ORI GIN AL PA PER

Politics and policies of promoting multilingualismin the European Union

Suzanne Romaine

Received: 4 August 2012 / Accepted: 1 February 2013 / Published online: 6 March 2013

� Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Abstract This article examines the politics of policies promoting multilingualism

in the European Union (EU), specifically in light of the recently released European

Union Civil Society Platform on Multilingualism. As the most far-reaching and

ambitious policy document issued by the European Commission, the Platform

warrants close scrutiny at a significant moment when multilingualism seemed

poised to become a policy field in its own right. This is an extremely important

move given the fact that language policy has been politically untouchable at inter-

governmental level and there is to date no coherent legally binding language policy

either at the level of EU institutions or in member-states. I raise the question of

whether the situation is likely to change in response to the Platform at a time when

public support for European integration has been waning and the economic crisis

surrounding the euro poses a new threat to the EU. The current austerity climate

makes multilingual policy an easy target for budget cuts as evidenced in the

European Parliament’s recent removal of the requirement to translate its plenary

sessions into all 23 official languages.

Keywords European Union � Language policy � Multilingualism �Language rights � Minorities

Introduction

This article examines the politics of policies promoting multilingualism in the

European Union (EU), specifically in light of the recently released European UnionCivil Society Platform on Multilingualism—hereafter referred to as the Platform

(European Union 2011). Launched by a call in September 2009 inviting

S. Romaine (&)

Merton College, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 4JD, UK

e-mail: suzanne.romaine@ling-phil.ox.ac.uk

123

Lang Policy (2013) 12:115–137

DOI 10.1007/s10993-013-9277-8

non-governmental organizations and other sectors of civil society and the media

interested in engaging in structured dialogue to formulate recommendations for

developing a multilingualism policy (European Commission 2009), the European

Commission (EC) selected twenty-nine members who met in October 2009,

working in four thematic groups: education, linguistic diversity and social inclusion,

translation and terminology, and language planning and policy. Leonard Orban,

European Commissioner for Multilingualism, responsible for language policy and

promoting multilingualism for EU citizens and institutions, set out five priorities at

the Platform’s inaugural meeting (European Union 2011:5):

To promote multilingualism for social cohesion and intercultural dialogue;

To provide opportunities for migrants to learn the language of the host country

and to cultivate their own native language at the same time;

To take advantage of the media which have the potential to open channels for

intercultural dialogue;

To enhance multilingualism policy to secure the rights of all European

languages (official, regional, minority, and migrant languages);

To secure language learning opportunities for all citizens, throughout their

lives.

Overall, the Platform aims to develop a coherent framework for multilingual

policy in the EU as part of a larger political agenda for ‘‘bringing Europe closer to

its citizens and strengthening a pan-European identity in harmony with national and

regional identities’’ (ibid:5). As the EU has evolved over the last five decades from

its origins in the European Economic Community into a more tightly integrated

political union, the notion of a European body politic whose citizens would feel and

act as Europeans rather than as members of individual nation-states has been the

topic of a considerable interdisciplinary literature cutting across fields like politics,

anthropology, sociology, economics, linguistics and others (Hermann et al. 2004;

Krzy _zanowski 2010; Strath 2000). From a linguistic perspective the Platform can be

seen as an extremely important move in an agenda Wodak (2007:71, 91) calls

‘‘doing Europe’’, an on-going dynamic process of negotiating the meanings of

Europe in different public spaces across a range of genres. The Platform heralds a

potentially momentous sea change in this agenda given that the Convention on the

Future of Europe and the Constitutional Treaty left language policy untouched

(European Union 2004). Wondering how and why language was ‘‘so much off these

critical EU agendas’’, Nic Shuibhne (2004:1) expressed disappointment and dismay

that despite the existence of language rules and regulations, no coherent legally

binding EU language policy exists either at the level of institutions or in member-

states. In characterizing the development of current language rules as ‘‘piecemeal

and rudderless’’, she concludes that ‘‘many ingredients are present, but there is no

recipe’’ (ibid:3). More recent assessments reached similar conclusions about lack of

coherent or holistic EU policy on language and multilingualism (Krzy _zanowski and

Wodak 2011:116, n.3; Moore 2011), but at that stage the Platform had not been

released. As far as I am aware, no critical assessment of it has appeared to date,

making my analysis timely.

116 S. Romaine

123

A key question is whether this situation is likely to change, particularly now that

the Multilingualism Portfolio headed by Orban is no longer a separate portfolio, and

the Platform’s mandate ended in July 2011. While work will continue during 2012

and 2013, the outcomes remain uncertain. Will the Platform redefine the role played

by multilingualism in identity-building, both in terms of actual multilingual

communicative practices and the symbolic meanings attached to multilingualism

by civil society and EU institutions? Will the Platform lead to a more inclusive

language policy in which minority language rights are regarded as human rights as

part of what is being called a new EU architecture of fundamental rights

establishing continent-wide standards on human rights? Or, will language policy be

side-lined or even removed from the political agenda in the midst of financial

turmoil occasioned by the Eurozone debt crisis?

Methodology

Answering these questions requires a critical framework for analyzing EU

discourses on multilingualism and language policies in sociohistorical and political

context. There is a constant interplay between politics and language policies. Like

the EU itself, language policies are political projects. They are always inherent

representations of different language ideologies, i.e. beliefs, visions and conceptions

of the role of certain language(s) held by different (most commonly institutional)

social actors (Krzy _zanowski and Wodak 2011:118). Competing ideologies drive

aspects of language policy in different, often conflicting, directions both at national

and supranational levels, as evidenced in action-plans, declarations, resolutions,

reports or surveys released since the late 1990s in which multilingualism featured

prominently on the EU agenda (see, for example, European Commission 2003,

2005a, 2008). These and other texts emanating from EU institutions represent

strategic sites for articulating language ideologies shaping the ways in which

politicians and policy makers conceptualize and attempt to manage linguistic

diversity and multilingualism. Krzy _zanowski and Wodak’s (2011) analysis of policy

documents between 1997 and 2010 adopted a critical discourse-historical approach

to examine evolving meanings of multilingualism in the context of other EU

discourses. Likewise, Moore (2011), contending that contemporary EU language

policy is in crisis, focused on policy documents from 2006 to 2008 to see how

officialdom framed multilingualism and diversity.

The cultural value or wealth of linguistic diversity on the one hand versus

economic benefits of multilingualism on the other are recurrent themes in these

policy documents, reflecting a fundamental dichotomy between symbolic or

emblematic versus instrumental legitimacy (Moore 2011). Krzy _zanowski and

Wodak (2011) found that discourses oscillated between those expressing economic

values and ideologies and those expressing traditional European cultural values like

diversity and education, but they did not detect a unidirectional shift over time from

one to the other. Orban’s (2009) opening speech launching the Platform stressed

both cultural and economic benefits and challenges to multilingualism. Elsewhere in

EU institutional discourses, however, Wodak (2008) observed a ‘rebranding’ of

Politics and policies of promoting multilingualism 117

123

multilingualism as part of a new rhetoric tied to globalization and economic

competitiveness. Linkage of language to contrasting values is of course not a

specifically European trait (Gal 2012:22). Others have also observed a significant

shift from discourse invoking rights, identity and cultural-linguistic preservation to

one grounded in economic keywords such as ‘added value’, ‘human capital’,

reflecting a transition from discourses of pride to those of profit as part and parcel of

late capitalist political economies (Duchene and Heller 2012).

A critical component of ‘‘doing Europe’’ is ‘‘communicating Europe’’, an arena

in which the EU is devoting considerable effort in order to strengthen its legitimacy

as well as create and promote a shared sense of identity, transnational belonging,

and community values among citizens. Although some still see multilingualism as a

major stumbling block to creating common meanings and values associated with

Europeanness, the New Framework Strategy for Multilingualism (European

Commission 2005a:3) stressed ‘‘respect for linguistic diversity’’ as ‘‘a core value’’

of the EU, while Multilingualism: an Asset for Europe and a Shared Commitment(European Commission 2008:3) underlined ‘‘harmonious co-existence of many

languages in Europe’’ as ‘‘a powerful symbol of the European Union’s aspiration to

be unified in diversity, one of the cornerstones of the European project.’’ Indeed, the

EU’s motto is in varietate concordia (‘unity in diversity’).

As discourses communicating Europe, such texts do more than announce and

create new political and legal structures, institutions, symbols and policies. They

also do strategic identity work as they construct a continually evolving narrative

articulating multiple (and sometimes ambiguous and contradictory) meanings of

Europe. Indeed, Strath (2000:14) sees Europe itself as a discourse translated into a

political ideology and project. One of my key tasks is to examine how the Platform

advances and situates its agenda for a multilingualism policy within this narrative.

Orban’s designation of official, regional, minority, and migrant languages within the

referential sphere of ‘‘all European languages’’ signals a move toward a more

inclusive language policy grounded in the context of a rights-based approach at the

same time as it extends the semantic scope of Europeanness. In so far as Europe

acquires salience when pitted against the Other (Strath 2002:388), the meaning of

Europe represents a discourse of power about how to define and classify Europe, its

borders, its peoples, cultures and languages. Wodak (2007:91) identified two

interrelated recurrent topoi across a variety of institutional and non-institutional

discourses on Europe: inclusion versus exclusion and insiders versus outsiders.

Expansion of the EU to include most countries on the European continent has been

accompanied by a conceptual convergence of the EU and Europe in what some now

refer to as ‘EU-rope’ (Krzy _zanowski 2010), which has implications for interpreting

the meanings of dichotomies between European versus non-European, autochtho-

nous versus non- autochthonous, official and non-official languages, etc. While

membership is being continually redefined so as to include those who were formally

excluded, gatekeeping mechanisms in the form of new policies and laws police a

shifting boundary between insiders and outsiders.

Strath and Wodak’s (2009) discussion of how the concept of Europe and related

notions like ‘European values’, ‘Europeanization’, ‘Europeanness’ and ‘European

identity’ are contested, negotiated, reformulated and reorganized in the context of

118 S. Romaine

123

various crisis events since 1945 is strikingly apposite to the current financial crisis

threatening to undo ‘EU-rope’ and the euro, one of the crowning symbols of

European unity. Strath (2002:388) traces the uncoincidental emergence of the

European identity concept to the 1973 Copenhagen EC summit, when the collapse

of the dollar and the oil shock threatened the global economic order and prospects

for European integration. Then, as well as now, crises provide opportunities for

reflecting on European identity and paying increased attention to legitimacy and

democratic accountability of EC/EU structures. Rejection of the Treaty establishing

a Constitution for Europe by large majorities of French and Dutch voters in 2005

triggered a constitutional crisis over the EU’s future. Just as the EC was rethinking

and broadening the social, political and economic role of languages and

multilingualism in EU policy with the appointment of Leonard Orban in January

2007 as the first European Commissioner for Multilingualism, the failure of large

US financial institutions triggered a global recession in 2008. The Multilingualism

Portfolio lost its status as a separate portfolio in February 2010 and returned to the

EU Commissioner for Education, Culture and Youth, leaving unimplemented most

of the key provisions of the policies elaborated within the Action Plan Multilin-gualism: An Asset for Europe and a Shared Commitment (European Commission

2008).

The following sections examine more closely how the Platform frames its

agenda for multilingual language policy in relation to these themes of

integration, identity, inclusiveness, and values. The next section looks at the

current state of multilingualism in the EU, particularly with respect to the

Platform’s recommendations on policy and practice involving national official

languages. Then, I turn to the Platform’s proposals for addressing unequal

relationships between official and non-official languages as well as hierarchies

within non-official languages in the context of the new post-Lisbon EU

architecture for human rights. Throughout I evaluate the Platform’s recommen-

dations in the light of significant discrepancies and contradictions emerging

between official narratives constructed in EU institutional discourses and the most

recent Eurobarometer opinion polls examining attitudes of Europeans towards

their languages and their visions of the future of the EU. Eurobarometers play a

key role not only in communicating Europe but also in providing EU institutional

actors, policy makers and researchers with information on public opinions and

preferences. Despite their flaws, they have also become an important tool for

evaluating policies and therefore cannot be ignored when analyzing EU policy-

making. Within both official discourses and opinion polls, sometimes discordant

and conflicting visions of the EU emerge that are indicative of struggles over the

very definition of what Europe is or might be and what multilingualism means.

Many ideologies, policies and discourses at national level contradict official

proposals or adapt them to national contexts so that a national ‘we’ takes

precedence over a common European ‘we’. Finally, I conclude by discussing

some problems and political conundra in need of resolution in policy areas

intimately connected to multilingualism like migration, citizenship, and multicul-

turalism, and by offering some recommendations aimed at better communicating

the Platform to the public and involving the public in its deliberations.

Politics and policies of promoting multilingualism 119

123

Multilingualism in the EU-the politics of monolingual multilingualismand hegemonic multilingualism

Despite featuring prominently in EU discourse over the past few decades,

multilingualism is by no means a new issue. While a multilingual policy has

existed from the outset, it functioned as monolingual in practice, or in other words

as ‘monolingual multilingualism’ (Krzy _zanowski and Wodak 2011:129). The

commitment to monolingualism in national languages, multiplied by the number

of member-states, has led the EU to support multilingualism in principle at the

supranational level since 1958, when Regulation 1 recognized the national

languages of all member-states as official and working languages. A recent

reiteration of commitment to this policy explains this principle of equality as a

prerequisite for democracy.

The EU adopts legislation which is directly binding on its citizens. It is

therefore a prerequisite for the Union’s democratic legitimacy and transpar-

ency that citizens should be able to communicate with its institutions and read

EU law in their own national language, and take part in the European project

without encountering any language barriers. The very first Regulation adopted

by the Council therefore defines the European Community as a multilingual

entity, stipulates that legislation must be published in the official languages

and requires its institutions to deal with citizens in the official languages of

their choice. (European Commission 2005a:12–13).

In accordance with Regulation 1, the number of official languages has

continually expanded to accommodate entry of new member-states with their

national languages so that the present EU-27 recognizes twenty-three languages.

Most member-states, however, endorse official monolingualism; only six (Belgium,

Finland, Ireland, Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Malta) are officially bi- or multilingual.

Although the mother tongue of the majority of Europeans is one of the state

languages of their country, at least 40–50 million citizens of the EU (ca. 10 % of the

population) speak a language other than official languages of the state of which they

are citizens. The languages spoken by these minorities often do not have the same

rights and status as those granted to the official languages.1 The Platform (2011:35)

addresses directly some unresolved tensions and contradictions arising from ad hoc

policy-making when it acknowledges existence of a ‘‘deeply rooted hierarchy of

languages’’. This hierarchy affects not only the relationship between official and

non-official languages, but also relationships among languages falling into these

categories. With respect to official languages, the gap between the commitment to

equality in policy and actual inequality in practice means that although all official

languages are legally equal in principle, some are more equal than others. This is

inevitable in a world with languages of different sizes and status. Indeed, Tonkin

(2006:8) regards equality as ‘‘one of the driving myths of language policy’’, which is

‘‘seldom a reality under any language regime’’.

1 This does not include (im)migrant languages, whose speaker numbers are difficult to assess.

120 S. Romaine

123

The EU is unique in having within its borders such a large concentration of world

languages. Although English is clearly at the top of this hierarchy, a second tier is

occupied by French and English as the most frequently used working languages,

followed by another tier in which Spanish and German co-exist with these two. The

other official languages are less widely used and hierarchies of status differences

exist within this group too. While small languages like Maltese and Luxemburgisch

are little used outside their national territories, Irish is the clear anomaly because it

is a minority language even in its own territory. Ireland is the only EU member-state

(apart from Belgium, officially trilingual in French, Dutch and German), where the

percentage of the population claiming the national and/or official state language as

their mother tongue is below 70%. Irish became the EU’s twenty-third official

language in 2007. The regional minority languages, Catalan, Basque and Galician,

were given a new status in 2005, which has since been extended to Welsh and

Scottish Gaelic.

The Platform (2011:3–4) recommends identifying and exploring ways to

‘‘include less-widely spoken languages besides the 3–5 languages that are most

frequently used in the EU institutional settings (English, French, German, Spanish,

and Italian)’’. At the moment, rhetoric promoting the positive values of multilin-

gualism is at odds with the practice of ‘hegemonic multilingualism’, in which only

selected core languages are used as de facto working languages of EU political

institutions (Krzy _zanowski and Wodak 2010). Indeed, European Parliament (EP)’s

decision to cut its translation budget in November 2012 will eliminate translation of

plenary sessions into all official languages and further reduce opportunities for

employing lesser-used languages.

It is by no means clear what could be done to counteract practices sustaining

linguistic inequality because forces propelling English to greater importance in the

EU and the world are largely beyond EU control. A massive global shift to English-

medium instruction is well underway in many countries as a key part of educational

strategy aimed at improving English proficiency in order to increase economic

competitiveness. In response to these realities, English has rapidly become the first

preferred foreign language studied in EU schools, with nearly 90% of students

learning it.

These trends are reshaping EU linguistic repertoires and putting pressure on the

2002 Barcelona objective of ‘1 ? two’ (i.e. mother tongue plus 2), entailing that

everyone should learn at least two languages in addition to their mother-tongue. A

recent Eurobarometer revealed that 72% of EU-27 citizens agreed with this vision of

everyone being able to speak more than one language in addition to their own; just

over half (54%) reported being able to speak another language in addition to their

mother tongue, but only 25% said that they were able to hold a conversation in their

mother tongue and two other languages (European Commission 2012a:5). However,

great disparities exist across member-states and certain segments of the population;

more than 90% of respondents from Luxembourg, Latvia, the Netherlands, Malta,

Lithuania, Slovenia, and Sweden claim to know at least one language other than

their mother tongue, whereas in five countries (Hungary, Italy, United Kingdom,

Portugal, and Ireland), 60% or more speak only their mother tongue. English is the

most commonly used language with 51% speaking it as their mother tongue or

Politics and policies of promoting multilingualism 121

123

foreign language; 38% of EU citizens claim sufficient knowledge of English to have

a conversation. French, German, Spanish and Russian are the next most commonly

used foreign languages. Although most Europeans (77%) believe that improving

language skills should be a policy priority (ibid:119), most of those surveyed (75%)

do not describe themselves as active language learners; nearly a quarter (23%) have

never learned a language and 44% have not learned a language recently and do not

intend to start (ibid:57–58).

In summary, despite broad support for multilingualism, there are no signs that it

is on the increase. A large segment of European society is not enjoying the

advantages of multilingualism. Men, young people and urban populations are more

likely to speak a foreign language than women, elderly people and rural populations

(ibid:17).2 After testing reading, writing, speaking and listening skills of more than

50,000 14–15 year olds across 14 European countries, the first European Survey on

Language Competences revealed that only 42% are competent in their first foreign

language and just 25% in their second. A significant number (14% in the case of the

first foreign language, and 20% in the second), did not achieve even ‘basic user’

level in the 5 most widely taught languages (European Commission 2012b:5).3

With formal education still providing the most common (and in many cases the

only) context for language acquisition across the EU, schools will obviously need to

do more to ensure that students complete their studies through the medium of more

than one language rather than study a foreign language only as a subject for a few

hours a week. Indeed, language learning, teaching and testing practices will need to

change quite radically if they are to meet the Platform’s (2011:50) call for providing

opportunities for developing plurilingual competence and linguistic repertories, ‘‘in

which all linguistic abilities have a place’’. At the very least, many more languages

like Turkish (the most frequently spoken second language in Bulgaria, Denmark,

Germany and Austria) will need to be offered. The most challenging aspect of

shifting from monolingual to plurilingual paradigms will involve dismantling the

assumption that learners will be tested in a single language in isolation with the

‘ideal native speaker’ as the ultimate model.4

Although the Platform (2011:19) mentions problems posed by dominance of

English as a European lingua franca, it sidesteps the question of what can or should

done about what some, like Moore (2011), regard as the most significant unresolved

EU policy issue by saying simply that ‘‘opinion varies as to whether language

policies should aim principally to reduce the influence of English, or to support

English as a platform to promote mobility and competitiveness’’. The First

European Survey on Language Competences continues this equivocation. While

admitting that ‘‘all languages are not equally relevant when entering the labour

market’’, it called for concrete actions to further improve English competence as a

tool for employability and professional development on the one hand and the need

2 The youngest Eurobarometer respondents were between 15 and 24 years old.3 Competence was assessed using the Common European Framework Reference (CEFR).4 The Platform (2001:15) distinguishes between multilingualism as presence of many languages at

societal level and plurilingualism as presence of many languages at individual level.

122 S. Romaine

123

to maintain and promote linguistic diversity for cultural and personal development

on the other (European Commission 2012b:13).

Unsurprisingly, most Europeans (57%) identify English as the most useful

language (European Commission 2012a:71). English is also the language most

school pupils have mastered to the highest level (European Commission 2012b:93).

As more people learn English, native speakers of English have shown less

motivation for learning other languages. The UK is the number one EU country

where interest in foreign language learning has been persistently declining

(European Union 2011:36), and one of two countries with least overall support

(69%) for prioritizing policy aimed at improving language skills (European

Commission 2012a:123). Only 9% of 14–15 year olds are able to communicate in

their first foreign language, French (European Commission 2012b:6).

The Platform (2011:60) also notes the overwhelming predominance of English as

a source language for translation, with more than 60% of book translations from

English into other languages, but only 3% of translations into English. Indeed, with

nearly 3/4 of EU documents currently prepared initially in English, top-down

rhetoric about equality of official languages and the need to promote linguistic

diversity smack of a double standard- ‘do as I say and not as I do’. Critics of EU

language policy like Tonkin (2006:10) have argued that keeping in place a policy

that manifestly cannot work serves the interests of the more powerful language

communities because it aids language shift in their direction—in other words,

primarily towards English. Acting in his capacity as European Commissioner for

Multilingualism, Leonard Orban (2007) rejected the idea of a lingua franca as

intrinsically against his commission’s mandate of promoting linguistic diversity.

The majority (69%) of those surveyed by Eurobarometer, however, believe that

Europeans should be able to speak a common language, with 53% agreeing that EU

institutions should adopt a single language to communicate with citizens (European

Commission 2012a:112). The survey did not ask respondents which language(s) they

would favor; therefore, support for a single language should not necessarily be taken

as unqualified endorsement of English.

Nevertheless, the Platform’s equivocation on the role of English fails to transcend

the conflict between official EU rhetoric about the values of maintaining cultural

diversity and the political goal of pursuing economic integration. Tonkin

(2006:11–12) argues that in the absence of regulation and protection the latter will

win out over the former. Through benign neglect at supranational level the policy of

de jure multilingualism is leading to de facto monolingualism. In other words, the

more languages [that compete], the more English [will dominate] (De Swaan

2001:144). Eurobarometer revealed some indications of shift towards English, which

is the first or second most common foreign language in all member-states except for

Luxembourg, where English comes third, after French and German (both official

languages there). English is the most widely spoken foreign language in 19 of the 25

member-states where it is not an official language (i.e. excluding the UK and Ireland).

Overall then, diverse discourses concerning perceived values of multilingualism

co-exist at various levels. Eurobarometer reveals some significant disjunctures

between EU top-down institutional discourses and the attitudes and communicative

preferences of EU citizens. While official discourses promote multilingualism as a

Politics and policies of promoting multilingualism 123

123

symbol of common European identity and a key to integration, only 10% of

Eurobarometer respondents saw language learning as a means to feel more

European. Instead, most (61%) think a key advantage of learning a new language is

that it enables working in another country (ibid:64). This opinion sits comfortably

with other official discourses stressing economic advantages to multilingualism,

particularly as a means to enhance mobility, but at the same time, individuals opt for

English as the language offering the most opportunities. It must be remembered,

however, that Eurobarometer refers only to multilingualism in official languages,

not to multilingualism across the EU more generally, and respondents were EU

citizens (though not necessarily nationals of the country in which they were

interviewed).5 There is of course more to multilingualism in the EU than

multilingualism in official national languages. I turn now to the issue of how the

Platform proposes to address the unequal relationship between official and non-

official languages as well as hierarchies within non-official languages between those

currently accorded some measure of legal protection and those without any.

Minority and/or migrant languages vis-a-vis national languages

The Platform’s (2011:36) explicit recognition that ‘‘multilingualism in the EU is

made up not only of European official and non-official languages, but also of

languages from non-EU countries or territories, such as Chinese, Arabic, Urdu, etc.’’

is a significant first step toward addressing a major unresolved gap in policy and

practice concerning unequal relationships between national and minority languages

within the supranational context of the community. Lack of a coherent framework

for all languages within the EU has left many minority issues unaddressed,

especially as the enlargement process continues and new and candidate members

containing large national and other minorities bring with them yet more layers of

complexity (Romaine 2007, 2011). Until now, the EU has made few or no

concessions to languages of migrants not already citizens of EU member-states.

Acknowledging that ‘‘it is not helpful to have a hierarchy of ‘European’ versus ‘non

European’, or ‘indigenous’ versus ‘immigrant’ languages.’’ (European Union

2011:5), the Platform (ibid:3) recommends including ‘‘all languages (not only

minority and lesser-widely used languages) and all aspects of language planning and

policy including language status planning, corpus planning and language education

planning.’’ This plan advocates that ‘‘autochthonous European languages be

protected and reinforced, as should the languages of recent economic immigrants,

such as Turkish, Arabic, Berber’’ (ibid:4). Although further details are not provided,

if these languages were to be put on equal footing with autochthonous European

languages, this would represent a major departure from the existing legal framework

at both the European and international level.

Without discussing specific details or shortfalls of the two Council of Europe

treaties setting standards for protecting so-called regional or minority languages

5 While Eurobarometers have also been criticized for their small sample size (1,000 people per country),

no other crossnational database of this size regularly measures public opinion across the EU-27.

124 S. Romaine

123

(RMLs) in the EU- namely, the European Charter for Regional or Minority

Languages (ECRML) and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National

Minorities (FCNM), the most important feature to highlight is that both address

European national minorities with a territorial base rather than non-territorial

languages like Yiddish, Romani, etc., or (im)migrant minorities and their languages.

In the absence of a territorial base, only a limited part of the charter applies.

FCNM (Council of Europe 1995), for instance, covers ‘national minorities’ (without

defining the term), but excludes ‘non-national’ immigrant groups, while ECRML

(Council of Europe 1992) does not provide uniform coverage or protection even to

the languages it can potentially include because each state can choose which

languages to include as well as which of numerous provisions to apply. Some states

have recognized Roma under the provisions of ECRML and FCNM (Council of

Europe 2012). Although both FCNM and ECRML are legally binding treaties with

monitoring mechanisms for signatories, the Council of Europe can ‘urge’, but has

no power to compel states to sign, ratify, or implement these agreements. As of June

2012, 25 Council of Europe (including 16 EU) member-states have ratified

ECRML.

Although some experts insist there should be no distinction in law between

linguistic rights of autochthonous and allochthonous minorities in human rights

treaties, in the absence of a normative theory of language rights, national ethnic

minorities have many more internationally and nationally coded rights than

immigrants. Interestingly, a majority (81%) of those polled by Eurobarometer

agreed that all languages spoken within the EU should be treated equally (European

Commission 2012a:8). More significantly, however, the survey (based on simple

closed questions with multiple choice answers) did not attempt to clarify what

understandings respondents had with respect to the issue of treating all languages

equally and the extent to which Europeans have shared meanings concerning the

kinds of specific actions required to ensure equal treatment.6 Although ‘‘allocating

special rights to one group of minorities and denying the same rights to other groups

is hard to explain with the principle of equal human rights for everyone’’ (Extra and

Yagmur 2002:46), equality is not guaranteed by treating everyone the same.

Different groups may require different treatment depending on their needs. Lack of

a common referential framework and use of varying terminologies across countries,

treaties and legal documents have hindered the development of standards for

minority rights. Commonly used terms within the European context (e.g. ‘lesser-

used language’, ‘regional minority language’, ‘cross-border language,’ etc.) include

languages with quite different sociolinguistic statuses reflecting the particular socio-

historical and political circumstances of different types of groups who speak them,

and whose minoritization exists by virtue of their specific relation to the larger state.

While legal scholars, linguists, political scientists and other experts have proposed

various typologies and classifications of different minority groups and languages, or

6 This illustrates some general problems in interpreting Eurobarometer results. It is not always clear that

questions have been translated accurately or that respondents across so many different countries interpret

them in the same way.

Politics and policies of promoting multilingualism 125

123

states, no single model or formula provides a solution applicable to all minorities or

minority languages.

Nor is there an international legal consensus on how to define a minority. Roma,

for example, are recognized as national minorities in some countries but not others.

In discussing the evolution of the United Nations framework for human rights and

minority protection, Duchene (2008:17) highlighted a series of paradoxes arising

from the necessity and impossibility of defining minority groups at supranational

and national level. Minorities demand protection from the state and what they

demand to be protected from is the state. Meanwhile, the state seeks to protect itself

from the risk posed by the very existence of minorities. The need for specifically

targeted minority rights has emerged in response to demands from different types

of groups wanting to belong to states in different ways, and to exercise specific

promotion rights going beyond anti-discrimination and toleration. The resulting

patchwork coverage whereby different types of minorities like national minorities

and indigenous peoples are accorded different kinds of rights, powers, or

accommodations from the state, but others have only generic rights has emerged

in an ad hoc way and is riddled with gaps and inconsistencies.

In the absence of legal provisions for minorities in EU treaties before the Lisbon

Treaty (European Union 2007) came into force in 2009, minorities had to rely on

human rights. The original European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR 1953)

included rights to equal treatment and non-discrimination, but did not include

specific provisions on minorities. The EP’s (2005) report on the protection of

minorities and anti-discrimination policies in an enlarged Europe emphasized

minority rights as an integral part of human rights, even while admitting

inconsistency of policy towards minorities, lack of standards for protecting national

minorities, or even a definition of who can be considered a member of a minority. It

urged the EC to develop policy standards drawing a clear distinction between

(national) minorities, immigrants and asylum seekers. The EP Intergroup for

Traditional Minorities, National Communities and Languages (TMNCL), whose

function is to promote awareness of and to develop policy for national and linguistic

minority issues in Europe, also advocates a distinction between different minority

communities such as traditional minorities, new immigrants and Roma (Gal et al.

2011:6). At the same time, the group has moved away from its original emphasis on

promoting languages and cultures as cultural heritage to focus on human rights

(ibid:242–243).

Nevertheless, even in the context of what is being referred to as the new EU

architecture of fundamental rights underpinned by the coming into force of the

Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) and the Lisbon Treaty, there is still no

Europe-wide system of adequate minority protection nor a EU level language policy

and planning for regional and minority languages (ibid:58). Under the Lisbon Treaty

provisions, minorities are for the first time explicitly mentioned in EU primary law,

and EU accession to the ECHR became a legal obligation. In addition, the CFR

(originally proclaimed in 2000 and adapted in 2007) has the same legal value as

treaties, i.e. it is an internationally legally binding document. Protocol 14 of the

amended ECHR, entering into force in 2010, specifically mentions national

minorities, as does Article 21 of CFR (Council of Europe 2010). Article 22 of CFR

126 S. Romaine

123

requires the EU to respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity. While Article 2

of the preamble to the Lisbon Treaty explicitly includes ‘‘the rights of persons

belonging to minorities’’ as part of the respect for human rights that member-states

are legally obliged to uphold (European Union 2007), it is unclear whether this

applies to (im)migrants. The European Court of Justice will have to clarify what

is meant by terms such as ‘‘persons belonging to minorities’’ and ‘‘national

minorities’’.

Despite post-Lisbon advances in minority protection, there is no reason to be

overly optimistic about what can be achieved as long as the EU lacks legal

competence to intervene against discrimination on the part of member-states toward

minorities (Gal et al. 2011:13, 58). The extent to which minority language rights

will be regarded as human rights remains unclear as long as language policy and the

protection of minorities and languages are member-state issues. Moreover, a

genuinely inclusive policy on multilingualism in the EU cannot be achieved without

resolving various political issues like migration, residence and citizenship. Despite

the push towards EU harmonization policies on migration and Europeanization of

citizenship expressed in the CEFR, member-state policies on migration, residence

of third-country nationals, and citizenship have remained national issues with wide

variation in eligibility criteria. Over the last 20 years, an increasing number of

European countries, along with others elsewhere, have introduced or formalized

linguistic requirements for migration, residency, and citizenship (Extra et al. 2009).

Indeed, policies requiring knowledge of national languages as prerequisites for

migration and residence represent one of the main gate-keeping devices to

integration and citizenship (Wodak 2007:79). Although the Platform (2011:48)

acknowledges the importance of looking at the role language testing should play in

decisions member-states make regarding migration, citizenship and social integra-

tion, it avoids making any recommendations by stating that these are ‘‘highly

controversial’’ issues.

Migrants comprise the majority of increase (73%) in EU population since 2008.

The 30.8 million foreigners living in the EU accounted for 6.2% of the total

population: almost two-thirds (63.3% or 19.5 million) were citizens from a non-

member country, while just over one-third (36.7% or 11.3 million) were citizens of

another member-state. The most significant numbers of third country nationals

residing in the EU are citizens of Turkey, Morocco, Albania and China.7

Naturalization laws are extremely restrictive for immigrants and their descendants.

Only about 700,000 persons (ca. 3.5%) acquired the citizenship of one of the

member-states in 2007 (European Commission 2010:192).

Despite official rhetoric portraying EU citizenship as inclusive in theory, in

practice it is exclusionary in so far as populations historically present in Europe are

included, but ‘others’ are excluded from belonging. Thus, the notion of ‘European’

rests on ‘‘a social organisation of cultural difference and the essence of European

identity emphasises the boundary between insiders and outsiders’’ (Nic Craith

2006:7). Indeed, Wodak (2007:81–82) contends that ‘‘the dimension of inclusionand exclusion thus touches on a central topos of all EU discourses and cuts across

7 These figures cover only legal migration.

Politics and policies of promoting multilingualism 127

123

the nexus of EU identity discourses’’ (emphasis in original SR). Even if migrant

languages like Albanian, Arabic and Turkish were admitted on equal linguistic

terms to ‘Club Europe’, as long as the member-states in which their speakers reside

do not grant them citizenship, they remain political outsiders. Individuals/groups

perceived as alien or foreign face stereotypes and prejudices reinforcing this

boundary, ensuring that they are still not welcome, even if they do manage to

acquire citizenship.

Moreover, enlargement of EU political borders eastwards from 2004 not only

created more member-states and EU citizens, but also resulted in unprecedented levels

of statelessness within the EU, not just among migrants but also among autochthonous

(especially transborder and/or national) minorities, like Russians and Hungarians in

new member-states like Latvia, Estonia and Slovakia. By enacting restrictive and

discriminatory language, education, employment and naturalization laws in the

context of aggressive policies aimed at undoing Russification, Estonia and Latvia in

effect rendered stateless and disenfranchised large numbers of Russophone minorities

(not all of whom are ethnic Russians). Acquiring citizenship by naturalization was

possible only under conditions equating integration with forced assimilation for

millions of former Soviet citizens who were framed variously as immigrants, settlers,

oppressors, colonizers or non-Europeans. By contrast, other post-Soviet states like

Lithuania naturalized all permanent residents (Pavlenko 2011; Sasse 2008).

When Hungary opened a path to citizenship in 2010 for millions of ethnic

Hungarian minorities in neighboring states like Slovakia by removing a residence

requirement, Slovakia imposed a law withdrawing Slovak citizenship from any

Slovak citizen voluntarily acquiring the citizenship of a foreign country. Meanwhile

Slovakia’s Slovak Language Law (dating from 1995 and amended in 2009) restricts

use of any language but Slovak in the public sector and imposes fines for using

minority languages. While this clearly constitutes discrimination on the basis of

ethnic origin and language, attempts at intervention from actors like the OSCE High

Commissioner on National Minorities, the Council of Europe and others have

been ignored. Slovakia’s abolition of dual citizenship does not actually violate

international or European law. The FCNM is silent on the issue of citizenship of

national minorities and the European Convention on Nationality permits withdrawal

of citizenship from persons who voluntarily acquire that of another country. Indeed,

Germany revoked German citizenship from thousands of naturalized citizens of

Turkish origin after they reacquired Turkish citizenship. The Lisbon Treaty leaves

unchanged the basic architecture of EU citizenship making it derivative from

member-state nationality and does not grant EU legal competence in matters of

nationality. While Baubock (2010:37) contends that states hosting a national,

linguistic or religious minority should have a special duty to protect it by

guaranteeing citizenship, citizenship (like national language policy) remains within

the jurisdiction of member-states.

These specific examples underline intimate connections between language,

migration and citizenship, while simultaneously highlighting various conundra

requiring resolution before the Platform’s goal of a multilingualism policy securing

the rights of all languages can be achieved. Because the nation-state continues to

provide the fundamental framework within which identities and rights are

128 S. Romaine

123

recognized or denied, citizenship is the most fundamental human right because the

‘‘right to have rights’’ is premised upon citizenship (Arendt 1951:294–295).

Requiring nationality of an EU state as a precondition for EU citizenship, which

confers the right to free movement and residence, in effect leaves millions of legal

residents throughout the EU without citizenship and basic rights. European

identities are constantly being constructed, reconstructed and recontextualized in

line with shifting socio-political circumstances (Krzy _zanowski 2010), in effect

allowing distinct national models to prevail when it comes to managing, containing

or suppressing ethnolinguistic diversity along with multicultural pressures on the

monocultural texture of nations.

Communicating Europe through the Platform and communicatingthe Platform to Europe

Previous sections have highlighted some of many unresolved tensions in the

Platform’s proposals that may cause it to founder for lack of clear direction on too

many difficult political issues in policy areas connected to multilingualism. The

Platform (2011:44) acknowledges that ‘‘there is still an urgent need to persuade

European institutions and citizens that the formation of a truly multilingual and

multicultural topos serves Europe’s economic and political interests; that multilin-

gualism and multiculturalism—inseparable from one another—may be a key factor

to ensuring conditions for unity.’’ Although discursive construction of a suprana-

tional identity based on common values has been well underway for a long time

from top-down in institutional EU discourses, opinion polls indicate much actual

identity work remaining to be done on the ground at grassroots level. The failed EU

constitution and continuing widespread Euroscepticism are indicative of a profound

identity crisis threatening to undermine the EU’s legitimacy and to impede further

integration. The most recent Eurobarometer survey on the future of Europe showed

this is particularly true in the two predominantly anglophone member states; 60% in

the UK and 58% in Ireland defined themselves principally in terms of their

respective national identities alone. Only in thirteen countries do a majority see

themselves as both Europeans and nationals of their own countries (European

Commission 2012c:55–56).

The Lisbon Treaty defines common values expected of member-states in Article

1a (which became Article 2 in the consolidated version treaty on European Union):

The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom,

democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including

the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the

Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance,

justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail (European

Union 2007).

While identities and values can be manufactured and imposed from top-down, they

can be resisted and contested from the bottom-up. Eurobarometer sheds a somewhat

different light on values and their ordering by EU citizens. When asked which

Politics and policies of promoting multilingualism 129

123

values the EU best embodied compared to other countries in the world, a majority

chose freedom of opinion (64%), peace (63%), social equality and solidarity (61%),

tolerance and openness to others (56%), respect for nature and the environment

(55%), and respect for history and its lessons (52%). While cultural diversity (44%)

recorded the largest increase since 2007, when asked to select two items European

society should emphasize in order to face major global challenges, social equality

and solidarity (45%) ranked highest over cultural diversity and openness to others

(17%). This order of priorities has remained unchanged since the question was

previously asked in autumn 2009 (European Commission 2012c:66–67).

While Eurobarometers may have limited utility for understanding attitudes,

values and beliefs across so many countries due to restricted sample size and

question formats, failure to appreciate cultural diversity and openness to others as

prerequisites for building firmer foundations for equality and solidarity is

nonetheless manifest in a rise in nationalistic, racist and xenophobic discourses.

Recent backlash against multiculturalism at high levels makes confronting these

issues particularly urgent. In 2010 and 2011 German Chancellor Angela Merkel,

British Prime Minister David Cameron and then French President Nicolas Sarkozy

decried multiculturalism as failed policies in their respective countries. At the very

least, the charge of failure should prompt a serious debate between governments and

civil society about the meanings of multiculturalism, which so far has not taken

place. As long as integration is seen as a one way process of assimilation, it seems

unlikely that a sense of belonging can be generated by policies placing the onus for

integration entirely on migrants. One might reasonably argue that a policy that has

never been seriously tried cannot fail. Policies on multiculturalism and multilin-

gualism never operate in a political vacuum. They are always linked to shifting

political and economic objectives. It is premature to predict the Platform’s outcome,

but worrying signs on the horizon already suggest that other political and economic

priorities threaten to overshadow and sideline multilingualism just as it was moving

to a higher level of prominence on the EU agenda.

Now that multilingualism has been downgraded and returned to the Education,

Culture and Youth portfolio, it may be significant that the home page of current

Commissioner Androulla Vassiliou does not mention the Platform. There is also no

direct link for information about multilingualism amidst the Quick Links to other

areas under her portfolio. A link from the home page to the Commissioner’s

‘‘overall political priorities’’ provides further information under the headings

Education, Culture, Multilingualism, Youth, and Sport. Education gets the lion’s

share of space, while Multilingualism receives the least, with just two short

paragraphs referring only to the cultural and economic values of learning Europe’s

official and regional and minority languages.

Language learning and use help us both professionally and socially, opening

people’s minds to the cultural diversity which is an integral part of the EU’s

wealth. We must support not just the EU’s 23 official languages butEurope’s 60 regional and minority languages. [emphasis in original SR]

One of my key tasks will be to promote language learning from a youngage. [emphasis in original SR] Our goal is for every EU citizen to speak at

130 S. Romaine

123

least 2 foreign languages [emphasis in original SR] as well as their own.

Knowledge of languages improves job prospects, communication and under-

standing, both inside Europe and beyond (http://ec.europa.eu/commission_

2010-2014/vassiliou/about/priorities/index_en.htm).

While both pride and profit discourses figure in Commissioner Vassiliou’s priorities,

there is no mention of (im)migrant languages or their cultural or economic value.

This page ends with the Commissioner’s personal statement that she will ‘‘be

listening to all stakeholders carefully’’ [emphasis in original SR], but my attempts

to contact her directly by email in April 2012 to find out more about the future of the

Platform went unanswered.

The conclusions of the Council of the European Union (2011) on language

competences to enhance mobility mention the Platform, but they largely reiterate

earlier statements about the need for language skills to enhance mobility and

employability in the context of the knowledge-based economy (KBE), a key

narrative impacting higher education policies not just in the EU but globally

(Fairclough and Wodak 2008; Krzy _zanowski and Wodak 2011). The Platform is

mentioned as a means ‘‘to secure lifelong language learning opportunities for all, in

order to enhance the social inclusion of citizens with disadvantaged backgrounds, as

well as to promote linguistic diversity and intercultural dialogue’’ (Council of the

European Union 2011:3). The Council’s conclusions end with a list of twelve items

it invites member-states to consider, the first of which is to step up efforts to meet

the Barcelona objectives. Although several points relate to issues concerning

(im)migrant languages, they are vaguely worded and without legal force (ibid:5–6).

These include broadening the choice of languages offered in education and training,

helping children and adults with migrant or Roma background to learn the official

language(s) of the host country, enabling children from such backgrounds to

maintain and develop their mother tongues, and exploring ways of recognizing and

validating native language competences of children and adults with migrant

backgrounds.

Another possible bellwether suggesting strategic realignment and reprioritization

of multilingualism policy to serve primarily economic goals appeared in the press

release issued after the Platform’s meeting in June 2012. Referring to the Platform’s

future role in what is called ‘‘the new political and economic context’’, the report

states that

the Platform will continue to promote multilingualism and policy develop-

ments within the European Union in a way that aligns with the new challenges

and priorities that the European Commission has outlined for the coming

years, especially with regard to the upcoming Erasmus for All programme that

will come into effect in 2014 (Europa 2012).

Erasmus for All, bringing together all the current EU and international schemes for

education, training, youth and sport, would emphasize ‘‘acquisition of languages for

professional growth and mobility for a more dynamic and competitive Europe’’

(ibid).

Politics and policies of promoting multilingualism 131

123

Yet more signs of shifting ground appear in Poliglotti4.eu (2012), an on-line

Language Observatory (accessible in English, French and German) for disseminating

the Platform’s results and gathering and sharing best practices in language policy and

language learning. Although launched in response to the Platform’s recognition of

the need for a central resource on multilingual policy, the Observatory’s scope and

remit appear much narrower than originally envisaged. Emphasis has shifted away

from the Platform’s call for collecting and monitoring data on the use and status of

‘‘all European languages’’ and for the Observatory to act as a watchdog of language

use throughout member-states by monitoring speaker numbers, implementation of

legislation, teaching provision and courses (European Union 2011:7–8, 12, 26). Even

as the European Day of Languages was being celebrated in September 2012, and

Commissioner Vassiliou was hosting a conference on multilingualism marking the

10th anniversary of the meeting leading to the Barcelona objective, Poliglotti4.eu

warned of rumors circulating in Brussels that the EU’s Multilingualism Policy Unit

would be axed. This would represent a retreat from the Barcelona objective, further

reduce opportunities for lesser used languages, and leave no place for language

policy in the EC’s infrastructure.

If nothing further happens with the Platform, an important opportunity will have

been missed for achieving a truly inclusive EU language policy that will promote

social cohesion and mutual understanding. Such a policy requires integrating both

economic and cultural values of linguistic diversity, while at the same time finding

the proper balance of interests between member-states and the EU. If the EU is to

live up to its motto, it must resolve this tension between national projects, serving to

consolidate and tighten traditional linkages between culture, language and national

identity, and a pan-European pluralist project founded on a more inclusive

conception of national identity and belonging within culturally and linguistically

diverse communities. Truly inclusive citizenship needs decoupling from nationality

and national identity.

Because the EU at the moment is not an autonomous governing entity, the

sovereignty of member-states limits what can be done. As long as language (and

education) policies remain the responsibility of member-states, supranational

initiatives can always be undermined by their actions. While cognizant of these

constraints, Donall O Riagain, a member of the Platform’s working group on

Language Planning and Policy, contends that political and moral pressure should

be brought to bear on offending institutions and member-states to comply with

treaty obligations. Singling out Greece as the most ‘‘problematic’’ member-state,

he suggests forcing the Greek government to adopt a more respectful attitude

towards its linguistic minorities now that Greece is obligated to other member-

states to rescue it from economic disaster (European Union 2011:5). Although

legalization of the CRF makes respect for minorities both a precondition for EU

membership as well as an obligation for member-states, there have been no signs

of this kind of quid pro quo being applied to Greece. Even under the so-called

‘‘Copenhagen criteria’’ requiring EU candidate countries to demonstrate adequate

standards of minority respect and protection, failure to ratify the two benchmark

treaties FCNM and ECRML did not prevent the Baltic Republics or Poland from

joining.

132 S. Romaine

123

In light of new complexities of diversity, or what has been called ‘superdiver-

sity’ (Blommaert and Rampton 2011; Vertovec 2007), brought about by changing

patterns of migration under globalization, policy makers everywhere must rethink

their understandings of multilingualism and multiculturalism. This seems unlikely

to be high on the EU political agenda while the financial crisis occupies center

stage. Nevertheless, the Platform could potentially provide significant impetus as

well as critical input to this rethinking by more proactively spearheading open

dialogue between governments and civil society. The EU’s White Paper onGovernance issued in the run-up to the debate on the future of Europe recognized

that perceptions of democratic deficit were at least partly due to a communication

deficit reflecting ‘‘tensions and uncertainty about what the Union is and what it

aspires to become, about its geographical boundaries, its political objectives and the

way these powers are shared with the Member States’’ (European Commission

2001:7). Acknowledging that democracy ‘‘depends on people being able to take

part in public debate’’ (ibid:11) and that feelings of alienation were creating

a widening gulf between the EU and the people, the White Paper wanted to make

EU policy-making more open, inclusive, and accountable by communicating more

effectively with the public in all official languages. The Action Plan onCommunicating Europe (European Commission 2005b:8) emphasized multilin-

gualism as ‘‘an integral aspect of the legitimacy, transparency and democracy of the

European project’’, while a press release posted on Europa, the official portal to all

information produced by EU institutions, highlighted multilingualism as ‘‘essential

to go further on European integration’’ as a major conclusion of the Platform’s

latest General Assembly at the end of June 2012 (Europa 2012).

Nevertheless, Eurobarometer revealed continuing perceptions of democratic

deficit, with only 33% believing their voice counted in the EU, and 68% thinking

the state intervened too much in their lives (European Commission 2012c:22, 32).

For the first time in its history, the 2010 Eurobarometer recorded a situation where

distrust in the EU outweighed trust, with the EU’s image deteriorating in 22 of the

EU-27 countries, especially in those most severely impacted by the financial crisis

like Greece, Spain and Ireland (European Commission 2011:43, 48). Although

Eurobarometers represent one way for feeding public opinion into the political

system, democracy is essentially a bottom-up process. Despite numerous White

Papers and action plans addressing deficiencies in EU communication, the linear

model of dispensing policies from above has not yet been replaced by what the EU

itself calls ‘‘a virtuous circle, based on feedback, networks and involvement from

policy creation to implementation at all levels’’ (European Commission 2001:11).

Some of these shortcomings are unfortunately evident in the Platform itself.

Although the work of its twenty-nine members was said to have been based ‘‘on

responses received from citizen [sic SR] of most EU Member States to a number of

detailed questionnaires sent to their members throughout the EU’’ (European Union

2011:5), it is not clear exactly how and to whom these questionnaires were

distributed, or indeed how the EC selected the twenty-nine members. Appendices

provided for each working group do not always include copies of the questionnaires

or details of the results. In cases where some details are given, the information

provided suggests that consultation was not very far-reaching. The Working Group

Politics and policies of promoting multilingualism 133

123

on Language Diversity and Social Inclusion, for instance, states that their

questionnaire was addressed to third sector organizations working with groups

potentially at risk of exclusion, especially migrants. The data represents a sample of

around forty respondents from different Member States such as Spain, Austria,

Switzerland, Latvia, Italy, and the Czech Republic among others (Platform

2011:13).

Conclusion

Opponents and proponents of multilingualism agree that absence of a transnational

European public sphere is a major source of democratic deficit. De Swaan (2001),

for instance, contends that Europeans do not understand each other well enough

even to disagree because multilingualism is a barrier to understanding and thus

impoverishes political debate. Even political theorists like Kymlicka and Patten

(2003:6), who recognize the need for a normative theory of language rights

grounded in social justice and fairness, argue that ‘‘linguistic diversity is one of the

most important obstacles to building a stronger sense of European citizenship’’.

However, lack of a common language does not in itself prevent emergence of a

public discursive space or democratic deliberation (Doerr 2012).

If democratic politics is indeed ‘‘politics in the vernacular’’ (Kymlicka

2001:213), a truly participatory dialogue must be carried out in as many languages

as possible so that further work on the Platform can meet its stated objectives of

‘‘putting in place an on-going process aiming to give a voice to all those committed

to promoting multilingualism in Europe’’ and ‘‘bring[ing] multilingualism closer to

the citizen’’ (European Commission 2009). While a dedicated webpage for the

Platform now exists within the Europa portal available in all 23 official languages

(ec.europa.eu/languages/orphans/civil-society-platform_en.htm), a genuinely inclu-

sive dialogue cannot occur as long as the document containing its policy recom-

mendations is available only in English. Although the original call for participation

in the Platform went out in all official languages, it mentioned that the EC would

provide support for two meetings per year, including ‘‘interpretation facilities from

and to several languages’’ (European Commission 2009). In its present form then,

the Platform is enmeshed in institutional communicative practices it advocates

transcending in its vision of an inclusive multilingualism policy. This dilemma

illustrates well many of the unresolved tensions highlighted in my discussion, in

particular how hegemonic multilingualism works against the principle of linguistic

equality and how equivocation on the role of English as a lingua franca fuels

increasing shift to English. Meanwhile, as the value of multilingualism is ideo-

logically repositioned to facilitate the Erasmus for All agenda, deepening

entrenchment of profit discourses threatens to sideline or displace a more pluralistic

human rights-based discourse embodied in the Lisbon Treaty and the Platform.

Acknowledgments I am very grateful to Davyth Hicks, Alexandre Duchene and Raphael Berthele for

comments on an earlier version of this article.

134 S. Romaine

123

References

Arendt, H. (1951). The origins of totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.

Baubock, R. (2010). Dual citizenship for transborder minorities? A rejoinder. In R. Baubock (Ed.), Dualcitizenship for transborder minorities? How to respond to the Hungarian-Slovak tit-for-tat?(pp. 37–43). Florence: European University Institute. EUI working papers. EUDO Citizenship

Observatory.

Blommaert, J., & Rampton, B. (2011). Language and superdiversity. Diversities, 13(2), 1–21.

Council of Europe. (1992). European charter for regional or minority languages. ETS 148. 5/11/1992.

Strasbourg.

Council of Europe. (1995). Framework convention for the protection of national minorities. 1/2/1995.

Strasbourg.

Council of Europe. (2010). European convention on human rights as amended by protocols 11 and 14.

Council of Europe Treaty Series. Number 5. Strasbourg.

Council of Europe. (2012). Human rights of Roma and travellers in Europe. Strasbourg: Council of

Europe.

Council of the European Union. (2011). Council conclusions on language competences to enhance

mobility. 3128th Education, youth, culture and sport council meeting. Brussels, 28 and 29

November 2011. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/educ/126373.

pdf, accessed April 26, 2012.

De Swaan, A. (2001). Words of the world. The global language system. London: Polity.

Doerr, N. (2012). Translating democracy: How activists in the European Social Forum practice

multilingual deliberation. European Political Science Review, First View, 1–24.

Duchene, A. (2008). Ideologies across nations. The construction of linguistic minorities at the UnitedNations. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Duchene, A., & Heller, M. (2012). Pride and profit. Changing discourses of language capital and nation-

state. In A. Duchene & M. Heller (Eds.), Language in late capitalism. Pride and profit (pp. 1–21).

London: Routledge.

Europa. (2012). Multilingualism is essential to go forward on European integration. http://ec.europa.eu/

languages/news/pdf/civilplatform_en.pdf, accessed June 30, 2012.

European Commission. (2001). European governance. A white paper. COM (2001) 428 final. Brussels.

European Commission. (2003). Promoting language learning and linguistic diversity: An action plan2004–2006. COM (2003) 449. 24/07/2003. Brussels.

European Commission. (2005a). A new framework strategy for multilingualism. COM (2005) 596. 22/11/

2005. Brussels.

European Commission. (2005b). Action plan on communicating Europe. SEC (2005) 985 final, 20 July

2005. Brussels.

European Commission. (2008). Multilingualism: An asset for Europe and a shared commitment. COM

(2008) 566. 18/09/2008. Brussels.

European Commission. (2009). Call for expressions of interest. Civil society platform to promotemultilingualism. Directorate-General for Education and Culture. Brussels.

European Commission. (2010). Europe in figures—Eurostat yearbook 2010. Luxembourg: Publications

Office of the European Union.

European Commission. (2011). Public opinion in the European Union. Eurobarometer 74. Brussels.

European Commission. (2012a). Europeans and their languages. Special Eurobarometer 386. Brussels.

European Commission. (2012b). First European survey on language competences. Brussels. http://ec.

europa.eu/languages/eslc/docs/en/final-report-escl_en.pdf, accessed June 27, 2012.

European Commission. (2012c). Future of Europe. Special Eurobarometer 379. Brussels.

European Parliament. (2005). Report on the protection of minorities and anti-discrimination policies in an

enlarged Europe. 2005/2008(INI) 10/5/2005. Brussels.

European Union. (2004). Treaty establishing a constitution for Europe. Official Journal of the EuropeanUnion, 47. 2004/C 310/01.

European Union. (2007). Treaty of Lisbon amending the treaty on European Union and the treaty

establishing the European Community. Official Journal of the European Union 50. 17 Dec. 2007.

2007/C 306/01.

European Union. (2011). Civil society platform on multilingualism: Policy recommendations for thepromotion of multilingualism in the European Union. 6/6/2011. Brussels.

Politics and policies of promoting multilingualism 135

123

Extra, G., Spotti, M., & Van Avermaet, P. (2009). Language testing, migration and citizenship: Cross-national perspectives on integration regimes. London: Continuum.

Extra, G., & Yagmur, K. (2002). Language diversity in multicultural Europe: Comparative perspectiveson immigrant minority languages at home and at school. Paris: MOST.

Fairclough, N., & Wodak, R. (2008). The Bologna process and the knowledge-based economy: A critical

discourse analysis approach. In R. Jessop, N. Fairclough, & R. Wodak (Eds.), Education and theknowledge-based economy in Europe (pp. 109–127). Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.

Gal, S. (2012). Sociolinguistic regimes and management of ‘diversity’. In A. Duchene & M. Heller (Eds.),

Language in late capitalism. Pride and profit (pp. 22–43). London: Routledge.

Gal, K., Hicks, D., & Eplenyi, K. (2011). Traditional minorities, national communities and languages.The issues raised in the European Parliament’s Intergroup, 2009–2011. Brussels/Budapest: Kinga

Gal. http://static.gal.fidesz-seu.hu/media/2/2/5/5/2255.pdf, accessed June 5, 2012.

Hermann, R. K., Risse-Kappen, T., & Brewer, M. B. (2004). Transnational identities: BecomingEuropean in the EU. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Krzy _zanowski, M. (2010). The discursive construction of European identities. A multi-level approach todiscourse and identity in the transforming European Union. Frankfurt: Peter Lang.

Krzy _zanowski, M., & Wodak, R. (2010). Hegemonic multilingualism in/of the EU institutions: An inside-

outside perspective on the European language policies and practices. In C. H}ulmbauer, E. Vetter, &

H. B}ohringer (Eds.), Mehrsprachigkeit aus der Perspektive zweier EU-Projekte: DYLAN MeetsLINEE (pp. 115–133). Frankfurt: Peter Lang.

Krzy _zanowski, M., & Wodak, R. (2011). Political strategies and language policies: The European Union

Lisbon strategy and its implication for the EU’s language and multilingualism policy. LanguagePolicy, 10, 115–136.

Kymlicka, W. (2001). Politics in the vernacular: Nationalism, multiculturalism and citizenship. Oxford:

Oxford University Press.

Kymlicka, W., & Patten, A. (2003). Language rights and political theory. Annual Review of AppliedLinguistics, 23, 3–21.

Moore, R. (2011). Standardisation, diversity and enlightenment in the contemporary crisis of EU

language policy. Working papers in language & literacies, 74.

Nic Craith, M. (2006). Europe and the politics of language. Citizens, migrants and outsiders. Houndsmill:

Palgrave Macmillan.

Nic Shuibhne, N. (2004). Does the draft EU constitution contain a language policy? II Mercatorinternational symposium: Europe 2004: A new framework for all languages? http://www.ciemen.

org/mercator/pdf/simp-shuibhne.pdf, accessed October 20, 2011.

Orban, L. (2007). Towards a lingua franca of the Mediterranean? Multilingualism in Europe. Lectiomagistralis for the XIII international summer school, Gorizia, 14 September 2007. Speech/07/529.

Orban, L. (2009). The benefits and challenges of linguistic diversity in Europe. Speech/09/495. 23/10/

2009. http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/09/404, accessed 20 October

2011.

Pavlenko, A. (2011). Language rights versus speakers’ rights: On the applicability of Western language

rights approaches in eastern European contexts. Language Policy, 10(1), 37–58.

Poliglotti4.eu. (2012). http://www.poliglotti4.eu/php/index.php?lg=en, accessed November 23, 2012.

Romaine, S. (2007). The impact of language policy on endangered languages. In M. Koenig &

P. De Guchteneire (Eds.), Democracy and human rights in multicultural societies (pp. 217–236).

Aldershot: Ashgate/UNESCO.

Romaine, S. (2011). Policy and planning for protecting linguistic diversity. In T. Migliore & P. Fabbri

(Eds.), The architectures of Babel. Creation, extinctions and intercessions in the languages of theglobal world (pp. 57–71). Firenze: Leo S. Olschki.

Sasse, G. (2008). The politics of EU conditionality: the norm of minority protection during and beyond

EU accession. Journal of European Public Policy, 15(6), 842–860.

Strath, B. (2000). Introduction: Europe as a discourse. In B. Strath (Ed.), Europe and the other andEurope as the other (pp. 13–45). Brussels: Peter Lang.

Strath, B. (2002). A European identity. To the historical limits of a concept. European Journal of SocialTheory, 5(4), 387–401.

Strath, B., & Wodak, R. (2009). Europe-discourse-politics-media-history: Constructing ‘crises’? In

A. Triandafyllidou, R. Wodak, & M. Krzy _zanowski (Eds.), The European public sphere and themedia: Europe in crisis? (pp. 15–34). London: Palgrave.

136 S. Romaine

123

Tonkin, H. (2006). Language inclusion and individual exclusion. Patterns of communication in bilingualand multilingual polities. Unpublished paper presented at the MIDP symposium multilingualism and

exclusion. University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa.

Vertovec, S. (2007). Super-diversity and its implications. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 30(6), 1024–1054.

Wodak, R. (2007). ‘Doing Europe’: The discursive construction of European identities. In R. C. M. Mole

(Ed.), Discursive constructions of identity in European politics (pp. 70–95). Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Wodak, R. (2008). ‘‘Communicating Europe’’: Analyzing, interpreting, and understanding multilingual-

ism and the discursive construction of transnational identities. Studies in Greek Linguistics. In

Proceedings of the annual meeting of the Department of Linguistics, School of Philology, AristotleUniversity of Thessaloniki, 21–22 April 2007 (Language and society series 28). (pp. 57–88).

Thessaloniki: University of Thessaloniki Press.

Author Biography

Suzanne Romaine has been Merton Professor of English Language at the University of Oxford since

1984 and is the co-author of Vanishing Voices. The Extinction of the World’s Languages (Oxford

University Press, 2000).

Politics and policies of promoting multilingualism 137

123