Obliterating Heterogeneity through Peace: Nationalisms, States and Wars in the Balkans.

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10 Obliterating heterogeneity through peaceNationalisms, states and wars, in the Balkans

Siniša Maleševic

Despite general recognition that not all nationalisms end up inviolence and that wars can be waged without nationalist hysteria thereis a tendency to assume that nationalism and warfare are deeplylinked. Moreover many social analysts believe that the most importantresearch task is to explain the causal relationship between the two.Hence some gauge the impact of warfare on the development ofnationalist sentiments while others are concerned with the question“What types of nationalism are most likely to cause war?” (Van Evera1994: 5). In this chapter I argue that nationalism and warfare havea very complex and unpredictable relationship that can neitherbe adequately captured, nor properly understood, by focusing on thenarrow causal connection between the two. Rather than causing oneanother or being a key effect of each other’s actions, both nationalismand war emerge, develop, and expand as the outcome of many longuedurée processes. Hence, in order to explain the relationship betweenwars and nationalisms it is crucial to analyze the long-term organiza-tional and ideological transformations that have shaped the world inthe last two hundred years. In this context I argue that (coercive/bureaucratic and ideologized) periods of peace matter much morefor the growth, expansion, and popular reception of nationalism thantimes of war. Nationalisms often witnessed in war contexts usuallyhave not brought about these wars, nor have they been forged on thebattlefields. Instead, both wars and nationalisms are multifacetedprocesses that emerge, develop, and are sustained by the continuousorganizational and ideological scaffoldings created and enhanced intimes of prolonged peace. Since the Balkan Peninsula is often per-ceived as the epitome of a region teeming with nationalism and war-fare I use this case to assess the strength of my general argument.

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Has nationalism caused war?

Traditional historiography tends to reinforce popular views of nationa-lism as being one of the principal causes of warfare. The violence ofthe French and American revolutions is regularly linked to nationalistaspirations. The Napoleonic Wars are often interpreted through theprism of rising French nationalism and the counternationalisms ofGermans and others that developed “in response to French invasions”(Calhoun 2007: 136). In particular the twentieth century has persistentlybeen described as the period when competing nationalist ideologiescaused total wars: “European nationalism was a major force in the originsof both world wars of the twentieth century. The peoples of Europewent to war in 1914 in an outburst of nationalistic fervour – the French‘à Berlin,’ and the Germans ‘nach Paris’…” (Snyder 2009[1968]: 71).This “naturalist” approach often presumes that cultural similarity byitself is a principal driver of violent conflict (Maleševic 2011: 143–46).“War is,” in the words of one of the main representatives of this perspec-tive, “an expression of culture, often a determinant of cultural forms, insome societies the culture itself” (Keegan 1994: 12). However, asdecades of sociological research show, not only is there no significantcausality between violence and cultural difference (Brubaker 2004;Fearon and Laitin 1996; Laitin 2007), but cultural similarity by itself isa poor predictor of most social action (Banton 2008; Brubaker et al.2007; Maleševic 2006). Furthermore, since warfare is a substantiallyolder social phenomenon than nationalist ideology, nationalism cannotexplain the outbreak of most wars throughout history. If we agree thatwarfare originated at least ten thousand years ago (Fry 2007; Otterbein2004) and that fully fledged nationalist ideology is barely two to threehundred years old (Breuilly 1993; Hobsbawm 1990; Mann 1986), then arough estimate would indicate that even if nationalism is a principalcause of war it can only account for less than 0.3 percent of wars foughtthrough history.

Nevertheless, even the more moderate version of this argument, whichposits nationalist ideology as a key generator of warfare only in themodern era (Snyder 2009[1968], 1990: 248–50) cannot explain instancesof large-scale modern wars where popular nationalist sentiments werenot a decisive force for initiating or waging wars such as the CrimeanWar (1853–56), the Austro-Prussian War (1866), the Second Boer War(1899–1902), or even World War I and World War II (Burbank andCooper 2010; Mann 2012).

The Balkan region provides an excellent testing ground for this thesisas the southeast of Europe experienced a progressive acceleration of

256 Siniša Maleševic


organized violence through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Forthis very reason the Balkans have regularly been singled out as theembodiment of a case where nationalism was (and some would argueremains) the main source of violent conflict. For example, writing aboutlate-nineteenth- and twentieth-century Balkan warfare Richard Hallargues that “each Balkan people envisioned the restoration of themedieval empires on which they based their national ideas” (2002: 2).Similarly Andre Gerolymatos believes that “at the heart of all theBalkan wars is the clarion call of ethnic hatred served up as culturalheritage,” (2002: 5) whereas most traditional historiography interpretsthe popular uprisings at the beginning of the nineteenth century insoutheast Europe as “national revolutions” and the “awakening ofnationalities” (Jelavich 1999; Pavlowitch 1999). However, not only isthere no reliable evidence to suggest that nationalism was behind vio-lent conflicts in the early nineteenth century Balkans, but it seemsplausible to argue that nationalist ideology played little or no part inthese early uprisings (Kitromilides 1994, 2010; Maleševic 2012a,2012b; Meriage 1977; Stokes 1976).

The Ottoman, and to a lesser extent Habsburg, imperial legacy positedaristocratic lineage and religious affiliation firmly ahead of any “ethnic”attachments which, if they existed at all, were shared by a minisculenumber of elite enthusiasts. The millet system reinforced confessionaldivides, most of which crisscrossed cultural and linguistic communities.1

Hence, the rebellions and uprisings of the early nineteenth century, suchas the First and Second Serbian Uprisings (1804–13 and 1815–17),Hadži Prodan’s Revolt of 1813, or the Wallachian and Cretan insurrec-tions of 1821, were not nationalist revolutions aimed at the overthrow ofthe Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the independent nation-states of Serbia, Greece and Romania, but were essentially social revoltsnot very different from the peasant rebellions of the previous centuries.In all of these Balkan uprisings, just as in the Greek War of Independence(1821–29) nationalist ideology played a marginal role or no role at all inthe mobilization of social action for violent conflict. Instead of imple-menting a coherent program of national self-determination these violentevents were a highly contingent, disorganized, and messy product ofdifferent individuals and groups motivated by diverse and often mutuallyincompatible interests. For example, the Serbian Uprisings were led byopportunistic merchants and outlaws who utilized the social discontentof peasants to expand their economic and political influence in the

1 The millet system was complex but its key feature was the division into semi-autonomousconfessional communities. For more information see Hanioglu, 2012.

Obliterating heterogeneity through peace: the Balkans 257


region. Both Ðorđe Petrovic Karađorđe and Miloš Obrenovic, theleaders of the two uprisings, were large-scale pig traders initially motiv-ated to establish a monopoly on pork trade with the Habsburg Empireand showing little inclination towards Serbian nationalism. Rather thanfight the Ottoman Empire they offered “to restore the order on behalf ofthe Sultan” and to remove the disloyal ayans and ill-disciplined janissar-ies (Djordjevic 1985; Meriage 1977; Roudometof 2001: 231; Stokes1976). Similarly the Greek War of Independence originated far awayfrom contemporary Greece (in present-day Romania) as a violent socialconflict between two groups of Christian elites. In contrast to latter-daynationalist reinterpretations, this was a far cry from organized nationalrevolution bent on establishing an independent nation-state. Instead itcomprised a chaotic and messy series of events involving prolongedinternal strife among different groups of “Greeks” with the final outcomedecided exclusively by the direct involvement of the great powers(Glenny 1999; Mazower 2000).

The social bandits in the Balkans – hajduks, uskoks, khlepts, andarmatoloi – later glorified in nationalist historiography as the heroes ofnational independence, were for the most part driven by economic self-interest, were essentially ignorant of national projects, would easily switchsides during the violent conflicts, and would rob Christians just as muchas Muslims (Glenny 1999; Hobsbawm 2000[1969]; Pavlowitch 1999).The notion of shared Greek heritage meant nothing to most banditswhose worldview was extremely parochial. For example, when a visitingscholar flatteringly compared leading klepht Nikotsaras to the ancientGreek hero Achilles, the klepht was angered by this comparison:“What rubbish are you talking about? Who is this Achilles? Handy witha musket, was he?” (Kakridis 1963: 252). In a similar vein, the Balkanpeasantry, who constituted an overwhelming majority of the population,had no understanding of nationalist ideals and tended to identify withthe local (village) or much broader religious community of OrthodoxChristian believers. Instead of looking towards the establishment of anindependent and sovereign nation-state they were much more inclinedtowards believing in the religiously inspired prophecies that linked thecollapse of the Ottoman Empire to the Second Coming of Christ andthe consequent restoration of the Byzantine Empire (Roudometof 2001;Stoianovich 1994).

Hence nationalist ideology could not possibly be a principal causeof warfare in the early nineteenth century Balkans as there was verylittle if any nationalism in the region at that time. What was muchmore important was the changed geopolitical context where theweakening of the Ottoman Empire created a fierce power struggle



between the remaining European empires who extensively encouraged(and in the Greek case even fought for) the establishment of the newpolitical entities in the Balkans (Burbank and Cooper 2010; Meriage1977).

Has war caused nationalism?

Although the view that nationalism causes war is still highly popularamong journalists and the general public, most social scientists subscribeto the opposite view: rather than causing war, nationalism itself is aproduct of war experience. Violent conflicts are seen as the crucible ofcultural and political identity: they sharpen group boundaries, externalizesocial divides, heighten the polarization of in-groups and out-groups, andinternally mobilize social action. In other words, protracted warfare isunderstood as leading towards forging a strong sense of national attach-ment whereby nations are conceptualized either as moral communitiescreated through “blood sacrifice” (Hutchinson 2007; Smith 1981, 2003),or as an institutional outcome of coordinated social action involvingagents who amplify their cultural markers for individual self-benefit(Hechter 1995; Laitin 2007), or as the historical product of geopoliticalcompetition between state-making rulers (Posen 1993; Tilly 1995).

The problem with this perspective is not its factual inaccuracy, as itis quite easy to demonstrate instances where the direct external threathas led to internal homogenization, but its reluctance to look at the long-term organizational and ideological processes that make this quasi-causalrelationship possible. Not all wars are able to generate social cohesion:some protracted conflicts, such as the devastating Peloponnesian warsor the tragic experience of the Habsburg Empire in World War I, entirelyshatter group solidarity while other violent conflicts, such as theMexican–American War (1846–8) or the recent Libyan Civil War, justreveal the intensity of existing group polarization. More importantly,historical timing matters a great deal: as pre-modern wars were generallyfought by warrior strata that excluded the majority of the, essentiallypeasant, population there were no structural conditions for the emergenceof nationalism as a mass phenomenon. It is only with the gradual expan-sion of nearly universal conscription, since the late eighteenth and earlynineteenth centuries, that nationalist ideology could be forged on thebattlefields. Nevertheless, even in this radically changed historical context,warfare did not automatically generate strong national attachments, but ittook long-term organizational and ideological transformations to fostera sense of solidarity that would surpass family-based, local, and otherface-to-face micro groupings (Maleševic 2010, 2011).



The history of the nineteenth-century Balkans was often utilized toverify the argument that the experience of warfare is a key generator ofnationalist sentiments. From the Greek War of Independence (1821–29)to the Balkan Wars of 1912–13, the southeast of Europe has been singledout by historians and social scientists as the perfect example of a regionwhere persistent warfare forged strong national consciousness (Biondich2011; Gerolymatos 2002; Glenny 1999; Stavrianos 2000). Nevertheless,just as wars do not automatically and inevitably create states, the histor-ical record is full of cases where protracted warfare has proved highlydestructive to nation formation and nationalism (Maleševic 2011; Smith1981). Much of early nineteenth-century Balkan warfare did not createlasting nationalist ideologies. Not only was it that the outcomes of theGreek War of Independence, the Serbian uprisings, and the similarviolent episodes in what are today Romania, Bulgaria, and Bosnia werenot more nationally conscious populations, but in most instances theseviolent rebellions generated deep internal divides in supposedly “nationalsocieties.” For example, the Greek War of Independence left the legacyof a deeply polarized and antagonistic society as the infighting andmassacres committed during the war had a profound impact on thepolitical life of future generations (Jelavich 1999; Roudometof 2001).Similarly, the Serbian Uprisings of 1804–13 and 1815–17 were led bytwo mutually hostile camps, represented by their leaders, Karađorđeand Obrenovic, both of who were determined to stake their legitimateclaim to the throne of Serbia. The direct outcome of these uprisings was adeeply divided society. Hence, instead of bringing more national cohesion,independence resulted in protracted clan-based feuds, internal conflicts,and occasional assassinations (Glenny 1999; Pavlowitch 1999).

More important, as Balkan polities emerged not through well-organized nationalist movements but as a consequence of the geopoliticalgames of the great powers and the gradual collapse of the OttomanEmpire, the overwhelming majority of their populations were not parti-cularly committed to the new states, nor were they fully aware of theirnationhood. While in the early nineteenth century the top Orthodoxclergy, wealthy merchants, bankers, and Phanariot families were still fullyloyal to the empire and the majority peasantry were equally distrustfulof all elites (Christian and Muslim, national and imperial), the intensivestate building witnessed in the second half of the century generated newforms of internal conflicts (Kitromilides 1994; Roudometof 2001). Thewars fought in the latter half of the nineteenth century and the earlytwentieth century fostered a degree of nationalist euphoria, but thissentiment would rarely spread beyond the narrow circles of the militaryestablishment, state administrators, top clergy, the royal courts, and



cultural elites (Roudometof 2001: 174–75). These wars, such as theSerbo-Bulgarian War of 1885, the Greco-Turkish War of 1897 and thetwo Balkan Wars of 1912–13, were an integral part of the instant andhistorically unprecedented state building projects whereby the politicaland military elites embarked on the gigantic transformation of theirpolities with a view to creating state structures resembling their WesternEuropean counterparts. The unintended consequence of this processwas highly polarized societies with a substantial administrative, urban-based stratum loyal to the new polities and supportive of the grandnational projects that stood in direct opposition to the huge swathes ofpeasants, many of whom did not identify with the new states and hadgreat difficulty in differentiating between their religion and their nation(Kitromilides 1994, 2010).2 In other words, while the wars waged in theearly nineteenth century were too small-scale, too short, too localized,and too disorganized to forge strong national attachments, the moreintensive, protracted, and large-scale warfare of the late nineteenth andearly twentieth centuries reinforced already existing, but very narrowlybased, nationalism of the elite; however, it proved too destructive toturn peasants into nationally self-conscious Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbsor Albanians. Despite various attempts to appease rural populations bygranting them land and the right to vote and in this way “secure theirparticipation in the First World War” (and the Balkan Wars), manypeasant recruits were reluctant to fight in these wars and were oftenignorant of nationalist rhetoric (Biondich 2011: 43, 61; Mungiu-Pippidi2010: 63). For example, the largest political party inBulgaria, the BulgarianAgrarian National Union, which represented the peasantry, reflected thismood in its firm opposition to Bulgarian involvement in the 1912–13BalkanWars andWorldWar I. The party’s leader, later the country’s primeminister, was released from prison “in an effort to assuage the mutinoussoldiers,” but upon his release he “joined the agitation against the war”(Hall 2010: 156). In a similar vein, and despite the excessive prevalenceof nationalist propaganda in the military, Serbian and Greek peasantsoldiers were not particularly enthusiastic about the nationalist projects

2 On his trip to Macedonia in 1903, British journalist Henry Brailsford (1906: 102)documents well this plasticity of collective identification in the region. When asking alocal peasant in Greek if his village was Greek or Bulgarian he received the followingreply: “Well, it’s Bulgarian now, but four years ago it was Greek … We used to have aGreek teacher [and priest] … but he was very unpunctual and remiss. We went to theGreek Bishop to complain, but he refused to do anything for us. The Bulgarians heard ofthis and they came and made us an offer. They said they would give us a priest who wouldlive in the village and a teacher to whom we need pay nothing. Well, sirs, ours is a poorvillage, and so of course we became Bulgarians.”



that included the capturing and carving up of Macedonia (Glenny 1999;Roudometof 2001). Hence, neither the sporadic rebellions and uprisingsof the early nineteenth century nor the fully fledged warfare of the latenineteenth and early twentieth centuries automatically produced mass-scale nationalisms in the Balkans.

The cumulative bureaucratization of coercionin the Balkans

To say that one should be wary of projecting direct causality betweennationalism and warfare in the Balkans does not mean that the twophenomena are completely unrelated. Of course in the modern agenearly all interstate wars (as well as many civil wars) are augmented withand legitimized through nationalist ideologies. Nevertheless, to explainhow and why nationalism becomes a key component of warfare in moder-nity, in contrast to the rest of pre-modern history, it is not enough simplyto assume either that a mere cultural similarity inevitably generatesnational cohesion, or that shared war experience will automatically createstrong and durable nationalist feelings. Instead, the focus of analysisshould shift to the longue durée processes that create institutional andsocietal conditions where nationalisms and wars appear as ontologicaltwins. Among these large-scale structural processes two stand out: thecumulative bureaucratization of coercion and centrifugal ideologization.As argued in my previous work (Maleševic 2010, 2011) these two inter-related processes constitute the key social mechanisms for understandinghow nationalism and warfare often become conjoined in the modern era.The cumulative bureaucratization of coercion is an ongoing historicalprocess that involves the constant increase of organizational capability forcoercion and the internal pacification of social order through the monopo-listic threat of the use of violence. Although the cumulative coercive powerof social organizations has been on the increase over the past ten thousandyears, its full potency – visible in its territorial scope, infrastructural reachand societal penetration – has acutely accelerated in the past two hundredyears (Maleševic 2010: 5–8, 92–130).

Although in some respects this region had a slower takeoff in terms ofits organizational development, southeast Europe was not impervious tothese large-scale structural transformations. On the contrary, the Balkansis the epitome of a region where the cumulative bureaucratization ofcoercion has been vivid in the past two centuries. While at the beginningof the nineteenth century most Balkan polities lacked nearly all organiza-tional prerogatives of statehood, by the second half of the twentiethcentury all of them have become pervasive bureaucratic machines. For



example, in 1813 the entire civil service of the new Serbian quasi-stateamounted to no more than 24 administrators (Stokes 1975: 4). In thesame period the population of around 2 million people inhabiting theDunabian Principalities (i.e. Romania) were administered by just 1,000office-holding boyars, whereas even as late as 1879 the entire Bulgarianpolity had at its disposal only 2,121 civil servants. Even more striking isthe case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which at the time of its occupationby the Habsburgs (1878) was administered by just 120 bureaucrats(Glenny 1999: 268; Pavlowitch 1999: 31; Roudometof 2001: 163).Similarly, the new polities were well short of the proper military and policeapparatuses. The “national” uprisings and wars of “independence” werefought by disorganized, decentralized, undisciplined, and poorly armedbandits, foreign-based volunteers and, often coerced, peasantry (Glenny1999; Maleševic 2012a; Meriage 1977; Stokes 1976). Hence it took sometime to transform such units into effective military and police forces.

The direct legacy of the declining Ottoman Empire was the poor ornonexistent road and communication networks, lack of sizable urbancongregations, highly decentralized power structures, undevelopedbanking sectors, and virtually no industrial base. For example, even inthe mid 1850s Serbia and Greece had only 800 and 168 kilometers ofpaved roads respectively; they had no cities with a population over30,000 until the second half of the nineteenth century, no national banksor factories until the mid to late nineteenth century, and no properrailways until the late nineteenth century (Beaver 1941; Roudometof2001; Stoianovich 1994).

The extremely intensive and, for the most part, highly coercive statebuilding programs brought about spectacular organizational changesso that by the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning ofthe twentieth, most Balkan states had changed beyond recognition.The increased cumulative bureaucratization of coercion resulted in thecreation of massive state apparatuses: all Balkan polities had introduceduniversal conscription, established military academies, increased militarybudgets and set up large armies. For example between 1872 and 1895the Greek officer corps expanded by 240 percent and the size of its armywas constantly rising so that by the beginning of the twentieth centuryit amounted to 150,000 soldiers; in Serbia in just ten years (1893–1903)the military grew fourfold, while the Bulgarian army was exponentiallyincreasing. The result was that by the beginning of the First BalkanWar (1912) these three small states were able to mobilize up to a millionsoldiers (Bell 1977; Hall 2002; Pelt 2010).

These huge structural transformations were particularly visible in theadministrative sphere, with nearly all Balkan states generating enormous



civil service apparatuses. Hence by the beginning of the twentieth centurythe administrative strata became the largest sector of the urban popula-tion. Whereas in 1837 Serbia still had a miniscule bureaucracy consistingof 492 civil servants, by 1902 over 22 percent of Belgrade householdsconsisted of administrators and their families (Stokes 1976). The samepattern of intensive bureaucratization emerged in Greece and Bulgaria,where by the end of the 1930s civil servants with their families constitutedone third and one fourth, respectively, of the entire urban population(c. 650,000 people in both cases) (Roudometof 2001; Stoianovich 1994).Despite the fact that these were still overwhelmingly rural societies, theadministrative strat were so enlarged that by the early twentieth centurycivil servants constituted over 5 percent of the labor force, which wassignificantly higher than in much more urbanized societies. For example,in the same period administrators accounted for 2.4 percent of the laborforce in Germany, 1.5 percent in Britain and 0.31 percent in Italy andBelgium. On top of that, between 25 and 40 percent of the state’s budgetwas allocated for the salaries of civil servants (Pippidi 2010: 130).

The governments also invested heavily in the development of infra-structure, with Serbia in 1883 having five times more roads than it hadtwenty-five years earlier, Greece dramatically expanding its transportand commercial shipping, and most Balkan states relying on railways asthe engine of development so that by 1913 the Balkan region was inpossession of over 8 thousand kilometers of rail tracks (Mirkovic 1958).The strengthening infrastructural powers of Balkan polities were alsovisible in the greater centralization of state power underpinned by theadoption of new constitutions (modeled on the highly centralized French1830, Belgian 1831 and Prussian 1850 constitutions) (Pippidi 2010:125). In contrast to the messy, decentralized, makeshift polities of theearly nineteenth century when the monarchs and administrators lackedreliable military and police forces and had no option but to share powerwith the local dignitaries and warlords (knezovi, kodzabasides, vojvodeand kapitanaioi), by the century’s end the rulers were in full control oftheir territories (Bechev 2010: 138–50).

In Serbia both the liberal oligarchs (ustavobranitelji) who ruledbetween 1842 and 1858 and Prince Mihailo Obrenovic (until his assas-sination in 1868) managed to enhance the authority of the central stateby expanding the coercive and bureaucratic apparatuses of the state.This enhancement included enforcement of the laws that curtailed thepower of municipalities, which were replaced by French-style districtprefects, the introduction of tenured administrative posts and estab-lished civil codes, the legal protection of civil servants, registers of landownership, and statewide censuses. The state was now heavily involved



with industrial output, which increased substantially so that by 1906there were close to five hundred large industrial enterprises in Serbia,and for the first time the authorities were able to provide statewideservices such as health care, public hygiene, cultural development,policing, and land management (Draganich 1974; Djordjevic 1970;Vucinich 1968).

The same developmental, centralizing and state building processes werejust as visible in Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and the rest of SoutheastEurope where the rulers largely imitated the French and Prussiantop-down models of state organization (Bechev 2010; McGrew 1985;Mouzelis 1978). In the words of a Bulgarian minister at the time, theprincipal ambition was to “arrange an omnipotent state machine on theFrench model, ruled by the centre with thousands of officials paid bythe state and depending on it” (Bechev 2010: 142). The administrativebuild-up went hand in hand with the modernization and expansion ofthe military and police apparatus, and the Balkan states spent vastamounts on armaments, military materiel and policing. For example, in1905 more than one third of Bulgaria’s budget was spent on the military(Pelt 2010: 240).

These highly vigorous processes of bureaucratization of coercion werefurther intensified throughout the twentieth century. The outcome oflarge-scale warfare (including the Balkan Wars of 1912–13, World War Iand World War II) was an even greater bureaucratic penetration ofsocieties in southeast Europe. Despite the enormous human and materialcasualties of these wars the post-war authorities were able to concentrateand further expand state power in its both administrative-organizationaland coercive sense. Although this was never a unitary, linear and teleo-logical process, as the economic and organizational booms and busts of the1920s versus the 1930s, or the 1960s versus the 1980s clearly show, allBalkan states, regardless of their political systems, economic development,or level of external openness, have continued to expand cumulatively theirorganizational and coercive reach. In this sense there was no substantialdifference between a communist state such as Yugoslavia and democratic/authoritarian Greece. In both communist and non-communist contextsthe state remained the main employer, the provider of social provisions,and the protector of social order. The post-1945 Balkans saw furtherexpansion of administrative apparatuses accompanied by acceleratedurbanization and the decline of traditional, rural lifestyles. For example,in Yugoslavia by the early 1980s the percentage of those involved inagriculture had dropped from 67 percent (in 1948) to only 20 percent(JSP 1986: 12), and the same trend could be observed in the rest of theBalkans (Biondich 2011; Glenny 1999; Jelavich 1999).



The second half of the twentieth century was by far the most stable andmost significant period in state development in southeast Europe. Thestates became involved in nearly every aspect of social life, providingcradle-to-grave welfare provisions that included guaranteed employ-ment, housing, childcare, pension schemes, free health care, and culturaland sport activities. Furthermore, the omnipotent state machine becamethe key generator of mass urbanization (building large new cities), indus-trialization, militarization and cultural production (setting up numeroustheatres, concert halls, libraries, museums, etc.). The post-World War IIBalkan states have, to use Mann’s (1986) concepts, dramaticallyincreased their infrastructural powers, including the ability to raise rev-enue regularly and efficiently, to collect and store information on theircitizens, to control the economy, police and military, and substantially toexpand the transport and communication networks. The building of thisenormous bureaucratic apparatus resulted in the continuous prolifer-ation of the administrative, military, and police sectors.

The communist states were well known for their huge coercive andbureaucratic state apparatuses, and the Balkan states were no exception.For example in the 1950s the Bulgarian army had over 200,000 soldiers andby the late 1980s the Yugoslav People’s Army had over 600,000 activepersonnel (Brown 1970: 275; Gow 1992). However, non-communistGreece boasted just as large a civil service, military, and police (Close2002). In consequence and despite their official proclamations, the midto late twentieth-centuryBalkan states remaineddominated by the adminis-trative strata. For example, for all its rhetoric of proletarian society, workers’councils, and self-management participatory economy, communistYugoslavia was largely governed by, and for the benefit of, state civilservants. Not only was it the case that apparatchiks rather than workersran the state, but white-collar strata were dominant in all sectors of societyincluding the Communist Party. The overwhelming majority of member-ship in the Yugoslav League of Communists consisted of middle-classadministrators and professionals: in 1976, out of 1.3 million, 41.8 percentwere white-collar workers, 28.1 percent were blue-collar workers and only5.1 percent were peasants (Jelavich 1999: 343). Hence, when the politicaland economic crisis reached its peak in the 1980s it was again the bureau-crats and the intelligentsia that spearheaded, and the military and policethat allowed for, the revolutionary transformations of the states to takeplace. While in Yugoslavia the competing party and state bureaucraticmachines ultimately found themselves on a collision course that ended inbrutal warfare, the rest of the communist Balkans embarked on the slow andpainful organizational (and ideological) transition, which brought abouteven more extensive state apparatuses. The Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s



were not simply manufactured by calculating politicians who were ablesomehow quickly to infest the masses with nationalist sentiments. Instead,both wars and nationalisms emerged as an (in part unintended) outcomeof long-term coercive bureaucratization (Maleševic 2006: 168–226)3.

As a recent comparative study of administration systems in southeastEurope demonstrates, all states in the region continue to have a very largecore civil service ranging from a staggering 5.52 percent of all theemployed population in Montenegro4 to around 2–3 percent in mostBalkan states (Cohen 2010: 47). Hence, regardless of the character of thepolitical or economic regimes involved, the nineteenth- and twentieth-century Balkans saw a continuous increase in the organizational andcoercive capacity of the state, which is a crucial precondition for waginglarge-scale prolonged wars.

Centrifugal ideologization in the Balkans

To understand fully why and how nationalism and warfare oftenappear so connected in the modern era it is not enough just to focuson the power of coercive/administrative organizations. As humanbeings are much more willing to follow organizational rules anddemands if they are perceived as being legitimate, the cumulativebureaucratization of coercion is regularly accompanied by legitimizingideologies. As I have argued in an earlier work (Maleševic 2010: 8–11,130–41), in the modern age, organizational developments create theconditions for the emergence and proliferation of centrifugal ideologi-zation as the principal mechanism for the justification of coercive-bureaucratic power. Since modernity gives birth to large-scale socialorganizations that are inevitably composed of highly diverse individualsand interest groups, it becomes necessary to develop and utilize aparticular ideological cement that would transform these heteroge-neities into quasi-homogenous units. Hence in this context centrifugalideologization is understood as a historical, mass-scale organizationalprocess that is able to gradually project, and temporarily forge, ideo-logical unity out of this enormous diversity. As this is a very complexand unpredictable process it is only in modernity, when ideological

3 This, of course, does not mean that the cumulative bureaucratization of coercioninevitably leads to war, nor that this process alone can explain the outbreak ofthe wars of Yugoslav secession. On the complexity of this particular case seeMaleševic (2002, 2006).

4 As late as 2009, tiny Montenegro with a total population of slightly above 600,000 hadover 50,000 people working in the public sector, which represents 23 percent of the totalemployed population (Cohen 2010: 47).



doctrines have to compete with other doctrines and acquire the organi-zational means to do so, that, when successful, ideologies are able tolink effectively diverse pouches of micro solidarity into a reasonablycoherent, believable, and comprehensive macroideological narrative(Maleševic 2010, 2011).

Despite the fact that the Balkan region has been in the whirlpool ofreligious and civilizational collisions for much of its history, culturaldifference was not an object for mass political mobilization. While theOttoman Empire was ruled in the name of Islam and privileged itsMuslim over its non-Muslim subjects, neither religion nor ethnicity wereconceptualized in the horizontal, cross-class sense. Instead the OttomanEmpire was a strictly vertical, highly hierarchical, order that clearlydistinguished between different social strata and positioned the Sultanas the absolute owner of the entire empire. Rather than politicizingcultural and religious differences the sultans integrated the conqueredChristian and Jewish elites into established Ottoman hierarchies. In thisprocess they made existing religious authorities the leaders of theirrespective millets, thus turning them into the civil servants of the empire.In this process they also appropriated existing dynastic and religious titlesso that all post-1453 Ottoman sultans were also automatically Caesarsof the Roman Empire and supreme rulers of the Ottoman Christians(Mazower 2000; Roudometof 2001). At the same time, the overwhel-ming majority of the Ottoman population were peasants who, regardlessof their religious affiliation, were confined to the very narrow world ofthe kinship and village universe whose worldview combined parochialattachments with elements of ritualistic official monotheism and still-strong pagan beliefs (Meriage 1977; Paxton 1972; Stojancevic 1966).

The establishment of quasi-sovereign political entities in the earlynineteenth century Balkans did not dramatically transform existingbelief systems and practices. For much of the first half of the nine-teenth century, religion and local attachments mattered much more forpeasant populations than did national and other designations (Meriage1977; Stokes 1976). The strong kinship structures were oftenreinforced by clan memberships and, among the South Slavs, thepresence of extended patrilocal family units (zadruga) (Erlich-Stein1964). In addition, popular comprehension of Orthodox Christianitytended towards syncretism (with widespread pagan practices andstrong Ottoman/Muslim cultural traditions) and religious millenaria-nism (Roudometof 2001: 14)

Even elite groups such as merchants, bankers, and intellectualsinvolved in the conspirational plans to rise against Ottoman rule concep-tualized their revolt much more in religious than in national, liberal,



or secular terms. As Roudometof emphasizes “it was religious and notethnic solidarity that shaped popular attitudes vis-à-vis the revolt … the1821 revolts were conceived of as a revolution of the Orthodox milletagainst the Ottoman authority structure” (2001: 64). Hence until thesecond half of the nineteenth century, modern ideological discoursessuch as nationalism, liberalism, socialism, or even coherent conservativeideology had very little or no impact on popular behavior.

Nevertheless, intensive state building accompanied by the cumulativebureaucratization of coercion throughout the late nineteenth and twentiethcenturies eventually created organizational conditions for the emergenceand proliferation of mass ideologies. However, for the successful dissemi-nation and reception of ideology it was necessary to establish elementaryprerequisites such as full literacy, the standardization of vernacular lan-guages, mass publishing, functioning and comprehensive educationsystems, access to affordable mass media outlets, and the creation ofinstitutions of “high” culture. While all the southeast European societiesstarted with an almost completely illiterate population, by the second halfof the twentieth century nearly full literacy had become the norm. Forexample, even in 1864 just 4.2 percent of Serbia’s citizens were literate andas late as 1880 only 3.3 percent of Bulgarians, 13 percent of Romanians,and 14 percent of the Greek population were able to read and write(Ekmecic 1991: 333; Pippidi, 2010: 127–28; Roudometof 2001: 165). In1830 there were fewer than 800 pupils and 22 teachers in the entireSerbian polity, while the first primary schools in Montenegro and Albaniaopened as late as 1834 and 1887 respectively (Roudometof 2001: 149;Stoianovich 1994: 208). The “national” vernaculars were standardizedquite late and it took a very long time for mass book publishing to develop.For example between 1806 and 1830 only 17 books were published inBulgarian, and the first Bulgarian language newspaper did not appear until1844 (Quick 2003; Roudometof 2001). Even when the new politieswere well established and had significantly increased the development ofthe national press and publishing this did not automatically translate intoincreased demand. So even in the mid nineteenth century “the appeal ofpublications in local languages was minimal given that the majority ofeducated readers tended to read German, Italian, English, or Frenchmedia” (Case 2010: 282).

Hence, apart from the peculiar religious belief systems and practicesmediated through local, clan, family, and village-based interpretations,there was very little ideological penetration in the mid nineteenth-century Balkans. For this to change it was essential to expand statebuilding simultaneously with the development of civil society networks,both of which were decisive in the gradual politicization and thus



ideologization of the masses. In other words, the intensive bureaucrat-ization of coercion went hand in hand with the mass ideologization ofpopulations. Sometimes this was a deliberate process led by the stateauthorities interested in turning peasants into loyal Greeks, Serbs,Romanians or Bulgarians, but often this intensive modernization createdunintended consequences with the development and spread of diverseWestern ideologies including liberalism, socialism, conservatism, com-munism, and fascism,which have oftenmetamorphosed into local syncreticvariations (Biondich 2011; Glenny 1999; Pavlowitch 2002).

The new states invested enormous resources in the development ofcultural apparatuses. Hence literacy rates dramatically improved, theeducation systems were substantially expanded to include entire popula-tions, and institutions of high culture such as theatres, museums, concerthalls, national academies, and universities quickly sprang up all over thelate nineteenth-century Balkans. For example, in just twenty-two years,between 1879 and 1911, the Bulgarian budget for public instructiongrew by no less than 650 percent and the number of newspapers andperiodicals nearly tripled, from 110 to 291 (Case 2010: 286; Pippidi2010: 128). By the 1930s, newspaper production had reached staggeringlevels so that in Yugoslavia there were 50 main daily papers in 1936with a combined circulation of over 400,000 and in Romania by 1938the leading daily, Universul, reached a circulation of 200,000 (Case 2010:294). This cultural production only intensified after World War II,and all Balkan states further expanded their educational, intellectualand information base. For example, by the 1970s Yugoslavia had 19universities with outpost departments in 74 cities so that by the early1980s more than one thousand PhD students graduated each year. Inaddition, by 1984 there were 1,474 academic and cultural journals, 202radio stations, and 3,063 daily newspapers (JSP 1986: 113–20).

The inexorable state building of the late nineteenth and the twentiethcentury inevitably created winners and losers. Regardless of the politicalsystems involved, the clear winners were the civil servants, military andpolice establishments, and the state intelligentsia, while the principallosers were the peasantry and later, with the advent of industrialization,the blue-collar laborers. The uncontrolled overproduction of educatedstrata that were later unable to find employment in state institutionsfostered ideological discontent and the proliferation of both right- andleft-wing extremism. For example, many highly educated but unemployedyoung Romanians joined the far right Iron Guard as “the uncontrolleddevelopment of bureaucracy fed extreme right-wing movements” (Pippidi2010: 133). In this sense southeast Europe was not an exception to thewider European trend for disenchanted intellectuals, university students,



and unemployable professionals to be at the forefront of extreme right-and left-wing radicalism (Mann 2004).

What differentiated this part of Europe from its western counterpart wasthe outcome of the speedy and severe structural transformation: state-ledorganizational modernization did not create independent middle-classsectors. Instead, the new states emerged and continued to exist as highlypolarized social orders divided between city-based administrative strataand the small land holding peasantry. Despite the gigantic politicaland economic changes that shaped the Balkan Peninsula in the latenineteenth and the twentieth century there was a great deal of continuityin the patterns of the region’s social stratification. Not only is there anuninterrupted increase in the size of the administrative, military, andpolice apparatuses from the mid nineteenth century until the end ofthe twentieth century, but there is a substantial degree of continuityin the principal ideological conflicts waged in the past 150 years. Theever-increasing organizational and coercive powers fostered the prolife-ration of several potent ideological discourses. Civil servants, militaryofficers, and state intelligentsia became the vanguard of irredentism, statenationalism, etatism, and conservatism in a variety of guises; the peasantrywas most receptive to agrarian populism, often infused with hefty religiousrhetoric; and blue-collar workers were initially sympathetic to variationsof socialist and communist ideas but in the wake of World War II statesocialism became more conservative (Biondich 2011; Glenny, 1999;Zupanov 1985). To circumvent agrarian populist and leftist movementsdissatisfied with the dominance of the urban administrative and coercivestrata, the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century state authorities,together with the rightist civil society groupings, often deployed xeno-phobic and chauvinistic rhetoric in order to displace internal conflictsoutside of its borders. Hence anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and ethnicchauvinism, often accompanied by the concrete policies of ethniccleansing (i.e. “population exchanges”) and periodic pogroms becamea crucial ideological tool for forging national homogeneity (Biondich2011; Glenny 1999; Mazower 2000). It is important to emphasize thatmuch of this protracted organized ideologization of the masses tookplace long before any major wars.

Nevertheless, despite concentrated efforts to turn peasants (and theurban proletariat) into nationally conscious Serbs, Bulgarians, Albanians,or Greeks, the majority of the population remained resistant to nationalistappeals well into the twentieth century (Maleševic 2012b; Meriage 1977;Stokes 1975, 1976). Even the Balkan Wars of 1912–13 and World War Idid not dramatically change this attitude as many peasant soldiers wereinclined to desert or deliberately injure themselves to avoid the draft



(Biondich 2011; Glenny 1999; Roudometof 2001). The wars could notcreate nationalist sentiments where they did not exist; the outbreak ofwarfare could only ignite the spark among already nationalist adminis-trative, military, and intellectual strata. The aftermath of World War IIwas much more significant in nationalizing masses and transformingpeasants into fully fledged nationalists. The combined influence of thecumulative bureaucratization of coercion and centrifugal ideologizationfostered the creation of literate, heavily urbanized, informed, andschooled populations highly receptive to the different articulations ofnationalism. In this sense there was no substantial difference betweencommunist states such as Bulgaria or Yugoslavia and anti-communistGreece. All twentieth-century Balkan states, just like the rest of themodern world, relied on nationalism as the principal operative ideologyfor the justification of rule. Despite the official rhetoric of internationa-lism and universal proletarian solidarity, all communist states utilizednationalism as the most important source of political legitimization. Theofficial Soviet formula of establishing societies that would be “nationalin form but socialist in content” could not conceal the actual reality ofsocial orders that were quasi-socialist in form but deeply nationalist incontent (Brubaker 1996; Maleševic 2002, 2006). Regardless of whether aparticular form of state socialism was very rigid (such as in Albania andRomania) or more liberal (as in Yugoslavia) they all invested heavily inthe nationalization of the masses and deployed nationalist ideology asthe key glue of popular legitimacy. As Enver Hoxha put it bluntly:“The religion of Albanian is Albanianism” (Glenny 1999: 560). Hencenationalism in the Balkans was neither a cause nor a product of thevarious wars fought over the last two hundred years. Instead its develop-ment owes much more to the processes taking place in time of prolongedpeace: centrifugal ideologization and the cumulative bureaucratizationof coercion.

Conclusion

It is difficult to deny that in the modern era most, if not all, interstate warsand other organized violent confrontations entail intensive nationalistmobilization. This is easily confirmed whenever a particular nation-stateis challenged by other political actors: from the reaction of the Britishpublic to the 1982 Argentinian invasion of the Falkland Islands, to thespontaneous outbursts of US nationalism in the wake of the 9/11 terroristattacks, to the popular outrage of Russian public opinion that followed the2008 Georgian military offensive in South Ossetia. However, the fact thattwo phenomena, nationalism and war, often emerge together does not



mean that one inevitably causes the other. For if this were the case,nationalism would accompany many more wars throughout history thanit actually has. Hence, rather than causing each other, both nationalismand war require long-term ideological and organizational work to mate-rialize fully. The historical experience of the Balkan Peninsula clearlydemonstrates the structural difficulties in deploying nationalist ideologiesto support a war effort where and when they do not exist. Instead oframpant nationalisms fuelling organized violence one often encountershistorical contingencies, the geopolitical games of large empires, the reluc-tant peasantry, and opportunist local elites. Not only did nationalistideologies not cause wars in the Balkans for much of modern history,but nationalism also remained a rather weak social force until well intothe twentieth century.

In a similar vein, taking part in large-scale wars does not automaticallymake human beings into stringent nationalists. On the contrary, asmany examples of Balkan warfare show, experiencing devastating andprolonged wars is often likely to make large sections of the populationresentful towards grand, national projects. The stunning victories of theSerbian and Greek armies in the Balkans Wars of 1912–13 did not makethe Greek and Serbian peasants more enthusiastic about the Megali Ideaor the Nacertanije. Hence, when nationalisms and wars appear to set eachother off, this often has less to do with the advent of a particular warand much more to do with long-term historical – organizational andideological – macro processes developed far away from the battlefields.

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