Nuclear- and Missile-Related Trade and Developments for ...

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998

Nuclear and Missile Trade and Developments

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NUCLEAR- AND MISSILE-RELATEDTRADE AND DEVELOPMENTSFOR SELECTED COUNTRIES,

MARCH-JUNE 1998

The material in this overview is drawn from selected abstracts that appear in the Center for Nonproliferation Studies’ nuclear andmissile databases. Transactions of nuclear and missile technologies, parts, and materials are listed according to the recipient country.Other developments are listed according to the country where the event or development took place.

by Michael Barletta, Clay Bowen, Gaurav Kampani, and Tamara Robinson

ASIA

AUSTRALIA

NuclearOn 2 June 1998, Energy Resources of Aus-tralia Ltd. (ERA) won an 18-year battle tobuild a uranium mine bordering the WorldHeritage-listed Kakadu National Park. ERAalso operates the Ranger uranium mine inthe same area. The Ranger mine has contractswith Electricite de France. ERA’s chief ex-ecutive, Phillip Shirvington, denied that therewas a possibility that the mined uraniumcould make its way into nuclear weapons.He said “all uranium from Jabiluka will besold under strict international safeguard sys-tems for use in nuclear power stations.”

AFP; in Inquisit , [Onl ine] http:/ /www.inquisit.com/, 3 June 1998.

CHINA

NuclearChina has abolished the China National

Nuclear Corp. (CNNC) in a bid to restruc-ture its nuclear power sector and place it ona more stable commercial footing. So farthere are no details on how the nuclear sec-tor will be reorganized. But the civiliannuclear power sector could be grouped intoa “profit center” under a to-be-determinedcentral government ministry. Similarly,nuclear weapons activity could be given tothe State Ministry of Defense. Earlier, theCNNC was a quasi-autonomous body re-sponsible to only the State Planning Com-mission (SPC). Now the CNNC will beaccountable to several government indus-tries. Although it will be several monthsbefore the new lines of authority becomevisible, U.S. industry officials speculate thatthe nuclear safety, radiological, protection,and regulatory arms of the CNNC could gainmore independence. Likewise, the civilianand defense activities may also be furtherseparated. The nuclear fuel activities thatwere earlier under CNNC’s control couldbe set up as a separate entity dubbed theChina Nuclear Fuel Corp. This new en-tity could come to control uranium pro-curement and other activities that wereearlier under the control of the China

Nuclear Energy Industry Corp (CNEIC).Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 26 March 1998, pp.1, 8-9.

The second phase of the Russian-assisted,gas-centrifuge uranium enrichment plant inChina will be commissioned in August 1998.According to the Russian Ministry forAtomic Energy, the first phase has alreadybeen put into operation in the town ofHanzhun. Russia believes that the buildingof a gas-centrifuge enterprise and theLianyungang nuclear power plant will be ofgreat political importance and boost eco-nomic cooperation between the two coun-tries. The third phase of theuranium-enrichment project is expected tobe commissioned in January 2002. This en-terprise will produce fuel for Chinese nuclearpower plants and has already been placedunder International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) safeguards. Russia and China havealso signed a contract for nuclear fuel sup-plies and the technology transfers associatedwith the VVER-1000 reactors being built atthe Lianyungang nuclear power plant.

Interfax (Moscow); in FBIS-SOV-98-098, 8 April1998.

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The Pentagon is trying to block the sale of avacuum-induction melting furnace by theU.S. based Consarc Corp. to China’s state-owned Shenyang Institute of Metals Re-search. Vacuum-induction melting furnacescan be used to miniaturize nuclear warheads.The Shenyang Institute of Metals Researchis involved in the development of nuclearweapons and ballistic missiles in China andtherefore is banned from receiving dual-usetechnologies under current U.S. law. Al-though the furnace was to be supplied un-der a World Bank effort to fund rare metalsresearch in China, the Pentagon has cited na-tional security reasons to try to block the sale.Another reason for preventing the sale hasbeen China’s refusal to allow post-shipmentinspections of the furnace.

Barbara Opall, Defense News, 27 April-3 May 1998,pp. 1, 20.

The United States has lifted the ban on theexport of some dual-use technologies toChina. Exports have been liberalized andbrought into line with the less stringentWassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls.Even so, export license requests will be re-viewed on a case-by-case basis. Accordingto the Director of the Wisconsin Project onProliferation, Gary Milhollin, exporters willnow be able to apply to the Commerce De-partment for licenses to export to China dual-use items such as “lasers, vacuum furnaces,neutron generators, and high-speed oscillo-scopes that can be used to improve the de-sign of nuclear warheads.”

Times of India, [Online] http:/www.timesofindia.com, 6May 1998.

On 17 June 1998, China announced that newregulations aimed at strictly controlling ex-ports of nuclear-related technology andproducts are effective immediately. The newlaw requires export agents to apply for per-mits every time they plan to export nuclearequipment, materials, or technology specifi-cally listed in the regulations. Agents mustapply for permits whether the exports areconsidered trade, gifts, exhibitions, technol-ogy cooperation or aid programs. Permitswill be granted only if: (1) receivers prom-ise not to use the items or technology to buildbombs, (2) exports will only be used fornuclear facilities operating under interna-

tional safeguards, and (3) exports will notbe transferred to third parties without theChinese government’s consent. The Minis-try of Foreign Trade and Economic Coop-eration, the China Atomic Energy Authority,and the Foreign Ministry will review the ap-plications. Permits will be granted within a45-day period, unless it is a major transac-tion, which will require the approval of theState Council. Violators of the new regula-tions will face criminal prosecution. The an-nouncement follows U.S. criticism ofsuspected nuclear technology transfers fromChina.

South China Morning Post, 18 June 1998; inInquisit, [Online] http://www.inquisit.com/, 18 June1998.

MissileActing U.S. Undersecretary of State forArms Control and International SecurityJohn Holum, told reporters in Beijing thatwhile the United States believes that Chinawas honoring its pledge not to help Iran buildnuclear weapons, it remains concerned overChinese missile sales to Iran. In addition todiscussing the proliferation of chemicalweapons and missiles, Holum also discussedthe possibility of increasing China’s quotaof U.S. commercial satellite launches.

Reuters; in Inside China Today, [Online] http//www.insidechina.com/, 27 March 1998. AFP, 26March 1998.

U.S. intelligence officials believe that Chinais developing a new short-range missile calledthe CSSX-7. The CSSX-7 will have a rangegreater than 185 miles.

Bill Gertz, Washington Times, 27 March 1998, p. 10.

According to the Belarus House of Represen-tatives National Security Committee Chair-man Uladzimir Yahoraw, Belarus and Chinahave signed a number of agreements on mili-tary-technical and military-scientific coopera-tion since 1995. Belarus will continue toprovide China with “Minsk-made wheeledtractors, which can be used as strategic mis-sile carriers.” China, however, is planning toproduce its own tractors.

Minsk Belapan; in FBIS-TAC-98-090, 31 March1998.

Two U.S. companies, Hughes Electronicsand Loral Space and Communications, are

under investigation by the U.S. Justice De-partment to determine whether they trans-ferred sensitive missile-related technologyto China. On 15 February 1996, a Chineserocket carrying a $200 million Loral satel-lite exploded within seconds after launch.In the aftermath of the explosion, LoralSpace and Communications and HughesElectronics participated in an independentstudy to determine the cause of the rocketlaunch failure. The cause of the accident wastraced to an electrical flaw in the electronicflight-control system. According to a clas-sified Pentagon report, however, scientistsfrom the companies also shared sensitiverocket guidance-related information that sig-nificantly helped improve the reliability ofChina’s nuclear ballistic missiles. The reportconcludes that the “U.S.’s national securityhas been harmed.”

A new report issued by the Defense Tech-nology Security Administration (DTSA) on16 May 1997, outlines more precisely someof the details of the damage and violationsdone by Loral Space and Communicationsand Hughes Electronics when they helpedChina find the cause of a failed rocket launchin February 1996. The 20-page DTSA re-port states that “there were three majorbreaches,” which the Pentagon would havestopped had “military authorities been giventhe opportunity to screen the material be-fore it was given to the Chinese.” Threemedium violations are also mentioned. Onesignificant breach was that the companiesvolunteered alternative causes for the acci-dent, which the Chinese did not arrive at ontheir own. China was also advised to use di-agnostic techniques to detect flaws in itsrocket guidance systems. Thus Chinese en-gineers will now be able to detect flaws inthe guidance systems of nuclear missiles aswell. The report argues that “the significantbenefits derived by China from these activi-ties are likely to lead to improvements in theoverall reliability of their space launch ve-hicles and ballistic missiles, and in particu-lar, their guidance systems.” Theseviolations would not have occurred had theState Department been involved in the over-all review process. When the State Departmentlearned of the nature of the information sharedwith the Chinese it immediately requested fourfederal agencies with expertise in rocket tech-



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nology to review the security implicationsof the exchange. CIA director George Te-net has also ordered his agency to reassessthe impact of the information exchange withChina on U.S. national security.

The Pentagon and the U.S. Central Intelli-gence Agency (CIA) differ in their analysesas to whether an American technical reportabout a 1996 Chinese rocket failure raisesproliferation concerns. The CIA, basing itsanalysis on the original report submitted bythe Loral-led panel and another report puttogether by its attorneys, concluded that thecompany had made “a concerted effort” toavoid providing space or missile relatedtechnologies to the Chinese during the re-view. In contrast, the Pentagon concludedthat Loral provided China with significantinformation in areas of “guidance systemproblems.” This information, it is believed,has been used by China to improve guid-ance systems on its ballistic missiles.

Loral Space and Communications has de-nied that it divulged sensitive guidance in-formation that may have helped Chinaimprove the reliability of its nuclear-armedballistic missiles.

Jeff Gerth and Raymond Bonner, New York Times,4 April 1998, p. 1. Jeff Gerth, New York Times, 13April 1998, p. 1. Walter Pincus, Washington Post, 7June 1998, p. 6. Eric Schmitt, New York Times, 27June 1998. Reuters; in Inside China Today, [Online]http://www.insidechina.com/, 15 April 1998.

China has informally linked its accession tothe Missile Technology Control Regime(MTCR) with curtailments in sales of U.S.weapons and ballistic missile defense tech-nology to Taiwan. Under the U.S.-TaiwanAnti-Ballistic Missile Defense CooperationAct, the U.S. Secretary of Defense has todecide by July 1998 whether ballistic mis-sile defense systems should be transferredto Taiwan. As a Chinese government offi-cial put it, “we expect any nonproliferationagreement on our side to be accompaniedby the basic acknowledgement that U.S.arms sales to Taiwan are a dangerous formof proliferation.” China is abiding by its1994 MTCR commitment not to supplywhole missile systems abroad. But it seemsto have circumvented that commitment bycontinuing to sell components for missilesystems to Iran and Pakistan. On 6 May1998, the U.S. Undersecretary of State for

Nonproliferation, Robert Einhorn, and theChinese Vice Foreign Minister, ZhangDeguang, concluded a memorandum of un-derstanding on visits and exchanges of in-formation pertaining to U.S. transfers ofnuclear technology to China. But China hasrejected a U.S. proposal to allow the U.S.government “pre-license” and “post-ship-ment” inspections of all dual-use technolo-gies exported to China.

Barbara Opall, Defense News, 18-24 May 1998, p.8.

In 1996, the U.S. Department of Justicelaunched a criminal investigation to deter-mine whether China diverted dual-use air-craft manufacturing equipment from acivilian to a military plant. In 1993, Chinapurchased 19 computer-controlled machinesfrom the U.S. aircraft manufacturerMcDonnell Douglas. The machines, whichare between nine and 26 years old, were usedto sculpt metal parts for the B-1 bomber andthe C-17 transport aircraft. China assured theU.S. Department of Commerce that the dual-use machines would be used to build com-mercial jetliners. But six of the 19 machineswere diverted to the Nanchang Aircraft Co.,which manufactures Silkworm cruise mis-siles. Officials from McDonnell Douglas re-ported the diversion to the U.S. Departmentof Commerce, which in turn raised the mat-ter with the Chinese. Since then the machineshave been transferred from the Nanchangplant to Shanghai. Officials from thePentagon’s Defense Technology SecurityAdministration (DTSA) believe, however,that China never intended to use the ma-chines for building commercial jet liners andthat McDonnell Douglas willfully turned ablind eye to the prospects of diversion. Thesecharges have been denied by Boeing, whichrecently acquired McDonnell Douglas.

John Mintz, Washington Post, 7 June 1998, p. 6.

The United States dropped plans to persuadeChina to join the MTCR during PresidentClinton’s summit meeting with Chineseleaders in June 1998. In April 1998, U.S.Undersecretary of State for NonproliferationJohn Holum offered China financial incen-tives in return for joining the MTCR. How-ever, according to a Clinton administrationofficial speaking on conditions of anonym-

ity, “their answer has been a flat no.” TheCIA believes that although China has notexported complete missile systems duringthe last three years, it has continued to assistPakistan and Iran in the development of bal-listic missiles. In particular, China suppliedboth countries with solid-fuel and improvedguidance system technologies for buildingballistic missiles. Intelligence officials nowspeculate that nuclear developments in SouthAsia might tempt China to help Pakistan withits ballistic missile program.

Richard Parker, Philadelphia Inquirer, 11 June1998, p. 2.

INDIA

NuclearAtal Behari Vajpayee, leader of theBharatiya Janata Party (BJP), was sworn inas prime minister of India on 19 March 1998.The new government has said that it will “re-view the country’s nuclear policy and inductnuclear weapons into its military arsenal.”The BJP has always wanted to declare Indiaas a nuclear state. On 23 February 1998, asenior advisor to the Indian governmentAbdul Kalam spoke on the ongoing Indiandevelopment programs for weapons of massdestruction (WMD). He said that Indiashould use “the most up-to-date technolo-gies, including nuclear ones, to strengthenthe country’s defense potential.” In referenceto Pakistan’s suspected development ofWMD, Kalam said that India “cannot allowour country to lag behind in scientific, ex-perimental, and designing work for defensepurposes.”

John Burns, New York Times, [Online] http://www.nytimes.com, 19 March 1998. DisarmamentDiplomacy, February 1998, p. 55. The Hindu,[Online] http://www.hinduonline.com, 27 March1998, p. 13. Indian Express, [Online] http://www.expressindia.com, 19 March 1998.

Defence Minister George Fernandes said on20 March 1998 that the government’s deci-sion to induct nuclear weapons into the mili-tary “has been kept on hold.” He said thatthe government “did not say that [they] weregoing in for nuclear weapons.” Fernandesstated that a strategic re-evaluation of India’ssecurity policy would be conducted by a re-vived national security council. “In light ofthat, we will decide on the nuclear option,”

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said Fernandes.The Hindu, 28 March 1998, p. 2.

In early April 1998, India’s Center for De-velopment of Advanced Computing un-veiled its new indigenously developedsupercomputer called the Param 10000. Itis a 100 gigaflops machine. This technol-ogy would allow India to test nuclear weap-ons, “reliably and rapidly,” withoutphysically exploding them. The open-framearchitecture of the Param 10000 allows it to“be scaled up to the rarefied world of teraflopcomputers,” and to manage data from a net-work (a teraflop computer can do 10e12floating-point operations per second,whereas a gigaflop computer can do 10e9floating-point operations per second).

Pakistan Link, [Online] http://www.pakistanlink.com, 6April 1998.

Officials from the U.S. Defense Departmentand the Indian Defence Ministry are meet-ing on 14-15 April 1998 in Washington D.C.to discuss the new BJP government’s stanceon nuclear weapons. Indian defense officialswish to reassure the United States, as wellas the entire international community, that“the government intends no drastic changein India’s nuclear policy.” U.S. defense ana-lysts believe that Pakistan’s 6 April 1998 testfiring of the Ghauri missile was “a warningshot aimed at Indian Prime Minister AtalBehari Vajpayee’s government.” U.S. de-fense officials believe that further deploy-ment or acquisition of ballistic missiles byIndia or Pakistan would be destabilizing andundermine security in the region.

Defense News, 13-19 April 1998, p. 24.

Indian army chief Gen. V.P. Malik said on20 April 1998 that the Indian military’s mainconcern should be a strategic deterrent tocounter the nuclear and missile challengesproposed by Pakistan. He said that “strengthand vigilance alone will ensure [India’s] de-fense and national security.”

Indian Express, [Online] http://www.expressindia.com,21 April 1998.

Defence Minister George Fernandes saidduring a TV broadcast on 4 May 1998 thatChina was India’s greatest threat to nationalsecurity. Fernandes said that China’s navy

is expanding fast and it “will be the biggestnavy in this part of the world” and “will begetting into the Indian Ocean fairly soon.”Fernandes said that China “has surroundedIndia with military installations and stock-piled nuclear weapons in Tibet.” Fernandesaccused China of entering a frontier area inthe northeastern state of Arunachal Pradeshmultiple times. Fernandes also said thatChina trained and equipped forces in neigh-boring Myanmar (also known as Burma).China said that the allegations were “un-founded and extremely irresponsible.”Fernandes said that the strategic challengepresented by China is a challenge that canbe met. He said that “India would exerciseits nuclear option if the planned strategic re-view recommended it,” and that if it becameobvious that it was the time to exercise thenuclear option, “then [India] will do it.”Fernandes also said that China was a greaterthreat than Pakistan and “any person who isconcerned about India’s security must agreewith that fact.” Since late 1997, China hasexpanded military airfields in Tibet in prepa-ration for the new Russian-made Sukhoicombat aircraft. China has also created a“massive electronic surveillance establish-ment” in the Coco islands.

Indian Express, [Online] http://www.expressindia.com,4 May 1998. Times of India, [Online] http://www.timesofindia.com, 4 May 1998.

India conducted three underground nucleartests in the Pokhran desert on 11 May. PrimeMinister Vajpayee announced that “the testsconducted today were with a fission device,a low yield device, and a thermonuclear de-vice. The measured yields are in line withexpected values. Measurements have alsoconfirmed that there was no release of ra-dioactivity into the atmosphere.” Vajpayeesaid that the tests were “contained” explo-sions, just like the explosion in May 1974.U.S. officials said they were “stunned” byIndia’s tests and are “huddling to assess whathappened and what [they are] going to beable to do.” Sanctions from the internationalcommunity are expected to follow. Princi-pal Secretary to the Prime Minister BrajeshMishra said that “these tests have establishedthat India has a proven capability for aweaponized nuclear program.” The tests willhelp scientists design “nuclear weapons of

different yields for different applications andfor different delivery systems.” A soundcomputer simulation capability, which mightbe supported by sub-critical experiments ifnecessary, is one project in which these testswill help Indian nuclear scientists. Vajpayeehas said that India needs nuclear weaponsto prevent the “military adventurism” ofneighboring Pakistan. Senior Pakistaninuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan saidin early May 1998 that “Pakistan does nothave nuclear weapons but has the capabilityto [make] them.” He also said that once In-dia exploded a nuclear device, “it’s just amatter of a few weeks, a few days [beforePakistan can] put it together.” SecretaryMishra said that India still supports “effortsto realize the goal of a truly comprehensiveinternational arrangement which would pro-hibit underground nuclear testing of allweapons as well as related experiments de-scribed as sub-critical or hydronuclear.”

Rediff on the Net, [Online] http://www.rediff.com,11 May 1998. ABC News, [Online] http://www.abcnews.com, 11 May 1998. CNN, [Online]http://www.cnn.com, 11 May 1998. The Hindu,[Online] http://www.hinduonline.com, 12 May1998, p. 1. Washington Post, [Online] http://www.washingtonpost.com, 11 May 1998. Times ofIndia, [Online] http://www.timesofindia.com, 12May 1998.

On 13 May, India exploded two additionalnuclear devices at its test range in Pokhran.Official statements out of India indicate thatit has completed its planned series of testswith its latest tests of two sub-kiloton, hy-dro-nuclear devices. These tests, like the pre-vious three on 11 May, were fully containedand no radioactivity was released into theatmosphere. Defense experts said that thelatest tests come as no surprise. Having con-ducted the first series of tests on 11 May,experts said, there would be no reason forIndia to abandon further testing until it hadcollected all necessary data. After the latesttests, the Indian government said that it “wasdeeply concerned about the nuclear environ-ment in India’s neighborhood” and that thesetests “provided reassurance to the Indian citi-zens that national security was paramount,and would be promoted and protected at allcosts.” In an official statement given by theIndian government, the latest tests were saidto have been conducted “to generate addi-



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tional data for improved computer simula-tion of designs and for attaining the capa-bility to carry out sub-critical experiments.”

Rediff on the Net, [Online] http://www.rediff.com,13 May 1998. CNN, [Online] http://cnn.com, 13May 1998.

The Washington-based Institute for Scienceand International Security (ISIS) said thatIndia has about 370 kg of weapons-gradeplutonium, enough for about 74 nuclearweapons.

Reuters, 14 May 1998.

On 13 May 1998, the United States imposedfar-reaching sanctions on India after it con-ducted a series of five nuclear explosions.The sanctions will cut off virtually all U.S.aid to India, halt U.S. loans, cause India’sWorld Bank and IMF loans to be opposed,and restrict the export of supercomputers andother equipment that might have militaryapplications.

Dawn, [Online] http://dawn.com, 14 May 1998.

A senior official from Russia’s atomic en-ergy complex reported that India’s recentnuclear tests could “complicate” Moscow-New Delhi negotiations on the nuclear powerplant Russia was to build in India. The offi-cial also reported that Russia and India wereclose to signing a contract on a project in-volving two light water reactors of theVVER-1000 type, but no agreement was fi-nalized due to financial problems. FormerRussian Atomic Energy Minister ViktorMikhailov said that Russia should begin con-struction on India’s nuclear power plantsdespite India’s nuclear tests.

Jamestown Monitor, 14 May 1998.

Although the fissile material that was usedin India’s nuclear tests has not been officiallyrevealed, there is speculation that for one ofits low-yield devices, India used a man-madevariety of uranium for the first time. Natu-ral occurring uranium comes in two forms:Uranium-238 and Uranium-235. India is be-lieved to have used a third type of uranium,Uranium-233, which does not occur natu-rally and has to be artificially produced bytransmuting uranium with thorium. India hasthe second largest reserves of thorium in theworld and can extract thorium from Kerala’s

beach sands. Since 1988, India has been con-verting thorium into Uranium-233 andstockpiling it. The Kamini reactor atKalpakkam is the only reactor operating inthe world which is fueled by Uranium-233.

Indian Express, [Online] http://www.expressindia.com, 14 May 1998.

Prime Minister Vajpayee announced on 15May that India was now a “nuclear weaponstate” and that it “would not hesitate to usethe bomb if attacked.” Vajpayee said thatIndia now has “the capacity for a big bomb,”as well as the necessary command-and-con-trol system. Although Vajpayee said that In-dia would not use its nuclear weapons toattack other countries, he also vowed “not[to] hesitate in using them for defense.”

AFP, 15 May 1998.

A.P.J. Adbul Kalam, scientific advisor to thedefense minister, said that India has becomea nuclear weapon state. The announcementwas made at a press conference on 18 May.Kalam was accompanied by the Chairmanof the Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. R.Chidambaram, and scientists Dr. K.Santhanam of the Defence Research andDevelopment Organization (DRDO) and Dr.Anil Kakodkar of the Bhabha Atomic Re-search Center (BARC). Santhanam andKakodkar are the co-directors of the Shakti-98, the codename of India’s weaponizationprogram, which culminated with the 11 and13 May tests. Kalam said that the commandand control structure, which has existed forseveral years, has been “consolidated.” Oneof the devices tested on 11 May was a 43kiloton (kt) thermonuclear device with a fis-sion trigger and a secondary fusion stage,not a boosted fission device as was firstspeculated. The fission device tested had ayield of 12 kt and the low-yield device a 0.2kt yield. The sub-kiloton devices explodedon 13 May had a yield from 0.2 kt to 0.6 kt.In an interview, Chidambaram explained indetail the steps leading up to the 11 May test,as well as details about the test itself.Chidambaram said the Atomic Energy Com-mission was cleared by the government totest around 10 April, at which time the airforce and army began preparations. An hour-and-a-half before the tests, an army teamwent to the nearby Khelotai village, 35 km

from the testing site at Pokhran. The testswere originally planned for the morning, butwere put off until the wind direction changedto the northeast. The control room was lo-cated 3.5 km away from the testing site andone trigger detonated all three devices.

The Hindu, [Online] http://www.hinduonline.com,18 May 1998, p. 1. Times of India, [Online] http://www.timesofindia.com, 19 May 1998.

Defence Minister George Fernandes said on18 May that India is “a nuclear weapons stateand the international community should ad-dress [it] on those terms.” He said that ex-isting nuclear treaties, such as the NPT, werediscriminatory, which doesn’t recognizenuclear states after 1967, and promotednuclear hegemony by the five nuclear weap-ons states. Fernandes also said that he neverdescribed China as “India’s greatest enemy,”rather that “in terms of threat perception,China ranked highest.”

Times of India, [Online] http://www.timesofindia.com, 19 May 1998.

Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee toldRussian President Boris Yeltsin, during atelephone conversation, that India would re-frain from conducting further nuclear tests.Vajpayee also informed Yeltsin that Indiawould negotiate a treaty concerning a com-plete nuclear test ban. Yeltsin said that Rus-sia and India will continue to maintain “along-standing, close-knit and friendly rela-tion” and that he (Yeltsin) would visit Indialater in 1998.

RIA-Novosti, Issue 023, [Online] http://www.ria-novosti.com, 22 May 1998.

U.S. officials acknowledged that the UnitedStates’ failure to anticipate India’s nucleartests was a group effort that includes seniorpolicymakers, diplomats, and intelligenceofficials. However, some U.S. officials be-lieve that spy satellite photographs that wereshown to India in 1995 by Frank Wisner,Jr., then U.S. ambassador to India, revealedhow the United States had spied on its testsite. Officials said these photographs enabledthe Indians to conceal their preparations, forexample, “by burying the cables and wiresrunning into the shaft where they conductedthe tests.”

New York Times, 25 May 1998, p. 3.

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Peter Zimmerman, a U.S. nuclear physicistand arms control expert, reported that someof India’s nuclear tests might be only “pressrelease tests.” Zimmerman said “there wasan inconsistency between Indian claims andwhat scientists had detected outside.” India’sfirst round of tests was conducted on 11May; the Indians claimed that they were ableto explode a hydrogen bomb that only pro-duced a yield of 43 kt. If the Indian claimswere correct, Zimmerman said, this wouldbe a strong indicator that the device is smallenough to mount on a ballistic missile.India’s second round of tests conducted on13 May is still a “puzzle” to Zimmerman.Indian scientists said that the tests were “lowyield,” which allowed them to acquireenough data to perform computer simula-tions of nuclear explosions. Zimmerman saidthat the tests must have been “very low yield,indeed” because the seismic record indicatedthat no tests were conducted that day.Zimmerman also said, “it is conceivable thatthe tests occurred only as a press release andnot in the field.” India reported that its low-yield tests had been conducted in a sanddune. Zimmerman said that a sand dune isporous and would not retain the radioactivegases produced in the explosion. If India didconduct its test in a sand dune, Zimmermansaid that India thwarted its responsibility notto vent radioactive debris into the atmo-sphere.

Dawn, [Online] http://www.dawn.com, 26 May1998.

Defence Minister George Fernandes saidthat India’s decision to implement a unilat-eral moratorium on nuclear tests will notaffect the weaponization process. Fernandesalso said, “without weaponization this wholequestion of being a nuclear weapons statedoes not make any sense.” In addition,Fernandes said that nuclear weaponizationis inevitable.

Indian Express, [Online] http://www.expressindia.com,26 May 1998.

On 26 May, the Clinton administration per-suaded the World Bank to “indefinitely de-lay” a $865 million loan to India. Japan,which is the second largest contributor tothe World Bank, also sought a delay. How-ever, unidentified officials said that most Eu-

ropean nations, including Britain, opposedeconomic sanctions and said sanctionswould not deter India from turning itsnuclear capability into weapons. The UnitedStates has also “cut off bilateral aid to India,including trade credits, private U.S. bankloans to the Indian government, and loanguarantees to U.S. companies doing busi-ness there.”

David E. Sanger, New York Times, [Online] http://www.nytimes.com, 27 May 1998.

Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee sub-mitted to India’s Parliament a policy paperthat would revise India’s developing nucleardoctrine. Vajpayee stated that India wouldnot initiate a nuclear preemptive strikeagainst Pakistan and instead would discussa “no-first-use” bilateral agreement. MohanGuruswamy, a national security advisor toVajpayee’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP),said “the latest offer was specifically in-tended to allay Pakistani insecurity and re-build bilateral confidence that was shatteredby the tests.”

Washington Post, 28 May 1998.

The G-8 states, a group of the most economi-cally developed countries, agreed on 12 Juneto block new international loans to India andPakistan because of the two countries’nuclear tests. Foreign ministers of the G-8said that they would be “seeking a morato-rium on loans, except those needed for hu-manitarian purposes.” In addition, the G-8“demanded” that both countries ceasenuclear testing and sign the ComprehensiveTest Ban Treaty. The ministers also said thatthe two countries should conduct talks on“all issues which divide them, includingKashmir.”

BT Online, [Online] http://www.asia1.com, 13 June1998.

Russian Atomic Energy Minister YevgeniAdamov and Indian Atomic Energy Com-mission Chairman R. Chidambaram signedan agreement on 21 June that would pro-vide India with two nuclear power reactors.Under the $2.6 billion agreement, Russiawill build two VVER-1000 light water re-actors at Koodankulam. The Koodankulampower plants will be placed under Interna-tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safe-

guards. However, the safeguards will be “fa-cility specific” rather than “full-scope,”meaning the safeguards will not coverIndia’s entire nuclear program. The U.S.administration opposed the project and saidthat Russia is violating its international com-mitment to insist on fullscope safeguards onits nuclear exports to non-nuclear weaponstates. Russia said that the deal did not ap-ply to nuclear agreements negotiated priorto 1992. Negotiations over the nuclear powerplants began in 1979 and were finalized inNovember 1988 by then Prime MinisterRajiv Gandhi and Soviet leader MikhailGorbachev.

Indian Express, [Online] http://www.expressindia.com,21 June 1998.

MissileIndia recently completed a successful testof a three-ton cryogenic rocket engine. Thistest comes after the test of a one-ton cryo-genic engine completed in early 1997. Thetest was conducted at the Liquid PropulsionSystem Center of the Indian Space ResearchOrganization (ISRO). The goal of India’sspace program is to develop an indigenousspace launch capability. The program is di-vided into four stages, which are expectedto result in the production of a giant Geosta-tionary Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) ca-pable of launching a 2,500 kg satellite. Thecryogenic engine burns liquid oxygen andliquid hydrogen and will be used for theGSLV. The cryogenic engine is currently themost efficient rocket engine available andproduces the highest thrust per kilogram ofpropellant of any engine. Constrained by therestrictions of the Missile Technology Con-trol Regime (MTCR), India has had to buildits own cryogenic engine after being deniedRussian technological assistance.

All India Radio General Overseas Service (Delhi),7 March 1998; in FBIS-NES-98-066, 7 March 1998.

Defence Minister George Fernandes saidthat India was not worried aboutPakistan’s testing of the medium-rangeGhauri ballistic missile. Fernandes saidthat “the [Indian] Prithvi [short-range]missile is there; we have it in adequatenumbers. We are capable of taking careof our threat perceptions vis-à-vis Paki-stan.” Fernandes also said that India ruled



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out further testing of the Agni [interme-diate-range] missile and “that it has un-dergone all the tests it needed to.”

Times Of India, [Online] http://www.timesofindia.com,10 April 1998.

Secretary of the All India Congress Com-mittee (AICC), retired Major Sudhir Sawant,said if India wants to become a crediblenuclear power, it still needs to develop a sec-ond-strike capability and an inter-continen-tal ballistic missile system. Sawant reportedthat the second-strike capability would onlybe possible through a submarine-launchedsystem. Sawant also reported that India didnot have this capability because the Sagarika,India’s submarine-launched missile system,is still in the developmental stage.


V.K. Saraswat, director of Indian air defense,reported that India could destroy any pos-sible threat posed by Pakistan. He said thatIndia’s missiles could easily reach Karachiand other strategically important places lo-cated on Pakistan’s coast. Saraswat also re-ported that India would not further developinter-continental missiles. However, differ-ent models of existing missiles would bedeveloped, “enhancing their capacity up to5,000 km.”

Times Of India, [Online] http://www.timesofindia.com,22 April 1998.

Senior Clinton administration officials re-ported that Russia is aiding India in its de-velopment of a sea-launched ballistic missilenamed Sagarika. Officials also reported thatthe Sagarika has a range of 200 miles, is ca-pable of carrying a nuclear warhead, and willbe launched from a submerged submarine.In the U.S. State Department, the Pentagon,and the Central Intelligence Agency, offi-cials are divided about whether Russia’s as-sistance violates the MTCR. If Russiaviolated the MTCR, the United States couldplace sanctions on both India and Russia. Asenior Defense Department official said“even if Russian help did not violate the re-gime, the cooperation has still raised con-cerns that India is close to masteringtechnology that would significantly improve

its arsenal of missiles.”New York Times, [Online] http://www.nyt.com, 27April 1998.

On 28 April, Russia denied allegations thatit was assisting India in building a sea-launched ballistic missile capable of carry-ing a nuclear warhead. A Russian ForeignMinistry spokesman said “there has been nocooperation between Russia and India in cre-ating missile systems.” Yevgeny Anayev,director-general of Russia’s state-ownedarms exporting company Rosvoorouzhenie,said that his company “is involved in allprojects of military-technical co-operationwith India.” Anayev said that India’s mis-sile program is closed to Russia, and that hehas never come across any information ofassistance. He said further that it is Russia’spolicy not to supply “offensive weaponscapable of destabilizing the regional balancein the Indian subcontinent.”


India’s Defence Research and DevelopmentOrganization (DRDO) sources said on 3 Maythat “defense scientists have been given thegreen signal” to work on the second phaseof the Agni intermediate-range ballistic mis-sile. The present range of the Agni is 1,500km, and the next phase will “modify the de-sign to increase its range.” DRDO officialssaid that the technology does not need to betested, since the desired performance capa-bilities of the Agni have been establishedduring the three test flights already con-ducted. DRDO scientists said that the nextversion of the Agni would have a “muchhigher range,” but refused to give any moredetails. Indian Defence Ministry officialsreported that despite pressure from theUnited States, India’s intermediate-rangeballistic missile (IRBM) projects were never“capped completely.” An unnamed officialalso reported that “capping the missile pro-gram at this stage means creating a consid-erable technological gap, and India cannotafford to do that keeping in mind its war his-tory.” In addition, sources said that India isin the process of increasing the range of theAgni intermediate-range ballistic missilefrom 1,500 km to 2,500 km.

Indian Express, [Online] http://www.expressindia.com,

4 May 1998. The Hindu, [Online] http://www.hinduonline, 11 May 1998.

During the second phase of “strategic dia-logue” between the United States and India,Foreign Secretary K. Raghunath met withU.S. National Security Advisor SandyBerger, Assistant Secretary of State StrobeTalbott, Under Secretary for Political AffairsThomas Pickering, director of the ArmsControl and Disarmament Agency JohnHolum, and other scholars and specialists.Among other things, they discussed India’sconcerns over Chinese assistance in nuclearand missile technology to Pakistan.

Times of India, [Online] http://www.timesofindia.com,5 May 1998.

An Indian Defense Ministry spokesman saidthat the multi-purpose short-range missileTrishul was test-fired by the Indian army totest its surface-to-surface capability. TheTrishul has a range of 50 km and cannotcarry nuclear weapons. It was launched fromthe Chandipur firing range on 11 May 1998.

Inquisit, [Online] http://www.inquisit.com, 11 May1998.

Abdul Kalam, chief of DRDO, said that India isattempting to develop a long-range missile “thatcan be used as many as 100 times and is capableof carrying a nuclear warhead.” Kalam also saidthat the reusable missile is a compilation of tech-nologies from aircraft, cruise missiles, and re-motely piloted vehicles. Kalam further added thatthe “dream missile” is in the “conceptual stage,”and that DRDO will make a proposal to the In-dian Defence Ministry for funding within the nextthree to five years. Kalam described characteris-tics of the missile, which include hypersonic speedand the ability to go undetected by radar due tothe composite material it would be made of.Kalam also said the missile will “use a referen-tial guidance system (RGS) to hit the target andreturn to base.” Kalam, however, did not com-ment on how the RGS works. The missile willalso use an air-breathing propulsion system calledramjet and scramjet engines “in which air suckedin during flight will be mixed with hydrogen andburned to produce a thrust pushing the missile toseven times the speed of sound (5,000 km/h).”Kalam reported that the ramjet engine is beingused in India’s Akash surface-to-air missile and

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the scramjet engine was recently ignited at a de-fense laboratory in Hyderabad.


Representatives from the Russian StrategicRocket Force’s main headquarters said thatit would take India several years toweaponize its nuclear arsenal. Unidentifiedsources in the Indian Defense Ministry re-ported that India has only five “operational-tactical” Prithvi missiles. The Prithvi is asurface-to-surface missile that has a rangeof 250 km.

RIA-Novosti, [Online] http://www.ria-novosti.com,15 May 1998.

Trade sources reported that the U.S. Com-merce Department gave a U.S. company,Viewlogic Systems Inc., authorization toexport design software to Bharat Dynamic,an Indian company “notorious for rocket andmissile production.” This transaction oc-curred the same day that U.S. President BillClinton imposed sanctions on India for con-ducting two additional nuclear tests. TheWisconsin Project’s Risk Report identifiedBharat Dynamics as the leading manufac-turer for India’s Defence Research and De-velopment Organization and the maker ofIndia’s Prithvi short-range ballistic missile.A U.S. commerce official reported thatBharat Dynamics does not appear on a “U.S.entity list of proliferators,” therefore thetransaction was allowed.


Indian defense experts said that India hasthe ability to arm its missiles with nuclearwarheads. Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, a spokes-man for India’s Institute of Defense Studiesand Analyses, said “Indian missiles havenow become the ultimate weapons of deter-rence.” Indian officials reported that the dataobtained from the nuclear tests provided In-dia with the technology to design thermo-nuclear warheads for India’s Agni andPrithvi missiles. Indian defense planners saidthat without a nuclear warhead the Agni had“limited strategic importance, but with athermonuclear warhead it gave India cred-ible deterrence against China.”


A high-level Indian defense delegation ledby Defence Secretary Ajit Kumar met withRussian counterparts on 20 June in Moscowto discuss military-technical cooperation.During the talks, Russia agreed to sell Indiasix SA-12 Giant anti-tactical ballistic mis-sile (ATBM) systems. The deal is being car-ried out under the existing long-termIndo-Russian defense cooperation program.

Pakistan Link, [Online] http://www.pakitstanlink.com,20 June 1998.

INDONESIA

NuclearIndonesia’s economic crisis has forced it toshelve plans to purchase floating pressurizedheavy water reactors (PHWR) from Russia’sMinistry of Atomic Energy (Minatom).Minatom had proposed to build barge-borne35 megawatt electric (MWe) KLT-40C re-actors to enable Indonesia to supply elec-tricity to islands in its outlying easternarchipelago. The reactors, originally de-signed as propulsion units for the SovietNavy by the OKBM engineering bureau,would be contained in ships and belong toMinatom. Under the proposal, the spent fuelwould be repatriated to Russia and the shipscontaining the reactors would also return toRussia for refueling. Western and Interna-tional Monetary Fund officials believe, how-ever, that the project is unlikely to succeedbecause of its poor economics. Indonesia ismore likely to tap natural gas fields in itsterritorial waters and international watersaround Thailand and Malaysia to meet itsenergy needs.

Nucleonics Week, 9 April 1998, p. 5.

JAPAN

NuclearJapan and Russia are exploring the prospectsof joint cooperation in the peaceful use ofatomic energy. Proposals under consider-ation include the use of fissile material fromRussia’s dismantled nuclear warheads andthe construction of nuclear power reactorsincorporating the latest technology.

Vladimir Andrianov, RIA-Novosti, [Online] http://www.ria-novosti.com/, 10 March 1998.

Japan’s Power Reactor and Nuclear FuelDevelopment Corp. (PNC) will be restruc-

tured due to accidents and attempted cover-ups at its nuclear facilities. The reorganiza-tion is expected to take place around 1October 1998. PNC is owned by the gov-ernment and reports to the Science and Tech-nology Agency (STA). Part of thereorganization will include the shuttingdown of the Fugen ATR reactor in March2003. The 100 MW reactor at Joyo will con-tinue to operate once modification and in-spection have been completed. The lightwater reactor (LWR) fuel processing plantat Tokai is expected to continue operationuntil March 1999. It was shut down after afire in the bitumen plant in March 1997. Theuranium enrichment plant at Ningyo Togewill be restarted and run for an additionalthree years. It will use reprocessed uraniumfrom PNC’s Tokai plant. The new organi-zation will likely build a second under-ground laboratory at the PNC GeoscienceCenter at Tono in addition to the one thatwill be built to study conditions in a rockformation suitable for a hot light-water(HLW) repository. Under the reorganizationplan, all of the PNC’s uranium explorationprojects will be sold off.

Nuclear Engineering International, May 1998, p.19.

Japanese police raided Ryokosha Co. forexporting restricted “high-precision equip-ment that could be used in the manufactureof nuclear weapons,” to China. The firm ad-mitted the machines exported were able tomeasure microns in the production ofnuclear weapons. The firm sold 18 precisionmachines to China in December 1996 witha fake export request indicating that the ship-ment was destined for South Korea.

AFP; in Hong Kong Standard, [Online] http://www.hkstandard.com, 28 May 1998.

MissileThe U.S. defense department believes thatNorth Korea has developed and deployedat least one Nodong medium-range bal-listic missile. The missile has an estimatedrange of 1,000 km and the potential toreach most of Japan within 10 minutes.The United States believes that theNodong’s accuracy is low. Defense offi-cials in Tokyo have stated, however, thatthey do not have enough evidence to agree



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with the U.S. Department of Defense. TheUnited States has proposed that Japan up-grade its Theater Missile Defense systemfrom the PAC-2 Patriot missiles to a largersystem capable of responding to a pos-sible Nodong threat.

Akinori Uchida, Daily Yomiuri, [Online] http://www.yomiuri.co.jp, 11 April 1998.

KAZAKHSTAN

NuclearEleven electric utility companies, includingthe Japan Atomic Power Co. (JAPCI), willundertake joint research in commercializinga fast breeder reactor (FBR) in Kazakhstan.The three-year project will begin in 1998.Since Kazakhstan is one of the few coun-tries taking the FBR route, Japan has decidedto establish a cooperative relationship be-tween the two countries to share their re-searchers and facilities. Japan is expected tospend approximately ¥500 million to sendits researchers to Kazakhstan. Although Ja-pan has made some headway in FBR tech-nology, it hopes to collaborate in the areasof safety and economy of the reactor coretechnology by jointly investigating fuelchanges during an accident. Japan’s plansto commercialize an FBR by the year 2030have been setback because of a sodium leakin the Monju prototype reactor.

Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun; in FBIS-EAS-98-092, 2April 1998.

Foreign Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayevhas denied allegations published in theJerusalem Post on 9 April 1998 and 10 April1998 that Kazakhstan may have transferredfour nuclear warheads to Iran. According tothe Jerusalem Post, classified Iranian gov-ernment documents indicate that in 1991,Iran received several nuclear warheads froma former Soviet republic, presumably Kaza-khstan. The warheads were reportedly ser-viced by Russian nuclear experts. ForeignMinister Tokayev claimed that “Kazakh-Ira-nian cooperation is economic by nature” andquestioned the basis for the recent allega-tions.

Interfax (Almaty), 15 April 1998.

At an 18 March 1998 news conference inAlmaty, Timur Zhantikin, director of theKazakhstani Agency for Atomic Energy,

said that the decision to build the South Ka-zakhstan Nuclear Power Plant has been fi-nalized. All documents concerning itsfeasibility have been submitted to the gov-ernment for final approval. The plant willhouse six VVER-640 reactors, planned tobe completed by 2030.

Revmira Voshchenko, RIA-Novosti HotLine, Rus-sian Dailies, Issue 066, 18 March 1998.

KOREAN PENINSULA ENERGY

DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION

(KEDO)ABB-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE)has withdrawn an application to the U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) toexport two nuclear reactors to North Korea.The application was withdrawn after criticsdemanded a public hearing on the issue.NRC officials said that reactor sales to NorthKorea can only be approved if the two coun-tries have a nuclear cooperation agreement.North Korea’s nuclear materials also needto be fully accounted for before a nuclearcooperation agreement can be reached. Butunder the terms of the 1994 U.S.-North Ko-rea Agreed Framework, a full inspection re-gime cannot be instituted before key reactorcomponents have been delivered to NorthKorea. The IAEA is also concerned that somuch time has elapsed since North Koreadischarged the graphite reactor fuel that thereactor’s operating history cannot be recon-structed through normal means (by measur-ing isotopic ratios). According to agovernment affairs expert, however, NRCapprovals can be bypassed and exports com-menced by executive authorization underSection 126(b) of the U.S. Atomic EnergyAct. North Korea has expressed unhappinessover continued U.S. economic sanctions andthe slow pace of the light water reactorproject. North Korea’s Foreign Ministry is-sued a statement saying, “nobody can pre-dict what will happen unless the UnitedStates seeks new practical measures andtakes decisive action to implement its obli-gations.”

Fresh Fuel, 2 March 1998, pp. 1-2. AP, 10 March1998.

Western intelligence agencies are concernedthat North Korea may still have a clandes-

tine nuclear weapons program. AlthoughIAEA Director General Mohamad ElBaradei is confident that “a freeze is inplace,” Western officials and experts are notso sure. In the past, some U.S. governmentintelligence estimates about North Korea’snuclear weapons program have been provenwrong. The U.S. CIA “crucially underesti-mated” the capability of a refueling machineat the Yongbyon graphite reactor complexand hence “undershot” the amount of weap-ons-grade plutonium that could have been“unloaded” prior to 1994. Also, analysts atLawrence Livermore National Laboratorymisidentified a textile plant in North Koreaas a spent-fuel reprocessing facility. Intelli-gence estimates now suggest that North Ko-rea may have converted part of theplutonium separated at the reprocessing hotcells at Yongbyon into plutonium metal be-fore the Agreed Framework was signed withthe United States. North Korea may havehidden as much as eight to 10 kg of weap-ons-grade plutonium, enough for a singlenuclear weapon. U.S. intelligence also be-lieves that, before signing the Agreed Frame-work, North Korea tried to conductdiagnostic and other tests of equipment usedin a nuclear device. North Korea is believedto have conducted several high-explosivetests at its Yongbyon complex. Unlike reac-tor operations and reprocessing activities thatleave behind signatures, weaponization ac-tivities do not. Furthermore, given NorthKorea’s labyrinth of underground tunnelsand military complexes, doubts have beenexpressed about the IAEA’s ability to de-tect a clandestine nuclear weapons program.

Mark Hibbs and Margaret L. Ryan, NucleonicsWeek, 5 March 1998, p.12-13.

KEDO is in financial trouble, with debts fromthree years of operation totalling $47 million.The debts mainly stem from loans contractedto meet the cost of supplying 500,000 tons ofheavy oil to North Korea annually. The UnitedStates initially estimated the cost of supply-ing oil to North Korea at about $45 millionannually. The average annual cost, however,has exceeded $60 million. The U.S. Congressallocated $21 million for the operation in 1997.Although the European Union has agreed tocontribute $20 million annually, the sum isnot sufficient to pay off KEDO’s accumu-

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lated debt. The U.S. Congress has approved$10 million in Fiscal Year 1998 for settlingthe debt. But no other country has contrib-uted additional money to pay KEDO’s debt.Meanwhile, accumulating interest chargesare worsening KEDO’s financial position.

Choson Ilbo, 8 March 1998; in FBIS-EAS-98-068,9 March 1998.

North Korea has refused to provide the op-erating records from its graphite reactor andnuclear fuel reprocessing operations to theIAEA. Access to these records is central toverifying North Korea’s nuclear inventorystatement under the safeguard agreementreached with the IAEA in 1992. North Ko-rea contends that it is under no obligation torelease the records. Its sole responsibilityunder the agreement is to assure the IAEAthat its nuclear activities have been frozen.According to Kim Yong Gil, a diplomat atthe North Korean mission to the United Na-tions in New York, the United States mustnow fulfill its part of the bargain and take“charge of the project” to build the two light-water reactors. Western officials believe,however, that the inability of the IAEA toverify North Korea’s nuclear inventory con-stitutes the principal stumbling block in thepath of a nuclear cooperation agreement be-tween the United States and North Korea.In the absence of a nuclear cooperationagreement, U.S. companies such as ABB-CE will not be able to export nuclear reac-tors and equipment as planned by the KEDO.ABB-CE, which filed an export license re-quest with the U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission in December 1997, withdrewit in January 1998. Experts believe thatverification problems could delay the exportof U.S.-origin nuclear reactors and relatedequipment by as many as five years.

Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 12 March 1998, p.13.

In the original 1994 Agreed Framework withNorth Korea, the U.S. government pledgedthat it would bear the entire cost for theheavy oil to be supplied to North Korea.Since then, however, the U.S. governmenthas asked South Korea and Japan to share$20 million of the total cost of the heavyoil. According to a South Korean govern-ment official, both Minister Pak and Senior

Secretary Yim have said that it will be diffi-cult for them to accede to the U.S. request.The official also said that, “the intention ofthe U.S. government to shift onto the SouthKorean side the cost not only for the light-water reactors, but also for the heavy oil, onthe pretext of the U.S. Congress denying thebudget, is inappropriate.”

Seoul Choson Ilbo; in FBIS-EAS-98-099, 9 April1998. Disarmament Diplomacy, May 1998, p. 54.

According to North Korean officials, NorthKorea has suspended the freeze on its nuclearprogram because the United States has fallenbehind on its end of the 1994 Agreed Frame-work. A member of the North Korean gov-ernment told a visiting academic that thegovernment plans to unseal one of thenuclear reactors and that technicians havebeen barred from packing the last of thereactor’s spent fuel rods for shipment out ofthe country. On 13 May 1998, the UnitedStates said that the freeze on North Korea’snuclear program was still intact, but NorthKorea had temporarily suspended cleanupoperations at its nuclear site in late April1998. According to American academicSelig Harrison, he was told by North Korea’sForeign Minster Kim Yong-Nam that theYongbyon nuclear reactor had been unsealedfor maintenance on 19 April 1998. NorthKorea’s Ambassador to China Chu Chang-jun said that his country’s Soviet-era heavywater reactors were for electricity only, notfor military use, plutonium, or for nuclearweapons.

Elisabeth Rosenthal, New York Times, 13 May 1998,p. A1. Justin Jim, Inquisit, [Online] http://www.inquisit.com/, 14 May 1998. Inside China To-day, [Online] http://www.insidechina.com/ 15 May1998. NewsPage, [Online] http://www.newspage.com/, 15 May 1998. Hong KongStandard, [Online] http://www.hkstandard.com/, 15May 1998.

According to U.S. State Department SpokesmanJames Rubin, the IAEA has confirmed that theseals remain in place on the Yongbyon nuclearreactor. Rubin also denied reports that the UnitedStates and KEDO are not meeting their obliga-tions to deliver heavy fuel oil in accordance withthe 1994 Agreed Framework. He stated that theUnited States and KEDO plan to fulfill their ob-ligations. The spokesman for South Korea’s Min-istry of Foreign Affairs and Trade also said, “themaintenance of North Korea’s nuclear freeze was

confirmed through the IAEA.”NAPSNET, [Online] http://www.nautilus.org/, 14May 1998. Korean Overseas Information Service,[Online] http://203.254.53.1/cgi-bin, 15 May 1998.

On 14 May 1998, North Korea’s Ambassador toChina Chu Chang Jun said that pressure wasgrowing in his country to re-open the sealedYongbyon nuclear power reactor. The reactorcan produce plutonium that can be used to buildnuclear weapons. U.S., South Korean, and Japa-nese experts believe, however, that North Korea’sthreats to reopen its nuclear weapons programare not credible, as it would be “too expensiveand technologically complex.”

Kevin Sullivan, Washington Post, [Online] http://www.washingtonpost.com/, 15 May 1998.

According to a report published in the NihonKeizai Shimbun, a confidential study conductedby Japan’s Defense Agency concludes that NorthKorea may have assembled a nuclear bomb. Inthe past, Japan has expressed concern that Paki-stan may have transferred nuclear technology toNorth Korea. Japan’s Defense Agency officials,however, have declined to comment on the re-port.

Sunday Times, [Online] http://www.Sunday-times.co.uk:80/, 4 June 1998.

According to the head of South Korea’s Agencyof National Security, Lee John Chan, contrary tomedia reports, North Korea is not trying to re-sume its nuclear weapons program. Furthermore,the IAEA is being allowed to supervise NorthKorea’s adherence to the 1994 Agreed Frame-work.

F.J. Kergamvala, The Hindu, [Online]http://www.hinduonline.com, 9 June 1998.

On 28 July 1998, negotiators reached a tentativeagreement on “cost-sharing arrangements forsupplying two nuclear reactors to North Korea.”The representatives of KEDO, the consortiumresponsible for building the reactors, did notspecify how the $4.6 billion cost would be di-vided. South Korea, which originally agreed topay 70 percent or $3.2 billion, had asked to pay alesser amount due to the Asian financial crisis.

New York Times, 29 July 1998, p. 5.

NORTH KOREA

MissileOn 13 March 1998, U.S. and North Koreanofficials agreed to resume bilateral missile



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talks. Negotiations were suspended after theUnited States granted asylum to NorthKorea’s ambassador to Egypt Jang Sung Gilin August 1997. No specific date has beenset for the resumption of negotiations.

Kyodo News, [Online] http://www.home.kyodo.co.jp, 14March 1998.

According to Pentagon officials, North Ko-rea has operationalized its intermediate-range Nodong ballistic missile. The Nodongwas flight-tested once in 1993. In Septem-ber 1997, the commander of the U.S. forcesin the Pacific Admiral Joseph Prueher indi-cated that North Korea had begun position-ing equipment for the eventual deploymentof the Nodong. Pentagon sources believe thatNorth Korea’s missile force can be armedwith chemical warheads, but there is uncer-tainty as to whether North Korea can pro-duce biological warheads. North Korea isalso believed to be working on two longer-range missiles, the Taepo-dong-1 and -2.However, no tests have been reported so far.

Bill Gertz, Washington Times, 10 June 1998, p. 9.

On 16 June 1998, North Korea declared thatit would continue to develop, test, and ex-port ballistic missiles. The official KoreanCentral News Agency said, “we will con-tinue developing, testing and deploying mis-siles.” Former U.S. ambassador to SouthKorea Donald Gregg met with officials ofthe North Korean delegation to the UnitedNations, and was told by the North Koreansthat they were dissatisfied with the pace ofoil deliveries from the United States. NorthKorea announced that “with missiles of theUnited States, which is at war with [NorthKorea] technically, aiming at our territory,we find no reason to refrain from develop-ing and deploying missiles to counter them.”It is also believed that North Korea is devel-oping a longer-range missile than theNodong-2 ballistic missile.

Kevin Sullivan, Washington Post, 17 June 1998, p.1.

PAKISTAN

NuclearForeign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan said thatif India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) pur-sues India’s nuclear weapons option, as it

had vowed during campaigning, “Pakistanwould have to reconsider its nuclear policy.”Khan said that while he hoped the BJP wouldnot force Pakistan into an arms race and thatdiplomatic solutions could be found, Paki-stan “would give a befitting and matchingreply to any aggression from the Indianside.” Khan said he would ask the new In-dian government to resume talks betweenthe two countries, planning also to continueto give “diplomatic and moral support to thepeople of Kashmir.” Khan also expressedhope that the United Nations would helpnegotiate peace in Kashmir, saying that the“U.N.’s resolutions should not be selectivelyapplied.” Pakistan’s top nuclear scientist, Dr.Abdul Qadeer Khan, said on 17 March that“Pakistan was capable of responding to anyIndian threat in the nuclear field.” QadeerKhan said that Pakistan is “examining allaspects of the situation” after the rise of theBJP. He expressed no fear of India’s missileprogram, saying that Pakistan’s missilescould reach any part of India.

Dawn, [Online] http://dawn.com, 17 March 1998.Dawn, [Online] http://dawn.com, 18 March 1998.

At a 9 April plenary meeting of the U.N.’sConference on Disarmament, Pakistan’sUnited Nations representative Khalid AzizBanar proposed the establishment of anuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. Hiscountry’s proposal is part of a comprehen-sive approach to resolve the problems in theregion, “including the resolution of disputesand the promotion of security.” Bunar wouldlike the assurances of nuclear weapon andnon-nuclear weapon states alike to be “un-conditional and legally binding.”

Pakistan Link, [Online] http://www.pakistanlink.com, 11April 1998.

Pakistan has successfully commissioned itsfirst indigenously built nuclear reactor inCentral Punjab. This reactor uses heavy wa-ter and will be used primarily for researchpurposes. It can generate electric power aswell as convert Uranium-238 into Pluto-nium-239. Construction of the reactor be-gan in 1985 under the supervision ofPakistan Atomic Energy Commission(PAEC) Chairman Munir Ahmed Khan.Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said that Pa-kistan has now become self-reliant in the

defense sector and no longer needs foreignassistance.

The Nation (Lahore), [Online] http://www.nation.con.pk,13 April 1998.

Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan announced on 14April during a national news broadcast that“he needed only government permission todevelop a nuclear bomb.” When asked ifPakistan would detonate a nuclear explosion,he again answered that he would need onlyto “get permission from the government.”

Dawn, [Online] http://dawn.com, 16 April 1998.Pakistan Link, [Online] http://pakistanlink.com, 16April 1998.

Unnamed private industry sources allege thatPakistan is making a new nuclear testing fa-cility with the help of a U.S. firm calledHolmes and Narver. The facility will becommissioned soon and will be labeled as a“Contained Firing Facility (CFF).” The de-sign of the Pakistani CFF is similar to a fa-cility at Lawrence Livermore NationalLaboratory (LLNL) in California. Construc-tion will be supervised by “scientists of Pa-kistani origin who have worked in theseismic division at LLNL.” The CFF is de-signed to withstand repetitive high explo-sive testing of the non-nuclear componentsof nuclear weapons. At the core is a firingchamber designed in a manner to “mask theblast overpressure and fragmentation effectsfrom detonations of cased explosive chargesup to about 100 kg.” The firing chamber isfitted with various sensors at the diagnosticand optics ports, as well as a gamma-raycamera. The Pakistan Ordnance Factory hasissued the specifications regarding the per-formance of the CFF. The detonations willbe conducted above a steel firing surface 150mm thick, which is embedded in the floor.The creation of such a facility indicates thatPakistan has “gone beyond the rudimentaryair-dropped stage, to be able to plan themanufacture of much more highly developedmunitions.”


Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said on 12May, following India’s underground nucleartest, that the government would take “anystep necessary to protect the national secu-

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rity” of Pakistan. Pakistani PresidentMuhammad Rafiq Tarar said that Pakistanhas the capability to counter India’s threats.Tarar said “the proper reaction will come atsome proper time.” An unnamed senior gov-ernment official said that Pakistan “can as-semble various components lying at differentplaces within seven days and carry out anuclear test.” Other unnamed sources saidthat “Pakistan had made some preparationsfor tests in Chagai Hills and could conceiv-ably conduct a test within a couple ofweeks.”

The Nation (Lahore), [Online] http://www.nation.com.pk, 12 May 1998. Indian Express,[Online] http:/www.expressindia.com, 12 May 1998.

Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan said on17 May that “it’s a matter of when, not if,Pakistan will test.” He said the decision hadalready been made by the cabinet and “it willnow be a political decision of when to test.”The Pakistani newspaper The Jang reportedon 17 May that preparations for a test atChagai have been finished, and Pakistan“can test within three hours.”

CNN, [Online] http://cnn.com, 17 May 1998.

The Clinton administration is discussingwith members of the U.S. Congress their at-tempts to repeal the Pressler Amendment.The Pressler Amendment banned economicand military aid to Pakistan in 1990 becausethe United States suspected Pakistan of de-veloping nuclear weapons. U.S. Congress-man Frank Pallone said a direct outcome ofthe repeals “would be the delivery of 28 F-16 fighter-bombers to Pakistan, which waswithheld eight years ago under the amend-ment.” U.S. National Security AdvisorSandy Berger said “this is a bad policy. Therepeal of the Pressler Amendment and thedelivery of the F-16 fighters would only in-crease tension within the region.”

Rediff On The Net, [Online] http://www.rediff.com,20 May 1998.

Following high-level negotiations inBeijing between the Chinese and the Pa-kistani foreign ministries, Pakistani For-eign Minister Shamshad Ahmedannounced that China would not imposeeconomic sanctions on Pakistan if it de-cided to conduct a nuclear test. Ahmedhoped to obtain a guarantee of nuclear

protection from China, however, no pub-lic promise was made. A senior researcherfrom a Chinese government research in-stitute said, “China will not encourage Pa-kistan to conduct its own nuclear test, andChina is not a country that providesnuclear umbrellas to other countries.”

New York Times, [Online] http://www.nytimes.com, 21May 1998.

U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohensaid that if Pakistan refrained from conduct-ing a nuclear test, it would benefit from cer-tain “incentives.” Cohen did not say whatthe “incentives” were, but said the UnitedStates has presented Pakistan with “a wholeseries of proposals to deter it from explod-ing a nuclear device.” In regard to Pakistan’salready purchased F-16 fighter aircraft,Cohen said that there would not be a “quidpro quo,” but “suggested that this could bepart of an overall comprehensive packagethat would really establish a new relation-ship.”

Dawn, [Online] http://www.dawn.com, 26 May1998.

A Pakistani Foreign Ministry statement saidon 28 May that it had received informationthat India was planning a preemptive attackagainst Pakistan’s nuclear sites. The state-ment also said that India’s High Commis-sioner was told that “any such act wouldwarrant a swift and massive retaliation withunforeseen consequences.” The Commis-sioner was told that an attack on Pakistan’snuclear facilities would be in violation of a1988 agreement between the two countries,which prohibits an attack on each other’snuclear sites. Several Pakistani newspapersreported that Pakistan was ready to deployits Ghauri intermediate-range ballistic mis-sile in order to retaliate against any Indianstrike. Pakistan’s U.N. Ambassador AhmadKamal said that he had informed U.N. Sec-retary General Kofi Annan of the “imminentthreat” of an attack. U.S. governmentspokesman Fred Eckhard said, “Annan hasevery hope that the information will proveto be incorrect.” Unidentified diplomats saidthat U.S. officials believed that Pakistan’sfear was “absurd” and that India was adher-ing to the 1988 agreement with Pakistan.

Reuters, [Online] http://www.dailynews.com, 28May 1998.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif reported on 28May that Pakistan had conducted fivenuclear tests and had “settled the score withIndia.” Sharif also reported that Pakistanwould weaponize its Ghauri intermediate-range ballistic missile with nuclear war-heads. In addition, Sharif criticized theinternational community’s response toIndia’s nuclear tests and said, “Pakistan wasleft with no choice but to detonate its ownnuclear devices.” Finally, while Pakistanischeered in the streets of Islamabad, India’sparliament erupted into shouting as opposi-tion leaders blamed the government for start-ing a nuclear arms race.

New York Times, [Online] http://www.nytimes.com,28 May 1998.

Pakistani scientists reported that radiationwas not released into the atmosphere by thefive nuclear detonations that took place on28 May at a Pakistani nuclear test site. Thescientists did not release any technical de-tails but said, “the collective yield of all fivetests were more than the 45 kt of the fiveIndian blasts conducted 5/11 and 5/13.” TheNews, a local Pakistani newspaper, reportedthat the five nuclear devices were placed inshafts four days before the tests. The shaftswere each 800 to 835 meters deep (2,640 to2,755 feet).

The Nation (Lahore), [Online] http://www.nation.com, 29 May 1998.

The Russian Academy of Sciences’ Geo-physical Service reported on 28 May that afive kt explosion occurred in Pakistan, whichregistered 4.9 on the Richter scale. The ser-vice also reported that the magnitudes ofboth India’s and Pakistan’s blasts wereequal.

Interfax (Moscow), 29 May 1998.

U.S. scientists reported that Pakistan’snuclear tests were detected by seismometersthat track earthquakes and undergroundatomic tests. The preliminary magnitude wasmeasured as 4.8 to 4.9 by two differentgroups, making its force equal to anywherefrom 8,000 to 17,000 tons of high explo-sives. The scientists said that the signal de-tected could have been caused by severalblasts occurring simultaneously or by a



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single detonation. U.S. weapons experts re-ported that “the Pakistani test was most likelycaused by one or more atom bombs, ratherthan a hydrogen one.” Ray Kidder, a formeratom bomb designer at the LLNL in Cali-fornia, said “there’s no question that theyhave a weapon with a militarily importantyield.”

New York Times, [Online] http://www.nytimes.com, 29May 1998.

Pakistani officials said that Pakistan’s recentnuclear tests established their country as oneof the world’s nuclear powers. The officialsalso said that Pakistan would not use itsnuclear weapons unless it was in responseto an attack. Foreign Minister Gohar AyubKhan said that “we have nuclear weapons,we are a nuclear power.” He added that ifIndia attacked, Pakistan would “retaliatewith vengeance.”

Washington Post, [Online] http://www.washingtonpost.com, 30 May 1998.

On 27 May 1998, Pakistan’s Foreign Secre-tary Shamshad Ahmed informed the UnitedStates and the United Nations that Pakistanexpected to be attacked on 28 May by Indianand Israeli warplanes flying from India. ThePakistani warning ignored U.S. statements thatno Israeli aircraft were in India, and has led tospeculation in the U.S. government that therumor of the attack was fabricated by Paki-stan to justify its underground nuclear tests.According to U.S. officials, reports of the an-ticipated attack produced panic among Chi-nese government officials. One U.S.intelligence official said there was a majorconcern that Pakistan would use the antici-pated Indian-Israeli attack as a pretext forlaunching a Ghauri missile, possibly armedwith a nuclear warhead, at India. On 1 June1998, Israeli Prime Minister BenjaminNetanyahu’s media advisor Shay Bazaq saidin an interview that rumors that Israel was in-volved in a plan to attack Pakistan’s nuclearfacilities in the wake of India’s May 1998nuclear tests were “unfounded,” and that Is-rael was in no way involved. On 30 May, theIndian charge d’affaires at the Indian Embassyin Cairo said that allegations of Israeli mili-tary aircraft landing in India in preparation fora joint Indian-Israeli attack on Pakistan’snuclear facilities were baseless, as were ru-

mors of Indian-Israeli nuclear cooperation.Jerusalem Channel 2 Television Network, 1 June1998; in FBIS-TAC-98-152, 1 June 1998. MENA(Cairo), 30 May 1998; in FBIS-NES-98-151, 31 May1998. Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv), 29 May 1998, p. A3; inFBIS-TAC-98-149, 29 May 1998. WashingtonTimes, 1 June 1998, p. 10.

Dr. Samar Mobarik Mand, head ofPakistan’s nuclear test program, said thatPakistan was able to test a thermonucleardevice if the government gave the mandateto do so. Mand also said that it was impor-tant to have a fission test first, before a ther-monuclear test. Since Pakistan conducted asuccessful fission test Mand said, “we cannow proceed towards thermonuclear tech-nology, if required.” Mand reported that theaccumulated yield of the five tests conductedon 28 May was 40 to 45 kt. Mand said thatthe test conducted on 30 May was only onedevice and its yield was 15 to 18 kt. He alsosaid that the second test was of a miniatur-ized device that could be mounted on mis-siles.

The Nation (Lahore), [Online] http://www.nation.com, 1 June 1998.

A Pakistani senior government official as-sured all the major powers on 5 June thatPakistan would not transfer its nuclear tech-nology to other countries. The official saidthat “Pakistan detonated nuclear devicesonly for its defense and it has no intentionto transfer the technology to others.” In June1998, Israel’s ambassadors to the UnitedStates and the United Nations received as-surances from their Pakistani counterpartsthat Pakistan would not transfer nuclear tech-nology or materials to Iran or to other MiddleEastern countries. Israeli officials had fearedthat Iranian Foreign Minister KamalHarrazi’s visit to Pakistan shortly after itsMay 1998 nuclear weapons tests was a signthat Pakistan was preparing to sell nucleartechnology to Iran.

Israel Wire, [Online] http://www.israelwire.com, 11June 1998. Pakistan Link, [Online] http://www.pakistanlink.com, 5 June 1998.

U.S. Under Secretary of State StuartEizenstat told a congressional hearing on 3June that the Clinton administration did notwant the sanctions imposed on Pakistan tobe as strict as the ones imposed on India.Eizenstat said that the administration had not

reached a decision on whether “the GlennAmendment required imposition of identi-cal sanctions against both countries or gavethe President discretion to differentiate.”Eizenstat said the administration wanted toimpose sanctions but did not want to pushIndia and Pakistan into “the behavior ofrogue regimes.”

Dawn, [Online] http://www.dawn.com, 5 June 1998.

U.S. intelligence officials were closely ob-serving Pakistan’s economy, fearing thateconomic sanctions might force the Paki-stani government to sell its nuclear technol-ogy. A congressional aid said that “while itmight not be Pakistani policy to proliferate,there might be an individual willing to doso.” David Albright of the U.S.-based Insti-tute for Science and International Securitysaid that Pakistan had enough enriched ura-nium for 16 to 20 weapons. However, re-gional experts said that Pakistan would notbe in a position to sell its fissile material,having depleted a large quantity of its stock-pile in its recent tests.

Hong Kong Standard, [Online] http://www.hkstandard.com, 20 June 1998.

Paul Beaver, a spokesman for Jane’s Infor-mation Group, reported that five senior Pa-kistani nuclear scientists had defected.Beaver said that Pakistan’s Inter ServicesIntelligence Unit (ISI) tried to stop the sci-entists from fleeing but they escaped to vari-ous countries including the United Kingdom,France and Germany. Beaver also said thatthe scientists defected to the West “after adisagreement over the first use of nuclearweapons.” The Pakistan government imme-diately dismissed the reports. The Pakistaniforeign office said that “the reports werewithout foundation.” Pakistan’s Foreign Of-fice also denied media reports that accusedPakistan of planning a pre-emptive strikeagainst India before it conducted its nucleartests.

Indian Express, [Online] http://www.expressindia.com,30 June 1998.

MissileWestern diplomats and Pakistani intelligencesources announced that Pakistan is prepar-ing to test-launch its new Ghauri surface-to-surface ballistic missile at the Gwadar Bay

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base on the coast of the Arabian Sea. Intelli-gence sources said that Pakistan’s originaltest launch had been cancelled due to diplo-matic pressure from the United States andthe United Kingdom. However, an unnamedsource said, “there is no question of Paki-stan backing down on the missile question.The test will go ahead whatever the cost forrelations with the West.”

Sunday Times, [Online] http://www.sundaytimes.com,22 March 1998.

A Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesmansaid Pakistan successfully test-launched theGhauri medium-range surface-to-surfacemissile on 6 April. The Ghauri, with a rangeof 1,500 km and a payload of 700 kg, is ca-pable of carrying a nuclear warhead. A Pa-kistani Foreign Office spokesman reportedthat the missile had hit its “target at a rangeof 1,100 km without any error.” The For-eign Ministry also reported that “this test rep-resents a step forward in Pakistan’sindigenous missile capability through thededication and commitment of our scientistsand engineers.” It would appear that “Paki-stan has revived symbolically the regionalrivalry between Hindu and Muslim,” be-cause the missile was named after an Af-ghan Muslim king who defeated a Hinduruler in the 12th century. Pakistan said thatdevelopment of the Ghauri was an entirelyindigenous effort. Prime Minister NawazSharif said, “our scientists, by their highsense of commitment and skill, have shownthat Pakistan has mastered complex tech-nologies.

Times Of India, [Online] http://www.timesofindia.com,7 April 1998. Amit Baruah, The Hindu, [Online] http://www.hinduonline.com, 7 April 1998. The Times,[Online] http://www.sunday-times.co.uk, 7 April 1998.

China has denied providing any technicalassistance to Pakistan in developing theGhauri medium-range ballistic missile. Chi-nese Foreign Ministry spokesman ZhuBangzao said, that “it would be unreason-able for the United States to investigate” thealleged development link.

Inquisit, [Online] http://www.inquisit.com, 7 April1998.

India said that Pakistan’s testing of theGhauri, a new medium-range ballistic mis-sile, was part of a “clandestinely” acquired

missile program. India’s Defence MinisterGeorge Fernandes claimed that China aidedPakistan with missile technology. Defenseanalyst K. Subrahmanyam agreed withFernandes and stated that the Ghauri mis-sile could either be Chinese or North Ko-rean in origin. China’s Foreign Ministryspokesman denied any technological role inPakistan’s test of the Ghauri. In addition, aspokesman for Pakistan’s Foreign Officesaid that China’s M-11 had “no relevance”to the Ghauri and that the Pakistanis devel-oped the Ghauri indigenously.

The News Pakistan, [Online] http://www.jang-group.com, 8 April 1998. The Nation (Lahore), 8April 1998.

U.S. government officials reported thatPakistan’s new Ghauri medium-range bal-listic missile was based on technologysmuggled from North Korea. U.S. officialsalso reported that the liquid-fueled missileis a version of North Korea’s Nodong. MalikZahoor Ahmed, a spokesman at Pakistan’sembassy, denied allegations that North Ko-rea had aided Pakistan in the Ghauri’s de-velopment and said it was built withindigenous technology.

New York Times, 11 April 1998.

Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan said on 15 April thatPakistan is ready to launch its indigenoussatellite “within no time” upon the orders ofPrime Minister Nawaz Sharif. He said thatPakistan was equipped with all the neces-sary technology to launch its own satelliteinto space. Khan told reporters that theGhauri was a completely indigenous ballis-tic missile completed at the Kahuta ResearchLaboratories, which is headed by Khan andprimarily known for its nuclear research.

Indolink, [Online] http://www.indolink.com, 17April 1998. Pakistan Link, [Online] http://www.pakistanlink.com, 17 April 1998.

Analysts believe that North Korea may bePakistan’s silent partner in the developmentof intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Pa-kistan tested its Ghauri intermediate-rangeballistic missile (1,500 km range) on 6 April.North Korean and Pakistani cooperation inthe development of ballistic missiles is sup-posed to have begun during the Iran-Iraq warwhen North Korea apparently supplied 160Scud Mod B missiles (known as Hwasong-

5 in North Korea) to Iran. North Korean andPakistani missile engineers and expertsworked together on Iran’s ballistic missileprogram. North Korea sold drilling and mill-ing equipment to Pakistan. The two coun-tries also launched a clandestine program toprocure nuclear and missile technologiesfrom Germany. Pakistan is also suspectedof having shared nuclear technology withNorth Korea. Cooperation was expanded in1988 after Benazir Bhutto became primeminister of Pakistan. Benazir Bhutto is cred-ited with the acceleration of missile coop-eration with both China and North Korea.During her tenure as prime minister, Paki-stani officials are alleged to have visitedNorth Korea’s Sanum-dong missile devel-opment center to appraise the Nodong bal-listic missile. In July 1992, North Korea’sDeputy Foreign Minister Kim Yong-namvisited Pakistan. High on the agenda was thesale of the Scud Mod C and the Nodongballistic missiles to Pakistan. From 29-30May 1993, Pakistani and Iranian missile spe-cialists witnessed the firing of a Nodong andthree Scud Mod B/C missiles in North Ko-rea. Benazir Bhutto’s subsequent visit inDecember 1993 to Pyongyang probably ledto the inception of the Ghauri. North Koreasupplied Pakistan with major componentsincluding fuel tanks and rocket engines forthe Ghauri. According to intelligencesources, Chinese assistance has been indi-rect and mainly confined to areas of softengineering such as guidance. It is also likelythat North Korea served as a conduit forChinese ballistic missile component trans-fers to Pakistan. On 24 April 1998, the U.S.State Department determined that missile-related transfers between North Korea’sChanggwang Sinyong Corporation andPakistan’s Khan Research Laboratories hadled to the development of the Ghauri andimposed sanctions on the two organizations.

Jane’s Defence Weekly, 20 May 1998, pp. 16-17.

SOUTH KOREA

NuclearSouth Korea has decided to base its futurenuclear power expansion plans on ABB-CE’s licensed pressurized water reactors(PWR) instead of the pressurized heavywater reactors (PHWR) supplied by the



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Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL).This is evident from the data on nuclear fuelrequirements compiled by Korea ElectricPower Co. (KEPCO). According toKEPCO’s projections, fuel requirements forAECL’s PHWRs will peak at 400 metric tonsof uranium in 2000 and then drop to 300 tonsby 2015. In contrast, the demand for enricheduranium for the PWRs is expected to doubleby 2010 and increase another 20 percent by2015. The decision to build more PWRs re-flects the need to build more cost-efficientenergy production units because of difficul-ties expected in the further licensing of reac-tor sites. The 1,000 MW and 1,300 MW PWRsare larger than the 700 MW PHWRs. As oneSouth Korean official put it, “we want to makesure that we get as many megawatts per squaremeter installed at these sites as possible.”South Korea is also trying to export its PWRsabroad to help alleviate its foreign exchangecrisis. In contrast to ABB-CE, which has li-censed its reactor design technology to SouthKorea, AECL has only contracted the con-struction of PHWRs to local equipment mak-ers. According to a western diplomatic official,however, Canada could persuade South Ko-rea to purchase more PHWRs under a pack-age deal. The deal would involve acomprehensive licensing agreement for thePHWRs, pricing the PHWRs below thePWRs, and offering non-nuclear goods soughtby South Korea. The U.S. State Departmentmay also promote AECL’s reactors, as itwould like South Korean cooperation in theU.S. Department of Energy’s Dupic fuel-cycle. Dupic has been proposed as an alterna-tive to the reprocessing of spent fuel and issupported by the United States in principle.

Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 23 April 1998, pp.16-17.

MissileAfter a six-day visit to South Korea, Russia’sFirst Deputy Defense Minister and State Sec-retary Nikolay Mikhaylov declared that therewould be an expansion in “military relationsbetween the ministries of defense and generalstaffs” of South Korea and Russia. Militarycooperation between Russia and South Ko-rea did not begin until 1994. It was partlyforced by circumstances as Moscow used armsdeliveries to settle the former Soviet Union’sdebt with Seoul. However, Russia is now try-

ing to carve out a niche for itself in the lucra-tive South Korean arms market. South Koreahas expressed interest in Sukhoi and MiGcombat aircraft, the S-300 air-defense system,anti-ship cruise missiles, and surveillance sat-ellites.

Sergey Golotyuk and Yuriy Golotyuk, RusskiyTelegraf, 3 June 1998.

TAIWAN

NuclearTaiwan’s Institute of Nuclear Research(INER) has clarified that it will build a newlight water research reactor at Lungtan, nearTaipei. It will not convert the 40 MW (ther-mal) Canadian-supplied heavy water mod-erated reactor that was shut down after theU.S. alleged it was being used to developnuclear weapons. Taiwan has already de-commissioned and dismantled this reactor.The light water reactor will use low-enricheduranium (LEU) fuel and will run on lowpressure. The entire project is expected tocost $100 million. According to INER offi-cials, Taiwan is in no position to buildnuclear weapons. The military that was re-sponsible for the nuclear weapons drive dur-ing the 1960s and 1970s has been “kickedout” of INER. The military’s exclusion wasformally assured by an executive decree in1988, after it tried to pursue the plutoniumroute to nuclear weapons.

Mark Hibbs, Nuclear Fuel, 23 March 1998, pp. 7-8.

The Dutch cabinet has agreed that Urenco,the international consortium based inAlmelo, can supply two nuclear plants inTaiwan with LEU. Urenco’s members in-clude Germany, the United Kingdom, andthe Netherlands. Negotiations are still un-der way between Taipower and Urenco overthe exact conditions of the order. Urenco alsorecently signed a contract with a Chinesenuclear company. The economic and foreignministers of the Netherlands said in a letterthat the “transaction can only take place ifthere are sufficient guarantees that Taiwanwill abide by the provisions of the so-calledNon-Proliferation Treaty.” Since most coun-tries do not recognize Taiwan as a separatestate, Taiwan is not a member of the treaty.The Netherlands also does not recognizeTaiwan. Therefore, the transaction will beorchestrated through the United States and

the IAEA. The United States is prepared tomediate the Urenco order and regular inspec-tions will be carried out by the IAEA.

Rotterdam NRC Handelsblad; in FBIS-WEU-98-176, 25 June 1998.

MissileThe Chungshan Institute of Science andTechnology (CITS) has modified the Tien-Kung surface-to-air missile and will test itin an anti-ballistic missile mode in May1998. In January 1998, tests were completedfor the target missile to be used in the test.According to a Taiwanese defense official,the key to developing a successful anti-bal-listic missile defense lies in fielding severalearly warning radar installations with a rangeof about 1,000 km. The CITS has proposedthat Taiwan acquire such radar systems.Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense,however, has not yet approved the plan. TheCITS has also achieved a breakthrough inthe development of supersonic cruise mis-siles. It has succeeded in using the Hsiung-feng anti-ship missile as a test-bed tointegrate a ramjet engine with the rocket sec-tion of the missile. The development planhas been dubbed the “Chien-Tien Plan” andthe new missile is called Hsiung-Feng-3.Taiwan recently tested the missile. However,it is too long to be deployed on fighter air-craft and warships. Taiwan hopes that theHsiung Feng-3 will strengthen its defensesagainst China. The missile will be config-ured for aircraft launch. The CITS is alsopushing for the development of short-rangeair-to-air missiles. The missiles to replacethe Tien-Chien-1(Sky Sword) will becomeoperational by the year 2010.

AFP; in FBIS-CHI-98-095, 5 April 1998. TaipeiChung-Kuo Shih-Pao, 25 February 1998, p. 1; inFBIS-CHI-98-060, 1 April 1998.

EUROPE

BELARUS

NuclearThe “Law on Export Control,” adopted inFebruary 1998, is the new legal basis for

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export controls in Belarus. Developed incooperation with the United States and draw-ing on legislation adopted or pending in Po-land, the Czech Republic, Germany, theUnited States, and Russia, the law is de-signed to fully conform to international re-quirements. The law stipulates export controlobjectives, principles, general rules andregulations, objects, authorities, and prin-ciples of interagency coordination, and pro-vides for pre-license and post-shipmentend-use checks, as well as civil and crimi-nal penalties for violations. The legislationalso requires the president and the Councilof Ministers to adopt and publish lists of con-trolled items, which will be harmonized withinternational regimes. These lists are likelyto be similar to Russian lists adopted in 1996,and will establish those countries to whichexports of these items are prohibited. Thegovernment has also enacted an “Order onImproving Control Over Transfer of SpecificGoods (Technologies and Services) Acrossthe Customs Border,” which includes newregulations on licensing and end-use checks.

Press Release of the Embassy of the Republic ofBelarus to the United States of America, 26 Febru-ary 1998. Andrei Makavchik, The Monitor, Fall1997/Winter 1998, pp. 35-37.

MissileTogether with Russia, Ukraine, and Kaza-khstan, the Belarusian military is realizingseveral programs to develop and manufac-ture modern space rocket systems, air-de-fense and anti-missile defense systems,elements for high-accuracy weapons, andunique optical equipment. One of Belarus’major customers is Moldova, to which it re-cently exported ammunition and Grad mul-tiple launch rocket systems [NATOdesignation BM-21]. Belarus has also sentPeru several Tunguska 9M311 SAM sys-tems [NATO designation SA-19 ‘Grison’]and 9M313 SAM systems [NATO designa-tion ‘Gauntlet’], both of which are capableof targeting low- and medium-altitude air-craft.

Yuriy Strigelskiy, Belapan Military Review, No. 11,2-10 March 1998; in FBIS-UMA-98-069, 10 March1998.

CYPRUS

MissileOn 27 March, Italian Ambassador to CyprusFrancesco Bascone announced Italy’s deci-sion to suspend further deliveries of Aspidesurface-to-air (SAM) missiles to Cyprus.

I Simerini (Nicosia), 30 March 1998, p. 18; in FBIS-WEU-98-089, 30 March 1998.

On 7 April, Italian Deputy Foreign MinisterPierro Fassino denied reports that Italy hadimposed a weapons embargo on Cyprus. Hesaid implementation of the Aspide missileagreement was halted so the Italian govern-ment could examine whether delivering themissiles would contribute to further milita-rization of Cyprus. In response, Cyprus’Ministry of Defense initiated consultationswith Russia for purchase of medium-rangeSAMs in the event Italy does not deliverythe Aspides to the island.

Andhreas Skordhis, O Logos Television Network(Nicosia), 7 April 1998; in FBIS-WEU-98-097, 7April 1998. Makarios Dhrousiotis, Elevtherotipia(Nicosia), 7 April 1998, p. 1; in FBIS-WEU-98-097,7 April 1998.

An unidentified Russian diplomat said on11 June that Russia would postpone deliv-ery of its $436 million sale of S-300PMU-1SAMs to Cyprus until late October or No-vember 1998 for technical reasons.

Defense News, 15 June-21 June 1998, p. 2.

CZECH REPUBLIC

NuclearOn 28 April, the Czech Supreme Court in-creased the sentences of three people con-victed in September 1997 of smuggling 2.72kg of highly enriched uranium from Belarusinto the Czech Republic. The three were ap-prehended after the December 1994 seizureof the uranium in Prague. Former CzechArmy officer Zdenek Cech, who was previ-ously sentenced to 2.5 years by the PragueMunicipal Court for his role in the smug-gling case, had his sentence increased to nineyears. Cech had previously been released ontime served during the investigation and trialand will now presumably have to return toprison. Jiri Sindlauer, a Czech police offi-cial, had his sentence increased from 1.5 tothree years, and Jaroslav Wagner, a nuclear

physicist, had his sentence increased to nineyears from eight. The court ruled that theevidence in the case justified the convictionof the three and the lengthening of their sen-tences.

CTK (Prague), 28 April 1998.

GEORGIA

NuclearIn a secret operation code-named “AuburnEndeavor,” the United States and Britainhave collaborated to remove 8.8 pounds (4.0kg) of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and1.76 pounds (0.8 kg) of highly radioactivespent fuel from the research reactor at theInstitute of Physics in Mtskheta, in theformer Soviet republic of Georgia. The ura-nium and spent fuel will be transported tothe Dounreay nuclear complex in Scotland,where the spent fuel will be reprocessed andthe residual nuclear waste stored. The ura-nium was brought to the Mtskheta reactorduring the Soviet era. The operation involvesplacing the HEU fuel into special drums andpacking the highly radioactive spent fuel intoa 40-ton cask. The United States has senttransport planes from Europe to Georgiawith forklifts and other equipment to handlethe materials. Georgia will receive $125,000for the material, and the United States is ex-pected to pay approximately $2 million intransport costs. Although operation “AuburnEndeavor” does not involve Russian assis-tance, Washington has informed Moscow ofthe plan. According to one senior Clintonadministration official, “it [Auburn En-deavor] is a successful example of multilat-eral diplomacy to counter a proliferationthreat.”

Michael Gordon, New York Times, [Online] http://www.nytimes.com, 21 April 1998.

GERMANY

NuclearIn its final report, issued 23 June, a Germanparliamentary committee concluded thatthere is no reason to believe that the Ger-man security service staged an August 1994incident in which plutonium was smuggledon a commercial flight from Moscow andseized in a dramatic operation at the Munichairport. Following public outcry over the in-



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cident, opposition politicians in the Germanparliament had charged that BerndSchmidbauer, German Federal ChancellorHelmut Kohl’s intelligence coordinator, hadhimself provided the plutonium to the al-leged smugglers in order to boost Kohl’schances of winning the 1994 general elec-tion in Germany. Summarizing the resultsof its investigation, however, the commit-tee said “the accusation of ‘staging for po-litical reasons’ is not backed up byanything.” The committee concluded that theplan for selling the plutonium was probablyformulated by a man named “Fernandez,” aSpaniard now in jail, who refused to testifybefore the committee. The committee didconclude, however, that Munich authoritieshad known of the plan to smuggle the pluto-nium to Germany in advance, and insteadof attempting to secure the material in Mos-cow, had allowed it to be put on a commer-cial airline flight. Committee member MaxStandler said that “this kind of plutoniumtransport entailed a high risk of damage, andshould not be repeated.” Kohl testified be-fore the committee in November 1997 anddenied that either he or Schmidbauer knewdetails of the operation in advance.

Reuters, 23 June 1998.

I TALY

NuclearA sting operation conducted by Italian para-military police has led to the seizure of a 10kg uranium fuel rod and the arrest of 14people implicated in a Mafia nuclear weap-ons ring. The uranium fuel rod is 70 centi-meters long and contains 200 grams ofUranium-238 and 38 grams of Uranium-235,indicating an enrichment level of 20 percent.The rod was initially reported to have origi-nated from the Soviet Union, but the stampednumbering on the outside of the bar indi-cates that it was in fact produced in theUnited States. According to environmentalexperts investigating the incident, it is oneof nine uranium fuel rods produced by theU.S. company General Atomic in 1971 foruse in the Triga II research reactor inKinshasa, Zaire (now the Democratic Re-public of Congo). Following a lead they hadbeen given from an informant in a separateinvestigation, members of the Italian Finance

Police’s Central Investigating Service(SCICO) infiltrated a Mafia nuclear ring byposing as Italian businessmen representingan undisclosed Middle Eastern country.Members of the smuggling ring reportedlyoffered to sell components for eight nuclearmissiles to the undercover agents for 200billion lire. Instead, SCICO undercoveragents offered to pay 23 billion lire for a totalof nine uranium fuel rods, and the illicit dealwas finally struck between an undercoveragent and the uranium peddlers in a Romecafe in February 1998. Italian FinanceGuards then seized the uranium rod in awarehouse in Rome after an undercoveragent posing as a nuclear scientist tested theradioactivity of the rod. Among those ar-rested were four Sicilians with ties to theCatania Gang in eastern Sicily and sevenRomans with ties to the Magliana Gang, theRoman arm of the Cosa Nostra. Investiga-tors say that Salvatore Tringale, an affiliateof the Santapaola clan, masterminded theplan. Two members of the nuclear smug-gling ring were arrested as they were driv-ing to a bank in Switzerland to collect thearranged payment. Italian police are cur-rently searching for two additional suspectsand the remaining eight uranium fuel rods.The Cosa Nostra reportedly obtained theuranium fuel rods after the ouster of Presi-dent Mobutu from Zaire in May 1997, butinvestigators have yet to determine exactlyhow they were smuggled into Italy.

Bruce Johnston, Sunday Telegraph, [Online] http://www.telegraph.co.uk, 22 March 1998. Corrieredella Sera (Milan), 21 March 1998; in FBIS-WEU-98-080, 21 March 1998. Rai Uno Television Net-work (Rome), 20 March 1998; in FBIS-WEU-98-079, 20 March 1998. Rai Uno Television Network(Rome), 20 March 1998; in FBIS-WEU-98-079, 20March 1998. Ansa (Rome), 20 March 1998; in FBIS-WEU-98-079, 20 March 1998. La Republica(Rome), 21 March 1998; in FBIS-WEU-98-080, 21March 1998.

ROMANIA

NuclearOn 30 March, U.S. Secretary of DefenseWilliam Cohen and Romanian Defense Min-ister Constantin Ionescu signed an accorddesigned to stop the transport of chemical,biological, or nuclear arms and componentsfrom Romania to rogue nations or terroristgroups. Under the agreement, the United

States will provide equipment, expertise, andtraining to Romanian border control officialsto help detect any transit of weapons of massdestruction out of Romania. Ionescu assertedthat, despite published reports, there is noevidence of any attempt to sell or transfernuclear material or chemical and biologicalweapons through Romania. Romania doesnot possess any weapons of mass destruc-tion, but Ionescu expressed his confidencethat Romania can serve an important func-tion for nonproliferation in the region.Ionescu called the agreement “a very impor-tant step forward” and said that he hopedthe agreement might help Romania’s bid forNATO membership. This is the first agree-ment of its kind signed between the UnitedStates and an Eastern European country.

Central Europe Online, [Online] http://www.centraleurope.com, 31 March 1998. Disarma-ment Diplomacy, 1 April 1998, p. 53. RFE/RLNewsLine, [Online] http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1998, 1 April 1998. Defense News, 30 March 1998,p. 2.

RUSSIA

NuclearInterfax reported on 20 May 1998, that theRussian Federal Security Service (FSB) hasdistributed lists to several Russian govern-ment agencies of foreign companies “provedto be involved in military programs for de-veloping weapons of mass destruction(WMD) and their delivery vehicles”. Ac-cording to Interfax, the lists were suppliedto the Ministry of Atomic Energy, the Min-istry of Economics, the Ministry of Tradeand Industry, the Ministry of Science andTechnology, the Russian Space Agency, andseveral other agencies. According to the re-port, the list names several North Korean,Pakistani, Iranian, and Libyan companiesknown to be involved in military WMD de-velopment programs. The report did notspecify if any companies from other coun-tries are also included on the lists. Accord-ing to the press service of the FSB, Russiangovernment agencies were told that theyshould “refrain from export deals with thelisted foreign companies” if they involvedmaterials and technologies that could be usedfor the development of WMD and relateddelivery vehicles. The FSB noted that thelists were compiled and distributed in accor-

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dance with Russia’s national security doc-trine, approved by President Yeltsin on 17December 1997, which termed preventingWMD proliferation a key priority of nationalsecurity policy. Additional unspecified for-eign companies were added to the list on 28May, according to an FSB press release.Another FSB press release, issued on 11June, added to its list of foreign companiesengaged in military programs aimed at de-veloping WMD. The press release noted thatamong the companies added was Iran’sSanam Industries Group, which tried to ob-tain data “on the latest Russian developmentwork in missile, space, aviation, nuclear andlaser technologies and vigorously estab-lished contacts with people in the defenseindustry.” The press release noted thatSanam’s operations in Russia had been“closed down” by the FSB in January 1998.It also noted that training of Iranian studentsfrom Sanam at the Baltic Technical Univer-sity in St. Petersburg had been suspendedpending the outcome of an investigation into“whether the cooperation between the twoinstitutions can be continued.”

Interfax, 20 May 1998. Interfax, 28 May 1998.Interfax, 11 June 1998.

At a press conference on 16 June, GeneralEugene Habiger, commander of the U.S.Strategic Command, briefed reporters on atrip to Russia the previous week in whichhe visited five nuclear weapons storage sites.Habiger told journalists that he did not haveany “serious concerns” with security at thefive facilities and lauded the Russian mili-tary for the degree of openness shown dur-ing his visit. Habiger visited the SS-19 baseat Kozelsk (Kaluga Oblast), a nationalnuclear weapons storage depot in SaratovOblast, the strategic bomber base at Engels(Saratov Oblast), the SS-25 base in Irkutsk(Irkutsk Oblast), and a naval nuclear weap-ons storage site near Severomorsk(Murmansk Oblast). At each of the five sites,General Habiger was shown the safety andsecurity measures used by the Russian mili-tary at facilities with nuclear weapons. AtKozelsk, he was shown an operational SS-19 missile in its silo with its six nuclear war-heads. Habiger said that unlike U.S. ICBMs,which are guarded largely by technological

measures, the Russian military has twoarmed security guards assigned to each op-erational ICBM silo, in addition to the launchcontrol crew. General Habiger described thesecurity at Kozelsk as “impressive” and “ex-cellent.”

DOD News Briefing, General Eugene Habiger, Com-mander of U.S. Strategic Command, Tuesday, [Online]http://www.defenselink.mil, 16 June 1998. USIA PressRelease, [Online] http://usiahq.usis.usemb.se, 24 June1998.

MissileOn 7 April 1998, the Russian Federal Secu-rity Service (FSB) reported several cases inwhich it has successfully apprehended sus-pects attempting to smuggle restricted itemsfrom Russia. In Krasnoyarsk, a Russian triedto export several kilograms of ultra-fine zir-conium oxide powder, a dual-use item, tothe West. The FSB completed the investi-gation and the powder has been turned overto the courts. In St. Petersburg, investiga-tors blocked the export of a silicon carbidesample, also dual-use. In Tula, the FSB ap-prehended two Russian employees of a sci-entific research institute, who were tryingto conduct negotiations with a foreign com-pany to develop electronic devices for self-guided missiles. In Moscow, investigatorsexpelled Aziz Masud, a member of an Ira-nian military delegation, for trying to receiveaviation technology from a Russian citizen.The FSB public relations office stated thatthey recognize that proliferation of weap-ons and dual-use items, particularly toRussia’s neighbors, poses one of the great-est threats to Russian national security. InMarch 1998, the U.S. State Department is-sued a list of 20 Russian companies believedto have connections with the Iranian missileprogram. These companies now require spe-cial permission from the United States be-fore participating in any jointnonproliferation projects. The United Stateshas already denied funding for three entitieson the list due to proliferation concerns: theBaltic State Technical University in St. Pe-tersburg, Russia’s Central Aerodynamic In-stitute (TsAGI), and the Moscow AviationInstitute. In April 1998, U.S. Senator TrentLott scheduled a late May 1998 vote on abill to place sanctions on Russian compa-

nies cooperating with Iran’s missile pro-gram.

Howard Diamond, Arms Control Today, April 1998,p. 26. Gennadiy Charodeyev, Izvestiya, [Online]http://www.online.ru/rproducts/izvestiya-izvestiya-year/30-May-98/31.rhtml, 30 May 1998. GeorgianTimes, 7 May 1998, p. 5. Michael R. Gordon, withEric Schmitt, New York Times, 25 April 1998, p. 1.

Russia’s Raduga missile design bureau willuse the cash from China’s purchase of the3M-80 Moskit [NATO designation SS-N-22 ‘Sunburn’] supersonic anti-ship missilesto develop a next-generation hypersonicanti-ship weapon. According to the Russianpress, export clearance for the missile de-pended on Raduga using the sales revenueto develop the missile’s replacement.Raduga has displayed the experimentalrocket/ramjet GELA, which is part of thenew Mach 3-5 missile. In addition, the de-sign bureau has conducted a small numberof test launches, with mixed results, from aTu-95 Bear bomber. Altair is developing thenew missile’s guidance system. In additionto developing a next-generation weapon,Raduga’s chief designer, Igor Seleznev, saysthat his bureau is offering a range increasefor the Russian Navy’s 3M-80s. Themissile’s effectiveness can be increased 1.7times, Seleznev noted. The maximum rangeof a Moskit is 90 to 120 km, but with anupgrade this can be extended to 150 km, andthe addition of a ventral fuel tank can ex-tend the range to 200 km Seleznev said. Healso said that upgrading the Russian Navy’s3M-80s is cheaper than buying an equalnumber of new anti-ship missiles. Accord-ing to Seleznev, Raduga is fully equippedto overhaul the 3M-80s. Raduga is currentlyproducing the first batch of 50 Moskit mis-siles, which China will receive as part of itspurchase of two Sovremennyy-class destroy-ers (Project 956). The Progress plant atArsenev is producing the missile’s exportvariant, the 3M-80E. Although the RussianNavy first deployed the Moskit in 1982, noWestern country has succeeded in develop-ing a supersonic anti-ship missile with per-formance comparable to the 3M-80.Seleznev said that at a recent airshow inZhukovskiy, Moscow Oblast, security offic-ers prevented several attempts by foreign-ers to steal data on the alignment and



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functioning of the Moskit’s injectors.Raduga is also in the final stages of devel-opment of the Kh-101, a conventional pre-cision attack air-launched cruise missile.

Flight International, 29 April-5 May 1998. ITAR-TASS, 16 April 1998; in Inquisit, [Online] http://www.inquisit.com, 16 April 1998.

Russia has announced the development ofthe new advanced anti-missile and anti-air-craft system, the Antey-2500, on the inter-national arms market. In an attempt to attractbuyers, Russia invited military attaches from10 countries to the first official presentationof the new system. The system’s general de-signer, Veniamin Yefremov, conducted thepresentation before representatives fromChina and Persian Gulf countries. RussianPresident Boris Yeltsin has given authorityto Antey, the system’s producer, to “sellthem [abroad] directly.” The system is de-signed to combat all types of air attacks, in-cluding strategic bombers and ballisticmissiles from a range of 2,500 km (thesystem’s name refers to its range). Accord-ing to Yefremov, the defense system is theonly weapon in the world capable of fulfill-ing such a mission. The Antey-2500 system“can fire 48 missiles on 24 targets at once or16 ballistic vehicles with a low reflectivesurface.” The Russian newspaper Krasnayazvezda states that the reflective surface needbe only two centimeters in size for theAntey-2500 to track the ballistic target.Kommersant-daily reported that the Antey-2500 can fire at 24 targets, flying at a dis-tance of 40 to 200 km with an altitude 25 to30 km, and at a velocity of up to 4,500 metersper second. In addition, Kommersant-dailysaid the new system’s key feature is its full-sector view radar system, which can track atarget without losing sight of it, unlike a “cir-cular scan” system which can take nine to12 seconds to completely scan the battle re-gion and during that time can lose the tar-get. According to Yefremov, the Russianarmy has already been equipped with theAntey-2500. Yefremov said 30 countries inthe world possess ballistic missiles and onlythe Antey-2500 system is able to “ensurereliable protection” against them. He alsosaid that sales of the Antey-2500 will notjeopardize Russia’s national security be-cause the design bureau “has already devel-

oped systems that will leave today’s [sys-tems] several years behind.”

Kommersant-daily reported that the air-de-fense system was formerly named the S-300VM. However, Antey changed the nameto avoid confusion with the S-300PMU[NATO designation SA-10 ‘Grumble’],which is made by the Moscow financial-in-dustrial group Oboronitelnyye Sistemy (De-fensive Systems). The Antey-2500 ismodeled after the land-based S-300V sur-face-to-air missile (SAM), but represents thenext generation of SAMs. The system usesnew Antey 9M82M [NATO designation SA-12B ‘Giant’] and Antey 9M83M [NATOdesignation SA-12A ‘Gladiator’] missiles.One Antey-2500 battery can reportedly pro-tect an area of 1,000-2,500 square kilome-ters from different types of ballistic missiles,or a 125,000 square kilometer area from en-emy aircraft. Mounted on a mobile truckchassis, the SAMs require only five minutesfor battlefield deployment, and do not re-quire maintenance or servicing during their10-year service life. The complete system isfully automated and is suited for any climate.In addition, the Antey system can simulta-neously process (with active and passivecountermeasures) up to 200 targets locatedat a distance of up to 300 km and designateup to 70 targets for firing. Using its naviga-tion, orientation, and topographical systems,it automatically determines its position onthe battlefield. Moreover, its mobility greatlyenhances its survivability by hampering en-emy reconnaissance efforts. The Antey-2500system can also fire its missiles while thecommand center is up to 20 km away, mak-ing the system “practically invulnerable,”Krasnaya zvezda reported. The Krasnayazvezda report stated that the Antey-2500 issuperior to the U.S. PAC-3 Patriot air-de-fense system [which is still in development]in practically all respects. The [PAC-1] Pa-triot air-defense system shot down only 35of 98 Iraqi Scud missiles fired during thePersian Gulf War (36 percent). At govern-ment ballistic missile firing ranges, theAntey-2500 proved its effectiveness is “noless than 98 percent.” At one of the latestsuccessful tests, more than 50 Scud-typemissiles and two Tu-16-type aircraft wereshot down. Krasnaya zvezda also reportedthat as a sign of its “superiority,” the United

States has “acquired” an Antey-2500 sys-tem to study it.

Russian Public Television Network (Moscow), 27May 1998; in FBIS-UMA-98-147, 27 May 1998.Aleksandr Yegorov, Kommersant-daily, 27 May1998. Vladimir Dernovoy, Krasnaya zvezda, 28 May1998.

UKRAINE

NuclearAfter a visit by U.S. Secretary of StateMadeleine Albright on 6 March, Ukrainedecided to withdraw from the contract it hadwith Russia to supply turbines for theBushehr nuclear power station in Iran.Ukraine’s withdrawal will force Russia tomanufacture the turbines needed in Bushehr.Russia has responded to the news ofUkraine’s withdrawal by saying that it “willin no way influence the implementation onthe Russian-Iranian construction project” atBushehr. A spokesman for the RussianAtomic Energy Ministry said that it “willplace orders for equipment in other places.”He said that the turbines could be producedin Russia by a turbine plant in St. Peters-burg.

Russian Public Television First Channel Network(Moscow), 6 March 1998; in FBIS-SOV-98-0653/6/98, 6 March 1998.

Turboatom, the Ukrainian plant that wascontracted to supply Iran with turbines forits planned Bushehr nuclear power station,wants compensation for the loss it has suf-fered due to Ukraine’s withdrawal from theagreement to supply the turbines, saidTurboatom’s General Director AnatoliyBugayets. The plant’s overall losses totalabout $130 million, and its direct losses (theamount spent on the development of the tur-bine) total $5.1 million. Job losses mayamount to between 5,000 and 7,000 posi-tions.

Interfax (Moscow), 16 June 1998; in FBIS-SOV-98-167, 16 June 1998.

YUGOSLAVIA

MissileIn autumn 1997, Russia and Yugoslaviasigned an agreement on permanent militaryand technical cooperation which includedthe $150-million sale of the S-300 PMU-1(SA-10D) surface-to-air missile (SAM) sys-

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tem to Yugoslavia. Under the agreement,Russia will also provide Otomat coastal de-fense anti-ship missile systems to Yugosla-via and deliver spare parts for Yugoslavia’sOVO-KUB and NEVA SAMs. The UnitedStates and NATO reportedly sought to blockthe transaction, which was scheduled forcompletion in the first half of 1998.

Nik Kotej, Nedeljni Telegraf (Belgrade), 8April 1998, pp. 2-3; in FBIS-EEU-98-099, 9April 1998.

MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

EGYPT

NuclearIn June 1998, Egyptian President HosniMubarak told a delegation from the Israeligroup Peace Now that after the collapse ofthe Soviet Union, he had the opportunity topurchase “know-how and nuclear materialsthat would have given Egypt immediate pos-session of nuclear arms.” Mubarak said hedeclined the offer because “anyone who tookadvantage of the opportunity would be en-tering an insane, dangerous arms race.” Hesaid, however, that he believed that nuclearinformation and weapons from the SovietUnion were available to other Middle Eastcountries.

Uzi Benziman, Ha’aretz, [Online] http://www3.haaretz.co.il, 19 June 1998.

MissileIn 1996, Switzerland prevented sales of Scud mis-sile parts from North Korea and China to Egypt.According to Urs von Daeniken, a Swiss intelli-gence official, two shipments were seized in late1996 en route to Egypt via the Zurich airport. Itwas the first time the Swiss had discovered ille-gal missile shipments. Authorities re-examinedthe falsely labeled shipments due to the suspi-cious nature of the sending and receiving firms.The first shipment was sent from a North Ko-rean arms and missile supplier and distributor toan Egyptian company linked to the productionof chemical and biological weapons. The ship-ment was labeled as “bulldozer parts,” but actu-

ally contained Russian BM-21 rocket launchers.The Egyptian army also uses these launchers.Less than a week later, a second shipment wasintercepted travelling en route from China to anEgyptian military armored vehicle manufactur-ing firm. The shipment was labeled as “machineparts,” but actually contained parts for Scud-Bmissiles. According to Daeniken, the parts couldalso be used to make North Korean Scud-C mis-siles.

AFP, 7 April 1998.

IRAN

NuclearRussia’s deputy prime minister and co-chair-man of the Russian-Iranian inter-govern-mental trade and economic commission,Vladimir Bulgak, said that Russia and Iranhave a “mutual desire to develop further theirtrade and economic relations on a long-termand mutual basis.” Included in these ex-panded trade relations are plans to build ther-mal, hydro-electric, and nuclear powerstations and to construct nepheline [aramidfiber] and titanium plants in Kahnooje, Iran.Gennady Tarasov, the official spokesman forthe Russian Foreign Ministry, said that bothRussia and Iran are prepared to guaranteethat Russo-Iranian nuclear cooperation issolely for “peaceable, civilian purposes.” Hesaid that such cooperation “is transparent andready for any inspections.” Tarasov also saidthat Russia and Iran are not cooperating in“any areas which would defy internationalstandards.” He dismissed as “groundless” theallegation that Russia “at the state level orat some other level” was helping Iran pro-duce missiles or weapons of mass destruc-tion.

RIA-Novosti, [Online] http://www.ria-novosti.com,5 March 1998. Interfax (Moscow), 5 March 1998.

In addition to Russia’s $850 million dealwith Iran to build a 1,000 MW nuclear powerplant at Bushehr, Russia will also build twomore nuclear reactors in Iran. Announce-ment of the deal for the additional reactorswas made on 7 March by Georgy Kaurov, aspokesman for Russia’s atomic energy min-ister. Kaurov said Russia “agreed in prin-ciple” with Iran on the construction of twomore reactors at Bushehr. Construction is notexpected to begin for five years. This new

deal was not a signed contract, but rather averbal agreement. Vitaliy Nasonov, aspokesman for the Russian Atomic EnergyMinistry (Minatom) said, “Russia will notsign any new documents with Iran until ithas completed the contract to build thenuclear power station at Bushehr.” He saidRussia isn’t refusing to expand cooperationwith Iran entirely, just “not until the 21stcentury.” Russia and Iran initially signed acontract on 8 January 1995 for the first re-actor at Bushehr. Russia took over construc-tion of the reactor at Bushehr in February1998 due to delays by Iran. Kaurov said thatRussia plans to speed construction of thecurrent project and expects to finish the re-actor in two-and-a-half years. Next, con-struction would start on two new 640 MWpower reactors, “which are still being de-veloped.” The New York Times reported on7 March 1998 that an unnamed Americanofficial doubts Iran will have enough moneyto pay for the planned reactors. “Whetherthey can get the first one done is iffy, andthe chance of their completing the second,third, or fourth is highly unlikely.”

Washington Times, 7 March 1998, p. A69. ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 6 March 1998; in FBIS-TAC-98-065, 6 March 1998. Israel Internet News Service,[Online] http://www.iinsnews.com, 12 March 1998.Russia Today, [Online] http://www.russiatoday.com,6 March 1998. Michael R. Gordon, New York Times,7 March 1998, p. A3.

On 12 March, Russian Prime Minister ViktorChernomyrdin and U.S. Vice President AlGore said that a joint U.S. and Russian groupof experts will be created to monitor andaddress the export of sensitive nuclear andmissile technologies. This effort reflectsclaims made by the Clinton administrationthat the United States is progressing in itsefforts to persuade Moscow to stop the pro-liferation of Russian military technology toIran. Russia said that it would not engage innuclear cooperation with Iran other than theBushehr nuclear power plant, which is stillunder construction.

Jamestown Monitor, 13 March 1998.

The United States said on 13 March that ithad persuaded China to halt its deal to sellnuclear weapons-related materials to Iran.However, the United States has also learnedabout a potential deal between China and



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Iran for anhydrous hydrogen fluoride(AHF), “a chemical that can be used in en-riching uranium for nuclear weapons.” U.S.State Department spokesman James Rubinsaid that the chemical in question is not onany international nuclear control list. Chi-nese officials say that no such transactionhas been agreed to, nor does China have any“intention of making such a transaction.”Some U.S. officials believe that the ChinaNuclear Energy Corporation will not deliverthe chemical to Iran’s Nuclear ResearchCenter. Others believe, however, that Chinawill continue to supply Iran with nuclear as-sistance. Iran denied U.S. allegations thatChina had ended its nuclear cooperation withIran. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesmanMahmad Mohammadi said, “Iran’s nuclearprogram and cooperation with other coun-tries is entirely peaceful, in accordance withthe International Atomic Energy Agency”(IAEA). U.S. intelligence agencies an-nounced new evidence that China tried tosell nuclear material with weapons applica-tions to Iran within weeks of assuring theUnited States that it would terminate all suchassistance. According to senior Clinton ad-ministration officials requesting anonymity,the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corp. inBeijing was negotiating to sell anhydroushydrogen fluoride (AHF) to the IsfahanNuclear Research Center in Iran, a suspectedsite for Iran’s secret nuclear weapons pro-gram. AHF can be used to separate pluto-nium dioxide from spent nuclear fuel. It canalso be used to convert uranium ore into ura-nium hexafluoride gas. Uranium enrichmentfacilities enrich and convert uraniumhexafluoride gas into weapons-grade Ura-nium-235. Although China has cancelledplans to supply a uranium conversion facil-ity to Iran, U.S. officials believe that Iranmay have wanted to stockpile AHF in thehope that it would eventually be able to buildsuch a conversion facility. According toForeign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao,“...Chinese companies have not sold and donot have any intention to sell such chemi-cals.”

Inside China Today, [Online] http://www.insidechina.com, 16 March 1998. AFP, 15March 1998; in Infoseek News Channel, [Online]http://guide-p.infoseek.com, 16 March 1998. BartonGellman and John Pomfret, Washington Post,

[Online] http://www.washingtonpost.com, 13 March1998. AFP, 17 March 1998.

IAEA spokesman David Kyd announced on16 March that the “IAEA has not detectedany suspicious nuclear activities being car-ried out” in Iran that violate the NPT or anyother laws governing nonproliferation. TheIAEA team inspected the research center atEsfahan and the experimental reactor at theUniversity of Tehran four times in the lastyear. The two reactors under constructionat Bushehr were not inspected because noform of nuclear fuel has been transferredthere yet. Kyd also stressed that the “IAEA[has] never detected any sort of suspiciousactivity in Iran.”

IRNA (Tehran), 16 March 1998; in FBIS-NES-98-075, 16 March 1998.

Acting Russian Atomic Energy MinisterYevgeny Adamov announced on 6 April thatRussia proposed building a research reactorin Iran. The contract was first drafted in 1996and is now awaiting approval by both gov-ernments. Adamov said that the reactorwould use enriched uranium of 20 percentor less and would meet IAEA requirements.Adamov also said that Russia was planningon “stepping up the pace of construction” atthe Bushehr nuclear power plant. Russianofficials are considering finishing the projecton a “turnkey” contract basis. This will al-low Russia to raise the price of the reactorfrom $780 million to just over $1 billion.

Washington Post, 7 April 1998, p. 18. Monitor, 7April 1998. Novyye izvestiya, 17 March 1998, p. 5.

Israel has obtained documents confirming1992 reports “that Iran received enricheduranium and up to four nuclear warheadsfrom Kazakhstan, with help from the Rus-sian underworld.” Russia has maintainedthese documents since the early 1990s, whenIran received the nuclear warheads. U.S.congressional experts have verified the au-thenticity of the documents, but the docu-ments are being studied in Israel. The U.S.Task Force on Terrorism and Unconven-tional Warfare released its original report on20 January 1992. It stated that by late 1991,“there was a 98 percent certainty” that Iranalready had most or all of the necessary com-ponents required for two or three aerialnuclear bombs and nuclear warheads for sur-

face-to-surface missiles. These nuclearweapons were allegedly “made with partspurchased in the ex-Soviet Moslem repub-lic.” Shai Feldman, director of Tel AvivUniversity’s Jaffe Center for Strategic Stud-ies, dismissed the report, saying, “there wasno evidence of any warhead transfer.” U.S.and Israeli officials have been alarmed aboutthis report due to Russia’s continued assis-tance to Iran’s nuclear and non-conventionalprogram. The Jerusalem Post also obtainedan Iranian document from 26 December1991 in which the Iranian RevolutionaryGuard (IRG) told the Atomic EnergyAgency head, Reza Amrollahi, that “two warmaterial[s] of nuclear nature” had arrivedfrom Russia and were being held by the IRG.On 2 January 1992, a senior IRG official saidthat the nuclear warheads were being storedin the Lavizan military camp. A RussianAtomic Energy Ministry (Minatom) spokes-man responded to the Jerusalem Post article,calling it “nonsense.” He said that “allnuclear warheads in the former Soviet Unionwere accounted for and that it was incon-ceivable that any could have disappearedwithout the knowledge of the military.”Minatom official Gennady Tarasov said,“Russia has stated on many occasions that ithas never rendered Iran any assistance increating weapons of mass destruction.” Heclaimed that the Jerusalem Post article“should be viewed as one more link in thechain of unfounded and politically-moti-vated charges.” The U.S. Department ofDefense said that it has “no evidence what-soever” that Iran received the nuclear war-heads from Kazakhstan. Minatom officialGeorgy Kaurov said “all nuclear warheadsproduced in the former Soviet Union areindividually registered and numbered.”Kaurov also said that none have disappearedand that all warheads are “either kept in stor-age, or have been destroyed in accordancewith agreements on nuclear weapons reduc-tion.” State Department spokesman JamesRubin said that although the United Statesbelieves that Iran currently possesses nonuclear weapons, it believes Iran is seekinga nuclear weapons capability.

Jerusalem Post, [Online] http://www.jpost.com, 9April 1998. The Times, [Online] http://www.sunday-times.co.uk, 10 April 1998; Interfax, 10 April 1998.Washington Post, [Online] http://search.

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washingtonpost.com, 9 April 1998. Jerusalem Post,[Online] http:/www.jpost.co.il, 10 April 1998.Interfax, 13 April 1998. AFP, [Online] http://guide-p.infoseek.com, 15 April 1998.

Russia’s ambassador to Iran, KostantinShuvalov, visited the Bushehr nuclear powerplant in Iran on 12 April to inspect certainsections of the plant as well as the progressof the Russian specialists working on theplant. Shuvalov said that a completion datefor the reactor would be announced at anupcoming meeting in Russia by the head ofIran’s Atomic Energy Organization,Golamreza Agazadeh. Russian Atomic En-ergy Minister Yevgeni Adamov said on 13April 1998 that he “will try to persuade Presi-dent Boris Yeltsin to authorize the sale ofan experimental nuclear reactor to Iran.”Adamov said that the “experimental instal-lation” would be a research reactor usinguranium enriched to less than 20 percent.

AFP, 12 April 1998.

Two U.S. congressmen, Jim Saxton and BillMcCollum, say they have closely followedIran’s military programs and that Iran “hasobtained nuclear weapons as well as estab-lished a ballistic missile command-and-con-trol system to launch them.” They havecalled on the Clinton administration to forma new policy on Iran in light of its nuclearweapons capability. The congressmen’sstatements conflict with what the DefenseDepartment and State Department allegeabout Iran’s nuclear program. Saxton ischairman of the House Task Force on Ter-rorism and Unconventional Warfare, andMcCollum is a former member of the taskforce. Both say they have been receivingreliable information for years “that Iran hasbeen obtaining nuclear weapons parts andsupplies from the former Soviet republicsin Central Asia.” McCollum said that Iran’spolicy indicates that “it already has nuclearweapons and is now trying to acquire a de-livery system to launch them.” McCollumsupports his claims by citing the acquisitionof ballistic missiles and the establishmentand exercising of a distinct national-levelcommand-and-control system as examplesof Iran’s capabilities.

Jerusalem Post, [Online] http://www.jpost.com, 16April 1998.

Iranian Ambassador to Russia Mehdi Safarisaid, “Iran never intended to have nuclearweapons or any other weapon of mass de-struction.” He said that Iran is aware that Is-rael has a nuclear bomb, and that capabilityexplains why Iran has called on the UnitedNations to make the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Interfax (Moscow), 23 April 1998.

The Tehran Times reported that a delega-tion from Iran’s Atomic Energy Organiza-tion is scheduled to leave for Moscow on 12May. The delegation will discuss withRussia’s Minatom the “Bushehr nuclearpower plant and the continuation of nuclearcooperation.” The Tehran Times also re-ported that the Iranian delegation “was likelyto visit” Beijing in June 1998 to discuss“nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposeswith China.”


Russian Atomic Minister Yevgeni Adamovsaid that Russia would continue to aid Iranin completing its Bushehr nuclear powerplant despite U.S. opposition. Adamov alsosaid that U.S. efforts to block Russian-Ira-nian nuclear cooperation stem from an “eco-nomic rivalry.” He further added thatRussia’s nuclear assistance is in compliancewith the IAEA’s nuclear safeguards.

Tehran Times, [Online] http://www.netiran.com, 22June 1998.

MissileSenior U.S. officials announced that theUnited States has offered to help Russia ex-pand its foreign satellite program. In return,Russia will discontinue its missile technol-ogy sales to Iran. U.S. officials said, “if theRussians do crack down, Washington is will-ing to ease limits on Russia’s launching offoreign satellites.” The U.S. effort to dis-suade Russian institutes and companies ispotentially worth “hundreds of millions ofdollars to Russian companies and the West-ern companies that have formed partnershipswith them.”

New York Times, [Online] http://www.nytimes.com,9 March 1998.

According to an official at Taiwan’sChungshan Institute of Science and Tech-nology (CIST), Iran has expressed interestin the purchase of Taiwan’s Sky Sword-1surface-to-air missiles. Taiwan, however,has shied away from the sale for fear of jeop-ardizing its relationship with the UnitedStates.

Chung-Kuo Shih Pao, 9 March 1998; in FBIS-CHI-98-069, 10 March 1998.

Russian and diplomatic sources said thatRussia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) hasrecruited Russian scientists to teach their Ira-nian counterparts how to build missiles ca-pable of carrying “deadly payloads” as faras 1,200 miles. Russians and foreigners saidthat FSB officials hired the scientists at Rus-sian technological institutes and weaponsfactories. However, the scientists’ contractswere negotiated in Iran in order to absolvethe FSB and Russian government of respon-sibility. Russian officials said that Russiaplans to stop recruitment and curb permis-sion for the scientists to travel to Iran. A 16March article in the Russian newspaperNovaya gazeta described Russian assistanceto Iran’s ballistic missile program. All of thescientists and government officials inter-viewed in the article insisted on anonymity.The author suggested that in place of buy-ing hardware for Russia, “Iran is buying theknowledge of leading Russian experts on theproduction of the most modern weapons ofmass destruction.” The author gave an ex-ample of such assistance. After the collapseof the Soviet Union, former Soviet weap-ons experts who had previously worked atsecret government facilities moved to newjobs at universities. Because of their exten-sive knowledge of government secrets, theywere denied travel passports by the FSB.However, when the same professors wereinvited to visit Iran by Iranian graduate stu-dents studying in Russia, the FSB not onlyapproved their requests for travel passports,but also facilitated their travel arrangements.Upon arriving in Iran, the Russian scientistswere provided lavish accommodations andattended meetings in secret facilities nearTehran. In these meetings, Iranian missileengineers allegedly asked specific questionsabout ballistic missiles, in an attempt to learnmore about developing medium-range bal-



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listic missiles and eventually inter-continen-tal ballistic missiles. During their visit toIran, the Russian scientists met with formercolleagues now considered “top-class ex-perts” already working in Iran in fields suchas metallurgy, composite materials, androcket engines. At the end of their stay inIran, some scientists were offered a two-yearcontract to join their former colleagues withsalary of $1,000 per month, large by Rus-sian standards. The Politburo decided in1986 to send Russian missile experts to Iran,and they have been there since 1994. Rus-sian experts believe that Iran can shorten theprocess of producing large missile systemsfrom 15 to five years by buying advancedtechnology, since missile production and testfacilities are already in place. One Russianofficial interviewed in the article said that,“everything that can be sold should be sold,to anyone who will pay for it.” A Russianscientist said that there are “plenty of loop-holes in the law” to get around export re-strictions and that “no ban can restrainworld-class scientists who are being paidnear the minimum wage.”

Daniel Williams, Washington Post, [Online] http://www.washingtonpost.com, 23 March 1998. Wash-ington Times, 8 April 1998, p. 15.

A U.S. federal grand jury issued an indict-ment against Daniel Malloy, the owner andpresident of International Helicopter Inc.Malloy is suspected of shipping 20 batter-ies, needed to power Iran’s AIM-54 Phoe-nix air-to-air missiles, to Joseph BalakrishaMenon. Menon is the owner of Singapore-based Heli-World Aviation. The two menwere indicted under the U.S. Arms ControlExport Control Act. The act proscribes thesale of a number of defense items to coun-tries that support terrorism.

New York Times, [Online] http://www.nytimes.com,25 March 1998.

U.S. envoy Robert Gallucci met with Israelileaders to discuss Russia’s aid to Iran’s me-dium-range ballistic missile program. Israelisources said that Iran, “with massive aidfrom Russian advisers and companies,” isnear completion of the engine for theShahab-3 missile. The Shahab-3 is expectedto have a range of approximately 1,300 kmand a payload of 700 kg. The Clinton ad-

ministration does not support Israeli effortsin lobbying Congress to impose sanctionson Moscow. The Iranian Missile Prolifera-tion Sanctions Act, already passed in theHouse of Representatives, punishes Russiancompanies that provide missile technologyto Iran.

Jerusalem Post, [Online] http://www.jpost.com, 8April 1998.

Russian intelligence forces stopped three at-tempts by Iran in 1997 to acquire Russianballistic missile technology. The announce-ment was made by Vladimir Orlov, directorof the Russian Political Research Center,during a press conference on 13 April.

RFE/RL Newsline, [Online] http://www.rfel.org/newsline, 14 April 1998.

Israel’s Industry and Trade Minister, NatanSharansky, met with Russian Prime Minis-ter Sergey Kiriyenko in Moscow on 21 May1998. During their meeting, Sharansky em-phasized Israel’s demand that Russia ceaseall missile technology transfers to Iran andalso said that Israeli intelligence would beused to monitor the effectiveness of Russianmeasures to control such transfers to Iran.Kiriyenko said that Russia would not takeany action in the Middle East that would af-fect Israel’s security.

Ma’ariv (Tel Aviv), 22 May 1998; in FBIS-TAC-98-142, 22 May 1998.

According to Harvard University arms con-trol expert Graham Allison, Israel and theUnited States have improperly characterizedRussian ballistic missile technology trans-fers to Iran as a matter of deliberate Russianforeign policy. Allison believes that thetransfers are instead the product of a combi-nation of private Russian business interestsand corrupt government bureaucrats. Allisonbelieves that if it were Russian governmentpolicy to export weapons technology to Iran,complete missile and nuclear weapons sys-tems would be transferred rather than com-ponents. Vladimir Orlov, director of theCenter for Policy Studies in Russia, said thatthe effective implementation of Russian ex-port controls is highly dependent upon theeffectiveness of Russian customs officials.

Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv), [Online] http://www3.haaretz.co.il, 16 June 1998.

U.S. intelligence sources believe that Chinais continuing to cooperate with Iran in thedevelopment of ballistic missiles. Iran is try-ing to purchase telemetry equipment for mis-sile testing from China’s Great WallIndustries. Great Wall Industries is negoti-ating to sell an “entire telemetry infrastruc-ture” for Iran’s Shahab-3 and Shahab-4medium-range missile programs. Russia re-cently informed the United States that Chi-nese and North Korean officials were spottedin Iran for a missile test. China has been co-operating with Iran in the development ofthe 110-mile range NP-110. China has sup-plied missile parts such as rocket motors andtest equipment for the missile. Iran has alsosought x-ray equipment, which is necessaryfor detecting flaws in the missile casing andfor checking the status of the solid fuel inthe missile boosters. The U.S. Central Intel-ligence Agency (CIA) has acknowledgedthat although assistance in the developmentof short-range missile systems is not a vio-lation of the MTCR, it could eventually findapplications in the development of long-range missiles.

Bill Gertz, Washington Times, 16 June 1998, p. 1.

IRAQ

NuclearChief United Nations arms inspector Rich-ard Butler said that inspections of the eightpresidential sites in Iraq, to which SaddamHussein previously denied U.N. inspectorsaccess, started on 26 March. The first siteinspected was the Radwaniyah Palace; U.N.officials said the inspection “went verywell.” The inspection team, led by U.N. Spe-cial Commission (UNSCOM) deputy execu-tive chairman Charles Duelfer, will conductinspections over the next two weeks. Butlersaid that the information collected during thecurrent inspections will be used to determinewhether follow-up inspections will beneeded. Butler said that Iraqi officials havechanged their attitude since the last roundof talks, and that meetings are now “veryconstructive.”

USIA, 26 March 1998; in NNN News, 27 March1998.

United Nations arms inspectors have visitedsix of the eight formerly restricted presiden-

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tial sites in Iraq since 26 March. They saythey “have found no clues about Iraqi weap-ons of mass destruction so far.” CharlesDuelfer said that it was “hardly a surprise”when UNSCOM didn’t find anything. In-spections are scheduled for 2 April at theRepublican Palace compound and Al-Sijood, both in Baghdad.

CNN, [Online] http://www.cnn.com, 1 April 1998.

United Nations arms inspectors havesearched each of the 1,058 buildings desig-nated as part of the Iraqi presidential sitesand have found no evidence of weapons ofmass destruction. Iraqi Deputy Prime Min-ister Tariq Aziz said, “the visit has verifiedIraq’s credibility.” Chief U.N. arms inspec-tor Richard Butler said, however, that Iraqmust still provide more proof to back itsclaims that all of its nuclear, chemical, andbiological weapons have been destroyed.

New York Times, 4 April 1998, p. A4.

In a report by UNSCOM, JayanthaDhanapala (head of the diplomatic team) andCharles Duelfer discussed open-ended ac-cess to weapons sites. Both UNSCOM mem-bers said that access to key Iraqi sitesremains an unresolved problem for weap-ons inspectors. The problem of unfetteredaccess arose “in connection with a problemin defining the boundaries of the Presiden-tial palace at Radwaniyah.” Although the lastsix months of UNSCOM inspections en-hanced the inspection process, they have notproduced any hard evidence to supportUNSCOM’s claims about undeclared weap-ons. UNSCOM said that inspections mustcontinue until all outstanding questionsabout the weapon’s programs are answered.Executive chairman of UNSCOM RichardButler will submit a separate report to Sec-retary General Annan in late April 1998 thatreviews the entire six-month inspection pro-cess.

Indian Express, [Online] http://www.expressindia.com, 15 April 1998. New YorkTimes, 15 April 1998, p. A9.

Iraq has denied receiving nuclear weapondesigns from Pakistan. However, Iraq didadmit that an offer was made by a Greekperson to sell nuclear weapon designs that

he allegedly obtained from senior Pakistaninuclear scientist Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan.Iraq turned down the offer because it sus-pected that it was an “intelligence ploy.” AnIraqi spokesman for the Ministry of Cultureand Information said that the U.S. allega-tions were the result of a premature leak tothe press after the IAEA stated that Iraq nolonger had any prohibited nuclear relatedactivities.


Pakistani security sources said in early May1998 that shortly before the 1990-91 GulfWar, Iraqi officials made a series of clan-destine visits to Pakistan in an attempt to buynuclear technology. The Iraqi officials ap-proached Pakistani politicians and seniormilitary figures, but were not welcomed.They also approached senior figures inPakistan’s nuclear program who they hopedto bribe. The Iraqis kept these visits secretfrom Pakistani authorities. Documents givento the IAEA by General Hussein Kamel sug-gest that the Iraqis were told by intermedi-aries that individuals in Pakistan werewilling to sell nuclear technology. A noteon one of the documents described an offermade by an “unidentified go-between” whoallegedly “put Iraqi agents in touch with se-nior figures in Pakistan’s nuclear programwho were willing to help President SaddamHussein’s regime to manufacture a bomb.”Pakistani officials denied considering a dealwith Iraqi officials for nuclear technology.However, a retired intelligence officer saidthat Iraqi officials attempted to bribe nuclearscientists. A second Pakistani intelligenceofficer said he heard reports of “Iraqi agentstrying to build a procurement networkamong hard-line Islamic elements in thecountry.” He said that it was allegedly runout of the embassy. The IAEA is investigat-ing a 6 October 1990 memorandum that re-ports a proposal from Dr. Abdul QadeerKhan to help Iraq “manufacture a nuclearweapon.” The IAEA’s investigation is con-centrated on Section B.15 of Iraq’s intelli-gence service and Section S.15 of its nuclearweapons directorate. The document was in-cluded in the information turned over to theIAEA in 1995 when Saddam Hussein’s son-

in-law Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel defected.Iraqi officials confirmed the authenticity ofthe document in December 1997, but saidthey “rejected the offer because they fearedit was a ‘sting.” Pakistani officials called thematter an “act of fraud,” and Khan has de-nied any involvement. IAEA spokesmanDavid Kyd said that the IAEA is “pursuingleads” concerning individuals that couldhave been contacted in the pre-Gulf Warperiod regarding Iraq’s clandestine nuclearprogram. Kyd said that it was “speculation”to identify Khan directly with the memo.Some Western analysts are not surprised atthe allegations of Pakistani nuclear assis-tance to Iraq. They say that Pakistan has of-ten “dangled the nuclear carrot before Iraqand Iran to win financial aid and diplomaticbacking.” One unnamed source indicatedthat Pakistan may have passed classifiedblueprints related to the manufacturing ofuranium melting furnaces or autoclaves toIraq. Another unnamed proliferation expertsaid that in the 1990s Iraq switched fromrefining uranium through magnetic fields tothe gas turbine method. The expert said, “itis the A.Q. Khan method.”

Newsweek, 11 May 1998, p. 11. India Express,[Online] http://www.expressindia.com, 5 May 1998.Dawn, [Online] http://dawn.com, 6 May 1998. In-dian Express, [Online] http://www.expressindia.com, 6May 1998. Sunday Times, [Online] http://www.Sunday-times.co.uk, 10 May 1998.

MissileU.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan said on30 April that he “is satisfied that Iraq con-tinues to be fully committed to the memo-randum of understanding” and has no reasonto think Iraq intentionally restrictedUNSCOM inspectors. His comments cameafter reports on 28 April that searches ofcompounds did not entitle inspectors to anunlimited number of visits. Iraqi ForeignMinister Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf saidthat surveillance of the palaces could not goon indefinitely. Iraqi Deputy Prime Minis-ter Tariq Aziz said that since the memoran-dum took place, over 1,000 palaces andstructures have been inspected. He said thatthe right of access to these site was “an ab-solute right to be exercised without any re-gard” for special procedures. Aziz said that



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the inspections were for the purpose of re-futing U.S. and British assertions that Iraqmaintained weapons of mass destruction(WMD). However, Charles Duelfer,UNSCOM’s deputy chairman, said that theinspection were “to establish a database tobe used in subsequent inspections and long-term monitoring and verification.”

CNN, [Online] http://www.cnn.com, 1 May 1998.

UNSCOM Chairman Richard Butler re-ported to the U.N. Security Council on 6May that “Iraq has granted unrestricted andunconditional access to all those sites thatthe commission has wished to inspect, in-cluding sites designated by Iraq as sensitiveand presidential.” U.S. Ambassador BillRichardson said “we respect the view ofAmbassador Butler,” however Iraq “stillfailed to provide access to records requestedby the commission.”

USIS Washington File, [Online] http://www.fas.org,7 May 1998.

UNSCOM Chairman Richard Butler saidthat U.N. weapons inspectors are present-ing Iraq with new information on its armsprogram and will demand that Iraq surren-der the last of its illegal weapons. Butler said,“I now propose that we design a road map,we tell them the last remaining pieces weneed to give a full account of their missile,chemical, and biological weapons,” and withthis information, “I will then go to the U.N.’sSecurity Council in October and say it’sdone.”


I SRAEL

NuclearIn a March 1998 interview conducted in Is-rael by Denmark’s DR 2 television channel,former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peresdisclosed that Israel began developing a“nuclear option” in the 1950s. However,Peres did not confirm that Israel possessednuclear weapons. When asked whether Is-rael had ever thought about using its nuclearcapability, Peres answered, “No, not for war.For peace. Our nuclear potential is to deterwar so we can arrive to peace.”

Washington Times, 2 May 1998, p. A6.

Egyptian nuclear specialist Tariq el-Nimarproduced a report stating that Israel con-ducted nuclear testing in the Gulf of Eilat,with the most recent test occurring on 28May. El-Nimar’s report prompted KnessetMinister Abd el-Wahab Darawsha to send aformal request to Israeli Prime Minister Ben-jamin Netanyahu, asking whether Israel con-ducted nuclear tests. Deputy DefenseMinister Silvan Shalom called the charges“baseless,” noting that Israel has signed theComprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The IsraeliSeismological Institute (ISI) said it had notdetected any seismological evidence of sucha test. According to ISI chief Abbi Shapira,an earthquake detected in the area on 28 Mayhad its epicenter west of Alexandria, Egypt,and was triggered by natural seismologicalactivity. However, Israel Television Chan-nel 1 Network reported that a series of con-ventional explosive tests was conducted bythe Home Front Command in the Negevdesert from 17 May to 6 June. It said thatthe largest test, which occurred on 28 May,prompted the allegation that Israel had con-ducted a nuclear test.

Israel Wire, [Online] http://www.israelwire.com, 16June 1998. Xinhua, 18 June 1998; in CNN News,[Online] http://www.cnn.com, 18 June 1998. YisraelSegal and Amnon Abramovich, Israel TelevisionChannel 1 Network (Jerusalem), 19 June 1998; inFBIS-TAC-98-170, 19 June 1998.

MissileThe U.S. government rejected a contract betweena U.S. firm and Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI)that would enable IAI to launch the Shavit mis-sile from U.S. territory. The United States refusedthe contract because Israel is not a signatory tothe Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of NuclearWeapons, and due to concern that Israel couldexploit launching rights to improve the perfor-mance of its nuclear-armed Jericho medium-range ballistic missile. IAI officials are seekingto persuade the U.S. administration to reconsiderthe contract denial.

Amnon Barzilai and Yerah Tal, Ha’aretz, [Online]http://www3.haaretz.co.il, 10 March 1998.

U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen an-nounced that the United States would providefunds for a third Arrow-2 anti-missile defensebattery in Israel in response to “growing missile

proliferation” in the Middle East. The UnitedStates will contribute two-thirds of the estimated$1.6 billion cost of the system. The Arrow wasscheduled to become operational in 1998, butthat date has been postponed “until at least 1999.”

Barry Schweid, Washington Post, [Online] http://www.washingtonpost.com, 27 March 1998.

IAI and the U.S. firm Coleman Research Corpo-ration (CRC) have signed an agreement for co-production and sale of a satellite launch vehicle(SLV). The launcher will be based on IAI’s ShavitSLV and will be called the LK-1. It will be de-signed to carry a 500 kg payload into orbit. IAIand CRC plan to compete jointly for satellitelaunch contracts in the United States.

Arye Egozi, Yedi’ot Aharonot (Tel Aviv), p. 5, 12June 1998; in FBIS-NEC-98-132, 12 June 1998.

On 27 June, Israeli Defense Minister YitzhakMordechai approved a 10-year plan to con-tinue development and production of thejoint U.S.-Israeli Arrow-2 anti-missile sys-tem. Israel Air Force (IAF) CommanderMajor General Eitan Ben-Eliahu said the IAFis preparing to deploy the first Arrow-2 bat-tery, and that deployment of the second bat-tery is to be completed by the end of 1998.

Xinhua, 28 June 1998; in CNN News, [Online] http://www.cnn.com, 29 June 1998.

LIBYA

MissileAccording to a report in Germany’s Focusnews magazine, German businessmanWalter Ziegler provided Libya with elec-tronic components for its missile program.Ziegler is the manager of Globesat and wasarrested in April 1998 following a four-yearinvestigation of his activities.

ADN (Berlin), 28 June 1998; in FBIS-WEU-98-179,28 June 1998.

SOUTH AFRICA

NuclearOn 16 May, South Africa’s SABC televi-sion news reported that a container holdinga radioactive isotope had been stolen fromthe cargo section of Johannesburg Interna-tional Airport during the week of 4 May. Theisotope, which was en route to Brazil, had

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been produced at the Safari reactor atPelindaba and cannot be used to producenuclear weapons. South Africa’s AtomicEnergy Corporation (AEC) said, “it was notresponsible for nuclear material once it lefttheir plant.” According to the SABC, morethan 30 similar containers “have gone miss-ing” since May 1996.

SAPA, [Online] http://www.anc.org.za, 16 May1998.

TURKEY

MissileThe Turkish news agency Anatolia reportedon 15 June that the Turkish military searcheda Russian cargo ship believed heading forCyprus, seizing seven mobile missile rampssuspected to be components for the S-300surface-to-air missile system ordered byCyprus from Russia. The search found sevenmobile missile launching pads, which Egyptconfirmed that it had ordered from Ukraine.Turkish authorities allowed the ship to pro-ceed.

BBC News, [Online] http://news.bbc.co.uk, 15 June1998. International Herald Tribune, 17 June 1998,p. 5.

SOUTH AMERICA

BRAZIL

NuclearBrazil terminated a 1996 accord on peace-ful nuclear cooperation with India to expressits “profound consternation” at India’s ex-plosion of five nuclear weapons. PresidentFernando Henrique Cardoso said, “We arenot favorable to these atomic tests, whichare outside the parameters of the contempo-rary world.” Acting foreign ministerSebastiao do Rego Barros said that Brazilwould not impose economic sanctionsagainst India, however, because such actionsare alien to the Brazilian diplomatic tradi-tion. The decision is of symbolic conse-quence, because the bilateral cooperation

accord had not yet won congressional ap-proval.

Odail Figueiredo, Estado de Sao Paulo, [Online]http://www.estado.com.br, 19 June 1998. AntonioCarlos Pereira, Estado de Sao Paulo, [Online] http://www.estado.com.br, 19 June 1998.

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