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ImplicationsforBeer'sontologicalsystem/metasystemdichotomy

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Implications for Beer’sontological

system/metasystem dichotomyMaurice Yolles

Liverpool John Moores University, Liverpool, UK

Keywords Cybernetics, Management

Abstract Stafford Beer developed managerial cybernetics, but there were many facets of hiswork. Most of his work concerned epistemology, and little concerned ontology. Not all of the aspectsor implications of his work has been fully recognised, and an attempt shall be made to explore oneof these. In particular, this paper explores his paradigm by considering some of theepistemologically and ontological angles. Some of the implications for Beer’s work will also beshown to have led to the creation of a virtual paradigm capable of exploring his achievements“externally”, after Godel.

Introduction

The 1960s saw the maturing of a few great thinkers who, in the 1970s and1980s, led the way into forms of constructivism that paved the way for a newemergence into the social sciences. These included people like Foucault (1974),Habermas (1970), Piaget (1977) and Vygotsky (1978). It is rarely recognised thatit also included Beer who developed his own constructivist approach[1]conditioned by the inconsistency theory of Godel (Beer, 1959, 1979, p. 311). BothPiaget and Vygotsky began their work with an interest in child development,adopting related, but distinct approaches that result in related, butdifferentiable axioms for their respective paradigms. Vygotsky wasinterested in the social processes that enabled learning to develop. Piagetused a cybernetic approach for his interest in how the interactions betweenchildren contributed to their learning processes, and this developed into anexamination of the relationship between subjects and objects (rather likeFoucault (1974) whose interest lay in subjectification and objectification aspolitical processes). Habermas (1970) was interested in the cultural, social andbehavioural aspects of people, and in the subjective transfer of meaningthrough the process of communication.

Beer was interested in how social communities were able to survive,realising that regulation was central to this. Like Habermas, he also recognisedthe need for communications. However, he was guided by the formal logic ofsystems by Whitehead and Russell (1910) and Godel’s (1931) incompletenesstheorem that illustrated the limitations of language. His interest in thislimitation led him to the development of a new cybernetic paradigm with clearpractical application for the management of coherent social communities, seen

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as systems with controlled operations. The control emanated from ametasystem that communicated internally through a metalanguage. Whilethe logical systems theory that Beer admired explored systems through the useof metasystems, his interests were very much centred on applied science. Theparadigm that he developed created an ontological dichotomy defined in termsof the system and metasystem. The term dichotomy was not the one normallyused by Beer, but in fact it is rather harmless because it means a “division intotwo”[2] that can be argued here to represent two ontological species of a givengeneric entity. The generic entity may be seen as a self-organising body and itsontological species are the system and metasystem that interact as an intimateontological couple. That is, they each have validity claims about reality thatoperate in a way that mutually relate: one validity claim to reality is manifestedin the other relative to its validity claim to reality. Hence, a thought in themetasystem may be manifested differently in different systems.

Survival, for Beer, related to viability, which he saw as occurring throughemergence. This is illustrated by a comment by Denis Adams, a close academiccolleague of Beer, when he recently said in a private communication that Beer“was very interested in viability which I see as an emergent behaviouralproperty of a complex system (that we can never establish without doubt) andhow we think it may work. But as a result of observations and thinking abouthow different systems (activities seen as if they were systems) seemed to have avarying behavioural emergent property, he was able to ‘see’ characteristics thatthe organisation of a viable system should have. These were systemiccharacteristics in that they had to be abstracted and described from aninteracting dynamic whole system.”

Beer’s pragmatic interest lay in mapping his analytical ontologicalconceptualisation of the metasystem/system onto practical situations. Whilehe developed the basis of a new ontology through the creation of thedichotomy, his pragmatic interest centred on epistemology, which becomemanifested through his viable system model (VSM). To illustrate this, againquoting from Denis Adams.

The thrust of Stafford’s work in VSM is epistemological in nature; “what do we know andhow do we know that” is how he defined epistemology to me “in a nutshell”. So the VSM helpsyou to think about a situation in terms of viability, and the VSM is describing thecommunication and information flows round a system that is doing the same (what do theyknow and how do they know that) for the sub-system behaviours.

The relationship between the dichotomous parts is recursive. By this we meanthat the ontological system/metasystem couple can be embedded as a wholewithin either the system or the metasystem to give it a new ontological contextand an epistemological consequence.

Beer’s approach also appears to be constructivist in a way that is consistentwith the ideas of not only Piaget, but Vygotski too. Beer was true to the ideas ofthe incompleteness theorem, and this paper discusses his developments not in

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the language of his paradigm, but consistent with his view, in anothercybernetic language that provides a way of exploring his managerialcybernetics externally.

The system paradigm, and beyondElementary systems thinking emerged from the work of the Gestaltpsychologists who emphasised that the study of the mind should be seen asa whole rather than as a collection of psychological parts. The approach led tothe notion of holistic thinking (Ellis, 1938).

The idea of using a system to understand the phenomena is normallyattributed to work in the 1930s by Ludwig von Bertalanffy, a German Biologist.He gave the name general systems theory to a discipline devoted to formulatingprinciples that apply to all systems (Bertalanffy, 1951). Others like Boulding(1956) and Churchman et al. (1957) developed these, and applied them toorganisational theory.

The traditional concept of a system still used in some areas of organisationaltheory (for instance, in the Organisational Development (OD) methodology(Yolles, 1999) used in Human Resource Management) is an input-output device.Thus, for instance, Fogel (1967) looked at the human as aninformation-input/decision-making/decision-output processor, and Nadler andTushman (1977, 1979) used the notion for organisational behaviour (Figure 1).Further conceptualisations of the idea of the system developed, harnessing theidea that it is not only a processor, but also has the property of synergy andwholeness (Ackoff, 1971).

The concept of the system, however, also had a cybernetic dimension. In afoundation paper, Arturo Rosenblueth, Norbert Wiener, and Julian Bigelow(Rosenblueth et al., 1943) were interested in the teleological properties ofsystems, those that relate to their identity and degree of autonomy and

Figure 1.Nadler and Tushman’sperception of systemicorganisational behaviour

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coherence. In particular, they were interested in biological, physiological, andsocial systems, and their control and feedback processes. These authors formedthe Teleological Society, and after Wiener coined the term cybernetics, theychanged its name to the Cybernetic Society.

While the conceptual base of cybernetics still centred on the single concept ofthe system, it was to become transformed by Beer with the introduction of a newframe of reference that involved a second conceptual arm, the metasystem. Thenotion of the metasystem is credited to Whitehead and Russell (1910) in theirlogical study of formal systems. Recent theoretical developments of this workhas led to Metasystem Transition Theory (MTT) by Turchin and Joslyn (1999)as a means by which higher levels of complexity and control are generated, andby Palmer (2000) as a general theory of metasystem engineering. Anotherdevelopment that had relevance to metasystem theory was the incompletenesstheorem of Godel (1931), who was concerned with the completeness (if anargument is valid, then it is provable) and soundness (if an argument isprovable, then it is valid) of logical systems, and showed that any attempts toprove that a logical system is sound (and therefore having validity and truth)will result in a paradox unless reference is made from outside the system.

Beer became interested in the use of the concept of the metasystem as apractical way of explaining the viability of coherent social communities throughself-regulation, self-organisation and control. As shown in Figure 2, part of hisdirection for this came from Godel’s (1931) inconsistency theorem (Beer, 1979,p. 311). While he does not seem to have used the term metasystem in his veryearly work, he did use the term metalanguage throughout. He noted that asystem uses a language to communicate about what it does – its operations.However, language is defective because there are always propositions about thelanguage itself that cannot be expressed in the language. Consequently, anotherlanguage is required that is “over and beyond” the language being used at thetime, and this is a matalanguage. It is parallel to the notion supported by Beer of“looking at problems themselves and not at their content” (Van Gigch, 1987,p. xv). In particular, in Beer (1959, p. 169), we are told that “a control systemcannot discuss itself and that a higher order [system] is needed in which todescribe the behaviour of a system expressed in a given language.” Indeed, hetakes this a little further by considering that control is practically linked tooperations through its local management. Beer (1966, p. 425) also says that“Since the normal occupation of management is to be expert in using thepractical language of the firm’s operations, there is the danger that themanagement will never speak the metalanguage in which its own structure canbe discussed.” While the term metasystem was clearly implied in his earlierwork, it does not appear to have been used in his books until later, when Beer(1972) explicitly adopts the term metasystem as the residence of themetalanguage. It is, he says, a “second order system” from which languageabout the system itself and its language can originate.

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The nature of the metasystem is that it operates as a control impulse domain,which in human systems occurs through the process of “thinking”, andaccording to De Bono (1977) has come to be associated with beliefs. Without themetasystem, the system would behave with spontaneous responses that areprogrammed into its structure through what Yolles and Dubois (2001) refer toas strong anticipation[3]. In the context of the human being, like Beer, De Bonorelates the concept of the metasystem to the social community when hesuggests that without the metasystem a person would act according to its ownpersonal systems, which might be based on immediate gratification,self-indulgence and impulse. Thus, the metasystem lies outside individualsystems and overrides these factors in favour of society and a longer time base.

Figure 2.The development ofthe applied use ofthe metasystem byStafford Beer

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De Bono provides an illustration of the use of the metasystem: an individualmay only collect enough food for his immediate needs, but the metasystem mayrequire him to collect enough to store for the winter as well. For De Bono, tosome extent, the success of societies has depended on the strength and natureof the metasystems they have created.

By creating a management approach incorporating the system/metasystem,Beer produced a new paradigm for management science and indeed in socialscience. To see this it is appropriate for us to discuss the idea of paradigmchange. It has been only within the last 30 years or so, largely since the work ofKuhn (1970), that we have considered how paradigms change their form.Incremental change involves the development of base[4] concepts and theirstructured relationships, creating new knowledge. Paradigms also changedramatically as new base concepts arise that alter their frames of reference, i.e.as new conceptual extensions enter their frames of reference (Yolles, 1996, 1999).In doing so, paradigm holders expand their capacity to explain and thereforediagnose the phenomena that they perceive. Such dramatic change has also beenreferred to as paradigmatic revolution[5] or metamorphosis. It occurs because ofa perceived need by paradigm holders to respond to inherent inadequacies,anomalies or paradoxes (e.g. Zeno’s paradox[6]). Such metamorphosis can bepart of an evolutionary process within which a new species of paradigm arisesthat has its basis in an existing paradigm[7]. Metamorphosis is not spontaneous,and paradigms first pass through a “virtual” stage (Midgley, 2000; Yolles, 1996,1999). VST is an example of this; its original development occurs because of aperceived need to respond to the problem of paradigm incommensurability(Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Yolles, 1996, 1999), and at that time other approachesseemed unable to adequately respond to it[8]. VST can be historically related tothe principles of managerial cybernetics.

Thus, Beer created a new paradigm whose frame of reference moved from asingle base conceptualisation of the operational system, to two: the operationalsystem and conceptual metasystem. We have already said that Beer’s interest inthis lay primarily in the epistemological basis of their relationship that wasassociated with structured communications and meaning. His creation of themetasystem/system dichotomy was clearly an ontological one, but his interesthere did not appear to extend to the proper ontological considerations that Casti(1989) would consider is important. The epistemological dimension is reflectedin conditions that enabled viability to develop, supported by structuredprocesses of communications that effectively related to semanticcommunications embedded in what Schutz and Luckmann (1974) would calllifeworld processes. The ontological analysis can be understood by following alead taken by Habermas (1987) in his three worlds model, and where he exploresthe validity claims about reality for each world resulting a distinct ontologicalcharacteristics that differentiate the realities. Therefore, in Beer’s terms, we arein a position where we should examine the validity claim about reality for both

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system and metasystem. This is illustrated in Table I and derives from Beer(1979, p. 311, 57, 70, 120). The system and metasystem are ontologicallycoupled, the connection occurring through the boundaries that differentiatethem. To elaborate on this, following Yolles and Guo (2003), the system andmetasystem each have boundaries that condition their validity claims aboutreality, and the boundary of one domain is differentiated from that of the otherthrough its ontological horizon[9]. This horizon maintains a content that variesdepending on the cognitive perceiver that provides an entry into what may bemeaningfully reflected on, spoken about, or acted over. The two domains areontologically related, and their horizons meld[10] when the domains are seen asan emergent whole. However, this can only occur if the boundaries that createthe horizons also harbour ontological migrations[11] that condition thatmelding. Thus, ontological horizons both distinguish and connect differentiablevalidity claims about reality. This notion provides entry into the understandingthat the boundaries have themselves transformation attributes.

Epistemologically the metasystem can be perceived to operate by housing aworldview that the members of an organisation (or more generally socialcommunity) hold to, and it is the repository of the knowledge that thecommunity accepts to perform its operations. Social communities areautonomous when they define, create and manage their own futures. Acorollary to this is that autonomous systems are recognised to exist only whenthey have a worldview(s) that has associated with it a language that caneconomically represent and effectively use its own knowledge.

Viability and recursionBeer (1979) wanted to provide an approach that can make autonomousorganisations viable, where viability is the ability to maintain a separateexistence and to survive as an identifiable entity through appropriateself-regulation and self-organisation. The metasystem has a role in this. Anorganisation is composed of a set of local systems, and each has its own set ofoperations. While local management manages each set of operations, thedifferent local systems with their operations are collectively managed through

Types of reality Nature of reality

System A first-order system composed of interactive operational objectsthat together form a whole, the perception of which is conditioned bya cognitive knowledge-based frame of reference. It is relative to individualsubjectivity of groups that have developed normative perspectives

Metasystem A second-order system that operate through concepts, thinking andbeliefs, from which knowledge derives. The local individual or groupbelief-based creation of concepts and their patterns are held inworldviews that establish a frame of reference, and determine what isknown and associated meanings

Table I.Realities for Beer’ssystem and metasystem

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the metasystem. These must operate together systemically with coherence(Beer, 1979, p. 120), and for Ackoff (1971) with synergy and wholeness.

An important aspect of organisations that has impact for their viability isthat they should be seen in terms of a set of nested system ontological focusesof reality that are also logically distinct levels of examination. This means thatthe ontological model can be applied and re-applied to different focuses ofexamination, each focus bringing in local complexity that cannot be seen froma higher focus. Each time this occurs, the nature of the ontology model becomesrelative to its host focus. One ontological focus can be used as the reality fromwhich the whole system is referenced (the frame of reference), and be referred toas the referencing focus with its vertically embedded subordinate focuses. Thisnesting is sometimes referred to as a logical hierarchy, but the term can leadto confusion in people’s minds by mistaking the meaning with that of asocio-political hierarchy typical of bureaucracies. The nature of the nesting offocuses is that at any referencing focus of examination, the system has a set ofoperations that can be expressed in terms of the deeper set of subordinatefocuses.

Recursion is often a concept used within methodology (Yolles, 1999). Forinstance, it is an essential part of Stafford Beer’s VSM when it is used as thebasis for methodological inquiry into organisations that may not be viable, andit can be used to correct the faults that it finds. Recursion is also quite intimateto the earlier works mentioned, for instance, Whitehead and Russell (1910).The system/metasystem couple can occur at every focus of examination,and the ability to apply the notion of the couple to distinct focuses is a form ofrecursion. The notion of recursion can be recalled to mean the applicationof a whole concept or set of actions that occurs at one logical level (focus) ofconsideration at a lower logical level (or focus) of consideration.

What is particularly interesting here is that the recursive use of thesystem/metasystem dichotomy provides not only a shift in the degree ofrelative complexity accessed relative to the reference focus, but also in therelativistic process the metasystem must be capable of being assigned adifferent worldview(s), with its different knowledge and its own metalanguage.Implicitly, this means that Beer has developed an approach that, because of itsknowledge implications, is fundamentally constructivist as well as providingan important entry into an understanding of the nature of the autonomousorganisation. To see this, let us first explore the notions that underpinconstructivism.

Knowledge acquisition paradigmsGuba and Lincoln (1994) are interested in the methodology, and identified fourknowledge acquisition paradigms that underpin them: positivism,postpositivism, constructivism, and critical theory. However, Anderson(1993) provides a distinct view of the classifications proposed by Guba andLincoln. Taking this into consideration, this distinction can likely be

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differentiated into two classes, positivism and constructivism, there being avariety of forms of the latter (Table II).

More generally, we can define ontological species of knowledge acquisitionparadigm. They are normally embedded within concepts of either realism orrelativism, as illustrated in Table II. In doing so, we shall consider theconsiderations of Guba and Lincoln initially, and their four species ofparadigm. For them, constructivism is relativistic, and relativists believe thatreality is defined by what it is locally perceived to be, and a definable socialcommunity usually defines that locality. Other perspectives adopt forms ofrealism. Epistemological species can also be differentiated, by distinguishingbetween knowledge acquisition paradigms that adopt objectivism orsubjectivism. Guba and Lincoln hold that positivism and postpositivism areobjectivist, while constructivism and critical theory are subjectivist. We shouldnote that their view of constructivism is defined in terms of the ontology ofsocial constructivism and the epistemology of cybernetic constructivism asidentified in Table II. Their postpositivism and critical theory both support

Postpositivism Constructivism

Aspect Positivism

(cognitive

constructivism)

Critical theory

Habermas

(1971)

Cybernetic

Beer (1972,

1979)

Radical

(Piaget, 1977)

Social

(Vygotsky,

1978)

Ontology Realism Bounded Relativism

Description Naıve

realism

Critical realism Historical

realism

Personal

or social

relativism

Personal

relativism

Social

relativism

Nature of

reality

Reality

exists,

and may be

apprehended

Reality exists

imperfectly. Is

probabilistically

apprehendable

Reality is

local and

cognitively

demiurgic:

shaped by

socially

related factors

(e.g. political,

cultural,

economic)

Reality is

local and

cognitively

demiurgic

being shaped

by

socially

related factors

Reality may

exist, but is

mediated by

individual

senses

Reality is

socially

constructed

Epistemology Objectivism Subjectivism

Description Dualist/

objectivist

Modified

dualist/objectivist

Transactional/

subjectivist

Transactional/

subjectivist

Transactional/

subjectivist

Transactional/

subjectivist

Knowledge

creation

Value free,

and through

objectivity,

findings

must be

replicable

to be true

Through

falsification,

findings

replicable and

probably true

Findings

are value

mediated

through

consensus

Findings

are value

mediated

Findings are

individual, and

connected to the

interrelationship

between subject

and object

Findings are

socially

created

through

normative

values

resulting from

interaction

Table II.Comparativeaxiomsfor eachspecies ofKnowledgeAcquisition Paradigm

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realism, and many realists are also instrumentalists (or logical positivists)believing that reality is defined by the readings that have been acquiredthrough measuring instruments.

One area of importance to management processes is communication.A positivist/postpositivist view of interpersonal communication looks atthe technical phenomena and expresses the efficiency of transactions.A constructivist view sees a communication episode as part of culturalframework with subjective outcomes. Critical theory takes a rather more bleakperspective on what communication is for, and its conceptualisations may beexplored best through the work of Habermas (1987) on Communicative Action,where participants to a process of communication pursue their planscooperatively on the basis of a shared definition of the situation. Similarly,Luhmann’s (1995) work on social science is concerned with the informationbound within a communication, noting that its nature must take on board thenotion that it means something very different for the sender and the receiver.

Positivism has an ontology that is naıvely realistic – that is, there is a realitythat may be apprehended and that we can see it as it “really” is. Itsepistemology adheres to the notion of objectivity, and the possibility of findinguniversal truths. Those who hold positivistic views see reality to existautonomously from any observer, and inquirers can be objective andnon-participant observers to the events that they see. The events can berepresented by observer independent measurables called data that representthe “facts” of a single objective “reality”. Thus, for instance, a giveninvestigation should always produce the same result for any observer if thetheory about it is “true”, and if it is undertaken “scientifically” (though what isscientific is defined by positivists in terms of a set of propositions for practicethat are consistent with a positivist epistemology). The truths set-up as apattern of propositions represents knowledge. Through deductive reasoning,the approach usually embeds an attempt to test theory in order to improve bothunderstanding of a situation and ability to make predictions about it.Positivism has a long tradition. It is sometimes referred to as mechanisticthinking as it paralleled the machine age western industrial revolution. In thelast century, it was manifested within psychology as behaviourism, and it hassome relevance to the learning theory of organisations (Yolles, 1999).

Positivism purports that statements that emerge from a theory should bepositive and testable, but this can be problematic in a complex world. This isbecause statements that may first appear to be simple may be quite complexand convoluted, and the creation of testable hypotheses may be highlyproblematic. Postpositivism arose as a counter to positivism to this.

The problems of quantum mechanics, chaos and complexity have beencaptured in postpositivism with its “participatory interminglings” that linksthe observer and that being observed, rather than perceptions of objectivethings standing apart from human subjectivity (Fischer, 1998). In short, the

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traditional understanding of the physical world as a stable or fixed entity is nolonger adequate. However, there is no standard definition of “postpositivism”.Its base assumption is that reality exists, but can never be fully understood orexplained, given both multiplicity of causes and effects and problem of socialmeaning. Objectivity can serve as an ideal, but requires a critical community ofinterpreters. Critical of empiricism, it emphasises the social construction oftheory and concepts, and qualitative approaches to the discovery of knowledge.

There is a critical tradition in postpositivism that is explained by Myers(1999). A critical realist believes that there is a reality independent of ourthinking that science can study. While positivists are realists, the criticalrealism of postpositivists supports the notion that observation is fallible andhas error and that all theory is revisable. That is, the critical realist is critical ofour ability to know reality with certainty. Unlike the positivist, the criticalrealism of the postpositivist believes that the goal of science is to seek the truthabout reality. Owing to the fallibility of measurement, the postpositivistsupports the notion that multiple measures and observations are needed, eachof which may possess different types of errors that can be related and thereforeeliminated. The postpositivist also believes that all observations aretheory-laden, so that scientific inquiry is inherently biased by their culturalexperiences and worldviews. To deal with this, they reject the relativistic ideaof the incommensurability of different perspectives. That is the idea that wecan never understand each other because of our different worldviewsdeveloped through our individual cultural experiences, leading to ourindividually different patterns of knowledge that deliver meaning to us fromour experiences and communications. Data information that defines replicatedfindings that create knowledge are considered to be true only probably.

Myers further contends that most postpositivists are constructivists whobelieve that we each construct our view of the world based on ourperceptions of it. This view will be developed further through theconceptualisations supported by Anderson (1999). It supports the notionthat since perception and observation are seen to be fallible, ourconstructions of reality must be imperfect. Postpositivists do not believethat any individual can see the world perfectly as it really is. All scientificinquiry is biased and all observations are theory-laden. Objectivity inpostpositivism is a social rather than individual characteristic involvingcritique across a subject area. Unlike Myers, Guba and Lincoln (1994) donot admit that postpositivists are technically constructivists. They agreethat like positivists who support the notion of an objective reality,postpositivists believe that this may only be apprehended imperfectly andprobabilistically, and only an approximate image of reality may bepossible. A distinction between constructivists and postpositivists, however,is that the former believe that they can construct their own reality whilethe latter are constrained in this by a positivist reality. Another distinction

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is that in positivism, replicable findings are assumed to be true. Inpostpositivism, however, the concept of falsification arises, where findingsare examined critically to see if they can be shown to be false.

Supportive of Guba and Lincoln, Fischer (1998) paints a picture ofpostpositivists as “interpretive consensualists” rather than constructivists.From an epistemological perspective, he tells us that empirical data that areaccepted by consensus becomes knowledge through interpretative interactionwith the perspectives of others. It is only by examining such data throughconflicting frameworks that the presuppositions giving it meaning can beuncovered. The crucial debates now become centred on their underlyingassumptions. Such deliberations produce new understandings in a processbetter framed as a “learned conversation” than the pursuit of empirical proof.Emphasis shifts from the narrow concerns of empirical-analytic theory to thedevelopment of “a rich perspective” on human affairs. Within this context,knowledge is the evolving conversation that is more accurately understood asconsensually “accepted belief” than as proof or demonstration.

Horkheimer and others developed critical theory in relation to the politicaldisappointments at the absence of revolution in the West, the development ofStalinism in Soviet Russia, and the victory of fascism in Germany (Habermas,1987; Held, 1980, p. 116). It was intended to explain mistaken Marxianevaluations without breaking with its fundamental intentions. The formproposed by Habermas (1970) is expressed in terms of his theory of knowledgeconstitutive interests.

Critical theory is a blanket term that may be defined to include bothpostmodernism and poststructuralism since their epistemology supports thenotion that inquiry is value determined (Guba and Lincoln, 1994).Epistemologically, critical theory is transactional and subjectivist. Aninquirer and the situation being inquired into are assumed to be interactivelyconnected through the values of the inquirer and any others involved (theinquiries). Any data information, taken as findings that create knowledge, aretherefore value mediated. As such a properly constituted value laden personalinterpretation of data information from findings made through personal valuesis seen to be valid.

The ontology of critical theory tells us that while there may be a realityseparate from experience, it can only be known through experience makingit relative to the viewer. Since all individuals have distinct experiences, thisleads to the notion that each view of reality is unique. In particular, itholds that reality is virtual as opposed to being tangible, and is shaped bysocial, political, economic, ethnic and other factors that crystallise overtime.

Myers (1999) tells us that inquirers who adopt a perspective through criticaltheory assume that social reality is historically constituted and that it isproduced and reproduced by people. Although people can consciously act to

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change their social and economic circumstances, critical inquirers recognisethat their ability to do so is constrained by various forms of social, cultural andpolitical domination. The main task of critical inquiry is seen as being one ofthe social critique, whereby the restrictive and alienating conditions of thestatus quo are brought to light. A critical framework focuses on theoppositions, conflicts and contradictions in contemporary society. It may beseen as the existence of any entity (a thing, object or event) that is perceivableand that can be experienced in some way. As such phenomena are what weshall call “cognitively demiurgic”: to be formative or creative, and derivingfrom the notion of one who fashions the material world out of chaos. It isconsistent with the notion of creative observation as defined by Roy Frieden(1999) that physical reality is a result of an interaction between a viewer andacquired information. Unlike constructivism, it is not consciously constructed.However like it, reality is locally made.

Following a lead offered by Carter et al. (1997), the underlying assumptionsfor critical theory can be identified as:

. all thought is mediated by power relations that are socially andhistorically constituted;

. the relationship between “concept and object” (relating to say an ideaabout something, and the thing itself) and “signifier and signified”(relating to say an indicator of something about a thing and that which isunderstood about it) is socially (and culturally) mediated rather thanbeing fixed and stable;

. language is central to the formation of subjectivity;

. certain groups are privileged over others;

. oppression (race, class, gender, age, for example) is reproduced whensubordinates accept their status or situation as natural, necessary, and/orinevitable;

. empirical data are interrogated with the intent of uncoveringcontradictions and negations in objective descriptions;

. information always involves acts of human judgement and interpretation;

. power is the basis of social groups;

. there is no such thing as neutrality;

. inquiry includes political action to redress injustices found in the inquiryprocess;

. purposes focus on facilitating change and emancipatory action;

. conceptual context, informed by the assumptions listed above, is explicit;

. research questions focus on uncovering, provide a space for introspection,seek out multiple realities;

. internal and external validity is replaced by critical trustworthiness.

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Habermas (1987) has developed a view of critical theory that eventuallydeveloped into a theory of communicative action, concerned with therelationship between behaviour and communication. His earlier work identifiesas part of its conceptual base, the notion of cognitive interest that is defined interms of three attributes that have embedded within them learning domainsthat generate knowledge. The three attributes are: work, interaction and power(Habermas, 1970, 1971). They determine how knowledge can be identified andwhether knowledge claims are warranted. It forms the basis of his theory ofKnowledge Constitutive Interests (KCI) that forms a basis for his three worldsmodel. MacIsaac (1996) differentiates between these three forms of knowledgein the following way.

. Work knowledge broadly refers to the way one controls and manipulatesone’s environment. Commonly known as the instrument of action,knowledge is based on empirical investigation and governed by technicalrules. The appropriateness of action is defined by the criterion “effectivecontrol of reality”. It is through empirical and analytical approaches thathypothetical and deductive theories can characterise the learningdomains.

. Practical knowledge occurs through communicative action within aprocess of social interaction. Social knowledge is created throughconsensual norms, and these define reciprocal expectations about thebehaviour of others. While social norms can be expressed throughempirical and analytical propositions, their validity is subjective andconnected to intention. The determinant of nature of appropriate action is“clarification of the conditions for communication and intersubjectivity”,that is, the understanding of meaning rather than causality.

. Emancipatory knowledge is individual self-knowledge or self-reflection.It involves an interest in one’s history, and biography is expressed interms of self-image, roles, and social expectations. Ones desires (libidinal),institutional and environmental forces limit emancipation byconstraining our options and rational control over our lives. Knowledgeis gained by self-emancipation through reflection leading to atransformation in perspective.

In critical theory, there is no absolute real world that can be separated out,because viewers create it within their frame of reference, and interact with theircreation in a way that creates local or demiurgic phenomenology. There istherefore no separation between viewers and the behavioural world aroundthem. Since what constitutes reality is determined through worldviews, itchanges as worldviews change. In each worldview, we build our view of whatwe perceive to be the world through our mental models, created through acollection of conceptual extensions that form our patterns of knowledge. Wemay believe that we share the mental models with others, but mostly they will

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be incommensurable (Yolles, 1999). This is because the mental models involveconceptual extensions, the meanings of which are not individually shared. Thisis because the meaning of the conceptual extensions that make them up iseither not known or is qualitatively different. This results in a mismatch inmeaning the models supposedly shared. We are never aware whether theshared models are related, except by attempting to draw meaning from others’explanations provided through language, or comparing what we expect fromthe behaviour of people in a situation with what we perceive that they aredoing.

Let us now move on to forms of constructivism as supported by Anderson(1999), whose classification of constructivism is different from that of Guba andLoncoln. He explains that the species of constructivism adopt the base notionsof Dewey (1938). According to Doolittle and Camp (1999) and Von Glasersfeld(1984), constructivism has four epistemological axioms:

(1) knowledge is the result of cognitive processes,

(2) cognition is an adaptive process that enhances the viability of behaviourfor a given environment,

(3) experience becomes meaningful through cognitive processes, and

(4) knowing is created through biological/neurological as well as social,cultural, and language-based interactions.

Thus, constructivism recognises that knowledge acquisition is a personalprocess that is based on experience. Therefore, the knowledge acquired by anindividual will be personal, be connected with experiences, and have a validitythat is related to the ability of an individual to relate it convincingly in terms ofreality. Interestingly, these axioms are also valid for the critical theoryparadigm, which may therefore be seen as yet another species ofconstructivism. However, this species of knowledge acquisition paradigmhas a number of subspecies, named by Anderson (1999) as: cognitive, socialand radical constructivism.

Cognitive constructivism, according to Dole and Sinatra (1998), accepts theepistemological axioms (1) and (2) above, is linked to the learning process, andholds that external structures that exist in external reality can be accuratelyrepresented as internal models. Hence, structures and processes that areinternally formulated can correspond to those of the real world, and reality isknowable to the individual, and like positivism supports the notion of naıverealism. Knowledge construction is therefore considered to be primarily atechnical rather than a subjectivist process of knowledge creation.Interestingly, from the brief descriptions provided here, it is not an easymatter to differentiate clearly between Anderson’s description of cognitiveconstructivism and Guba and Lincoln’s postpositivism, and ultimately adecision occurs through a matter of fancy or context. In Table II, we relatepostpositivism with cognitive constructivism.

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Both radical and social constructivism are closely related, each adopting allfour axioms. Their distinctions are differentiated in that Vygotski (1978) seesknowledge processes being dependent initially on social processes in what weshall call naıve knowledge acquisitors, while Piaget (1977) allows knowledgeacquisition to be totally a subjective process.

Radical constructivism is principally due to Piaget, whose propositions weredesigned to enable him to explain the capacity of children to learn (Doolittleand Camp, 1999). Knowledge acquisition is an adaptive process that resultsfrom active cognising by the individual learner, and while social interactionsrepresent a source of knowledge, it occurs through internalisation by theindividual. As such, knowledge has an internal nature, and the idea that, whilean external reality may exist, it is unknowable to the individual knowledge isinternal. This is because our experience with external forms is mediated by oursenses, and our senses are not adept at rendering an accurate representation ofthese external forms (e.g. objects, social interactions). Therefore, knowledge isconstructed from experience, and does not represent an accurate representationof external reality. The adaptive nature of knowledge supports the notion thatknowledge cannot represent objective truth, and that internal knowledge is aviable model of experience rather than a reflection of external reality. Piagettheory of psychological constructivism is cybernetic, and holds thatunderstanding is constructed through the interrelationship between theobject, that is differentiated from self and towards which one acts withoutpersonal attachment, and the subject that is associated with personalattachment. This distinction is similar to that supported by Foucault (1974),and we shall return to this in a moment.

Piaget’s perspective on cognitive learning may be constrained through thatof Vygotsky’s (1978) social constructivism (Doolittle and Camp, 1999). Rathersimilar to radical constructivism, knowledge is a social phenomenon and is theresult of social interaction, language usage and social discourse. However, themajor departure from Piaget is that knowledge is seen to be a shared ratherthan an individual experience. The social collective seeks and finds truththrough their collective interactive dialogue. Truth is therefore sociallyconstructed in the collective consciousness defined by cultural co-participants.The social interaction occurs within a socio-cultural context, so that knowledgeis bound to a specific time and place. Truth is socially constructed and agreedupon through common participation in cultural practices. Social constructivistsare concerned not so much with the mental constructions of knowledgecreation, but rather the co-construction of meaning within a social activity.In this sense, social constructivism is more concerned with meaning thanstructure. Cullen in 1999 notes that the social constructivist notions of theconstruction of knowledge focus on its social origins, and appear to have directrelevance to learning in organisational settings.

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Vygotsky (1978) builds upon a foundational principle that all cognitivelearning occurs at a social level prior to becoming individual. As such, othersmediate cognitive learning, social dialogue is an important component oflearning; and cultural tools (beliefs, artifacts, systems) are accessed and acquiremeaning in social contexts. However, the mediated cognitive learning approachdoes not reflect particularly on the processes of knowledge intensification, onlyon the conditions that enable knowledge intensification to develop. We canrefer to this as the mediation proposition.

This leads us to the question of where Beer’s conception fit into the patternof knowledge acquisition paradigms with his system/metasystem recursiveprocess. Following Pickering (2002), Beer’s interest in the success or failure oforganisations was a function of their adequacy in coping with theirenvironment as the real world. However, this real world was classified byhim as an “exceedingly complex system”, meaning that it was not exhaustivelyknowable, however much, one mapped it and theorised it, one would always besurprised by it. Hence, ontologically speaking, reality may exist, but it is notknowable. In this sense, it is similar to critical theory. We can consider Beer’sunderstanding of epistemology by recognising first, that the metasystem is theharbour of knowledge and the place where it is acquired. Consequently, therecursive principle is consistent with the notion that knowledge, embedded inlanguage, is subjective to subordination as relative movement occurs from onesubordinate focus to another, relative to a superior focus. In particular, Beer(1972, p. 228-9) implies, but states in Beer (1979, p. 311), quite clearly theconstructivist nature of his work when he says: “systems are to be recognisedsubjectively; and their purposes exist only in the mind of an observer (or groupof observers, who have themselves agreed on the conventions of their jointobservation)”. This would seem to link with the constructivistconceptualisations of both Piaget and Vygotsky. As a result of this, we havepresumed to interpret Beer’s perspective as given in Table I, with similarities toHabermas, Piaget and Vygotski. However, there is a difference between theconstructivism of Piaget and Vygotsky, and that of Beer, Beer is a realist in thesense that ultimately reality is independent of our thinking about it (and this isimplicit in his thinking when he developed his Viable Systems Model - see forinstance Beer, 1979). However, he is also a constructivist, and his relativism isbounded by his realism. This ontology may be referred to as reality relativism.

The system/metasystem dichotomy in viable systemsOrganisations that are viable can adapt to a changing environment. Variety inthe environment of an organisation is determined by more or lessdistinguishable entities (elements, events or states) that occur within it. Thisis not problematic since to be adaptable, one has to see what it is that one mustadapt to. These entities can be expressed in terms of time, space or purpose.The distinguishable entities may:

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. be constrained through relatively stable causal relationships betweenthem in time and space, and

. appear to have a lack of constraint or be chaotic, when they appear to beloosely related such that one event or state cannot be clearly associatedwith another.

The variety of a system can be defined (Beer, 1979, p. 3) as the number ofpossible states that the system is capable of exhibiting. The basic condition ofthe complexity of a system is determined by its variety. Variety can thereforebe seen to act as a measure of complexity. As environmental variety changes,so will environmental complexity. Organisational and social problemsituations are often seen to arise with changes in complexity. We often seethis as a natural development with, for example, the rise of new technologiesand their consequence for existing labour mechanisms.

The context of a situation that exhibits variety is important when discussingcomplexity. Thus, what we mean by variety will be dependent upon the contextwithin which the system is placed by an inquirer. In this light, we can say thatwhen we talk of the number of possible states in a situation that definesvariety, then we are also talking about the worldview of an inquirer.

A viable system is one that can be seen to be self-dependent, and thus takeon an independent existence. At present, a system can be viewed as a set ofhierarchies that together form a complex whole. In the same way as it ispossible to explore the viability of an organisation as a whole, the viability ofeach focus can also be explored as a part of the system as a whole.

This leads to a question posed by Beer. “If a viable system is one ‘able tomaintain a separate existence’, how is it that a viable system contains viablesystems which are clearly not separate from the viable system in which theyare contained” (Beer, 1979, p. 118). The answer is that often parts of the systemthat might be identifiable as self-standing viable systems have other social,cultural, propositional, operational, or human constraints that do not enablethem to separate out to work as independent viable systems.

Having said this, it should also be noted that organisations might beresponsible for their own demise due to their pathology. This is tied into theirautopoietic nature, which should relate to ontological focuses and indeed thereferencing focus that may define the whole. Autopoiesis should not be appliedto an organisation’s metasystem. An example of when this might occur is whenpart of the metasystem attempts to control for the sake of control. Seeingcontrol as a product of the organisation destroys the viability and autonomy ofthe broader system. In Beer’s terms, a system in this condition can be describedas pathologically autopoietic (Beer, 1979, pp. 408-12). Ultimately, the pathologyof a viable system concerns the failure of its cohesiveness.

Beer (1959), in his development of managerial cybernetics, explored thenature of viable systems as he created his VSM. Viable systems participate inthe autonomous development of their own futures. A viable organisation

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participates in automorphosis[12], when it is responsible for and participates inchanging in its own form, and thus enabling it to maintain appropriateoperational behaviour under a changing environment and survive. The form isdetermined by its structure that both facilitates and constrains that behaviour.Its refinement over the OD methodology is that strategic decisions are notsimply seen as an input to the system (Yolles, 1999). Rather, they derive fromits metasystem that is responsible for manifesting and maintaining systemstructure. While OD sees the system itself as the transformation, themanagement cybernetics that underpins VSM invents a metasystem, and itimplicitly supposes a transformation between the system and metasystem.Thus for instance, in OD strategy decisions are seen as inputs to the system,while in VSM they derive from the metasystem. In this way, the metasystemformally becomes one aspect of a structured inquiry.

When decision-making is part of a formalised determinable process in anorganisation, so the metasystem is also formalised, and decisions are madewithin it with respect to the perceived needs of the organisation at the level offocus concerned. This does not mean, however, that there may be anotherinformal metasystem from which informal decisions derive. The metasystemultimately operates through and is defined by the worldviews that determinethe nature of the organisation. When a worldview exists formally it may becalled its paradigm (Yolles, 1999).

VSM is a generic model of the organisation that promotes principles ofcommunication and control that help it to maintain its viability (Schwaninger,2001). It is axiomatic in VSM that any organisation that can be modelled as aviable system can also be modelled as a set of five subsystems. They eachrepresent an interactive function that act together as a filter between theenvironment and organisation’s management hierarchy, and connectmanagement processes and their communications channels. The filter issophisticated because it attenuates (reduces the importance of) some data whilesimultaneously amplifying other data. The filtered data are converted intoinformation that is relevant to different levels of management within theorganisation. A final control element addressed in the model offers auditingtools to make sure that the correct data are being collated. The audit channelmops up variety by sporadic or periodic checks. However, making sure that theappropriate data are assembled is only one of its functions.

The VSM is defined in terms of five entities, referred to as system one (S1) tosystem five (S5), plus S3*, each with related communicative relationships(Yolles, 1999). S1 is defined as the system of operations (with its localmanagement), and S3, S4 and S5 compose the metasystem. The meaning ofeach of the systems is described in Table III. While the epistemology of theVSM is taken care of by Beer, there is an ontological discussion. In exploringthis we see that S1 is ontologically associated with the system, and S3-S5 areontologically associated with the metasystem. However, S2, S3* and the

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System Ontology Nature of system

1 Operations System System 1 is concerned with the system in focus (“thesystem”) and its behaviour. “Operations” provide arepresentation of what the system does and produces; it isusually broken down into functional units, and interactswith the environment through futures/planning. It is thesystem that is itself the subject of control. S1 interacts withthe environment directly and through S4. There may be anumber of perspectives from which to see system 1, and itmay be seen from more than one by an organisation. Forinstance, system 1 could be seen in terms of product line,technology used, location, cycle time of products, customers,distribution channels, etc.

2 Coordination In void System 2 can provide effective control. It concerns aspectsof culture and is interested in limited synergy acrossdivisions of an organisation. It tries to harmonise the cultureand structure of the enterprise whilst also trying to reducechaos and introduce order. It amplifies the control capabilityto try to induce self-regulation into its behaviour, which is inthe implementation of operations. It can be seen aspredominantly anti-oscillatory. It implements non-executivedecisions like schedules, personnel and accounting policiesand other areas governed by (legal and other) protocol. Theaspect of culture it addresses is that of house style ratherthan the values/identity questions of S5

3 Integration/control

In void(early work)or metasystem(later work)

This function is concerned with effective regulation of thedynamic internal to the organisation. Integration/control isin charge of the functional units of the system. It controlsand monitors what is going on. It is responsible for theimplementation of policies, resource allocation, and thecontrol and monitoring of the implementation activities.It determines information needs. It is involved in synergyrelated tasks

3* Audit In void Investigation, evaluation and validation of information flowbetween S1 and S3, noting that the link to S1 occurs only topick up the information deficit associated with S2

4 Future/planning

Metasystem This function is important to the identity of theorganisation. Futures/planning involves issues ofdevelopment and strategic planning. It observes theorganisation from both internal and external views. It doesthis by gathering information from the environment and thesystem itself. It does all the future orientated tasks: researchand development, training (except the orientation andmaintaining skills at S2), recruitment, public relations, andmarket research. Consistent with the information gatheringactivities, it is also connected with the creation of knowledge

(continued )

Table III.Nature of the VSM

systems

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environment are normally portrayed within an ontological void (Table III) asillustrated in Beer (1979, p. 253). It must be stressed that this has no impact atall on the practical power VSM, concerned with the meanings associated witheach S1-S5 and their associated messaging (epistemological migrations) alongchannels of communication (ontological migrations).

Beer’s constructions, when considered from an ontological perspective,provide entry into a rich development that almost immediately connects withthe work of Schwarz (1997) and Yolles (1999). Schwarz has developed aprincipally ontological theory that explains how persistent viable systems areable to maintain themselves, change and die. However, it does very little toengage with human activity systems, and it explains processes rather thanprovides for diagnosis as in VSM. In what follows we shall create a synergybetween the conceptual constructions of Beer and Schwarz. It will result in anew paradigm that is capable of engaging the power of VSM while at the sametime can draw on Schwarz’s elegant explanations. In creating this synergy suchthat it is true to Beer, however, we shall need to develop some additionalconceptualisations that extend those of Schwarz into human activity systems.

The three domains VSMConsistent with Table I, the needs of Table III, and with the construction ofSchwarz, we shall define the three domains (Yolles and Guo, 2003): cognitive orexistential (that can house a metasystem), the virtual or organising (that interms of VSM would house System 2, System 3 and System 3*), and thephenomenal of behavioural (that can house the operational systems and theirenvironments). Domain epistemology is shown in Figure 3, which is originallyderived from the need to give a relatively practical explanation of change inChina as it joins the World Trade Organisation (Yolles and Guo, 2003).

Each domain has boundaries that condition their validity claims aboutreality. The boundary of one domain is differentiated from that of the othersthrough its ontological horizon. In exactly the same way, as we considered thesystem/metasystem couple, this horizon maintains a content that variesdepending on the cognitive perceiver that provides an entry into what may be

System Ontology Nature of system

5 Policy Metasystem This is concerned with the establishment and maintenanceof a coherent context for the processes of the organisation. Itrelates to what the organisation sets out to do. It defines thedirection of the organisation. It requires an accurateoverview that represents the various dimensions of activity.Policy provides the systematic capability to choose from thedifferent problem situations or opportunities thrown up bythe environment. It is concerned with identity and cohesionand balances the present and future and internal withexternal perspectivesTable III.

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meaningfully reflected on, spoken about, or acted over. The three domains areontologically coupled, and their horizons meld when they are seen as anemergent whole. However, this can only occur if the boundaries thatdifferentiate the domains maintain ontological migrations that condition themelding process. Thus, ontological horizons both distinguish and connectdifferentiable validity claims about reality.

Earlier, we introduced the ontology of the system and metasystem, and inTable IV, we consider the ontology of the three domains. Consistent with thenotions of phenomenology, the three domains have boundaries that conditiontheir realities. The boundary of one domain is differentiated from that of theothers through its ontological horizon. In exactly the same way, as weconsidered the system/metasystem couple, this horizon maintains a contentthat varies depending on the cognitive perceiver that provides an entry into

Figure 3.Influence diagram

exploring therelationship between thephenomenal, virtual and

existential domains

Types of domain Nature of reality

Phenomenal or behavioural Material objects or events in interaction, the perception ofwhich is conditioned by a cognitive knowledge-based frame ofreference. It is cognitively demiurgic (meaning formative orcreative), deriving from the notion of one who fashions thematerial world from chaos, and consistent with Frieden (1999)and Husserl (1950, p. 108)

Virtual or organising Symbolic or logical relational images that relate to phenomenalreality and involve purposeful organising. It is local to theexperiences of the perceiver. Images of value and belief aremaintained, partly represented through ethics and ideology.The domain is conditioned by a cognitive knowledge-basedframe of reference

Existential or cognitive The local belief-based creation of concepts and their patternsheld in worldviews that establish a frame of reference, anddetermine what is known and their related meanings

Table IV.The three domains and

their realities

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what may be meaningfully reflected on, spoken about, or acted over. The threedomains are ontologically related, and their horizons meld when the domainsare seen as an emergent whole. However, this can only occur if the boundariesthat create the horizons also harbour ontological connections that conditionthat melding. Thus, ontological horizons both distinguish and connectdifferentiable realities.

These domains have properties (Table V), this notion inspired byHabermas’s (1970) Theory of KCI relating to the phenomenal domain, relatedto Beer’s ideas on the system/metasystem couple, and extended to the otherdomains. The idea of cognitive interests was Habermas’s, and in addition wehave included the notion of cognitive purposes and influences. Additionally, wehave adopted the notion of sociality properties that describes some of thecapacities of the organisation as a whole (Yolles and Guo, 2003).

It is interesting that some of Habermas’s conceptualisations in his KCItheory are directly reflected in Beer’s notions. Thus for instance, whenHabermas talks of technical and practical interests, they are principallyreflected in Beer’s system (S1) that links practical management control with theoperational system. Beer’s principles of variety and requisite variety imply ahost of soft issues that are associated with organisational processes, and arenecessarily related to the emancipation and critical deconstraining ofHabermas. However, Beer’s language is less than transparent in this respectand requires deep reading. It has therefore permitted critics of VSM to makeincorrect statements about the inadequacies of VSM, for instance by Checkland(1980) who says that it misses the human meaning aspects of individuals(surprising realising the epistemological nature of VSM), and from Ulrich(1981) who suggests that tools of inquiry should have an ethical dimension.

The three domains of Figure 3 exist in a first-, and second-order ontologicalcouple that is expressed through its boundaries. The relationship between thephenomenal and virtual domains defines a first-order ontological couple. This ismore usually referred to as autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela, 1979; Schwarz,1997; Yolles and Dubois, 2001), but in fact autopoiesis is only an example of theontological migrations that can occur when two ontologies are coupled together.It leads to the simple notion that the autopoietic capacity for a system can bedirectly related to its ability to manifest phenomenally its own virtual imagesthrough the self-production of usually structured intentional behaviour. We sayusually because organisations operate through normative behaviour that isconsistent with their expectations, and normative behaviour is normallyregulated through structure. This does not mean that structure is a necessarycondition for regularised behaviour to occur. Having said this, it is probablypossible to express any mechanisms through which regularised behaviouroccurs in terms of either implicit or explicit structure associated with theorganisation in focus. The second-order ontological couple that we have referredto connects the existential or cognitive domain to the first-order ontological

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Sociality properties

Cognitiveproperties

Kinematics (throughenergetic motion)

Orientation(determining trajectory)

Possibilities (throughpotential development)

Cognitiveinterests

Technical Practical Critical deconstraining

Phenomenal orbehavioural(conscious)domain

Work. This enablespeople to achieve goalsand generate materialwell-being. It involvestechnical ability toundertake action in theenvironment, and theability to makeprediction and establishcontrol

Interaction. Thisrequires that people asindividuals and groupsin a social system gainand develop thepossibilities of anunderstanding of eachothers subjective views.It is consistent with apractical interest inmutual understandingthat can addressdisagreements, whichcan be a threat to thesocial form of life

Degree of emancipation.For organisationalviability, the realisingof individual potentialis most effective whenpeople: liberatethemselves from theconstraints; imposed bypower structures andlearn throughprecipitation in socialand political processesto control their owndestinies

Cognitivepurposes

Cybernetical Rational/appreciative Ideological/moral

Virtual ororganising(subconscious)domain

Intention. This isthrough the creationand strategic pursuit ofgoals and aims thatmay change over time,enables people throughcontrol andcommunicationsprocesses to redirecttheir futures

Formative organising.Enables missions,goals, and aims to bedefined and approachedthrough planning. Itmay involve logical,and/or relationalabilities to organisethought and action andthus to define sets ofpossible systematic,systemic and behaviourpossibilities. It can alsoinvolve the use of tacitstandards by whichexperience can beordered and valued, andmay involve reflection

Manner of thinking. Anintellectual frameworkthrough which policymakers observe andinterpret reality. Thishas an aesthetical orpolitically correctethical orientation. Itprovides an image ofthe future that enablesaction throughpolitically correctstrategic policy. It givesa politically correctview of stages ofhistorical development,in respect of interactionwith the externalenvironment

(continued )

Table V.The three domains, their

cognitive properties,and organisational

patterning

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couple. An example of this ontological migration is autogenesis, that representsthe self-production of the rules of production, and that can therefore be expressedin terms of the creation of principles that are able to guide self-production. Theontological migrations shown in Figure 4, will be discussed later.

The use of autopoiesis within the context of social communitiesIt may here be noted while we have referred to autopoiesis in a socialcontext, there is an argument that this is not appropriate to this. Following

Sociality properties

Cognitiveproperties

Kinematics (throughenergetic motion)

Orientation(determining trajectory)

Possibilities (throughpotential development)

Cognitiveinfluences

Social Cultural Political

Cognitive(non-conscious)domain

Formation. Enablesindividuals/groups tobe influenced byknowledge that relate toour social environment.This has a consequencefor our social structuresand processes thatdefine our social formsthat are related to ourintentions andbehaviours

Belief. Influences occurfrom knowledge thatderives from thecognitive organisation(the set of beliefs,attitudes, values) ofother worldviews. Itultimately determineshow we interact andinfluence ourunderstanding offormative organising

Freedom. Influencesoccur from knowledgethat affect our politydetermined, in part, byhow we think about theconstraints on groupand individualfreedoms, and inconnection with this toorganise and behave. Itultimately has impacton our ideology andmorality, and ourdegree of organisationalemancipationTable V.

Figure 4.Relationship betweennormative belief systemin a social communityand patterns ofknowledge that itdevelops

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Mingers (1995), Maturana and Varela (1980) developed the concept ofautopoiesis[13] within the sphere of biology applied to living systems. They donot see social systems as an appropriate application because they are not livingsystems and cannot self-produce the components that comprise them. Beer(1980) notes that the purpose of Maturana and Varela (1980) is “to understandthe organization of living systems in relation to their unitary character. Thisformulation of the problem begs the question as to what is allowed to be acalled a living system, as they themselves admit.” From an epistemologicalperspective, Beer (1980, p. 68) does not see that the need for systems to be livingstands in the way of social systems being seen as autopoietic:

The fact is that if a social institution is autopoietic (and many seem to answer to the propercriteria) then, on the authors’ own showing, it is necessarily alive. That certainly sounds odd,but it cannot be helped. It seems to me that the authors are holding at arms length their owntremendously important discovery. It does not matter about this mere word “alive”, whatdoes matter is that the social institution has identity in the biological sense; it is not just therandom assemblage of interested parties that it is thought to be.

When it comes to social evolution then, when it comes to political change: we are notdealing with institutions and societies that will be different tomorrow because of thelegislation we passed today. The legislation – even the revolution – with which we confrontthem does not alter them at all; it proposes a new challenge to their autopoietic adaptation.The behaviour they exhibit may have to be very different if they are to survive: the point isthat they have not lost their identities.

Beer (1980, p. 71) consequently shows that he is not neutral to whether or notsocial systems can be autopoietic, as he also argues epistemologically that:

. . .any cohesive social institution is an autopoietic system because it survives, because itsmethod of survival answers the autopoietic criteria; and because it may well change its entireappearance and its apparent purpose in the process. As examples I list: firms and industries,schools and universities, clinics and hospitals, professional bodies, departments of state, andwhole countries.

If this view is valid, it has extremely important consequences. In the first place itmeans that every social institution (in several of which any one individual is embeddedat the intersect) is embedded in a larger social institution, and so on recursively – andthat all of them are autopoietic. This immediately explains why the process of change atany level of recursion (from the individual to the state) is not only difficult to accomplishbut actually impossible – in the full sense of the intention: “I am going completely tochange myself ”. The reason is that the “it”, that self-contained autopoietic “it”, is acomponent of another autopoietic system. Now we already know that the first can beconsidered as allopoietic with respect to the second, and that is what makes the second aviable autopoietic system. But this is in turn means that the larger system perceives theembedded system as diminished as less than fully autopoietic. That perception will be anillusion; but it does have consequences for the contained system. For now its ownautopoiesis must respond to a special kind of constraint: treatment which attempts todeny its own autopoiesis.

Consider this argument at whatever level of recursion you please. An individualattempting to reform his own life within an autopoietic family cannot fully be his newself because the family insists that he is actually his old self. A country attempting tobecome a socialist state cannot fully become socialist; because there exists aninternational autopoietic capitalism in which it is embedded, by which the revolutionary

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country is deemed allopoietic. These conclusions derive from entailments of premiseswhich the authors have placed in our hands. I think they are most valuable.

In exploring the argument against social system autopoiesis, Mingers (1995,p. 123) defines the ontological argument that inhibits social systems being seenas autopoietic. For this he identifies the following three “problematic” elements.

(1) Centrally, autopoiesis is concerned with the processes of production –the production of those components that constitute the systemthemselves.

(2) It is constituted in temporal and spatial relations, and the componentsinvolved must create a boundary defining the entity as a unity – that is,a whole interacting with its environment.

(3) The concept of autopoietic organisation specifies nothing beyondself-production. It does not specify particular structural properties andthus should not need to be modified for social systems.

There is a concern explored by Mingers that these elements cannot belegitimately applied to social systems, presumably because it is unclear howthis can occur directly in terms of individuals and groups. While he discussesLuhmann’s (1986) approach to autopoiesis in social systems later in his book,he does not appear to highlight that because it may not be the individual or thegroup that is self-produced, but the components that enable the social group toexist. Thus for instance, Luhmann’s model centres on communications and theself-production of communications. In the same way, social systems producepatterns of knowledge, myths, behaviour, and other things to whichautopoiesis can similarly be applied. Mingers (1995, p. 125) notes, however,that “a more radical approach” is to apply autopoiesis to concepts or ideas,though why this radical is unclear.

In another vein, Mingers (1995, p. 124) notes that the fundamental problemsof autopoiesis for social systems are not significant if they are appliedmetaphorically “in helping our thinking, or that a more generalised version,such as Varela’s idea of organisational closure, could be fruitfully applied.”Having said this, Mingers also indicates that metaphors produce merelymetaphoric results, and thus they have no greater claim on our attention.Consistent with this view, Beer (1989) suggests that comparisons deriving frommetaphor should not be taken too seriously. These representative viewsabout the limitations of metaphor relate to those that are on a par withsimile, which take experiences from one domain and apply them to anotherdirectly. However, unlike simile, metaphor is often purposefully abstractedand elaborated, leading to more profound and significant comparisons.For Brown (2003), metaphor is very important to the development of science,facilitating mature knowledge and understanding. Based on his characteristicsof metaphor, we list the following.

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(1) Metaphors, like simile, begin with literal everyday experiences in asource domain that is necessarily local and culturally based.

(2) Metaphors are mapped from the source domain to a sink domain (whereit is used). The aim is to enlarge and enhance understanding of situationsin that sink domain. These understandings ultimately derive from directexperiences that enable us to create more abstract conceptualisations.

(3) A given metaphor may highlight certain features of the source domainand may obscure others. Obscured features are often implied or inferredthrough context, and this can make the metaphor a powerfully creativeforce in scientific reasoning.

(4) Although metaphors invite comparisons of two disparate things, themore interesting metaphors do more than this. They stimulate creationof similarities between the source and sink domains, such that the latteris seen in an entirely new light.

(5) Metaphors in science serve an explanatory role and are a stimulus tonew inquiries. They may be very simple and evocative initially, thengrow more detailed as research findings support or disconfirminferences drawn from the initial metaphor.

(6) Metaphors may be elaborated, when they are extended and abstracted,and also perhaps individually or in plural convergence so can formmodels. These models may have associated with them metaphoricalentailments that influence how they are understood and applied. Modelscommonly form a basis for theory creation. They may constituteprimary[14] propositions, and when this occurs they need to beevidenced. As an example of this, we note Beer’s (1989) reference to hisVSM that he considers to be a generic[15] model for the social domain,and rather than talking about evidencing it, he equivalently refers to it asbeing testable and verifiable.

Scientific principle may be thought of as a literal representation of anelaborated metaphor, a statement that we shall explore briefly. Whilemetaphors are grounded in experience, scientific principles are grounded infacts. However, what is fact? In one of Beer’s writings, he said that facts are“fantasies that you can trust”, where we can take trust to be a firm belief [16],and where fantasies at there best can be a “subjective interpretation ofinformation”. Trust, however, occurs through belief, and it should therefore berealised that it can vary from individual to individual, from group to group, orfrom time to time. In other words, it is a cultural phenomenon. From aconstructivist perspective, this must mean that since scientific principle aregrounded in fact, and fact is culture relative and not absolute, scientificprinciple must also be relative. A simple illustration of this arises from a briefexamination of the conflict between the supporters of the wave and particletheories of light (Hoffman, 1947).

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The distinction between metaphor and scientific principle therefore becomesless differentiable, as can be illustrated through an example. The system is aconceptual construction that constitutes an elaborated metaphor. It operates asan abstracted ideal, and used non-literally in a sink domain aids the process ofinquiry and the creation of intervention strategies for improvement where thisis desirable. This is a constructivist view that Beer (1980) supported, when hetells us “a system is not something presented to the observer, it is somethingrecognized by him”. Sometimes the knowledge and language of an extendedmetaphor becomes so embedded in the sink domain that it becomes a frame ofreference, and any scientific principle that develops become grounded in themetaphor(s). When this happens, it becomes very difficult to distinguishbetween extended metaphor(s) and resulting scientific principle. Hence,metaphors can be as important as the scientific principles that rest on them.

In developing our viable systems theory conceptualisations, we create aframe of reference that like the system should be thought of as an abstractmetaphor. As such, the ontological constructions that appear here should notbe seen in positivist terms, as might be the case if we were attempting to createliteral causative models. They operate to assist the formation of explanationsabout social community pathology, which may more pragmatically enable aninquirer to reflect on ways of creating intervention strategies for improvement.

The abstract metaphor that we are using is a development of philosophicalquestions that ask what is the nature of reality (ontology) and knowledge(epistemology). Systems concepts are normally framed in an epistemologicalframe of reference. Thus, it may be asked, “how can we improve a givencomplex situation for a social community”, where the notion of improvementimplies the acquisition of knowledge such that this can happen. It is a rarity forsystems concepts to be defined in ontological terms. The reason is that realityis usually taken for granted because it cannot apparently provide a route, likeepistemology, for improvement. However, one of the reason that our socialcommunities are pathological is that we each individually have our ownrealities, and when we form into bounded groups these too ascribe to newnormative bounded realities. These realities form with the development of localparadigms that are the concern of epistemology. In this sense, epistemologyand ontology can only be divorced analytically, not practically orpragmatically. However, the analytic and pragmatic approaches are differentsides of the same coin, especially if the analytic approach is explicitly intendedfor use to satisfy the pragmatic one.

Mingers (1995, p. 151) discusses the metaphorical use of autopoiesis byMorgan (1986) whose thesis is that the organisation is influenced by its owninternal self-image or identity. They are continually concerned to recreate andmaintain their image and identity by projecting themselves onto environments,and what they monitor is a reflection of their own concerns and interests. Whilethere is more to the theory than this, its basic tenets are consistent with the

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notions embedded in the ontological arguments of Eric Schwarz (Yolles, 1999),who developed his abstract analytic ontology that we are applying in principleto social community. Schwarz is concerned with the ontological perspectivethat explains the dynamic that enables autonomous systems to maintain theirviability, and his constructions explored the nature of autonomy in terms ofautopoiesis and its second-order form autogenesis. We assert that there is arelationship between autonomy and autopoiesis in social communities, anargument that comes, for instance, from Jessop (1990). He defines autopoiesisas a condition of radical autonomy that enables a system to define its ownboundaries relative to its environment and its own operational code. Itimplements its own programmes, reproduces its own elements in a closedcircuit, and obeys its own laws of motion. When it has “autopoietic take-off”, itsoperations can no longer be directly controlled from outside, though there maybe a variety of indirect controls that in part constitute its “environment”. Whenwe talk of autonomous systems, we are often interested in autopoiesis, andconversely when we talk of autopoiesis, we are normally concerned withradical autonomy. However, it can be argued that the characteristics thatconstitute the condition of radical autonomy may have a subjective dimension.

It must be stressed at this juncture that even though we consider that thisconstruction, like that of the system, is a metaphor, this does little to weakenthe importance of theoretical arguments to pragmatic approaches of inquiry.

RecursionThere are epistemological implications to our ontological construction thatrelates to the notion of recursion, so important to VSM. Maturana (1996)explores the nature of reality, regarded as:

a proposition that we use as an explanatory notion to explain our experiences. . .. [beyondthis] it is that which in our living as human beings we live as the fundament of our living.Under these circumstances, reality is not energy, not information, however powerful thesenotions may appear to us in the explanation of our experiences. We explain our experienceswith our experiences and with the coherence of our experiences. That is we explain our livingwith our living, and in this sense we explain human beings as constitutively the fundamentfor all that exists, or may exist in our domains of cognition.

Explaining our experiences with our experiences is a recursive phenomenon,enabling whatever images of reality that we perceive to be embedded withinother images, like two mirrors at an angle reflecting an image of an object toinfinity. This is effectively a recursive frame of reference, and each imagerepresents a new validity claim about reality that is contextualised by thevalidity claim in which it is embedded. This idea allows us to talk aboutrecursion, by which we mean that each of the three domains can, through thelocal context of its own validity claim about reality, recursively host the set ofthree domains. When this happens, the host domain has a validity claim that isontologically distinguished. When the domain hosts other relative domains

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within it, they are capable of formulating finer, more local validity claims aboutreality.

Let us illustrate this. Phenomenal reality can be apprehended by a unitaryconsciousness from which a single person responds to his or her phenomenalexperiences. Alternatively, a socially plural consciousness with distinguishablecomplexities may be defined, for which coherent social behaviour occursphenomenally. This is enabled through phenomenal structures thatanticipate [17] a plurality of commonalities and norms, and an expectationfor behavioural adherence to them. It is within the virtual domain that imagesof these arise that enables the phenomenal structures and behaviours to bemanifested in the first place. They are defined in the conceptual domainthrough the knowledge that constitutes such commonalities and norms. This isonly possible because of the recursive nature of the domains within theconceptual domain, through which the commonalities and norms aremanifested through the interaction of a plurality of consciousnesses. It maybe noted that the commonalities and norms that have arisen to create aparadigm for the group arose originally through the creation of a virtualparadigm in the virtual domain at another level of recursion. In this case, theparadigm itself with its shared concepts and their structured interconnectionsthat constitutes a pattern of normative knowledge would have been associatedwith the phenomenal domain.

We can apply the concept of recursion to our three domains model. UnlikeBeer’s VSM, this is not intended to diagnose the system. Rather, like the workof Schwarz (1997), its purpose is to provide explanations for the complexorganisation that relate to its operational behaviour. This may or may notprovide additional ways of diagnosing the organisation.

We illustrate the notion of recursion and its significance for explanation inFigures 4 and 5. Figure 4 shows the relationship between normativeorganisational beliefs and the patterns of objectified knowledge it has. Figure 5shows how recursion can occur in this model. The postulated model in Figure 4is not claimed as valid, and the notion that the relationship between an

Figure 5.Embedding the threedomain model into theexistential domain

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organisation’s paradigm and its patterns of knowledge is an autopoietic one issheer hypothesis. It postulates that an organisation can maintain its ownpatterns of knowledge as structures that can be represented in the phenomenaldomain. Likely these patterns are explicit and can be expressed as propositionsthat underpin the organisation’s modus operandi. They derive from thedominant paradigm (if one exists) that the organisation maintains and fromwhich it operates. In viable organisations, the relationship between theparadigm and patterns of knowledge may well be expressed as an autopoieticprocess. Earlier, we indicated that this relationship between the virtual andphenomenal domains is a first-order ontological couple. The second-orderontological couple links from the existential domain to the first-order couple.

To illustrate recursion, in Figure 5, we have embedded the three domains inthe existential domain to explain how the normative belief system arises in thefirst place from a plurality of them connected with the individuals that make upthe social community. Normative processes develop during communicationbetween participants of an organisation through the lifeworld[18]. Therecursion in Figure 5 postulates how a normative belief system emerges in anorganisation from a plurality of individual belief systems. Throughautogenesis common, principles of lifeworld interaction about belief systemsemerge that enable a plurality of competing images of what belief system is tohold to be managed. It is through autopoiesis that these competing images areself-produced as a normative organisational belief system. The normativebelief system that results is now reflected as the existential domain for Figure 4.

In Figure 6, we develop a further model that deals with co-evolutionarydevelopment. This model derived from Yolles, explores the relationship

Figure 6.Indication of the

ontological relationshipbetween adaptation and

co-evolution “Man is aprisoner of his own wayof thinking and his own

stereotypes of himself”Beer (1975, p. 15)

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between adaptation, self-organisation [19] and co-evolution, the first two ofthese concepts are a serious concern of Beer. Interestingly, this representationnow gives autopoiesis a simple form of expression, illustrating that it is anorganisation’s ability to manifest its internal images of itself and its future intophenomenal/behavioural reality. It may be noted here that Figure 4 would alsoappear to give clear meaning to Beer’s (1975, p. 15) statement that “Man is aprisoner of his own way of thinking and his own stereotypes of himself”.

The new ontology of the three domains model provides the capability ofmore easily appreciating the notion of pathological autopoiesis, a term that iseasily open to a variety of interpretations. This is primarily because autopoiesisis an ontological condition, and if one does not engage ontological argumentsthe notion of autopoiesis can become convoluted and unclear. Viewed from theontological perspective of Schwarz, the meaning of pathological autopoiesis isvery clear. Since autopoiesis is the capacity of a social community(or individual) to establish/produce its image of itself and its future as apattern of behaviour, pathological autopoiesis must mean that the socialcommunity gets locked into this, thereby decoupling the ontological connection(autogenesis) to autopoiesis as shown in Figure 6.

We have represented this situation of pathological autopoiesis in Figure 7 asa development of Figure 6. The pathology leads to a stationary image of oneselfand the future with whatever embedded variety it may have in it. Adaptationcan occur, but if none of the possibilities available within that image areadequate to deal with the changing environment, then a lack of capacity foradaptation occurs. In general, while it might appear that an evolutionaryprocess is under way, this is not the case since a host of variations available tothe community will be called on, but no new evolutionary ones will develop. Asa consequence, there is no possibility for a co-evolutionary process. This type of

Figure 7.Situation duringpathological autopoiesiswith bounded varietyoptions

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situation therefore explains the onset of the eventual demise of a species ofsocial community, when all of its variety has been used up without success.

The legacy of Stafford Beer and the dynamics of paradigm changeWe have discussed the contribution that Beer has made to organisationaltheory through his introduction of constructivism, adopting the theoreticalideas of the metasystem and recursion, and giving them practical capacity. Inarguing this, we have also discussed the idea that paradigms change, and indoing so that pass through a virtual stage that they may not survive. Thisbrings us to an interesting juncture, which is how do we perceive the legacy ofBeer’s conceptualisations. The problem we have here relates to what Iles andYolles (2002) and Yolles (2000) call knowledge migration that explains theepistemological distance between the semantic implications seen in acommunication by a message source and semantic inferences applied to acommunication by a message sink. This epistemological distance results in theacquisition of distinct information and the creation (not re-creation) ofknowledge that is catalysed by the communication, not embedded in it. Whenpeople communicate they send messages that carry meaning, and thus embedsknowledge, in coded form. To encode the message the source of the messageuses their current patterns of knowledge to encode the message. The messagesink does something similar. In a paradigm that adopts the epistemology andontology of positivism, knowledge migration is simply knowledge transfer.However, in the critical theory approach adopted in this paper, everycommunicator has their own unique pattern of knowledge defined by theirexperiences and contextualised by their culture. This means that theknowledge that is assembled by each message sink is not a reconstruction ofthe knowledge of a source, but is rather a knowledge re-creation facilitated andcatalysed by the message, and it is unique. This is complexified by the idea thatevery message has a horizon of meanings, those things implied by those whoknow, but not made explicit.

There is a problem therefore, when a new paradigm arises. It is that eachperson who interacts with it is likely to create what Yolles (1999) calls adoppelganger virtual paradigm. It is a new species of the genus that hasre-interpreted or recreated the new paradigm. Unless this shift is substantive inthat it has the capacity to introduce a new conceptualisation thatfundamentally alters the frame of reference of the original paradigm,contestations can be fed back through lifeworld processes that involveresponse and debate. Sometimes this is not sufficient, and contested differencesbecome elaborated, and result in conflict. This process is explained by Yolles(2001).

This process of paradigm contestation can become exacerbated with thedemise of the father of the paradigm. In the case of Beer’s cybernetic theory ofmanagement, there is no possibility of a feedback control process, and theconsequence is that bloody paradigmatic revolution can result. This author

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wonders therefore, whether the legacy of Beer’s ideas will fragment into notonly a set of virtual paradigms, but also whether the result will be destructivebloody conflict.

To ensure that this does not happen, the operational research and systemscommunity needs to establish a metasystem in which the operationalsubsystems are the species of virtual paradigms. For the sake of simplicity, wecan call this a metaparadigm. I pose this as a challenge to the OR and systemscommunity.

Notes

1. To illustrate that Beer was a constructivist, and held such principles at least in the sameperiod as those whose names are assigned to this, we will be obliged to explore the notion ofconstructivism in this paper, and it has led to an appreciation of an apparent conflict of viewin the literature.

2. Webster online dictionary.

3. The complement to this is weak anticipation that can be associated with strategy.

4. Swanson (2001) differentiates between base and auxiliary concepts. Auxiliary conceptsdescribe base concepts.

5. “. . .scientists, just like the rest of humanity, carry out their day-to-day affairs within aframework of presuppositions about what constitutes a problem, a solution, and a method.Such a background of shared assumptions makes up a paradigm, and at any given time aparticular scientific community will have a prevailing paradigm that shapes and directswork in the field. Since people become so attached to their paradigms, Kuhn claims thatscientific revolutions involve bloodshed on the same order of magnitude as that commonlyseen in political revolutions, only the difference being that the blood is now intellectualrather than liquid. . .the issues are not rational but emotional, and are settled not by logic,syllogism, and appeals to reason, but by irrational factors like group affiliation and majorityor ‘mob’ rule” (Casti, 1989, p. 40).

6. Zeno’s paradox is concerned with the impossibility of moving between two points A and B inspace. To reach B from A, one must travel half the distance to it to a point say a1, and to gofrom a1 to B you must reach a point half way to it at a2. This argument is recursive as youmove to a3, a4, a5,. . .. To count the full distance that you have travelled you must add all ofthe half distances that form an infinite series, suggesting mathematically that you can neverreach B. The solution to the paradox is to introduce time as a new analytically andempirically independent conceptual extension that operates as a limiting factor on thesummation. The introduction of this new conceptualisation has meant that a new paradigmhas been created with new propositions and beliefs, and it is thus incommensurable with theprevious paradigm since it creates a new conceptual extension through which new ways ofseeing can be created (Yolles, 1998).

7. This happens in all paradigmatic environments, whether they relate to the cultural basis ofan organisation – for instance, in the privatisation of public companies (Yolles, 1999), or of adiscipline of science as that being considered here.

8. For example, see Yolles (1999), referring to the work of Flood and Jackson (1991).

9. The idea of ontological horizon may be developed by referring to Ladriere (2002).

10. According to the American Heritage Dictionary 4th edition 2000 online, meld means to mergeor blend (e.g. a meld of diverse ethnic stocks). In our context, it relates to a process ofde-differentiating that is a consequence of emergence.

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11. An ontological migration enables validity claims about one reality to be migrated to anotherontologically coupled reality.

12. The term self-organising is normally used here, but within the context of this paper, it can bemisleading in that it can be supposed to be part of an “organising” domain, rather than whatit is, associated with system structure and its manifest behaviour. It is for this reason that werefer to it as automorphosis, or self-change-of-form, relating to the concept of morphogenesis(Yolles, 1999).

13. Mingers (1995) notes that this word autopoiesis, also referred to as self-production, comesfrom auto as self as opposed to alloi as other, and poiesis as bringing forth, in this contextwith respect to production.

14. Propositions constitute knowledge. Axioms are base propositions that are culturalstatements of belief, need no demonstration, and underpin the primary propositions thatmay be elaborated and perhaps generalised abstractions of a metaphor. Secondarypropositions are derived consequences from primary propositions and may describe aparticular characteristic of them. Following Keynes (1973), such secondary propositions maybe claimed to support rational belief.

15. Beer’s language is different, and rather than talk of a model being generic, he rather uses themore formal logical word homomorphism.

16. Collins Reference Dictionary, 1992.

17. When we say anticipation, we are actually referring to “strong anticipation” (Yolles andDubois, 2001), relating to the nature and relationship of the boundaries of the three domainsand their validity claims about reality.

18. According to Habermas (1987), lifeworld is a transcendental site where speakers and hearersmeet for intersubjective affairs like dealing with validity claims, settle disagreements,achieve agreements. It has both teleological and communicative aspects of a managementsituation. Lifeworld defines patterns of the social system as a whole, and is associated withculturally transmitted background knowledge.

19. The term automorphosis is used here for self-organisation. The reason is that the virtualdomain can be called as an organising domain, and it is better to be sure thatself-organisation is part of the phenomenal domain and relating to self-change of form.

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Van Gigch, J.P. (1987), Decision Making about Decision Making: Metamodels and Metasystems,Abacus, Tumbridge Well, Kent, UK.

Von Glasersfeld, E. (1984), “An introduction to radical constructivism”, in Watzlawick, P. (Ed.),The Invented Reality, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, NY, pp. 17-40.

Vygotsky, L.S. (1978), Mind in Society: The Development of Higher Psychological Process,Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

Whitehead, A.N. and Russell, B. (1910), Principia Mathematica, Cambridge University Press,Cambridge, MA.

Yolles, M.I. (1996), “Critical systems thinking, paradigms, and the modelling space”, SystemsPractice, Vol. 9 No. 6, pp. 549-70.

Yolles, M.I. (1999), Management Systems: A Viable Approach, Financial Times Pitman, London.

Yolles, M.I. (2000), “From viable systems to surfing the organisation”, Journal of AppliedSystems, Vol. 1 No. 1, pp. 127-42.

Yolles, M.I. (2001), “Viable boundary critique”, Journal of Operational Research Society, Vol. 51,pp. 1-12, ISSN 0160-5682/00.

Yolles, M.I. and Dubois, D. (2001), “Anticipatory viable systems”, International Journal ofComputing Anticipatory Systems, Vol. 9, pp. 3-20, ISSN 1373-5411.

Yolles, M.I. and Guo, K. (2003), “Paradigmatic metamorphosis and organisational development”,Sys. Res., Vol. 19.

Further reading

Bateson, G. (1972), Steps to an Ecology of Mind, Ballantine Books.

Beer, S. (1985), Diagnosing the System, Wiley, Chichester.

Bruning, R.H., Schraw, G.J. and Ronning, R.R. (1999), Cognitive Psychology and Instruction,Merrill, Upper Saddle River, NJ.

Piaget (1969), The Mechanisms of Perception, Basic Books, New York, NY.

Staver, J.R. (1995), “Scientific research and oncoming vehicles: can radical constructivist embraceone and dodge the other?”, Journal of Research in Science Teaching, Vol. 32 No. 10,pp. 1125-8.

Von Glasersfeld, E. (1998), “Why constructivism must be radical”, in Larochelle, M., Bednarz, N.and Garrison, J. (Eds), Constructivism and Education, Cambridge University Press,Cambridge, MA, pp. 23-8.

Yolles, M.I. (2002), “Viable boundary critique: a reply to Bryant”, Journal of Operational ResearchSociety, Vol. 53, pp. 1-3.

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