12,000 disciples in various parts of Turkey and Arabia. All the Koords call him an evlia or saint, and a great many of them almost put him on a footing with their Prophet. Osman Bey [a brother of the pasha], who with the Pasha [Mahmud] and almost all the principal Koords are his mureeds or disciples, told me that he was at least equal

" Rich (1836), 1,119-20; Minorsky (E12). Also cf. Edmonds (1957), 79-8 1, who gives some details about the outward appearance of SUleymaniye (low mud brick houses with five mosques, some hans, a bath and some churches), which seems to have been relatively constant through time. 37 Longrigg (02) ; Longrigg (1925), pass.; Edmonds (1957), 52-9. 3' Rich (1836), 1,80,88; for the origin of this stratification cf. Bruinessen (1992), 105-115.


to the famous Mussulman saint, Sheikh Abdul Kader [al Gilani, the founder of the Kadiriya, 1078-1166]. "

This 'saint' is no other than Abu'l-Baha Ziya al-Din Halid al Shahrizuri founder of the Halidiye branch of the Nakýibendi order. Although Ahmed probably was too young to be taught personally by the famous sheikh, his membership in Halid's order is the main influence, which shaped his life as I will show in the following. " The Nak§ibendiye-

Halidiye not only gave Ahmed the incentive to leave his hometown; the order also furnished him with the ideology, which played a role in his decision to found the Society of Martyrs. For this reason it may be useful to say a few words about Halid and the Halidiye.

Born in the late 1770s in a village near Siileymaniye, Halid studied with the local

sheikhs of the Kadiriye until, after the obligatory pilgrimage to Mecca, he was initiated

into the Nak§ibendi order during a visit to India. Upon his return to Sijleymaniye Halid

began to establish that order permanently in southern Kurdistan. In fact, he was so

successful that soon he got into conflict with the traditionally predominant order of the

region, the Kadiriye. Its sheikhs, notably the Barzinci family, managed to let him be

exiled, first in 1811/12 and again in 1820 when he was ousted from his dominant

position in Sfileymaniye permanently as we have seen in Rich's account. Halid first

went to Baghdad were he won many followers, also among the Ottoman officials of the

city, and finally, in 1823, settled in Damascus where he died in 1827 during an outbreak

of the plague. "

Even though Halid's active life as a Nak§ibendi sheikh was relatively short his new branch of the order saw a sweeping success especially in Kurdistan. Halid was able to

train many deputies (khalifa) so that soon the Halidiye rivalled the Kadiriye in

Kurdistan and even managed to convert some of the latter's sheikhs. Its success was

founded on its organisational pattern, especially on the fact that, unlike in the case of

the Kadiriye, deputies could become sheikhs of their own standing. The influence of the

order increased with the social and political changes taking place in Kurdistan after all

independent Kurdish emirates had been abolished in the second half of the nineteenth

century. The Sufi sheikhs, Nak§ibendi as well as Kadiri, became the arbitrators of

_conflicts rising out of these changes. In some cases the sheikhs even were able to

assurne all-out political power, often to the effect of been chosen as leaders in rebellions

'9 Rich (1836), 1,140- 1. The unconfirmed assumption that Ahmed was a Nak§ibendi in Mardin (1991), 131 is proven by M

18697 (18 B 1270). 1 will come back to this document later. 4' Hourant (1972); Abu Manneh (1982), 1-17; Rich (1836), 1,147,320- 1.


against the central power. The most prominent example was the revolt, which erupted

much later in 1880 and was led by one Ubaydullah, a Nakýibendi sheikh from Nehri. "-

About Ahmed's own rise in the Halidiye we have no information whatsoever, but he

must have undergone a thorough religious and literary training to acquire the immense

classical learning he was later credited with . 43 It is not clear whether he began his

education directly under Halid while the latter stayed in SUleymaniye. If Ahmed had

been considered too young - he was seven or eight years old when Halid was expelled from his hometown -, he might have studied under Mahmud al-Sahib, who kept

teaching in SUleymaniye after his famous brother had to leave the town. "An ideal place for Ahmed to continue his traditional education would have been Baghdad as also one

minor figure in the interrogation protocol asserted he did. ' There he could have been

studying at the Ahsaiya school, which, at that time, was a centre of Nak§ibendi learning.

In 1247/1832 he could have followed Mahmud al-Sahib when the latter left

SUleymaniye for Damascus to become the successor of his brother in the local tekke. "

Whereas all these stops on Ahmed's way of education in the Halidiye are imagined, the

destination of this journey is well known. Ahmed installed himself in Istanbul for the first time around 1263/1846 as the interrogation protocol states. We do not know the

reasons why Ahmed did not go back to Kurdistan and become a sheikh and leader in the

regional context as described above. This may be due to a wide array of reasons ranging from intellectual curiosity to problems on the spot and there is no way to find out until further sources emerge. Instead of speculating about such reasons I would like to

conclude the account of Ahmed's relationship to the Halidiye with some remarks

concerning the situation of the order in Istanbul. It will be useful to see what contacts Ahmed might have found in the capital. Moreover, some information about the general

relationship of the order with the Ottoman central authority may give a hint towards

Ahmed's ideological standing at the time he arrived in Istanbul.

The first khalifa of Halid arrived in Istanbul at around 1820. He represented only the

latest of several waves of Nak§ibendi sheikhs, who had come to the capital of the

empire since the late seventeenth century. Like the Halidiye itself the Nak§ibendi order

of the earlier times in general was inspired by the Indian mujadiddi tradition in that it

awaited each century a reformer of religion to appear. In the above quoted statement of

42 Bruinessen (1992), 222-34; Blau (1990); Olson (1989). 43 Vamb6ry (18 84), 24-5. 44Abu Manneh (1982), 7. 45 igdemir (1937), 60, no. 17, Abanli Haci lbrahim: ýeyh Ahmedin Hicazda dodup Bakdat'ta tahsil eylediginden ve elli bin askere malik olarak islahi Aleme qali§acakindan bahsile I-]". " Abu Manneh (1982), 35.


the medrese student describing Ahmed's goals as reforming the world (islah-i alem)

this tradition becomes clearly visible. Many of the followers of the Nak§ibendiye in the time of Selim In and Mahmud H were Porte officials and men of the Palace, who also were involved with the reforms these

two Sultans tried to initiate. In the time of Mahmud H the Nak§ibendi order was the largest in Istanbul regarding the number of their convents as well as their residents. The

Halidiye, too, quickly won a substantial following in the capital especially among the

ulema and the Kurds. However, in the beginning the order was not entirely accepted

and several times sheikhs were banned by Sultan Mahmud. This measure seems to have

been rather due to the autocratic character of the sultan than because of any fundamental opposition against his policy on the part of the order. Later in his reign

when Mahmud again tried to stress his image as a pious Muslim the Halidiye was back

in favour. '

In general the Nak§ibendi order was known for its propagation of strict observance of Islamic law. There is no better illustration of Ahmed's membership in a branch of this

order than the icra-i ýeriat-slogan he chose for his secret society. This regard for the

sharia was also the reason for the prima facie loyalty of the Halidiye towards the

Ottoman Empire. Being the largest and most powerful Islamic state the empire was

regarded as an instrument to enforce the Law and to defend the sunna on the one hand

against shiism and on the other hand against European imperialism. " In this respect the

Islamic revivalist ideology of the Halidiye did not per se exclude reforms as initiated by

Mahmud and the subsequent sultans. In a later section I will reconstruct the process by

which the relationship between the Halidiye and the state deteriorated and which

ultimately led Ahmed to organise his conspiracy. To sum up, the most important theme of Ahmed's life until he arrived in Istanbul

clearly was his connection with the Halidiye. His membership in the order first of all

gave him the opportunity to leave his region of birth and come to the capital. Secondly,

the order was responsible for Ahmed's education, which, as can be surmised, not only

implied the classical learning of the sheikh but also a distinct ideology, which let the

sheikh assume the sacred authority to challenge the Ottoman government. It is this

ideology that lay at the very basis of the Kuleli conspiracy.

47 Abu Manneh (1982), 17-34; Kreiser (1983); GUndUz (1984), 236-55. 41 Abu Manneh (1982), 12-17; Algar (1990), 136-43.


Turning now to the second stage of Ahmed's life beginning with the 1850s, my task in

the following will be to show how the Halidi ideology was translated into action. As it

turns out the Society of Martyrs was not the first attempt of the sheikh to actively

pursue his beliefs. The foundations for the plot had been laid a couple of years earlier

when, according to his interrogation, Ahmed spent some time with the army of Anatolia

and Batum. Unfortunately, the interrogation protocol gives no specific information

about the circumstances of Ahmed's sojourn in Anatolia during the time of the Crimean

War. For more information about this period we have to turn to a very different source. On his first visit to Istanbul in 1859 Arminius Vambery, the Hungarian orientalist, traveller and diplomatist, found employment as the tutor of the son of Hiiseyin Daim

Pasha, the military leader of the Society of Martyrs. In his house Vambery also got

acquainted with Ahmed, who became his teacher of Persian and Arabic. Apart from

being a rare personal description of the sheikh, Vambery's account gives some hints

regarding Ahmed's activities during the time preceding the events of the plot.

I was an inmate of [HUseyin Daim's] house at the time when this notorious conspiracy was being hatched and the plans for its consummation formed. A mollah from Bagdad, by the name of Ahmed Effendi, a man of rare mental gifts, immense reading, ascetic life, and boundless fanaticism was the life and soul of the whole conspiracy. He had taken part in the whole of the Crimean war as a Gazi (a warrior for religion), bareheaded and barefooted, and clad in a garb whose austere simplicity recalled the primitive ages of Islam. His sword never left his lean loins, nor his lance the firm grasp of his clenched fist, either by day or by night, except when he said his prayers, five times a day. Through the snow, in the storm, in the thickest of the fight on the battlefield, durmg toilsome marches, everywhere could be discovered the ghost-like form of this zealot, his fiery eyes scattering flames, and always at the head of the division, under the command of my chief [HUseyin Daim]. "

In the rest of this section I like to verify the facts given by Vambery in his rather

romantic description. To be able to draw conclusions from Ahmed's behaviour it is

necessary to place them in the general context of the Crimean War and its place in

Ottoman history. .

The imperial struggle between the Ottoman and the Russian empires by both opponents

always had been couched also in religious terms and their wars were justified as a fight

for Islam and Orthodoxy respectively. The Russo-Ottoman war, which began to become

almost unavoidable from May 1853 when the Russians occupied the Danubian

Principalities, was an exception only in so far as the Porte had to be careful not to

estrange its Western allies. Among the religious establishment and large parts of the

population, however, religious feelings regarding the political events stayed alive. Arif

49 Vamb6ry (1884), 24.


Hikmet, ýeyhfilislam from 1846 onwards, who supposedly had sympathies for the

Nak§ibendi order, even before the war issued several pieces of fetva stressing the duty

of the sultan to lead the jihad. 1' Of more political significance, however, was the

pressure from the street, which clearly showed how certain groups in Ottoman society

perceived the war in religious terms. This pressure for the first time reached boiling point in the beginning of September

1853 when the ulema and the students of religious sciences together with the trade

guilds started a campaign in favour of war. A poster on the walls of the ýehzade

Mosque called for the jihad and, on a somewhat more official level, a petition, which

voiced the same demand and was signed by 35 ulema, was presented to the sultan. A

separate petition of a sheikh of the Rifai order may count as a special example of

religious enthusiasm in the face of the war. The sheikh asked permission from the

authorities to be handed the banner of the Prophet stored at EyUb to lead his followers

into battle. The atmosphere in Istanbul was tense and there were rumours of a coup to

bring Abdiilaziz, the sultan's brother, to the throne. Eventually all of these initiatives

were crushed and some of the ulema and students were arrested and subsequently exiled

to ýumla, the headquarters of the Ottoman army in Europe. "

Also in the provinces there were efforts from the religious elite to support the war

against Russia. An interesting case was the initiative of the head of an unnamed tekke in

Damascus named Mahmud, who equipped a large number of volunteers to fight the

Russians. "

The second and more serious outbreak of popular religious feelings took place in late

December when the softas went on strike and disrupted life in the capital. After the

destruction of the Ottoman fleet at Sinop they demanded a tougher reaction towards

Russia. It seems that one of the ulema supporting the students was hodja Nasuh, who

later would be connected to the Society of Martyrs. " At the same time there was also

unrest among the soldiers of the Davud Pa§a and the 1ý-iftlik barracks threatening to join

the students. To restore order the government had to arrest 160 of the activists. They

KrUger (1978), 123; Kruse (1979), 165; Abu-Manneh (2001), 106. Ahmed Cevdet (1953-67), 1, tez. 5,23-24; Aliye (1332), 99-103; a translation of the poster in FO

78/938, no. 255, Stratford to Clarendon, Therapia, 01/09/1853; see also ibid. no. 259,05/09; no. 272, 15/09; no. 284,29/09; no. 286,30/09; iD 17634 (15 M 1270); Journal de Constantinople, 470, 19/05/1853, Interieur; Pottinger Saab (1977), 81-84. 52 Journal de Constantinople, 483,24/11/1853. Also in the war of 1877/78 there were such volunteers as the example of Gdm5§hanevi, a famous Nak§ibendi sheikh, demonstrates, cf. Algar (E12), 937. 51 inal (1940-52), 1.65.


were offered to join the army instead of being exiled, but upon declining most of them

were deported to Crete. ' It was in this atmosphere of tense public opinion and political intrigue that Ahmed took

his decision to participate in the war against the Russians as it has been described above in Vambery's account. In contrast to the rioting students the sheikh was apparently able

to convince the Ottoman government that his offer for military help was serious. In

spring 1854 Ahmed gained permission for himself and three thousand of his followers

(mfirid) from Kurdistan to join the army of Anatolia. The authorities promised to

furnish provisions for him and his men on their way to the front. " During his journey

additionally Ahmed could have relied on the Halidi network in eastern Anatolia. It

seems that also other sheikhs of the order were organising resistance against the

Russians. For example Mustafa Fehmi, head of the Halidiye in Erzincan, was actively involved in the fighting. 56

We may assume that Ahmed's initiative first of all was part of the general patriotic

upsurge in public opinion as shown above. Moreover, it certainly also was influenced

by the revivalist beliefs he held. In the general framework of Hatidi ideology it was

only consequent to participate in the war against the most threatening enemy of the

most powerful Islamic state. In this case for Ahmed to defend his country at the same

time must have meant to defend the Islamic world - two notions, which were hardly

distinguishable under the circumstances. Ahmed's mobilisation of his Kurdish followers may serve as a good historical example

of centre-periphery relations in the Islamic world. " In this case the central state and the

non-state organisation worked together in mobilising resources for a common cause.

But this co-operation was to prove very superficial. In the course of the war a differing

ideological and geographical outlook could also lead to misunderstandings between

centre and periphery. This will become apparent below when I turn to discuss the local

and regional forces in eastern Anatolia during the time of the Crimean War. Through

his affiliation with the Halidiye and his presence at the eastern front Ahmed was part of

a world and an ideology, which was larger than the Ottoman Empire. When he returned

to Istanbul he imported some of the periphery's problems back to the centre. The

personification of this mechanism is the Circassian members of the Society of Martyrs.

54 FO 78/941b, no. 396, Stratford to Clarendon, Constantinople, 23/12/1853, which forwards Reshid to Stratford, Beshik Tashe, 23/12; see also ibid. no. 400,24/12; Journal de Constantinople, 489,24/12/1853, Int6rieur; and Pottinger Saab (1977), 124-5. 55 tD 18697 (18 B 1270); A. MKT. M]FiM 58/60 (10 ý 1270). 56 Bremer (1959), 16,121b. 17 Cf Eickelman/Piscatori (1996), 149-55.


The European designation of the war starting in late 1853 as Crimean War hides the fact that, from a different historical perspective, this was another Russo-Ottoman war

standing in continuity to its immediate forerunner of 1829 and was followed by the one in 1877/78. Regarding the causes for as well as the conduct of the three wars in

question there are many parallels to be found. One is the fact that in all three cases an important theatre of war was Eastern Anatolia.

In the first two years after the declaration of war in winter 1853 the eastern front saw no decisive military operations. The Ottoman army, which had been assembled in Erzurum

and was thence stationed on the border, in Batum, Ardahan, Kars and Bayezid, was

equal to if not stronger than the Russian forces dispersed over the Caucasian province, because of the insurrection of the native Muslims. However, apart from conquering Fort

Nicolas opposite of Batum the Ottomans could make no decisive foray into Russian

territory, because their generals could not decide on an offensive strategy and their

army was weakened by desertion and cholera. After a couple of indecisive battles in

1853/54 in turn the reinforced Russian army was able to encircle Kars and threaten Erzurum in the beginning of 1855. The Ottomans tried to start a diversion and invaded

western Georgia with an army transferred from the Crimea. But soon the offensive

slowed, more due to bad weather than to Russian resistance, and there was no relief for

the encircled fortress of Kars. Nearly starved, its defenders had to capitulate in late

November. "

It is in the army defending Kars that Ahmed's trail in Anatolia can be picked up again. According to Ahmed Cevdet the sheikh stayed in the town during the siege and it was

there that he met HUseyin Daim. 19 Due to the literary activity of the many European

officers employed in the army of Anatolia we are particularly well informed about the

situation in the fortress. In contrast to HUseyin, however, Ahmed was not mentioned by

these European observers. The latter concentrated on the military and political events of

the campaign and disregarded the heavily entwined local and religious undercurrents of

the war. The fate of two groups of people present at the eastern front, however, might illustrate this particular side of the war transcending Russo-Ottoman rivalry and also

influencing Ahmed.

" AHan/Muratoff (1953), 57-102; Baumgart (1999), 177-184. 59 Ahmed Cevdet (1953-67), H, tez. 15,82: "Asl reis-i fesdd ulemadan SUleymaniyell ýeyh Ahmed Efendi nam kimsene imi§ ki esndy-I [sic] muh5rebede Kars'a geldigi vakit lsldhfit fermAn-lirisi oraya vA, sl olmakla daha ol vakit devlet aleyhine bir fitne uyandirma kurmu ve orada Hilseyin Ddlm Pap ile gbrd§mij§ ba'deha Batum ordusuna ve oradan Dersaddet'e gelmi§. "


The first group of people were the Muslim inhabitants of Kars, who volunteered for the defence of their town encircled by the Russian an-nies. They explicitly ascribed to their fight the character of a religious duty and when the first attack on the fortifications had been repulsed a pious legend circulated among them that 10.000 heavenly warriors, clad in green, helped to defeat the enemy. ' In turn, the Christian inhabitants of Kars, notably the Armenians, were suspected of spying for the enemy and at one point had to leave

the town collectively. The Muslims of the Caucasus, who were represented in Kars by a band of fighters from

Daghistan, are the second group, which can serve as an example of the wider ideological implications in the Russo-Ottoman war. " As I would like to show below,

their struggle against the Russian conquest of their homelands was in many ways linked

to the Ottoman Empire and, particularly during the Crimean War, to the headquarters of the army of Anatolia where Ahmed served. Already in the examination of the istintakname I mentioned the statement of a student, who compared Ahmed's secret

society with the freedom struggle of Shamil, the leader of the resistance against Russia

among the Muslims of the Caucasus. What, at first hand, appeared as a casual remark or

an advertisement strategy invented for his youthful followers nonetheless could tell

something about Ahmed's selfconception. As I will argue in the following, it is highly

likely that the events in Daghistan made an imprint on Ahmed's worldview.

When Ahmed came to eastern Anatolia in 1854 Shamil's fight against the Russians was

almost over. Shamil, a Halidi sheikh like Ahmed, had emerged as leader of Muslim

resistance in the eastern Caucasus against the Russian conquest of the region in the

1830s. In the course of his struggles he had succeeded to organise parts of Daghistan

into a veritable state from which he not only drew the material resources for his fight

against Russia, but also tried to realise the ideological goals of his order. The structure

and the organisation of Shamil's realm were based on the sharia. The sheikh took the

title of amir al-muminin., commander of the believers, and assumed the authority to

interpret the Holy Law. His officials collected taxes, which were used to pay the army,

but also to help Muslim refugees, who were settled in Shamil's territories. The personal

followers of Shamil formed the hard core of his army and regarded him as their spiritual

' Sandwith (1856), 248-52,285. The Russians already had occupied the town for two years in 1829, but it seems to have retained the usual Muslim Institutions, cf. Monteith (1856), 166-7. 61 Sandwith (1856), 143.


master (miirýid) as they, in turn, were his pupils (mfirid). In this sense Shamil's whole

state resembled an extended tarikat. 62 During the 25 years of his ongoing struggle Shamil constantly tried to secure support from outside his native land to be able to keep up with mounting Russian pressure. In

order to recruit new fighters he sent emissaries to neighbouring communities like the Circassians, but also to the Ottoman Empire. One of Shamil's lieutenants was expelled by the Ottoman authorities from Batum after protests from the Russian consul. Recruitment through his 'Halidi channels', however, could not be controlled so easily

so that there was a constant stream of volunteers coming from the Kurdish regions both

in and outside the empire. 63

Also on a state level there were contacts between Shamil and the Ottomans, which, however, ultimately displayed the incompatibility of the two sides. Initially, in 1839,

Shamil approached the sultan as the supreme Muslim leader, who, in Halidi doctrine,

always had been held in high esteem. But the good political relations between the Porte

and Russia as ratified in the treaty of Hiinkar iskelesi at that time made any positive

answer from the Ottoman side to the overtures of Shamil impossible. Although Shamil

was naturally very disappointed - he is said to have cursed Abdijlmecid in public these channels nonetheless remained open throughout the 1840s. 1

With the Russo-Ottoman relations deteriorating and Shamil's military situation getting

worse, the official contacts intensified again. In 1853 Shamil once more sent a letter to

the sultan describing his desperate situation and asking for help. After the outbreak of the war there were plans from the Ottoman side to profit from Shamil's military

operations at the back of the Russian army. The sultan even issued aferman investing

Shamil as a governor with all the land he would be able to conquer. But apart from such

symbolic moves a real co-operation between the Ottoman army and Shamil's forces

never materialised. Both sides were too weak and did not trust each other entirely. 65

Below this official level, however, there seems to have been some military contacts and

support from individuals like the group of fighters from Daghistan at Kars. Another

local group, who only partly shared the war plans of the Ottoman generals, were the

Circassians about whom I will say more in a later section of this chapter. Here I like to

mention only the example of Haci Mehmed, a member of the Society of Martyrs and

62 Gammer (1994a), 225-35; Knysh (02) 285-6. 6' Gammer (1994a), 250-2. These sheikhs are al Sayyid Tahta, Salih, his brother and successor and Tahir, the khalifa of the latter in Persia. 64Gammer ([994a), 257-60. 65 Garnmer (1994a), 267-72; FO 195/410, no. 60, Brant to Stratford de Redcliffe, Erzeroom, 14/10/1853; ibid., no. 64,28/10/1853; ibid., no. 2, Brant to Raglan, Erzeroom, 30/05/1854.


refugee from the Karagay region in the northern Caucasus. He stated that he met Ahmed for the first time in Baturn in Muharrem 1271/September 1854 and that he as

well as Ahmed had come to the front to participate in a jihad. 66

Mehmed's statement once again illustrates that Ahmed's participation in the Crimean

War rested on values that went beyond pure loyalty to his country or, at least,

responded to one particular side of Ottoman legitimacy. However, for Ahmed's

activism to turn against the empire and into an oppositional spirit an additional development was necessary. In the four years between the Crimean War and the Kuleli

conspiracy Ahmed's goal changed from defending Islam against an outside enemy to defending it against an enemy from within. It is the task of the next section to explain this transformation in Ahmed's perception that, as I will suggest, was mainly due to the

transformation of the empire's system of legitimacy as embodied in Tanzimat. I will

examine, which aspects of the reality and ideology of change in the Ottoman Empire

were responsible for Ahmed's decision to form the Society of Martyrs.

Reform vs. icra-i yeriat

As I suggested in the introduction and as could also be seen in the reactions of the Ottoman authorities to the plotters, the Ottoman state could evoke different forms of legitimacy to ensure the loyalty of its subjects. There was one explicitly Islamic and

one, which was more secular in nature, but only together could these produce their full

effect. Indeed, in his interrogation Ahmed had challenged the religious side of this

legitimacy and thus tried to justify his opposition. According to his belief the present

government of the empire had disregarded the sharia by promoting the equality of rights

of all Ottoman subjects in the reform process known as the Tanzimat. In the following I

will try to verify Ahmed's claim and try to examine how the reform policy of the

Ottoman government had altered the traditional balance of legitimacy of the empire. In fact, the question of the rights of non-Muslims did not figure very prominently in the

beginning of the reform process. The stress rather lay on military matters and the

immediate preservation of the territorial integrity of the empire. Since non-Muslims

traditionally did not serve in the Ottoman army except for some special purposes the

early reform did not prima facie concern them. When Sultan Mahmud II brought the

matter of equality to the agenda this was in accordance to his project to strengthen the

' Cf Mehmed's statement in iD 29258: AM& yetmi§ bir senesi muhareminde esna-i harbda Batum'da g6rfi§ddm. 0 dahi cihad igin gelmi§ti. Orada carni-i §erif odasinda oturur idi. " This information is onutted from Mehmed's statement in the istintakname (no. 20).


secular side of the imperial framework. The sultan on several occasions made

statements that all of his subjects were equal under his rule, he gave money to let

churches be repaired and urged his officials to treat Muslims and non-Muslims alike

and be accessible for their problems. These statements have to be seen in the light of Mahmud's general behaviour as a paternalistic and absolutist ruler and did not alter the

traditional imbalance of the status of the religions inscribed in the imperial system. "

The fact that there was no major opposition by the official religious establishment in the

capital towards Mahmud's and later reforms underlines how much these were regarded

as a rejuvenation of the classical system. The ulema in the capital, who were the ones

that controlled the religious sphere on behalf of the state, could only gain from the

growing power of the sultan and sometimes even found employment in the newly

created institutions. " When there was opposition to the early reforms operating within a

religious framework it came from the people and the representatives of popular religion

and not from the ulema. Famous is the incident when a dervish stopped Mahmud on the

street in Istanbul calling him the 'gavur padiyah' (heathen sultan) - an epithet that is

said to have been used for his successors, too.

When Mahmud died in 1839 and his son Abdiilmecid promulgated the first of the two

great Tanzimat decrees, the Hatt-1 ýerif of GOlhane, there was not much of a change in

the attitude towards Christian-Muslim equality. In general, the decree ordered reforrns in three fields: the personal rights of the sultan's subjects, the system of taxation, and

the military. The new sultan promised to respect the life, honour and property of his

subjects, to introduce proportional taxation and abolish tax fanning as well as to restrict

military service to four or five years. As a special requirement it was stated that no one

should be punished or put to death without a proper trial any more. These measures

were said to be valid for Muslims as well as all other subjects of the sultan. 19

The statement regarding equal treatment for Muslims and non-Muslims, however, was

far too marginal to call the G01hane decree a "declaration of equality"20 As we shall see

later it served many other - more worldly - purposes and thus excellently demonstrates

the many dimensions the reforin process had. Another fact underlining this is the

Islamic rhetoric the decree was charged with. In a lengthy prologue it was made clear

67 Moltke (2000), 157 (05/05/1837), 164 (21/05/1837); Temperley (1964), 40-1. 6' The overall thesis of Okumu§ (1999); cf. also Kushner (1987); Levy (197 lb); Heyd (196 1). 69 "[VIe teb'a-i Saltanat-i Seniyye'rrýzden olan ehl-i Isldm ve milel-i sdire, bu mUsAadAt-i §dhAne'rnize bildistisnd mazhar olmak Uzere cdn u irz u ndmOs u mM mAddelerinden hiikm-i §er'i iktizdsinca kAffe-i

memAlik-i mahrOserniz chdlisine taraf-i §fihfine'mizden emniyyet-i k5mile verilmi§", Okumu§ (1999), 555-6. 7' Davison (1954), 847; also Engelhardt (1882), 1,36 caHs the prorruse of equality "le point capital du Hatti Ch6rif".


that the following regulations were to cure the ills that had befallen the empire because

the sharia had been neglected in the last 150 years. It was not the majority of ulema

alone sitting in the council where the decree was drafted, who were responsible for this

religious rhetoric. The young sultan himself is known to have had religious minded Z: )

tutors, who - ironically - were connected to the Nak§ibendiye-Halidiye. "

Although the question of equality was not central to the GUlhane decree, nonetheless it

had a levelling effect when it was put into action. In the provincial administration Christian representatives won access to the newly created regional councils. The most

radical changes, however, concerned the economic structure of the empire. Whereas the

cizye or haraý, the poll tax only non-Muslims had to pay and the most traditional sign

of inequality between the religions, was not lifted, the corv6e and other labour duties

the Christian peasants in the Balkans had to render their Muslim landlords were

abolished. 11

Much of the passive and active resistance to the reforms in the following years derived

from the ensuing immediate economic losses of Muslim landowners as well as tax

farmers, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. Sometimes even the ulema in the provinces

were involved in these activities like in the case of the sacking of the quarantine station in Amasya. 11 That these changes in the economic structure were also interpreted as an

attack on the sharia and the fundamental order of society might be illustrated by a ferman the sultan issued in 1841. It altered many of the new regulations regarding

taxation, because in the financial sector they had proven inefficient. In the same decree

the sultan also called for the strict enforcement of sharia and threatened to punish

everyone, who would not observe the five daily prayers prescribed by Islam. 74

Despite the conservative approach of AbdUlmecid and his government the question of

equality between the religions remained an issue throughout the next decades. The

immediate economical effects, which rising equality produced, were entwined with the

question of the preponderance of Islam and the centrality of the sharia for the Ottoman

state. That Islamic law slowly was delimited in its influence and superseded by secular

codes, especially in the realms of commercial and penal law, was only one side of this

process. I would like to argue that for Ahmed's growing inclination towards opposition

as well as for Muslim public opinion in general more symbolic incidences of growing

Abu-Manneh (1994), 182-8. inalcik 0 964b), 625-3 1. Okumu§ (1999), 402-9; inalcik (1964b), 632-6. inalclk (1964b), 638: "Ahkfim-i diniyyenin icrdsina dikkat farz-i 'ayn".


equality were more important, in particular when these were connected with European

intervention in favour of the Christian population of the empire. Mostly this intervention was exerted in economic or legal life concerning the privileges

of European traders and Levantines holding European passports. However, how it

touched directly the question of the sharia may best be illustrated by having a look at the question of apostasy from Islam. It was especially Stratford Canning, British

ambassador to Constantinople from 1842-58, who made the apostasy question the

centre of his humanitarian aspirations when in several cases Christians, who converted

under dubious circumstances to Islam, after a short while wanted to return to their

original faith and as a consequence were punished or in some cases publicly executed. The ambassador insisted on a literal reading of the GOlhane rescript and in 1844 was

promised by the sultan that in future the death sentence would not be executed. The fact

that in one of these apostasy cases the corpse of an Armenian victim after the execution

was seized by the mob and displayed in European clothes and a European hat showed

that Islamic public opinion also saw this case as a victory over an exterior enemy. 11

An equally culturally and religiously loaded issue was the question of slavery in the

empire. It was connected to the question of equality between Muslims and non-Muslims

only in the imagination of British abolitionists. The pressure of these groups, however,

was sufficient to force the British government in the 1840s to make some half-hearted

representations at the Porte regarding the abolition of slavery in the empire and of the

slave trade to it. "

We are not concerned here with the steps leading eventually to a general abolition of

the African slave trade in the empire in 1857. A single event may show how the

Ottoman government itself got associated with this issue regarded as going against

Islam. In 1855 the ýerif of Mecca plotted a revolt against Ottoman rule and used

rumours of an imminent ban on the Hejaz slave trade to find supporters among the

traders of the region. When the revolt broke out the head of ulema in a fetva condemned

the prohibition of the slave trade as running against the sharia and the Turks in general

were proclaimed polytheists (nifiýrik), who unlawfully introduced many innovations,

which were contrary to Islam. "

Ottoman liberal writers began to take up the issue of slavery much later, from the 1870s

onwards. However, it is interesting to note that dissidents like Ali Suavi - about whom

75 Lane-Poole (1888), fl, 89-100; Temperley (1964), 223-9. 76 Toledano (1982), 91-123; Erdem (1996), 67-93. 77 Toledano (1982), 129-35; Ahmed Cevdet (1953-67), 1, tez. 12,101-52, esp. I 11.


we have to say more in the following chapters - still defended it as a Muslim

institution. 78

This event in the periphery of the empire had its parallel in the centre where the second

of the two great Tanzimat decrees, the Hat-i HUmayun of 1856, marked a decisive break

with the image of a conservative approach to reform that the sultan had entertained so far. This year also marked a turning point in Ahmed's relationship with the empire, as I

will show in the following.

The most important motor of the changes in the basic political structure of Ottoman

Empire without doubt was the Crimean War (1853-6) and its outcome as ratified in the

peace treaty of Paris in May 1856. Apart from the restitution of the territorial status quo

ante as a main result of this treaty in article seven the Ottoman Empire was invited to join the European Concert of Powers and was formally admitted to the realm of international law of which it factually had been part for some time. As a part of that the

signatory powers formally guaranteed the empire's independence and territorial integrity. 19

The price the Porte had to accept to be issued this formal guarantee of existence was a decisive break with the traditional ideology of external relations. The past mode of dealing with the outside world in the face of political realities had become a sham

anyway. The fact that the yeyhfilislain had degraded the empire's European allies to

vassals rendering their master their due services shows how persistent the traditional

view on politics in some circles could be. " The student protests to push the empire into

the war with Russia further illustrates that a considerable part of the religious milieu

still clung to the old religious categories. Moreover, Muslim refugees from the Crimea,

the Balkans and the Caucasus can be regarded as a persistent reminder of the old

worldview. For its complexity I will defer the full discussion of this topic to chapter five of this study. Apart form changing its international relations the treaty of Paris also urged the Porte to

reorganise its internal structure, namely to readjust the status of its non-Muslim

communities. That the Porte accepted these conditions, which were contained in the

historical and moral baggage of international law, was not only due to the pressure of its

7' Karpat (2001), 363-4; Celik (1994), 188-9. The name of the article was 'Abd ve cariye ticaretl' F ublished in HU 'yet 28,04/01/1869. 'I Noradounghiamn(l 897-1903), 111,73-4: "[The signatory states of the treaty] d6clarent la Sublime Porte

admi a participer aux avantages du droit public et du concert euro-6ens. [They] s'engagent, chacune de se son c6t6, A respecter l'ind6pendance et Fint6grit6 territoriale de I'Empire Ottoman cf. Wood (1943). 80 KrUgcr (1978). 123; Kruse (1979), 165.


allies. It also was in its own interest to remove this bone of contention that had been

used by Russia as a reason to go to war in the first place. In the diplomatic crisis

preceding the outbreak of hostilities the Tsar had claimed the right to intervene in

favour of the sultan's Orthodox subjects referring to a controversial interpretation of the

treaty of Kilgiik Kaynarca of 1774.

In consequence, with the personal help of the British, the French and the Austrian

ambassadors, a document was drafted and promulgated as an imperial decree (hat-i

hiimayun) in February 1856 to announce a new effort of reform. " That there is, indeed,

a strong connection between the changes in the external and internal status of the Ottoman state not only shows the implication of the foreign diplomats in drafting the hat. Additionally the document was explicitly mentioned in article nine of the Paris

peace treaty, which, however, at the same time forbade any interference in the affairs of the empire on the ground of the decree. 82

In the introduction of the Hat-i HUmayun on the one hand the sultan acknowledged the

contribution of his allies to the present condition of the empire. On the other hand he

tried to place the document into the tradition of the reform process in general and the GUlhane decree in particular. But although the provisions of 1839 were confirmed, the

new decree breathed an entirely different spirit and literally was written in a different

language, which lacked any Islamic undertones. Whereas the promises in the GUlhane

decree implicitly had been aiming at the Muslim elite of the empire this time most of

the provisions mentioned in the Hat-i HUmayun explicitly addressed the sultan's non- Muslim subjects. There are many reform measures announced in the document, most notably the

restructuring of the millet system. For our purpose of examining how this document

may have influenced Ahmed's opinion of the empire's politics, only the provisions that

touched on the rights of the non-Muslims are important. Regarding religious rights the

decree stated that in places solely inhabited by Christians all restraints on the practice of

their religion would be abolished. Old churches could be repaired without permission by the authorities and the construction of new ones would be made easier. Also the

8'Cf Karal (1947), 266-72, for the Ottoman version and Noradounghian (1897-1903), 111,83-8, for the official French translation. 82 On the process of drafting the document see Engelhardt (1882), 1,123-38; Davison (1963), 52-60; par. 9 in Noradounghian (1897-1903), 111,74: "S. M. I. le Sultan, [ ... I ayant octroy6 un Firman qui, en am6liorant [the subject's] sort sans distinction de religion ni de race, consacre ses genereuses intentions envers les populations chr6tiennes de son empire, et [ ... ]a r6solu de communiquer aux Puissances

contractantes ledit Firman, spontan6ment 6man6 de sa volont6 souveraine. Les Puissances contractantes constatent la haute valeur de cette communication. 11 est bien entendu qu'elle ne saurait [ ... ] donner le droit aux dites Puissances de s'imn-Liscer, [ ... ] dans les rapports de S. M. le Sultan avec ses sujets, ni dans l'administration int6rieure de son Empire. "

H: "1


public manifestation of religion like processions and ringing church bells would be

allowed in those places. Even the question of apostasy once again surfaced in the

document. It was assured to abolish all constraint in the choice of religion, but because

this was still a touchy subject the meaning of this provision had to be explained in a

separate note. The Porte repeated the promise made to Stratford Canning in 1844 not to

execute the death sentence in case of apostasy and even extended this to apostasy of Muslims from Islam. 83

Furthermore, an anti-defamation clause inserted in the imperial decree was to protect the collective honour of the non-Muslim subjects of the empire. Henceforth in official language no one should be addressed with potentially insulting names invoking his or her religion or race. Consequently, in the document the old designation reaya, a term

referring to the taxpaying subjects of the sultan, especially the Christians, literally

meaning 'flock', was replaced by the neologism tebaa meaning 'subject' in a more

neutral sense regardless of religion. Regarding equality of Muslims and non-Muslims before the law the decree repeated a

provision already introduced in March 1854. Then the Porte had removed all criminal lawsuits from the sharia courts and assigned them to newly created penal courts. In the

same move the testimony of non-Muslims, which hitherto had been only counted as

evidence, had been made equal to the testimony of Muslims. "

Lastly, the question of taxation of non-Muslims that had only been partly touched by

the reforms in the 1840s was once again brought up. The decree in principle agreed to

the equality of taxation, which essentially meant abolishing the poll tax. The condition

was, however, that the non-Muslims would contribute to the military defence of the

empire. Along this line of reasoning in May 1855 the Porte already had abolished the

poll tax and admitted Christians to the Ottoman army due to the need of new recruits

and British pressure. Since this was the biggest conceivable break with the Ottoman

military tradition, however, these provisions never had been executed. The Christians

themselves showed not much enthusiasm to make use of this right. In the light of this

experience the hat now allowed for the payment of an exemption tax for its non-Muslim

subjects in lieu of the poll tax and deferred regulations regarding the possibility to enter

15 the army to a later time.

" Eichmann (1858), 249-57; 404-10. 14 Eichmann (1858), 217-25. 15 Eichmann (1858), 225-32,436-40.


To sum up, the Hat-i Hiimayun of 1856 unlike the Giilhane decree was designed to alter

the ideological balance of the traditional Ottoman system. This was due to external

pressure, but also because the statesmen, who drafted the hat, felt the necessity to

integrate the Christians to a greater extent into the structure of the modem polity the

Ottoman Empire was to become. The opposition to the hat therefore came from both

sides, Muslims as well as traditional elites of the non-Muslim millets. Both feared to lose the power and influence they had exercised in the imperial framework where the

ruler needed their support. "

On the popular level the non-Muslims seem to have been quite content with the

provisions of the Hat-1 Hiimayun, whereas traditional minded Muslims saw the

promulgation of the decree as a black day for Islam. Spontaneous and active resistance, however, did not seem to have been the result. Especially in eastern Anatolia where Ahmed was at the time when the decree was published there prevailed an attitude of

wait and see among the population. Generally it was not believed that the document

was sincere and people thought that it was only promulgated to please the European

powers. The quiet may also have been resulting from the fact that in the short run

nothing changed in the dealings with the non-Muslims, because the provisions of the

decree were not put into reality instantly. "

Unfortunately, we have no direct knowledge how Ahmed reacted to the Hat-1 HUmayun

at the time it was promulgated. The Ottoman historian Ahmed Cevdet states that

Ahmed's decision to plot against the Ottoman government has to be seen in direct

connection to the Hat-i Hiimayun. 11 For all that we know about the sheikh's education

and his resulting worldview it makes sense that his reaction was different than the one

of the common populace alluded to above. Although the reforms decreed in 1856 had

no immediate bearing on the lives of most people in the empire, it is likely that Ahmed

understood their ideological implications. The empire's association with the European

powers, its acceptance of their notion of international politics, the attempt to make the

Christian subjects equal to the Muslims, all ran counter to the notion of an Islamic state

based on the sharia, which was at the heart of the political ideology of the Halidiye

shared by Ahmed. Under such conditions the traditional religious legitimacy the empire

could rely on was damaged and Ahmed's activism could translate into opposition

against the sultan and his government.

86 Engelhard (1882), 1,147-5 1. 87 Ahmed Cevdet (1953-67), 1, tez. 10,1,67-8; FO 195/493, nos. 35,37 and 43, Brant to Stratford, Erzerum, 13/05,19/05 and 19/07/1856. 11 Ahmed Cevdet (1953-67), H, tez. 15,82: "Kars'a geldiki vakit IsldhAt fermin-i Arisi oraya v5sil


Having thus tried to put into context the motivation of the founder and leader of the Society of Martyrs let us turn to the other members of the group. In the remaining sections of this chapter I will examine how far the motives described above were

understood and shared by Ahmed's fellow plotters. In the focus of my examination will be the largest group of the plotters, the military officers, choosing HOseyin Daim Pasha,

the second in command, as a personal example. Regarding the involvement of the

military the central question will be whether the officers only followed their sheikh or if

they had their own reasons for opposing the government.

Hfiseyin Daim Pasha

The general difficulty in researching the life of the second in command of the Kuleli

conspiracy and its most prominent member from the military side is again the lack of

reliable information. As a matter of fact the istintakname gives no particular details

about Hiiseyin's life, as it was the case with Ahmed. Since Hiiseyin came from inside

the Ottoman ruling elite he might just have been a known person. Also other sources like the Sicill-i Osmani for his biography prior to 1859 only give an outline in a most

abstract manner, i. e., that he was a Circassian by origin and was promoted up to the

rank of ferik (general of division). 19

Therefore, the following attempt to reconstruct the life of the general before he became

involved in the Kuleli conspiracy has to depend on other sources. Most notably these

are two European 'adventurers', who got to know Hiiseyin during their sojourn in the

Ottoman Empire. One is the already introduced Arminius Vambery, who was the tutor

of Hiiseyin's son in 1858/9; the second is Frederik Millingen or Osman Seify Bey, a Levantine with a mixed Ottoman and English background. 91 The following paragraph from his book on his experience as an officer in the Ottoman army is the most concise

portrait of HUseyin's origins to be found.

Hussein DaYm-Pacha est un Circassien appartenant a la noble tribu des Berzeks. AI age de dix a onze ans, il fut amene par ses parents a Constantinople, et entra au palais imperial comme page du sultan Mahmoud. Ses chefs, remarquant les beaux traits de sa figure et son air distingue, destinerent le jeune Hussein a la musique du palais, avec I'We d'en faire un Donizetti ou un danseur. Mais le jeune montagnard,

olmagla daha ol vakit devlet aleyhine bir fitne, uyandirmaki kurmu§". " Sicill-i osmani 11,228: "Hiiseyin Daim Bey. (; erkesdir. Miralay ve Liva ve Fcrik oldu. Ve ijqiincil Ordu Erkanindan olarak 1276'da rUtbesi ref olunup kal'a bend edildi. 1278'de ba'de'l-afv riitbesi iade olunup, evasit Abdiiiaziz Hanide fevt oldu. " " Vamb6ry (1884), 23; Vamb6ry (1904), 165-6; Millingen (1868), 157-60.


revolte de Fidee de devenir un musicien, brisa son clairon, avec colere sous le yeux de son maitre, disant que 'ses ance^tres n'avaient jamais su jouer que du sabre. ' Cette incartade transplanta notre Hussein au sein d'un peloton, ou' il debuta comme simple soldat. 91

The fancy story about HUseyin's rejection to become an army musician may not be

taken for granted; however, it is worthwhile to comment on two general facts , i. e., HUseyin's place of birth and his education, which are also confirmed by Vambery, to

get a notion of his origins. In the early nineteenth century Circassia, the land north west of the Caucasus towards

the shores of the Black Sea, was still inhabited by independent tribes. Their social

structure was varying from one tribe to another. Some of them displayed a strong hierarchical order with a feudal nobility at the top and a slave class at the bottom of the

tribe. Such was the case for the Beskesek-Abaza, a tribe living in the northern part of Circassia, which might be identified with the Berzeks from Millingen's account. "

Nominally the Circassians were vassals of the sultan; however, the empire had neither

the means nor the intention to put the country under its direct control. There had been

an attempt for a stronger integration of Circassia into the empire in the 1780s, but the

country had lost the strategic interest to the Porte after the border with Russia had been

fixed on the river Kuban in 1792. Although from this time onwards Circassian

independence was constantly threatened by its northern neighbour, in the early

nineteenth century Russia's expansion was mainly directed towards Georgia and Daghistan in the eastern Caucasus -a factor to help the rise of the Halidiye in the latter

country. 91

HUseyin started his career in Istanbul following a classical pattern for a boy from the

periphery. He was part of the steady stream of Circassians, who were recruited into the

great households of the capital, especially after the devyirme had been falling gradually

out of use since the beginning of the eighteenth century. It is a matter of speculation, if

HUseyin really was 'sent by his parents' or actually sold. The difference between these

two notions may not have been so great in the first Place. Regarding the mentality

prevailing among Circassians recorded until the late nineteenth century parents often

saw the sale of their children or the ones of their slaves as a chance for them to enter a

new career. In general Ottoman slavery was not marked with social stigma. 91

9' Millingen (1868), 157-8. 92 Cf Bennigsen/Carrere dEncausse (EV). 9' Henze (1992), 74-80. 94 Erdern (1996), 48-52.


Indeed, through their training in the great households of Istanbul the young recruits got

a chance to attain the highest positions in the military or the bureaucracy of the Empire.

This is particularly the case for the inmates of the Imperial household, which was seen

as the nucleus and model of this system. In the early reign of Sultan Mahmud H the

palace with its schools and ways of advancement still seems to have been largely intact.

Unfortunately, we have no specific information about HUseyin's education and

advancement in the palace. 91

Also about Hiiseyin's early time in the army there can only be speculations. His age and further career suggest that he belonged to a group of military officers, who were the first to serve in the reformed Ottoman army set up after the dissolution of the Janissaries by Mahmud 11. The earliest tentative to this reform had originated with Selim 111, who in 1793 set up his famous model corps trained after European methods

and clad in European uniforms called Nizam-i Cedid. These were forcefully dissolved

after the revolts of 1807/08 and Sultan Mahmud was careful enough to wait before

touching again on the subject of reorganising the military of the empire. Only after the

palace had emerged as the only centre of power and the Janissaries had been abolished in the bloody events of 1826 could the sultan set up a new army. In order not to arouse

religious opposition they were called the Trained Victorious Soldiers of Muhammad

(Muallem Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammadiye).

One of the biggest problems in the organisation of this new army was the formation of its officer corps. Mahmud, unlike his Egyptian vassal Mehmed Ali, who had been in a

similar situation after the destruction of the Mamluks, could not build his army from

scratch. He had to take into account a longstanding Ottoman military tradition and because of the war in Greece it was difficult for him to recruit European officers to train

the army like the governor of Egypt had exercised with success. As a result junior

officers had to be promoted from the ranks without undergoing any special training; the

positions of senior officers first had to be assigned to the officers of the old army. Moreover, Mahmud set aside high positions in the army for the members of his own household. To ensure a minimal training he set up a court battalion staffed by his men from the so-called Inner Service (enderun) of the palace as well as by high-ranking

members of the other great households. Part of this battalion was trained as infantry,

part as cavalry and there was a music band, too, which since 1828 was supervised by

Giuseppe Donizetti, the brother of the famous Italian composer. It might have been here

9-'ilyas (1987), Intr.; Gibb/Bowen (1950), 1,71-88; G6qek (1996), 20-8.


that HUseyin originally was to be trained, if Millingen's account is true and actually

refers to this stage of Hiiseyin's education. '

It was from this court battalion that the first generation of officers for the reformed Ottoman army originated until the battalion was disbanded in 1830. Their professional training was rather minimal consisting largely in drill exercises. However, the officers

were personally picked by Mahmud and thus were assumed to be loyal to him. Apart

from the sultan other Ottoman grandees, most notably Hiisrev Pasha, originating from

the Caucasus like HUseyin and minister of war (serasker) during most of the 1830s,

were also able to ensure high positions in the military for the members of their households. Thus, throughout the first decade of the existence of the new army senior

commandership was retained by a special group of people being recruited through the

traditional patrimonial channels, who, however, were not military specialists in the

modem sense of the word. They were probably the last representatives of the old

military administrative branch of the Ottoman ruling class, the seyflye. Only slowly they

were replaced by the men turned out by the new military schools, like the military

academy (mekteb-i harbiye), which was founded in 1835, but only towards the end of

the 1840s produced its first graduates. 91

To be able to imagine how a single officer fared in this system, to imagine a life parallel

to HOseyin's about whom information is scarce, it may be useful to have a look at the

career of his brother Hafiz Mehmed. 91 After having been brought from Circassia

Mehmed grew up and was educated in the palace, too. There he performed the office of

a tebdil hassekisi, 99 a kind of Plain-clothes detective to protect the sultan, assigned to the

corps of the bostancibayi, one of the highest officials of the Outside Service. In 1828

Mehmed entered the regular army as a binbayl (major) and fought in the war against Russia. After the peace of Adrianople he was part of the Ottoman delegation to St.

Petersburg. In the first war against Mehmed Ali he commanded a cavalry unit first as a

miralay (colonel) later as a mirliva (brigadier general). In 1833 he was appointed ferik

(general of division) and posted to Skodra where he successfully suppressed an

96Levy (197 1 a), 27. 97 Levy (1971a), 28-31; Ozcan (iA 2).

9' That the two were brothers is claimed by Ebijzziya Tevfik in a note to Vamb6ry's article 'Osmanli Hakumeti Me§rutasnin istikbalin' in Yeni Tasvir-i Efkar 14 (14 Ca 1327) as quoted in lAden-iii- (1937), 18-9. Unfortunately, I don't know any other contemporary source which confirms this fact. It is strange that Miffingen who also got to know Hafiz Mehmed in 1853 says nothing about his relationship with HUseyin, cf. Millingen (1877), 300-9. " Gibb/Bowen (1950), 1,350-1. The Redhouse dictionary says the tebdil hassek-isi had to control the bread price on the markets.


Albanian revolt. Other offices in the provinces followed, most importantly the military

governorship of Sivas in 1836. There he carried out the centralisation policy of sultan Mahmud against independent Kurdish rulers. Additionally Mehmed was made

commander of one of the armies, which were to expel the Egyptians from Syria. He

was, however, defeated in the battle of Nizip in 1839. After various assignments in the

provinces of the empire Mehmed's most interesting office perhaps was the presidency

of the newly founded refugee commission (muhacirin komisyonu) from 1859 to 1864.

He died in Medina in 1868 two years out of office as governor of that city. 100

Not only their common origin and upbringing in the palace suggests that Hiiseyin's

career was closely connected to that of his brother; at that time an office in the

administration of the empire was not so much an individual affair but a source for

employment and promotion for a whole group of clients and family members. Accordingly, while Mehmed was military governor of Sivas he employed his brother

Ali Bey and, on that occasion, promoted him to the rank of colonel (miralay). '01 During

the campaign against Ibrahim in Syria his brother in law Receb served as Mehmed's

divan efendi and his younger brother Bahri Pasha lead one of the units of the army. "I In

this light it is highly possible that the officer named HUseyin, who was promoted

alongside Ali and employed in the redif troops of Sivas, actually was Hiiseyin Daim. "I

This would fit with Millingen's statement that Htiseyin had his first war experience in

Syria.

We have no information about HUseyin's whereabouts in the 1840s except for a detachment to Albania probably situated in these years. "' He seems to have pursued a

regular military career like other people of his origin. It is a matter of speculation as to

whether his advancement in the military would have been quicker if his lord Mahmud H

had not died in 1839. At least concerning his brother Mehmed, Sultan Mahmud's death

led to initial difficulties as a change at the head of the state could be dangerous in the

highly factionalised political sphere of the Ottoman Empire. After his defeat at Nizip

Mehmed was accused to have taken an unauthorised decision to go to battle by Hiisrev

Pasha, who had seized the office of grand vizier after the death of the sultan, and the

11 Sicill-i osmani H, 100; MoItke (2000), 221-2 (19/03/1838), 388-9; Wagner (1893), 69-70. ... Takvim-i Vekayi 141 (29 N 1252). 102 Wagner (1893), 108,218. In 1262/1846 Bahri was ferik and became governor of Erzurum where he died in the same year, cf. Ahmed Lutfi (1999), VIH, 115 (1227), 126 (1235); Sicill-i osmani 11,8. 103 BOA, HH 18087 (1252), speaks of Ali and HiiseyM' Aga both in the rank of binbaýi. 104Millingen (1868), 158. This might have been during the revolt in Albania against conscription in 1844. Unfortunately, HUseyin is not mentioned in the British consular correspondence but so is Cafer Dem, another member of the conspiracy, at that time conu-nander of Kirzova, cf. FO 78/568, no. 5, Saunders to Aberdeen, Prevesa, 03/06/1844.


serasker Halil Rifat Pasha. He was allowed to resume his post as governor of Sivas only

after he could prove his innocence. "'

But overall there was no real damage to Mehmed's career. The high offices in the

military like the one of the serasker or the kapudan paýa (minister of the navy) during

the whole reign of AbdUlmecid were monopolised by what can be called a 'palace

group' consisting of some of the sultan's relatives, most notably his three sons in law

(damat) Mehmed Said, Halil Rifat and Mehmed Ali, and other trusted men, e. g., Hasan

Riza. Hafiz Mehmed certainly was excluded from the highest office, but he continued

to take high positions under all these pashas.

The next time Hfiseyin emerges personally from the records is during the Crimean War.

Once more he was employed side by side with his brother Mehmed, who, at that time,

was governor of Trabzon and in the middle of 1271 (beginning of 1855) was sent to

support the armies of Erzurum and Kars. The exact date that Hiiseyin was dispatched to

Anatolia is not known. During the war we find him in the army defending Kars against

the Russians. In the beginning operations on this part of the front were co-ordinated by

the British-Hungarian general Guyon or Hur§id Pasha, his Turkish nom de guerre, who

had on his staff a couple of Hungarian and Polish officers. "' After Guyon's demise the

British general Fenwick Williams took over command supported by a British medical

mission dispatched to Kars to assist the Ottoman medical corps. Despite all

inconsistencies of these European observers in stating clearly HUseyin's name, rank and

unit it seems that it was he, who distinguished himself on two occasions in the war.

First during the battle of Kurudere in August 1854 and later at Kars in the end of

September 1855 when he served under the command of general Kmety shortly before

the fortress was handed over to the enemy. As a result Hiiseyin was promoted to the

rank of ferik (general of division). 101

Moltke (2000), 342-3,10/08/1839. A short biography in 'Dictionary of National Biography' 23. On Kurudere cf. FO 195/400, no. 37, Wiliams to Stratford, Camp near Kars, 16/10/1854 forwarding a

list of officers who distinguished themselves. The "Colonel Hussein Bey, I st Reg. t Arabistan Infantry"

may be HUseyin Daim. Also cf. Duncan (1855), 1,188 "a colonel, Hussein Bey, a Circassian by birth,

who commanded an Arab regiment" and Sandwith (1856), 113, the chief of the medical mission who gives the most substantial account concerning the general atmosphere in Kars during the siege. On Kars

cf. Kmety (1856), 13, who speaks of major general Tcherkess Hussein Dairn Pasha commander of the 1. brig. inf. The author, a Hungarian in Ottoman service, was also known as ismail Pasha. Cf. also Ahmed Cevdet (1953-67), 11, tez. 15,82: "HUseyin Pa§a dahi qerkesiyyfil- asil olup miralaylikla Kars'a giderek orada yararliki zAhir olmakla terfi'-i rUtbe ederek feriklik ile avedt etmiýti. "


Apart from his military experience"' the most important event in this time certainly was HUseyin's first contact with Ahmed. About the exact circumstances of their encounter there is no information available, but it seems that the sheikh quickly gained a

considerable influence over the officer. Vambery ascertained that it was Ahmed's

activist stance and warlike faith that attracted HUseyin to the latter. Later in 1862, when,

on his way to Bukhara, Vambery met HUseyin again in Erzurum he called him "an

enthusiastic religious mystic" with connections to the Nak§ibendi order of dervishes -a fact that seems to confirm Ahmed's lasting influence. 119 About HUseyin's relation to Islam or any Sufi affiliation before he got acquainted with the sheikh we know nothing. But also his encounter with the Hungarian and Polish officers in Kars may have been

responsible to shape Hiiseyin's political worldview. It was Vambery, who mused that Hiiseyin's "close intimacy with the [Hungarian] refugees, who were living at that time in Turkey, may have considerably contributed towards making a political enthusiast of him. ""' These Polish and Hungarian refugees found their way to the Ottoman Empire in

a very special way, which I like to delineate shortly in the following.

The reasons for the outbreak of the Crimean War on the one hand have to be sought in

the traditional rivalry between the Ottoman Empire and Russia. On the other hand the

war also had a European dimension connected with the changing balance of power on

the continent and the rise of nationalism as a weight in this balance. One of the

preconditions that made the Crimean War possible was the destruction of the

conservative order of 1815 and the re-emergence of France as a political power. The

final blow to the system of Vienna was the revolutionary events of 1848, which showed

the rising power of nationalism in Middle and Eastern Europe. Only with military help

from Russia could the Hapsburg Empire be saved from dissolution. The new

nationalism was considered such a threat that Petersburg even was willing to cooperate

with the Porte in holding the peoples of the Balkan down. "'

Nonetheless, a diplomatic crisis was provoked by about 5000 refugees from Poland,

Hungary and Italy, who crossed the Ottoman border as it became clear that the

revolution had failed. When the Austrian government with the support of Russia

demanded the extradition of these refugees the Porte rejected this demand treating them

as asylum seekers under the safeguards of international law. To curb their political

activities all refugees were taken into custody unless they wished to convert to Islam,

"' Reid (2000), 303 diagnosed that the events at Kars caused a 'post traumatic stress disorder' in Hfiseyin, which later made him take part in the conspiracy. " Vambery (1884), 23; ibid. (1904), 1,165. 110 Varnb&Y 0 884), 23. ... Goldfrank (1994), 62-66; Ahmed Cevdet (1953-67), 1, tez. 1,12-3.


which was regarded as a change of nationality by the contemporaries. With the support

of the French and the British the Porte was able to fend off Russian threats and a

compromise was worked out in Petersburg. The Russian foreign minister did accept the

link between religion and right of asylum and the call for extradition was dropped under

the promise that the refugees would be relocated from the border. ' II

While the most prominent of the refugees, the Hungarian revolutionary Kossuth, soon left the Ottoman Empire for America many others stayed. Some of them really

converted to Islam and, having been part of the revolutionary armies in Hungary,

entered Ottoman service as officers as well as on technical jobs. Among them were

officers, who later served alongside HUseyin in Kars like Guyon or Kmety. ' 11

When the war against Russia broke out in 1853 these officers were a welcomed

enforcement of the Ottoman army, but the Porte was also aware of the diplomatic

problem these officers could signify. For this reason they were explicitly posted to the

Anatolian front in order not to offend the neutral Austrians. "' Nonetheless the

Hungarian and Polish officers remained politically suspicious even for the Ottoman

authorities as shown by the fact that some of them were summarily arrested in 1859

when the Kuleli conspiracy was suppressed. It is well known that HUseyin like his brother Mehmed stood in contact with many Europeans, among them the officers of Kars or individuals like Millingen and Vambery.

The way they affected Hfiseyin's political thinking, however, is hard to measure. That

all European observers described HUseyin as a liberal minded and enlightened man

should not be dismissed out of hand and it may well be that his European contacts were

partly responsible for that. It was this side of HUseyin's character, which strove to

promote the 'reform of politics' as cited above in the interrogation protocol. However,

for HUseyin there was no unbridgeable gap between these reformist ideas and his

adherence to Ahmed. I"

After Kars Hiiseyin Daim was deployed next to the border of Montenegro where he had

another encounter with Balkan nationalism. Hiiseyin was charged to repel Montenegrin

militias, who had entered the Grakhovo valley, formally part of the empire, to

incorporate it into their territory. The larger question behind these quarrels at the

Ottoman border was Montenegro's independence from the empire already under

112 Goldfrank (1994), 68-72. 113 Karpat (2002a); Davison (1963), 76-7; Duncan (1855), 1,155-78; FO 78f782, no. 370, Stratford to Palmerston, 'I'lierapia, 05/12/1849. 114 FO 78/938, no. 284, Stratford to Clarendon, Therapia, 29/09/1853. 1-1 Millingen (1868), 157; Duncan (1855), 1,188-9; MoItke (2000), 221-2 (19/03/1838).


discussion during the peace negotiations at Paris. In May 1858 an Ottoman advance unit

led by HUseyin was ambushed by the rebels and lost up to 700 men. The Porte had to

accept European arbitration so that the border was fixed according to the military status

quo. ' 16

As a consequence out of this defeat HUseyin seems to have had a similar experience as his brother Mehmed. He had to give back a decoration (ikinci derece niyan), which was

newly assigned to him only about a year later. 117 Again it is possible that the experience

of defeat and degradation, which, however, seems to have been a fairly normal one in

the Ottoman military, deepened Hilseyin's willingness to take part in Ahmed's

conspiracy. The frustration may not have derived solely from the humiliation of the

Ottoman army in confrontation with a band of rebels. The result of the affair may also have been a personal grudge towards serasker Riza Pasha, who is said to have been

partly responsible for the lack of troops in the trouble region on the Montenegrin

border, but who did not have to face the consequences, because of his palace

connections. "'

As a consequence, however, HUseyin's career was not damaged seriously. Subsequently

he was employed in the general staff of the third Ottoman army, a position he still held,

when Vambery arrived in Istanbul and became the tutor of his son. By then the hatching

of the plot was already under way and finally was discovered when Miseyin was posted

to Yanina and the officer, who was approached to act as the new military leader of the

conspiracy, made his confession to the serasker.

To sum up this short biographical sketch, it is easy to connect Ahmed's Halidi beliefs to

the ideology of the secret society, whereas the life of Hiiseyin Daim reveals far less

about the Society of Martyrs. Since the general seems to have been mainly responsible

for the logistics and military realisation of the plot he was not actively involved in

formulating its ideology. His individual motives for joining the sheikh, too, remain

unclear after the examination of his life. On the background of a normal military career

the encounter with Ahmed in Kars seems to have been the real incentive to join the

conspiracy. Unfortunately we have no special information about this encounter and it is

116 BOA, A. MKT. UM. 313/21 (13 N 1274) and 314/29 (29 N 1274); FO 88lf760, No. 217 enclosure 1, Hecquard to Walewski, Ragusa, 14/05/1858; ibid., no. 219, Churchill to Malmesbury, Trebigne, 17/05/1858; ibid., no. 297 inclosure 2, Rumbold to Loftus, Vienna 14/06/1858; Millingen (1868), 158-9, who served under the command of Hfiseyin; Jorga (1908-13), V, 511-2; Times 24/05/1858,10; 28/05,10; 01/06,10; 04/06,10; 12/06,10. 117 iD 28213 (4 ý 1275). "' For the shortcomings of the serasker cf. Times 01/06/1858,10 and FO 88lf760, no. 219, Churchill to Malmesbury, Trebigne, 17/05/1858. Also cf. Times 03/10/1859,8, hinting at HUscyin's frustration.


hard to assess how far Hiiseyin was not only fascinated by the charismatic character of

the sheikh, but also shared his religious and political beliefs. The same naturally holds

true for the other members from the military about whom we know even less than about HUseyin Daim.

It is only HUseyin's statement in the interrogation that it was the aim of the Society of Martyrs to reform Ottoman politics, which hints at a specific ideology distinct from the

sheikh's held by the general and maybe by some of the other officers involved in the

plot. 'Refonn of Ottoman politics' (islahat-i umur-i umumiye) may be understood as a

summary for other contemporary opinions ascertaining that the plotters were dissatisfied with the general financial and political situation of the empire as well as

with the personal conduct of the sultan. In the following section I will explore these scattered motives trying to show how the Tanzimat was not able to change the basic rules of the Ottoman political culture and therefore the whole of the reform process began to attract opposition. In the case of the Society of Martyrs it was especially military officers, who reprimanded these defects of Ottoman political culture. That this, however, was a general phenomenon including

other social groups the next chapter will show, in which I will examine the opposition

of the Young Ottomans. The general remarks I will make in the beginning of the next

section about the reform of the Ottoman administration, are also important to

understand their opposition.

Islahat-i umur-i umumiye

Politics in the Ottoman Empire during the Tanzimat period can be observed from two

different points of view. First of all, like the military the political institutions of the

empire were the object of reform to adjust them to new functions and let them work in a

more rational fashion. During the reign of Mahmud 11 new offices were set up like the

one of the serasker as well as entire branches in the bureaucracy like the foreign

ministry and the ministry of the interior. Moreover, to secure his autocratic rule Mahmud tried to weaken the office of the grand vizier, divesting it from its status of

being the 'absolute delegate' of the sultan and making it a mere prime minister (baý

vekio - "'

When Abdillmecid came to power in 1839 he was only sixteen years old and too

inexperienced to exert the same influence on Ottoman politics as his father had done.

I" Mardin (1962), 149-155; Findley (1980), 113-150.


The civil bureaucracy of the Porte inherited much of the power to defme the direction

of politics in the empire and it pressed on with institutional reform. Regarding the

constitution the sultan remained an autocratic ruler, but he depended heavily on these

officials especially in their capacity to deal with the European powers, whose influence

was growing steadily. The new importance of the civil bureaucracy could be observed from the very beginning of Abdiilmecid's reign in the Gijlhane decree. According to

one interpretation the document sponsored the interests of the new class of bureaucrats,

who tried to secure their lives and property against the encroachments from the side of

the sultan. "'

The fact that the reform measures were not only something used to restructure the

political institutions of the empire, but were also a means of power in the political

struggle itself constitutes the second point of view I like to discuss in greater detail in

the following. Although during the Tanzimat the system of government became more

rational and the centre of power shifted away from the palace to the Porte, day to day

Ottoman politics stayed heavily embedded in the traditional political culture. From the

beginning power was not totally confined to the bureaucrats of the Porte, but highly

contested within the whole of the ruling elite. Like in the old times a relatively small

group of individuals and factions struggled to gain political influence and material

wealth by competing for the various offices to be filled in the central government. They

ruthlessly tried to destroy their opponents' chances by means of intrigue and conspiracy forming new alliances when it was to their advantage. The result of this constellation

was a constant change in the top offices of the administration of the empire -a process,

which, at the same time, provided the new and inexperienced sultan with a means of

political influence by playing off the warring factions against each other. "'

By looking at the political realm of the empire in this way the clear-cut distinction

between a reform camp and a reactionary camp among Ottoman politicians as often depicted by contemporary European observers blurs significantly. Officially all active

Ottoman politicians had to be reformers since in the GUlhane decree the Tanzimat had

been made the only line of policy sanctioned by the sultan. So it should not be

surprising that a politician like Riza Pasha, who was the main rival of the so-called

reformers around Re§id throughout the 1840s, could be lauded for his reorganisation of

the army. The only pattern on which the two camps could be told apart perhaps was

their attitude towards European culture and how far modernisation of the state at the

same time had to mean the Westernisation of its culture.

120 Mardin (1962), 156-8, Findley (1980), 146-7.


The alleged difference between refon-n and reaction blurs even more regarding the day

to day professional conduct of Ottoman politicians -a fact that had already been

acknowledged by Moltke in the late thirties with regard to Hiisrev Pasha, the leading

reform minister of his time. 122 The assurance, for example, that Re§id and his followers

were less driven by the pursuit for power and that they were less venal was, for the

greatest part, the result of wishful thinking by European observers and was directly

contradicted by Ottoman contemporaries. Like his competitors Re§id was a patron-

pasha par exellence giving posts to his followers and relatives and making a fortune by

using his influential position. 123 In the same way Re§id's disciples Ali and Fuad, who became the two leading Ottoman politicians in the 1850, were accused of monopolising

power by unfair means and working more for their own material wellbeing than for that

of the state. "

The situation in the military, which was the sphere were Hiiseyin made his personal

experience, was not very different. Theoretically he civil and military branch of the

administration had been divided at the beginning of the reform period. But that did not

mean that the men, who were appointed as commanders, necessarily had any military

experience. The professionalisation of the army began slowly in the 1850 when there

were more graduates from the military schools available. HUseyin apparently did not

belong to this group, but for some reason he had the ethos of a professional soldier,

which his superiors often lacked. Especially during the Crimean War reports were

numerous about the disinterested and unprofessional attitude of the Ottoman

commanders, who saw their dispatch to the front as a nuisance preventing them to

pursue their careers in the capital. 125

Regarding this kind of atmosphere the justification a person like HUseyin gave for his

involvement in the opposition to the Tanzimat regime becomes more understandable.

He must have been convinced to work for the reform of the political sphere by ousting

any of the old and corrupt ministers from power and replaceing them with supposedly

more honest people. Only in the eyes of the Europeans the religious ideology of

Ahmed's plot and the goal to reform Ottoman politics were contradictory. For the

plotters themselves it did not make a difference that some of the ministers they were

12 'Findley (1980), 163-5. 122 Moltke (2000), 75,20/01/1836: "Mir kommt es manchmal vor, als ob der Seraskier Mehmed Chosref die Reform in seinem geheimsten Innern rrUt der tiefsten Ironie behandele; aber sie ist ihm das Mittel zur Macht, und Macht ist die einzige wahre, ungebändigte Leidenschaft dieses Greises. " 123 Ahmed Cevdet (1953-67), 1, tez. 6,19-20,26-27. 124 Abu-Manneh (2001), 115-124. 12' For the eastem front cf FO 195/4 10, no. 6, Brant to Raglan, Erzeroom, 04/07/1854 and the numerous reports of General Williarns in FO 195/440,481 and 482.


conspiring against belonged to the so-called reform party.

A realist perspective on Ottoman politics during the Tanzimat not only makes the moral

reasoning of people like Hfiseyin more intelligible. This perspective also opens the

possibility that the Kuleli conspiracy itself was, at least partly, connected to the factional struggle within the ruling elite. And indeed, sometimes this struggle took the form of a conspiracy as can be observed in an affair around the grand vizier Hiisrev

Pasha at the beginning of Abdillmecid's reign. After he had been ousted from power

after eleven months in June 1840 Htisrev was not only accused of venality, but he and

some followers also were suspected to have planned the overthrow of the whole

government and to return to the old system of a strong grand vizier recently abolished by Sultan Mahmud. All information about the affair is very vague including rumours

that personalities like Mehmed Ali of Egypt and the valide sultan, the mother of AbdUlmecid, were partaking in it. 126 The implicit assumption that the plotters built on

the dissatisfaction of parts of the public opinion with regards to the rights of the

Christians might give an indication that there were some similarities between this

alleged conspiracy and the events in 1859.121

That also in the case of the Kuleli conspiracy there was a connection to the factional

struggle was asserted by Millingen, who claimed that the plot had to be seen in the light

of the succession to the Ottoman throne. 128 Indeed, from the end of the 1840s the

reigning sultan had become very unpopular. Together with the worsening financial

situation of the state, which led to arrears in pay for the army and the civil

administration, irumours of Abdiilmecid's drinking habits and the incredible waste of

money in the palace were spreading. 119 In turn, his younger brother and heir apparent to

the Ottoman throne, Abdiilaziz, was styled as a complete contrast to the sultan's

allegedly corrupted morals. In popular opinion he was presented as a very religious

person up to a point that people believed with his reign an era of renovation of Islam

would set in. "'

This constellation made Prince Abdiilaziz a figure in the political game very early and inevitably his name was brought up by those, who opposed the ruling sultan or wanted

"' FO 78/394, no. 120, Ponsonby to Palmerston, Therapia, 09/06/1840; no. 135,01/07/1840; no. 153, 29/07/1840; no. 159,01/08/1840. 127 FO 78/395, no. 156, Ponsonby to Palmerston, Therapia, 01/08/1840. 128 Millingen (1881), 204-6. 129Ahmed Cevdet (1953-67), 11, tez. 13,8; FO 78/894, no. 72, Rose to Malmesbury, Therapia, 04/09/1852; ibid., no. 84,23/09/1852. 110 Millingen (1881), 202; FO 78/819, no. 120, Stratford to Palmerston, Constantinople, 05/04/1850.


to put pressure on him. "' Over time the supporters of the sultan discussed several ways to react to this constant threat. The most traditional proposal was to get rid of the prince

altogether. There were rumours and allegations that Abdiilaziz was to be murdered

either by circles around the valide sultan or on demand of the sultan himself. 112 Another

envisaged course of action was to involve the young prince in the government and make him governor of Tripoli -a project, which was given up on opposition from the side of Re§id, grand vizier at that time. "'

The most radical project, however, was to change the law of succession and pass the

office of sultan on to Murad, Abdiilmecid's eldest son. It seems that from 1850 onwards there was a group of high dignitaries advertising the right of Murad to the throne,

among them the valide sultan, who, naturally, sponsored the rights of her grandson. Re§id, whose own son married a daughter of the sultan in 1854, and Riza, who is said to have arranged secret meetings to this avail in his house, were also part of this party. '34

The sultan himself seems not to have supported this project openly and it is totally

unclear whether it ever was pursued earnestly at all or if it was just a rumour started to

worry Abdiilaziz. 111 But even if there was no real backing for this project, it seems to have been credible enough that on the opposite side prominent politicians were declaring their loyalty to Abdiilaziz.

The long time kapudan paya Mehmed Ali can be singled out as one of the most

prominent supporters of the heir apparent. 136 He started as a palace official under Mahmud, then moved on to become commander of ToPhane and after his marriage to a

sister of AbdOlmecid in 1845 belonged to the group of members of the royal family,

who monopolised the military offices of the empire in the 1840s. Until 1852 when he

became grand vizier for the first time he had been three times kapudan paya and once

serasker. In 1853 at the time of the outbreak of the Crimean War Mehmed Ali again held the office of minister of war. In this function he was the leader of the war faction

in the cabinet and was secretly supporting the demonstrations and riots in September

and December, which were decisive to push the empire into war. These riots not only

"' Cf. FO 78/519, no. 119, Stratford to Aberdeen, Constantinople, 01/06/1843, about rumours to bring Abddlaziz to the throne. "2 FO 78/60 1, no. 23 1, Stratford to Aberdeen, Constantinople, 30/09/1845; FO 78/602, no. 245, 22/10/1845; Ahmed Cevdet (1953-67), 11, tez. 17,134. 113 Ahmed Cevdet (1953-67), 11, tez. 17,133; ibid., (1980), 26; FO 78/819, no. 120, Canning to Palmerston, Constantinople, 05/04/1850. " Millingen (1881), 200-3; Ahmed Cevdet (1953-67), 111, tez. 17,134-5. 135 Ahmed Cevdet (1953-67), 11, tez. 17,135-6. The British ambassador speaks of the sultan's unconscious wish to make Murad his successor, cf. FO 78/1275, no. 1083, Stratford to Clarendon, Constantinople, 12/12/1857. 136 Ahmed Cevdet (1953-67), 1, tez. 7,38 and H, tez. 14,54; Millingen (1881), 207. On his life see Sicill-i


were a spontaneous outburst of religious patriotic feelings. By politicians like Mehmed

Ali they were used to put pressure on Re§id and all, who stood for reconciliation with Russia as advised by the Powers. In this time Mehmed Ali certainly was in close

contact with the religious milieu and the ulema - among them not only the yeyfilislam Arif Hikmet, but also the tutor of the crown prince Aziz -'11 who signed the petition for

war and actually orchestrated the demonstrations of their students. Also rumours of the imminent deposition of AbdUlmecid in favour of his brother

frequently re-emerged during the tense atmosphere in winter 1853.11' Announcements of

this kind continued to surface in the run up to the events of autumn 1859. When

Mehmed Ali in March 1855 shortly fell from grace and was sent to exile to Kastamonu

this was not only due to a financial affair, but also because he was accused of being in

contact with a group of dissatisfied ulema with connections to the harem and perhaps

even with Abddlaziz himself. "' With the deterioration of the sultan's health and his

rising unpopularity as the war drew on many people, among them the British

ambassador, expected a violent resolve of the succession crisis. "

In 1857/58 the tense political situation apparently even led to an intervention of the

British, French and Austrian ambassadors. In a joint note they were pointing to the

inappropriate behaviour of the sultan and the bad mood among the ulema and the

people. Also in the Ottoman cabinet the rumours of an imminent revolt ran high. "' A

similar atmosphere prevailed in summer 1858 when the rumour emerged that a

conspiracy was hatched either by the 'fanatical party' or by a group of Hungarian and

Polish officers being engaged by Greek circles in the capital. "'

All these rumours were clearly the result of the unstable political situation, the problems

the empire underwent from the 1850s onwards and the dissatisfaction of large parts of

the politically conscious populace. These rumours should, however, not be linked too

directly to the Kuleli conspiracy. Indeed, there is no proof for Millingen's assertion that

the plot of 1859 was organised by the supporters of Prince Abdiilaziz. These assertions

seem to rest more on the conspiracy theories depicted above than on hard fact. Merely

in an indirect way these rumours affected Ahmed's secret society, viz. in making their

members believe that they were part of a much wider network involving high-ranking

osmani IV, 298-300 and inal (1940-52), 1,59-73. "' Hasan Fehmi Efendi, cf FO 78/938, no. 284, Stratford to Clarendon, Therapia, 29/09/1853, which, however, does not state the name. 138 FO 78/938, no. 272, Stratford to Clarendon, Therapia, 15/09/1853. 139 FO 78/1077, no. 292, Stratford to Clarendon, Constantinople, 16/04/1855. 14' FO 78/1086, no. 675, Stratford to Clarendon, Therapia, 10/09/1855. 14 ' Ahmed Cevdet (1953-67), 11, tez. 14,52.1 couldn't find this joint note in the PRO. 142 F0 78/1366, no. 106, Bulwer to Malmesbury, Tberapia, 04/08/1858; ibid. FO 78/1367, no. 196,


Ottoman politicians. However, it seems unlikely that there was any direct connection between the plotters of 1859 and people like Mehmed Ali, who later was part of the

special commission to try them. The link of the Kuleli conspiracy to the factional struggle in the capital does not

materialise in personal connections, but in the general atmosphere the Ottoman political

system created. Conspiracy was the natural form of behaviour in this political culture

and it was only a matter of time before some discontent and vigorous people turned

such rumours into reality. It can be seen as symptomatic for the failure of the

conspiracy that its leader, Sheikh Ahmed, was not part of the political establishment. Hfiseyin Daim's position was not high enough to secure success and despite all the

discontent and factional struggle among Ottoman politicians this did not translate into

their participation in the plans of the Society of Martyrs.

The legacy of the Kulefi incident

Given the diversity of its members and their motives it is hard to put forward a neat

summary of the Society of Martyrs. As indicated by its name, the most peculiar feature

undoubtedly was its Islamic ideology personified by its leader, Sheikh Ahmed. It was he, who recruited the members of the plot, his charismatic personality held the

heterogeneous group of people together and he defined the style of opposition by

choosing the group's tarikat-like structure and coining its pro-sharia slogan. For Ahmed

as for others the alleged disregard for Islamic law by the Ottoman government seems to

have been the main reason to see their opposition to the regime as legitimate. For other

members of the secret society like HUseyin a general reform of Ottoman politics seems

to have been an important objective. These openly stated motives probably were

accompanied by other more vague feelings of discontent, which stemmed from the

empire's difficult political and economic situation.

This mixture of aims and motives was in no way incomprehensible, but related to an

organic ideal of how the Ottoman state was to be. Regarding its ideology the empire

was to return to Muslim preponderance, regarding its political sphere it was to adopt a

more open distribution of power - one, which was not monopolised by a small group of

high ranking functionaries. According to the traditional ideal of the autocratic state the

plotters saw the exchange of sultans as the key to their success. In this way they were

very traditional and not against the regime per se, but only against the current

08/09/1858-, FO 195/585, Philip Saule to Bulwer, Pera, 31/08/1858.


government including the sultan. For all the condemnatory rhetoric that was used in the istintakname the treatment of the plotters was very lenient, which suggests that the

opposition of the Society of Martyrs was understood for what it was. The Ottoman

political system had quite effective and traditional ways of dealing with this kind of

opposition. After the detection of the Kuleli conspiracy first of all the authorities tried to appease Muslim public opinion, which was in favour of the plotters, who, according to a poster,

should be liberated, because the only crime they were guilty of was to defend the

sharia. " Apparently to quieten these voices the goverment issued a decree concerning

public drinking and women's dresses. 144

However, it was much harder to find a suitable reaction for the dissatisfaction with the

general political situation. From the side of the sultan the easiest thing to do was to

show leniency towards the plotters and commute the death sentences of the five main

culprits. Another measure was to promise to set in order the finances of the empire and

reduce the spending of the palace. 141 Also the replacement of Ali Pasha as grand vizier

with Kibnlsli Mehmed Pasha at the end of October 1859 can be seen as a reaction to the

public mood. A replacement, which had been the demand of an anonymous petition

sent to the palace some time after the detection of the plot. "

These, however, were only temporary measures and in the following years the influence

of Ali and Fuad was even increasing. As we will see in the following chapter the

fundamental problems of the empire stayed the same so that it is not astonishing that the

pressure on the Porte was mounting in the following years. Not even the individuals

sent to exile after the Kuleli conspiracy could be confined for long. When AbdOlmecid

died in 1861 and his brother AbdUlaziz finaUy came to the throne, most of them were

allowed to return to Istanbul except for Ahmed, who had to stay in Cyprus, his former

place of exile. "'

14' Ahmed Cevdet (1953-67), H, tez. 15,84. " Ahmed Cevdet (1953-67), tez. 15,87-8; A. MKT. NZD 293[77 (30 Ra 1276). 14' FO 195/627, Pisani to Bulwer, Yenikioy 13/10/1859 and 15/10/1859. "Ahmed Cevdet (1953-67), 11, tez. 15,84. 147 iD 32064 (3 Ra 1278). Also cf Nanuk Kemal's petition to Midhat Pasha for Ahmed's return to his hornecountry, in Tansel (1967-86), 1,308-12, letter 113 and 114 (Oct. 1874).


Ul. THE YOUNG OTTOMANS

69

One of the main goals of the men of the Kuleli conspiracy had been to exchange Abdiilmecid for his brother, who, it was generally believed, would have a better grip on his ministers and the problems the empire was facing. When Abdiilmecid died in 1861

and succession brought Abdiilaziz to the Ottoman throne none of the high hopes that

were set in the new sultan materialised. In terms of the foreign and internal political

situation the 1860s not only remained a decade of an ongoing crisis for the empire. This

decade also saw the birth of the most well known opposition movement of the Tanzimat

era: the Young Ottomans.

In the following I will explore how the Young Ottomans related to the general motives

of opposition as laid out in the initial chapter of this study. Given the similarity of the

political environment it is not surprising that there was a resemblance as well as a

personal connection between them and the opposition of the late 1850s. There were, however, also radical differences, which explain why the Young Ottomans were - if not for their contemporaries, so clearly for future historians - so much more prominent than

their predecessors. Although their roots also lay in a conspiratorial movement, some of

the Young Ottomans managed to move away from the traditional forms of opposition by discovering the newspaper as a new medium of political agitation. Moreover, in their

writings the Young Ottomans for the first time came close to develop what might be

called 'political theory'. Here the question of Ottoman legitimacy was posed in a much

more articulated manner than before. This also included hints towards a new

legitimisation of opposition against the authorities -a matter I will explore in the last

section of this chapter.

The Patriotic Alliance

The standard account of the origin of the political engagement of the individuals, who

were later to be called the Young Ottomans, came from Ebtizziya Tevfik, a writer and

journalist, who made their acquaintance in the 1860s. ' According to him an important

step was taken in June 1865 when a revolutionary society (cemiyet-i inkilabiye) was

constituted by six young men at a picnic in the Belgrade forest near Istanbul. In the

secondary literature this society became known under the name Patriotic Alliance

' This account was serialised in 1909 over 40 years after the events in the Yeni Tasvir-i Efkar. Bilgegil (1976), 356, quotes the passage about the events referred to above. There are alternate versions of the


Ottifak-i Hamiyet), which for the reasons of convenience I will use in the following, too. 2

If we can believe in the standard version about the establishment of the Patriotic

Alliance, at first glance the character of this organisation seems to have been very different from that of the Society of Martyrs. Already its name suggests a more secular

approach to opposition. Also the alleged fact that its structure was modelled after the Italian carbonari, the republican revolutionaries from the beginning of the century, as

well as the social background of the six alleged founding members point in this direction.

Despite the fact that there was no clear leader, one Mehmed Bey, born in 1843 as a descendant of a well-known family of Ottoman officials, seems to have played a central

role in the group. Mehmed had been a pupil of the Mekteb-1 Osmanii, the Ottoman

school that had been founded in Paris in 1858, before he was employed in the

translation office (tercfime odasi) of the High Council at the Porte? His job in this part

of the administration, which was the embodiment of the Tanzimat par exellence in

producing many of its great statesmen, was the common denom inator of all alleged founding members of the Patriotic Alliance. Two of Mehmed's colleagues from the

translation office, Nuri Bey (1840-1906) and Re§ad Bey (1844-1901/2), also joined the 4 conspiracy. The three of them were and remained close friends of the most famous

member of the society: Namik Kemal.

Born in Tekirdak in 1840 Kemal had come to Istanbul in 1857/8 where he first became

a customs clerk and later was transferred to the translation office of the Sublime Porte.

More important, Kemal got involved in the literary circles of the capital gaining a

reputation as a poet. ' lbrahim ýinasi became one of Kemal's mentors and gave him the

chance to write for his paper Tasvir-i Efkar (Description of Opinions) of which Kemal

became editor in chief in 1865. ýinasi had been one of the founding figures of the

Ottoman press, who in 1860 had started one of the first independent Ottoman

newspapers, the Terciiman-i Ahval (Translator of Conditions). It was only preceded by

the Ceride-i Havadis (Register of Events) edited by an Englishman named Churchill,

whose office was said to have been a cradle for liberal opinion in Istanbul. 6

establishment of the group in Cevdet's 'Maruzat' and by a niece of a founding member, cf. Kuntay (1944- 57), 1,35 8. For an overall evaluation of the sources see Mardin (1962), 10-11. 2 Cf. Kuntay (1944-57), 1,357, who does not state who invented this name. He suggests that it imitates the German Tugendbund movement. ' Kuntay (1944-57), 1,414-26. On the Mekteb-i Osmani in Paris cf Chambers (1968) and ýI§man (1986). 4 Kuntay (1944-57), 1,381-93. 'On Kemal's youth cf. Kuntay (1944-57), 1,2-28; in general Mardin (1962), 283-7; Tansel (E12). 6Cevdet in Maruzat as quoted in Kuntay (1944-57), 1,363-4.


In his articles ýinasi mainly wrote on educational and cultural subjects, but he also

touched politics from time to time. This seems to have been the reason why he had to

leave Istanbul in 1865 and decided to go into voluntary exile to Paris. How much also his alleged involvement in a conspiracy against Ali Pasha organised by one Said

Sermedi might have played a role is not clear. ýinasi's connection to this shady affair is

unproven like the allegation that had been part of the Society of Martyrs on account of

the fact that he had been employed as a scribe in the Tophane regiment in the 1850s and

that he was a good friend of Bekir Efendi, the miftfi of Tophane. '

Also the remaining two founding members of the Patriotic Alliance were connected to

the literary milieu of Istanbul and apparently were employed in one of the translation

offices of the Ottoman administration. Ayetullah Bey, who is said to have written down

the statutes of the secret society, was the son of the host of one of Istanbul's most important literary salons, which was also frequented by European scholars. 8Refik Bey

was the editor of the short-lived journal Mir'at (Mirror) founded in 1863 where Kemal

published translations from Montesquieu. Because he died from cholera in 1865 Refik

could not have played a leading role in the secret society.

To sum up, the founders of the Patriotic Alliance as presented by EbUzziya were a very homogenous group of young officials in their twenties, who were also connected to the

literary milieu of the capital and active in creating an Ottoman press. A further detail

setting them apart from most of their contemporaries was the fact that by virtue of their

profession they all knew French. In this they potentially belonged to the modernist elite

of the Ottoman administration that generally took top positions regarding salary and

advancement. One effect of this knowledge of French was that the young officials were able to follow

political developments outside the empire. EbUzziya Tevfik assures that the programme

of the Patriotic Alliance displayed a European element, which only could have been

picked up by men with such a special background. According to his account it was the

general aim of the Patriotic Alliance "to change absolute government into constitutional

government". ' This blunt mentioning of constitutionalism, however, has to be taken

with caution. Given the intellectual background of the six alleged founders of the

society it might well be that they discussed such matters. In fact, there had been a trend

' Mardin (1962), 252-5; Karpat (1964), 258-9. On ýinasi's alleged connection to the Society of Martyrs

cf. EbUzziya (1997), 155-64. 8 Cf Mardin (1962), 232-3; Davison (1963), 181-2. 9 "[I]dare-i mutlakanin iddre-i me§rfitaya tahv^lti iqUn as quoted in Bilgegil (1976), 356.


towards more political topics in the literary salons of Istanbul in the late fifties and early

sixties. These also comprised European political philosophy as can be seen from the

success a translation of Fenelon's 'Telemaque' had in these circles. 'o Openly

constitutional matters were not discussed until 1867 and therefore it is hard to say

wether the constitutional plans of the Patriotic Alliance were not projected back in time by EbUzziya.

Whereas EbUzziya gave no information about the means the five men were

contemplating to implement 'constitutional rule', the reason why they thought such a fundamental change in the Ottoman political system was necessary may be inferred

from the general political situation. This had not changed very much since the time of the Kuleli conspiracy. Russia, the big

threat to Ottoman sovereignty, had been contained by the Treaty of Paris, but a number

of smaller internal crises in the provinces proved that pressure on the empire had only

partly relaxed. Many of these crises were part of the continuing slow retreat of Ottoman

rule from the Balkan Peninsula. The unification of the Principalities under one king and

the cessation of most Ottoman rights to the new country, Romania, were fought out

entirely in the diplomatic arena. There were, however, cases were ancient Ottoman

rights were disputed more hotly. In Serbia where there were still small detachments of

the Ottoman army it came to clashes with the local population. The Turkish quarter of Belgrade had to be evacuated and two of the fortresses the Ottomans still occupied had

to be given up. There were also minor revolts in Herzegovina, Montenegro and on Crete, all of which could be suppressed. The most striking example in the early sixties of how the Treaty of Paris was not able to

guarantee Ottoman territorial integrity and how the Powers continued to use the

question of reforms to curtail Ottoman sovereignty were the events in Lebanon. In the

summer of 1860 clashes between Druzes and Maronites on Mount Lebanon had spilled

over to Damascus where riots broke out and led to a massacre of local Christian and

European consuls. " As a result France decided to intervene and occupied Beirut. In the

ensuing negotiations the empire had to grant a special status for the Lebanon and a

Christian governor was appointed to the province.

Unfortunately, there is little historical evidence as to what effect these political

developments had on public opinion in Istanbul and on the individuals, who were about

" CE Mardin (1962), 241-6.


to establish the Patriotic Alliance. Only from their reaction to similar events later in the decade can we infer that these events, indeed, made an impression on them. The only time popular discontent was voiced openly was during the financial crisis of November

1861. After a dramatic devaluation of the kaime, the Ottoman paper money, there were bread shortages and for a short time it looked as if riots could break out in the capital. With a new loan from Europe, however, confidence could be restored and the kaime

was withdrawn from the money market. "

What kind of damage this as well as the military and diplomatic defeats meant for the

prestige of the sultan can only be guessed. For sure, the damage must have been huge

for the Ottoman politicians, who tried to deal with the constant crisis. From the end of

the 1850s onwards Ottoman politics were dominated almost exclusively by Ali and Fuad Pashas, who had risen from the translation office of the Porte as proteges of Re§id.

During the time of the Crimean War they had become independent of their mentor, who had died in 1859 and apparently they had used the Kuleli conspiracy to consolidate their

power. 13

Also under the new sultan AbdUlazizAli and Fuad remained in their supreme positions, because of their diplomatic skills and their ability to rally European support for the

empire. AbdUlaziz, who was eager to widen his influence on day to day political decisions, had to learn this during the cabinet crisis in December 1862/January 1863.

When he collided with his grand vizier Fuad Pasha over the question of financing the

army and navy and the appointment of a new kapudan paya Fuad handed in his

resignation and was followed by most of the ministers in his cabinet, among them Ali as

minister of foreign affairs. The sultan had difficulties finding a new grand vizier and the

political stand off could only be overcome by persuading the other ministers to

withdraw their resignation promising that Fuad would be allowed back to office in a

couple of months. Already in June 1863 the latter was re-appointed grand vizier and

additionally held the post of serasker. For the next three years he remained the leader of

the Ottoman government before he was replaced by MUtercim Mehmed RU§di. ̀

It may be assumed that the five founding members of the Patriotic Alliance were

affected by the constant crisis of the empire and that they made Mi and Fuad

responsible for this crisis and therefore wanted to introduce constitutional checks on

II The unrest in Syria was partly caused by the reform poticy of the late 1850s. There were allegations that 'reactionary circles' in Istanbul had its fingers in it, which, however, can not be proven, cf. Ma'oz (1968), 239. 12 Ahmed Cevdet (1953-67), H, tez. 19,226-7; Davison (1963), 110-3. 13 Abu-Manneh (2001), 120- 1.


their power. A proof for this assumption, however, we have only for the time after 1867

when most of them were implicated in publishing activities. In fact, about the views of

most of the five men in the time between 1865 and '67 there is little information

available. The only exception to this is Namik Kemal, whose life is much better

researched than that of the others. In the following section I will concentrate especially

on his career as a journalist, which not only was a key element in the story of the

coming into being of the Young Ottomans, but also inaugurated a new phase in the

history of political opposition in the Ottoman Empire.

Journalism and intrigues

When Namik Kemal took over the Tasvir-i Efkar in 1865 he did not use it instantly to

voice any political views he might have discussed with his friends in the Patriotic

Alliance. Despite the very liberal Ottoman press law in its beginnings the paper

remained essentially dedicated to cultural and literary topics as it had been in the time

ýinasi was its editor in chief. There was virtually no criticism of the government and

one of Kemal's articles even was publicly approved of by Ali Pasha. "

However, successively Kemal together with other journalists began to sport more

politically minded articles. The occasion for conflict with the government derived from

yet another crisis in the provinces of the empire. In 1866 a rebellion flared up on the isle

of Crete, which proved hard to contain for the Ottoman army. This local revolt on the

one hand strained the relationship with the kingdom of Greece from where voluntaries

streamed to the island and on the other hand that with the Powers busy proposing plans

regarding the future of Crete. In this critical situation the Ottoman government was very

susceptible not only to outside pressure by the Powers, but also to interference into its

policy by the press at home. The articles Kemal printed in autumn 1866 on the Cretan

question and especially his campaign to help the Turkish population of the island were

anxiously watched by the government. The authorities interfered openly when in

October Kemal wrote a column about Greek inhabitants of Istanbul singing anti-Turkish

songs. The Tasvir-i Efkar was ordered to print an official statement by the ministry of

police that everything was under control. 16

The relation between the small Ottoman press and the government further deteriorated

in the following year when the Tasvir-i Efkar began to take a part in a campaign against

" Ahmed Cevdet (1953-67), H, tez. 19,259-62; cf also PRO, FO 78/1732, no. 20, Erskine to Russell, Constantinople, 05/01/1863 and ibid. no. 28,08/01/1863. " Kuntay (1944-57), 1.54-8.


the government led by Mustafa Fazil Pasha, a former Ottoman minister and descendant

from the ruling dynasty of Egypt. As we will see in the following this campaign started

as a very conventional intrigue but soon took an unexpected turn creating the framework for the establishment of the Young Ottoman Society.

Mustafa Fazil, the man, who played an important part in this development, was born in

1830 and with sixteen came from Egypt to Istanbul to start a career in the central

administration. First he was appointed to the office of the grand vizier and then

proceeded quickly as a member of the High Council and the Reform Council (Meclis-i

Tanzimat). In the end of 1862 for a short time he became minister of education and after the cabinet crisis in 1862/63 finance minister. Mustafa Fazil's ultimate goal seems to have been the office of grand vizier putting him in conflict with Fuad Pasha. Eventually,

his attempt of an intrigue against the latter backfired and in the end of February 1866 he

was dismissed from his last post as president of the Treasury Council (Meclis-i Hazain).

Apparently he continued his acerbic critique of the government, he was believed to be

behind a string of anonymous letters to the sultan, so that in April he was ordered to

leave the capital within 48 hours. 17

At the time Mustafa Fazil was trying to get to the top of the Ottoman administration he

was heavily involved in the Egyptian succession question. After his elder brother ismail

had become governor of Egypt in 1863 Mustafa Fazil was next in line to governorship,

which had become hereditary to the eldest mate of the family in 1841. His brother,

however, from the beginning of his reign tried to secure the office for his own son and

to that avail was lobbying in Istanbul. Naturally, the relationship of the two brothers

was hostile and reportedly Mustafa Fazil had an agent in Cairo plotting against ismail.

In 1863 a first attempt by ismail to obtain the sultan's permission to alter the law of

succession failed due to Fuad's opposition to the plan. Also Mustafa Fazil's presence in

the capital may have been an obstacle. Generally, however, Abdalaziz was well inclined

to consider ismail's wish, because the sultan himself had similar plans regarding his son izzeddin and therefore was eager to create a precedent and watch popular reaction.

What part ismail might have had in removing his brother from Istanbul is impossible to

say. Once the latter was gone within a month the Egyptian governor was able to obtain

the ferman allowing him to alter the line of succession. The money he spent to convince

16 Kuntay (1944-57), 1,59-63; Mardin (1962), 27. 17 Cf. Sicilk osmani IV, 481; Mehmed Mcmduh (1990), 44; FO 195/862, no. 32, Pisan' to Lyons, Pera, 19/02/1866; Colombe (1958), 24.


the sultan and his ministers additionally bought him the title khedive (hidiv) or viceroy,

a rank equal to the one of a vizier. "

This last development definitely crushed Mustafa Fazil's hope to retain his claim on the Egyptian governorship and it may have rekindled his contempt for the politicians at the Porte. After his banishment from Istanbul Mustafa Fazil in an unprecedented step chose Europe as a place of exile eventually settling in Paris. The first public statement that indicated that he was going to continue his criticism of the government from exile came in the beginning of 1867. In a letter to the Belgian newspaper Le Nord, which was

printed on 5 February, he claimed that he was the representative of the "grand parti de

la Jeune Turquie", which strove to continue reform in the empire. '9 This proclamation

made its way into the Istanbul press where it was first reprinted in the Counier d'Orient.

In the end of February different translations appeared in the Muhbir (Reporter), a paper,

which had been established only at the beginning of the year, and in Namik Kemal's

Tasvir-i Efkar. The term 'Jeune Turquie', which Mustafa Fazil had used and which, at

that time, had been a common name for a reform movement in any country was

rendered 'Osmanli milletinden ejkdr-i cedide esbabl' by the Muhbir and 7firkistan'In

erbab-i ýebabi% 'the young ones of Turkey' by Kemal. 20

It is unlikely that Mustafa. Fazil, at that time, already was in direct or indirect contact

with Namik Kemal or any other member of the Patriotic Alliance. He seems to have

appealed to a wider movement of reform-minded journalists in the Ottoman capital as

also the commentary by Kemal on Mustafa Fazil's article suggested. 21

More crucial in establishing the link between Mustafa Fazil and the critical journalists

in Istanbul was a second document as part of his campaign against the Porte. This was

an open letter to Abdiilaziz possibly written already in 1866, but reaching a wider

audience only in March 1867.22 In the time honoured form of a petition to the sultan and in deferential language this letter raised some the points, which already had been at the

root of the opposition of the Patriotic Afliance. Most obviously this was the damning

criticism of the tyrannical and corrupt system of government of the empire that

especially afflicted the Muslims. Responsible for this were the sultan's ministers - 'ces

tyrans subalternes' -, who were neither checked by the sultan's good intentions nor by

a public opinion that did not yet exist in the empire. As an immediate remedy, as

11 Davison (1963), 197-200; Mardin (1962), 28-31; Douin (1933-41), 1,205-232. 19 For the text of the letter and a discussion of the circumstances of its publication cf. Bilgegil (1976), 5- 11. An English translation appeared in Levant Herald, 22/02/1867, cf. Mardin (1862) 34-5. 20 Cf. Sungu (1940), 777. 21 The text in Mardin (1962), 37-8.


opposed to more long-term measures as improving the educational and economic framework of the empire, Mustafa Fazil urged the sultan to adopt a constitution. There

were no details in the open letter how this constitution should work. According to its

author, however, it would result in the total equality of Muslims and Christians and

would improve the image of the empire in Europe.

When the open letter became known in Istanbul unlike Mustafa Fazil's letter to Le Nord

the press did not dare to print it. It was anonymously translated into Turkish by a friend

of Namik Kemal and then distributed as a pamphlet. 23 The publication of the letter

added the last element to a constitutional debate now going on in Istanbul, which seems to have been mainly orchestrated by Mustafa Fazil. Already in February a certain Halil

ýerif, an Egyptian, too, who would later become Mustafa Fazil's son in law, had

presented a draft constitution for the empire to the public. Also the Courrier d'Orient, 21

whose editor was in contact with Mustafa Fazil in Paris, took part in this discussion.

It is hard to say, whether the constitutionalism that Mustafa Fazil advocated displayed

his true political convictions. Given the events preceding his voluntary exile in Paris it

might as well have been that he cleverly anticipated public opinion in Istanbul to put

pressure on the Ottoman government. Also a calculated effect on European public

opinion should not be excluded as the letter got some positive response in the liberal

French press. 25

Whereas Mustafa Fazil's motives are not entirely clear, by means of his campaign he

was very successful in becoming a recognised figure of opposition against the

government led by Ali Pasha. A clampdown by the Ottoman government on the

Istanbul press in March 1867 subsequently made him its leader.

Since the beginning of the year it had been especially the Muhbir and its main writer Ali

Suavi, who had openly criticised government policy. Besides the ongoing rebellion in

Crete it was the situation in Serbia, which furnished the occasion for this criticism. After

the Ottoman retreat from its strongholds earlier in the decade, in 1866 the Serbian

government began to demand a complete withdrawal of all Ottoman troops from its

territory. Already the ensuing negotiations aroused Muslim feelings and it seems that it

was this bad mood the public was in that cost Mfitercim Mehmed RU§di his office as

22 The text of the letter in Colombe (1958); Bilgegil (1976), 14-30 and FO 78/1958, no. 101, Lyons to Stanley, Constantinople, 20/03/1867. Davison (1963), 203 gives a list of all its publications. 23 Kuntay (1944-57), 1,277-81, reproduces the first page of the lithograph print; Davison (1963), 207-8. 24Mardin (1962), 32-4. On Halil ýerif cf. Davison (198 1). 2' Bi Igegil (1976), 41-5 1.


grand vizier in February 1867. In March under heavy international pressure the Porte

accepted all Serbian demands. '

Ali Pasha, who became the new grand vizier apparently decided not to take any chances

and, on 9 March, closed the Muhbir and exiled Ali Suavi to Kastamonu. The Tasvir-i

Efkar was closed two weeks later after it had printed a critical article on the situation in

Crete and a note by the owner of the Muhbir protesting against the closure of his paper. To get Kemal out of the capital he was ordered to take up a post in the administration of Erzurum. Likewise Ziya Bey, who occasionally had written for the Muhbir and who

was an old political rival of Ali was sent as an official to Cyprus. "

It was at this moment that Mustafa Fazil stepped into the picture and offered his

assistance to the three exiled journalists inviting them to come to Paris. In the end of May Kemal and Ziya, who had not yet left Istanbul, escaped on a steamer to Italy. On

the boat to France they met Ali Suavi, who had accepted MUstafa Fazil's invitation a

couple of days after them. Landing in Marseilles they took the train and on 30 May they

arrived in Paris. Kemal, Ziya and Ali Suavi were only the first of a small group of men,

who began to assemble around Mustafa Fazil subsequently called the Young Ottomans.

Under circumstances I will discuss in the next section also Mehmed, Re§ad and Nuri,

the members of the Patriotic Alliance, found their way to France.

The Vocation group (Meslek)

In the second week of June 1867 papers in Europe broke with the news that an uncertain

number of people had been arrested in Constantinople, because a plot against the

government had been detected. According to several papers among the arrested was HUseyin Daim Pasha as well as Azmi Bey, a secretary of Mustafa Fazil. It was believed

that the plotters were connected to the Egyptian prince and that also other members of his Jeune Turquie, namely Ziya and Kemal, were involved. 28 The first of these articles

seems to have relied on the same information given to the British dragoman Pisani on 5

June about the arrests that had been made two days earlier. '

One of the most comprehensive reports in the European press, which claimed to draw

its information from an anonymous letter sent from Pera on 14 June, gave the following

26 Mehmed Memduh (1990), 50. " iýelik (1994), 75-80; Davison (1963), 208-9; Kuntay (1944-57), 1,63-4. On Ziya see Mardin (1962), 337-9. 2' Bilgegil (1976), 309-337. The author reproduces about 20 articles mainly from the French press, which appeared between 8 June and 21 August. 29 CC FO 195/887, no. 145, Pisani to Lyons, Pera, 05/06/1867 and FO 78/1961, no. 245, Lyons to Stanley, Constantinople, 13/06/1867.

OPPosition to the Tanzimat State 79

account of the conspiracy: The plan of the plotters had been to invade the Porte with a

mass of people on 5 June and assassinate the grand vizier Ali and other ministers

assembled there to take part in the council of ministers. Afterwards the crowd was to

march to the palace to force the sultan to implement a reform plan. This would have

included the signing of 'a sort of charte', the creation of a parliamentary assembly as

well as the adoption of financial reforms putting an end to the extravagance of the

palace. The letter stated that the author of the conspiracy was Mustafa Fazil, who would have returned to Istanbul immediately, if the plot had succeeded. Its president was said to be Ziya Bey, its vice president Mehmed Bey, both of whom had been able to flee

before they could be arrested. The plot apparently had 400 members, whose names were found on a list seized by the police in the house of Mustafa Fazil's secretary; 120 of those had been affested. 'o

All this information as well as the fact that Mehmed, Nuri and Re§ad Beys arrived in

Paris shortly after these events suggests that it was the Patriotic Alliance that had been

detected by the authorities. Official Ottoman documents concerning this conspiracy, however, considerably alter the picture up to the point to suggest that there never had

been a 'Patriotic Alliance' as Ebiizziya presented it.

The surviving documents about the trial against the arrested members of the plot are

very similar to the ones about the Kuleli conspiracy. They consist of an official report (mazbata), surnmarising the events and adding the edited interrogation protocols

together with the sentence for each of the suspects. In addition there is a memorandum (arz teskeresi) to the sultan making him acquainted with the findings of the trial and

asking him to confirm the sentences in a decree (irade). 31

The introduction to the official report recounts the events in the following manner:

When the news was heard that some people had founded a secret society (cemiyet-i hafiye) to cause sedition (fltne ve fesad) against the vigorous administration of the state, these people were arrested in groups of one or two in the quarters where they lived and were brought with the imperial ship Mahmudiyye to the ministry of police where they were imprisoned and interrogated alone or, if necessary, by confronting them with each other. 32

Le Nord, 25/06/1867 as quoted in Bilgegil (1976), 326-30. These are reproduced in Bilgegil (1976), 372-96. The mazbata has no date, the arz teskeresi is dated 4

Ca 1284 (03/09/1867). The original, which I have not seen, is to be found in BOA, Milhimme-i MektOme Defteri 10,47-57. In all the following quotations from this source I simplified Bilgegil's transcription. 32 "Bazi e§hasin heyet ve idare-i hazra-i devlet aleyhinde ika-i fitne ve fesad kasdiYla bir cen-iiyet-1 hafiyye te§kil etmi§ olduklan haber alinmaklar bunlar olduklan mahallerden birer iki§er celb ve Mahmudiyye kalyon-i hiimayuniyla Bab-i zabtiyye'de habs olduktan sonra miinferiden ve iktizasina g6re muvaceheten emr-i istintaklan icra [ ... ] olunarak Bilgegil (1976), 372.


The report went on saying that some of the arrested had to be released again, but 25

stayed in custody. The instigators of this organisation, which was called Vocation

(Meslek)., were Mehmed, Re§ad and Nuri Beys, who had not yet been arrested. Until

twenty days before the arrest of their members the aim of the society was the promotion

of civilisation, humanity and prosperity (medeniyet, insaniyet, umraniyet). Only after

that date they turned against the government and tried to recruit new members to carry

out their plans. Apparently for each member a booklet with writings of the society was

produced (Meslekname) and they held meetings in their houses, in various medreses

and one on a field outside of Istanbul.

Regarding the group's plan of action the introduction stated:

On a day that the Privy Council (Meclis-i Has) was to meet they wanted to finish off the members of that council before attacking the Porte and then, as they had written it down in the circulating documents, wanted to conclude the matter by making [new] appointments. In short, their principle consisted in venturing to bring up to realisation the treason of assassination in order to find a way to their vile hope to obtain rank and office for each of them. "

After thus defining the aim of the society the introduction of the report concluded by

stating that the suspects were to be classified in five categories according to their degree

of involvement in the conspiracy, i. e., if they knew about the plans of a violent

overthrow of the government. Then the report turned to the individual interrogations of

the suspects.

As it had been the case with the Society of Martyrs the composition of the Vocation

group depended heavily on the social environment of its three leading figures, Mehmed,

Nuri and Re§ad. Like them nine of the 25 interrogated suspects were employed directly

by the government, seven in the central bureaucracy of the capital and three in the local

administration. One of them, Tahsin Efendi, a scribe in the ministry of war (no. 3),

figured as the secretary of the group. Furthermore, there were four people with

professions related to the administration, two writers of petitions (arzuhalct) and two

tax farmers (mfiltezim)- In most of the cases it seems to have been professional contacts

with the three leaders that brought these officials to the secret society.

More of a surprise regarding the background of Mehmed, Re§as and Nuri were the four

men with a religious background, who joined the group. One sheikh, two hodjas and

" "Meclis-i hassin miinakid olduku bir giinde Bab-i all'ye bilhiicum evvelden Meclis-i mezkurun heyet-i

mijctemiasini bitirip badehu zikr olunan varakalarda muharrer olduku vechile icra-i tevcihat etrnek ile

neticelendirmek istenii§lerdir. Efliasil bunlarin esasi tefekkiir ve kusurlan birer makam ve memuriyete destres olmak emel-i bAtilina yol bulmak iqin suikasd hiyanetini icraya kadar getinnegi g6ze aldin-naktan ibaret olup [ ...

]", Bilgegil (1976), 373-4.


one softa were arrested, interrogated and found guilty. Like the government officials they were recruited by Mehmed and Re§ad, who apparently had connections to the

religious milieu. In one of the interrogation protocols it was stated that the two one day

came to the Aya Sofya Mosque and proclaimed "that the commands of the sharia were worthy and that the time of their realisation will come and also showed the statues of the Vocation group (Meslekname)". From another side we know that Mehmed sometimes

went to the medreses attached to Fatih Mosque to share his opinions with the ulema. "

Unfortunately there is no information as to whether these religious professionals had

any ideological influence in the group. Especially regarding the sheikh, Tepedelenli

Hasan (no. 5), one would like to know more. The fact that he lived in the Kadirga

Limani quarter of Istanbul might indicate that he was connected to the Buhara tekke

affiliated to the Nak§ibendiye. " As for the hodjas, VelRiddin and ibrahim Efendis (nos.

8 and 15), especially the former seems to have been of some importance, because one of the last meetings of the group was held in his room. In general it seems to have been the

task of the hodjas to have their students ready at the Aya Sofya Mosque on the day of the attack on the Porte following the classical pattern of popular unrest in the capital. The rest of the 25 members of the Vocation group came from different or unclear backgrounds. Among them was an astrologer (no. 9) and two tradesmen (nos. 21 and 22), who, however, played no important role in the society. The near total absence of

any members with a military background - there was one retired major, who was

already in his sixties (no. 23) - perhaps marked the most striking difference to the

Society of Martyrs.

Another specific feature of Vocation clearly was the structure of the group. Rather than

a charismatic individual it had three leaders at its top and instead of the tarikat it chose

another model of organisation. On the outside the Vocation group operated as a charity

promising financial help to its members. In this way it attracted people before its real

purpose was revealed to them. At least to four of the poorer suspects, among them one

of the hodjas, small stipends were paid (nos. 8,12,16,18). One of the tradesmen was

asked to contribute to the funds of the society (no. 21).

As the introduction claimed another strategy to tie the members to the group had been to

promise them offices for the time after the coup. Indeed, there seems to have been a list

31 Cf statement no. 23: "Mehmed ve Re§ad Bey'lerin oraya [Ayasofya'ya] gelip §enat-i Islarruyenin ahkarm layikiyla meki-i icraya gelecegini ifade ve bir de Meslek-name irae etmelerinden Bilgegil ( 1976), 392. Also cf. the account of Mehmed's daughter in Kuntay (1944-57), 1,35 8 n. 4. 35 Cf. Zarcone (ist. A).


of appointments (tevcihat pusulast) (no. 2), but only in three cases there is more detailed

information available as to what offices the suspects were promised. In one of them a future member demanded a very specific rank in the Ottoman official hierarchy (rfitbe-i

mir-i miraniye) (no. 4). Two others (nos. 1 and 3) were awarded the offices of the war

ministry's chief scribe as well as that of minister of commerce. Another common strategy the leaders employed to strengthen the trust in the conspiracy

was to exaggerate its dimensions. Many of the suspects claimed that at the time they

were recruited they were told that high Ottoman politicians as well as thousands of

soldiers and softas were involved in the plot and that annedfedai were at its disposal.

One statement (no. 4) explicitly mentioned HUseyin Daim Pasha, but there is no further

hint in the whole report as to what his involvement really was. His name might just have

been mentioned to show that the conspiracy had the backing of an experienced officer. The same applies to the alleged connection of the Young Ottomans to the plot. One of Mustafa Fazil's ex-secretaries, Azmi Bey, who was on position one in the list of

suspects, said that there was a plan to bring back his former chief from Paris and that

also another of the latter's servants was involved in the matter. Once again it is not known how much Mustafa Fazil himself knew about the conspiracy. Likewise, there is

no information as to what extend a claim is true that the group only tried to put into

action the conspiratorial ideas that also Kemal and Ziya held. This claim allegedly was

made by Mehmed and related in one of the suspect's statements. However, from the

context of this statement (no. 13) it seems likely that Mehmed just wanted to put the

person he was recruiting to the plot at ease about the use of violence. Ziya himself

vehemently denied a connection between the plotters and the Young Ottomans already

assembled in Paris in an article to a French newspaper. 36

Apart from offering financial help or government posts the leaders of Vocation clearly

wanted to bind its members ideologically to the group. Already the introduction of the

report mentioned the so-called Meslekname, which seems to have contained the

programme of the group. It seems that every member was handed a numbered copy of

this piece of writing about the content of which there is no specific information to be

found in the report (nos. 2,9,18).

Nonetheless, the ideology of Vocation partly can be reconstructed from the suspect's

statements. Only one of them (no. 2) actually seems to have used the terms found in the

introduction 'insaniyet, medeniyet' to describe the goals of the society. Two suspects

said it was about reform (islahat dair bir ýey, no. 10) or about the reform of the

36 La Liberte, 18/06/1867, as reproduced in Bilgegil (1976), 342-5.


administration (idare-i devletin islahati, no. 17). Also the term 'millet', designating the Muslim community, was used describing the object of the group's endeavours (no. 20).

A much more concrete picture of the ideology of Vocation, or rather the ideology of its

leaders, emerges when looking at the description of the last meetings given in the interrogation statements. One of the most important was held in hodja VeliUddin's room

and was attended by his colleague lbrahim, the three leaders as well as other members

of the group. It was there that Mehmed Bey publicised his plan to found a national

assembly (millet meclisi), which he also repeated in other circumstances (cf. statements

nos. 8,15,19). Also Cemal Efendi, one of the petition writers (no. 25), propagated

parliamentarism with the argument that now that even the Armenians had a national

assembly the Muslims could not wait any longer. This might indicate that, at least for

some of the members of the plot, the seats in this national assembly should be limited to Muslims.

Summing up so far, on the one hand Vocation shared many features of other secret

societies in the Ottoman Empire at the time like the Society of Martyrs and the ones we

will encounter later. Each of them was founded by a close circle of leaders, who hatched

the plans and who sometimes left the wider circle of associates ignorant about the real

aims of the society. These leaders regarded violence to be a legitimate means of

changing politics. These conspiracies usually failed, because in contrast to their

pretensions they managed to mobilise only limited concrete support outside the circles from which they were recruited. On the other hand the Vocation group as it emerged from the official report analysed

above clearly bears the individual stamp of its leaders. This is reflected in its

membership structure as well as in its ideology. Especially the endorsement of

constitutionalism displayed a modem political consciousness that emerged among the

literary minded officials in the mid 1860s. Regarding this feature the leaders of the

Vocation group most certainly were inspired by Mustafa Fazil's campaign.

Remains the question as to how far Vocation can be equated with the Patriotic Alliance

as presented by Ebiizziya. To give a proper answer to this it would be necessary to

know more about the establishment of the former. Here, however, the collected

statements offer only limited evidence. One of the suspects, ismail Hakki Bey, a clerk in

the High Council (no. 19), claimed that he was persuaded by Mehmed to join the group

17 months ago, in December 1865 or January 1866, but then lost contact and did not go

to any of its meetings. A scribe of the same office (no. 13) stated that he joined one year

before; the astrologer All (no. 9) said that he became a member of the Vocation group


nine months before it was detected, in September 1866. The latter two also reported that

they tried to leave the group when a change in its programme occurred that "did not

correspond to Vocation's just and moderate principles and regulations". 37

The information from the introduction that this second phase in the life of the Vocation

group began twenty days before its detection is not directly confirmed by the two men. This date, however, makes sense since in spring 1867 the society seems to have tried hard to recruit new members. From the statements of at least seven suspects it can be inferred that they joined the conspiracy at that point. One of them (no. 18) claimed that in the middle of March he saw fifteen names on a membership list. Most of the other

members (nos. 4,6,16,17,23) were recruited in May 1867, in the weeks when the

planning for the attack on the Porte was under way. EbUzziya's account of the establishment of a secret society in summer 1865 could be

purely fictitious, but it also could refer to the first phase of the Vocation group, when it

was merely a debating society and might not even have carried this name. Later in his

account of the history of the Young Ottomans Ebijzziya showed that he also had some first hand information of the second phase of the Vocation group and its detection. But

he neither uses this name nor seems to have been aware of the change the group had

18 undergone in the last phase of its existence. Whereas it is doubtful that there were any real contacts between the plotters and the

journalists assembling in Paris like Namik Kemal and Ziya, there still may be an indirect connection. The change in attitude regarding violence in the leadership of the

Vocation group seems to have been taking place at the same time as the Porte began its

crackdown on the press in Istanbul. This might have convinced Mehmed that it was

time to try other means to alter the politics of the empire. In the light of the blatant failure of this attempt the establishment of the Young Ottoman

Society looks like an antithetical approach to politics. As I will show in the following

section also the Young Ottoman Society had still strong connections to the old Ottoman

political culture of opposition. However, at the same time it represented a new kind of

opposition, which, in some ways, surpassed the means of conspiracy. On the one hand

this was connected to cultivation of political journalism. On the other hand also the

exile situation played a part in this. With the Young Ottomans a very successful type of

dissident emerged in the Ottoman Empire: the political emigre.

31 Cf statement no. 13: Meslek usul u kaide-i muhikka ve mutedilesine tevafuk etrYUyeceginden ( ... ]",

Bilgegil (1976), 385. 38 Cf Bilgegil (1976), 396-8. On EbUzziya's credibifity cf Z. EbUzziya JA 2).


The Young Ottoman Society

85

On 10 August 1867 eight men came together in Mustafa Fazil's quarters on the

Boulevard Malesherbes in Paris to establish the Young Ottoman Society. Mehmed,

Re§ad and Nuri by that time had joined the original three fugitives Kemal, Ziya and Suavi and had brought with them one Agah Efendi, a former scribe in the translation

office, minister of post and owner of the TercUman-i Ahval, *inasi's old journal . 39The

eighth member of the society was Rifat Bey, a defector from the Ottoman embassy in

Paris and an old friend of Kemal. ' The aim of the society was to propagate the reforms Mustafa Fazil had advocated in his open letter to the sultan. Therefore it was decided to

publish a journal, which was to be the continuation of the Muhbir with Ali Suavi as its

chief editor. Mustafa Fazil, who already had paid for the travel expenses of the men,

was to carry the costs of the publication. He also deposited a sum of money in Ziya's

name, who was chosen president of the society, because he was the oldest of the Young

Ottomans. 41

The aim of a second meeting on 30 of August that from the Turkish side seems only to have comprised Kemal, Ziya, and Mustafa Fazil, obviously was to build a bridge

between the Young Ottomans and the European revolutionary milieu. The programme

written down during this meeting stated the aim of the Young Ottoman Society (party of

the Jeune Turquie) as "carrying out the reform programme of prince Mustafa Fazil

contained in his letter addressed to the sultan and consequently the changing of the

regime and of the men who presently oppress the Ottoman Empire. " In a second

paragraph a co-operation between the Young Ottomans with the Polish resistance

against Russia was proposed. From the European side the Pole Wladyslaw Plater as

well as Simon Deutsch, an Austrian socialist, who also was Mustafa Fazil's doctor,

were present and signed the programme. This connection, although it seemed not to

have been very important for the future work of the society, is quite interesting for its

anti-Russian direction. 42

For a time the Young Ottoman Society focused entirely on the press as a means of

opposition and moved away from the conspiratorial means still employed by some of its

members in the Vocation group. The background of its founders as well as the

circumstances of its establishment was clearly responsible for this development. From

39Sicill-i osmani 1,393; Kuntay (1944-57), 1,394-400. 4'Kuntay (1944-57), 1,401-13. 41 Mardin (1962), 44-5; Davison (1963), 213. 42 Davison (1963), 213-6. The quote (pp. 213-4) comes from A. Lewak: Dzieje emigracjI polskieJ w Turcii (1831-1878), Warsaw 1935, who claims to quote from the original document, which was to be found in the Polish National Library before it was destroyed in the war. Also cf. Koray (1983), 574-8.


Paris it was impossible to organise the overthrow of the government, but the European

environment proved ideal for editing newspapers. Because of the liberal British press law it was decided to produce the Muhbir in London rather than in France. The Muhbir

as well as later Young Ottoman publications could then easily be smuggled into the

empire to be circulated among friends. Usually they were simply sent through the foreign postal services -a fact that the Porte was well aware of, but could not prevent. "

This exile situation, however, also had its disadvantages. Not only had some of the

young men problems adapting to life in Europe, which further pronounced the existing differences among them. ' Also the circumstance that they were totally dependent on Mustafa Fazil's money was to cause difficulties for the group. As it turned out, even before the establishment of the group the mentor of the Young Ottomans had already begun to prepare his return to Istanbul to resume his engagement in Ottoman politics. In

June and August Mustafa Fazil had several audiences with Abdiilaziz, who, at that time,

was on a state visit to France and Britain. The ex-minister and his sovereign seem to have come to some kind of agreement and in September Mustafa Fazil returned to the

empire. At a last meeting with Kemal in Baden Baden he apparently told the latter that

he could pursue their common goal much better from inside the Ottoman

administration. We do not know, if Mustafa Fazil really thought he could influence the

sultan to move in the direction of the open letter or if, from the beginning, he only had

used the dissidents from Istanbul to put pressure on the Porte to let him return. Neither

his goals nor his strategies to attain them were very clear. Back in the capital waiting to be admitted to the Ottoman cabinet again Mustafa Fazil

had a very different idea of what the task of the journal he financed was supposed to be.

He considered the Muhbir much too radical, but nonetheless did not cut his support immediately. Also the other Young Ottomans were not content with the paper, which

was more and more run exclusively by Ali Suavi. The latter's political views, to be

examined in chapter five in greater detail, were considerably different from the ones of

the other Young Ottomans. Also the personal relationship between Ali Suavi and the

rest of the group continuously deteriorated. For these reasons in spring 1868 Mustafa

Fazil finally ordered the Muhbir to stop its publication and allowed Kemal and Ziya to

establish their own paper, Hdrriyet (Freedom), which first appeared on 29 June of the

same year.

43 Cf FO 195/893, Sublime Porte, Nfinistýre des Affaires Etrangeres to British Embassy, note verbale, 05/10/1867 and ibid., no. 369, Savfet to Elliot, Constantinople, 14/10/1868. 4' Iýelik (1994), 106-7.


However, the inherent conflict of the Young Ottoman Society between its cautious financial backer in Istanbul and the quarrelling individuals in Europe continued to pose

problems. Mustafa Fazil was especially concerned about Ziya's bitter articles against Grand Vizier Ali Pasha in the Hiirriyet. Finally, in summer 1869, Mustafa Fazil

withdrew his financial commitment and Ziya had to run it alone, because Kemal had

also quit the paper. Ziya's temporary financial backer became Khedive ismail, who wanted to use the Young Ottoman press in Europe to campaign for yet greater Egyptian independence from the empire. 4'

The Hiirriyet ceased to exist in this form when Ziya was prosecuted by the English

authorities. He was reported to the police by the Ottoman ambassador to London,

because in December 1869 he had printed a letter by Suavi to the Hiirriyet inciting to kill the grand vizier. Ziya never appeared in court, but fled to France and from there

went to Geneva where he reissued the Hdrriyet. 46

In the meantime also the other Young Ottomans had engaged in their own publications independent of their original mentor. In July 1869 Ali Suavi had started a paper called Ulum (Science) in Paris. At the same time Mehmed edited the ittihad (Union) in Paris

defending constitutionalism and featuring articles in Turkish, Arabic, Greek and Armenian. 47 Later, in April 1870, he issued the most radical of all Young Ottoman

papers, the inkilab/La Revolution in Geneva of which only five numbers appeared. This

paper featured personal attacks on the sultan and his administration calling for a

revolution in the empire to achieve any political change. For that reason it was quite

exceptional among the Ottoman exile-papers of the time. "

Apart from his journalistic activities Mehmed also claimed to have been involved in a further attempt to overthrow the sultan. According to his own statement he travelled

secretly to Istanbul to organise an 'active revolution'. The journey, which probably took

place in April or May 1869, however, seems not to have shown any results. 49 Since

there are no other witnesses to it, it is hard to say, whether it ever took place, and what

planning it might have involved. There is a possibility that it has to be seen in

connection with the arrest of Hiiseyin Vasfi Pasha, an officer in contact with the Young

Ottomans.

" Davison 0 963), 216-8; Mardin (1962), 46-56. 46 Times, 07/03/1870,11; (ýelik (1994), 189-90. 47 Cf. Bilgegil (1976), 106-137. 48 Cf. Bilgegil (1976), 138-28 1, who reproduces many of the articles of inkilab. 49 "Ben milletin hukuk ve hUrriyetini iade ettirmeye, bizim mel'un sultanin mahvinden ba§ka qare tasavvur edemedigimden ve fdruattan bildigim ne§riyat hususu da Aciz kalernimin ianesine o zamanlar ihtiyaq g6rmedigimden, yazi ile ukra§mayip fiilen bir inluldp yapmak Uzere Istanbul'a girip malum olan teýebbiisd ettim. ", inkilab, 28/04/1870, as quoted in Koray (1987), 200.


Hilseyin Vasfi (1835-78), who had graduated from the Ottoman military academy and

who was the son in law of MUtercim Mehmed RU§di, became military attache in Paris

and director of the Mekteb-i Osman^i in 1867. There he apparently came in contact with the Young Ottomans and perhaps even joined their group. In the end of February 1869

he returned to Istanbul where he was arrested for an unknown reason. He was released

again in April with an official assurance of his innocence and then went back to Europe

and helped Mehmed to produce the inkilab. 50

Like Mehmed Hdseyin Vasfi seems to have been a radical accepting violence as a

means to attain his goals. He remains a shadowy figure, because there is little

information available about the nature of his political ideas. There have been attempts to

connect him to other plots against Abdiilaziz during the 1860s. One European account

asserts that HUseyin Vasfi and Mehmed organised a conspiracy among the officers of

the Istanbul guard regiment to kill the sultan in the mosque of Beylerbey in June 1865.

If this account is not completely fictitious in the first place - the author claimed to have

heard it in Young Turk circles in Brussels in 1870 -, it might actually refer to activities

or rather plans connected with Mehmed's secret visit to Istanbul in spring 1869. "

Equally unproven is the claim made by EbUzziya that HUseyin was part of the so-called Konduri-Altinci plot in the end of September 1868 involving a Russian tradesman and

the son of a Greek banker, who were charged to have conspired to murder Sultan

AbdUlaziz. Apart from the fact that the plot rested on a false denunciation at the time of

the events Hiiseyin Vasfi probably was on his way back from Yeni§ehir, where he was

commander of a military unit, to Europe. It is thus very unlikely that he had anything to

do with the episode. "

In accordance with their revolutionary ideals Mehmed and HUseyin Vasfi stopped

publishing the inkilab when the Franco-Prussian war broke out to give support to the

French side. After the war, in late 1871, Hiiseyin Vasfi under conspiratorial

circumstances took residence in Athens from were he corresponded with the opposition

against Abdiilaziz, among others with the heir apparent Murad. He returned after the 53

deposition of the sultan and eventually died in the Russo-Ottoman war in 1878.

Mehmed already had returned in 1874 to the empire after an amnesty had been

proclaimed, but he died in the same year. Regarding their radical ideas and their stress

of action to attain their political goals the two had been exceptions compared to most of

10 Sicill-i osmani H, 229-30; Koray (1987), 197,202. " [Schweiger von Lerchenfeld] (1879), 201-6. 52 Koray (1987), 196-8. Also see the interrogation protocols of Konduri and Altinct in BOA, HR. MTV 232/1 and 2. 53 Koray (1987), 202-4.


the other Young Ottomans. The latter represented the mainstream of Ottoman political ideas, which I will present in the following section.

Old attitudes and new political ideas

The Young Ottoman Society had been founded in 1867 to promote political ideas in a

newspaper, the new Muhbir. Four years later the individual members of the society had

come up with a multitude of journals. Given the fact that they were not subjected to any form of censorship except for the dependence on some sort of external financial backing

the Young Ottomans could express their political views in relative freedom. In the following section I will examine what use they made of the press. This concerns

particularly the political views of Namik Kemal and Ziya as expressed in Hiirriyet;

Suavi's political ideas will be treated in a later chapter. It will be especially interesting

to see what understanding Kemal and Ziya had of their opposition and of opposition in

the empire in general. Conforming to their writings in Istanbul many articles of the two principal Young

Ottomans were about the political situation in the empire since the beginning of the

Tanzimat. In general they criticised the interference of the European states in Ottoman

affairs and the influence of their representatives in the empire. As one of the gravest

effects of this interference Kemal and Ziya singled out the changing position of the

Christian subjects in the empire, who in the eyes of the two journalists had attained a

privileged position in present times. That this had been a relatively recent development

matched the veneration, which especially Ziya showed for Re§id Pasha in contrast to his

successors Ali and Fuad. Once again the Hatt-i HUmayun of 1856 was seen as the

watershed between good and bad reforms. 54

As also was to be expected Kemal and Ziya propagated a constitutional system (usul-I

mqveret) in their articles and tried to explain it to their readers. At the basis of such a

system would be a written constitution that would replace all the existing secular laws

and particularly the two reform decrees of 1839 and 1856. The political institutions of

the French Second Empire could serve as a model for a new institutional framework for

the Ottoman Empire. An elected legislative chamber would be complemented with an

appointed senate and a council of state. The sultan would keep his prominent position, 15 but would be subjected to the law.

54 Sungu (1940), 781-99, with many extensive quotes from HUrriyet. 11 Mardin (1962), 308-13, referring to Kemal's article 'Usul-i me§veret' in HUrriyet, 14/09/1868.


It may seem more of a surprise regarding the background of the Young Ottomans that

throughout their articles in HUrriyet Ziya and Kemal awarded religion and especially the

sharia an important position. Not only did they reject the split the Tanzimat

administration had introduced between the new secular courts and codes of law and the

original Islamic administration of justice. For Kemal in particular the sharia was the

general foundation of reform and freedom. As a consequence also the constitution

would depend on it. It was for this reason that, when in spring 1868 the High Council

was reformed and split into a Council of State (ýura-i Devlet) and a Judicial Council

(Divan-i Ahkam-1 Adliye), Kemal criticised the sultan for not linking the new institutions to the sharia. 56

This respect for Islamic contents and concepts was also reflected by the more theoretical

articles Kemal wrote for Hiirriyet. Although he was acquainted with Western political

philosophy and took some concepts like the separation of powers or the idea of the

social contract from there, he tried to integrate them into an overall Islamic framework.

For example, whereas Kemal's theory on the origin of society resembled the classical European social contract theories, his explanations regarding the origin of government

altogether relied on classical Islamic thinking. With a pledge of allegiance (biat) the

Islamic community delegated power to an imam or caliph, whose task it was to oversee the correct implementation of the sharia in the Muslim community. "

Also the relationship of the Young Ottomans towards their own opposition was still

very much entrenched in traditional concepts. Beginning with Mustafa Fazil's open letter, one of its characteristics was that it tried hard to efface its own oppositional

stance. The conventional form Mustafa Fazil chose, informing an ignorant ruler about

the true circumstances in his country, made it possible for him to criticise the

government without questioning the legitimacy of the sultan. Regarding the aim of the

letter a direct confrontation would have been unhelpful since it would have made Mustafa Fazil's return to power unlikely. Analysing the contents of the letter, Mustafa Fazil tried to transfer the formal relation of loyalty and submission, which as writer he tried to evoke with its receiver, Abdiilaziz,

onto the Turks in their relation to the sultan. In the beginning the letter describes a

political utopia set in the times of the early Ottomans where the subjection to one ruler

was freely accepted and an expression of the high moral and religious values of the

" Sungu (1940), 800-7; Mardin (1962), 313-9. 57 Cf. Mardin (1962), 293-5, referring to Kemal's article 'Wa shAwirhum f-i'l-'amr' in Hurriyet, 20/07/1868. Also cf Lewis (1960), 143-4.


Turks. The letter contrasts this form of government with the 'secular despotism' of the Byzantines - an only thinly veiled allusion to the Tanzimat administration cleverly

putting Abdiilaziz in the position of the morally impeccable early Ottoman sultans. That the present day empire did not resemble this utopia any more was the fault of a

class of clerks, who interfered in the harmonious relationship of ruler and ruled. Whereas the Christian subjects of the sultan had the option to engage in rebellion

against these oppressors, the original political pact between the Turks and their sultan

prevented the Muslims from doing so. They suffered patiently except for some 'badly

suppressed murmurs' against such oppression. These were the only forms of opposition in the absence of a public opinion, which Mustafa Fazil also seems to count among the legitimate means to react to the oppression of the administration. Under these

circumstances even a legitimate form of political action, i. e. petitioning the monarch, an

activity in which Mustafa Fazil clearly saw himself engaged in, became dangerous:

"Vos sujets [ ... I ne pouvant meme faire parvenir jusqu'aux pieds de Votre trone leurs

plaintes legitimes (car leurs tyrans verraient dans cet appel respectueux a votre pouvoir la pire des seditions)". Mustafa Fazil was able to integrate even his call for a constitutional system into this

traditional model of politics. Like in Piedmont, Austria or Prussia he wanted the

constitution to be imposed by the monarch and not demanded by the people. The limits

it would pose to the absolute power of the sultan would be the limits set by himself. 18

Naturally the Young Ottoman journalists were not under the same restraints as Mustafa

Fazil and had a different agenda from that of their mentor. However, it is interesting to

note that most of them maintained the distinction Mustafa Fazil had made between the

authority of the sultan and his administration. Only the latter was criticised as tyrannical

while there were no attacks on Abdiilaziz personally from the side of the principal two

Young Ottomans.

The most striking example how this distinction worked was Ziya Bey. Born in 1825 -

and thus belonging to the same generation as Ali and Fuad - he attended the rfiýdiye-

school in the Siileymaniye quarter in Istanbul and subsequently became part of the

circle of young officials, who were sponsored by Re§id Pasha. In 1855 Ziya was

appointed second secretary to the imperial palace and at the same time he began to

study French and began to translate French history books and parts from Rousseau's

Emile'. Ziya's rivalry with Ali first broke out when, in 1861, he sided with the new

-" Cf. Colombe (1958), 29-38. The quote comes from p. 31.


sultan against Ali's dominant position in the administration. But his subsequent attempt to intrigue against the latter backfired and he was first dismissed from the palace and then sent to administrative posts further and further away from the capital. 59

As already noted, in exile in Europe Ziya remained one of the fiercest critics of the

government. As the apogee of his personal hatred vis-a-vis Ali might be regarded the Zafemame (Account of Victory), a satirical poem, which he composed during this time

on Ali's dealing with the crisis in Crete in 1867. Moreover, many of the grievances

against his government were retrospectively treated here making it a source for the

mood prevailing in the journalistic circles in Istanbul throughout the 1860s. "

However, as much as Ziya criticised the government and the grand vizier in particular he tried very hard not to appear in opposition to his sovereign Abdiilaziz. Already in

summer 1867 when the sultan was on his visit to Britain Ziya had managed to hand over

a petition to AbdUlaziz explaining his association with the Young Ottomans. Likewise

he abstained from any direct criticism of the sultan in his articles for the HUrriyet. Even

when he advised the reform of the political institutions of the empire the position of the

sultan was exempt. One of Ziya's articles relates a conversation with Abdiilaziz the

author had in a dream while sleeping on a bench on Hampstead Heath on the topic of introducing a national assembly. In this dream Ziya assured the sultan that his power

61 would be curtailed only in so far as it was now curtailed by the precepts of the sharia. The general tendency by Young Ottomans like Ziya or Kemal to see European political institutions as a modem expression of Islamic law in this case also forbade any

alteration of the role of the ruler. But it was not only for this ideological reason that

opposition to the sultan was not a possible option. For Ziya as for Mustafa Fazil it also

made no sense from a professional standpoint. Belonging to the highest class of functionaries for them it was important to get from the sultan the additional power to be

able to defeat their enemies with whom they were competing for office.

Regarding people like Kemal, who were never part of the highest class of officials, the

reason for upholding the distinction between the sultan and his government is perhaps to

be found on a more abstract level. It is interesting to note that Kemal, although he was

59Sicill-i osmani HI, 238-9; Gibb (1900-09), V, 41-61; Mardin (1962), 337-9; Kuntay (1944-57), 1,425- 35. For the events in 1861 cf. Mehmed Memduh (1990), 41-2. On Ziya's school years cf. A§qi Dede lbrahim's account in Bremer (1959), 50-1,239-4 1. 60 Cf. Gibb (1900-09), V, 69-77,96-111. 61 Mardin (1962), 347-50. The petition was later published in Istanbul in 1909 under the title 'Cennetmekan Sultan Abdiilaziz Han'In Londra'ya Azimetinde Takdim Olunan Merhum Ziya Pa§anm Arzuhali' Also cf. Kuntay (1944-57), 1,436; the article from Hdrriyet, October 1869 'Sultan AbdUlaziz Han - Ziya Bey - Ali Pa§a'; and Lewis (1960), 139-40.


the most advanced of all Young Ottomans in developing a political theory, never dealt

theoretically with the topic of opposition. This probably was due to the fact that he

relied very much on classical Islamic political philosophy. His ideal of politics, for

example, was a state harmony, which also was a characteristic of classical Islamic

political thinking where there was never a strong tradition of the right of rebellion. Likewise Kemal never felt the necessity to think about mechanisms to divest the ruler of his power and legitimacy. 62

In this respect it would be interesting to know Kemal's attitude to earlier opposition

movements. There is an article by Kemal in HUrriyet about the Kuleli conspiracy disapproving of the means employed in this rebellion (isyan). At the same time, however, he remarked that the group also made some constructive proposals as to how

to save the state from its present condition and asked whether the authorities had the

right to judge them in the manner they did. 63 In another article about the promise made by the state in the GUlhane decree not to put anyone to death without a trial, Kemal

invoked the death of Cafer Pasha surmising that it was improbable that he threw himself

from the boat that was to bring him to the Kuleli barracks into the Bosphorus. 6'

Calling for fairness in the behaviour of the state vis-a-vis the opposition, even if it

planned to use violence to accomplish its objective, was perhaps the most modem

attitude of Kemal. He himself, however, always seems to have kept away from violence

and preferred the press as a means to propagate his political views. That this was one of Kemal's fundamental political convictions is illustrated by the events following his

return from Europe.

Because he was no politician and his opposition did not rest on personal grounds, it was

easier for Kemal to return to the empire when the group of the Young Ottomans had

finally disintegrated. In a first step Kemal disassociated himself publicly from the

HUrriyet and in August 1870 got permission from the government to return to Istanbul

where he arrived in October. There, Kemal continued to publish articles in a paper

called Diojen (Diogenes) and lbret (Admonition), whose editor in chief he became.

History seems to repeat itself. Because of his criticism of the government the paper was

closed in July 1872 and he was appointed prefect (mutasarrij) of Gallipoli. But already

in December Kemal managed to be back in Istanbul and continued to publish the lbret.

62 Mardin (1962), 295-6,305-7. 63 Hurriyet 30,18/01/1869 (old style? ), 'Innallahe ye'rndrd bil'adli vii'ihsan', partly reproduced in iAdernir (1937), 13-4. 1" Huff iyet 45,3 Mayis 1869, as quoted in Kuntay (1944-57), 11.1,690 n. 3.


Because of the disturbances surrounding his play 'Fatherland or Silistria' (Vatan yahud Silistre) the paper was again closed in April the following year and Kemal together with

the other writers of the paper, among them Nuri from the Young Ottomans as well as

their later biographer, EbUzziya Tevfik, was sent to Cyprus until he profited from an

amnesty on the occasion of the deposition of AbdUlaziz.

During his exile in Magosa (Famagusta) Kemal encountered Sheikh Ahmed, who like

other religious dissidents had to stay on the island. In his letters Nanuk Kemal

expressed veneration for the sheikh and his plight and helped him to petition the

government to be released from his exile. Kemal said nothing about his attitude to the

sheikh's radical past. However, that he must have been somewhat impressed with his

opposition showed in the fact that he called him 'imam-fil ahrar' (imam of freedom). 65

The impact of the Young Ottomans

Just like Namik Kemal the other Young Ottomans, too, found their way back to the

empire after some years. After the death of AJi Pasha in December 1870 a very

important reason for their self-imposed exile and their opposition to the government no

longer existed and it was safe for them to return. Agah came back to Istanbul in

November 1871; Ziya in the following year after a panegyric poem together with a

petition to the sultan had been successful. Also Nuri and Re§ad returned in 1872 when

they had been granted an amnesty for their implication in the activities of the Vocation

group. Most of them in time were reintegrated into the Ottoman administration. Agah first was employed in the provincial administration before he became Ottoman

ambassador to Greece in 1884/5 where he died in the following year. 66 Ziya,

immediately after his return, again held an office in the central administration and later

became pasha. Except for a collection of poems Ziya was not implicated in any

publishing activities any more before he died in 1880 as governor of Adana . 6' As has

already been said, Nuri wrote for the ibret after his return from Europe and like Kemal

was punished with exile for his political activities. Later, under Sultan AbdUlhamid H,

he was appointed scribe in the palace. Re§ad managed to become pasha and mutasarrif

of Jerusalem. 68

None of these individuals played an important political role after their return from exile

except for Namik Kemal and Ziya. In 1876 after the deposition of Sultan Abdiilazlz the

6' Kuntay (1944-57), H. 1,689-693. 66Sicill-i osmani L 393. 67Sicill-i osmani 111,238-9; Kuntay (1944-57), 1,448-65.


two were first appointed secretaries to the new Sultan Murad and later, after the

ascension of Abdfilhamid, included in the commission, which was to draft a constitution for the empire. " This came as no surprise for perhaps the most important and lasting

result of the Young Ottoman's publications in exile had been the propagation of certain

political concepts such as that of a constitution or a parliament. In 1867 the function of a constitution had been to curb the power of the Tanzimat administration embodied by Mi

Pasha. Choosing originally European institutions was an expression of the Young Ottomans cultural background being part of the Tanzimat bureaucracy, although these institutions were being justified by them in an Islamic framework.

Ten years later the task of the constitutional commission was very different. A political development that will be in the focus of the next chapter, had eradicated the sharp distinction the Young Ottomans had made between the sultan and his administration. Now it was the sultan himself, who was to be controlled. This notion was a consequent

step towards a modem understanding of a constitutional system, but a notion diametrically opposed to the traditional framework in which the Young Ottomans still had moved. So it was perhaps no surprise that such a constitution could not be

implemented. Abdiilhamid could easily fend off any attempt to have his autocratic

power curbed. There is no information as to how Kemal and Ziya as members of the drafting commission personally thought about this issue. Ottoman political culture could

adapt a constitution, but the age-old autocratic legitimacy was harder to abolish. And

thus the parliament, which was established after the constitution finally had been

promulgated in December 1876, never was the seat of an effective opposition until it

was disbanded after just two years.

68 Kuntay (1944-57), 1,376,381-93. 119 Devereux (1963), 46-51,53-9.


IV. THE COUP AGAINST ABDULAZIZ

96

The year 1876 holds a special position in the political history of the Ottoman Empire in

the nineteenth century. It not only saw the promulgation of the first Ottoman

constitution, but also the first violent exchange of sultans since the depositions of Selim

III as well as his successor Mustafa IV by rebellious troops in 1807/8.

The deposition of Abdiilaziz was not effected by any group similar to the ones I have

examined so far, but by a handful of senior officials led by Midhat and HUseyin Avni

Pashas. These men, who regarding their social standing might be best compared to Mustafa Fazil, did not stop short of taking the sultan himself as a target for their

opposition. A development in the central administration of the empire, which I will delineate in the first section, was the reason why the plotters abandoned the previous

consensus among high Ottoman officials to look for the sultan's favour as a factor

enhancing their power rather than to attack the ruler himself.

Apart from these officials two other groups will be in the focus of the following chapter. One is the softas, the students of religious sciences, whom Mahmud Celaleddin, a

contemporary Ottoman observer, counted among the traditional 'opposition groups' (cemiyet-i muhalife). Curiously, the same author also described the Society of Martyrs

as a softa movement. However, the difference between the unrest incited by the softas

and the Kuleli conspiracy will become clear when we compare the style of opposition of

these two movements. '

The other group, the one that was most important to the success of the coup against Abdiilaziz, was formed by a handful of officers. They were the first harbingers of a

growing political awareness in the Ottoman military -a process that eventually would

witness its apogee in the Young Turk revolution of 1908.

The sultan's ministers

In the 1870s the political landscape of the Ottoman Empire underwent a change, which

prepared the basis of the coup in 1876. From the death of sultan Mahmud II in 1839

onwards officials from the Porte had dominated and guided Ottoman politics. I tried to

show in the preceding chapters how the reform decree of 1839 partly served to secure

the position of the bureaucracy vis-a-vis the sultan and how first Re§id and then from

the mid 1850s Ali and Fuad Pashas had dominated the central administration of the

I Mahmud Celaleddin (1326), 1.2.3,9 1.


empire. The Kuleli conspiracy as well as the opposition of the Young Ottomans was directed against the exclusive position of the two statesmen and the secularising reforms

they had initiated. When Fuad and Ali died in 1869 and 1871 they left no apparent

successors, who could fill their dominating role in the Ottoman administration. After 30

years much of the power they possessed shifted back to the palace. AbdUlaziz was free

to accomplish what he already had tried at the beginning of his reign. He was able to

exert control over the Porte by appointing ministers from various factions and shifting them at an increasing speed. The office of the grand vizier as well as the various

councils that had been created during the Tanzimat lost much in importance during this

time. '

The first grand vizier Abdfilaziz chose after his new-won freedom to act independently

was Mahniud Nedim. Pasha. Born in 1818 he came from the same generation as Fuad

and Ali. Like the latter also Mahmud Nedim. had been among the young bureaucrats

protected by Re§id. However, he took his first steps in the administration not in the

translation bureau, but as Re§id's secretary in the grand vizierate. After some years in

the administration of the provinces Mahmud Nedirn returned to Istanbul in 1858, but his

hopes of gaining a high position in the government did not materialise; he became

minister of commerce for a short time before he was removed again after the Kuleli

affair. The fact that Mahniud Nedim's father was a Halidi sheikh might have aroused

suspicion or, at least, furnished an excuse to oust him from the government.

In 1860, apparently discouraged he asked to be transferred to Tripoli in North Africa

and spent the following seven years there as governor of the province. The fact that he

returned to the capital in summer 1867 at a time when the conspiracy of his nephew

Mehmed with the Vocation group had just been discovered, led some people to

conclude that Mahmud Nedim had been part of it. There was, however, no proof for this

allegation and this time Mahniud Nedim was able to win the favour of Ali and he was

appointed kapudan paya and stayed in office for the next three years. '

When AbdOlaziz appointed Mahmud Nedim grand vizier after Ali's death in September

1871 the sultan was said to have rejoiced that, at last, he got a first minister, who did

what he wanted. By contemporaries Mahmud Nedirn was characterised as a hypocrite

only wanting to please the sultan and secure his own advancement. 4 But there may have

been another reason why Mahmud Nedim was the ideal choice for Abdiilaziz, who

longed for a greater political role.

'Findley (1980), 222-4,242-5. Sicill-i osmani IV, 336-7; Inal (1940-52), L 259-68; Abu-Manneh (2001), 163-7,172-3.

4 Davison (1963), 281.


While in Tripoli Mahmud Nedim, disillusioned with his experiences in the central administration, wrote a treatise called 'Mirror of State' (Ayine-i devlet), giving his own interpretation of Ottoman decline. The treatise looked back to the glorious past of the

empire when its rulers still had absolute power and their will was only limited by the

precepts of religious law. Only when the sultans lost touch with their people and officials increasingly began to manage the affairs of the country it was that the decline

of the empire set in. The first signs of this decline were the numerous revolts of the Janissaries that shook the Ottoman state. The decline fully materialised in the nineteenth century and was symbolised by the imitation of Europe that started during the Tanzimat. In an interesting parallel to the critique of the Young Ottomans also Mahmud Nedim

condemned the fact that the sharia was replaced by new codes and that a new class of bureaucrats, large in number, inefficient and expensive, ruled the country. He also

criticised the idea to give equal rights to the Christian inhabitants of the empire. In

contrast he stressed the importance of justice for every subject of the sultan. According

to this picture of the golden age of the Ottoman Empire Mahmud Nedim's remedy for

these ills was to give back the political initiative to the sultan. 5

From Mahmud Nedim's behaviour it becomes apparent that he still subscribed to these

views when he became grand vizier in 1871. He seems not to have contradicted the

wishes of the sultan and on every occasion he highlighted his sovereign's personal

political supremacy. It is not important whether this behaviour resulted from his

convictions or the necessity to secure his office. The result was that the blame for the

growing chaos in the administration of the country caused by the ceaseless shifting of

officials not only was ascribed to the grand vizier himself, but necessarily also fell back

on the sultan. 6

The sultan's increasing power on expense of the bureaucracy was mirrored in the

personal hatred some high officials began to cultivate for Abdiilaziz and his grand

vizier. One of the first measures Mahmud Nedim undertook apparently in consent with

the sultan was to purge the administration from all followers and clients of Ali and Fuad. From the set of politicians punished in this way the organisers of the coup of 1876

were recruited. The outline of their careers can provide valuable information about their

growing inclination to turn against the sultan and explain their need to eventually get rid

of him altogether.

'A resurnee of the treatise, which was printed only in 1909, in Abu-Manneh (2001), 168-72. 6Davison (1963), 286.


One of the most important men sent to exile in 1871 was the serasker HUseyin Avni

Pasha. Born in 1820 as the son of a poor family in a village near isparta he got a medrese education in Istanbul. In 1837 he entered the newly founded military academy

and graduated from its general staff class as an adjutant major (kolagasi) in 1849. He

belonged to the first generation of Ottoman generals, who got a professional education in a western style military academy. '

In the following decade Hfiseyin Avni made a steep career in the army. Before the Crimean War he was on duty in the Balkans and got promoted to the general staff during the war. Afterwards he was sent to fight the rebellion in Montenegro and,

returning to Istanbul, he became president of the Military Council (Dar-i ýura-i Askeri)

and commander of the guard corps in 1863. In 1867 he was sent to Crete as governor

and two years later he was officially nominated serasker for the first time - an office he

had effectively ran for Fuad when the latter combined it with his grand vizierate from

1863 to 1866. Hiiseyin Avni headed the ministry of war until he was sent to exile to his

hometown by Mahmud Nedim. '

A second high official, who was banished for the same reasons and entered an alliance

with Hiiseyin Avni, was the minister of justice ýirvanizade Mehmed Rii§di Pasha. Born

in 1828 in Amasya as the son of a Halidi sheikh Mehmed Rii§di first pursued a career as

an alim, but for some reason he changed to the civil bureaucracy when he accompanied Fuad on his special mission to quell the rebellion in the Lebanon in 1861. With Fuad's

help Mehmed Rii§di became first a member of the High Council and in 1863 governor

of Syria. Upon his return to Istanbul after two years he continued his career at the Porte

heading several ministries. Fuad's death did not stop his career, although Mehmed

Rii§di reportedly had some problems with Ali. Only when Mahmud Nedim came to

power he was exiled to Amasya, because he had belonged to the circle of officials

working together with Ali and Fuad. 9

The third and most prominent high official in the forthcoming alliance against the sultan

was Midhat Pasha. Born in 1822 in Istanbul as the son of a judge working in the Balkan

provinces as a boy he entered the Ottoman administration as an apprentice eventually

becoming a clerk in the office of the grand vizier in 1840. In the next twenty years

Midhat advanced in the central administration, occasionally charged with special

missions to the provinces to check on the local governors and oversee the

implementation of administrative reforms. In 1859 he was president of the High Council

I Cf Onan OA 2). 8 Gencer (IA2); Mahmud Celaleddm (1326), 1.2.6,100-1. 9 sicill-i osmani H, 385; inal (1940-52), 1,436-42.


and part of the special commission investigating the conspiracy of the Society of Martyrs.

After 1861 when Midhat was promoted to the rank of vizier his career shifted fully to the administration of the provinces. First he was appointed governor of Nish and the

reform measures he enacted there were taken as a model for the reform of the provincial

make-up of the empire introduced in 1864. Subsequently Midhat was made governor of the Danube province, the first model province administered according to the new

provincial code. Brought back to the capital for a short time as president of the newly installed State Council (*ura-i Devlet), in 1868 Midhat got in conflict with Ali, who

was grand vizier at that time, and he was again transferred to the provincial

administration of Baghdad. 'O

When Midhat came back to Istanbul in summer 1872 he eventually caused Mahmud

Nedim's downfall. Sensing the unpopularity of the grand vizier with the support of the

alienated officials, who had remained in the capital, he obtained an audience with the

sultan. As a result Abdfilaziz disillusioned with Mahmud Nedim. sacked the grand vizier

and appointed Midhat instead. "

As grand vizier Midhat tried to get a grip on the problems in the central administration

with the means and attitude of a provincial governor. He not only prosecuted the

followers of Mahmud Nedim severely but also showed little regard for the wishes of the

sultan. Moreover, he opposed the influence of Khedive ismail and the Russian

ambassador Ignatiev, who in turn hatched intrigues against him. After just 80 days in

office Midhat was dismissed again.

Midhat's sudden downfall as well as that of his successors - Abdiilaziz managed to use

six grand viziers in three years - may be seen as a symbol of the general conditions of

Ottoman politics during this time. To secure their offices against the vagaries of the

sultan Midhat, HUseyin Avni and ýirvanizade Mehmed R4di formed an alliance and

initiated what in retrospective looks like a general rehearsal of the coup of 1876. This

alliance first became effective when in April 1873 Hiiseyin Avni, then serasker, and

Mehmed RO§di, minister of finance, protested with the sultan against Grand Vizier Esad

and achieved Mehmed Rii§di to be appointed in the latter's stead. "

As grand vizier Mehmed RU§di held regular meetings at his house with HUseyin Avni

and Midhat, who had been appointed minister of justice, and other cabinet ministers.

" Davison (El'); Ali Haydar Midhat (1903), 32-66. " Davison (1963), 287. 12 inal (1940-52), 1,444.


Apart from discussing the general situation of the empire, also the necessity of a

constitution and a national assembly to control the sultan was brought forward. It seems to have been Midhat, who advocated the project of a constitution and prepared a

memorandum for the sultan to that avail. If the sultan would decline to consent to the

proposed reforms, he had to be deposed and apparently there already were detailed

plans of how to realise this deposition. But when Midhat suddenly was removed from

Istanbul and appointed governor of Salonica, these plans broke down. In the end it was Hiiseyin Avni, who informed the sultan about the existence of the plot against him. Not

seeing the matter going anywhere - naturally ýirvanizade was not pressing the

execution of the plans since he had attained the highest office in the state - HUseyin

Avni decided to use his knowledge for his own aims and succeeded to be appointed

grand vizier in February 1874. "

If the allegations are true that already in 1873 the ministers plotted Abdiilaziz'

deposition, it shows that the sultan was perceived as not any longer standing above the

political factions, but as a contestant for power like everybody else. Especially

AbdUlaziz' habit to shift his ministers as often as possible in order to let none of them

grow too strong had to be a thorn in the side of any ambitious politician. The most

ambitious of them all was Hfiseyin Avni, who reportedly was driven increasingly by the

thought of revenge for his first exile in 1872. Mahmud Celaleddin, a somewhat hostile

Ottoman commentator on the events, assured that this was HUseyin Avni's only

objective and that even during the time he was grand vizier he thought of a way to

depose the sultan. 14

To sum up, from the early seventies onwards Abdiilaziz' throne was increasingly

threatened by a group of high officials formerly associated with Ali and Fuad. In 1873

there had been a first tentative attempt by this group to depose Abdiilaziz, which,

however, had been abortive, because of divisions among the plotters as well as the quick

reaction of the sultan. But only three years later, when it came to mass demonstrations

against the government on the streets of Istanbul, a new opportunity for a coup emerged.

These demonstrations were carried out by the softas, a group in the Ottoman capital that

had intervened into Ottoman politics before. As I will show in the next section they

acted on the background of the general unpopularity of the sultan's regime.

" Davison (1963), 293-5; inal (1940-52), 1,451-3; Ahmed Cevdet (1953-67), IV, tez. 40,124-5; Mahmud Celaleddin (1326), 1.2.6,102-3; SUleyman Pasha in Devereux (1979), 16. 14 Mahmud Celaleddin (1326), 1.2.6,102-3.


Popular discontent and the softa demonstrations

102

In the 1870s criticism of the sultan and his government was not only confined to the high-ranking officials of the Porte, but was also growing on a more popular level. This

was due to a crisis in the empire, which was induced by a series of natural catastrophes that were worsened by the administration's mismanagement. In summer 1873 a draught destroyed much of the harvest in parts of Anatolia and Europe and frost and heavy rain during the following winter caused conditions to deteriorate for the population of the

affected regions. The diminishing revenue added to the strain on the treasury leading to

a collapse in October 1875. The government had to announce that for four years it

would only pay half of the interest on Ottoman bonds -a measure that not only destroyed Ottoman credit on the international financial markets, but also hit the small bondholders inside the empire. 15

Entwined with the agricultural and economical downturn were political events adding to

the atmosphere of crisis in the empire and in Istanbul. In June 1875 a violent rebellion broke out among the Christian peasants of Bosnia-Herzegovina inspired by short and long-term socio-economic grievances as much as nationalistic aspirations. The Ottoman

government since August 1875 headed again by Mahmud Nedim, who had been

recalled from his post as governor of Adana, lacked the will and the financial means to

put a quick end to the rebellion. Thus the Concert of Powers started to be drawn into

what became to be known as the Great Eastern Crisis, which, eventually, would result in

another Russo-Ottoman war. In accordance to the origin of the crisis, the nationalism of the Balkan Slavs, it were foremost Austria and Russia that were engaged in the diplomatic attempts to dissolve

the problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was in both powers' general interest to smooth

over the crisis, so that two joint proposals for its solutions were publicised. Both, the

Andrassy note of December 1875 and the Berlin Memorandum of May 1876, urged the

Porte in a conventional fashion to implement refon-ns in the rebellious provinces under

the supervision of the Powers.

However, there were multiple forces preventing a speedy handling of the rebellion in a

way all Powers would have preferred. On the one hand there were circles in the Russian

administration that wanted to use the crisis for a more aggressive foreign policy playing

on Pan-Slav ideas, which had grown popular in Russian in the time after the Crimean

War. Particularly the Russian ambassador in Constantinople, Ignatiev, was an advocate

of this policy. The more public opinion in Russia made itself heard in favour of the

"Davison (1963), 301-10; Dwight (1881), 391.


rebels, the more the tsar was willing to follow this lead. Encouraged by this Russian

attitude, but with their own agenda, the rebels and the small Balkan states Serbia and Montenegro obstructed a peaceful solution. The former rejected the Andrassy note as insufficient and the latter first supported the rebels secretly and later, in July 1876,

openly declared war on the Ottoman Empire.

On the other hand, also the Porte wanted to avoid a solution that would be too damaging

regarding its sovereignty and territorial rights in the European parts of the empire. More

than ever before in Ottoman political history the government had to take into account

public opinion and therefore could not make too many concessions, neither to the rebels

nor to the Powers. In the 1870s a critical press had become a normal feature of the

political life in the capital and the authorities were trying to keep it under control. A

regular victim of suspension was the ibret, the journal Namik Kemal had started

publishing after he had come back from Europe. In 1875 the government imposed a

strict censorship regarding news about the insurrection in general and the Andrassy note in particular to avoid any awkward discussion of its conciliatory stance that was dictated

by its weakness. "

In general, Muslim public opinion in the 1870s seems to have grown more self-

conscious and hostile to European influence in the Islamic world. It was the time of

nascent Pan-Islamic feelings that were taken up by the sultan and his government, but

which in turn also created political obligations. 17 The fact that much of this new ideology developed in reaction to the Russian expansion in Central Asia and the public

perception that Mahmud Nedim was working together with Ignatiev, directly linked the

international with the domestic situation. This made the sultan and his government, both

of them already affected by the crisis at home, even more unpopular. 18

As always, it is impossible to pin down precisely the development of the ill feelings the

population especially in the capital held vis-a-vis the sultan and his government. It

seems, however, that in spring 1876 public opinion slowly reached boiling point. In

Istanbul the sultan was openly scolded by the Muslim population, because the

government had defaulted on the interest payments for the bonds due in April.

Additionally there was talk of a looming insurrection in Bulgaria, which, indeed, broke

out around 5 May. Despite the swift military reaction and a total control of any news

" Cf Times 07/08/1875,5 and 22/09/1875,10. 17 TUrk6ne (1994), 145-95. " Davison (1963), 312-4.


concerning the events in Bulgaria this caused considerable anxiety in Istanbul. So did

the murder of the German and French consul committed by a Muslim mob in Salonica. '9

The diffuse opposition in Istanbul against the government found its expression in the demonstrations the softas staged in the beginning of May 1876. To think of the softas as the natural embodiment of popular opinion like some contemporaries did, seems logical

enough . 20 There are, however, also claims that their protest was wholly organised by

Ottoman politicians like Midhat or even the grand vizier himself. 21 It is very likely that

all Ottoman politicians tried to use the softa movement for their own purposes. But, as I

like to argue in the following, regarding its programme the softa movement seems to have incorporated into its demands some genuine popular grievances that surpassed factional politics. It was on 8 or 9 May that the students at the medreses attached to Fatih Mosque

followed by their fellows of Bayezid and SUleymaniye suspended their lessons as a sign

of opposition to the regime -a behaviour, which the court-historian Ahmed Liitfi

compared to the ancient example of the Janissaries turning over their soup cauldrons. The softas then began roaming the streets of Istanbul and were reported to supply

themselves with weapons in the local shops. There were several big meetings where

patriotic speeches were held. Alluding to the situation in Bosnia and Bulgaria the

students denounced the suppression of Muslims by Christians and they stressed the

religious duty for each Muslim to oppose any statesman, who tolerated such conditions. To ensure the reform of the state and the nation (islah-i mfilk-ii millet) they demanded

the deposition of the grand vizier and the yeyhiilislam, against whom some hodjas, had

protested with the sultan earlier because of his favouritism. In Mahmud Nedim's stead Midhat or MUtercim Mehmed RU§di Pasha should be appointed. 22

On II May the softas staged two big demonstrations, one in front of the office of the

yeyhiilislam and the other in front of the Porte, to demand the resignation of Mahmud

Nedim and Hasan Fehmi. Additionally, a delegation was sent to the sultan's palace and,

negotiating with the protesters, Abd0laziz' chamberlain immediately granted all their

demands. But it was not until the next day, Friday 12 May, that Mfitercim Mehmed

19 Dwight (1881), 1-6; Times 18/05/1876,10 (this article later was published in Gallenga (1877), 11,67- 7 1); Davison (1963), 323-5. 20 Dwight (1881), 11; PRO, FO 78/2458, no. 539, Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 25/05/1876 and SUleyman Pasha in Devereux (1979), 12. 2 'For Midhat's implication see F078/2458, no. 492, Elliot to Derby, Constantinople, 12/05/1876 and Mahmud Celaleddin (1326), 1.2.6,104. For the theory that Mahmud Nedim was behind the demonstrations to discredit Nfidhat and get rid of the ýeyhfilislam see FO 78/2458, no. 543, Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 27/05/1876. Also cf. Lewis (1960), 160-1.


R0§di and Hayrullah Efendi were appointed grand vizier and ýeyhfilislam. If Mahmud

Nedirn really had a hand in exiting the students, his plan had gone utterly wrong. 23

After this sudden victory the mass meetings subsided, but the student movement stayed intact for a while. That might be an indication that now there was some organising spirit behind it, which was generally thought to be Midhat. In fact, the latter did not become

part of the cabinet until 24 May, despite the initial demand of the students. The

programme of the softas in this second phase of the movement, however, gives no clear indication as to any outside influence.

The first position in this programme took the old demand to limit the sultan's civil list. This step was to be accompanied by the creation of a General Council (ýura-i Cjmmet)

where notables of all the provinces of the empire would be represented. On top of that

the students asked for measures against oppressive officials and the punishment of the

ones responsible for the murders of the foreign consuls in Salonica. 24 According to

another source popular demands like an employment guarantee for officials and the

augmentation of the latter's wages were also included in this list. 25

The very mixed nature of these demands makes it likely that the softa movement, indeed, represented public opinion. Regarding the excitement about the insurrections in

the Balkans the student's reaction was very similar to the one at the beginning of the

Crimean War. Demands like the control of the sultan's expenses or the convocation of a

representative body sounded more modem and would not have been possible 20 years

earlier. The idea of a General Council, however, was much more conservative than the

parliament Midhat tried to implement subsequently. It was probably fed by the

generally vague understanding of constitutionalism in Ottoman public opinion at the

time. 26 If Midhat really took part in organising the student movement, his influence on its ideology was thoroughly watered down by the general understanding of politics. In

fact, in August 1876 when Midhat was earnestly preparing a constitution a group of

softas opposed his draft on the ground that it was to give equal rights to the Chfistians in

the empire. 27

22 LUtfi in Uzunqar§ili (1943), 354; Mahmud Celaleddin (1326), 1.2.3,91-2 (92-3); Times 18/05/1876,10. Mahmud Celaleddin (1326), 1.2.4,93-94; Dwight (1881), 7-11; Davison (1963), 325-6.

24 Lijtfi in Uzunqar§ili (1943), 356. Also cf. FO 78/2458, no. 512, Elliot to Derby, Constantinople, 18/05/1876, who confirmed that the softas demanded a "modified constitution". 25 FO 78/2458, no. 534, Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 25/05/1876. 26 FO 78/2458, no. 492, Mot to Derby, Constantinople, 12/05/1876; no. 512,18/05/1876; no. 534, 25/05/1876; no. 539,25/05/1876. 2' Devereux (1963), 39-40.


In summary, the particularity of the softa movement was that it was able to incorporate

so many of the public grievances into its opposition against the regime. Its success clearly was due to its capability to muster a mass of armed young participants at a time

when the regime had no soldiers at hand to quell the demonstrations. It was certainly for fear and not for a sudden appreciation of public opinion that Abdiilaziz almost immediately granted the more technical demands of the students. But as easy as it was for the students to cause a change of ministers, they needed leaders in higher positions to put into reality the demands that reached deeper into the Ottoman political system. This was the point when the alliance of ministers around Hiiseyin Avni and Midhat took

over again and, switching to a more clandestine style of opposition, deposed Sultan

AbdUlaziz.

Ministers and officers

The advent of Mahmud Nedim to the grand vizierate in late August 1875 again had

exposed the factionalism among Ottoman high officials. HUseyin Avni, who was

serasker at that time, was pushed out of the cabinet in October and appointed governor

of Bursa to keep him away from the capital. Midhat, in an unprecedented and

provocative step, handed in his resignation as minister of justice in late November,

justifying his behaviour in a memorandum with the lack of initiative of the grand vizier in the face of the internal crisis. Like Hfiseyin Avni also Midhat advocated the use of force against the rebels in Bosnia as well as a firmer stance against the interference of

the Powers. 28

In an interrogation five years later Midhat gave a very lively description of the period

when Mahmud Nedirn was grand vizier. 9 According to this description the fact that he

had been removed from power under similar circumstances as in 1872 brought HUseyin

Avni's hatred for the sultan to a peak. Midhat himself watched the crisis grow from his

country house near Istanbul to where he had retired. But all his attempts to influence the

political situation from there failed. Through an emissary he was in contact with the

valide sultan, who asked for his advice how to overcome the present crisis. His

proposals, however, to check the rebellion militarily, to govern the country in a lawful

way and to introduce true equality between Christians and Muslims, was deemed too

radical to be related to the sultan.

28 Cf. Ali HaydarNfidhat (1903), 67-8. The vakaniivis Ahmed Uitfii Efendi called the memorandum a "varaka-i §eytaniyye", cf. LUtfi in Uzunqar§ili (1943), 357. 29 Cf. Midhat's statement of 8 Mayis 1297 (188 1) in Uzunqar§ili (1987), 52-55.


In order to speak personally with Abdiilaziz Nfidhat sought support from MUtercim

Mehmed RU§di, who also had collaborated with Ali and Fuad and had been grand vizier from 1866 to 1867 and again for five months after Midhat had been dismissed from this

office in October 1872. Mehmed Rii§di was said to be a very cautious and conservative

politician and therefore declined Midhat's approach. Soon, however, he was to become

the new principal ally of Midhat and HUseyin Avni, in a way replacing his namesake ýirvanizade, who had died in 1874 while governor of the Hijaz.

Among the other contacts Midhat maintained during his time out of office probably

were Hilseyin Avni and other Ottoman politicians and ulema as well as the British

ambassador Elliot. The latter claimed that from December 1875 he knew of Midhat's

constitutional plans to limit the absolute power of the sultan especially in financial

matters and to create a parliament constituted of delegates from all parts of the Ottoman

population. 'o

It is not likely that during winter 1875/6 either Hfiseyin Avni or Midhat undertook any

concrete steps planning for the forthcoming coup against AbdUlaziz. But Midhat's

opposition against the sultan was growing more and more pronounced as showed an

anonymous memorandum issued on 9 March 1876. The document was written in

French and signed by a group of 'Muslim patriots', but probably had been actually

composed by Midhat himself. " The main aim of the memorandum was to influence

international public opinion in favour of Midhat's faction and to ask for support from

the European ambassadors for his political programme. Quite frankly the author of the

document played with the possibility to depose AbdUlaziz, who was called a 'miserable

fou'. A deposition was not only wished for by the general public, but would also be

legitimate, because the sultan was not in possession of his full mental capacity any more

and violated the sharia that gave him the duty to work for public good. According to the

document AbdUlaziz' officials plundered the country and were responsible for its

catastrophic financial situation. Like Mustafa Fazil's open letter also the memorandum

of the Muslim patriots advocated a representative assembly as a solution for the

empire's problems. In the latter's opinion this assembly would act as a counterweight

not solely to the administration, but to the absolutism of the sultan. 32

A further step towards the realisation of the deposition imagined and legitimised in the

memorandum was made after the fall of Mahmud Nedim's government on 12 May.

Elliot (1888), 279-80. 31 On the question of authorship cf. Davison (1963), 320. 32 'ne text of the memorandum in Staatsarchiv 30 (1877), no. 5642,213-9.


Together with MUtercim Mehmed Rii§di's appointment to the grand vizierate and Hayrullah's to the office of ýeyhfilislam, HUseyin Avni was recalled from Bursa and took over the war ministry again. One week later after ongoing pressure from the softas

also Midhat was taken into the cabinet as minister without portfolio. Now all the

principal leaders of the future coup were assembled in the government and their

motivation to oust AbdUlaziz seems to have been intensified by the rumour that, after the excitement would have subsided, Mahmud Nedim would be made grand vizier

again. "

According to all available information it was HUseyin Avni, who first urged his

colleagues to take the final step, and it was he, who then undertook much of the actual

planning for the realisation of the coup. Midhat, in the interrogation already quoted

above, said that at first he had warned the seraskei- and only had consented to the deposition plan when he realised that it had become so general a topic - he said that

there was no one among the ministers and ulema, who was not pleased with the thought

- that he could not resist any more. Midhat also claimed that, while he was again

negotiating with the valide sultan about the implementation of a reform programme, HUseyin Avni started to organise the particularities of the coup and created a fait

accompli. "

Surely Midhat exaggerated his opposition to the deposition plan in order not to

incriminate himself. In reality, however, he seems to have opposed rather the way the

deposition was to be carried out than the plan itself. Midhat envisioned a huge popular

demonstration to precede the deposition to give some democratic credentials to the

plot. " Maybe it was also his idea to obtain a fetva from the yeyhfilislam allowing the

deposition in order to keep the coup in the formal limits of Islamic law. HOseyin Avni,

in turn, did not care for thiS. 36 In accordance with his background he stressed the

military side of the operation and he introduced a couple of young officers to the plot,

who proved vital for its success. To one of these officers, Sfileyman Pasha, we owe the 37 most detailed account of the coup titled 'Feeling of revolution' (Hiss-i inkilab). Before

I will describe the circumstances of the coup according to SUleyman's account in the

next section, I would like to introduce this group of officers and their motives to take

part in it.

33 Saleyman Pasha in Devereux (1979), 14; Mahmud Celaleddin (1326), 1.2.6,105-6. 3' Uzunqar§ili (1987), 54-55. 3' Ali Haydar Midhat (1903), 8 3. 36 SWeyman Pasha in Devereux (1979), 16.


Approximately at the time of the beginning of the softa strike SUleyman Pasha, the director of the Ottoman military academy, had a conversation with a couple of his

colleagues, most of them majors of the Imperial Guard Regiment. He was sounding out, if they would be willing to participate with the troops under their command in a coup to depose Abdiilaziz. SUleyman's resentment of the sultan and his favourites had been

growing over the last years and his determination to undertake such a coup had

hardened after the insurrections in Bosnia and Bulgaria, which in his opinion had cost the lives of too many innocent Muslims. Since he commanded only 300 military

students he needed the support of real troops to carry out such an operation. 31

Apart from the sultan's ministers and the softas these officers around SUleyman Pasha

form the third group that was necessary for the successful realisation of the coup against Abdillaziz. Their leader, SUleyman Pasha, was an interesting figure in that he combined

a military background with strong liberal and constitutionalist convictions. He was the

example of a new social type in the ranks of Ottoman opposition, which in future would dominate that field.

Born in Istanbul in 1838 Siileyman Hi1snii entered the military preparatory school in

Mat9ka in 1852 and graduated from the military academy in 1859 as a second lieutenant. Subsequently he started active duty in Bosnia and Albania and advanced

through the ranks, before he returned to Istanbul in 1863 and a year later was made

adjutant major. In 1866 he was sent to Crete as commander of a battalion. Upon his

return to the capital three years later he was appointed teacher for literature to the

Military academy on the merit of his translation of an Arabic treatise into Turkish. After

an interval on duty in Yemen Sifleyman resumed his post at the military academy whose director he became in 1873 being promoted to the rank of a brigadier general (mirliva).

As director Siileyman first of all brought the curriculum of the military academy in line

with similar European institutions and founded a military rfiýdiye as a preparation for

the academy proper. Additionally he introduced new textbooks some of them written by

himself. He also tried to extend his educational reforms to other parts of society. Therefore he wrote several works of general interest, among others a history of the

world, an Islamic catechism for children and a Turkish grammar, and pursued the

project of introducing the teaching of sciences to the medreses.

SUleyman was known to have held liberal views - he frequented the salon of

Abdurrahman Sami Pasha, the grandfather of the Young Ottoman Ayetullah - and was a

supporter of constitutional rule for the empire. Stressing education as a means to cause

" For the history of its edition and a translation cf. Devereux (1979).


the progress of the Muslim peoples Sifleyman's views were in line with that of the Young Ottomans, it is, however, very doubtful, if he really was a member of the Young

Ottoman society as sometimes was claimed. "

SUleyman and his colleagues were an example of a new development in the Ottoman

military, which would in future make a certain type of officer figure very prominently

as a dissident to the regime. " As we have seen, from 1826 when the new army was founded on the ruins of the Janissaries on the one hand it entertained a special

relationship to the sultan that still reflected the traditional Ottoman military tradition. One of Mahmud's first objectives had been to create an army loyal to him and also the later sultans saw in the military a natural ally against the encroachment on their power by the civil bureaucracy.

On the other hand the army like the Porte became an independent institution in the Tanzimat state. It was the educational efforts, which exemplified the nature of the army

as a Tanzimat institution best. After a phase when students were sent to Europe to

acquire military knowledge, in the end of the thirties a couple of schools, the military

academy, a military engineering school and a medical school, were established to

produce the professional staff the military needed to keep up with modernisation. The

system of military schools was gradually expanded until in 1875 it also comprised the

elementary riiydiye-level and middle schools (idadiye). "

The first students started graduating from these special schools in the late forties. In the

beginning they were a minority and according to one report they were mocked and not

employed as to their abilities by their traditionally minded officers . 4'This probably was

the first observation of the rivalry between the traditional officers risen from the ranks

(alayh) and the ones educated in the new schools (mektebli), which was to become a

standard feature of the Ottoman officer corps up to the time of the 1909

counterrevolution. Apart from their professional military knowledge the education in the new schools also

induced the new officers with new political ideals. It was no longer the person of the

sultan they owed their loyalty, but the fatherland and the nation. SUleyman Pasha's

account of the deposition of AbdUlaziz contains many examples of this new political

SUleyman Pasha in Devereux (1979), 11-3. med by 39 Cf. Devereux (1979), 5-8 and Suleyman in ibid., 13,15. The Young Ottoman connection is clai

Mahmud Celaleddin (1326), 1.2.6,109-10. 40 Many of the following points are treated in Turfan (2000), 49-129. On the 1876 coup especially 59-61. 410zcan 02). 42 FO 195/440, no. 39, Williams to Stratford de Redcliffe, Camp near Kars, 23/10/1854.

Opposition to the Tanzimat State III

consciousness and rhetoric. One passage where he describes his and his fellow officers'

motives may suffice to illustrate this point.

In any case, nationalist ideas were well established among the Academy's officers and students. In short, neither the War Minister nor a commander called these battalions and students into action; rather, they were ordered and aroused by the patriotic sentiments that filled the consciences of all. And SUleyman Pasha was the living personification of those patriotic sentiments. "

In the following decades there would be many more examples of this new political

consciousness especially from the side of the students of the military schools of the

capital. As part of the Young Turk movement these students directed their opposition

against Abddlhan-ýd and his neo-patrimonial understanding of his authority.

The coup of 30 May

The group of young officers from the military academy and other units in Istanbul was linked to the clique of ministers when Redif Pasha, the president of the Military

Council, approached his friend Siileyman Pasha after he himself had been taken into

confidence by HUseyin Avni. SUleyman, who already had toyed with the thought of a

coup, responded favourably to Redif's proposals and two meetings between him and the

serasker were arranged. One took place on Friday, 26 May, in HUseyin Avni's yall, the

other on the following Saturday in the military academy. At these meetings Sfileyman told HUseyin Avni about his own preparations for the coup

and dispersed the latter's doubts about the loyalty of the army towards Abdiilaziz.

According to SWeyman the rift in the army between officers trained in the palace and

those from the military academy was not important for the success of the coup. Even the

former did not support the sultan any more and they could be easily bypassed.

Eventually the serasker was convinced and went to consult his ministerial colleagues.

Midhat and Kayserili Ahmed Pasha, the kapudan paya, already had been informed and

now also Grand Vizier Mehmed RU§di, ýeyhfilislam Hayrullah as well as the kaziasker

Kara Halil Efendi and his colleague ýirvanizade Ahmed Hulusi Efendi, the brother of

ýirvanizade Mehmed RU§di, were given notice of the forthcoming coup. JA

The final decisions on the execution of the coup were taken on Sunday, 28 May again in

Hiiseyin Avni's yah at Pa§ahmam near UskUdar. In between the three officers present at

this meeting, the sei-asker, the kapudan paya and the director of the military academy, it

43 Suleyman in Devereux (1979), 27. " Sdleyman in Devereux (1979), 12-4,16.


was agreed that on the following Wednesday, 31 May, Prince Murad would be taken from his quarters and brought to the war ministry, while Sifleyman and his battalions

would surround Dolmabah9e Palace where Abdiilaziz was staying. In the war ministry in Istanbul the oath of allegiance (biat) to the new sultan would then be sworn by the

members of the cabinet. On Monday, while briefing his friends about the deposition and procuring ammunition for the events scheduled for Wednesday, SUleyman was informed that the plan had been

brought forward to the following day. Apparently the ýeyhfilislam had objected, because

his daily horoscope showed an unfavourable entry on the original date. SUleyman was

charged to pass the news on to Midhat so that Murad could be infon-ned. At a meeting in Midhat's house the task to give notice to the crown prince was assigned to Ziya Bey,

the former Young Ottoman, who was in contact with Capoleone, Murad's personal doctor. The question how to get Murad from his quarters in Dolmabahqe Palace to the

war ministry seems to have caused the most complicated negotiations in the planning of the coup. Ideally, since the crown prince had been set under house arrest because of

serious rumours regarding a forthcoming coup, Murad had to sneak out of his

apartments without causing a great sensation. " Murad and his councillors, however,

insisted that it was necessary that he would be taken by a unit of soldiers from his

quarters so that, in case the coup would fail, he would be able to claim that he was

yielding to force-46

The deposition plan once more was thrown into disarray when, again on Monday,

HUseyin Avni got a message from the palace to meet the sultan the same evening or the

next morning. Sure that the plot had been discovered and that at the audience he would

be dismissed as serasker, HOseyin Avni immediately convoked an emergency meeting

in his yah for the same evening. After an anxious discussion Redif and SUleyman were

able to convince HUseyin Avni to stick to the plan, but to move the time of its execution from eleven o'clock a. m. to three o'clock in the early morning of Tuesday, 30 May. In

order to make the necessary preparations and inform the other ministers of the change of

plan Sfileyman and three of HUseyin Avni's adjutants made their way back across the

Bosphorus and Sfileyman reached the military academy at around 11.30 at night. The

next few hours he spent in preparations and discussions with his friends from the

neighbouring Ta§kl§la barracks as well as his fellow officers from the military academy.

One of the former, who was assumed to be a partisan of the palace, was put under arrest,

" FO 78/2458, no. 535, Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 25/05/1876. 46Suleyman in Devereux (1979), 17-8,27.


all the others were sworn in on the plot. At two o'clock in the morning Sifleyman let the

officers perform their prayers and ordered the students of the academy to be turned out,

given ammunition and take position in front of Murad's palace. Next, Silleyman went to the Ta§ki§la barracks to summon the four battalions under the

command of his friends with whom he had originally discussed the sultan's deposition.

These battalions were ordered to take position in front of Dolmabahýe palace and

prevent anybody from entering or leaving the place. Neither the cadets nor the soldiers

of the four battalions were told what they were involved in. Many thought that Abdiilaziz had suddenly died and they were guarding his palace. After the soldiers had taken their positions, shortly after three o'clock in the morning before sunrise, Siileyman entered Murad's quarters, which lay on the far side of Dolmabahqe palace towards Be§ikta§. 'fhe crown prince had never seen the officer and

so it took some time before Murad consented to leave with Siileyman. At that moment, by chance HUseyin Avni's carriage arrived and took over the future sultan to bring him

to the ministry of war. Until then nobody had noticed that there was something unusual

going on. Some of Abdiilaziz' servants, who had seen Murad been taken away by

soldiers, thought that he had been arrested. "

When HUseyin Avni arrived with Murad at the ministry of war almost the whole cabinet

was assembled there. Midhat, the grand vizier and Hayrullah had come directly from

HUseyin Avni's house where they had been informed that the deposition had been

brought forward to the early morning hours. In the ministry of war the deposition fetva

was read by Hayrullah stating that Abdiilaziz was wasting the resources of the country

and that he had lost his common sense and was no longer fit to rule. Then the biat was

made and Murad V. became the new Ottoman sultan. 48

Abdiilaziz only learned of his deposition together with the inhabitants of the capital

when the warships on the Bosphorus, which had been guarding the seaside of the

palace, began firing their canons. According to all accounts the sultan immediately

grasped the meaning of the noise and resolved in his fate. Together with his two sons,

his wives and his mother he was taken to Topkapi Palace by SUleyman. '

In contrast to their ruler the inhabitants of the quarters along the Bosphorus were thrown

into panic when they first heard the sound of guns in the early morning hours. They

assumed the Russian fleet had come to Istanbul, but in the course of the morning the

47 SiileyMan in Devereux (1979), 19-26. 4' Ali Haydar Midhat (1903), 82-5; Liitfl in Uzungarph (1943), 359-60. 49 Suleyman in Devereux (1979), 29-30; Ldtfi in Uzunqar§ili (1943), 363-4.


news of the exchange of sultans transpired. At first the public seems to have been very careful with any display of emotions, but as the day wore on a general feeling of relief

and joy took over. It was assumed that now a new era of peace and liberty would begin. 'O

Meanwhile the transition of power was completed with Murad moving into Dolmabahqe

Palace. Upon arrival the new sultan was hailed by the soldiers, who had brought him to

the throne, and a second biat-ceremony was held in the palace. Also new appointments for various government offices were made; among others Ziya became chief secretary

of the palace and Capoleone hekimbaýi or imperial doctor. "

From Murad to Abdiilhamid

There had been no immediate problems in the transition of power from the old to the

new sultan, but already in the first week after Murad's enthronement the different

agendas of the officials, who had brought him to power, came to light. The decree

traditionally issued on the occasion of a new sultan's ascension disregarded Midhat's

demand that Murad should make a clear promise for the promulgation of a constitution. It was foremost Mehmed Rii§di and Hiiseyin Avni, who had been against such a project

and prevented any step in this direction. Regarding the more general reasons on which

the opposition against Abdiilaziz had rested only the financial problems of the empire

were addressed. Then, on 15 June, a bloody incident suddenly altered the balance of power in the

cabinet. (ýerkes Hasan, an army captain, ambushed a cabinet meeting and managed to

kill Hiiseyin Avni and the foreign minister Re§id Pasha. This assassination never was

cleared up sufficiently and it remains dubious, whether it was a political murder at all or

rather an act of private revenge - the reason why I will exclude it from my sample of

events of opposition. For all its doubtful circumstances the consequences of the murder

were considerable. On the one hand Midhat was able to push through his constitutional

project without any significant opposition. On 15 July the Grand Council took the

decision to elaborate a constitution for the empire against the doubts of some ulema. 52

On the other hand the violent disruption of Ottoman politics seems to have profoundly

disturbed Murad. The suicide of his uncle Abdiilaziz just six days after his deposition

for the first time had exposed Murad's metal instability, which grew even more severe

50 Dwight (1881), 17-9. 51 Liitfi in Uzunqar§ili (1943), 364. 52 Devereux (1963), 37-8.


after the attack on the cabinet. When Murad's state of mind did not alter in the

following weeks this began to pose a real problem for the running of the empire in

general as well as for the progress of Midhat's constitutional project in special. The

precedent of Abdiilaziz' deposition made it easier to come to the conclusion that also Murad had to be exchanged for his brother and heir apparent AbdUlhamid Efendi.

Before a final decision was taken and Murad like his uncle AbdUlaziz was declared unfit

to rule, Midhat tried to ensure that Abdiilhamid would consent to his plans. The prince duly assured that he would work for the implementation of a constitution and was

51 declared sultan on I September 1876.

Because Abdiilhamid, indeed, formally kept his promise and created a commission to

draw up a draft of the future constitution, the immediate opposition to his rule came from the conservative side. When Midhat investigated the origin of posters speaking

against the constitution and gossip being spread about the refonners among the ulema, a

small but high-ranking conspiracy was detected in the end of October. Because many of its members came from the class of ulema, at first the sultan seems to have been

reluctant to act tough as the cabinet demanded. Only when his ministers threatened to

step down, AbdUlhamid agreed to deal with the plotters. Less than twenty persons were

arrested, stripped of their rank and were then summarily exiled. "

All that we know about the goals of this conspiracy are rumours, since there had been

no formal trial of the suspects and no other documents seems to have survived. That its

ideology was based in the religious opposition against the constitution, however, can be

inferred from the persons involved in it. The main instigators were two high-ranking

former Islamic judges (kaziasker), one Muhyiddin and one ýerif Efendi. " In the

beginning, together with Ramiz Pasha, a former beylerbey, they had openly opposed the

idea of a constitution and only later had switched to their conspiratorial methods.

The fact that both Muhyiddin as well as *erif had been heavily linked to Abdiilaziz and

that their advancement now was blocked, seems to have further fuelled their opposition.

Muhyiddin had been the tutor of Yusuf izzeddin, the eldest son of AbdUlaziz, and it was

claimed that the ultimate goal of the plot was to bring him to power. 56 Also other high

functionaries like Kamil Bey, a former steward of Kibnsli Mehmed Pasha, and Riza

Bey, connected to Abdiilaziz' last grand vizier Mahmud Nedim, may have joined the

53 Devereux (1963), 38-42. 'Mahmud Celaleddin (1326), 1.3.3,190-4; inal (1940-52), 1,367. Cf also the notice in the press Stamboul 23/10/1876; Levant Herald 23/10/1876; Times 26/10/1876,3.

Sicill-i osmani IV, 347-8. FO 78/2466, no. 1194, Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 25/10/1878.


conspiracy to improve their career prospects by a change of sultans. Also ýerif Efendi

might have had such a motive. In the crisis of May 1876 caused by the softa protests he

had been Mahmud Nedim's candidate for the office of ýeyhfilislam, which, however,

then went to Hayrullah. 57

As could be seen before, also this plot was partly fuelled by exterior events. If we believe the report of the British dragoman, a second immediate goal of the plotters apart from preventing the promulgation of a constitution was to carry on the war against Serbia and Montenegro. The two countries had declared war against the empire in the

end of June 1876 and had been beaten before the Powers had halted the advance of the Ottoman army in mid September. 58

The Muhyiddin conspiracy, however, was not typical for the early opposition against AbdUlhamid, especially regarding the fact that it was initiated by partisans of Abdiilaziz.

In the following years the opposition to his rule rather came from the side of the friends

and family of Murad. The extraordinary circumstances of Murad's deposition first left

his followers in shock, but subsequently rumours that he had regained his health were a

constant incentive to contest his younger brother's right to the Ottoman throne.

The first attempt in this direction occurred in early December 1876 when the guards of (ýirag'an Palace where Murad was staying arrested four suspicious men. Disguised as

women they had tried to enter the palace, but had been recognised. Among them was a former employee of the British embassy, Stavrides, who had been dismissed for

corruption, 59 a Pole and two Turks. Apparently they had planned to free Murad from the

palace and subsequently remove him from Istanbul. The question of who was behind

this plan, however, remains mysterious. According to one rumour prince Kemaleddin

Efendi, a brother of Murad, was involved in the planning to bring the ex-sultan by night

aboard an English ship waiting in the Bosphorus. According to another of these rumours

the Russian embassy was behind the plan and wanted to bring Murad to Odessa. This

was the version given by the suspects themselves when they were questioned after their

arrest, which, however, was not taken seriously by the British ambassador Elliot . 60 A

third version ascertained that it was Murad's elder son Salahaddin Efendi, who wanted

" Cf. Times 12/05/1876,5 and Mahmud Celaleddin (1326), 1.2.4,93-4. 58FO 78/2466, no. 1194, Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 25/10/1878. 59 FO 197/37: Registers 1876, correspondence with FO, no. 275,11/03. The original despatch is missing. 60 Cf. FO 78/2467, no. 1336, Elliot to Derby, Constantinople, 06/12/1876 and no. 1342,07/12/1876.


to flee from the palace in this way. The Times even mused that it was AbdWhamid 61 himself, who had set this plot in scene to compromise Murad and his followers .

Not only for the general lack of sources it is hard to give any of these interpretations of

the real background of the event preference over the others. Another reason is that all of

them come from persons themselves implicated in the political game. For its shadowy

character the Stavrides affair, however, was very typical for the early opposition against Abdiilhamid carried out in the name of his brother Murad. In the focus of the last two

chapters of my study will be two similar groups trying to bring Murad back to power.

11 Cf. Uzunqar§tli (1944c) for the different versions as well as Times II and 12/12/1876 and YEE 22/85, 18 Za 1293.


V. THE USKUDAR SOCIETY

118

The most significant incident in the early opposition against Abdillhamid was the riot that took place in front of 1ý-iragan Palace in May 1878. This act of political violence

was in many ways linked to events discussed earlier in this study. It was planned and

staged by a secret society - called the Vsk0dar Society in the secondary literature -, whose president and founder was Ali Suavi, the political exile and editor of the first

Young Ottoman journal, the Muhbir.

After presenting the details of the ý-'irakan incident much of the following chapter will deal with Suavi's biography. In order to get a notion of the motives for his opposition

against Sultan Abdiilhamid, I will examine the political theory he had expressed while in exile in Europe and in the time after he had returned to the empire. In part his

political attitudes resembled that of the other Young Ottomans, in part they were an individual expression of Suavi's different background and experiences. However, apart from Suavi's personality there are also more general elements, which

need to be looked at in explaining the 1ý-iragan incident. In the last section of this chapter I will examine the role the Muslim refugees played in the history of opposition in the

time of the Tanzimat and especially in Suavi's opposition. As 1will show, the refugee

question is linked to the external legitimacy of the empire and its religious justification.

We will see how the damages done to this legitimacy could become the source for

opposition against Sultan Abdiilhamid.

The Iýirag'an incident

One of the first people to know of the incident at qiragan Palace apart from the

participants themselves probably was Hasan Pasha, head of police at Be§ikta§. At

around three o'clock Turkish time (11 o'clock in the morning), when he got to his

police station, there was an officer waiting to inform him that in front of ý, Iirag-an a

group of refugees was making trouble. As he set out for the palace with some men he

was further informed that the rioters had broken the gate and entered the gardens of the

palace. When Hasan arrived at the scene he was directed by wailing palace servants to

the second floor. There he came upon ex-sultan Murad supported on each side by a

bearded man and surrounded by others shouting 'Long live Sultan Murad! ' Identifying

the man on the ex-sultan's right side as the leader of the party Hasan drew a stick he had

taken earlier from a guard and hit the man's head. The policemen, who had come up the

stairs together with Hasan, attacked the other men in the room throwing two of them


from the windows and wounding or killing several others with their guns. Later the rest

of the party was killed or arrested in the garden by the soldiers, who had secured the

gate of the palace. '

The information the earliest articles in the press gave to the public about these events as

well as the first reports in the diplomatic correspondence were very similar to the eye

witness report recounted above. The short notice the correspondent of the Times sent to his newspaper on the afternoon of 20 May depicted the events at 1ý, irakan Palace as a

riot of Turkish refugees from the Balkans, who had swamped the streets of Istanbul due

to the war with Russia. Likewise the telegram the British ambassador Layard sent to London at around six p. m. tried to play down the incident and spoke of "a deputation of

about 100 refugees [who] wished to penetrate into Chiraghan Palace on the plea of

presenting a petition to the reigning Sultan" .2 Soon, however, a detail concerning the riot at Cirag-an was revealed, which gave a new twist to the events. Already in his second and more comprehensive report

communicated in the evening of the same day the Times correspondent was able to tell

his readers that the person identified as the instigator of the riots was Ali Suavi, the

former director of the school at the Galata Saray, who had been killed in the incident.

Since Suavi was known to be a partisan of the ex-sultan Murad, according to the

correspondent of the Times, there seem to have been more people involved in the events

at Cira'an than was apparent to the eyes. ' 9 Also Layard in his second report gave much more importance to the incident and

stressed the agency of Suavi, who was not unknown to him. In his opinion Suavi had

tried to restore Murad to the Ottoman throne using the desperate situation of the

refugees assembled in the capital. 4

The first official statement of the Ottoman government seems to have been a telegram

the Ottoman foreign secretary Safvet Pasha sent to the representatives of the Porte in

Europe. It admitted Suavi's authorship of the riots and was eager to assure that the

government had everything under control. ' A more comprehensive report was published

the next day (21 May/19 Cemaziyiilevvel) in the press explaining the events to the

public. In this report it was officially confirmed that it was Ali Suavi, who had

instigated and led the attack on (; irag-an Palace. The article carefully avoided to mention

' Cf. Hasan's report three days after the events, BOA, YEE 23/26 and Uzunqar§iLi (I 944a), 111-2. 2 PRO, FO 78/2811, no. 494, Layard to Salisbury, Therapia 20/05/1878. 'Levant Herald 21/05/1878; Times 22/05,7; 24/05,5 and 29/05/1878,5. 4 FO 78/2788, no. 657, Layard to Salisbury, Therapia, 21/05/1878. ' FO 78/2884, Safvet to Musurus, Constantinople, 20/05/1878; Safvet, Pera, 20/05/1878, in: ýIrn§ir (1968-89), 1,458.


Suavi's goal to re-instate Murad as sultan and instead spoke only of his 'long

established inner baseness' (minelkadim caygir-i zamir-i habaset semiri olan mefsedeti)

as being the motive for his actions. Additionally a further investigation and the trial of the culprits of the members of the 'cemiyet-ifesadiye', which was said to be behind the

events was announced. 6 As we will see below the procedure of the authorities to deal

with the conspiracy had not changed significantly since the time of the Kuleli incident.

At the time Hasan Pasha was on his way to 1ý-irag-an the sound of gunshots being heard

at Yildiz Palace where Abdfilhamid was residing had thrown the court into utter

confusion. It was believed that there was a great popular uprising against the sultan to

reinstate his brother and the palace servants prepared for the last stand against the

rebels. Only later when Hasan Pasha, who just had dispersed the refugees, arrived at Yildiz to give his first oral report the real circumstances of the events became known.

Immediately a commission was created to investigate the origins of the disturbances. '

This commission was headed by the sultan's chief secretary (baýkatib) Said Pasha and

comprised among other officials the minister of police Mehmed Pasha. Even the sultan

himself was said to have taken part in the questioning of the arrested suspects, which

had begun immediately in a big tent set up in the gardens of Yildiz. 1 On 30 May the

final report of this commission was completed. Apparently Ali Suavi, the instigator of

the events, some months ago had founded a secret society that met in his house in

UskUdar. The refugees, who had made up the bulk of the participants in the riot at

1ý-irag'an, generally had not been members of this society and claimed not to have known

of Suavi's aims at all. The society's members rather were drawn from among Suavi's

friends and admirers. Three of them, Arnavut Salih, Haci Ahmed and Molla Mustafa,

or had been killed in the fighting at qira, ýan. There were, however, a handful of other Z! ý

suspects, whose names were mentioned on a list found in Suavi's pocket after his death.

The commission extended its investigations to these persons, but since no other incriminating documents could be found neither at Suavi's house - apparently his wife had burned all papers before the police could lay hand on them --ý nor in the houses of

the other suspects, all findings of the commissions remained uncertain and entirely

rested on the credibility of the statements given in the interrogation.

Altogether there were seven persons, who were accused to have been members of the

'Quoted in Uzunqar§ih (1944a), 90-1. A French version appeared in La Turquie cf. FO 78/2788, no. 657, Layard to Salisbury, Therapla, 21/05/1878.

Cf ingiliz Said Pasha's diary as quoted in Uzunqar§ih (1944a), 88-90. 'Cf Times, 24/05/1878,5. 9 Uzunqar§ili (1944a), 92.


Oskiidar Society, but had not been implicated directly in the events at ý-'irakan. It is hard

to say anything certain about them; some came from families of the Ottoman bureaucracy like the poet SUleyman Asaf Bey, the son of a certain izzet Pasha, 10 or like Sijleyman, son of the mutasarrif of Basra. " Among the members of Suavi's secret society there also was a strong presence of people originating from the Balkans, like Filibeli Ahmed Pasha, his son in law Hafiz Nuri and one Hask6yld Haci Mehmed. We do not know when they had come to Istanbul, but it is probable that they were in contact with the refugees from their home region. Another important member of Suavi's circle seems to have been one VskUdarli Nuri,

who, being a former servant of Murad, stood accused of having acted as an intermediary

between Suavi and the ex-sultan. According to the statement of the other suspects there had been an exchange of letters between the two in which Suavi had informed Murad

about his aims. It is hard to say, whether there were really any direct contacts between

Suavi and Murad, since the witnesses had to admit that they never had seen the letters in

question. Officially the Ottoman government suppressed this grave accusation and the

sultan personally gave the assurance to the British ambassador that his brother had been

ignorant of the plot. Likewise, the affirmation of the suspects that Suavi entertained

contacts with the British government is dubious. If there had been any such contacts, no traces of them were left in the official correspondence. "

Unlike friends and acquaintances of Suavi, who stood accused to have been members of the secret society, another group of people was suspected to have known of the plot beforehand. As already reported in the press there were rumours that behind Suavi's

attempt there was a much larger conspiracy of Murad's supporters among the officials

of the capital. In the days after the events there seems to have been quite a few

denunciations, which the commission subsequently investigated. One of the most

prominent people named in the report was the kapudan pap lbrahim Pasha and the

captain of the steamship Mesudiye Hasan Hiisnii Pasha, who - as the unspoken

accusation was - at the time of the events were cruising in front of the palace to assist

the rebels. These two, however, as well as the other officials, who were named in the

report, could not directly be linked to the conspiracy. "

Other officials, who were dealt with outside the commission, were less fortunate. After

" It remains unclear, if this was the serasker of the time or, as inal (1940-52) 11,765 claims, Koca Hakkipaz§azade Ahmed izzet Pasha, the former vali of Hddavendigar. " And the father of Mahmud ýevket Pasha, cf. Uzunqar§ili (1944a), 92. 12 FO 78/2789, no. 688, Layard to Salisbury, Therapia, 30/05/1878. 13 These were Nusret Pasha, M]Lrahur Mustafa Pasha, former istabl-i amire, and Mehmed Bey, cf. Hasan HdsnU*s report of 09 Mayis 1294 in YEE 23/37 and Uzunqar§ili (1944a), 111-3.


the event there was the usual reshuffle in the cabinet. The highest-ranking victim was the grand vizier Sadik Pasha. Apart from the fact that he had not been able to detect

Suavi's conspiracy in advance he had not reacted quickly enough when it occurred and, as a consequence, he was suspected by Abdiilhamid to have been part of it. Very shortly

after the events, on 26 Cemaziyiilevvel/28 May, he had to give back the seal of office. "

A third group of people questioned by the commission about their contacts to Suavi

were Murad's palace servants. But also in their case no certain connection to Suavi

could be established. This was also the case with Ali, the editor of the newspaper Basiret. As the commission had found out, a letter of Suavi Ali had printed in his paper the day before the events at (; irag-an apparently had served as a secret message to Suavi's followers to strike the next day. Ali, however, claimed to be innocent and it is

impossible to say, if he really did not know what he was printing-`

After the real instigators and background of the conspiracy had been investigated the

culprits were handed over to a court martial, which was responsible to deal with any disturbances of public order since Istanbul had been put under the state of siege in May

1877.11 The court, which sat under the chairmanship of Alyanak Mustafa Pasha, a

former governor of 1§kodra, reconsidered the statements of the suspects and issued its

judgements successively in June and the beginning of July. All judgements were

pronounced according to articles 55,57 and 58 of the Ottoman penal code on the inner

security of the empire. 17

The sentences concerning the members of Suavi's inner circle were passed on 1

Cemaziyiilahir (2 June). " One of the members, Hafiz Nuri, was condemned to death,

because he was believed to have been involved in the planning of the coup and on the

day of its execution he had been seen disguised as a Balkan refugee in the vicinity of

1ýiragan. 19 For a lesser degree of involvement Nuri's father in law Ahmed Pasha, a

certain Haci Mehmed Aga and one Hafiz Ali Efendi were sent into exile. They had not

been present at q1rag-an, but had known about Suavi's plan and had not informed the

government about it. The former palace servant Uskiidarli Nuri as well as SUleyman

14 inal (1940-52), R, 781-5; Times 27/05/1878,5; FO 78/2590, no. 1299, Layard to Derby, Therapia, 05/11/1877; FO 78/2789, no. 696, Layard to Salisbury, Therapia, 30/05/1878.

Cf also Levant Herald 23 and 24/05/1878. Cf. FO 78/257 1, no. 448, Layard to Derby, Constantinople, 14/05/1877, the law of state of siege, Art

16: "Tous les comit6s secrets, fussent-ils form6s avant la proclamation de 1'6tat de si6ge, sont justiciables des conseils de guerre. " Also cf. Levant Herald 25/05/1877. 17 Cf. Diistur 1,47-8 and Young (1905-6), VIII, 11-2.

All the judgements are collected in Y. EE 23/14. Also cf Uzunqar§ili (I 944a), 107-9. Apparently his death sentence later was commuted to life long imprisonment in Akka, cf. Uzunqar§ili

(1944a), 94.


Bey and Ba'dadli Sifleyman were sentenced to serve three years in prison in some 9

remote place of the empire, because they had some knowledge of the plot and on the day of the events had walked around in Beýikta§ in the vicinity of ý-'irag'an Palace.

The cases of the refugees, who had been arrested, some of them wounded, were dealt

with on several occasions. On 26 CemaziyUlahir (27 June) a group of 24 of them was

sentenced to various punishments according to their degree of implication in the plot

and its planning. One of them, Hask6ylii Bekirzade Haci Mustafa Efendi, seems to have

belonged to the inner circle of the 0skUdar Society and therefore was exiled to Bolu.

The others, in their majority from Filibe, Hask6y and Pazarcik, towns located in what is

today southern Bulgaria, were awarded sentences between ten and three years of hard

labour (kfirek). Two or three confessed to have had known Suavi's goal, the others

stated that they had been assembled in Be§ikta§ under the pretext to collect weapons from the arsenals at Tophane to fight the Russians and thence had been led to the

palace. A great amount of other suspects had to be released, because neither a connection to Suavi nor knowledge of the plot could be proven. On 18 and 29 CemaziyUlahir a group

of 16 and 34 suspects respectively, most of them refugees from various places in the

Balkans, was acquitted. As for Murad's servants, although the accusation that they had known of Suavi's

designs and actively supported the intruders by showing them the way to the rooms of

the ex-sultan could not be sustained, nonetheless they were remitted from their service

and sent back to their provinces of origin. 20

Likewise no serious involvement of Ali Efendi, editor of the Basiret, could be proven. Ali confessed that he knew Suavi and that he visited him several times to collect articles for his paper. For the publication of Suavi's last letter, which secretly announced the

attack on the qiragan palace, Ali was sentenced according to article 138 of the Ottoman

penal code to a fine of 25 gold-Mecidiye. Additionally, the Basiret was closed down for

an indeterminate time. 21

The nervous behaviour of the government vis-a-vis the Istanbul press could also be

observed in the case of the editor of the Levant Herald, Whittaker. After he dared to

print an anonymous letter in his paper ascertaining that Murad in contradiction to all

other reports was sane and healthy, his paper was shut down and he was ordered to

20 Y. EE 23/14,1 B 1295. 21 Y. EE 23/14,3 B 1295; Dfistur 1,5 67-8; Young (1905-6), VII, 28-9 and Ali's own account in Ali (1325), 58.


leave the country within 48 hours. 22

124

Summing up, the violent incident at 'ý, irag'an Palace clearly displayed some already familiar features of Ottoman opposition. As had been the case in the Kuleli conspiracy, this opposition was expressed by advancing a new candidate for the Ottoman throne. The events in the year 1876 apparently had made this option the more feasible and it

remained a problem for Abdfilhamid for some years. The example how quickly Ottoman sultans could be replaced had further added to the already existing factionalism

of Ottoman politics and probably made the new sultan even more suspicious of his

functionaries. Thus the rumours about the huge dimension of the conspiracy can be

understood. Whereas its form is conventional, the 1ý-irag'an incident bears many individual traits

explaining why it broke out in 1878. One of these traits can be found in the life story of Ali Suavi. It was he, who established the Uskiidar Society and who persuaded the

refugees to come to the palace on 20 May. In the following section first I would like to

examine in detail Suavi's political thinking as it developed during the ten years in

Europe. The next section will deal with the more immediate political influences on Suavi after his return to Istanbul.

Ali Suavi

In contrast to some of the other leaders of opposition the life of Ali Suavi in general is

well documented. Because he was part of the group of Young Ottomans, who went into

self-imposed exile to Europe, scholars were interested in Suavi from the beginning. 23

Another reason why we know so much about him and his worldview is the fact that he

himself had been an active writer. For example, in 1869 in a series of articles for his

paper Ulum Suavi published an account of his own life; other articles and books of his

deal with political questions and topics like education and science.

Ali was born in 1839 in Istanbul as the son of a paper seller. He studied in a local

rfiýdiye school before he entered the Ottoman bureaucracy as a scribe in the war

ministry. Despite his education and his chosen profession Ali also had strong

connections with the religious milieu. At the time he was employed in the central

22 FO 78/2790, no. 744, Layard to Salisbury, Therapia, 07/06/1878; FO 195/1199, Safvet to Layard, Porte, 02/06/ 1878: ibid. Mehmed Arif to H. Fawcett, MInistere de la Police, 06/06/1878. The new role of the V ess is highlighted by Davison (1963), 312-3 and Anderson (1993), 136-44. 3rThemost recent and concise biography is Iýelik (1994). Cf. also Kuntay (1946) and Mardin (1962),

360-84 and Uqman OA 2)

. There is even a theatre play on Suavi by i. Tarus.


administration he completed his traditional education in the local medrese and began to

write on religious topics before he went on the pilgrimage to Mecca at the age of seventeen. "

Upon his return Ali first taught at a medrese in Anatolia and then, for a short time, was director of the rfiýdiye of Bursa. In 1861 he was recalled to Istanbul, because he got into

trouble with the local authorities. Subsequently he was transferred to the court of

commerce in Sofia and later, in 1864, he worked in the local administration of Filibe (Plovdiv/Philippopolis). There again he clashed with the local governor and had to

return to Istanbul in 1866.11

It is in the capital that Ali's career as a public political figure really started. Looking

back on his life while staying in Paris, he claimed that even during his terms of office in

Anatolia and Rumelia he had constantly protested against misuse of power and general in ustice. In Istanbul, however, the political side of his character was becoming much

more pronounced -a development, which eventually caused his exile from the capital. Parallel to his experience in the religious and the bureaucratic worlds Ali had two places

of political agitation. The first was the *ehzade Mosque where he used to be a preacher. Apparently his sermons were very popular, because they did not exclude political topics

and because they were delivered in a fervent style in the language of the common

people. Also intellectuals like Naryuk Kemal and officials like Fuad Pasha were said to

have visited theM. 26

The other part of his public role consisted of Ali's beginning career as a journalist with

the paper Muhbir. Before, Ali had been writing mostly small essays on religious

subjects, which circulated among his students. With his newspaper articles, however, he

gained a new and wider audience. The Muhbir, first appearing in January 1867, for a

major part treated educational topics like Namik Kemal's Tasvir-i Efkar had done. But

like the other papers also the Muhbir very soon started to sponsor more politically

minded articles. There was, for example, a column where Ali, who was the main

contributor to the paper, explained general political terms to his readers. He also wrote

articles on domestic and foreign policy, especially on the events in Crete. Ali personally

opened a campaign to help the Muslims of Crete, who were ruined by the war and

threatened to be expelled from the island. Also the famous open letter by Mustafa Fazil

that kicked off the Young Ottoman movement, was reprinted in the paper, although Ali

seems not to have been, as sometimes has been claimed, responsible for the translation.

24 The same way from an government official to religion made A§qi Dede ibrahim, cf. Bremer (1959). 25 iýelik (1994), 43-64. 26 qelik (1994), 65-6.


As it seems the Muhbir took a lead among other Ottoman papers in openly addressing

political matters. The incident, which eventually led to the closing of the Muhbir and Ali's exile to Kastamonu, was a hostile article towards the policy of the Porte and the

person of the grand vizier Ali Pasha. In this article Ali protested against the fact that the fortress of Belgrade was left by its Ottoman garrison and given back to the Serbs. "

His opposition to the Ottoman government firmly established and popularised through his articles and the fact of his exile to the Black Sea, Ali, while in Kastamonu, was

approached by an agent of Mustafa Fazil Pasha. The Egyptian prince invited Ali to join

him in Paris in order to give intellectual backing to his opposition. After some hesitation

Ali accepted the invitation and, together with Namik Kemal and Ziya Bey, reached Paris via Marseilles by the end of May 1867.

With his trip to Europe a second phase began in the life of Ali, who at some point

acquired the byname Suavi, 'the active and industrious one'. On the one hand Suavi's

life story developed similar to that of his fellow Young Ottomans, who went to exile to

Europe, founded journals and eventually returned to the empire. Also intellectually he

shared much of their basic political believes, like the importance of Islam regarding the

political order or the personal hatred towards Ali Pasha. On the other hand Suavi was

different not least, because he was the last of the Young Ottomans to return to Istanbul.

Especially his political thinking as expounded in the three journals and several books he

edited in Europe reveal that he was the one Young Ottoman thinker most conscious of

his dissident role. The first of his journals was a new version of the Muhbir, which Suavi started

publishing in London from September 1867. As we have already seen in chapter three

the paper was financed by Mustafa Fazil and was intended to diffuse the latter's views.

Although the articles generally were not signed, regarding their style many of them can

be attributed to Narrak Kemal. However, from the beginning Suavi exerted much

personal influence on the production of the new Muhbir. As one of the earliest and most

notable examples might serve the fact that in the foreword to the first number of the

Muhbir the name 'Young Ottomans' was not mentioned. Instead an Islamic society

(cemiyet-i islamiye) was indicated as the publisher of the paper. Its task was described

as to "cause the progress of education and civilisation of the eastern people and to

bravely give expression to the reform opinion and to try to correct the opinions of

27 qelik (1994), 71-80.


Europe about Orientals". 21 Although Suavi's views in general are associated with

political radicalism, this programme was considerably different and politically more

modest than the programme the Young Ottoman Society drafted at the same time in Paris together with some European revolutionaries. From those contacts Ali Suavi

seems to have been excluded and the rift in outlook and aims between him and the rest

of the Young Ottomans began to be revealed increasingly as time drew on. Especially after his benefactor had returned to Istanbul in September 1867 Suavi's

relationship with Mustafa Fazil became increasingly difficult. In a letter Mustafa Fazil

addressed to Ziya and Kemal in December he accused Suavi of being a slanderer. 29 It is

probably from this moment onwards that the two other Young Ottomans planned to

issue their own paper, the HUrriyet, which started to appear from June 1868. Despite

waning support from Mustafa Fazil, Suavi continued to publish the Muhbir alone until November the same year. The point to give up came when he ran out of funds or,

according to a different source, his set of Ottoman types was stolen. Next, Suavi went back to Paris and from July 1869 onwards started to publish a new

paper, the Ulum (Science), appearing every two weeks in lithograph print. Even more

than the Muhbir it was meant to address topics of education and science and to spread

them among Muslims of all classes. However, also here Suavi frequently touched on

political questions. Being his own master and not dependent on anybody he frequently

used the Ulum to fight out political and personal quarrels, e. g., against Namik Kemal.

Perhaps the most important step during this time was the final break with Mustafa Fazil

announced by Suavi in a series of articles during February and March 1870.1'

The Prusso-French war of 1870/71 disrupted the printing of the Ulum and of its

successor, the Muvakatten Ulum (Provisional Ulum), only five numbers appeared.

Afterwards Suavi abstained from publishing any paper by himself, apparently for lack

of funds, and concentrated on writing for other papers in Europe and Istanbul until he

was able to return to the empire in 1876.

What were the political ideas Ali Suavi expounded in his writings in exile and in what

way do they help us to understand the nature of his opposition? Of immediate interest

are, of course, utterances that touch directly on the notion of opposition towards the

28 "Ahali-i §arkiyyenin terakki-i ma'5rif U medeniyetlerini mucib olacak efkdr-i cedideye serbazlik vermek ve §arkilar haUinda Avrupa'nin efkSnni tashihe qali§mak 1ý-elik (1994), 97-8. Only from

no. 7,12/10/67, the paper began to display a vignette on its last page reading Yeni Osmanhlar Cerniyeti beside Suavi's own vignette. 29Reproduced in 1ý-elik (1994), 152. 30 Iýelik (1994), 229-40 referring to Ulurn 13,15 Za 1278 (16/02/1870) and 14, n. d. (01/03/1870).

V


power of the state. Concerning this topic Suavi seems to have held two opinions, which

are not easy to reconcile. On a very general level he was defending the right of rebellion

within an Islamic framework. On several occasions in the Muhbir as well as in the Ulum

he put forward that it was not the duty of any Muslim to show obedience to a tyrannical

government. Like the other Young Ottomans in defending their notion of

constitutionalism, Suavi in his defence of the right of resistance drew on examples from

the Koran, the life of Muhammad as well as the early Caliphs. He was perhaps the first

Muslim thinker in modem times, who invoked the well known Koranic obligation to

'command right and forbid wrong' to legitimise his stance. "

Suavi's radical theory, however, in practice was restrained by several factors. Suavi

never invoked the right to revolt to the Ottoman sultan of his time, Abdfilaziz, whom he

always treated respectfully. As had been the case with the other Young Ottomans the

target of his polemic was the Ottoman administration rather than the sultan. In one of his most radical articles Suavi issued a fetva ordering to kill the grand vizier. This fetva

published in the HUrriyet by Ziya was the main reason why Suavi unlike some of the

other Young Ottomans could not return to the empire until Ali's death.

Also regarding the Ottoman past Suavi defended opposition against the central

government and tyrannical ministers. In one article in the Muhbir he chose the

Janissaries as an example for an intermediary body defending the right of the people

against absolute government (hfikumet-i mutlaka). Although their destruction by sultan

Mahmud had been legitimate, in the current situation there was no body that could take

their place and prevent unlawful action by the ministers, who thus had become all-

powerful. "

The fact that Suavi never actually called to overthrow the Ottoman regime or attacked

the sultan personally reveals a political conservatism that was becoming more and more

pronounced during his years in Europe. In the beginning and under the influence of the

other Young Ottomans he defended their model of a constitutional system, the usul-i

mqveret. 11 Like Nanuk Kemal he presented the need for consultations in the affairs of

the state as deeply rooted in the Islamic tradition and rejected firmly any form of

arbitrary government. That, however, made Suavi neither a supporter of a Western style

parliamentary system nor a constitutionalist in the modem sense of the word. In his

political thinking the sharia took the place of a modem constitution and the sultan

" Iýelik (1994), 557-62, referring to Muhbir 14 (28/11/1867) and 17 (25/12/1867), Ulum 9,522. Cf. Mardin (1962), 377-9; TUrk6ne (1994), 124-7. For the formula of 'Commanding right... 'cf Cook (20W), 511. 32 Muhbir 10,02/11/1867, 'Hakikat-i hal'. 33 Tijrk6ne (1994), 107-10.


remained an effective political institution retaining most of his powers. In fact, the role Suavi assigned to the sultan in one of the articles of the Muhbir was very traditional,

consisting in guarding religion, protecting the empire's borders, dispensing justice and

choosing the right functionaries for the administration. '

This political conservatism regarding the actual political structure of the empire became

even more pronounced during the time Suavi published the Ulum. Although he

ascertained that historically speaking democracy was the natural political system in

Islam, Suavi was very sceptical about the democratic regimes of the present day world. Alluding to the events that shook Paris under the rule of the Commune in 1871, he

maintained that in Europe this form of government had brought godless people to power

rejecting religion as the basis of society. In contrast to Mehmed Bey, who at the same

time in his paper inkilab had embraced the revolutionary principle, Suavi displayed a

very traditional attitude to the phenomenon of a revolution. It was very similar to that of Ottoman contemporaries to the French Revolution.

Moreover, Suavi was concerned about the export of the modem concept of democracy

to the Islamic world. He expressed doubt whether people in the Ottoman Empire were

educated enough for this sort of government, which only would lead to sedition and

rebellion (fitneengiz olacakfir). Instead he promoted the monarchy as the ideal form of

government for his own country. "The thing, which we will understand, is that a state

suitable to the opinion and the circumstance and the community we find for example in

the Ottoman state must be a monarchy. ""

Suavi again pronounced his scepticism vis-a-vis European style parliamentary systems in an article in the Istanbul paper Vakit (Time) in September 1876. Writing under the

impression of Gladstone's campaign concerning the so-called 'Bulgarian Horrors' Suavi

directly condemned the system of parliamentary opposition and its tendency to

influence public opinion. In contrast he depicted the Ottoman Empire as a polity that 16 knew no changes and revolutions and thus stood for internal and external stability.

Suavi and Abdiiihamid

It might have been this display of conservative views, which finally made it possible for

Suavi to return to the empire in November 1876 after Sultan AbdUlhamid had given a

' Iýehk (1994), 570- 1, referring to Muhbir 36,27/05/1868, 'Umfir-i dmme'. 15 "Bizim anlayacagin-uz, mesele, meseld deviet-I Osmaniye bulunduku mevkiine ve haline ve cernaafine sAlih bir devlet ki pAdi§ahU olmah. ", Ulum 18, 'Demokrasi: Hiikiimet-i Halk, MUsavAt', in: TUrk6ne (1994), 302-10. Also cf. (ýelik (1994), 575-9. '6Vakit 323,1 N 1293 (19/09/1876) as reproduced in Kuntay (1946), 90-7.


positive answer to a petition of his. Back in the capital a third phase in the life of the Ottoman official, Islamic preacher, journalist and political exile began in an environment very close to power. Even before his return Suavi had been appointed a member of the so-called Translation Society, an institution founded by the sultan to influence public opinion abroad and inside his realm. It seems that Suavi also began to build a personal relationship with Abdiilhamid for he was invited to the palace on

several occasions and ultimately was appointed tutor of the princes as well as head

librarian. " At the peak of his success, in February 1877, Suavi became director of the Mekteb-i Sultam^, the school at Galata Saray where he was able to reorganise the

curriculum according to his own ideas.

It made sense for the sultan not only to use Suavi's knowledge of European affairs; also

as a political ally Suavi was valuable regarding the sultan's struggle to become

independent from the Porte and especially from the faction around Midhat. Although

AbdUlhamid formally complied with the conditions under which he had assumed his

office, above all to promote a constitution, he did everything not to have his personal

power limited by such a document.

In this struggle Suavi was on Abdtilhamid's side for several reasons. First of all, it was his personal enemies like Namik Kemal and the British ambassador Elliot, who

supported Midhat's ideas. Moreover, in agreement with his earlier political writings Suavi did not think that a constitution would be a solution for the problems of the

empire. " Suavi also feared that Midhat could dominate the sultan and become a figure

like Ali Pasha had been. For this reason he wrote a justifying article when Abdiilhamid

finally sent Midhat to exile using the famous article 113 of the constitution allowing the

sultan to remove any person from the empire, whom he deemed dangerous to public

security. Suavi applauded the active stance of the new sultan, who, in accordance with

the duties of an Islamic ruler, was wresting real power from the hands of his

subordinates. "

Regarding Suavi's situation in 1877 the events in front of 'ý-irag-an Palace just one year later are not easy to understand. Suavi was the director of a famous school where he

could implement his ideas of educational reform under the protection of the sultan. For

sure, during his early years in Europe Suavi had put forward a radical doctrine

defending the right of resistance against tyranny. This doctrine, which was a new way of

applying Islamic thinking on the recent political situation, however, during the years

Iýelik (1994), 291-9. Diplomatic Review, July 1876,162, 'Reform in Turkey'. (ýelik (1994), 301-3, referring to SadakAt 63,12 Kanun-i SAni 1877 and Vakit 460,8 ý 1877.


had been toned down by his political conservatism resting on a traditional loyalty to the

empire and its ruler. Suavi's position close to power, however, was just another episode in his life. Already in December 1877 he was evicted from his office as director of the Galata Saray School

what, no doubt, also tarnished his loyalty to Abdillhamid. The reasons for his dismissal

are not entirely clear, but probably old and new enemies had their share in it. One of Suavi's old enemies was the minister of education, MUnif Pasha. Already in Paris Suavi had accused him of being a man without religion - an insult, which he apparently

reiterated when he was made director at Galata Saray.

One of the most powerful new enemies Suavi made was the British ambassador Layard.

Suavi had angered the latter by way of a series of anti-British articles he had written for

the Vakit . 40 Additionally, Suavi's reforms at the Galata Saray directed mainly against the foreign staff and the non-Muslim pupils of the school displeased Layard. Soon after his accreditation to the Porte in the end of March 1877 Layard became the most important diplomat for the sultan, because of the war with Russia. When the

ambassador in autumn 1877 finafly demanded Suavi's dismissal the latter was dropped

by the sultan. "

We do not know much about Suavi's state of mind and his activities in the time after his

dismissal. It is likely that he harboured a personal grudge against the sultan, but there

are no sources available to sustain this assumption. Rather than speculating about Suavi's psyche, in the following I like to examine how the general political

circumstances, which are more accessible to scrutiny, might have influenced his

decision to try reinstating Murad.

In 1877 the so-called Eastern Crisis that already had made its imprint on the course of

the political events of 1876 had developed into an armed conflict between the Ottoman

Empire and Russia. In late April 1877 the Russians had declared war and then,

approximately two months later, had crossed the Danube. Everyone expected a quick Russian victory until the offensive came to a standstill in front of Plevna, a fortress In

northern Bulgaria, which was successfully defended by the Ottoman army under Osman

Pasha.

Like earlier conflicts between the two contestants the Russo-Ottoman war of 1877/8 had

its ideological implications. The year before the tsar already had declared his 'sacred

40 Iýelik (1994), 339-42, referring to Vakit 684,20/09/1877. Also cf. Times 18/10/1877,5 and 20/11/1877,6. 41 Iýelik (1994), 347-63. On Layard's role cf. FO 78/2586, no. 1157, Layard to Derby, Therapia,


mission' choosing the Pan-Slav ideology of a group of his advisors to legitimise his decisions for war. Also the sultan tried to mobilise additional forces with a new Pan-

Islamic ideology -a political strategy, which, for example, resulted in an Ottoman diplomatic mission to the emir of Afghanistan. Also at home Islamic ideology was

employed to sustain the war effort. The yeyhiilislam supported the war by means of a fetva and, after a couple of Ottoman victories, awarded the title gazi to Abdiithamid

henceforward to be used publicly in Friday prayer. 42

However, as we have seen earlier, the reverse of fortune also could spawn opposition to

the government. As usual the most unruly element in the capital were the softas. In the

run up to the war there were demonstrations in favour of a return of Midhat Pasha from

his exile in Europe and against the conciliatory stance of the Porte regarding the Eastern

Crisis. " In May after the fall of the town of Ardahan in eastern Anatolia a crowd of up to 3000 students invaded the parliament to demand the dismissal of the minister of war,

who, according to them, was unable to handle the situation. The sultan gave in and

removed him, but at the same time took the event as an opportunity to arrest the

ringleaders of the protest. At the same time some of Midhat's followers, who had

remained in office, were removed. '

The Ottoman press in general seems to have been in a warlike mood and Suavi

supported the war effort by articles he wrote mainly for the Vakit . 41 He tried to keep up

the spirits of the population giving the assurance that in the end the Ottoman an-ny

would prove stronger than the Russians and he put much emphasis on the fact that

Abdtilhamid himself was directing the defence of the country. " It was in this context

that Suavi wrote his anti-British articles in which he warned his compatriots not to hope

for British assistance and accused the superpower of the day to be the source of all

political evil. 47

In December, when Suavi was dismissed from his office and fell out of favour with the

sultan, the war entered its second and decisive phase. The Russian army in the end did

overcome the Ottoman defence at Plevna and was now advancing into southern

Bulgaria. In the beginning of January 1878 Sofia was taken, a couple of weeks later

Edirne fell and on 23 February after a near confrontation with the British fleet the

01/10/1877 and FO 78/2590, no. 1290, Layard to Derby, Therapia, 02/11/1877. 42 Levant Herald 17/05/1877. 4' Times 16/03/1877,5. 4' Levant Herald 25,28,29/05 and 02/06/1877; Times 31/05,5; 12/06/1877,10; Y-EE 23/1 (14 Ca 1294). 45 Cf. Levant Herald 14 and 15/05/1878. 46 (ýelik (1994), 335-9, referring to Vakit 619,17/07; 630,28/07; 637,04/08/1877 (old style). 17 (ýelik (1994), 339-42, referring to Vakit 684,20/09; 730,05/11; 734,09/11; 763,07/12/1877 (old style).


Russian advance came to a halt at San Stefano (Ye§ilk6y) south of Istanbul. There in the beginning of March a treaty was signed ratifying the terms of peace, which the Porte had been forced to accept already in the end of January.

Unfortunately Suavi did not publish any articles after his dismissal, probably due to an informal ban. Inferring from his earlier published opinion, however, it is likely that he

still supported the continuation of the war even at the moment the Russian army was encamped in front of the Ottoman capital. In an article he had published in summer in

the Vakit he had foreseen this situation and had invoked how easy it would be to defend

Istanbul against an invading army. " Likewise he seems to have been well aware of the

political myth attached in Russia to the possession of Constantinople and therefore

would have been inclined to defend the capital by all means. 19

In the same manner Suavi most certainly was opposed to the treaty of San Stefano

considering the fact that it would have meant the end of Ottoman rule on the Balkans.

The signing of the treaty by the Ottoman government must have delivered a further step in Suavi's decision to topple the sultan, whom he must have held responsible for the defeat in war. That he was not to accept this situation clearly shows an episode from some time before

the riots at qiragan. Suavi together with a certain Sheikh Ahmed and one Necib Bey

was arrested, because he had apparently tried to incite the population. These events

remain shady for our only source of information about them is a short note by the

minister of war to the minister of police. " Nonetheless, his arrest may have been the last

incentive for Suavi to strike rather sooner than later in fear that his plans might be

detected.

Summing up, the information that can be derived from the life story of the instigator of

the qirag-an incident, we see that on the background of some very conservative traits

there was a constant potential of opposition in Suavi's character. The latter got

activated, because of Suavi's precarious personal position after December 1877

culminating in the organisation of the 0sk0dar Society. This, however, does not mean

that we can understand the qiragan incident by solely concentrating on its leader. Like

we have seen in the case of Sheikh Ahmed and others, the life and thinking of Suavi

only make sense in the wider framework of Ottoman history. Therefore, in the last

section of this chapter, I would like to explain Suavi's connection to the question of

" (ýelik (1994), 378, referring to Vakit 630. 49 I; elik 0 994), 499-500 about 'A propos de I'Herz6govine', Paris 1875, ch. VI. 51 qelik (1994), 380-1; YEE 23/35 (n. d. ).


Muslim refugees, who were the largest group of people arrested after the qirag'an incident. This topic brings us back to the question of Ottoman legitimacy and adds another facet in explaining the connection between legitimacy and the various opposition movements during the Tanzimat.

The refugee question

Generally speaking Muslim refugees were a living sign of the crisis of the Ottoman

Empire as it was unable to defend its borders and the home of its subjects. Their

existence, however, was not only a measure of the decline of the empire's military

power, but directly touched on the religious side of its legitimacy. The Ottoman term for

refugee was muhacir, the one who migrates, which unlike its Turkic equivalent g6ýmen immediately triggers a range of religious meanings. In Islamic legal theory the problem

of migration from a land falling back to the dar fil-harb was an old problem. Orthodox

scholars never had come to a conclusion regarding the question, whether it was a duty

for Muslims to leave such a country. However, it was never in doubt that it was an

obligation to shelter and feed a muhacir, who rather chose to leave his home than to live

under a non-Muslim ruler. "

For the Ottoman Empire the problem of Muslim refugees for the first time appeared in

the last quarter of the eighteenth century when in 1774 after defeat against Russia in the

treaty of KUqUk Kaynarca the empire had to renounce its sovereignty over the Crimean

Khanate. The annexation of the khanate by Russia ten years later brought a first wave of Muslim refugees to the empire. Parts of the Tartar ruling elite as well as the religious

establishment, who had both lost their privileged position and had preferred to emigrate, joined the war faction in Istanbul, which called for renouncing the treaty. 52

This was the first expression of a political mechanism affecting the Ottoman state for

the next century. According to this mechanism Russian expansion resulted in the loss of Ottoman territory and the intake of refugees, who brought political instability to the

empire. It may be perceived as a historical irony that the same defeats in war also inspired reforms in the internal structure and the foreign relations of the empire, which,

over time, seriously put in question the traditional legitimacy structure of the empire

with the results that have been discussed above.

" Masud (1990); Toumarquine (1996).


Apart form the Crimean Tartars, who produced a second and third wave of refugees in

the Russo-Ottoman war of 1828/9 and after the Crimean War, it was the Circassians,

who represented the other large group of Muslim refugees in the nineteenth century. Like the Crimean Khanate also Circassia had been loosely subjected to the Ottoman

sultan until the Russians systematically started to conquer the region in the late 1840s.

Most of the millions of Circassian refugees came to the Ottoman Empire in the last

phase of the conquest between 1862-4. But already in the fifties and after the end of the Crimean War a constant stream of refugees was trickling into the empire. Leaving their homeland the Circassians usually went by boat along the Black Sea coast and many of them eventually stranded in Istanbul', which already had a large Circassian community. In the beginning the Ottoman authorities had difficulties to cope with such an influx of

people, most of them ill and impoverished. Soon, however, a refugee code (muhacirin

kanunnamesi, 1857) was enacted and a refugee commission (idare-i umumiye-i

muhacirin komisyonu, 1860) was set up and the spontaneous influx was led into

administrative channels. Subsequently, the Ottoman goverrunent used the refugees for

its own demographic politics. Tartars and Circassians were settled in the Balkans to increase the Muslim element there. Additionally, the Circassians, in their homeland

mostly pastoral nomads, were used as an irregular police force and caused much trouble

among the local farmers, Christians and Muslims alike. "

Above we have seen the many ways of how individual Circassians were connected to

the Society of Martyrs, although a collective participation of the Circassian refugees

assembled in Istanbul seems unlikely. Moreover, Sheikh Ahmed probably understood

the ideological implication these refugees had for Ottoman legitimacy. In the case of the

ý_'irag'an incident the involvement of Muslim refugees in an opposition movement seems

even clearer. The Balkan refugees, who in contrast to the Tartars and the Circassians

were no outsiders, but ethnic Turks coming from the ancient heartland of the empire,

actively took part in the riots. As I would like to argue in the following, however, also

their personal participation has to be qualified. Once again it is more important to see

them as a symbol that enticed the activism of others.

Most of the refugees involved in the 1ý-irag-an incident came from southern Rumelia,

from Filibe and adjacent towns in the Maritsa (Merig) valley like Hask6y or Pazarcik.

The advance of the Russian army entered the sancak of Filibe in the end of July 1877

52 Fisher (1970), 58-63,91-94. 53Pinson (1972); Fisher (1987), 66-69; Karpat (2002b).


and a panic broke out among the Muslim inhabitants fearing massacres by Cossacks and Bulgarian militias alike. People fled from the countryside to Filibe, the main city of the

region, and remained there even as the Russians had to retreat due to the stalemate at Plevna. In December 1877, with their position getting precarious again, many inhabitants were leaving Filibe despite the order of the authorities to hold the city. Only

on 8 January 1878 permission was granted to evacuate the city. Under most difficult

conditions tens of thousands of refugees, most of them women and children, were trying

to reach Edirne by train. "

Suavi was in many ways connected to this particular group of refugees. It is possible that members of the Uskfidar Society like Ahmed Pasha and his son in law Hafiz Nuri

as well as Haci Mehmed or Bekirzade Haci Mustafa, both of them from Hask6y, were

old acquaintances of Suavi from the time he was working in Filibe before 1867. It must have been these men, who persuaded the other refugees to come to ý-irag-an Palace on 20 May, otherwise it would be hard to explain why they almost entirely came from this

particular region of the Balkans.

At first glance the refugees in Suavi's eyes must have appeared as a ready mass of

people to give momentum to his attempt. He might have thought that they would

support him once the plan to seize Murad and declare him sultan would have been

successful. The plotters seem to have been well aware that it would not have been wise

to tell the refugees the truth about their designs. Being small townspeople and peasants

they had little revolutionary spirit. In fact, most of them stayed outside after Suavi and his followers had crashed the gates of the palace. In general the political activity of the

refugees in Istanbul had been more peaceful consisting mainly of petition writing. To

this means of political participation they returned after the events to protest their

innocence in front of the sultan. "

In order to motivate them to assemble in front of the palace the refugees were told the

story that they were to receive weapons to join the Muslim insurgents against Russian

occupation in the Rhodope Mountains. This story was the more credible as there already

existed refugee committees in Istanbul to support the insurrection. It is not likely,

however, that there was any real connection between Suavi and the Muslim insurgents

in the Rhodopes, although this was mused by the British ambassador. One of the leaders

of the insurgents, the British adventurer St. Clair, later denied all contacts to Suavi. 11

54 Cf. McCarthy (1995), 59-81 and the reports of the British and French consuls and the Ottoman authorities collected in ýim§ir (1968-89), nos. 41,42,46,51,63,105,107,114,117,121 incl., 125,126, 128,129,133,137,138,140,142,143,144,153 incl. 1. 5'BOA, Y. A. HUS 159/42 (1 C 1295). " FO 195/1199, Sandison to Layard, Therapia, 02/05/1878; FO 78/2789, no. 667, Layard to Salisbury,


Despite the fact that Suavi tricked most of the refugees to take part in his scheme, they

were not just a disposable mass of people for him. On the contrary, it was their suffering

that first encouraged him to action. When in summer 1877 the first refugees arrived In the capital, in his sermons and articles in the press Suavi tried to rally support for them

and founded a relief organisation like he had done ten years earlier for the Cretan

refugees. 57

Since his campaign for the Turks of Crete while writing still for the Muhbir, one of Suavi's aims had been to show that the Muslims of the empire were the ones, who were

really disadvantaged. According to the political situation of the day other Muslims

oppressed by foreign powers came into his focus. With the outbreak of the Oriental

Crisis in 1876 this role was passed on to the Muslims of Bosnia. Later in 1876 during

Gladstone's campaign of the 'Bulgarian Horrors' his support switched to the Muslims

of Bulgaria. "

Additionally, the fact that the Muslim refugees from the Balkans were victims of Russian mifitary expansion awarded them a special status. Since his early political

writings Russian imperialism had been a recurring theme with Suavi. While in exile in

Europe he wrote two books connected with this topic, one on Khiva attacking the

Russian conquest of Central Asia, the other on Bosnia criticising the Pan-Slav

movement on the Balkan Peninsula. Also his connections with David Urquhart and the

Foreign Affairs Committees, a British anti-Russian and pro-Ottoman pressure group

with its own journal, the Diplomatic Review, underlines this strand in Suavi's political

thinking. '9

Suavi was part of a rising number of Ottoman intellectuals perceiving the international

environment in terms of a Muslim-Christian rivalry. It is interesting to see that at this

stage, in 1878, this opinion could still be used as a motive for opposition against the

government. Later Abdiilhamid managed to bring this line of thinking under his control

and used it for his own political purposes in his notorious Pan-Islamist policy. It may have been the experience in the early years of his reign that taught him the importance

of this matter regarding the damaged legitimacy of the empire.

Therapia, 24/05/1878; FO 78/2792, no. 822, Layard to Salisbury, Therapia, 24/06/1878. " (ýelik (1994), 342-4, referring to Ceride-i Havadis 3517, N 1294 and Vakit 644,11/08/1877. 51 Diplomatic Review 24 (10/1876), 270-4, 'Letters by Ali Suavi Effendi'. 19 About Suavi's relationship with Urquhart cf. ý_'elik (1994), 112-32.


V1. THE SKALIERI-AZIZ COMMITTEE

138

Although detected only in July 1878, the secret society called after their two leaders

the Skalieri-Aziz Committee was older than Ali Suavi's group. The committee

originated among a group of Murad's friends and servants as a reaction to his

deposition, but most of its members were arrested by the police before they were able to put their goal to reinstate the ex-sultan into action. There were some points of

contact with the UskUdar Society, but as we will see in the following the two groups

were very different especially regarding their ideology.

The Skalieri-Aziz Committee was small and insignificant, but in many ways it may

serve as a good ending of this study. With it the pro-Murad phase in the opposition

against AbdUlhamid came to an end and, at the same time, the committee was

connected to the emerging Young Turk opposition against the sultan. Another point

why this conspiracy is interesting is the fact that for some unknown reason the

complete interrogation protocols of the official investigation into the activities of the

group survived. Moreover, these interrogation protocols were not edited like it had

been the case with the istintakname concerning the Society of Martyrs, so that it is

possible to read the interrogators questions and listen to the answers of the suspects

given in plain Turkish. '

With the help of this source I will examine in the following chapter the particularities

of the Skalieri-Aziz Committee regarding its members, their activities as well as the

underlying ideology of their secret organisation. The last section of this chapter will be

dedicated to the members of the committee coming from the civil bureaucracy. The

examination of the involvement of this special social group is to round off our study of

the opposition during the Tanzimat.

Detection and first interrogations

On the night of 26 Haziran/8 Receb (Monday, 8 July 1878) the police raided a house in

Cerrahpa§a, a quarter in the south west of Istanbul, belonging to Aziz Bey, a scribe in

' The interrogation protocols, 81 A3 or A4 sheets, can be found in YEE 23/5. Originally they were arranged in thirteen small booklets each of them occupied with a certain group of suspects or concentrating on a special question. Apparently in the process of cataloguing their original order was destroyed and the individual pages were given random numbers I to 8 1. In the following I will quote the document according to the date and person of the statement and additionafly I will give the sheet number with 'a' or 'b' indicating front and back page in case of a single A4 sheet and 'a', W, 'c' and V indicating the four pages of a folded A3 sheet, 'a' being the page given the archival number, W, 'c' and


the ministry of religious foundations (evkaf nezareti). There had been a denunciation

that a secret society working against the government would meet on that evening. Apart from the owner of the house and his son the police arrested two other people on the spot. An unknown number of suspects was able to flee through the back door and through the garden. The authorities were able to arrest most of them later that night. '

Ottoman officials must have been aware of the existence of such a secret society for

some time. In January or February, one of the members of the committee, a certain Haci HUsnii Bey, had given notice of the group's secret meetings and activities to the

authorities. When he was summoned before the sultan, however, the news had been

blown totally out of proportion by some courtiers. 'Me plot was now believed to

contain up to seven thousand followers meeting at a school in Aksaray. Asked about it,

HUsnil denied the knowledge of any such plot and - be it from fear or, as he claimed later, not wanting to bother the sultan with insignificant things - he did not reiterate his

original notice about the committee. He received some money and was enlisted as an informer without, however, being subsequently of much help for the authorities. HUsnii

was again arrested in connection with the Suavi affair, but had to be acquitted. '

The day after the raid on the society's meeting place at Cerrahpaýa the interrogation of

the suspects started and the real dimensions of the plot slowly began to unravel. During

the night and the following days other arrests were made so that in the end the police

was able to question 28 people. The investigation carried on until 12 ýaban (I I

August) and it is due to the documents produced during this time that we know so

much about the Skalieri-Aziz Committee.

One of the most important statements made on the first day of the interrogations

undoubtedly came from Aziz Bey, the vice president of the committee, in whose house

its last meeting took place. ' Aziz fully co-operated with the police and revealed the

basic facts about the committee. According to him it had been founded by a man

named Kirlandi a while after Murad's deposition, at a time when the ex-sultan already had recovered from his illness, with the objective of winning back the throne for the

latter. The committee usually met once or twice a month, however, Aziz Bey's house

had been the meeting place only in the last two months. Before, the comm-ittee had

assembled in Beyoglu in Kirlandi's house. Regarding Aziz' statement it seems that the

V being the following pages in the order of a European book. There are almost no European sources on the conspiracy except for a fantastic account in Schweiger von Lerchenfeld (1879), 218-224. 2 Y. EE 23/3. Mahmud to Mehmed Arif (26 Haziran 1294); YEE 23/4, Bab-i Zabtiye (26 Haziran 1294). YEE 23/6,1, no date, gives a list of the persons arrested. Cf. also the rest of the official correspondence between the police and the palace in this folder and Uzunqar§ili (1944b), 280-4. 3 Y. EE 23/5, Haci Hiisnij (21 B 1295) and YEE 23/11, HUsnii's petition to AbdUlhamid (n. d. ). 4 Y. EE 23/5, Aziz (9 B 1295), 2 1b.


membership of the committee was rather fluid. Different sets of people came to the

meetings depending on their relationship to the host. In his first interrogation Aziz

gave altogether 18 names and much of the work of the police subsequently concentrated on finding these people and establishing what their real relationship towards the committee had been.

The objective of the plot, to bring back Murad to the Ottoman throne, was to be

attained by the following plan: With the help of Muslim refugees from the Balkans - obviously here Aziz echoed the q1ragan incident - and an officer of the palace guards

or other high military commanders, who had to be won over to the committee, Yildiz

Palace was to be blocked and Murad freed from qirag-an Palace. From there the ex-

sultan would have been brought first to a crowded place, so that the people could take

the oath of allegiance, the biat, and later to the parliament. These steps seems to have been co-ordinated with Murad. The plotters had been in

regular contact with q1ragan as Aziz revealed. At first, letters were sent through the fresh water canals running under the palace and after these had been closed some

guards and servants were bribed to deliver them. According to Aziz there were letters

from Murad himself and from his mother ascertaining that the ex-sultan was well and

that he wanted to leave the palace. '

Aziz Bey stated that apart from these letters the committee had no help from outside. Obviously to minimise his own involvement he described the person named as Kirlandi

as the active force, who kept the committee alive while he himself got more and more

sceptical about its goals.

Starting from these bits of information furnished by Aziz and five other suspects on the

first day of the interrogation, the police tried to reconstruct the activities of the

committee as a whole. By comparing the suspects' statements and confronting them

personally the interrogators tried to find out each suspects' involvement in these

activities. Unfortunately, the interrogators were not interested very much in the

motives of the plotters, but more in the technicalities of their involvement on the basis

of which their punishment would be awarded.

It is impossible to present in detail all the statements made by the 28 suspects during a

period of over one month. Instead in the following I will focus on some key issues that

are important to understand the character of this opposition group. As I have done

"Sultan Murad ve gerek validesi tarafindan gelirdi. Iýericlen zabtiyeye para verilerek qikarilirdt. Kakidlann meallan sultan Murad 'Ben iyiyim. Gayretedin. Beni buradan alin' ve validesi dahi beni bu

mealda yazip 'Gayret edip. Oklumu buradan q1kart' diye yazardilar. " Aziz (9 B 1295), 17d.


before, looking at the membership structure of the group will reveal a great deal about its character. Especially its development over time and its ways of recruiting new members will alter the image of it being a monolithic organisation. In a later section I

will then enquire what the activities and plans of the committee reveal about its style of opposition.

Membership

In all statements to the police - except for one, which maintained that Aziz was the

president (reis) and grand vizier (sadrazam) of the committee --ý a Christian named Kirlandi or Kirlanti was said to be the initiator of the plot. The full name of this person

was Kleanti Skalieri or Cleanthi Scalieri, a citizen of Istanbul of Greek ethnic origin,

whose identity I will investigate in a separate section of this chapter. The Ottoman

police never managed to lay hand on him, but from the information given by his

nephew Mihal, who was arrested shortly after the raid on Aziz' house, we know that Kleanti lived together with his wife and two sons from his first marriage, aged eight

and nine, in a house near the Aga Hamam in Pera. He had been a stock broker before

he established a business for metal and paint in Izmir one year before the detection of the committee, whose founder he had been. He spoke and wrote Greek and French and

was able to speak Turkish. 7

Some members of the plot like Aziz knew Kleanti, because in the past they had been

doing business with him. ' His job as a stock broker seems to have made him a

considerably wealthy man - or at least taught him how to obtain money - so that, at

several occasions, he was able to offer large sums to members of the committee to

either entice them to action or buy their silence. The most important connection between the president and the members of the committee, however, was Kleanti's

longstanding friendship with the ex-sultan. On several occasions in the interrogation

protocols he was called the dost or ahbab of Murad. Several suspects, who had

connections to the palace, ascertained that in the time when Abdiilaziz was sultan they

remembered seeing Kleanti with the heir apparent in the unofficial environment of the

latter's farm in Kurbag-ali Dere. 9 Also with Seyyid Bey, one of Murad's courtiers, he

was regularly seen in the time before Murad became sultan. "

' Agah (9 B 1295), 12a. 7 Mihal (14 B 1295), 31a, b.

Aziz (9 B 1295), 19d; Esad (21 B 1295), 60b; Uskiidarli Nun (23 B 1295), 53b. Akif (20 B 1295), 45a; tiitiinciibaýt HUseyin (18 B 1295), 42c; Kavasba§izade Tevfik (28 B 1295), 69b

10 Sayis Abdullah, (22 B 1295), 74b.


The reason for Kleanti's friendship with Murad was revealed nowhere in the interrogations protocols -a question I will examine later in detail. The statements of the remaining suspects, however, show that this friendship prevailed after the events surrounding Murad's deposition and that it probably was one of the main driving forces

for Kleanti to establish the committee.

Regarding Kleanti's longstanding contacts to Murad it is only natural to find many of the latter's servants among his acquaintances. Their fate after the deposition of their

master made them prone to either actively support Kleanti's plans or at least not to

report him to the government. While the British ambassador Elliot remarked that Sultan AbdUlhamid treated the members of his family honourably, " nonetheless there

were heavy encroachments on Murad's entourage. All of his servants, who were

questioned by the police in connection with the Skalieri-Aziz Committee, at some

stage had been released from their service, but there were many more, who had been

exchanged with employees more favourable to the regime. 12 They had been. suspected

to conspire against the government even before some of them had been arrested in the

course of the Suavi affair. "

Without doubt the most interesting of these former palace servants, who got involved

with Kleanti, was one Nak§fend or Nak§bend kalfa. A woman in her sixties she had

been raised in the palace in the time of Sultan Mahmud II and later had become part of

Murad's household until she had been dismissed after his fall. 14 Afterwards she lived in

the houses of several of her colleagues and for a time she also stayed with Kleanti. She

had many contacts and, being a woman, she could enter places where men were not

allowed in order to collect information or approach people. On several occasions it was

she, who invited future members to the sessions of the committee in Kleanti's or Aziz'

house. 15

More than any other person from the group of palace servants Nak§fend can be

described as a real member of committee. Apparently she had a close relationship with

Kleanti and Murad and was Present when the discussions about the future of the ex-

" Cf. PRO, FO 78/2464, no. 1010, Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 14/09/1876. 12 For a list of the dismissed servants cf. YEE 23/5, Akif (24/25 B 1295), 75d, c. In the beginning of November 1877 there seems to have been a raid on 1ý, trakan palace by the government to enforce such an exchange of personnel, cf. Times 19/11/1877,5. 13 Cf. Y. EE 23/32 (12 Ca 1294), about a certain AbdUlkerim Aga, who was convicted for "mefsedet ve intizara muhalif hareket".

Aziz (18 B 1295), 38a; Uzunqar§lli (1944b), 251-3, with additional information. Nak§fend invited Vacid Bey, cf Vacid (14 B 1295), 28a, 4a, and also stayed at his house, cf. Vacid (14

B 1295), second statement, 30a. She stayed for two nights at kurena Ismail's house, cf. ismail

(16 B 1295), sec. statement, 32b and one month with kahvecibaýi lbrahirii, cf ibrahim (28 B 1295), 65b. She also lived for some time with Haci Bekir, cf. Tevfik (29 B 1295), 72a.


sultan took place. All the suspects insist that on such occasions she wore a headscarf

and thus they fended off any attempt by the interrogators to morally discredit her. "

Like Kleanti she had remained in contact with the palace and received letters from Murad's mother, which she answered personally in Turkish. " Since she had not been at Aziz' house when the police carried out the raid, she was able to flee together with Kleanti and the police never got hold of her.

The other palace servants involved to a similar degree in Kleantils activities were Murad's former tfitiincfibaýi Hfiseyin and his kurena ismail. Also the kethuda Haci

Bekir as well as the long standing kahveciba. ýi of Murad's mother and his second wife, lbrahim, frequented Kleanti's house. However, the latter were involved in the activities

of the committee only to a lesser degree. A special case was IDskfidarli Nuri, who had

also been arrested in connection to the Suavi affair. His involvement with Kleanti's

committee is altogether unclear. Also two other former courtiers of Murad were

questioned to give evidence, but they seem not to have had any knowledge of the

plot. "

As it appears from one suspect's statement the group of palace servants formed the

nucleus of what was later to become the committee. At the time they had been

dismissed from their services, in the second half of 1876 and the first half of 1877, they

began to frequent Kleanti's house where they engaged in discussions turning around Murad's state of health. " Later, when other people became part of this circle and Kleanti began to press for action, most of the servants stopped playing an important

role. Their most important task was to keep up the communication between Murad and Kleanti. In the course of the year 1877 contact seems to have become increasingly

difficult. Not only had many of Murad's entrusted servants by now been removed, but

also was the palace where Murad resided guarded more strictly than before. Salih, a

servant of ibrahim, who remained in the palace, organised the exchange of letters

between Murad and Kleanti. Either he transported them himself or two bribed workers,

who tended the freshwater channel running from a reservoir outside of Iýjra'an into the 9

palace, delivered these letters. ' Later when these canals were closed some guards of

the palace had to be bribed to keep the communication alive. The police was able to

arrest and question three of the latter. "

16 Kadri(IOB 1295), 22a; Ahmed Riza(15 B 1295), 33b; Mlhal(15B 1295), 34b; HaciHiisnii(23B 1295), 50b. " Aziz (9 B 1295), 17d; Haci Hiisnii (23 B 1295), 52a; Tevfik (29 B 1295), 72a. " These were Akif Bey and the sayis Abdullah. " Muhtar Bey (17 B 1295), 39d, c. " Muhtar Bey (27 B 1295), 71c. 21 Sayis Abdallah (22 B 1295), 74b; zabtiye Hasan (4 ý 1295), 74,76d; zabtiye Memi§ (7 ý 1295), 76b.


Whereas Murad's former servants formed a distinct group, the rest of the individuals

associated with Kleanti and his committee came from a more diverse background. Most of them, altogether around ten men, were lower-ranking civil servants like Aziz Bey. In the last section of this chapter I will discuss the significance of their

participation in the conspiracy in the light of the general development of Ottoman

officialdom. For the time being the first impression is that their participation in the

committee depended on their friendship or a professional relation with either Kleanti

or Aziz.

An important member of the committee coming from this group was Muhtar Bey. 42

years old and a scribe in the ministry of finance (maliyede mektubcu) he was also a rika teacher in a riiydiye- school. Because of his neat handwriting, he was one of the

secretaries of the committee. He had been working with Aziz in the Evkaf and had

been his acquaintance for 20 years. Living in Be§ikta§ he also knew many of Murad's

servants, among them Seyyid Bey, who introduced him to Kleanti. Although he had

been acquainted to many of the other suspects and admitted to have been seeing them

regularly, in his statement to the police Muhtar claimed that he had not become aware

of the committee earlier than January/February 1878.22

The second secretary of the committee was said to be Ahmed Riza. He was 25 years

old and scribe in the ministry of war as well as a drawing teacher in the school of Aziz'

son. He had been acquainted with Aziz for one year and claimed that he came to the

committee at the beginning of the year 1878. Ahmed Riza also recruited another scribe from the war ministry, a soldier named Mustafa. 23

Another of the suspects, who was a longstanding friend of Aziz, was Vacid Bey from

the Council of Education (Meclis-i Maarif). He was also acquainted with Nakýfend and Kleanti, because he once taught a young palace servant to read and write. Vacid was invited by Nak§fend to join the committee in April 1878.24

Furthermore, there were two former clerks from the High Council. Esad Efendi, who

was also a well known journalist, had been a friend of Kleanti for seven or eight years. He had been arrested earlier in connection with the Suavi affair. 2' Haci HUsnii, the

man, who eventually was to betray the committee, was a school friend of Aziz.

However, it seems that he was introduced to the committee by Murad's servant ismail,

22 Muhtar (10 B 1295), 18d; (10 B 1295), sec. sL, 18b; (13 B 1295), 23a. 23 Ahmed Riza (9 B 1295), 16b, a and (15 B 1295), 32a; Kadri (10 B 1295), 17b. 24 Vacid (14 B 1295), 28a and (14 B 1295), sec. st., 30a; Aziz (14 B 1295), 29d. 25 Esad (21 B 1295), 60b.


whom Hi1snii knew, because he himself had been second scribe of Murad's household

for two days until he had been dismissed again. 26

Other less important individuals form the class of civil servants were Mustafa Asim

from the ministry of commerce, Tevfik Bey from the foreign office and Mehmed Nuri

Efendi, a customs clerk. 27 At an early stage also Ali Bey, a scribe from the Porte seems

to have frequented Kleanti, until he was brought before AdUlhamid and warned by the

sultan because of his political activities. Although he apparently played no big role in

the committee, Ali preferred to leave Istanbul after the raid on Aziz' house in June

1878. Together with Esad he clearly belonged to a political milieu of the capital I like

to investigate later. 28

As we have also seen in other conspiracies, the identity of the remaining persons

associated with Kleanti or the committee underlines the importance of personal

relations regarding their recruitment. This is especially true for Kleanti's nephew Mihal and Aziz' son Kadri, 24 and 19 years old, who, obviously, entered the committee

through their family connection. This is also the case for Agah Efendi, the family

doctor of Aziz. It seems that he came to the committee almost accidentally in winter

1877, when he made a visit to Aziz' wife and stumbled into a meeting of the

conspiracy. He stopped coming to the meetings in April or May 1878, after he had

been arrested and the police had to be bribed to set him free again. 29

The existence of only two men with a religious background once again stresses the

secular and liberal character of the conspiracy. Moreover, both of them were only

involved minimally. Mehmed Efendi, a hatib at the mosque in Ortak6y, was the former

mfiezzin of Murad. It is not clear if he had been at any of the meetings of the committee

at all, or if he had just acquired some knowledge of the plot. 'O A certain Ruhi Molla,

brother of the kaziasker Cemil, who was not questioned by the police, seems to have

played a similarly insignificant role. "

Last, there were three persons from Filibe who seems to have been clients of Aziz. One

of them, a porter at Aziz's house, had not been involved deeply in the committee; the

other two, students at the Dardlmuallim, the teachers' college, had been classmates of

Kadri, Aziz' son. Abdullah, the only one of them, who was questioned by the police,

did not give any special reasons for his membership in the society. However, he might

26 Mimi! (21 B 1295), 51b, a; Aziz (22 B 1295), 48a. 21 Mustafa Astm (16 B 1295), 37c; Tevfik (28 B 1295), 69b; Mehmed Nuri (27 Haziran 1294), 15b. 2' Aziz (20 B 1295), sec. st. 77a; Muhtar (21 B 1295), ibid., 47b, a. 29Agah (9 B 1295), 24b; Aziz (9 B 1295), 22d. 'o Mehmed (14 B 1295), 27b.


0 have had the same motives as the other refugees from the Balkans, who had been involved in Suavi's UskUdar Society. "

As already suggested by the initial statement made by Aziz and exemplified by Murad's palace officials the group assembling around Kleanti was very fluid. There is

no founding date for the Kleanti-Aziz Committee and there are no membership lists to be found. The group evolved in different stages over a span of almost two years and the

various individuals presented above played a changing role in these different stages. On the one hand this fluid nature offered a perfect defence strategy to the suspects and especially to old friends of Kleanti, who, after they had to admit to know Kleanti,

claimed that they were only seeing him as friends and knew nothing of his plans. On

the other hand the rather loose structure of the group that proved to be helpful for the

suspects in front of the police had been a problem regarding the work of the

committee. Probably Kleanti and maybe also Aziz recognised this and undertook at least two attempts to bind the individuals more closely to the group and widen its

appeal. A common strategy was to offer government offices in exchange for the support of the

members. Although Aziz strongly denied such methods, it seems that a list was made

containing the positions each member of the committee would be awarded with after a

successful exchange of sultans. Uskiidarli Nuri, for example, claimed that Kleanti

wanted to lure him into the group by putting his name down as a second courtier (ikinci 33

mabeynci). Also Filibeli Abdullah mentioned this list of appointments (tevcihat

defteri), which granted him and Kadri the office of aide-de-camp (Yaver) to Murad and Aziz the post of minister of the Evkaf. Likewise, in case of a successful coup, Ahmed

Riza and Abdijrrahim were promised a trip to France to stud Y. 31

The second attempt to streamline the structure of the group, get its members more involved and attract support from outside was some booklets Kleanti had prepared. On

top of the first page a slogan, the promise to work for the good of the nation (milletin

selameti), was written. The idea was that each member, who was supplied with such a

booklet, should first sign or seal the above statement and then show it to his friends and let them do the same. " However, when a week later Aziz recollected the booklets there

" Aziz (9 B 1295), 19d. 32 AbduHah (I I* 1295), 79d, c; ibid. (11/12 B 1295), sec. st., 8 Ic.

OskUdarli Nuri (24 B 1295), 53b. Abdullah (12 ý 1295), 81d.

15 Ahmed Riza (I IB 1295), 22c: "Ol vakit ise komitenin di§andan adam celb [...? ] Kirlandi tarafindan verilen mUsveddesi Uzerine balsina 'Milletin selameti iqin elden geldigi kadar qali§maga gayret etmeklike taahhijd ederim' ibareli be§ yapraktan ibaret be§ kita defteri yazip birisini dahi merkum Agah


was not a single signature there. Later these papers were burned for fear that the

committee might be detected, because it was during this time, February 1878, that Agah Efendi had been arrested by the police. 36

The problems the committee faced in attaining its aims apparent in its membership

structure become even more evident when we turn to its plans and activities. This

means first and foremost the plans and activities of Kleanti, because he was the main driving force pushing the committee to take action and help Murad. As I will show in

the following he constantly intensified his labours until the first attempt to abduct the

ex-sultan in January or February 1878.

Plans and activities

Kleanti's first action in favour of his friend Murad after the latter had been declared

unfit to rule was to hire a psychologist from Paris specialised in treating his patients

with magnetism. Murad not yet strictly guarded and easily accessible apparently

responded well to the treatment of the doctor, who stayed one week or ten days with him in the palace. " One of the suspects consulting this specialist in Kleanti's house

said that his treatment took place about one and a half years earlier, which would make it winter 1876/77. "

According to a statement by Aziz the next step in Kleanti's commitment to Murad's

cause was brought about by the letters the ex-sultan sent to the outside world. In these

letters Murad demanded justice and urged Kleanti to help him. '9 Thus, at first Kleanti

together with Nak§fend tried to gather support for their friend and former master from

the pashas in the capital. Under a pretext Nak§fend entered the harem of Mehmed

RO§di Pasha, grand vizier under Murad and dismissed by Abdiilhamid in December

1876. His wife, however, would not let her through to explain her reasons. Equally

efendiye verilerek mezbur defterde ise §ahsiyata dair bir §ey olup yalniz balalarina i§bu ibare yazilarak ibtidai emirde kimin yedinde duracak olursa kendisi mUhUrlerek badahu her kimi kandirip celb edecek olursa adan-un dahi imza veyahud miihilrdnd o deftere yazip veyahud mUhUrfinij bastinp 6ylece yedinde duracak idi. Hash bu defterlerin birisi merkum Agah efendi ve digerlerini Abdullah efendi ve Mustafa efendi ve binsi dahi ben aldim idi. "

Ibid, 20b; Kadri (10 B 1295), 22a; Agah (9 B 1295), 24b; Abdullah (12 ý 1295), 81d. Aziz (16 B 1295), 35b: "Sultan Murad'in hali vukuaninda ol vakit bu Kirlandi Paris'e giderek oradan

Fransizli mAnyatizmci [ ... ?] ruhani hocalarindan birisi ahp Dersaadet'e g6dirdii. 01 vakit ise sultan Murad yine Iýirakan sarayinda isede yoktur. Girilip qikilmasi siki degildi. Hasili merkum Kirlandi g6turdiiAd manyatizmciyi bir tarkrib saraya soktu ve iqeride alettahmin bir hafta on giin kadar durdu. Hasih yaptiki §ey sultan Murad'a teessUr edip iyi oldukunu sbylerler. Ben g6tdrdUkU merkum manyatizmeciyi Kirlandi'nin hanesinde g6rdUm. W yUz Uq yiiz lira He hediye [...? ] olarak be§ alti yUz firayi bularak badehu yine merkurn buradan yine Paris'e avdet etti. " " Kavasba§izade Tevfik (28 B 1295), 69b; Muhtar Bey (27 B 1295), 69d and his second statement 68a.


unsuccessful was Kleanti's attempt to approach Mehmed Ali Pasha through Haci Hfisnii Bey, who at that time was president of a military commission. "' Also religious

officials like the kaziasker Seyfeddin Efendi wanted to have nothing to do with Kleanti's plans. Equally, a group of religious scholars (hocalar mocalar) declined to

act without Alyanak Mehmed Pasha, who could not be won over to Murad's cause. "

According to another statement Kleanti also tried to deliver letters by Murad directly

to a couple of high Ottoman officials. Among these were the ýerif of Mekka, Mehmed

Rfi§di Pasha and the military commander Gazi Osman Pasha. In none of these cases, however, Kleanti was successful. 42

As a last resort, according to the statement of Aziz quoted above, Kleanti seems to have looked for support beyond the circle of high Ottoman officials. Apparently he

sent a letter in the name of the Ottoman nation (millet-i osmani) to the British

ambassador to which, however, he received no reply. The story of this letter may well

coincide with Kleanti's visit to Layard in June 1877. At this occasion, as we know from

the ambassador's report to the Foreign Office, Kleanti produced a letter by Murad and implored the ambassador to save the captive ex-sultan from a plot to murder him. 43

After these fruitless attempts, all or at least most of them occurring in the first half of

the year 1877, there seems to have been no more serious efforts by Kleanti to win over

any individual of high standing to Murad's cause. In the committee there was a lot of

talking to recruit men with military power, but none of the suspects' statements gives

any evidence that this was more than talking. In order to attract followers and give a false image of the extent of the conspiracy Kleanti, in the following, often claimed that

some pashas - even European statesmen - were involved in the committee. '.

The fact that in reality the committee had no such high-ranking members, in turn,

seems to have been hard to accept for the interrogators. In almost all of the

interrogations the question about the implication of Ottoman politicians or outside help

for the committee turned up. The authorities rightly insisted that the plan to bring

Murad back to power was doomed without any such support. Obviously it was beyond

their imagination that low-ranking officials could meddle in politics without backing

'9 Aziz (16 B 1295), 35b: "Ondan sonra artik sultan Murad 'Kendisini bilerek gayret edin! Hakkimi isterim! ' diye Kirlandi'ye yazmaga Kirlandi dahi 'Gayret ediyoruz! Kuvve-i cesime tedarigine qali§iyorum! ' diye cevab yazmaga ba§ladi. " " This was probably Mehmed Ali, the commander-in-chief of the Balkan armies. The fact that he died in September 1877 reveals the terminus ante quem for this matter. " Aziz (16 B 1295), 40d; Aziz (20 B 1295), 77a. 42 Abdullah (I Iý 1295), 81d, c. 43 Aziz (16 B 1295), 40d; FO 78/2574, no. 635, Layard to Derby, Therapia, 19/06/1877. " CL Mehmed Nuri (27 Haziran 1294), 15a; Muhtar (23 B 1295), 56d; HUseyin (25 B 1295), 60d; Muhtar (27 B 1295), 69c.


from the traditional political factions, which during AbdUlhamid's reign were more pronounced than ever.

After these various attempts to mobilise support for Murad among the high-ranking functionaries of the empire had failed, Kleanti obviously got to the point where he took

matters into his own hands. It was probably in the second half of 1877 that the variety of plans to reinstate Murad by abducting him from ý-'irakan Palace were taking shape. As it appears from the interrogation protocols it was mainly Kleanti, perhaps supported by Nak§fend and Aziz, who pushed ahead with these plans. Some of the suspects, who

got involved in Murad's abduction, reported that they were taken by surprise with the

scheme and were tricked into giving their assistance to it. But this assurance - which

once more would underline that, at that time, there was no such thing as a 'committee',

but a loose circle of friends - might as well be regarded as a strategy of defence

invented by the suspects to minimise their culpability. The most realistic of all the plans to free Murad was to get him out of qiragan using

the fresh water canals mentioned earlier. These had not only been used to pass on letters between the palace and the outside world. During Ramazan 1294 (September

1877) Kleanti and Ali Bey had visited Murad using this way and thus had established

the feasibility of such a plan. " Why Kleanti waited for its execution until January or

February 1878 is hard to say. One of the suspects claimed that a further letter from

Murad signed 'garib dost Murad' and asking for his freedom was the immediate

incentive to act. 46

One of the first preparations being made by the plotters was to furnish a room in Aziz

Bey's house to be able to hide the ex-sultan. Nak§fend organised new furniture and

cloths and, to mark the dignity of the old and new sultan, even an incense box

(buhui-danhk) was put into the room. Herself as well as ismail Bey temporarily lived

with Aziz to be able to welcome Murad at any time. 47

The most important precondition for the plan to work was the co-operation of the canal

workers, who had to lead Kleanti into the palace, pick up Murad and bring both of

them back again. They were informed about the plan at several meetings, probably

taking place in one week, at Kleanti's and Muhtar's house where also Mihal,

tfitfinciibaýt Hfiseyin and Tevfik Bey were present. The canal workers were, however,

afraid and not willing to co-operate especially since Kleanti wanted two persons,

45 Akif (25 B 1295), 75c; Muhtar (27 B 1295), 71c. According to Aziz (10 B 1295), 20d, Kleanti boasted he could enter the palace at any time he liked flying into the window like a balloon. 46 Tevfik (29 B 1295), 72b.


himself and HOseyin, to enter the palace. Kleanti offered them money, 1000 liral a lot

more than they had received earlier for delivering letters, and tried to persuade them

claiming that he was acting on orders of some important persons, among them the

minister of police, whom they could see the next day at Aziz' house. But the workers did not believe him and still were unwilling to provide their services. '

Probably in the same week at least two meetings were held at Aziz' house to introduce

the plan to free Murad to the remainder of Kleanti's friends. In order to persuade them

and justify his decision in the first meeting Kleanti once again read the last letter by

Murad asking to be freed from the palace. " Although there was some opposition to the

plan, Kleanti announced it to be executed the following day. Also in the second

meeting the next day Kleanti could not persuade all of his friends to stay; according to

their own statements Muhtar and Esad left immediately while a small group of followers stayed to await the ex-sultan. 'O

Kleanti was to go to 1ý, irakan with a carriage, enter the palace through the canals, meet Murad and immediately take him to Aziz' house. But at around half past two at night, he came back announcing that the canal workers had not appeared and that therefore

51 the whole plan had to be cancelled. It remains unclear from the information given in

the suspects' statements, whether the workers had ever agreed to a deal with Kleanti or if the latter only pretended they had in order to keep up the commitment among his

friends. Most likely, however, although they never admitted it, the workers were kept

from keeping their appointment by a person from outside the conspiracy, who, as a further precaution, the next day closed the canals. Henceforth fresh water entered (ýirag'an Palace only through pipes. 5'

The man behind the closing of the canals was Haci Hiisnd. Immediately after the

meeting in Aziz' house he had informed Yakub Han, the Kashgar envoy to the Porte

and Hiisnii's sheikh, whom he had known for years. This also explains the fact that one

of Hfisnii's servants in the night Murad was to be abducted arrived at Aziz' house

informing his master that the ex-sultan would not come that evening. It was

" Agah (18 B 1295), 43d; Aziz (18 B 1295), 43c, 38b; ismail (18 B 1295), 41c. 48 Muhtar (24 B 1295), 51c, 56d; FlUseyin (25 B 1295), 56c, 60d; Muhtar (27 B 1295), 69d; suyolcu Ahmed (27 B 1295), 65d, c; Tevfik (28 B 1295), 69a; Ahmed (28 B 1295), 71b. 49 In the first meeting there were Muhtar, HUseyin, ismail, Filibeli Abdullah, Mihal, Nak§fend and Kadri,

cf. Muhtar (13 B 1295), 23a, and (18 B 1295), 41c, 40b. '0 According to Muhtar (13 B 1295), 23a, there were HUsnii, ismail, Esad, Aziz, Milial, Nak§fend and himself. Aziz (14 B 1295), 29d, names Vacid, Haci Bekir, ismail, HUsnd, Esad, who left earlier, Nak§fend, a certain (Laz) Mehmed and himself. " Aziz (14 B 1295), 29d, c; Aziz/Vacid (14 B 1295), 26a. If Aziz' statement refers to Ottoman time this would have been at half past seven in the evening. 52 Suyolcu Ahmed (27 B 1295), 65c.


immediately after this affair that Hiisnii was brought before the sultan and recruited as a spy as mentioned above. "

After the canals had been blocked there seems to have been two other attempts to free Murad using different ways. It was Kleanti's idea to get Murad over the wall of the

palace with a rope at a place where the palace wall was low and neighbouring a garden on the road from Be§ikta§ to Ortak6y. For unknown reasons, however, Murad declined

54 to be freed on this way. In a second attempt Kleanti tried to enter 1ý-irakan Palace from the seaside by night. He was, however, detected by the palace guards and had to

55 pretend that the storm had accidentally blown his boat to the quay.

Although all these projects came to nothing, the plotters had detailed plans in case they

would have been successful in bringing Murad to Aziz Bey's house in Cerrahpa§a.

There were some suspects, who claimed that Kleanti wanted to smuggle Murad out of the city to bring him to Europe, more specifically to England. 56 All the others related that Murad was to remain in the capital to be re-appointed sultan by acclamation and taking the traditional oath of allegiance (biat). There was, however, considerable

confusion regarding the question by whom and where this acclamation should be

performed. The different answers to this question reflect the different concepts of legitimacy the Ottoman sultan possessed in the eyes of the plotters. Aziz Bey

remembered a discussion turning around this ques tion at the night of the expected

abduction of Murad . 5' The different options where to bring Murad were the Hirka-i

ýerif, the place the mantle of the Prophet was stored, the war ministry or parliament. The first option clearly stressed the religious legitimacy of the sultan with special

regard to the traditional ritual for an Ottoman prince to become sultan. Murad, when he

was made sultan in 1876, had neglected this step and whoever proposed this

proceeding might have acted out of the feeling that this time the ritual should be

performed in the right order. The second proposal, to bring Murad to the war ministry, was more conscious of the

fact that Murad, first of all, had to gain a power basis among the Ottoman military to

challenge his brother Abdiilhamid. Since earlier attempts by Kleanti to recruit

individual commanders had failed it was up to Murad himself to gain the necessary

" HUsnij (21/22 B 1295), 52d, 48b; Azlz (22 B 1295), 48d; Muhtar (13 B 1295), 23a. On Yakub's mission cf. Davison (1963), 273-4 and Karpat (2002c). ' Mihal 05B 1295), 33d. 15 Ahmed Riza (15 B 1295), 32a.

Kadri (10 B 1295). 17b; ismail (16 B 1295), 37b; Mihal (26 B 1295), 61a. 57 Aziz (14 B 1295), 29c.


support. This opinion seems to have appealed to most members of the committee 58 present at the discussion and was also mentioned in other suspects' statements.

There were variants to this pragmatic and power oriented approach to be found. According to one, Murad was to be brought to Kubbe Alti, i. e., to the Council of State,

according to another to the 11ýrivy Council (Meclis-i Has) where loyal members of AbdWhamid like Mahmud, Said and Rauf Pashas would have been arrested and the

59 others would have taken the oath of allegiance to Murad.

The proposal to bring Murad to parliament displayed yet another and more recent

notion of the sultan's legitimacy. It was Esad, who admitted to have been in contact

with some members of parliament, among them its president Hasan Fehmi Efendi. But

he denied to have talked with them about the committee-60 Also Kleanti probably followed this line of thinking since he was a constitutionalist, as I will show in the following. He and others, who stressed this kind of legitimation, seems to have

perceived the parliament as a place of opposition to AbdWhamid's absolutist rule. Apart from these three opinions, which could be found in almost all of the statements, it was Mihal, who voiced the most radical theory about the ideological implications of Murad's re-instatement. He compared the ex-sultan to Napoleon III and like the latter

the former should be made padiýah by the people and therefore be brought to Fatih. 61

That there was to be some sort of popular acclamation was also echoed in another

statement suggesting that students of theology and people (suhtelerlahafiler) had to

take the oath of allegiance on Murad . 6' These opinions clearly reflect the political role

the softas in the capital had played in the downfall of Abdiilaziz in spring 1876.

Given all the eventualities the plans described above contained, especially the lack of

real support by any Ottoman politician, it was very unlikely that Murad would have

been able to supersede his brother. There was, however, also a second and a more direct approach to get rid of Abdiilhamid and that was to assassinate him in the

Ortak6y Mosque while he was performing the Friday prayer. This plan seems to have

emerged quite spontaneously at a meeting, which was held at Kleanti's house. We do

" Mehmed Nuri (27 Haziran 1294), 15b; Mustafa, ibid., 15d; Agah (9 B 1295), 24a; Vacid (14 B 1295), 4b. '9 Aziz (20 B 1295), 46a; HUsnij (21 B 1295), 48b; Aziz (22 B 1295), 48d. 6' Esad (21 B 1295), 56a, 51b. 61 Mihal (20 B 1295), 44b: "Bu sultan Murad'in padi§ah olacagini Napolyon gibi olacakti qUnkii Napolyon dahi mectisten kaqip ingiltere'ye giderek sonradan oradan Paris'e gidip orada ahall kendisine [ ... ?I olup padi§ah oldugunu gibi bey sultan Murad'i egerce saraydan qikarihp Aziz beyin hanesine

g6tjirjilmd§ olsaydi oradan yine kiyafetiyle alinarak Fatih canuna g6tiirdlecek idi. Orada ahaliye Han

ettirilerek 'Padi§ahiniz buraya geldi' diye beyan olunarak 6ylece padi§ahliki 1cra olacakti. " 6' Agah (9 B 1295), 24a.


not know when this meeting took place exactly, but since Agah Efendi was there it

must have been sometimes between December 1877 and May 1878, the date he left the

committee. At first Kleanti seems to have been anxious about the consequences such an attempt on the life of the sultan could have at a time when the Russians were at the

gates of Istanbul. But then, with the strong approval of Nak§fend, he started to develop

the plan. Because Agah claimed that he had contacts to people, who could be

persuaded to commit such an assassination, Nakýfend gave him a dagger and Kleanti a

revolver as well as some money. In the following days, when Agah did not show up

any more and on top of that demanded more money and threatened otherwise he would to go to the police, it became clear that he had just bluffed and that the whole plan had

failed. 63

The official, who led this part of the questioning, remarked that the plan would have

failed anyway without the help of someone working at Ortak6y Mosque, who could

smuggle an assassin into the building. Apparently also Kleanti had put forward this

objection, but Agah responded that he could arrange a meeting with GUrcii ýerif

Efendi, the alim, who had been sent to exile in autumn 1876 after organising a plot

against Abdiilhamid. It is entirely unclear if this, too, was a bluff by Agah or if Aziz

was right claiming that there had been real contacts between Agah and *erif. It is also

unclear what to think of the story Aziz told about a letter from Murad's mother to ýerif, which Nak§fend delivered but the latter declined to accept. " Regarding all the

scheming and double play going on at the time it seems likely that the name of ýerif

was only brought up, because of the reputation he still held for his past opposition to AbdUlhamid. As has been shown earlier, recent events clearly had left an imprint on

the imagination of the plotters.

Summing up the examination of the investigation protocols so far, the Skalieri-Aziz

Committee emerges as a loosely knit circle of individuals, which was held together by

the connection to Kleanti Skalieri and his determination to help the ex-sultan Murad.

This determination was rising steadily with the news that Murad apparently had

recovered from his illness. It culminated in the plan to free the ex-sultan from his

palace and assassinate the current sultan -a plan organised by Kleanti and one or two

of his closest friends.

Obviously Kleanti Skalieri was the driving force behind the conspiracy and an

exception compared to all other leaders of opposition groups as he was the only non-

61 Agah (I IB 1295), 20b and ibid. (7 ý 1295), 47d, c, 77b. 64Agah and Aziz (7 ý 1295), second statement, 77b, c and ibid., third statement, 77c.


Muslim Ottoman subject among them. By having a closer look at Skalieri's person in the following section I would like to determine how his leadership influenced the ideology of the committee. Especially his link to Freemasonry will reveal an additional detail about the committee and its opposition not apparent from the investigation

protocols.

Kleanthi Skalieri and Ottoman Freemasonry

Apart from the information given in the interrogation protocol by his nephew Mihal we know very little about the particularities of Kleanthi Skalieri's life. Born in 1833

descending from an old Phanariote family after his studies in Paris Skalieri went into 65 banking business and later became a stock broker in Istanbul. More interesting than

his youth and career, however, is the fact that he was an important member of the Masonic milieu of Istanbul. How this fact was directly linked to his opposition against Abdiilhamid I will explain in the following.

Up to the second half of the nineteenth century Freemasonry in the Ottoman Empire

was solely confined to the circle of expatriates in the capital and other large port cities. As a consequence the lodges did not want and could not exert any influence on Ottoman internal affairs. It was only long after the beginning of the Tanzimat that

some lodges tried to act as a bridge to Ottoman society by first admitting persons from

the non- Muslim communities and later Muslims into their numbers. Thus they became

a political factor. Many of the Tanzimat statesmen, like Re§id, Fuad and Ali, are said

to have been Masons. For Ottoman liberals the Masonic lodge was a suitable place to

socialise and to exchange new ideas -a capacity that earlier had been solely fulfilled

by the Sufi orders. 66

This function as a bridge between Europe and the empire especially was taken on by

the Union d'Orient, a lodge of French obedience founded in 1863 in Istanbul. 67 Its

members were mainly Ottomans of Jewish, Greek and Armenian extraction and its

programme endorsed Ottomanism, i. e., the equality and peaceful coexistence of all

peoples in the empire. The fact that Skalieri was initiated into this loge and in 1868

was admitted into its chapter for higher grades is a clear indicator of his liberal

political views. In 1865 the president of the Union d'Orient, Louis Amiable, decided to

make an attempt to attract also Muslims to the lodge and therefore translated its rituals

65 SVolopoUloS (1980), 445. 66This is the overall thesis of Zarcone (1993) who shows the functional similarities of these institutions. 67 See Dumont (1983), 178-83.


and its constitution into Turkish. The success was immediate; the number of Muslim Masons was constantly growing up to 1869 when there were 53 Turks among the 143 brethren. Most of them came from the army, but also other palace and government officials could be found. The most famous among them were ibrahim Edhem Pasha, frequently in the Ottoman cabinet, and Mustafa Fazil Pasha, the sponsor of the Young Ottoman exiles in Paris -a fact once more underlining the ideological climate in the lodge.

The end of the Union d'Orient came when a new president in the beginning of the

seventies abandoned the pro-Muslim stance and the lodge was coming under stricter

police observation. In 1873, with many others Skalieri withdrew his membership and the lodge officially ceased to exist in February 1874.

By that time Skalieri's Masonic activity had already shifted to another lodge. I Proodos

(Progress)6' had been founded in 1868 as a lodge of French observance and, like the Union d'Orient, was promoting progressive and liberal values as well as peace and fraternity among all Ottoman subjects. When in 1870 Skalieri became president of the hitherto predominately Greek lodge he opened up its membership for the other ethnic

elements of the empire following the example of Amiable. In 1872/73 among the 68

members of the lodge there were 19 Turks. Most of them were small government

officials - among them some of the members of the committee as I will show in the following section -, but also Namik Kemal was a member of Proodos.

Not figuring on the official list of members but undoubtedly the most prominent of all Turks was Murad, the heir apparent. He probably first got interested in Freemasonry

during his visit to Paris with his uncle Abddlaziz in 1867. Upon his return he received a

letter from the central lodge in Paris, the Grand Orient de France, that was handed over

to him by Skalieri. This meeting was the starting point of the friendship between the

two men, which later proved so vital for Skalieri's decision to form the committee.

Skalieri, who was just seven years older than Murad, seems to have acted as a

inten-nediary relating to the prince European culture as well as the liberal ideas

discussed in his lodge. 69

When Murad himself was initiated to the lodge in October 1872 this was seen as a

personal success of Skalieri. The initiation had to take place under strict secrecy in the

house of Amiable, because, as Skalieri mused in a letter to the Grand Orient in Paris,

the information that the heir apparent to the Ottoman throne was a freemason would

68 See Durnont (1983), 188-94. 69 K6ratry (1878), 58,61.

Opposition to the Tan-7imat State 156

have been highly unpopular with the conservative Muslim milieu and would have delivered a pretext to Abdiilaziz to change the line of succession. "

With the initiation of Murad Ottoman Freemasonry clearly entered a new phase regarding its political role in the empire. There might have been hopes from the side of the mother lodge in Paris to be able to widen French political influence in the empire once Murad would have become sultan. As for the men on the spot like Skalierl and Amiable, they clearly tried to influence the prince to eventually transfon-n the Ottoman

Empire according to their ideals. Their strategy mainly seems to have been to

encourage Murad's liberal ideas. It was said that Amiable drew out a draft constitution for the empire on demand of the prince. Through his Mason connection Murad was

also brought in contact with Midhat Pasha. Skalieri, in turn, was busy lobbying the British ambassador Elliot and kept him informed about Murad's ideas. 71

The active support for Murad from the side of some highly placed Masons and their

entanglement into Ottoman politics was further deepened by the events of summer

1876. After their highest hopes had been fulfilled they were crushed almost

instantaneously with Murad being declared unfit to rule. This had an immediate effect

on Proodos: its normal life was suspended for a couple of weeks because everybody

expected reprisals by the new sultan. To get rid of the pro-Murad image, in November

1876 a faction among the brethren forced Skalieri to abandon his office as president.

As a consequence most of the friends and supporters of the ex-sultan left the lodge. The

next blow for its membership came in 1878 when Skalieri had to flee Istanbul and

several of its long standing members were arrested. Especially the remaining Turks

deemed it too dangerous to be associated with the lodge and by the end of 1878 all of

them had left. After that Proodos continued its life with a mainly Greek membership

until 1901.72

Even after Skalieri had been forced from the presidency of Proodos his struggle to help

his friend Murad in many ways still was connected to Freemasonry. He might have

attempted to organise the loose circle of friends and followers of the ex-sultan into a

structure similar to a Masonic lodge. This suggests his idea to collect signatures under

the document mentioned above. It is also likely that Skalieri used his Mason contacts

to rally outside support for Murad. In the time before and after he had to flee from

70 Cf. SVolopoUlOS (1980), 446-7,450-1; Dumont (1983), 191-2. 71 Svolopoulos (1980), 452-3; K6ratry (1878), 59,86-7. 72 Dumont (1983), 192-4.


Istanbul he ran a campaign to influence international public opinion in favour of the

cause of the ex-sultan. The most concise product of this campaign was a booklet Skalieri produced in 1881 on the occasion of the trial of Midhat Pasha, who stood accused to have been implicated in the death of AbdUlaziz in 1876.73 The text adds nothing of importance to the events described above apart from the story of Skalieri's adventurous flight to Athens together

with Nak*fend kalfa. Skalieri went so far as to deny the existence of a secret society to

conspire against AbdUthamid altogether. From the rest of the book, however, some of Skalieri's motives to act on behalf of his friend Murad become clearer. The basic legitimation for his campaigning was that Murad had recovered from his

illness for a long time and thus had to be reinstated as the rightful sultan. In a

reconstruction of the events of summer 1876., to which he claimed he had been an eye

witness, Skalieri tried to uncover the intrigues by the now reigning sultan AbdOlhamid.

In his treatise Skalieri went so far as to accuse AbdWhamid to have tried to kill his

brother with the help of black magic. 74

As a second complaint he added the maltreatment of Murad by his brother after he had

to give up the throne. Skalieri referred to several incidents when Abdiilhamid

exchanged Murad's servants, among them Na§fend, to exert a tighter control over his

brother. To this avail also the access of the outside world to the ex-sultan was limited

up to a point that Murad became a prisoner in 1ý-irakan Palace. According to Skalieri

also Murad's personal property was partly confiscated and his allowance from the civil list was drastically cut. "

The booklet was part of Skalieri's campaign to petition influential personalities to

speak up for the cause of the ex-sultan. Apart from the Ottoman statesmen that were

approached by the members of the committee these were the British ambassadors in

Constantinople. As already mentioned in the end of June 1877 Skalieri had an interview with Layard imploring the ambassador to help him to save Murad from his

imprisonment. He ascertained that Murad was perfectly sane and produced some of his

letters and in the end even offered to arrange a meeting between the ambassador and

the ex-sultan. Regarding the political implication of Skalieri's offer and the good

relationship between Layard and Abddlhamid it was no surprise that nothing became of

" Scalieri (1881). 74 Ibid., ch. 2. 75 Ibid,, ch. 3.


that. Later ambassadors were equafly unimpressed by the lengthy letters they received by Skalieri. "

While it is easy to establish the connection between Skalieri's political activities and Ottoman Freemasonry, such a connection is less clear regarding other individuals or groups engaged in the early opposition against Abdiilhamid. Ironically, neither the

suspects nor the interrogators in the trial against the Skalieri-Aziz Committee made any mention of a link between opposition and Freemasonry. Soon, however, this became a stock accusation by the authorities until, in the early nineties, the Freemasons were branded "a habitual source of sedition"'. 77

In the case of a conspiracy to kill Abdii1hamid that was detected in September 1879 at least one of the six members, who were aU of Greek origin, admitted to have been a

member of the Proodos lodge. The group had formed around a former servant of Murad

named Sokrat and had hired a kiUer,, who was caught when he tried to climb the walls

of Yi1diz palace hiding a dagger in his cloths. The motives of the plotters remain

somehow shady - one suspect ascertained that Sokrat made AbdUlhamid personally

responsible for the fact that he was out of work since the deposition of Murad - and it

is not clear whether the link to Proodos had influence on the ideology of the group. 78

The picture gets even more blurred when trying to assess what was behind the rumours

of a much wider Masonic conspiracy against Abdiilhamid that continuously emerged in

the early years of his reign. According to Kleanti Skalieri's nephew Mihal also Edward, British heir apparent and son of Queen Victoria, worked for the re-instatement

of Murad. The two princes probably had been introduced when Edward personally

supervised Abdiilaziz' one week excursion from Paris to Britain in 1867 and they

might have met again when the prince of Wales visited Istanbul in 1869. Their

acquaintance frequently had been brought in connection with Freemasonry. Edward

himself had become a Mason during a visit to Sweden in 1868 and back in London had

been initiated into British Freemasonry where he became a grand master in 1875.

76 Cf. FO 78/2574, no. 635, Layard to Derby, Therapia, 19/06/1877. The letter sent to the British ambassador and signed 'millet-i osman" to which Aziz (16 B 1295), 40d, referred may have been handed over on this occasion. Also cf. FO 195/1332, no. 504, Scalieri to Goschen, Athens, 21/06/1880

and FO 195/1384, no. 490, Scalieri to Dufferin, 06/07/188 1. "Cf Hanioklu (1995), 35. "A rdsum6 of the investigations is to be found in Y-EE 106/6, the interrogation protocols in YEE 10617-13. The member of Proodos was a certain Haccar or Nikolas Haggiar, cf. Svovopoulos (1980), 442.


Edward might have tried to influence Murad to adopt Freemasonry, but there is no positive proof that later he tried in any way to assist Murad to regain power. 79

Likewise an allegation that Midhat, while he was in exile in Europe, used his Mason

contacts to plot the overthrow of AbdUlhamid, cannot be proven. 'o All these rumours have to be understood in the political climate during AbdUlhamid's regime and the fear

of the authorities vis-a-vis any independent social organisation, which could escape the

surveillance of the Ottoman government.

To sum up, Skalieri's way into opposition is easily understandable from his personal

relationship to Murad. The Mason lodge was the framework for this friendship, it

offered the space and the ideology to foster it. Skalieri's opposition activities after Murad's deposition were still connected with this Masonic framework, but to realise his plans to bring Murad back to the throne by abducting him from his palace or

assassinate the ruling sultan he had to find other allies. These were the rest of the

suspects, who had been arrested in June 1878 and whose statements I have presented

above. In the following and last section of this chapter I will examine more closely what their

connection to the opposition against AbdUlhamid was. This is evident for the ex-

servants of Murad, who were materially touched by the deposition of their former

master, owed him loyalty and, in some cases, felt personal affection towards him. The

connection is less clear for the ten odd persons in Skalieri's circle, who came from the

civil bureaucracy of the capital. Most of them had personal contacts to Skalieri, some

even were Masons, as I like to show in the following. Apart from that on a more

general level they were representants of an emerging Ottoman bourgeoisie, who, as

products of the modernisation policy of the years after 1839, looked for a new form to

express their new political aspirations.

The Ottoman civil bureaucracy and opposition

All opposition movements I have presented so far in this study had members from the

Ottoman bureaucracy in their ranks. This group had undergone a remarkable

" Cf. Mihal (20 B 1295), 46b: "'Bir bUyUk komite dahi daha var irrii§ yani Ingiltere komitesi olup [...? ] kiraliqe Victorya'nin oklu prens DigAl [de Galles] dahi bu kornitede beraber imi§' diye, I§itirdik. Fakat kornitede kimler bulunduklarini isin-deriyle bilemem. Burada §a'yesi ve gerek kin-derile muhabere eylediklerini bilemem. " The existence of such a conspiracy is also ascertained in two secret reports to Abdfilhamid in 1878 reproduced in Uzunqar§ili (1944b), 245, n. I. On Prince Edward cf. Lee (1925), 1, 272-5,291,296-8. '0 Y. EE 141/15, n. d.


development during the Tanzimat. As I have shown earlier the civil bureaucracy had been among the first objects of reform and after the death of Sultan Mahmud II its high

functionaries had acquired a dominant position in the state. At first its principal representative, Re§id Pasha, had to share his power with other contenders, who were

connected to the palace. In the 1850s, however, partly because of the increasing

dependence of the empire on European support, his successors, Fuad and Ali Pashas,

had acquired a virtual monopoly regarding the high offices of the state. This monopoly

was broken only after the death of Ali in 1871 when the sultan tried to assert his

personal influence over politics again. Together with the ascension to power of these individuals slowly a new class emerged in Ottoman society: the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Its distinctive mark was its formation

in the modem and European style schools that were founded during the Tanzimat era. These schools not only enabled the bureaucratic bourgeoisie to reproduce as a distinct

social group independent from the favour of the sultan or other patrons unlike the old

scribal service. They also induced them with new political values beyond personal loyalty towards the sultan. 81

These new values were forged into an ideology of opposition by a new group of intellectuals. They were discussed in voluntary associations not controlled by the state

and propagated by new channels like the newspaper. The first full representatives of this class of intellectuals were the Young Ottomans, but Predecessors of this type had

already been present in the Kuleli conspiracy. These intellectuals did not only protest

against the general conditions in the empire and the failure of reform, but especially

applied their new political values to their own superiors. It was they, who pointed to

the stark discrepancy between the promise of a rational-legal administration and the

real behaviour of the high functionaries of the civil bureaucracy that was still

entrenched in traditional Ottoman political culture. "'

The members of the Skalieri-Aziz Committee, who originated from the Ottoman bureaucracy, may be understood as late examples of this trend, only that now it was the

sultan and not the Tanzimat statesmen they opposed directly. At least two of the

suspects involved in the committee bear a striking resemblance to the Young Ottoman intellectuals. The first of these, Ali ýevkati, was a political activist and journalist with roots in the civil bureaucracy. Bom in 1843 as the son of a rich customs director of Izmir Ali had been an assistant in an office of the Council of State. His clearest

G6ýek (1996), 80-6. Findley (1980), 212-8; GNek (1996), 125-33.


connection to Skalieri was his membership in the Proodos lodge, but he was also a journalist writing for Theodor Kassap's paper istikbal (Future). It was for his articles that he was reprimanded by the sultan and later sentenced together with the members of the Skalieri-Aziz Committee, although he seems not to have been deeply involved in it. By the time of his sentence Ali had already left Istanbul and gone to Europe as a precaution. There he started producing some small exile papers against Abdiithamid

until he died in 1896 in Paris without having ever returned home. Ali can count as the

clearest example of the continuity between the early opposition against Abdiithamid

and the Young Turk opposition of the 1890s. 83

Also Esad Efendi, " a clerk in the High Council and later chief secretary in the

commercial court of appeal, fits the Young Ottoman model of opposition as explained

above especially regarding his work as a journalist. Esad mainly wrote for the Basiret,

the paper, which in the 1870s had helped to popularise pan-Islamic ideas. " He was also

a regular contributor of articles to the Hayal (Idea) and the Vakit for which also Ali

Suavi wrote. The range of his political ideas are best understood with regards to two

booklets Esad wrote in the 1870s. 'Union of Islam' (ittihad-i islarn, 1873) was one of

the first contributions to the discussion around a pan-Islamic policy for the Ottoman

Empire. The treatise promoted Islam as the central ideology to strengthen the Ottoman

Empire in the way of the national states of Europe. In 'Constitutional Government'

(Hiikumet-i me§ruta, 1876) Esad tried to justify a constitutional government for the

empire on the basis of the sharia to prevent the abuse of power by the administration. In the years after his conviction Esad spend most of his years in Syria and later again in

exile in Bitlis were he died 1899.86

About the other suspects from the civil bureaucracy, who had been arrested for their

association with Skalieri, we know considerably less than about Ali and Esad. They

were not engaged in journalism, so that it is hard to judge their political ideas. Because

of their anonymity, however, they might be even more typical examples for the

Ottoman bureaucratic bourgeoisie and its relation to opposition against the sultan. The

connection of the members of the Skalieri-Aziz Committee to this class I will

demonstrate in the following starting with the example of Aziz Bey.

" The list of the Proodos members in Svolopoulos (1980), 442, gives his name slightly distorted as Safaati Ali, employe de gt.. Also cf. Sel (1975). " Cf. Uzunqar§ili (1944b), 257; Osmanli Mdelliflen 11,85. 15 On the role of the Basiret cf. Karpat (2001), 119-24. " Tfirk6ne (1994), 208-9,234-7; Tunaya (TCTA).


Details about Aziz Bey's life, who, at least in the last phase of the committee, had been its second most important man, are scarce. According to the information he himself

gave to his interrogators he was 42 years old and an official (mukabeleci) in the

ministry of Evkaf. In the following interrogations he said little about his political ideas. Given his close relation with Skalieri it is probable that he was a liberal. Another very strong indicator for this assumption is Aziz' membership in the Proodos lodge. "'

Unfortunately we have no direct comment by Aziz what motivated him to join

Ottoman Freemasonry, but at the time it offered an ideal place to discuss modem

political ideas. It was also the only place where members of the bureaucratic

bourgeoisie could meet members of the commercial bourgeoisie coming from the

minorities like Skalieri.

It is interesting to know that at the same time Aziz followed a sheikh of the Mevlevi

order, Kadirallah Efendi, although this affiliation had, as he assured, no political implication. 88 As it is known from other examples the world of Freemasonry and Sufism did not exclude each other. Contemporaries frequently pointed to the parallels in both organisations' rituals and mystical contents. But first of all both were voluntary

organisations outside the control of the state where one could socialise with likeminded

people. '9

Moreover, the role education played in the case of Aziz and other members of the

committee reveals the bourgeois origin of the plotters. We do not know anything about Aziz' own education, but from the interrogations it becomes clear that he sent his son Kadri to a riiydiye, probably to enable him to start a career in the central administration like his father.

Here it is interesting to remember that also some of the other suspects, who had

connections to Aziz or Kleanti, were involved in the modem education system of the

empire. Above all this were the two officials, who were teachers in different rfiýdiye-

schools, Muhtar and Ahmed Riza, as well as Vacid, a member of the Council of Education. In the late nineteenth century it was a common practice for Ottoman

officials to augment their pay by having a second job, for example as a teacher. ' The

two cases of this practice to be witnessed among the officials involved in the Skalieri-

" Haccar (Haggiar), who was arrested for his implication in the Sokrat affair, named Aziz as a member of Proodos in his interrogation of 18 (Za? ) 1296, YEE 106/11, p. 14. In the Proodos membership list of 1873 there is fisted one "Aziz Mahmoud, empl. de gt. " which, if he did notjoin later, probably was Aziz Bey. " YEE 23/5, Aziz (16 B 1295), 40c. '9 Zarcone (1993), 301-26. "0 Cf. Findley (1989), 302.


Aziz Committee pose the question as to how far also economic motives were part of the suspects' decision to partake in the opposition against Abdiilhamid.

Like the civil bureaucracy as a whole also the payment system for the officials had been modernised with the general introduction of salaries in 1838. Due to the constant financial crisis in the empire, however, this system never worked smoothly during the

whole of the nineteenth century. Often salaries were in arrears for several months, paid

only partly or paid in the form of salary vouchers, which fetched only half of their

nominal value on the free money market. 9'

Regarding these conditions it has been calculated that, in the 1870s, a government

official needed a nominal salary of 1500 to 2000 kuruý to support a small family. 92

Among the officials, who had been arrested in connection with the Skalieri-Aziz

Committee and whose salary is stated in their interrogation, only Esad with 1700 kuruý

reached this level. Aziz' salary of 1000 kuruý was below this level as were the salaries

of the two teachers with 700 and 500 kuruý respectively. The two remaining known

salaries were even lower. Tevfik, a clerk in the foreign office, earned just 100 kuruý

and Rauf, who worked in the Evkaf, too, 550.

These figures confirm the general perception of falling living standards in the civil bureaucracy in the 1870s calculated for the personnel of the Ottoman foreign ministry. They might also give an indication for an increasing willingness of the civil bureaucracy to take part in oppositional activities or political violence. For the

individual surely this financial hardship meant that pecuniary promises, made by

Skalieri on several occasions, were the more tempting. 93

" Findley (1989), 293-305. 92 Findley (1989), 329. 9' Findley (1986); Findley (1989), 328.


V11. CONCLUSION

Opposition and legitimacy in the Tanzimat era

The foregoing historical analysis of five opposition groups has revealed many examples of the interdependence between opposition and legitimacy during the Tanzimat era. It underlines how differentiated, varied and complex relations of legitimacy between rulers and ruled can be in any historical context. Legitimacy may be enshrined in a state ideology, but in the concrete historical situation obedience has

to be negotiated anew according to the circumstances. Vis-a-vis different social groups

active in opposition the state shows a different reaction and claims a different form of legitimacy. I would like to close with some general remarks trying to bring together the

results from the five case studies into a broad sketch of Ottoman legitimacy and its

contestation in the nineteenth century. Starting with a description of the Tanzimat in Weberian terms, the study has revealed the development of the empire's system of domination towards a more rational-legal form. Above all, this concerned the relationship between the sultan and an emerging

modem-style bureaucracy. Later also the legitimacy the Ottoman government claimed

vis-a-vis its subjects, especially the non-Muslims among them, was gradually being

redefined. As long as this process remained within the flexible boundaries set by the

system of historical bureaucratic empire and did not touch the regime's traditional

resources of legitimacy, the Tanzimat per se was no source for opposition. The more so

as it carried the promise of being the only means to save the empire in the face of

external threats and internal dissolution. The fact that the reform programme could not

avert the permanent crisis, however, made the Tanzimat prone for opposition. This opposition naturally was expressed in ideological terms deriving from the tensions

between the old and new forms of legitimacy claimed by the Ottoman government. There was, however, no simple confrontation between the old and the new legitimacy

and its supporters or opponents. As we have seen in various cases, often the ideology

of opposition groups contained elements from both sides. For the contemporaries there

was no strict border between the two sides especially since the Tanzimat as a new and

still developing ideology was open to different interpretations. But also the elements of

the traditional Ottoman legitimacy were used in various ways by the opposition and the

state to bolster their respective claims of legitimacy.

The most important ideological issue present in most of the five case studies presented

above was the position of Islam in the Ottoman system of government. In its basic form


opposition with reference to religious ideologies was directed against the secularising strands of the Tanzimat. It was embodied best by Sheikh Ahmed's Islamic-revivalist ideas shaped by his membership in the Nak§ibendiye. On a less articulate level it was also present in the various protest movements from the side of the softas. In both cases the main issue was the changing position of the non-Muslim subjects of the empire as well as the redefinition of the empire's external relations with the European Powers.

The religious motive was adapted differently by the Young Ottomans, who integrated Islam into their prima facie modem belief system as a means to express their disappointment with the broken promises of the Tanzimat. They forged religion into a

modem ideology used to support goals, the most important being the modernisation of

education, that were very similar to the ones of the Tanzimat.

Frequently interwoven with the religious issue was the question of power in the Ottoman state. Viewed from an institutional angle, should ultimate sovereignty lie with the sultan as an autocratic ruler or should it be entrusted to a wider group of Ottoman

politicians or even to an elected parliament? On a more abstract level, should the

sharia or a constitution set down the rules of government in the country? Finally, what

role were the people to play in the changing system? Regarding these questions the opposition movements displayed various positions using

elements from the old and new legitimising ideologies present in the Ottoman Empire.

The groups, whose main target were the Men of the Tanzimat, usually wanted to

restore the powerful role of the sultan, which had been lost at the beginning of the

Tanzimat era. Their traditional picture of an autocratic ruler could go together with a

sort of populism. Especially the Young Ottomans maintained that the wellbeing of the

people was best served by an absolute monarch. Like Sheikh Ahmed they saw the

sultan mainly as an executor of the sharia without, however, coming to the same

conclusion about the role of Islamic law. For the Young Ottomans Islamic and

constitutional government were in essence the same. A constitution was supported for

quite different reasons by others, but also for people like Skalieri the person of the

sultan stood in the focus of his struggle.

An opposite trend regarding the question of sovereignty was embodied in the coup

against Abdiilaziz. Midhat and his followers wanted to change the role of the sultan

from a traditional patrimonial ruler to a modem representative monarch. The fact that

his project ultimately failed delivers a verdict on the attempt to modify the Ottoman

system of legitimacy in the Tanzimat. With a sultan who was willing to fill his

traditional role and use his resources of legitimacy any change was hard to achieve.

That all five opposition groups promoted an alternative and presumably better


candidate to the throne underlines the fact that the sultan remained central to the question of Ottoman legitimacy. Although they contested the legitimacy of the actual ruler it is fair to see that all of them remained loyal to the house of Osman. In the five

case studies we see different interpretations of Ottoman legitimacy, but never a fundamental rejection of the structure of the Ottoman state.

Opposition as conspiracy

The variety of ideological positions described above lets the opposition movements in

the nineteenth century appear as a string of hardly connected events. There are, however, also elements demonstrating that opposition was shaped by a common

political environment and therefore displayed common features. Most importantly

there is the prevalent form shared by the five opposition groups we looked. All of them

were organised as conspiracies, clandestine small groups with usually not more than

two or three dozens of followers. As we have seen, conspiracy was not the only fonn of

opposition in the Tanzimat era, but because it was the most organised form, it is better

to study than other more elusive manifestations of opposition I mentioned in passing. At the end of the day the five conspiracies feature so prominently, because they were

unsuccessful and thus got into the document-producing machinery of the Ottoman

state. In general conspiracy and intrigue was a time honoured phenomenon in Ottoman

political culture usually occurring as harem or office conspiracies to further the

political standing of high-ranking members. The fact that these traditional conspiracies had almost no connection to questions of legitimacy seems to be the reason of why Mardin did not count them seriously among the forms of 'popular rebellion' in the

article evoked in the introduction of this study. ' Clearly the apolitical tradition of

office conspiracy still existed in the nineteenth century. Conspiracies of this kind

frequently crossed the paths of the five opposition groups and sometimes they were

entwined with the latter as in the case of the coup against Abddlazlz. All the five

conspiracies studied above, however, also contain elements, which easily make them

fit Mardin's typology. Consequently I would like to see conspiracy as an additional

element in the pattern of popular rebellion against the government.

The five conspiracies fit Mardin's typology not only in that their opposition involved

questions of legitimacy and rested on the sort of ideologies described above usually

' Mardin (1988), 26. He disrrusses them as forms of 'anarchy'.


embodied by a charismatic leader. At the same time they were 'popular' in the true sense of the word in containing members from all kinds of social groups and walks of life. We have seen that some of these members were not politicised at all and got involved with the opposition groups for other that political reasons. But most of the

groups contained people, low-ranking members from the Ottoman bureaucracy or the

military, who were usually not involved in Ottoman politics, but who by virtue of their

modem education represented a new political class. In wont for other more modem forms of political organisation - political parties were only to appear much later in the Ottoman Empire - conspiracies, which frequently imitated other popular forms of

organisation like the tarikat, the charity or the masonic lodge, were the only way to discuss and express their political worldview. This heterogeneous nature together with their small size and their isolation also was the reason for the lack of success of most of the conspiracies. Mardin's observation that

a popular rebellion followed a pattern - gossip, co-optation of the Janissaries, agitation in the bazaar and among softas - and could only be successful, if all the element came

together, still holds true for the nineteenth century. All the leaders of the five

opposition groups clearly were aware that, to be successful, they had to start such a

sequence of events and link up with other groups in the capital. Given the ideologies

involved most of them sought the support of the religious milieu and the softas as the

only organised group in the capital that could get away with openly defying the

government. Another group the conspiracies frequently tried to mobilise, albeit with less success, were the Muslim refugees. The third and most important group was the

Ottoman military, which traditionally had supported popular rebellions through

Janissary mutinies. In the nineteenth century, however, support from this side seems to

have been hardest to obtain. Through the professionalisation in the first half of the

century the army seems to have been successfully separated from the people, so that

with one exception there was never more than a few individuals from the military to be

found in the conspiracies. It is telling that only the conspiracy of ministers against AbdUlaziz succeeded to

establish connections to these suppoit groups and execute a coup. The co-operation of

high-ranking politicians and a handful determined officers of a new type and a rigorous

planning was the ingredient for successful action. All the other conspiracies ended up

stillborn, because they failed to reach beyond their small circles depending very much

on personal relationships. In the end all the conspiracies were denounced by one of

their own members. In the long run no charismatic individual was able to control all of

his followers and thus the authorities got the chance to break the secrecy surrounding


the groups. It is ironic that apparently the best insurance for a conspiracy was the

suspicion of the government. The more rumours there were going around concerning possible conspiracies against the government, the more secure a real one could be.

As the conspiracies seem to fit into an older pattern of popular rebellion so does the

uniform and stereotype reaction by the authorities vis-a-vis the opposition. All

conspiracies were designated as fitne -a term that underlines the monopoly the Ottoman government claimed over all political activity, which went beyond

politicising in the coffee houses, and that had been employed summarily for all kinds

of activities for centuries. Generally the political intention of the various plotters was

played down and they were treated as mere criminals. This stance also becomes apparent in the juridical process to deal with these opposition

groups once they had been detected. On the one hand this. process showed some

elements typical for the Tanzimat like the ministerial commissions judging the culprits

according to the newly introduced criminal code. The contents of the judgements, on

the other hand, were quite traditional. Punishment to exile to a remote comer of the

empire for the more important members of the groups, or for the lesser members to the

galleys (arek), which usually meant hard labour in the nineteenth century, were

conventional Ottoman punishments. The few death sentences the Ottoman government dispensed usually were commuted

and members of the ruling elite were very quickly reintegrated into the Ottoman

administration. In general the Ottoman government in the Tanzimat era seems not to

have felt threatened too much by the opposition, which, indeed, was minimal

compared to other problems the empire had during this time. Only during the reign of AbdUlhamid this cavalier attitude towards conspiracy changed. With a short preview of

the period following the Tanzimat I would like to close this study.

Opposition in the Hamidian era

The opposition to Sultan Abdiilhamid (1876-1909) in many ways resembled the types

we have already encountered during the Tanzimat. The most important political

development certainly was the emergence of the Young Turk movement and the CUP

in the 1890s. The Young Turks stood in the tradition of the liberal-constitutional

movement of the 1870s and they represented groups that had been politically active

before, like the students of the modem schools and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie.

However, also opposition linked to other groups of society, like high ranking Ottoman


politicians or the softas, continued to play a role in the opposition of the Hamidian

period. '

For several reasons the relation between these opposition groups and the sultan seemed to have been more tense and charged with hatred than before. First of all, Abdillhamid's personality and past experiences seem to have shaped his reaction to

political opposition. Tbe events at 1ý-iragan Palace in May 1878 apparently had a considerable impact on him. The British ambassador Layard reported that the sultan was afflicted by sleeplessness and headaches as well as a general suspicion against his functionaries and the army including the ambassador himself to have been part of the

plot. AbdUlhamid seriously feared his immediate overthrow and was already painting his expected exile in dark colours. '

After one week this depression vanished from the sultan's mind, but subsequently the

same symptoms returned in a more permanent manner. For fear of assassination Abdiilhamid completely isolated himself at Yildiz Palace and very rarely showed in

public. He became pathologically suspicious of everyone and everything and built up a

network of spies reporting on the activities of real and imagined opponents. Apart from these psychological reasons it was Abdtilhamid's understanding of office

which influenced his reaction to opposition. The sultan seems to have been convinced

of his divine right to govern the Ottoman state and his personal mission to save the

empire, so that every means seemed appropriate to him to fulfil this task. The earliest

outcome of this attitude was the closure of the parliament and the suspension of the

constitution both of which limited his personal rule. Subsequently, AbdUlhamid

centralised power in the palace to an extent unknown in Ottoman history and made

every decision dependent on his personal approval. 4

Given these facts it comes as no surprise that AbdUthamid was very susceptible to the

question of legitimacy in the Ottoman Empire. The authorities in the cases examined

above seem largely to have ignored the changes the legitimacy structure of the empire

had undergone in the Tanzimat era and the challenges new ideologies and forms of

political expressions posed. In contrast, Abdiilhamid actively looked for new ways to

counter the legitimacy crisis of the state using all the available modem forms of

creating legitimacy that had been tested mainly by European monarchies. The

I Hanioglu (1995), 7-70. 3 FO 78/2789, no. 692, Layard to Salisbury, Therapla 27/05/1878; ibid., no. 693,31/05/1878; ibid., no. 752, 'nerapia, 08/06/1878. 4 Karpat (2001), 161-8.


particularity of the Hamidian era was, that it were often traditional Islamic symbols that were cast into the new legitimising forms. '

Abdillhamid was able to remain in office longer than any other Ottoman sultan in the

nineteenth century, because of this profound understanding of modem politics paired with ruthlessness in his dealings with opposition to his regime. The need to present the Ottoman state tradition as an unbroken chain was the reason why he deterred not only the present, but also past opposition. This can be observed most clearly in the

persecution of the men implicated in the coup against Abdiilaziz. The sultan was eager to eradicate any notion that this event could be used as a precedent to end his own rule. The most promment victim of persecution was Midhat Pasha. After he had become

grand vizier in winter 1876 Midhat was exiled from the empire to Europe in February

the following year. Having returned and worked for a short time in the administration

of the provinces, in 1881 he was arrested and condemned to death for the implication

in the 'murder' of Abdiilaziz. The death sentence was commuted and Midhat was sent to exile to Taif in Arabia where he was assassinated on order of the sultan in 1884.

The fate of exile was shared by Hayrullah Efendi the ýeyhfllislam, who had issued the

two fetvas to depose Abdiilaziz and Murad. Likewise Sfileyman Pasha, the director of

the military academy, who became commander-in-chief of the Balkan armies in the

Russo-Ottoman war, was put on trial after the war, being accused of having disobeyed

orders. He was sent to exile to Baghdad where he died in 1892. Even the lower ranking

officers and military students taking part in the coup seemed to have been watched

closely. Their names can be found on a list in the Ylldiz Palace archive, which might have been used to incriminate thern. ' Also a report about the Society of Martyrs

prepared at some point after the death of AbdUlaziz, perhaps in 1880/1, might have

been used for such a purpose. Apart from the five leaders in the inner circle of the

conspiracy it contained the name of mfiýir Hidayet Pasha, who at the time of the plot

had been HUseyin Daim's aide-de-camp. In the general atmosphere of mistrust during

the reign of AbdUlhamid the implication in a conspiracy was ideal for a denunciation

by a rival. In Hidayet's case, however, this did not work out and he continued to hold

high positions in the provincial administration until his death in 1892. '

I That is the general topic of Deringil (1991) and ibid. (1998). 'Y. EE 20/26 (n. d. ). 7 Y. EE 94/1 (n. d. 1298? ) and Sicill-I Osmani IV, 627.


V1111. ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbreviation of Hijri-months

M= Muharrem S= Safer Ra = Rebiyiilevvel R= RebiyUlahir Ca = Cemaziyiilevvel C= Cemaziyiilahir

B Receb * *aban N Ramazan L ýevval Za = Zilkade Z= Zilhicce

Archival abbreviations

171

A. MKT. MHM = Bab-i Ali Evrak Odasi. Sadaret Evraki. Mektubi Whimme Kalemi, in

BOA

A. MKT. NZD = Bab-i Ali Evrak Odasi. Sadaret Evraki. Mektubi Kalemi. Nezaret ve Devair, in BOA

A. MKT. UM = Bab-i Ali Evrak Odasi. Sadaret Evraki. Mektubi Kalen-ii. Umum Vilayat

Kismi, in BOA

BOA = Ba§bakanlik Osmah Ar§ivi, Istanbul

1D irade Dahiliye, in BOA

FO Foreign Office, in the PRO

HH Hatt-i HUmayun, in BOA

HR. MTV = Hariciye Nezareti Evraki. Mfitenevvid Kisnu, in BOA

PRO = Public Record Office, London

Y. A. HUS = Sadaret Hususi Maruzat Evraki, in BOA

YEE = Yildiz Esas Evraki, in BOA


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Opposition to the Tanzimat State : conspiracy and legitimacy in the Ottoman Empire, 1859-1878

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