Ontological Commitment and The Natural Definition of Reality

Ontological Commitment and ‘The Natural Definition

of Reality’

Jonathan Ochs, 2013University of Maryland

What is Ontology?

What is Ontology? Ontology is the study of what there is.


“An ontology” can be thought of as ‘a list’.



Studying language to do ontology.



Studying language to do ontology. Ontological Claims

What is an Ontological

Claim?


Claim? A statement about…well…anything!


Claim? A statement about…well…anything! Some examples:



“Apples exist.”



“Apples exist.” “There are apples.”



“Apples exist.” “There are apples.” “Some apples are red.”



“Apples exist.” “There are apples.” “Some apples are red.”

Is this last statement different from the first two?

What is Ontological Commitment?


The commitment one has to the existence of a thing when one talks about that thing.


The commitment one has to the existence of a thing when one talks about that thing. “Apples exist” or “There are apples”.



Clear commitment to the existence of apples.




“Some apples are red.”




“Some apples are red.” Not so obvious.





‘Explicit Commitment’ vs. ‘Implicit Commitment’.





‘Explicit Commitment’ vs. ‘Implicit Commitment’. For my purposes, both express

ontological commitment.

The Problem for Ontological Commitment


We commit ourselves to things that we don’t intend to commit ourselves to.



Two in-your-face-annoying examples about ordinary language:



Two in-your-face-annoying examples about ordinary language: “Santa exists” vs. “Santa does not

exist”.



Two in-your-face-annoying examples about ordinary language: “Santa exists” vs. “Santa does not

exist”. “There is no beer” … In the fridge, I

mean!


Even worse when we write out the things we say in ordinary language using symbolic logic:


Even worse when we write out the things we say in ordinary language using symbolic logic: E.g. “There is no beer” is symbolized as

~x(x is a beer).



~x(x is a beer).

Even if we are explicit about what exists, things still get messy!



~x(x is a beer).

Even if we are explicit about what exists, things still get messy! E.g. “Numbers exist” is symbolized as x(x

is a number).



~x(x is a beer).

Even if we are explicit about what exists, things still get messy! E.g. “Numbers exist” is symbolized as x(x

is a number).

My focus will be on these latter sorts of problems.

Where I’ll Go from Here

1. Three symbolic formulations for expressing our ontological commitments:1) Existential Quantifier2) Existence Predicate3) Reality Operator

2. Address their shortcomings.

3. Propose an original formulation which evaluates ontological claims in terms of ‘naturalness’.• ‘The Natural Definition of Reality’

Quine’s Quantificational

Theory of Ontological Claims


Theory of Ontological Claims “To be is to be the value of a

variable”. (Quine, 1961)



variable”. (Quine, 1961) Existentially quantified idioms—”There is…”, “…exists”, “Some…”, “All…”, etc.—are symbolized using the existential quantifier x.




E.g. “Do numbers exist?” amounts to “Are there numbers?”




E.g. “Do numbers exist?” amounts to “Are there numbers?” So the question is whether x(x is a

number)?

Kit Fine’s Objection to the Quantificational

View


View “[The quantificational account] gets the basic logic of ontological commitment wrong.” (Fine, 2010)


View “[The quantificational account] gets the basic logic of ontological commitment wrong.” (Fine, 2010)

Argument evaluating the relative strengths of the two claims “integers exist” and “natural numbers exist”.


View"Consider a realist about integers; he is ontologically committed to the integers and is able to express his commitment in familiar fashion with the words 'integers exist'. Contrast him now with a realist about natural numbers, who is ontologically committed to the natural numbers and is likewise able to express his commitment in the words 'natural numbers exist'. Now, intuitively, the realist about integers holds the stronger position. After all, he makes an ontological commitment to the integers, not just to the natural numbers, leaving open whether he might also be committed to the negative integers. The realist about integers--at least on the most natural construal of his position--has a thorough-going commitment to the whole domain of integers, while the natural number realist only has a partial commitment to the domain.However, on the quantificational construal of these claims, it is the realist about integers who holds the weaker position. For the realist about integers is merely claiming that there is at least one integer (which may or may not be a natural number) whereas the realist about natural numbers is claiming that there is at least one natural number, i.e. an integer that is also nonnegative. Thus, the quantificational account gets the basic logic of ontological commitment wrong. The commitment to F's (the integers) should in general be [stronger] than the commitment to F&G's (the nonnegative integers), whereas the claim that there are F's is in general weaker than the claim that there are F & G's." (Fine, 2010, pp. 165-6)

Another Option:The Existence Predicate


Friederike Moltmann proposes ‘existence predicates’. (Moltmann, 2010)



One might commit one’s self to the existence of numbers like this: x(Nx Ex)



One might commit one’s self to the existence of numbers like this: x(Nx Ex) Reads: “For all x, if x is a number,

then x exists”.



One might commit one’s self to the existence of numbers like this: x(Nx Ex) Reads: “For all x, if x is a number,

then x exists”. To be taken as a primitive.

Fine’s Objection to the Existence

Predicate


Predicate Makes existence trivial! For it is uninformative about what ‘existence’ is.


Predicate Makes existence trivial! For it is uninformative about what ‘existence’ is.

“Do numbers exist?” … An acceptable answer would be “Sure they do, just ask your tax accountant!”

Fine’s Solution:The Reality Operator


Use a ‘reality operator’ to make explicit the concept of reality.



Placed in front of a sentence to express “It is constitutive of reality that ”.




Rx =df R[(x)]




Rx =df R[(x)] “We can now define an object to be real if, for some way the object might be, it is constitutive of reality that it is that way.” (Fine, 2010, p. 172)


To be taken as a primitive. (Fine, 2012)



Effectively separates ‘existence’ from ‘reality’.



Effectively separates ‘existence’ from ‘reality’. A thing may ‘exist’, but it need not

be constitutive of reality that it exists.

Problem with the Reality Operator:

The Primitiveness Problem


The Primitiveness Problem Argument against the ‘primitive existence-predicate’ works equally well against the ‘primitive reality-operator’.



Needs to be given truth conditions!



Needs to be given truth conditions! Otherwise, we learn no more about

Fine’s notion of ‘reality’ than we learn about ‘existence’ if we take the existence predicate as a primitive.

Coming Up…

Coming Up… Ted Sider and ‘The Fundamental Structure of Reality’.


Intuition about what is ‘natural’.


Intuition about what is ‘natural’. Using ‘Naturalness’ to save the reality operator.


Intuition about what is ‘natural’. Using ‘Naturalness’ to save the reality operator.

The Natural Definition of Reality

The Fundamental Structure of

Reality


Reality “Carving reality at its joints”. (Sider, 2011, p. 1)


Reality “Carving reality at its joints”. (Sider, 2011, p. 1)

“[Discerning structure] means inquiring into how the world fundamentally is, as opposed to how we ordinarily speak or think of it.” (Sider, 2011)

‘Intuition’ for Sider:

“Naturalness”


“Naturalness” Intuition behind our understanding of what is fundamental/joint-carving.



E.g. Suppose 3 objects:



E.g. Suppose 3 objects: 2 electrons in identical intrinsic

states, and a cow.




states, and a cow. “It is the most natural thing in the world to say that the two electrons go together, and neither goes with the cow.” (Sider, 2011)




states, and a cow. “It is the most natural thing in the world to say that the two electrons go together, and neither goes with the cow.” (Sider, 2011) This is what is meant by “joint-

carving”.

‘Intuition’ for Fine


Consider Fine’s argument against the existential quantifier:



“Intuitively, the realist about integers holds the stronger position. After all, he makes an ontological commitment to the integers, not just to the natural numbers, leaving open whether he might also be committed to the negative integers. The realist about integers--at least on the most natural construal of his position--has a thorough-going commitment to the whole domain of integers, while the natural number realist only has a partial commitment to the domain.” (Fine, 2010, p. 165)



“Intuitively, the realist about integers holds the stronger position. After all, he makes an ontological commitment to the integers, not just to the natural numbers, leaving open whether he might also be committed to the negative integers. The realist about integers--at least on the most natural construal of his position--has a thorough-going commitment to the whole domain of integers, while the natural number realist only has a partial commitment to the domain.” (Fine, 2010, p. 165)

Are Fine and Sider indirectly getting at the same sort of idea?

In What Follows…

In What Follows… If we speak of Fine’s notion of reality in terms of Sider’s notion of naturalness, then there is a way for Fine’s reality operator to evade the primitiveness problem.

In What Follows… If we speak of Fine’s notion of reality in terms of Sider’s notion of naturalness, then there is a way for Fine’s reality operator to evade the primitiveness problem.

BUT FIRST! … The language of Ontology.

The Language of Ontology:

“Ontologese”


“Ontologese” Eli Hirsch: Metaphysical debates are merely verbal disputes. (Hirsch, 2010)


“Ontologese” Eli Hirsch: Metaphysical debates are merely verbal disputes. (Hirsch, 2010) No position is better than any other.



On what metaphysical accounts should we ground our ontology?



On what metaphysical accounts should we ground our ontology? Sider: On those which carve at the

joints of reality.




joints of reality. Need a language of ontology

—”Ontologese”.





—”Ontologese”. What will Ontologese consist of?





—”Ontologese”. What will Ontologese consist of?

Sider: Only the most fundamental things are to be included.

A ‘Naturalness Operator’


How do we discern the most fundamental terms?


How do we discern the most fundamental terms? Sider: Evaluate their naturalness.



Sider is getting at a ‘naturalness operator’:



Sider is getting at a ‘naturalness operator’: Insert 2 sentences, and , in the

scope of the operator to indicate that one is more natural than the other.



Sider is getting at a ‘naturalness operator’: Insert 2 sentences, and , in the

scope of the operator to indicate that one is more natural than the other.

N(,) means “ is more natural than ”.

Using the Naturalness Operator to Save the Reality Operator

Using the Naturalness Operator to Save the Reality Operator Incorporate the naturalness-relation

as a condition for that which is stated to be constitutive of reality.



Naturalness-relation can provide the terms by which we can attribute truth conditions to the reality operator.



Naturalness-relation can provide the terms by which we can attribute truth conditions to the reality operator.

Gets around the primitiveness problem.


R[(x)] [(x) & ~(x)(N(,))]


R[(x)] [(x) & ~(x)(N(,))]

“It is constitutive of reality that (x) iff (x) and it is not the case that there is some sentence containing x, such that is more natural than .”


R[(x)] [(x) & ~(x)(N(,))]


We can define both x to be real and the sentence (x) to be real.


R[(x)] [(x) & ~(x)(N(,))]


We can define both x to be real and the sentence (x) to be real. It is because of the latter that this

formulation gets past the primitiveness problem on the grounds that the sentence makes for a description of reality; that is, a description of what x is like in reality.

R[(x)] [(x) & ~(x)(N(,))]

R[(x)] [(x) & ~(x)(N(,))]

Right Conjunct: ~(x)(N(,))

R[(x)] [(x) & ~(x)(N(,))]

Right Conjunct: ~(x)(N(,)) Merely stipulates the naturalness-

relation.

R[(x)] [(x) & ~(x)(N(,))]


relation. E.g. (x) = “Electrons are subatomic

particles”.

R[(x)] [(x) & ~(x)(N(,))]



particles”. Problem: Consider the fundamental

sentence “Some electrons satisfy contradictions”.

R[(x)] [(x) & ~(x)(N(,))]





Left Conjunct: (x)

R[(x)] [(x) & ~(x)(N(,))]





Left Conjunct: (x) (x) (x) is trivial on its own

R[(x)] [(x) & ~(x)(N(,))]





Left Conjunct: (x) (x) (x) is trivial on its own. Imposing the requirement that is

true on the reality operator rules out any false statements.

ReferencesFine, K. (2010). The Question of Ontology. In D. Chalmers, D.

Manley & R. Wasserman (Eds.), Metametaphysics: New essays on the foundations of ontology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Fine, K. (2012, March 23). Interview by R. Marshall. Metaphysical kit., Retrieved from http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/metaphysical-kit/

Hirsch, E. (2010). Ontology and Alternative Languages. In D. Chalmers, D. Manley & R. Wasserman (Eds.), Metametaphysics: New essays on the foundations of ontology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Moltmann, F. (2010). On the Semantics of Existence Predicates. In Ingo Reich (ed.), Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 15, Saarbruecken.

Sider, T. (2011). Writing the book of the world. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Quine, W.V. (1961). On What There Is. In From a Logical Point of View. Harvard University Press.

Ontological Commitment and The Natural Definition of Reality

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