Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found athttp://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=reno20

Download by: [LSE Library Services] Date: 19 September 2015, At: 01:07

EthnopoliticsFormerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics

ISSN: 1744-9057 (Print) 1744-9065 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/reno20

Autonomy Impaired: Centralisation,Authoritarianism and the Failing Iraqi State

Dylan O'Driscoll

To cite this article: Dylan O'Driscoll (2015): Autonomy Impaired:Centralisation, Authoritarianism and the Failing Iraqi State, Ethnopolitics, DOI:10.1080/17449057.2015.1086126

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2015.1086126

Published online: 18 Sep 2015.

Submit your article to this journal

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Autonomy Impaired: Centralisation,Authoritarianism and the Failing IraqiState

DYLAN O’DRISCOLL

Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism (ASEN), UK

ABSTRACT Regional autonomy is guaranteed in the constitution of Iraq, yet between 2006 and2014 the Shiite prime minister at the time, Nouri al-Maliki, did his utmost to limit the power ofboth Kurds and Sunnis. Maliki worked to further centralise governance and amassed greatercontrols and power—from militarily to legislative—for his party. Instead of strengthening andsecuring Iraq, Maliki’s actions have led to a rise in both Kurdish and Sunni nationalisms, whichhas resulted in civil war and the effective failure of the Iraqi state. This article analyses howMaliki’s actions enabled the rise of the Islamic State, and have changed the dynamics of Iraq. Itproposes that, in light of these changes, the best way forward for the effective running of thecountry is the implementation of federalism across Iraq.

Introduction

Iraq can currently be identified as a failing state; this state of affairs is highlighted mostrecently by the fact that the Islamic State (IS) managed to gain large swathes of Iraqi ter-ritory with relative ease (Dodge, 2014).1 Since the start of Nuri al-Maliki’s second term asprime minister (2010) IS has gone from being an offshoot of Al Qaeda in Iraq, to fightingthe Assad regime in Syria, to controlling territory spanning from Syria to Iraq and includ-ing the key Iraqi cities of Fallujah, Tikrit and Mosul. IS is well-organised, well-financedand has become such a threat that the international community has returned to Iraq mili-tarily in order to provide air support in the fight against it. The success of IS in Iraq epit-omises the failure of the state both politically and militarily; in the Sunni areas IS plays afar more prominent role than any of the Iraqi governmental or military organisations (AlJazeera, 2014a, 2014c; Dodge, 2014; Phillips, 2014; Stansfield, 2014a). Further proof ofIraq’s failure, and yet another danger to Iraq’s territorial integrity, is the fact that forthe first time the Kurdish leadership has actively voiced their well-known desire for seces-sion by calling a referendum to vote on whether to break away from Iraq (Rubin, 2014).Although the referendum has since been postponed, the previous elephant in the room ofthe Iraqi political debate between Kurds and Arabs has manifested into a lion and in order

Ethnopolitics, 2015http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2015.1086126

Correspondence Address: Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism (ASEN), London School ofEconomics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK. Email: odriscoll.dylan@yahoo.com

# 2015 The Editor of Ethnopolitics

Dow

nloa

ded

by [L

SE L

ibra

ry S

ervi

ces]

at 0

1:07

19

Sept

embe

r 201

5

to prevent secession major concessions will have to be made towards the Kurds (Ditz,2014).2 The questions that need to be asked are what has caused IS’ rapid growth inIraq and why are the Kurds voicing their desire for secession at this particular momentin time?

Many blame the discontent of both Sunnis and Kurds on Maliki’s quest to amalgamatepower during his two terms, between 2006 and 2014, as prime minister of Iraq (see, forexample, Dodge, 2013, 2014; O’Driscoll, 2014a; Romano, 2014; Stansfield, 2014a).3

For instance, the Iraqi constitution makes territorial autonomy available to all those gov-ernorates that choose it and makes many provisions for liberal consociational governanceat the central level (McGarry & O’Leary, 2007). Yet, Maliki continuously fought theKurds’ attempts to achieve their constitutional autonomy. Furthermore, he centralisedgovernance and side lined the Sunnis politically (O’Driscoll, 2014a). Consequently, itcan be argued that Maliki’s actions had a very negative impact on the unity of Iraq—however fragile that unity might have been—and have actually marginalised bothKurds and Sunnis politically to the extent of no return. Although the policies implementedby Maliki were extremely divisive for Iraq, he still maintains tremendous support amongstthe Shiite community, which was cemented in the 2014 parliamentary election where hisState of Law coalition won the most votes across Iraq and more than 50% of the Shiitevotes (Sly, 2014). Additionally, Maliki, as leader of the Dawa party, won the most personalvotes in Iraq, with more than 721,000 people voting for him (Al Jazeera, 2014b). Ulti-mately, Maliki paid the price for appealing to only one section of the population, asdespite his popularity amongst his voters, his unpopularity amongst others made it imposs-ible for him to form a government. However, even though Maliki lost power, the results ofhis actions still resonate today.

This article examines how the process of the denial of adequate autonomy (to Kurds andSunnis) by Maliki, as well as a share of the power at the central level, has resulted in Kurdsacting on their secessionist desires and has led to the rise of IS in the Sunni provinces. Fur-thermore, this article will highlight how Maliki’s actions have led to many Sunnis seekinga federal region rather than backing a centralised state, as previously done. It will alsoanalyse whether increased autonomy and power for both Kurds and Sunnis could have pre-vented the current path towards the failure of the Iraqi state project. Finally, it will addresshow federalism and the creation of three ethnic/sectarian territories—Sunni, Shiite andKurdish may be the best, and possibly only sustainable, way forward in order to maintainthe territorial integrity of Iraq in the light of Maliki’s legacy and IS’ recent expansion.

Although this article focuses on the role Maliki has played in leading Iraq to the state itnow finds itself in, it must be acknowledged that the blame cannot be placed on him alone.As highlighted by Romano (2014) the USA was heavily involved in forming and encoura-ging a strong centralised state. The USA allowed Maliki to strengthen his position withinIraq and despite the warning signs backed Maliki to remain as prime minister following hiscoalition losing the 2010 national elections (Khedery, 2014). Iran has also been heavilyinvolved in ensuring that Iraq is a centralised, Shiite-dominated state, has financedShiite militias, and has interfered in political decisions from forming the Iraqi governmentto choosing one of the main Kurdish parties’, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, leadership(Deknatel, 2014; Khedery, 2014; O’Driscoll, 2014a). Additionally, Turkey’s burgeoningtrade relationship with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and signing of hydro-carbon export deals against Baghdad’s will has increased the KRG’s financial capacityand has put them in a far stronger position when negotiating for concessions with

2 D. O’Driscoll

Dow

nloa

ded

by [L

SE L

ibra

ry S

ervi

ces]

at 0

1:07

19

Sept

embe

r 201

5

Baghdad (O’Driscoll, 2014a). Finally, as highlighted by Dodge (2014) the corruption thatplagues Iraq is partly to blame for the army’s defeat against IS, as corruption led to thetroops being badly supplied (due to missing funds) and even led to non-existent troops(due to fraudulent claims to wages). Therefore, although this article will largely focuson the role that Maliki’s politics have played in the failure of the Iraqi state, it is importantto note that he cannot be seen as solely responsible for the vast number of negative devel-opments that have led to the current state of affairs.

Liberal Consociational Federalism

McGarry and O’Leary (2007) demonstrate the liberal consociational elements of the IraqiConstitution (2005) and argue that in accordance with it, federal autonomy is available toall those who choose it. As this article argues for a liberal consociational federal Iraq, it isimportant to examine the concept.

Liberal consociation follows self-determination, in that any political identity that winsenough votes in the election may choose to join the power sharing coalition (O’Leary,2005). At the same time, as Burgess (2006) argues, federalism is a less straightforwardterm to define, as it can encompass so many different types of federations. In the case ofIraq, and for the purposes of this article, liberal consociational federalism (which isenshrined in the Iraqi constitution) refers to allowing the governorates of Iraq to chooseif they want to form a federal region with other governorates giving them territorial auton-omy and powers (as detailed in the constitution), and giving Baghdad a special status as thecentre of the federal state. However, due to the changing dynamics of Iraq, as will be arguedin this article, it is now more likely that the governorates of Iraq will choose to be dividedalong ethnic/sectarian lines into three different regions—Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish.

Consociational federalism has been proven to work elsewhere, and Belgium is a suc-cessful example of this form of federalism at work in a society divided along ethnicand religious lines (Deschouwer, 2006; Lijphart, 1977, 1981, 2008, 2012; McGarry &O’Leary, 1990, 2004).4 However, some scholars are not convinced by consociational fed-eralism as an effective conflict solving mechanism, and Caluwaerts and Reuchamps(2015) argue that the process, based on the Belgium case study, will eventually dig itsown proverbial grave. These contrasting views on the use of consociational federalismin Belgium make it an important site to situate and contextualise its use in Iraq, as boththe negative and positive aspects can be analysed and addressed in order to understandthe prospect of its implementation within the dynamics of Iraq. Additionally, this articleanalyses the case study of Belgium in order to refute the claim of Caluwaerts andReuchamps that consocialtional federalism is doomed to fail; Caluwaerts and Reuchampsclaim that federalism fails beacuse the granting of autonomy leads to the call for moreautonomy, whereas this article demonstartes that the denial of autonomy in Iraq has ledto the call for, and realisation of, more autonomy. Moreover, Belgium is also importantbecause there are currently very few working examples of consociational federalism—the only two other examples are Bosnia and Herzegovina and Switzerland (Caluwaerts& Reuchamps, 2015). Finally, and closely related to the points mentioned above, it isimportant to analyse the criticisms of consociational federalism in Belgium before advo-cating its full implementation in Iraq.

According to Caluwaerts and Reuchamps (2015), the granting of autonomy creates theneed for more autonomy, which is then used in negotiations as a carrot in order to form a

Centralisation, Authoritarianism and the Failing Iraqi State 3

Dow

nloa

ded

by [L

SE L

ibra

ry S

ervi

ces]

at 0

1:07

19

Sept

embe

r 201

5

government. However, when you are left with carrots that you do not want to give away, apolitical stalemate is caused, and when you have no carrots left at all, the system will fail.There are a number of issues with this analysis.

Firstly, it does not address the question of whether Belgium would have failed in the firstplace without the introduction of consociational federalism. In Belgium, both consociationand federalism were introduced, at different times, to address self-determination disputesthat existed in the divided society. The likely alternatives would be disintegration of thestate or authoritarianism and centralisation, which this article argues Maliki attemptedto introduce to Iraq. The second scenario can lead to the segments of society that arenot in power witnessing one or more of the following consequences: subjugation,forced assimilation, displacement and even genocide (Sisk, 1996). Both the Kurds andShiites can attest to having experienced these in Iraq under the previous regime, whichis a further reason to prevent authoritarianism from returning to Iraq (O’Leary, 2012).There is also a third option of the dissolution into smaller, ethnically homogeneous,states—which this article argues is the path that Iraq is heading down (Sisk, 1996).However, as O’Leary (2011) has examined, partitions are seldom just in their split; theydo damage to the resulting states (O’Leary compares them to the separation of Siamesetwins, where at least one is badly lamed in the process), and they lead to violence, bothbefore and after the partition.

Secondly, although Caluwaerts and Reuchamps mention that the regionalist demandscould grow even more without the introduction of federal regions, they do not adequatelyaddress this concern. Through denying territorial autonomy, it can be argued that theactors are postponing the inevitable, and that once autonomy is eventually introduced itwill have to be at a higher level than initially called for. This is what is currently happeningin Iraq, as this article will demonstrate. Additionally, the main fear that Caluwaerts andReuchamps express is that the current system will eventually lead to secession inBelgium, however, according to Duchacek (1970), secession is just as likely to happenin a unitary state as it is in a federation. Moreover, there is no overwhelming supportfrom the population of Belgium for its dissolution, but rather the majority call for differentlevels of regional autonomy (Dodeigne, Gramme, Reuchamps, & Sinardet, 2014; Reu-champs, 2013).

Finally, Caluwaerts and Reuchamps totally ignore the recent developments to consocia-tional theory that could solve some of the issues they perceive as unavoidable. Caluwaertsand Reuchamps (2015) blame consociational federalism for the delays in government for-mation that Belgium has recently witnessed in both the 2007 and 2010 elections. However,the majority of the theory they use on consociation is pre-1985 and follows corporate con-sociational principles rather than liberal consociational, which could be used to success-fully address this issue without sacrificing either consociational principles orfederalism.5 The reason for the lengthy process of government formation in Belgium isthe Flemish desire for increased fiscal and financial autonomy, and as the formation ofa government is negotiated by the parties, it is an ideal time to make these demands(Deschouwer & Reuchamps, 2013). Iraq has also witnessed these same lengthy govern-ment formation procedures and they are also to blame on negotiations for the formationof the government, rather than consociation and federalism, which has not been entirelyimplemented in Iraq (O’Driscoll, 2014a, 2014b). One way to address this conundrum isthrough allocating the cabinet portfolios automatically through a sequential proportional-ity rules (SPR) system such as d’Hondt; the government would be chosen through a

4 D. O’Driscoll

Dow

nloa

ded

by [L

SE L

ibra

ry S

ervi

ces]

at 0

1:07

19

Sept

embe

r 201

5

mathematic equation that encourages power sharing. This would stop negotiations on pol-icies in the formation of the government, and in the case of Belgium it could have led toless devolution and decentralisation of powers, and would have allowed for a practicallyinstant formation of the government.6 The introduction of SPR also leads to fairer powersharing, and thus in Belgium it would have prevented the undemocratic fact that the largestFlemish party Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (New Flemish Alliance) was not included in thefederal government following the 2010 elections, which is also to blame for slowingdown politics, as the Flemish representatives at the federal level do not maintain strongregional support (Deschouwer & Reuchamps, 2013).7 In the case of Iraq, the introductionof SPR would have prevented the unconstitutional action of Maliki becoming prime min-ister following the 2010 elections when his coalition did not receive the most votes(O’Driscoll, 2014a). Caluwaerts and Reuchamps do argue that consociational federalismhas eased conflict in Belgium, but also argue that federalism is leading to its failure, asdemonstrated by the long process of government formation. However, as demonstratedabove, this can be counteracted through the implementation of the more recent develop-ments to consociational theory. Therefore, the issues that Belgium has recently facedcannot be blamed on consociational federalism; indeed the most stable governanceperiod that Belgium has witnessed was after proper territorial autonomy was granted in1993 (Deschouwer & Reuchamps, 2013). As argued by Wolff (2013)—in his examinationof territorial self-governance in 12 countries—many of the criticisms of the forms of ter-ritorial self-governance do not look at the full political package and thus unfairly blameissues on the territorial aspect, when realistically speaking it needs to be combined withother conflict management mechanisms. The need for SPR in the allocation of cabinetportfolios to coincide with territorial autonomy, in both Belgium and Iraq, is a perfectexample of the need for such a combined package. Whereas, Caluwaerts and Reuchampslaying the blame on federalism without analysing the advances made to consociationaltheory, is a perfect example of blaming the territoral element of the equation withoutexamining the full package.

Caluwaerts and Reuchamps (2015) do however demonstrate that the devolution ofpower is like feeding an addiction; the more power that is given, the more power that isdemanded. This desire for power therefore needs to be addressed. As already stated, byintroducing a SPR system to choose the cabinet portfolios you take away a major bargain-ing chip in seeking further devolution and decentralisation of powers. Furthermore, thereare additional corporate consociational principles that exist in Belgium that affect the stab-ility of the system and could be made more liberal. For example, the language line thatdetermines the regions is fixed and does not follow any changes in demographics,which in turn can lead to members of the population being unrepresented (Deschouwer& Reuchamps, 2013). More importantly, for the purposes of this article, the dynamicsof Iraq are very different to that of Belgium and there are many factors that lead to, andmake it necessary for, a stronger federal government in Iraq, which is a point that willbe raised next.

Firstly, due to the powers of the European Union, Belgium can be seen as a federationwithin a federation. Therefore, the federal state’s powers are already weakened beforedevolution and decentralisation even begins; this is not the case in Iraq (Beyers &Bursens, 2013). Secondly, if Article 112 of the Iraqi Constitution—giving the central gov-ernment control of the present oil and gas fields—is followed the Iraqi federal governmentmaintains considerable power through the distribution of wealth (Iraqi Constitution,

Centralisation, Authoritarianism and the Failing Iraqi State 5

Dow

nloa

ded

by [L

SE L

ibra

ry S

ervi

ces]

at 0

1:07

19

Sept

embe

r 201

5

2005). Finally, the security situation in Iraq and Belgium are extremely different; rela-tively peaceful neighbours surround Belgium, whereas Iraq borders countries that arewaiting to pounce on a weak state.8 Insurgencies and coup attempts are often aided byIraq’s neighbours and jihadists are offered safe passage both into and out of Iraq(O’Leary, 2012). Therefore, it is in the best interests of the regions of Iraq to have a stron-ger federal state than that of Belgium.

As has been demonstrated, consociation and federalism are not incompatible and can beused—as will be argued later—to prevent the failure of the Iraqi state project. It will alsoargued that denying autonomy in Iraq, has led to the seeking/granting of more autonomythan was originally sought. However, it is important to first examine the impact that thedenial of these principles has had on the Iraqi political system, which will be addressedin the next section.

Maliki’s Legacy

With the ratification of the new Iraqi constitution in 2005 (Carrol, 2005) the path wasopened up for a consociational federal Iraq (McGarry & O’Leary, 2007). According toDavid Romano the 2005 Iraqi constitution ‘provided a legal and political structure thatcould have led the country to a much more propitious future’ (2014, p. 548). Yet, in histwo terms as prime minister, Maliki did little to honour these principles and his actionsdid more to lead Iraq back to the authoritarianism that it witnessed under the previousregime (O’Driscoll, 2014a). This section will map out the unconstitutional actions thatMaliki carried out that have led Iraq to the precarious position it finds itself in today.

Amalgamating Power

Maliki ignored the liberal consociational elements of the constitution and prevented thepopulation from choosing their internal borders. He made countless promises on theimplementation of Article 140 of the constitution, particularly with regards to implement-ing these principles in Kirkuk, yet deadlines passed and little materialised (Anderson &Stansfield, 2009; O’Driscoll, 2014b; O’Leary, 2009; Romano, 2007; Wolff, 2010a).9

Following the national elections in December 2005, where no party won a majority, theKurds were in a good position (with almost a quarter of the seats in parliament) to nego-tiate concessions with potential prime ministerial candidates. Thus, the Kurds’ support forMaliki as prime minister gained them a written guarantee for the implementation of Article140 and resulted in the creation of the Article 140 Committee, whose duty it was toimplement the article. However, by the 31 December 2007 deadline for its implemen-tation, little progress had been made and Maliki and his government had failed their con-stitutional obligation (Anderson & Stansfield, 2009; O’Driscoll, 2014b). The March 2010national elections saw al-Iraqiya winning just two more seats than the coalition led byMaliki (State of Law), which again put the Kurds in a strong position as these twoparties were aiming to win power in a coalition government. Based on these developmentsthe Kurds released a document containing nineteen conditions—which included theimplementation of Article 140—that would need to be agreed to in order for them tojoin any coalition (Kurdistan Region Presidency, 2010). Once again the Kurds backedMaliki following a signed agreement stating that he would implement Article 140 in atwo-year time period (Ali, 2010). However, when the funds were not made available

6 D. O’Driscoll

Dow

nloa

ded

by [L

SE L

ibra

ry S

ervi

ces]

at 0

1:07

19

Sept

embe

r 201

5

for its implementation, it soon became apparent that Maliki had no intention of honouringthis agreement (Ahmed, 2011). The treatment of Article 140 demonstrates how Malikimade promises he had no intention, and possibly no chance, of keeping in order to gainpower in the first instance and then to maintain it.

Once Maliki gained a second term as prime minister following the 2010 elections heincreased his efforts to centralise the governance of Iraq and amalgamate power underhis command. To maintain power Maliki made an agreement for the formation of apower sharing government, and made promises to al-Iraqiya for the formation of a newstrategic council, under their command, to act as a check on the prime ministers powers(Agence France-Presse, 2010). However, it soon became apparent that Maliki had nointention of honouring these agreements; the strategic council never materialised due toMaliki preventing it from having any real power (Visser, 2011), and Maliki went on toalso become minister of defence, minister of interior, minister of state for national securityand commander-in-chief of the armed forces, all alongside his role as prime minister(O’Driscoll, 2014a; Romano, 2014). In short, rather than honouring Iraqi power sharingagreements, these actions resembled the authoritarianism of Iraq’s past.

Unsurprisingly, both Sunnis and Kurds feared that Maliki was attempting a grab forpower and to break up the other parties in order to return Iraq to a dictatorship, as high-lighted by Kurdish Democratic Party Head of Kirkuk-Garmia Leadership Council,Salah Dalo (personal communication, April 17, 2013): ‘We voted for Maliki, but helied we think he is going to be a dictator again, like Saddam’. This perception was alsopartly down to the fact that Maliki was seen to be eliminating political opponentsthrough non-political means such as accusations and arrests (O’Driscoll, 2014a). Theprocess began with the trial of (Sunni) Vice President of Iraq, Tariq al-Hashimi, whofled first to the KRG and then to Turkey and who was sentenced to death in hisabsence. Hashimi, who was fiercely critical of Maliki’s government and supports the cre-ation of a Sunni region, was charged with running deaths squads. It is important to notethat the warrant for his arrest came the day after the last of the US troops withdrewfrom Iraq, which effectively removed a restraint on Maliki’s quest for the amalgamationof power (BBC News, 2012). The view of Maliki eliminating political opponents was notappeased following the arrest, on terrorism charges, of many staff and bodyguards ofSunni Finance Minister, Rafie al-Issawi, who had called for Maliki to resign (Faraj,2013; Gordon, 2012). Additionally, another critic of Maliki, Iraqiya MP Ahmed al-Alwani, was also arrested under terrorism charges; on a raid on his home, in December2013, at least six people were killed, including Alwani’s brother, and a further 18 wereinjured (Al Jazeera, 2013b). The belief that Maliki was forcing those who oppose himout of office with terrorism and corruption charges was further cemented with thearrest of the chairman of the election commission and the head of the central bank (VanHeuvelen, 2012; Wilson, 2012). Whilst, those who supported Maliki, like the formertrade minister, who is thought to have embezzled millions, came through trialsunscathed—the outcome of the trial was that the investigating judge was dismissedfrom his position (Reuter, 2013). According to Dodge (2013, p. 242):

The moves against Issawi and Hashemi are part of a larger pattern of deployment bythe Prime Minister of the judiciary and security forces to break any political opposi-tion to his long running attempts to centralize power in his own hands and those ofhis allies.

Centralisation, Authoritarianism and the Failing Iraqi State 7

Dow

nloa

ded

by [L

SE L

ibra

ry S

ervi

ces]

at 0

1:07

19

Sept

embe

r 201

5

As is evident, Maliki used allegations and arrests to rid himself of political opponents. Hethen went on to fill key positions with those allied with him. Additionally, he widened theremit of the prime minister and placed many additional bodies (such as the high court,election commission, central bank, etc.) under his power (Dodge, 2013). This wentagainst the constitution and contributed to a failure of the democratic process.

In order for Maliki to carry out the actions described above, he first had to take control ofthe security forces. He began by slowly disbanding the Sunni Sahwa forces in 2008, whichhad been created to fight al-Qaeda. Maliki gradually integrated them into the Iraqi SecurityForces (ISF) and also cancelled arms licences and arrested many of its members. Purgingthese forces from Iraq essentially rid him of (Sunni) military opposition, but also tookaway a protective force from the Sunni provinces, which—could be argued—allowedIS to fill this military vacuum (Benraad, 2011). Additionally, as already stated, Malikihad taken control of the ministry of defence, as well as the ministry of state for nationalsecurity, ministry of interior and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Alongsidethis, Maliki replaced high-ranking military officials with his allies and began givingdirect orders to them, thus leading to him effectively running ISF both in the parliamentand on the ground. Furthermore, he created provincial command centres with generalsloyal to him and placed both the army and police under these generals’ control (Dodge,2013; Ibrahim, 2012; O’Driscoll, 2014a). Although taking charge of the ISF cementedMaliki’s position and gave him enough power in order to make it difficult to challengehim, it actually weakened Iraq militarily, as his focus was on self-preservation ratherthan protecting the territory. Iraq’s military weakness is highlighted by the fact that ISwas able to take control of Iraq’s second biggest city, Mosul, with a force of as little as800 fighters (Chulov, Hawramy, & Ackerman, 2014). Indeed, a parliamentary reportreleased in August 2015 has directly blamed Maliki’s actions for the fall of Mosul andmay result in legal action against him (Melvin, 2015).

The aforementioned section demonstrates the unconstitutional path that Maliki fol-lowed in order to amalgamate power under his control. Maliki’s actions also failed increating a strong Iraqi state, as he alienated large sections of the population. Bydenying proper political representation, conflict and sectarianism increased in Iraq andthis dissatisfaction led to widespread protests.

Protests

The Sunni discontent over Maliki’s governance, in particular the arrest of Sunni politicalfigures, led to widespread protests from Sunnis across Iraq, especially in Anbar, Salahad-din, Nineveh, Diyala and Kirkuk (Markey & Kami, 2013). Maliki’s reactions to these pro-tests were particularly telling in understanding the type of regime that was formed underhim. When Sunni opponents to these actions gathered in protest—as is their constitutionalright under Article 38 of the Iraqi constitution (Iraqi Constitution, 2005)—Maliki sent inthe army and the results were disastrous and resulted in many deaths (see: Adnan, 2013; AlJazeera, 2013a; O’Driscoll, 2014a; Tawfeeq & Abedine, 2013).

Maliki used the army not only to rid himself of political opposition, but also to destroythose who protested against him. His actions against the protesters led to an increase insectarian violence across Iraq and created the political atmosphere that has allowed ISto flourish, a point that will be returned to later. At the same time, it is important tonote, that Maliki maintained the support of large sections of the Shiite community,

8 D. O’Driscoll

Dow

nloa

ded

by [L

SE L

ibra

ry S

ervi

ces]

at 0

1:07

19

Sept

embe

r 201

5

which became evident in the pro-government counter protests in the Shiite provinces ofsouthern Iraq that took place in 2012/2013 (Tawfeeq, 2013).

Kurds

The main issues that the Kurds had with Maliki—other than the already discussed issueswith Article 140—was that to them he was not following his constitutional obligationswith regards to the budget and hydrocarbons. The Kurdish dissatisfaction is highlightedin this statement by Falah Mustafa, KRG Foreign Relations Minister (personal communi-cation, June 6, 2013):

We have committed ourselves to a federal democratic pluralistic Iraq at the time, butwe see that this is not functioning and we cannot wait for this . . . we cannot begfrom Baghdad for a budget that everyday they threaten us for this and that thingwhile they have not been able to improve the security, improve the services,provide any opportunity and they have got billions and billions of dollars as abudget.

The Kurdish reading, as well as that of many political analysts (see: Anderson & Stans-field, 2009; O’Driscoll, 2014a; Romano, 2007, 2014; Stansfield, 2014b) of the Iraqi Con-stitution is that Article 114 stipulates that all new oil and gas fields are controlled by theregions (or governorates if they are not organised into regions) and that ‘present fields’ arecontrolled by the central government, as per Article 112 (Iraqi Constitution, 2005). Asthere were no oil fields discovered in the KRG prior to the creation of the constitution,this therefore gives the KRG the right to explore for, and manage, their own hydrocarbons.However, for Maliki, having the Kurds in control of their own resources constituted a per-ceived threat to his power, as it took away their reliance on Baghdad for their budget.Therefore, in his view all hydrocarbons in Iraq should have been managed by thecentral government and he thus ignored the use of the term ‘present fields’. As a resultof these opposing views there was a high level of political conflict between the Kurdsand the central government. The Kurds signed oil deals with international companiesagainst the will of the central government and as a result they did not receive paymentsfor the operating costs of these oil companies, which in turn led to them halting exportsthrough the centrally controlled Ceyhan pipeline (Today’s Zaman, 2013b). As a result,the Kurds, through Genel Oil, began exporting oil by truck to Turkey (Today’s Zaman,2013a). The Kurds also expanded their oil and gas infrastructure and on 27 November2013, the KRG and Turkey finalised their agreement for exporting oil and gas to, andthrough, Turkey, which they began the next month (Khoudouri, 2013; Rudaw, 2013b).This led to Maliki stopping the KRG’s allocation of the budget, which will be examinednext.

The Kurds complained that the central government, under Maliki, had not been givingthem their 17% share of the budget and that instead they only received around 11%. This isdue to the fact that the central government makes deductions for payments to oil compa-nies, and the KRG’s share of expenses for national defence and foreign affairs after cal-culating the 17% rather than before (Ottaway & Ottaway, 2014). Despite the Kurdshaving to pay towards national defence, Baghdad was not paying for the operation ofthe peshmerga, even though there was an agreement to do so and they are vital to Iraqi

Centralisation, Authoritarianism and the Failing Iraqi State 9

Dow

nloa

ded

by [L

SE L

ibra

ry S

ervi

ces]

at 0

1:07

19

Sept

embe

r 201

5

security (Toomeh, 2012). The importance of the peshmerga to Iraqi security has only beenfurther emphasised by the major role they have played in the fight against IS, which makesthe lack of payments from the central government even more questionable (Bas News,2015; Engel, 2015; Ignatius, 2015; Stansfield, 2014a). Even though the peshmerga arecritical in the fight against IS, they are also not receiving their fair share of the internationalarms supplies from Baghdad. According to Masrour Barzani, Chancellor of the KurdistanRegion Security Council, ‘90% of the burden for this war is on the shoulder of the pesh-merga . . . but we are only getting 10% of the armaments’ (as cited in Lake, 2015). More-over, following the Kurds’ export of oil to Turkey through their own pipeline (of whichTurkey offered to give Baghdad its 83% share), Maliki suspended the Kurds’ 17% ofthe budget altogether (Ahmed, 2014).

On their end, the Kurds have followed the liberal consociational federalist constitutionto the letter. However, as this goes against the centralistic authoritarianism that Malikitried to implement, he attempted to block them at every step. Thus, driving themfurther away from the central state, which is an area that will be analysed in the nextsection.

Federalism for Iraq

The Need for a Sunni Region

In examining the future of Iraq—prior to the 2010 national elections and Maliki’s amal-gamation of power—Anderson and Stansfield (2010) call for the protection of theKurdish region through international law, but the removal of the federal option for therest of Iraq. Instead, they propose a strong central government in order to protectSunnis from the regionalisation of Iraq and to protect the Kurds from having their auton-omy revoked. However, the dynamics of Iraq have changed since 2010, with Maliki’sactions leading to many Sunnis also favouring federalism and it is now too late toimplement the framework proposed by Anderson and Stansfield. Therefore, althoughprior to Maliki’s intense centralisation efforts it was unlikely that Iraq would becomeentirely federal, now, if the state is to survive, it is potentially the only way to counteractthe rise of IS and to regain the trust of those marginalised by Maliki’s actions and policies.Moreover, whereas previously if more regions were created they would not necessarilyfollow the ethnic/sectarian division, they are now certain to do so. One of the reasonsthe Sunnis were against federalism was that they still had visions of past glory wherethey dominated Iraq politically (Romano, 2014). However, their political marginalisationhas made them realise that not only is this impossible, but also that they need the protectionthat regional autonomy can offer. The dissatisfaction with Maliki’s governance led to sep-arate declarations of autonomy from the Sunni governorates of Diyala and Salahaddin in2011. These were the first calls for autonomy by the Sunnis, but did not constitute a call fora Sunni region per se. Maliki blocked the process and part of his response led to the arrestsof the politicians who supported it, as demonstrated in the previous section (Gavin, 2012).It was in the 2012 demonstrations, and due to the dissatisfaction with Maliki’s governance,that protestors began to call for the creation of a Sunni region. The solution was backed bymany prominent Sunni politicians, such as Osama al-Nujaifi, Rafie al-Issawi, Ahmed al-Alwani and Tariq Al-Hashimi (Rudaw, 2013a; Zaidan, 2015). The former governor ofMosul, Atheel al-Nujaifi, who fled following IS’ invasion of Mosul in June 2014 has

10 D. O’Driscoll

Dow

nloa

ded

by [L

SE L

ibra

ry S

ervi

ces]

at 0

1:07

19

Sept

embe

r 201

5

also called for the creation of a Sunni region and furthermore for the creation of a Sunniarmy. He directly blames Maliki for the rise of IS, as the Iraqi army fled without a fight dueto the fact that the military leaders were Shiite and had no allegiance to the area (Sherlock& Malouf, 2014). The calls for a Sunni region went even further with some Sunni tribeshiring US consultancy firm Calex Partners to help aid their push for an autonomous regionby representing their cause in Washington (Wilson, 2014).10

As demonstrated, the Sunnis initial opposition to federalism in Iraq has graduallydeclined due to Maliki’s actions during his time as prime minister. This developmentbegan with a smaller call for the creation of regions by individual governorates and hasnow led to the wider call for the creation of a Sunni region. Moreover, the rise of IShas also led to an increased desire, or even perceived need, for a Sunni region. Many ofpolicies and decisions that were implemented by Maliki, which have already been high-lighted, can be seen as partly responsible for the rise of IS in Iraq. Firstly, the disbandingof the Sahwa took away any active Sunni-led force to fight against IS and protect the Sunniterritory. Furthermore, this created a vacuum with there being no military representationfor the Sunnis, which IS gladly filled. Secondly, Maliki’s interference in the army—par-ticularly his appointment of new generals allied to him in charge of local commandcentres, who fled when IS arrived and left the remaining army with no command—further created conditions that IS took advantage of. Finally, Maliki’s amalgamation ofpower and the resulting side lining of the Sunnis created a political vacuum that neededto be filled. When this is paired with the treatment of the protestors and the acts againstthem by the Iraqi military, the ideal conditions were formed for the rise of an alternativepolitical and military force in the Sunni-majority areas, which is what IS offered. Thus, thecentralising and authoritarian actions of Maliki have had the opposite affect in the longrun. Sunnis have gone from championing a centralised Iraqi state to calling for a Sunniregion. Sectarianism and presence of militias have increased in Iraq and it now seemsthat the only way to appease this would be the creation of a Sunni region, which wouldeffectively divide Iraq across sectarian and ethnic lines.

Although the actions discussed above have changed the dynamics of Iraq, there are stilloptions available in order to make Iraq more secure and democratic. It is also imperativethat these actions are followed as part of the battle against IS. Firstly, a Sunni force needsto be created, not only to fight IS, but also to give the Sunnis a sense of military protection.Secondly, the Sunnis need better protection politically in Iraq and part of this wouldinvolve giving them a federal region so that the actions of power hungry individualssuch as Maliki will not be repeated in the future. This way the fight against IS can getthe support of the Sunni population, which again is crucial for its defeat (Stansfield,2014a). Finally, there needs to be institutionalised power sharing at the central leveland Maliki’s centralisation and authoritarian actions need to be reversed so that all sectionsof the population are represented in the government—not just one, as was the case underMaliki (O’Driscoll, 2014a).

What You Ask for is What You Get?

Maliki’s actions also affected the level of autonomy that the Kurds are demanding. Due tohim denying them their constitutional rights they have taken action and gained more auton-omy than they were aiming for in the first place. Firstly, the Kurds wanted to follow the con-stitution and develop their own hydrocarbons; they were, however, content to export these

Centralisation, Authoritarianism and the Failing Iraqi State 11

Dow

nloa

ded

by [L

SE L

ibra

ry S

ervi

ces]

at 0

1:07

19

Sept

embe

r 201

5

through Baghdad and receive their share of the funds from Baghdad. Nonetheless, due to thefact that Maliki was constantly blocking them and denying them their share of the budgetthey adapted by developing their own pipelines and they now export and receive paymentsindependently of Baghdad. There is no going back on this and since Maliki has lost power ahydrocarbon deal between the Kurds and Baghdad has been signed along these lines, thusgiving the Kurds more financial freedom than they initially sought (Bradley, Kent, &Adnan, 2014). Secondly, following the rise of IS and the fleeing of the Iraqi army, theKurdish forces moved in filling the vacuum left and now act as a protection against ISforces in much of the disputed territories.11 However, as a result, they effectively tookthe land in the disputed territories without it being put to a vote or being negotiated onwith the central government, as it would have if Maliki had allowed Article 140 to comeinto effect or tried to renegotiate it through offering other concessions. Therefore, theKurds have gained territory that they were initially willing to decide through constitutionalmeans, and it would be very hard for them to just relinquish this territory back to Baghdadwith all the mistrust that has been created through not realising Article 140. Finally, theKurds have called for a referendum on seceding from Iraq, and although they did notfollow through, it has now been voiced and continues to resonate politically.

As demonstrated above, Maliki’s actions backfired and instead of leading to a more cen-tralised authoritarian Iraq, they have led to a virtual failing of the state. His actions resultedin more autonomy being sought, and now the only way to limit the damage done, curb IS’advances, and possibly also save Iraq, may be the creation of a completely federal Iraq.The creation of a Sunni region may not necessarily lead to the creation of a Shiiteregion, but it would make sense for them to follow suit, as if they did not the Kurdsand Sunnis would have more say in their governance than they would have in that ofthe Kurds and Sunnis. It is also important to note, that due to the lack of regional devel-opment there have previously been calls for the creation of separate regions in the Shiitesouth (Hiltermann, Kane, & Alkadiri, 2012).

Ultimately, Maliki’s actions led to him losing power, as he lost the support of bothKurds and Sunnis, which thus made it impossible for him to be elected following the2014 national election. It is now left to the new prime minister, Haider al-Abadi, to tryand control and undo the damage done by Maliki. Part of this is granting more autonomyto the Kurds and Sunnis in order to save Iraq, a process that he has already begun. Abadihas agreed a hydrocarbon deal, budget and peshmerga financing with the Kurds (Bradleyet al., 2014). Additionally, he has begun decentralising Iraq by giving more power to thelocal governments and he has lifted the veto on creating new regions, thus effectivelypaving the way for federalism (al-Abadi, 2014; Shamsulddin, 2015) Most importantly,Abadi has begun the process of parliamentary reform and has slashed the number of pos-itions and advisors within the government (this included cancelling Maliki’s position ofvice president). When paired with the report blaming Maliki’s government for the fallof Mosul and resulting rise of IS, it becomes clear that Abadi is attempting to restorethe population’s faith in the Iraqi political process (Rasheed & Kalin, 2015). However,with the drop in oil prices and the cost of fighting IS, Abadi may find it difficult financiallyto keep promises and make the impact that is needed (Coles, Gamal, & Zhdannikov, 2015;Kamil, 2015). It is also important to note that Abadi is not just up against Maliki, and hislegacy, but also Iran, who are entrenched in the notion of a centralised Shiite-dominatedIraqi state (Deknatel, 2014). Therefore, although Abadi seems to be willing to lead Iraq inthe right direction, this will be no easy task and there is a long road ahead.

12 D. O’Driscoll

Dow

nloa

ded

by [L

SE L

ibra

ry S

ervi

ces]

at 0

1:07

19

Sept

embe

r 201

5

Additionally, although this article advocates federalism as the only viable option avail-able to Iraq within the current dynamics, as discussed in the opening section, in order toprotect the territorial integrity of Iraq, this federal system needs to be paired with theimplementation of more liberal consociational elements, such as the use of SPR in the allo-cation of cabinet portfolios (O’Driscoll, 2014a; Wolff, 2010b). As the creation of a Sunniregion has been proposed in this article, it is also important to outline the benefits thereof,which is the last point that will be raised in this section.

Firstly, as already discussed, the Sunnis have been marginalised politically and by grant-ing them a region they largely become responsible for their own governance, which in turnshould lessen the sectarian tension. Secondly, and closely linked to the first point, throughself-governance the Sunnis can prioritise regional development, including the gas sector,which was largely ignored under Maliki, thus giving them the financial stability necessaryfor them to negotiate at central level on equal terms (Hiltermann et al., 2012). Thirdly, as thecreation would very likely lead to the formation of an entirely federal Iraq, federalism,alongside liberal consociational developments at the central level, would stabilise Iraqand protect its territorial integrity. Finally, and arguably also most importantly from the per-spective of regional stability, the creation of a Sunni region is critical in the fight against IS.It is important that the Sunni people support the Iraqi state against IS but due to Maliki’slegacy this is improbable without granting them territorial autonomy. The fight againstIS, as analysed by Stansfield (2014a), should also include a Sunni force and a way toimplement this is through the creation of a Sunni region. Ultimately, in order for Sunnisto support Iraq against IS both militarily and politically they need guarantees of theirfuture security, which only federalism can offer.

Conclusion

During his time in power Maliki tried to strengthen Iraq by centralising power and essen-tially fashioning himself into an authoritarian leader. This failed drastically, as he alie-nated Kurds and Sunnis and allowed sectarianism to flourish. His treatment of Sunniprotestors was a significant reminder of the former regime, which ultimately led to hisdownfall. As former senior USA official in Iraq, Ali Khedery (2014) stated: ‘In short,Maliki’s one-man, one-Dawa-party Iraq looks a lot like Hussein’s one-man, one-BaathParty Iraq.’ Whether he had Iraq’s best interests in mind, or became power hungry isless relevant than the fact that he effectively drove Iraq to virtual failure. At the sametime—and it is a point that has not been fully engaged with in this article due to thelack of space–the USA must take some of the blame for the current state of Iraq; they con-tinued to support Maliki despite the fact that he was not following the constitution, all in amisguided attempt to strengthen Iraq. However, as Romano (2014, p. 565) argues, theirsupport ‘may have shown more commitment to Iraq’s territorial integrity than to its con-stitutional integrity’. Even though ‘recent events suggest that commitment to the latterwould have proven more effective at securing the former’.

The fact is, the dynamics of Iraq have changed and there is no going back. In order toprotect the integrity of Iraq’s external borders the internal ones need to be altered. The pol-itical chaos and distrust that Maliki created is not reversible, Iraq cannot return to a cen-tralised state if it is to win back the Sunnis and drive out IS. Therefore, the Sunnis must begiven a region and a military force and the Kurds must be granted all their constitutionalrights, as well as there being an acceptance of the hydrocarbon and territorial advances

Centralisation, Authoritarianism and the Failing Iraqi State 13

Dow

nloa

ded

by [L

SE L

ibra

ry S

ervi

ces]

at 0

1:07

19

Sept

embe

r 201

5

they have made. Both will equal to the devolution and decentralisation of more powersthan were initially sought. Paradoxically, Maliki’s denial of regional autonomy has ledto greater autonomy.

The analysis in this article that Iraq is, or at least should be, heading towards full fed-eralism means that Maliki’s centralising authoritarianism process actually had the oppositeeffect, thus questioning Caluwaerts and Reuchamps appraisel that territorial autonomyshould not be granted in the first place, as it leads to the call for more autonomy. Thedenial of this territorial autonomy and the centralisation project that goes with it has notonly led to the call for more autonomy, but has also resulted in ethnic and sectarian vio-lence and a practical failure of the Iraqi state. The line of argument developed in this articledemonstrates that it is far more desirable to grant autonomy in the first place and to pairthis with liberal consociational principles in order for the system to work.

Notes

1. Although referred to as the Islamic State in this article, this term only came into being after a caliphate

was declared on 29 June 2014 and they were formerly known, and are often still referred to, as theIslamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Islamic State ofIraq and the Levant. They are also often referred to as Daesh, which is based on the Arabic acronym

for their name.2. The Kurdish leadership postponed the referendum and stated that they would give Iraq and the new gov-

ernment ‘one last chance’ to prove that Iraq can succeed and that the central government will fulfill itsprevious promises.

3. This includes the period when Maliki acted as a de facto prime minister between the 2014 election results

on 19 May and the formation of the new government under Haider al-Abadi on 08 September 2014.4. The works prior to 1993 examined purely the consociational element.

5. Their only reference to consociational theory post 1985 is to highlight that according to O’Leary con-sociation and federalism are two sides of the same coin. They completely ignore the major developmentsto the theory that have happened over the past 30 years, particularly that of liberal consociational theory.

6. For a detailed analysis of the use of sequential proportionality rules, particularly in Iraq, in the allocationof cabinet portfolios (see: O’Driscoll, 2014a, 2014b).

7. This can slow down negotiations through sub negotiations at the regional level. It can also lead to the call

for higher demands, as the party feels a greater pressure to demonstrate their worth to their region.8. In an interview conducted by the author in Kirkuk, Iraq, the spokesperson for the Asayesh (Kurdish secret

police), Lieutenant Colonel Azad, alluded to Iranian, Turkish, as well as Qatarian interference in thepolitics of Iraq.

9. Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution calls for the implementation of Article 58 of the Transitional Admin-

istrative Law by the 31st December 2007. Article 58 calls for the normalisation of the disputed territoriesof Iraq, followed by a census and then a referendum on the future constitutional status (in Kirkuk’s case

whether it would join the KRG or not).10. Additionally, in a lecture, ISIS, the state of Kurdistan and the State of Kurdistan, given by Brendan

O’Leary (London, 30 March 2015) O’Leary stated that the prior to IS’ success in Iraq the Kurdish

prime minister asked him if he would advise the Sunni governors of Nineveh and Anbar in creating aregion.

11. The disputed territories of Iraq are those areas that had their borders changed by the previous regime andnow involve disputes over the borders. They involve Kirkuk, Diyala, Nineveh, Salahaddin and the KRG.

ORCID

Dylan O’Driscoll http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5938-3809

14 D. O’Driscoll

Dow

nloa

ded

by [L

SE L

ibra

ry S

ervi

ces]

at 0

1:07

19

Sept

embe

r 201

5

References

Adnan, D. (2013, January 25). Deadly turn in protests against Iraqi leadership. New York Times. Retrieved from

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/26/world/middleeast/clashes-turn-deadly-after-iraqi-forces-open-fire-on-protesters.html?_r=2&

Agence France-Presse. (2010, November 11). Power-sharing deal reached in Iraq. Al Jazeera. Retrieved fromhttp://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2010/11/201011119329394717.html

Ahmed, H. (2011). ‘Neighbors’ interference greatest impediment for enforcing article 140, says official. AK

News. Retrieved from http://aknews.com/en/aknews/4/214014/Ahmed, H. (2014, February 18). Iraq’s deputy finance minister: Kurdistan budget blocked directly by Maliki.

Rudaw. Retrieved from http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/180220141al-Abadi, H. (2014, December 18). A united Iraq is pushing ISIS back. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from http://

www.wsj.com/articles/haider-al-abadi-a-united-iraq-is-pushing-back-the-islamic-state-1418946399

Al Jazeera. (2013a, December 31). Dozens of Iraqi MPs quit over Anbar violence. Al Jazeera. Retrieved fromhttp://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/12/iraq-anbar-violence-20131230222045598880.html

Al Jazeera. (2013b, December 29). Iraq security forces arrest MP in deadly raid. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/12/iraq-security-forces-arrest-mp-deadly-raid-20131228836395606.html

Al Jazeera. (2014a, January 4). Iraq government loses control of Fallujah. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/01/iraq-government-loses-control-fallujah-20141414625597514.html

Al Jazeera. (2014b, May 19). Iraq’s Maliki ‘set to win elections’. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/05/iraq-maliki-set-win-elections-201451913511590643.html

Al Jazeera. (2014c, January 6). Iraqi army assault underway to eject Al-Qaeda. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from http://

www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/01/iraqi-forces-bomb-east-fallujah-20141518832201807.htmlAli, S. (2010). Maliki signed to implement article 140 in two years. AK News. Retrieved from http://aknews.com/

en/aknews/4/204359/

Anderson, L., & Stansfield, G. (2009). Crisis in Kirkuk: The ethnopolitics of conflict and compromise. Philadel-phia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Anderson, L., & Stansfield, G. (2010). Avoiding ethnic conflict in Iraq: Some lessons from the Aland Islands.Ethnopolitics, 9(2), 219–238. doi:10.1080/17449051003784770

Bas News. (2015, February 9). Turkish foreign minister: Only peshmerga exists, there is no Iraqi army. Bas News.

Retrieved from http://basnews.com/en/news/2015/02/09/turkish-foreign-minister-only-the-peshmerga-exists-there-is-no-iraqi-army/

BBC News. (2012, September 10). Iraq VP Tariq al-Hashemi rejects guilty verdict. BBC. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19540960

Benraad, M. (2011). Iraq’s tribal “Sahwa”: Its rise and fall. Middle East Policy, 18(1), 121–131. doi:10.1111/j.

1475-4967.2011.00477.xBeyers, J., & Bursens, P. (2013). How Europe shapes the nature of the Belgian federation: Differentiated EU

impact triggers both co-operation and decentralization. Regional & Federal Studies, 23(3), 271–291.doi:10.1080/13597566.2013.773898

Bradley, M., Kent, S., & Adnan, G. (2014, December 2). Iraq and Kurdistan agree on oil deal. The Wall Street

Journal. Retrieved from http://www.wsj.com/articles/iraq-agrees-kurdistan-oil-deal-1417513949Burgess, M. (2006). Comparative federalism: Theory and practice. London: Routledge.Caluwaerts, D., & Reuchamps, M. (2015). Combining federalism with consociationalism: Is Belgian consocia-

tional federalism digging its own grave? Ethnopolitics, 14(3), 277–295. doi:10.1080/17449057.2014.986866Carrol, R. (2005, October 17). First results show victory for Iraqi constitution. The Guardian. Retrieved from

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/oct/17/iraq.topstories3Chulov, M., Hawramy, F., & Ackerman, S. (2014, June 12). Iraq army capitulates to ISIS militants in four cities.

The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/11/mosul-isis-gunmen-middle-

east-statesColes, I., Gamal, R. E., & Zhdannikov, D. (2015, March 13). Kurdish oil deal with Baghdad unravels as tensions

rise. Reuters. Retrieved from http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN0M91MQ20150313?irpc=932Deknatel, F. (2014, Decemeber 19). After promising start, Iraq’s Abadi must confront Maliki—and Iran. World

Politics Review. Retrieved from http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/14712/after-promising-

start-iraq-s-abadi-must-confront-maliki-and-iran

Centralisation, Authoritarianism and the Failing Iraqi State 15

Dow

nloa

ded

by [L

SE L

ibra

ry S

ervi

ces]

at 0

1:07

19

Sept

embe

r 201

5

Deschouwer, K. (2006). And the peace goes on? Consociational democracy and Belgian politics in the twenty-first century. West European Politics, 29(5), 895–911. doi:10.1080/01402380600968760

Deschouwer, K., & Reuchamps, M. (2013). The Belgian federation at a crossroad. Regional & Federal Studies,

23(3), 261–270. doi:10.1080/13597566.2013.773896Ditz, J. (2014). Iraqi Kurdish officials postpone secession referendum. Retrieved February 6, 2015, from http://

news.antiwar.com/2014/09/04/iraqi-kurdish-officials-postpone-secession-referendum/Dodeigne, J., Gramme, P., Reuchamps, M., & Sinardet, D. (2014). Beyond linguistic and party homogeneity:

Determinants of Belgian MPs’ preferences on federalism and state reform. Party Politics. Advance

online publication. doi:10.1177/1354068814550429Dodge, T. (2013). State and society in Iraq ten years after regime change: The rise of a new authoritarianism.

International Affairs, 89(2), 241–257. doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12016Dodge, T. (2014). Can Iraq be saved? Survival, 56(5), 7–20. doi:10.1080/00396338.2014.962795Duchacek, I. D. (1970). Comparative federalism: The territorial dimension of politics. New York, NY: Holt,

Rinehart and Winston.Engel, R. (2015, February 10). Analysis: Why Kurds are losing patience with the U.S. over ISIS. NBC News.

Retrieved from http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/analysis-why-kurds-are-losing-patience-u-s-

over-isis-n303481Faraj, S. (2013, January 11). Thousands of Iraq Sunnis in angry anti-Maliki demos. Daily News Egypt. Retrieved

from http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/01/11/thousands-of-iraq-sunnis-in-angry-anti-maliki-demos/Gavin, J. (2012). Provinces in Iraq call for autonomy. MEED. Retrieved from http://www.meed.com/

supplements/2012/iraq-projects/provinces-in-iraq-call-for-autonomy/3129608.article

Gordon, M. R. (2012, December 20). Tensions rise in Baghdad with raid on official. New York Times. Retrievedfrom http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/21/world/middleeast/tensions-rise-in-baghdad-with-raid-on-sunni-

official.html?_r=0Hiltermann, J., Kane, S., & Alkadiri, R. (2012). Iraq’s federalism quandary. The National Interest. Retrieved 28,

from http://nationalinterest.org/article/iraqs-federalism-quandary-6512

Ibrahim, M. (2012, November 16). New Iraq army HQ sends Arab–Kurd ties to new low. Middle East Online.Retrieved from http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=55545

Ignatius, D. (2015, February 11). The Kurds need weapons, now. The Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-kurds-need-weapons-now/2015/02/11/4a0966ee-b20f-11e4-886b-c22184f27c35_story.html

Iraqi Constitution. (2005). Iraqi constitution. Baghdad: Ministry of Interior. Retrieved from http://www.iraqinationality.gov.iq/attach/iraqi_constitution.pdf.

Kamil, B. (2015, February 16). PM Barzani about Baghdad accord: We struck a deal with a bankrupt country.

Rudaw. Retrieved from http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/160220151Khedery, A. (2014, July 3). Why we stuck with Maliki—And lost Iraq. The Washington Post. Retrieved from

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-we-stuck-with-maliki–and-lost-iraq/2014/07/03/0dd6a8a4-f7ec-11e3-a606-946fd632f9f1_story.html

Khoudouri, W. (2013, December 15). Erbil-Ankara oil agreement threatens Iraq’s unity. Al-Monitor. Retrieved

from http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/business/2013/12/oil-kurdistan-turkey-threat-baghdad.htmlKurdistan Region Presidency. (2010, October 24). Kurdistan alliance and formation of new Iraqi government.

Retrieved from http://krp.org/eng/articles/display.aspx?gid=1&id=23736Lake, E. (2015, January 30). Victorious Kurds ask U.S. for promised guns. Bloomberg View. Retrieved from

http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-01-30/kurds-who-beat-islamic-state-at-kobani-ask-u-s-for-

promised-gunsLijphart, A. (1977). Democracy in plural societies: A comparative exploration. New Haven, London: Yale Uni-

versity Press.Lijphart, A. (1981). Conflict and coexistence in Belgium: Dynamics of a culturally divided society. Berkeley:

Institute of International Studies, University of California.

Lijphart, A. (2008). Thinking about democracy: Power sharing and majority rule in theory and practice. London:Routledge.

Lijphart, A. (2012). Patterns of democracy: Government forms and performance in thirty-six countries (2nd ed.).New Haven, London: Yale University Press.

Markey, P., & Kami, A. (2013, January 8). Iraqi Sunnis, Kurds boycott cabinet to back protests. Reuters.

Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/08/us-iraq-protests-idUSBRE9070C520130108McGarry, J., & O’Leary, B. (1990). The future of Northern Ireland. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

16 D. O’Driscoll

Dow

nloa

ded

by [L

SE L

ibra

ry S

ervi

ces]

at 0

1:07

19

Sept

embe

r 201

5

McGarry, J., & O’Leary, B. (2004). The Northern Ireland conflict: Consociational engagements. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press.

McGarry, J., & O’Leary, B. (2007). Iraq’s Constitution of 2005: Liberal consociation as political prescription.

International Journal of Constitutional Law, 5(4), 670–698. doi:10.1093/icon/mom026Melvin, D. (2015, August 18). Report blames former Iraq PM, other senior officials for fall of Mosul. CNN.

Retrieved from http://edition.cnn.com/2015/08/17/middleeast/iraq-mosul-report/O’Driscoll, D. (2014a). The costs of inadequacy: Violence and elections in Iraq. Ethnopolitics Papers (No. 27),

1–29. Retrieved from http://www.ethnopolitics.org/ethnopolitics-papers/EPP027.pdf

O’Driscoll, D. (2014b). Throwing water over the tinderbox: An alternative for Kirkuk (PhD, University ofExeter). Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10871/14954

O’Leary, B. (2005). Debating consociational politics: Normative and explanatory arguments. In S. Noel (Ed.),From power sharing to democracy (pp. 3–43). Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press.

O’Leary, B. (2009). How to get out of Iraq with integrity. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

O’Leary, B. (2011). Debating partition: Evaluating the standard justification. In K. Cordell & S. Wolff (Eds.),Routledge handbook of ethnic conflict (pp. 140–157). Abingdon: Routledge.

O’Leary, B. (2012). The federalization of Iraq and the break-up of Sudan. Government and Opposition, 47(4),

481–516. doi:10.1111/j.1477-7053.2012.01372.xOttaway, M., & Ottaway, D. (2014). How the Kurds got their way. Foreign Affairs, 93(3), 139–148.

Phillips, A. (2014). The Islamic State’s challenge to international order. Australian Journal of InternationalAffairs, 68(5), 495–498. doi:10.1080/10357718.2014.947355

Rasheed, A., & Kalin, S. (2015, August 18). Iraq’s Maliki rejects blame for fall of Mosul. Reuters. Retrieved from

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/18/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-reforms-idUSKCN0QN1GY20150818Reuchamps, M. (2013). The future of Belgian federalism through the eyes of the citizens. Regional & Federal

Studies, 23(3), 353–368. doi:10.1080/13597566.2013.773893Reuter, C. (2013, 20 March). Kirkuk thrives in sea of corruption and violence. Spiegel Online International.

Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/kirkuk-thrives-despite-corruption-and-sectarian-

violence-in-iraq-a-889611.htmlRomano, D. (2007). The future of Kirkuk. Ethnopolitics, 6(2), 265–283. doi:10.1080/17449050701345033

Romano, D. (2014). Iraq’s descent into civil war: A constitutional explanation. The Middle East Journal, 68(4),547–566. doi:10.3751/68.4.13

Rubin, M. (2014, March 7). The complexities of Kurdish secession. Commentary. Retrieved from http://www.

commentarymagazine.com/2014/07/03/the-complexities-of-kurdish-secession/Rudaw. (2013a, May 16). Iraq’s Sunnis divided over need for their own federal region. Rudaw. Retrieved from

http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/16052013

Rudaw. (2013b, December 13). Kurdistan region begins oil export to Turkey. Rudaw. Retrieved from http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/131220131

Shamsulddin, S. (2015, May 3). Can Abadi’s decentralization plan save Iraq? NRT. Retrieved from http://nrttv.com/EN/birura-details.aspx?Jimare=1031

Sherlock, R., & Malouf, C. (2014, June 12). Mosul governor calls for fragmentation of Iraq. The Telegraph.

Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10895792/Mosul-governor-calls-for-fragmentation-of-Iraq.html

Sisk, T. D. (1996). Power sharing and international mediation in ethnic conflicts. Washington, DC: CarnegieCommission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, U.S. Institute of Peace.

Sly, L. (2014, May 19). Maliki’s bloc leads in Iraq election. The Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.

washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/malikis-bloc-leads-in-iraq-election/2014/05/19/f7e695cb-414b-4a63-879e-bd13df8ad8d7_story.html

Stansfield, G. (2014a). The Islamic State, the Kurdistan region and the future of Iraq: Assessing UK policyoptions. International Affairs, 90(6), 1329–1350. doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12167

Stansfield, G. (2014b). Kurdistan rising: To acknowledge or ignore the unravelling of Iraq. Middle East Memo,

(No. 33). Retrieved from http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/07/31-kurdistan-iraq-isis-stansfield

Tawfeeq, M. (2013, January 8). Thousands protest in Shiite provinces in Southern Iraq. CNN. Retrieved fromhttp://edition.cnn.com/2013/01/08/world/meast/iraq-demonstrations/

Tawfeeq, M., & Abedine, S. (2013, April 23). Clash at Sunni protest in Iraq leaves dead and wounded. CNN.

Retrieved from http://edition.cnn.com/2013/04/23/world/meast/iraq-violence

Centralisation, Authoritarianism and the Failing Iraqi State 17

Dow

nloa

ded

by [L

SE L

ibra

ry S

ervi

ces]

at 0

1:07

19

Sept

embe

r 201

5

Today’s Zaman. (2013a, January 18). Genel says to boost N. Iraqi oil exports as tension brews. Today’s Zaman.Retrieved from http://www.todayszaman.com/news-304454-genel-says-to-boost-n-iraqi-oil-exports-as-tension-brews.html

Today’s Zaman. (2013b, January 17). Iraq plans tough steps against Kurdish region, oil firms. Today’s Zaman.Retrieved from http://www.todayszaman.com/latest-news_iraq-plans-tough-steps-against-kurdish-region-

oil-firms_304276.htmlToomeh, A. W. (2012, July 4). Kurdish peshmerga fighters wait on funding from Baghdad. Al-Monitor. Retrieved

from http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/01/07/iraq-bishmarks-minister-we-have.html

Van Heuvelen, B. (2012, April 17). Iraqi leaders criticize president Nouri al-Maliki after arrest of top electionsofficial. The Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/war-zones/iraqi-

leaders-criticize-president-nouri-al-maliki-after-arrest-of-top-elections-official/2012/04/14/gIQA3la7NT_story.html

Visser, R. (2011). The apparent end of the Strategic Policy Council. Retrieved from https://gulfanalysis.

wordpress.com/2011/03/03/the-apparent-end-of-the-strategic-policy-council/Wilson, E. (2012, November). Iraq’s central bank governor Sinan al-Shabibi is forced out. EuroMoney. Retrieved

from http://www.euromoney.com/Article/3112481/Iraqs-central-bank-governor-Sinan-Al-Shabibi-is-forced-

out.htmlWilson, M. R. (2014, September 25). Iraqis hire DC consultant for autonomy push. The Hill. Retrieved from

http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/lobbying-hires/218955-sunnis-in-iraq-hire-dc-consultant-for-autonomy-push

Wolff, S. (2010a). Governing (in) Kirkuk: Resolving the status of a disputed territory in post-American Iraq.

International Affairs, 86(6), 1361–1379. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2010.00948.xWolff, S. (2010b). The relationships between states and non-state peoples: A comparative view of the Kurds in

Iraq. In G. Stansfield & R. Lowe (Eds.), The Kurdish policy imperative (pp. 16–26). London: ChathamHouse.

Wolff, S. (2013). Conflict management in divided societies: The many uses of territorial self-governance. Inter-

national Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 20(1), 27–50. doi:10.1163/15718115-02001003Zaidan, S. (2015, January 14). The rationale behind the regionalization of Iraq. Alakhbar English. Retrieved from

http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/23211

18 D. O’Driscoll

Dow

nloa

ded

by [L

SE L

ibra

ry S

ervi

ces]

at 0

1:07

19

Sept

embe

r 201

5